

INDEX

- Alexander, Peter, 32, 37, 193, 199
 Alston, William, 75, 76, 83, 86, 109, 136, 183, 193
 Atherton, Margaret, 70, 81, 193, 194
 Ayers, Michael, 28, 32, 40, 70, 81, 85, 94, 98, 99, 141, 164, 194, 197
 Benardete, José, ix, 28, 29, 194
 Bennett, Jonathan, ix, x, 62, 67, 68, 70, 75, 76, 83, 86, 90, 102, 109, 117, 136, 163, 164, 165, 167, 170, 193, 194, 198
 Bolton, Martha, 65, 70, 75, 108, 194
 Boyle, Robert, 84, 85, 86, 193, 195
 Broad, C. D., 70, 71–73, 94, 195
 Cartwright, Richard, 148, 195
 Chappell, Vere, 70, 83, 89, 91, 97, 110, 111, 135, 142, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 203
 Chisholm, Roderick, 149, 151, 152, 156, 195, 203
 Counterpart theory, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190
 Edwards, Jonathan, 152, 153, 154, 196, 201
 Fales, Evan, 37, 196
 Four-dimensionalism
 and David Lewis, 148
 and Hume, 150–52
 and Jonathan Edwards, 152–54
 and Kant, 160
 and Locke's principle of individuation, 95
 and Mark Heller, 148
 and McTaggart, 155
 and modern physics, 148
 and Newton, 160
 and Quine, 148
 and Richard Cartwright, 148
 and Roderick Chisholm, 155
 and the isomorphism between space and time, 155–60
 incompatible with
 corpuscularianism, 162
 Geach, Peter, 83, 89, 90, 94, 149, 176, 177, 196, 197
 Heller, Mark, 93, 136, 148, 149, 152, 155, 156, 197
 Hume, David, 57–62, 150–54, 169, 194, 196, 198, 200, 201, 202
 Identity
 absolute conception of, 15, 89, 178
 and cross-temporal unity, 106, 110, 124, 176, 178, 182
 and persistence, 20
 numerical vs. qualitative, 12
 relativistic conception of, 14–20, 83–92, 96
 incompatible with Locke's principle of individuation, 91–93
 statements of

- diachronic, 12, 13
- synchronic, 12, 57–61
- trans-world, 185
- topic-neutral conception of, 16–17, 76
- vs. synchronic unity, 57–61
- Jubian, Michael, 14, 198
- Kant, Immanuel, 128, 160, 198
- Kinds, species
 - corpuscularian conception of real species, 38–40
 - Locke's anti-realist conception of, 33–36
 - Locke's rejection of real species
 - at odds with his realism concerning individuals, 12, 53–54, 92–99
 - empirical/biological considerations, 44–47
 - epistemological considerations, 41
 - semantic considerations, 42–43
 - realism vs. anti-realism concerning, 11–12, 36–37
 - scholastic/Aristotelian conception of, 38
- Leibniz, G. W., 33, 45, 67, 163, 164, 196, 198, 200, 202
- Lewis, David, 95, 107, 136, 138, 148, 171, 172, 185, 186, 189, 190, 198
- Mackie, J. L., 37, 70, 76, 83, 108, 109, 199
- Mattern, Ruth, 37, 194, 199
- McCann, Edwin, 55, 70, 81, 96, 97, 108, 122, 199
- McTaggart, John, 155, 156, 172, 195, 197, 200
- Newton, Isaac, 24, 145, 147, 154, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 191, 197, 200, 201, 202
- Odegard, Douglas, 83, 200
- Persistence, persistence
 - conditions
 - absolute vs. relative endurance conditions, 24, 96, 175
 - and essential properties, 20
 - and identity, 20
 - endurance vs. perdurance conditions, 22, 95
 - relative to sortal concepts, 14, 75–81, 92, 190
 - three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism, 21, 93–95
 - and change, motion, 93–94, 170–73
- Personal identity
 - and moral responsibility, 114–16
 - and the nature of thinking substances, 116–23
- Locke's refutation of the immaterial substance theory, 123–26
- reductive vs. nonreductive theories of, 14
- role of consciousness, 81
 - analogy with life, 81, 114
 - as effecting cross-temporal unity, 126–33
 - consciousness not identical with memory, 120
- Properties
 - accidental vs. essential, 8
 - and possible worlds, 9–10, 184–90
 - both accidental and essential properties relative to sort, 29, 30
 - de re* essential properties, 1, 11, 24, 29, 52, 96, 97, 175, 182, 191

- essential properties relative to
sort, 10, 23, 25, 26–27, 30,
52, 98
- Putnam, Hilary, 182, 201
- Quine, W.V.O., 29, 94, 97, 148,
149, 150, 156, 172, 176, 177,
201
- Real essence
 - as corpuscularian
 - microstructure, 27, 30
 - corpuscularian real essences
 - unknowable, 35, 41, 43
 - of unsorted particulars, 27, 33
 - relative to sort, 30–32, 33
 - scholastic/Aristotelian
 - conception of, 37–38
- Realism/anti-realism
 - concerning individuals, 2, 7,
12, 22, 25, 53–54, 92–99,
180, 183
 - concerning kinds, 11, 12, 22,
25, 53–54, 92–99, 180
 - concerning ontologies, 6
- Reid, Thomas, 14, 120, 152, 201,
203
- Rogers, G. A. J., 167, 193, 199,
200, 201
- Stein, Howard, 159, 160, 164,
165, 166, 167, 201, 202
- Taylor, Richard, 94, 156, 202
- Uzgalis, William, 19, 29, 37, 81,
83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 109,
110, 202
- van Inwagen, Peter, 93, 105, 107,
149, 170, 184, 185, 186, 187,
188, 189, 190, 193, 202
- Wedeking, Gary, 57, 58, 63, 64,
70, 83, 84, 88, 91, 202
- Wiggins, David, 83, 94, 141, 203
- Winkler, Kenneth, 97, 98, 110,
203
- Woolhouse, Roger, 37, 164, 165,
203
- Zemach, Eddy, 2–8, 21, 203



<http://www.springer.com/978-1-4020-1670-7>

Locke on Essence and Identity

Conn, C.H.

2003, X, 212 p., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-1-4020-1670-7