

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note on the Author

Preface

Chapter 1 - Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory

1.1. Introduction

- 1.1.1. The Purpose, Method, and Materials of This Volume
- 1.1.2. Legal Doctrine and Legal Dogmatics
- 1.1.3. Particular and General Doctrine
- 1.1.4. Justification, Description, Explanation
- 1.1.5. Influence of Legal Doctrine
- 1.1.6. Kinds of Legal Research

1.2. General Legal Doctrine

- 1.2.1. General Legal Doctrine and Normative Legal Theory
- 1.2.2. Defeasible Norms of General Legal Doctrine

1.3. The Sources of Law

- 1.3.1. Causal Factors, Legal Justification, and Sources of Law
- 1.3.2. Classification of the Sources of Law
- 1.3.3. Legal Doctrine as a Source of Law

1.4. Statutory Interpretation

- 1.4.1. Types of Argument in Statutory Interpretation
- 1.4.2. Systemic Arguments
- 1.4.3. Restricting and Extending a Norm's Area of Application
- 1.4.4. Analogy
- 1.4.5. Teleological Construction of Statutes

1.5. Interpreting Precedents

- 1.5.1. What Is Binding in a Precedent?
- 1.5.2. The Binding Force of Precedent
- 1.5.3. Justification of Precedent

1.6. The Doctrine of Fact-Finding

Chapter 2 - Particular Legal Doctrine

2.1. Preliminary Remarks

- 2.1.1. Juristic Theories
- 2.1.2. The Distinction between Public and Private Law
- 2.1.3. Inner and Outer System in Private Law
- 2.1.4. Principles of Private Law

2.2. Philosophical and Juristic Theories of Property

- 2.2.1. Philosophical Theories of Property
- 2.2.2. Juristic Theories—Transfer of the Right of Ownership
- 2.2.3. Benson's Formalistic Analysis of Property
- 2.2.4. Philosophy as a Tool of the Doctrine of Property

2.3. Juristic Theories in Contracts

- 2.3.1. What Justice? What Freedom?
- 2.3.2. The Binding Force of Contracts
- 2.3.3. Moral Philosophy, Economics, Legal Research
- 2.3.4. Good Faith
- 2.3.5. The Theory of Assumptions

2.4. Juristic Theories in Torts

- 2.4.1. Philosophical Theories of Justification in Tort Law

- 2.4.2. Ernest Weinrib's Theory of Corrective Justice in Torts
- 2.4.3. The *Pro Tanto* Locality of Corrective Justice in Torts
- 2.4.4. Three Intellectual Moves of Legal Doctrine
- 2.4.5. Theories of Negligence
- 2.4.6. Theories on Adequacy in Torts
- 2.5. Some Theories of Criminal Law
 - 2.5.1 Philosophical Justification of Punishment
 - 2.5.2. Some Juristic Questions
 - 2.5.3. *Dolus* Crimes and *Culpa* Crimes
 - 2.5.4. Causation in Criminal Law
- 2.6. Law and Economics as the Main Juristic Theory?

Chapter 3 - Criticism and Defence of Legal Doctrine

- 3.1. Criticism
 - 3.1.1. Reform Movements and the Alleged Deficiencies Of Legal Doctrine
 - 3.1.2. The Alleged Irrationality of All Normative Theories
 - 3.1.3. Indeterminacy and Façade Legitimation
 - 3.1.4. Ontological Obscurity
 - 3.1.5. Unjustified Normative Claims
 - 3.1.6. The Risk of Fragmentation
 - 3.1.7. Unscientific Character
 - 3.1.8. Philosophical Background of the Criticism
- 3.2. Defence of Legal Doctrine
 - 3.2.1. The Copernican Turn: Philosophy Tailored to Legal Doctrine
 - 3.2.2. Saying and Doing in Legal Doctrine
 - 3.2.3. The Philosophical Background of Anti-Critique
 - 3.2.4. Contextually Sufficient Justification and Preference for Weak Theories

