ISBN: 3790800988
TITLE: Contributions to Management Science, Dynamic Alliance Auctions
AUTHOR: Ihde
TOC:

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation 1
1.2 Environment and Aim of the Thesis 2
1.3 Contribution of the Thesis 2
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 3
Part I Background
2 Theories 7
2.1 Axiomatic Models of Bargaining 7
2.1.1 The Basic Model 7
2.1.2 Literature on 2-Person Bargaining 8
2.1.3 Solution Concepts 8
2.1.4 A Note on the Strategic Approach to Bargaining 13
2.2 Auctions 14
2.2.1 Terminology 15
2.2.2 Literature on Auctions 17
2.2.3 Solution Concepts 17
2.2.4 Theoretical Models 18
2.2.5 Revenue, Efficiency, and Collusion in Private Value Auctions 20
2.2.6 Combinatorial Auctions 23
2.3 The Marriage Problem 25
2.3.1 Stability 25
2.3.2 Matching Procedures or Who-Proposes-to-Whom 26
2.3.3 Reporting Preferences 27
3 Internet-Based Freight Marketplaces 29
3.1 A Classification Scheme 29
3.1.1 Participants 30
3.1.2 Traded Goods 31
3.1.3 Trade 32
3.2 A Critical Analysis 36
3.2.1 The Blackboard Teleroute 37
3.2.2 The Auction House Benelog 39
3.2.3 The Exchange Eulox 43
3.2.4 Conclusion 46
Part II Freight Auctions
4 Conventional Freight Auctions 51
4.1 Markets Considered 51
4.2 Empty Lanes 52
4.2.1 Standard Auctions & Cost Calculation 53
4.2.2 Combinatorial Auctions - No Solution to Spot Markets 55
4.3 Packagewize Placements 56
4.3.1 Imbalanced Flows of Goods 56
4.3.2 Monotony, Pareto-Optimality, and Reserve Prices 57
4.4 Conclusion 59
5 Dynamic Alliance Auctions 61
5.1 Stages of an Appropriate Mechanism 61
5.2 How Dynamic Alliance Auctions Work 63
5.2.1 The Basic Procedure 63
5.2.2 General Notation and Terms 64
5.2.3 The Rules of Dynamic Alliance Auctions 65
5.2.4 An Illustrative Example 66
Part III Evaluation
6 Stages and Price Division 71
6.1 A Trade-off for Shippers 71
6.2 Collection Stage 72
6.3 Aggregation Stage 73
6.4 Placement Stage 77
6.5 Division of the Package Price 79
6.5.1 Axioms Satisfied 80
6.5.2 Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky 81
6.5.3 An Appropriate Weight 83
6.6 Summary 84
7 Efficiency, Payoff, and Bids 87
7.1 Why Investigate Efficiency, Payoff, and Bids 87
7.2 Paul 91
7.3 Polar Cases 91
7.3.1 Perfectly Balanced Flows 92
7.3.2 Perfectly Imbalanced Flows 95
7.4 Expected Payoff 95
7.4.1 If |SI| and |S'|) Are Common Knowledge 96
7.4.2 If Only the Total Number of Bidders is Common Knowledge 97
7.4.3 If the Number of Bidders is Unknown 97
7.4.4 Maximizing Payoff 97
7.5 Polar Case Equilibria and Intuitive Bidding Strategies 98
7.5.1 Breakdown of the Polar Case Equilibria 98
7.5.2 Intuition & Ad-hoc Strategies 100
7.6 Summary 103
8 Experiment 105
8.1 Experimental Design 106
8.1.1 Procedure 106
8.1.2 Information 107
8.1.3 General Remarks 108
8.2 Experimental Results 109
8.2.1 Average Payoffs and Revenue Efficiency 109
8.2.2 Bid-to-Value Ratios 113
8.2.3 Bids in T1 and T2: Intuition Revisited 118
8.2.4 Summary 121
9 Putting Insights to Practice 123
A Proofs 129
B Formulas 133
B.1 Expected Payoff 133
C Experiment 135
C.1 Translated Instructions 135
List of Figures 141
List of Tables 143
References 145
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