

## *Hegel's Epistemological Realism: Corrigenda*

TEXT:

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- p. 14 §D Originally misprinted, the quotation reads in full:  
[I]n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow [those who make knowledge claims] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress *ad infinitum*. And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning. (*PH* 2:20; *cf.* 1:116–7)
- p. 59 §C Re: 2 quotations, add: It has become common to distinguish between “acceptance” and “belief,” whereby only belief but not acceptance affirms the truth of whatever is believed. Using this distinction to interpret Carnap’s statements, however, is entirely anachronistic; Carnap (1963a, 57; 1967, v) himself confirms that the passages quoted here do concern knowledge by acquaintance.
- p. 64 §G ¶1 (The answer to the internal question about whether any kind of entity exists is not so simple as here claimed. It is supposed to be a matter of empirical research to determine whether entities of any particular kind – specified by a linguistic framework – exist. The problem is that such empirical explorations presuppose the framework which specifies such an entity, whilst adopting that framework cannot, on Carnap’s account of such choices, make use of any empirical information about such entities, because such information would be framework-independent claims about the entities in question.)
- p. 98 ‘VII. Three Points of View’ should read ‘VI. Three points ...’
- p. 153 ¶1 Add: Twice in later works Hegel does say that the idea is rightly called a subject-object, but he insists on each occasion on the mediated character of this identity (*Enz.* §162, *WL* II [*Werke* 6] 466/*SL* 758).
- p. 156 ‘Freedom of Consciousness’ should read ‘Freedom of Self-Consciousness’ (in the Chart, under B.IVB)

NOTES:

- p. 219 n54 Add: Hegel does mention skepticism about the criterion of truth in passing (*ibid.*, p. 212 line 9).

- p. 245 n118 Following the quotation from Schlick, add: Schlick then rejects this coherence theory of truth (*ibid.*, 215) and relies on a version of “knowledge by acquaintance” for experiential “confirmations” which occasion the basic synthetic statements in terms of which alone we can ultimately formulate our knowledge. This is to accept the basic inference Will criticizes.
- p. 246 n121 Replace ‘Ayer’ with ‘Schlick’; replace ‘214’ with ‘213–15’.
- p. 251 n70 The volume containing Alston’s article, ‘A “Doxastic Practice” Approach to Epistemology’ (‘DPAE’), appeared in 1989; it appears on pp. 1–29; the reference is to p. 3. Further references to this published article are as follows:
- |                            |                     |                     |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| n71. DPAE p. 3             | n72. DPAE p. 18     | n79. DPAE p. 21     |
| n80. DPAE pp. 5–7          | n81. DPAE pp. 7–8   | n82. DPAE p. 12     |
| n83. DPAE pp. 12–14        | n84. DPAE p. 23     | n85. DPAE p. 30     |
| n86. DPAE pp. 17–18        | n87. DPAE p. 17     | n88. DPAE p. 16     |
| n89. DPAE pp. 18–19        | n90. DPAE pp. 19–20 | n91. DPAE pp. 13–14 |
| n92. <i>cf.</i> DPAE p. 25 | n97. DPAE p. 17     |                     |
- p. 261 n35 Add: *Cf. Skepticismus (op. cit.)*, p. 222.5–11.
- p. 265 n24 In: ‘This simple infinity, of the absolute concept ...’, read ‘or’ for ‘of’.
- p. 266 n31 Add: Compare Hegel’s remark that the methods of realism and idealism overlap one another (*VGP* III [*Werke* 13] 145/*LHP* III 164) and the following statement: “This idealism of recognizing the idea in the whole of nature is just as much [*zugleich*] realism, since the concept of the living individual is the idea as reality, even if the individuals only correspond to a moment of the concept” (*Enz.* §353z).

- INDEX:      Skepticism,    methodological, Hegel's, 134f.  
    substantive, 127  
          Van Cleave: '231' should read '221'.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Carnap, 1963a. 'Intellectual Autobiography'. In: Schilpp (1963), 3–83.  
 ———, *Logical Structure of the World*; original press: Weltkreis; date of publication of the translation: 1967; rpt.: Chicago: Open Court, 2003.

NOTE: A revised, second edition is planned. Comments, questions and criticism are welcome.

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