Chapter 4 - Law and Morality

- 4.1. Links between Morality and Law
- 4.2. Natural Law
 - 4.2.1. Strong Natural Law
 - 4.2.2. A Recent Development: Weak Theories of National Law
 - 4.2.3. The Claim to Correctness
- 4.3. Exclusive Legal Positivism
 - 4.3.1 Exclusive Legal Positivism—The Normative-Meaning Component
 - 4.3.2. Defeasible *Grundnorm*, Conditional *Grundnorm*, and Transformation into Law
 - 4.3.1 Positivist and Non-Positivist Criteria of Valid Law
 - 4.3.4. Progressing Sophistication
 - 4.3.5. Political Legitimacy instead of Philosophical Justification
- 4.4. Inclusive Positivism and Propositions *de Lege Lata*
 - 4.4.1. Legal Positivism Inherent in Legal Doctrine?
 - 4.4.2. Inclusive Legal Positivism and Tuori's Critical Legal

- Positivism
- 4.4.3. Criteria of Validity and Hypothetical Imperatives
- 4.4.4. The Fused Descriptive and Normative Modality of Propositions *de Lege Lata*
- 4.5. The Justification of Morality
 - 4.5.1. Positivism, Natural Law, and Moral Theory
 - 4.5.2. The Controversialism of Strong Moral Theories
 - 4.5.3. Strong Contractarianism
 - 4.5.4. Weak Contractarianism
 - 4.5.5. Society-Centred Moral Normativity
- 4.6. Pluralism and Common Ground in the Law
 - 4.6.1. The One-Right-Answer Ideal and Moral Relativism
 - 4.6.2. Plurality of Cultures
 - 4.6.3. The Plurality of Objective Values in General and the Common Core
- 4.7. Social Normativity, Morality, and the Law

Chapter 5 Coherence in Legal Doctrine

- 5.1. Weighing and Defeasibility
 - 5.1.1. Space for Defeasibility and Weighing in Legal Justification
 - 5.1.2. General Theories of Weighing
 - 5.1.3. Extending the Domain of Reason
 - 5.1.4. Decisive Reasons, Defeasible Reasons, Rules, Principles
 - 5.1.5. Defeasibility, Not Indeterminacy
 - 5.1.6. Logic and Rhetoric in Legal Argumentation
- 5.2. Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Doctrine
 - 5.2.1. Wide, Constrained, and Segmented Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Doctrine
 - 5.2.2. Equilibrium around Platitudes—Philosophical Background
 - 5.2.3. The Philosophy of Platitudes for Legal Doctrine
 - 5.2.4. Reflective Equilibrium and Society-Centred Morality
- 5.3. The Coherence of Legal Knowledge
 - 5.3.1. Aspects of Coherence in Legal Doctrine
 - 5.3.2. Foundationalism, Scepticism, and Coherentism
 - 5.3.3. Conceptions of Coherence
 - 5.3.4. A Complex Web of Big Circles
 - 5.3.5. Epistemic Coherence, Truth, Knowledge, and Segmented Coherence
 - 5.3.6. Criteria of Coherence in Legal Doctrine
 - 5.3.7. Coherence over Time
- 5.4. Coherence and Justice in Law
 - 5.4.1. Coherence in Practices and Norms, Not Only in Knowledge
 - 5.4.2. Justice as the Weighing of All Considerations
 - 5.4.3. Different Justice in Different Contexts?
 - 5.4.4. Procedural Justice?
 - 5.4.5. Justice, Coherence, Law, and Morality
 - 5.4.6. The Importance of Justice for Judges, Legal Scholars, and Politicians
- 5.5. Coherence and Concepts in Legal Doctrine

- 5.5.1. Value-Open Legal Concepts and the Nature of Things
- 5.5.2. Intermediate Concepts
- 5.5.3. Concepts and System
- 5.6. Is Coherence Contrary to Facts?

Chapter 6 - Metatheory and Ontology for Legal Doctrine

- 6.1. The Question of Cognitivism
 - 6.1.1. The Controversy over the Truth of Normative and Evaluative Statements
 - 6.1.2. Normative and Descriptive Meaning
 - 6.1.3. Four Possibilities
- 6.2. Ontology for Legal Doctrine
 - 6.2.1. The Problem of the Ontology of Law
 - 6.2.2. Law as a Dependent Entity
 - 6.2.3. A Theory of Legal Conventions and Institutions
 - 6.2.4. The Law as a Product of Convention and Morality

Chapter 7 - Conclusions

Bibliography
Index of Subjects
Index of Names

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Jurisprudence

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