ISBN: 354043352X
TITLE: Voting Procedures under Uncertainty
AUTHOR: Nurmi
TOC:

1. Choice Theory and Constitutional Design 1
1.1 Theories and Models 2
1.2 Applying Social Choice Theory 4
1.3 Varying Assumptions 8
2. Chaotic Behavior of Models 13
2.1 The U.S. Presidential Elections 13
2.2 Referendum Paradox and the Properties of Majority Rule 16
2.3 How Chaotic Can It Get? 22
3. Results Based on Standard Model 29
3.1 Voting Procedures 29
3.2 Performance Criteria 35
3.3 Chaos, Strategy and Self Correction 37
4. Aggregating Voting Probabilities and Judgments 45
4.1 Avoiding Arrow's Theorem via Average Rule 45
4.2 Condorcet's Jury Theorem 49
4.3 Relaxing the Independence Assumption 53
4.4 Optimal Jury Decision Making 56
4.5 Thought Experiment: Council of Ministers as a Jury 59
5. Condorcet's Rule and Preference Proximity 65
5.1 Condorcet's Rule 65
5.2 Measuring Preference Similarity 71
5.3 Preference Proximity and Other Desiderata 75
5.4 Ranking and Choice Rules 79
5.5 Kemeny, Dodgson and Slater 83
6. Responses to Changes in Voter Opinions 91
6.1 Monotonicity, Maskin-Monotonicity and No-Show Paradox 92
6.2 The Strong No-Show Paradox 96
6.3 Qualified Majorities and No-Show Paradox 98
6.4 Monotonicity Violations of Voting Systems 100
6.5 Preference Truncation Paradox 105
6.6 Preference Misrepresentation 110
7. Mos Docendi Geometricus 117
7.1 The British Parliamentary Elections of 2001 117
7.2 Critique of Condorcet's Intuition 123
7.3 Profile Decomposition 126
7.4 Berlin vs. Bonn Vote Revisited 132
8. Conclusions 135
List of Figures 139
List of Tables 141
Bibliography 143
Author Index 149
Subject Index 153
END
