ISBN: 3540438971
TITLE: Markets, Games, and Organizations
AUTHOR: Jchiishi, Marschak
TOC:

Introduction 1
On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy
Rabi N. Bhattacharya, Mukul Majumdar 7
Uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu and Arrow-Radner equilibrium when utilities are additively separable
Rose-Anne Dana 29
Entry, productivity, and investment
Kenneth J. Arrow 49
A model of Russia's "virtual economy"
Richard E. Ericson, Barry W. Ickes 59
Reaction to price changes and aspiration level adjustments
Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler 89
Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives
Peter B. Linhart 99
Investment and concern for relative position
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite 115
Coordination of economic activity: An example
Stanley Reiter 137
Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching
Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter 163
Roy Radner and incentive theory
Eric S. Maskin 179
Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
Steven R. Williams 193
Majority rule with dollar voting
James S. Jordan 211
Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution
Charles A. Wilson 221
Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment
Jess Benhabib, Aldo Rustichini, Andrs Velasco 239
Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric?
Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui 265
Trust and social efficiencies
Robert W. Rosenthal 281
Survival and the art of profit maximization
Prajit K. Dutta, Rangarajan K. Sundaram 297
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