ISBN: 3540240098
TITLE: Criminal Dilemmas 2. Aufl.
AUTHOR: Sieberg
TOC: 

1 Alternative Sentencing 1
1.1 Prisons 8
1.1.1 Retribution 8
1.1.2 Rehabilitation 10
1.1.3 Deterrence 13
1.2 Protection of the Public 15
1.2.1 Violent Crime and Sex Predators 15
1.2.1.1 Recidivism and Violence 15
1.2.1.2 Sex Offenders 16
1.2.1.3 Incapacitation 19
1.2.2 Criticisms 21
1.2.2.1 Three Strikes 22
1.2.2.2 Alternative Sentencing 25
1.2.3 Victim Compensation 26
1.2.3.1 Victim Model 27
1.2.3.2 Benefits 29
1.2.3.3 Compensation 31
1.2.3.4 Pain and Suffering 31
1.2.4 Alternative Sentencing - Fitting the Crime 32
1.3 Conclusion 33
2 Private Prisons 35
2.1 Privatization Versus Public Service 35
2.1.1 Positive Side 36
2.1.2 Drawbacks 38
2.2 Power and Money: Expanding Imprisonment and Profit 44
2.3 Conclusion 47
3 Prostitution 49
3.1 Victimless Crime 49
3.1.1 Why is Prostitution Illegal? 49
3.1.1.1 Prostitutes 51
3.1.2 Disease 52
3.1.3 Drugs 55
3.1.4 Crime and Violence 56
3.2 The Economics of Prostitution 57
3.2.1 Results 61
3.3 Consequences and Costs of Hiding 62
3.4 Pimps and Illegal Prostitution 64
3.4.1 Anti-Pimping Laws 65
3.4.2 Pimp Model 65
3.5 Unilateral Legalization 70
3.6 Conclusion 71
3.6.1 Policy 71
3.6.1.1 Limited Control 72
3.6.2 Regulation 73
4 Drugs 75
4.1 Introduction 75
4.1.1 The Ailment 75
4.1.2 The Cure 76
4.2 Illegal Versus Legal Drugs 77
4.2.1 Illegal 77
4.2.1.1 Hidden but Available 78
4.2.2 Legal 80
4.3 Demand Versus Supply 81
4.3.1 Demand 81
4.3.2 Supply 83
4.3.3 Illegal Drugs - Negative Effects 85
4.3.3.1 Quality 86
4.3.3.2 Youth 87
4.4 Violence 87
4.4.1 Anti-Competitive Strategies 88
4.4.1.1 Legal Behavior 90
4.4.1.2 Criminal Behavior 91
4.4.1.3 Organization 92
4.4.2 Anarchy 94
4.4.2.1 Contracts 95
4.4.2.2 Informal Mechanisms 96
4.4.2.3 Employee Relations 97
4.4.2.4 The Cure? 97
4.5 Legalization 98
4.5.1 Undercutting the Black Market 98
4.5.2 Experimentation 98
4.5.3 Addiction Control 99
4.5.3.1 Inelastic Demand 99
4.5.4 Control 101
4.5.5 Resources 100
4.6 Legal - The Zurich Problem 104
4.6.1 Voting With One's Feet 105
4.6.2 International Prisoners' Dilemma, 106
4.7 Conclusion 106
5 Gangs 109
5.1 Gangs as Drug Enterprises 110
5.2 Gangs as Alliances 112
5.2.1 Structure 114
5.2.2 Protection in Numbers 115
5.2.3 Protection of Numbers 120
5.2.4 Economics 121
5.3 Extortion Model 122
5.4 Job Search and the Market for Crime 127
5.5 Conclusion 128
6 Gun Control 131
6.1 Introduction 131
6.2 Gun Control 132
6.3 The Right to Bear Arms 135
6.3.1 The Criminals Have Guns 135
6.3.2 Guns for Self-Defense 136
6.3.3 Firearm Accidents 140
6.3.4 Information 141
6.3.5 Black Market 141
6.3.5.1 Buyers 143
6.4 Deterrence 145
6.4.1 Rural Versus Urban Characteristics 145
6.4.2 Deterrence - the Fear of Armed Victims 148
6.4.3 Open and Concealed Weapons 148
6.5 Model 151
6.5.1 Reputation: The Chain Store Paradox 152
6.5.2 Massacres 156
6.6 Statistics 157
6.6.1 Accidental Deaths 160
6.6.2 Gun Control 161
6.6.3 Summary and Problems 161
6.7 Implications and Suggestions 162
6.7.1 Training 162
6.7.2 Waiting Periods 164
6.7.3 Safeguards 165
6.7.4 Penalties 167
6.7.5 Caveat 167
6.8 Conclusion 169
7 Police 171
7.1 Introduction 171
7.2 Serve and Protect 171
7.2.1 Anti-Shirking Policies 173
7.2.2 Anti-Brutality Policies 174
7.2.3 Contract Design 177
7.2.4 Institutional Checks 177
7.3 Discussion
178 Bibliography 181
Index 199
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