

CHAPTER 2

Some Historical Notes

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INTRODUCTION

Even if the sociology of the military became firmly established and, especially, demonstrated its applicability to concrete cases starting with the vast research of *The American Soldier* (see “The American School” below), sociological investigation of the military and of the phenomenon of war preceded it by nearly a century, and was contemporaneous with the first studies commonly considered sociological. Seeking out these roots is not merely an operation of historical interest: Those starting out on the study of this special sociology need to know the paths that have already been trod, of which some came to an end and others produced studies and researches of what we consider contemporary sociology of the military (from *The American Soldier* onward). Our discipline did not develop in some sort of cosmic vacuum, emerging from nothing, but embraced previous contributions to thought and research and very often carried them further. To give just a pair of examples, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz (see below) offered their own solutions to the convergence/divergence dichotomy between the armed forces and civil society already evidenced by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 19th century, while Charles Wright Mills’s model of the “*power elite*” is clearly indebted to the studies of Gaetano Mosca at the end of the 19th century. Some knowledge of the thought of those I call the “forerunners” here is important, therefore, especially for the novice, in order to build a more complete and broad mental framework of the discipline than would result from study of contemporary sociology of the military only.

A second section is devoted to what I have called “the American School” because its development took place chiefly in the United States and because military sociologists from other countries initially moved within it and according to its schemes. This school begins with the research published in the mid-20th century in *The American Soldier* and remains a fertile one, although here we stop with the most noted authors of the 1980s. The necessary brevity of the section means that only the contributions of a few authors, generally the founders of a scientific current, can be mentioned here. But because the

worldwide development of the sociology of the military in the second half of the 20th century, with specific regional connotations, issues from the mold of this school—at times also by reaction to some of its schemes—the third, and final, section of this chapter is dedicated to giving an accounting of this development. It is a section that newcomers will find particularly useful for orienting themselves in the panorama of the institutions, now prevalently international, engaged in the subject today.

THE FORERUNNERS

The sociology of the military starts with sociology *tout court*, if not as a specification of a scientific sector, at least in the treatment of the subjects that would later be characteristic of it. Considered by many the founder of sociology (and for certain the one who coined the term), Auguste Comte, in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*,¹ deals with a number of topics that we would today undoubtedly include in the sociology of the military. As is well known, Comte's analysis of the crisis of the society of his time led him to construct a social history² of humanity, a history built according to an evolutionary, linear conception itself based on the principle, from the Enlightenment, of the progress of the human species. In this construction, the military, along with religion, plays a fundamental role, especially before the emergence of the industrial, bureaucratic, and civil aspects of society in a pluralistic sense.

The military aspect of associative life is as old as *Homo sapiens*, Comte observes: Humans' first tools are weapons and the first authority established in the group is that of the military chief; cooperation between humans is imposed as a necessity and a social value, especially for the needs of war. War acts on primitive microsocieties (the family, the clan, the tribe) by diverting them in two directions: On the one hand, individual human aggregates tend to increase numerically to better meet military necessities; on the other, there is an extension of human associations through the subjection of defeated groups to victorious ones. The human species thus converts the impulse that in many animals remains limited to the destructive act of fighting into a means of civilization. Indeed, says Comte, even the typically human institution of slavery is civilizing. Since the slave is a defeated person whose life has been spared, his survival is civil progress, on the one hand, because it avoids useless destruction of the species and a perfecting of the military institution on the other, since it is largely the work of slaves that makes it possible to wage war and have warriors. Morality itself, for Comte, is at the outset mainly a military ethic in that it subordinates the guiding lines of human action to war aims.³ In the evolutionary blueprint that Comte sees written in humankind's social history, the first institutional situation is the polytheistic primitive society, where the eminent man is the eminent warrior, the dominant society is the one that dominates militarily, and power is the prerogative of the warrior caste.

The polytheistic age is followed by the monotheistic one, which is characterized by a markedly defensive military attitude, partly due to a loss of organization which results in a poor capability of conducting offensive operations. For Comte the growth of monotheism leads to a number of social changes fraught with consequences for the military, such as the

¹ Comte's fundamental work, in six volumes, published between 1830 and 1842. The edition I refer to is the one published by UTET, Turin, 1967, edited by Franco Ferrarotti.

