ISBN: 3-540-66028-3
TITLE: The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information
AUTHOR: Schwalbe, Ulrich
TOC:

1 Introduction  Information in Models of General Equilibrium 1
1.1 Information as a Commodity 4
1.2 Information as a Characteristic of an Agent 7
1.3 Organization of the Analysis 10
2 Survey of the Literature 13
2.1 The Information of the Agents 13
2.2 Commodities, Consumption Sets, and Initial Endowments 15
2.3 Preferences 16
2.4 The Impact of Information on Consumption Plans 18
2.5 Information of the Agents as Coalition Members 20
2.6 Feasible Allocations 23
2.7 The Blocking of an Allocation by a Coalition 26
2.8 Incentive Compatibility 28
2.9 Definitions of the Core 30
2.10 Existence of Core Allocations 34
2.11 Properties of Core Allocations 40
2.12 Replica Theorems and Large Economies 42
3 Exchange Economies 45
3.1 Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information 47
3.1.1 Agents and Their Information 47
3.1.2 Commodities, Agents, and Consumption Plans 48
3.1.3 Preferences 52
3.2 An Exchange Economy with Information Rule 54
3.2.1 Coalitions 54
3.2.2 Information Rules 55
3.2.3 Feasible Allocations 60
3.2.4 The Core of an Economy with Information Rule 65
3.3 The Game Generated by an Exchange Economy with Information Rule 69
3.4 Extensions: Incentives, Sequential Trade, and Learning 75
3.4.1 Incentive Compatibility 75
3.4.2 Sequential Trade and Learning 78
3.5 Conclusion 85
4 Production Economies 87
4.1 Coalition Production Economies with Asymmetric Information 89
4.1.1 Production Information Rules 89
4.1.2 The Technology Set of a Coalition 91
4.2 Feasible Allocations 93
4.2.1 Asymptotic Cones in Map(Omega,R^L)  P* 96
4.2.2 Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations 98
4.3 The Core of a Production Economy with Asymmetric Information 101
4.4 The Cooperative Game Generated by a Production Economy 104
4.5 Balanced Technologies and the Existence of Core Allocations 107
4.6 Costs of Coalition Formation 114
4.7 Summary and Discussion 121
Conclusion 125
List of Symbols 129
References 131
Index 137
END
