ISBN: 3-540-66955-8
TITLE: Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production
AUTHOR: Knigstein, Manfred
TOC:

An Overview 1
1. Profit Sharing in an Asymmetric Bargaining Game 5
1.1 Introduction 5
1.2 Ultimatum Bargaining with Advance Production 7
1.2.1 Description of the Game 7
1.2.2 Efficient Production 8
1.2.3 Game Theoretic Solution 9
1.2.4 Equity Theory and Multiple Equity Standards .10
1.3 Experimental Procedures 12
1.4 Description of the Decision Data 14
1.4.1 Production Choices and Acceptance Decisions 14
1.4.2 Demanded Shares of Return and Surplus 15
1.5 Aggregate Demand Behavior 19
1.5.1 Regression Model 19
1.5.2 Influence of Cost 22
1.5.3 Experience 23
1.5.4 Decision Preparation 24
1.5.5 Fixed Effects of Matching Groups 24
1.5.6 Summary of Regression Results 25
1.6 Individual Demand Behavior 25
1.6.1 Equity Types as Point Predictors or Area Theories 25
1.6.2 Hit Rates of Return Share Predictions 27
1.6.3 Hit Rates of Surplus Share Predictions 28
1.6.4 Comparison and Discussion of Results 30
1.7 Summary 31
2. Measuring TreatmentEffects in Experimental CrossSectional Time Series 33
2.1 Introduction 33
2.2 Experimental Data, Repeated Measurement and Strategic Interaction 34
2.3 Fixed Effects, Identifying Restrictions and Interpretation 36
2.4 Estimation Procedures 39
2.4.1 Restricted Leased Squares or Transformation of
OLS-Coefficients 39
2.4.2 Nested Effect Coding 41
2.5 Summary 42
3. Convergence to Equitable Play in the Repeated Ultimatum Game with Advance Production 45
3.1 Introduction 45
3.2 Repeated Bargaining with Advance Production .47
3.3 Theoretical Analysis 49
3.4 Experimental Procedures 51
3.5 Considerations of Experimental Design 51
3.6 Descriptive Statistics of Base Game Decisions 52
3.7 Explanatory Power of Single Predictors 57
3.7.1 Hit Rate Analysis 57
3.7.2 Hit Rates and Success Measures in RG1 .58
3.7.3 Hit Rates and Success Measures in RG2 .60
3.8 Joint Predictions and Convergence to Equitable Play 62
3.9 Summary 64
4. Equity Anchoring in Simple Bargaining Games with Production 67
4.1 Introduction 67
4.2 Bargaining with Advance Production 68
4.2.1 Game Rules 68
4.2.2 Game Theoretic Solution 70
4.2.3 Equitable Allocations 71
4.2.4 Some Properties of the Games and the Experimental Design 73
4.3 Experimental Procedures 74
4.4 Empirical Distributions of Production and Bargaining Decisions 75
4.5 Explaining Aggregate Behavior by a Single Equity Standard 78
4.6 Equity Anchoring and the Tactical Bargaining Margin 80
4.6.1 Theoretical Considerations 80
4.6.2 Hit Rate Analysis 82
4.6.3 Equitable Decisions and Equitable Vectors 84
4.6.4 A Further Look at Treatment Effects 87
4.7 Summary 88
5. Efficiency and Evolution of Social Preferences and Prosocial Behavior 91
5.1 Introduction 91
5.2 Ultimatum Bargaining with Subsequent Social Production 94
5.3 Game Theoretic Solution 96
5.3.1 Stage 3: Production 97
5.3.2 Stage 2: Acceptance or Rejection 99
5.3.3 Stage 1: Demand 99
5.3.4 Subgame Perfect Equilibria 100
5.3.5 Properties of the Game Theoretic Solution 103
5.4 The Indirect Evolutionary Game 107
5.4.1 Description of the Model and the Solution Concept107
5.4.2 Some Methodological Remarks 110
5.5 Solution of the Indirect Evolutionary Game 111
5.5.1 Preliminaries 111
5.5.2 Existence of Evolutionarily Stable Altruistic Preferences 115
5.5.3 Evolutionary Results for All Technologies within the Unit Square 120 
5.5.4 Properties of the Evolutionary Results 121
5.6 Summary 125
A. Experimental Instructions Chapter 1 129
B. Experimental Instructions Chapter 3 143
C. Experimental Instructions Chapter 4 157
D. Mathematical Supplement To Chapter 5 173
D.1 Properties of the functions DeltaS_1, DeltaU^1_1 and DeltaU^2_1 173
D.2 Mutations beta < alpha are Non-Improving if Candidate alpha Supports Efficiency 175
D.3 Technology 2.a 176
D.4 Technology 2.b 179
D.5 Technology 2.c.1 182
D.6 Technology 2.c.2 186
D.7 Technology 2.d 189
References 193
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