ISBN: 3790800309
TITLE: On global aging
AUTHOR: Kune et al.
TOC:

Chapter 1 - Introduction 1
Chapter 2 - Strategic delegation in firms competing under incomplete information 7
2.1 Strategic competition and the firm's organisational design 7
2.2 A model of strategic delegation in duopoly with incomplete
information 10
2.3 Equilibrium output and effort provision with strategic delegation 17
2.4 The effort provision under alternative settings 22
2.4.1 No moral hazard 22
2.4.2 Unobservable contracts and non-strategic delegation 23
2.4.3 No delegation 24
2.4.4 Product market competition and agency costs 27
2.5 The case of linear demand 28
2.6 Conclusions 34
Appendix 2.1. Proofs of Proposition 2.3 and of Lemma 2.6 35
Chapter 3 - Delegation contracts observability and collusion 41
3.1 Introduction 41
3.2 Observability in delegation games 43
3.3 The benchmark model 44
3.4 Non-renegotiable contracts 47
3.5 One round of renegotiation 49
3.6 Delayed observability and renegotiation costs 56
3.7 Conclusions 62
Appendix 3.1 - Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and of Corollary 3.7 63
Appendix 3.2 - The computation of a collusive equilibrium 66
Chapter 4 - Strategic delegation in the trade union 69
4.1 Introduction 69
4.2 The nature of the trade union: co-ordination costs and the delegation of authority 70
4.3 A model of bargaining with threats 72
4.4 Direct bargaining 76
4.5 Strategically delegated bargaining 80
4.6 Conclusions 86
Chapter 5 - Competition for delegates and the evolution of market structure 89
5.1 New managers, technological innovation and industry evolution 89
5.2 A model of dynamic competition for managers 92
5.3 Catching-Up 95
5.4 Increasing Dominance 102
5.5 Market structure and returns to managers 105
5.5.1 Constant returns 107
5.5.2 Increasing returns 109
5.5.3 Decreasing returns 110
5.6 Market size and product differentiation with DRM 111
5.6.1 Gross incentives 111
5.6.2 Managers' prices 112
5.6.3 Simulations 116
5.7 Some welfare implications 120
5.8 Conclusions 125
Appendix 5.1 - Programs for the simulations 126
Chapter 6 - Conclusions 133
References 137
Declaration 143
List of figures 145
List of tables 147
END
