

# Contents

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## Part I. Incentive Contracts and Elections

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<b>1.</b>	<b>Overview</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1	The Ideas .....	3
1.2	The Theme .....	7
<b>2.</b>	<b>Unobservability and Short-Termism in Long-Term Policies</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1	Introduction .....	11
2.2	The Model .....	14
2.3	Fixed and Conditional Reelection Probabilities .....	18
2.4	Incentive Contracts at the Reelection Stage .....	21
2.5	Other Sources of Inefficiencies .....	24
2.6	Practical Issues .....	25
2.7	Conclusion .....	27
<b>3.</b>	<b>Short-Termism and Competition for Incentive Contracts</b>	<b>29</b>
3.1	Introduction .....	29
3.2	The Model .....	33
3.3	Elections .....	38
3.4	Competition for the Incentive Contracts .....	41

VIII Contents

3.5	Competition Without Commitment.....	44
3.6	Asymmetric Information .....	47
3.7	Conclusion .....	49
3.8	Appendix .....	50
<b>4.</b>	<b>Reelection Thresholds</b>	<b>53</b>
4.1	Introduction.....	53
4.2	The Model .....	55
4.3	First-Best Solution .....	58
4.4	The Reelection Mechanism .....	59
4.5	Threshold Incentive Contracts .....	62
4.6	Conclusion .....	66
<b>5.</b>	<b>Effort Incentives and Monetary Rewards</b>	<b>67</b>
5.1	Introduction.....	67
5.2	The Model .....	70
5.3	First-Best Solution .....	74
5.4	The Reelection Mechanism .....	76
5.5	Self-Financing Incentive Contracts.....	80
5.6	Robustness and Non-commitment .....	85
5.7	Conclusion .....	87
5.8	Appendix .....	88
<b>6.</b>	<b>Limits to Incentive Contracts in Politics</b>	<b>97</b>
6.1	Introduction.....	97
6.2	The Model .....	99
6.3	Fixed Wages .....	101
6.4	Competition for Wage Contracts .....	102

6.5	Welfare Comparisons .....	106
6.6	Conclusion .....	110
	Epilogue to Part I .....	111
	References to Part I .....	112

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## **Part II. Rules for Decision-Making and Agenda Setting**

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<b>7.</b>	<b>Overview</b>	<b>119</b>
7.1	The Ideas .....	119
7.2	The Theme .....	122
<b>8.</b>	<b>Examples for Agenda Rules</b>	<b>125</b>
8.1	Introduction .....	125
8.2	Model and Treatment Rules .....	127
8.2.1	The Model .....	127
8.2.2	The Game .....	129
8.2.3	Constitutional Principles .....	130
8.2.4	Socially Efficient Solutions .....	135
8.3	Examples of Constitutions .....	136
8.3.1	Constitutions for Socially Efficient Projects ....	137
8.3.2	The Curse of Equal Treatment .....	142
8.3.3	Constitutions for Socially Inefficient Projects ..	143
8.4	Discussion .....	144
8.4.1	General Constitutions .....	144
8.4.2	Amendments .....	146
8.4.3	Secret Ballots .....	149

8.5	Conclusions .....	150
8.6	Appendix .....	150
<b>9.</b>	<b>Flexible Majority Rules</b>	<b>157</b>
9.1	Introduction .....	157
9.2	Model and Constitutional Rules .....	162
9.2.1	The Model .....	162
9.2.2	Socially Efficient Solutions .....	163
9.2.3	The Game .....	165
9.2.4	Constitutional Principles .....	168
9.3	First-Best Constitutions .....	171
9.3.1	No Negative Utility .....	172
9.3.2	Uncertainty Regarding $p$ .....	176
9.3.3	Uncertainty Regarding $p$ and $(1 + \lambda)k$ .....	178
9.3.4	Uncertainty Regarding $p$ , $V_h$ , and $(1 + \lambda)k$ .....	179
9.4	Conclusion .....	180
9.5	Appendix .....	183
9.5.1	Formalization of the Implementation Requirement .....	183
9.5.2	Proofs .....	185
<b>10.</b>	<b>Democratic Mechanisms</b>	<b>191</b>
10.1	Introduction .....	191
10.2	Motivation and Approach .....	194
10.3	Model and Treatment Rules .....	197
10.3.1	The Model .....	197
10.3.2	Socially Efficient Solutions .....	198
10.3.3	The Game .....	200

10.3.4	Constitutional Principles .....	203
10.4	First-Best Constitutions .....	207
10.4.1	Uncertainty About Winners and Losers .....	208
10.4.2	Uncertainty Regarding $V_h$ .....	210
10.4.3	Uncertainty Regarding $p$ .....	211
10.4.4	Higher Dimensional Uncertainty .....	213
10.5	Discussion and Alternative Democratic Mechanisms ..	213
10.5.1	Dictatorial Agenda Setting .....	213
10.5.2	Equal Treatment Rules .....	215
10.5.3	Only Project-Winners .....	216
10.6	Conclusions .....	217
<b>11.</b>	<b>Fair Division</b> .....	<b>219</b>
11.1	Introduction .....	219
11.2	The Model .....	223
11.3	A Finite Number of Periods .....	226
11.3.1	Random Recognition .....	226
11.3.2	Agenda Rules and Equal Distribution .....	228
11.3.3	Uncertainty About Discount Factors .....	230
11.4	Division of Resources with Infinite Periods .....	233
11.5	Discussion and Conclusions .....	234
11.6	Appendix .....	235
	Epilogue to Part II .....	238
	References to Part II .....	239



<http://www.springer.com/978-3-540-22402-0>

Designing Democracy

Ideas for Better Rules

Gersbach, H.

2005, XI, 244 p., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-540-22402-0