² Understood as *history without the names of individuals and even without those of peoples*, op. cit., p. 123.

³ Op. cit., Lecture LIII, p. 551.

separation of spiritual leadership from temporal leadership, the breaking up of centralized authority into numerous local authorities, and the transformation of slavery into servitude. As a result, warfare gradually loses importance, the military leader is stripped of all religious power, armies shrink until they become elitist, and the military spirit declines until it becomes something internal to the military (*esprit de corps*).

With the coming of the modern age, the military undergoes new and radical changes. First, military leaders also begin to lose part of their temporal power, eroded by the bureaucratic organization that is being created in the new structure of the national state. Second, the internal structure of the military is modified: The standing army replaces feudal militias, military leaders come under civilian authority (the problem of political control of the armed forces arises), the international negotiating function begins to be handled by civilian authority as well, and military activities themselves are gradually subordinated to the commercial interests of the nascent national state.⁴ The bourgeois society characteristic of Comte's period, increasingly bureaucratizing and controlling military activities, leads him to point to a substantial antimilitarism from which he concludes that war is destined to become increasingly rare and ultimately disappear completely. In particular, Comte sees conscription, instituted during the French Revolution, as the decisive element that would reduce the military system to a subaltern task; for Comte the social significance of conscription is a diluting of military customs and mentality, a muting of the specialistic nature of the military profession, a marked subordination of the military to the complex machinery of modern society.

The social history that Comte constructs helps him, finally, to create sociology as *the last major branch of natural philosophy*,⁵ a science that provides the élites who lead the people with a rational basis for operational intervention on the various national societies throughout the world. In these élites he includes military leaders, who, precisely due to their greater awareness of war, must help to rid society of a phenomenon that has become antihistorical and anachronistic in order to institute the conception of that positive society that he believes is coming into being.

Written more or less in the same years as Auguste Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, the chapters that Alexis de Tocqueville devote to the military and to war⁶ depart from the same Enlightenment outlook that inspired Comte's work and would later inspire that of Spencer. In de Tocqueville, however, one notes a theoretical caution and an attention to concrete facts that makes his historical predictions less distant from actual future reality. Also, for Tocqueville the sociopolitical emergence of nations appears to move in the opposite direction from war and toward a taming of the military spirit. For the author of *Democracy in America*, this result, which for Comte (and later for Spencer as well) was the result of the process of industrialization of national societies, would instead come from the internal democratization of society. But it would be a partial result and slow in coming, so that *equality of living standards, and the institutions that derive from them, do not exempt a democratic people from the obligation of maintaining armies*.⁷ It is therefore important, he concludes, to study the social makeup of armies and the behavior and tendencies of those who compose them. de Tocqueville thus appears to create the subject matter, the topic of

⁴Op. cit., Lecture LV, pp. 77–81.

⁵Op. cit., Lecture LVII, p. 430.

⁶In *De la démocratie en Amérique*, published between 1836 and 1839. The edition I refer to is the one by Gallimard, Paris, 1951.

⁷Op. cit., p. 270.

study, the central object, of what will later be the sociology of the military. And it is not merely superficial: de Tocqueville immediately identifies and explores a number of very concrete themes, such as relations between the armed forces and society, the social origins of officers, the military profession as an instrument of social ascent, and careerism.

In his analysis of the armed forces/society relationship, de Tocqueville takes on what will be the great themes of debate and research in the sociology of the military in the second half of the 20th century: the divergence/convergence of military society and civil society,⁸ the problem of political control over the armed forces, and the excessive strengthening of the executive during a protracted state of war.⁹ The modernity of Tocqueville's approach to the concrete problems he tackles can be illustrated by reporting one of his passages on political control of the military. After affirming the concept that armed forces are the expression of the country to which they belong, he asserts that the remedy against a possible divergence between their ends and those of society must be found through democratic education of all citizens, when they "will have acquired a virile love for order and voluntarily bent to the rules . . . , the general spirit of the nation, penetrating in the particular spirit of the army, will temper the desires and the opinions that the military condition brings into being, will compress them through the powerful pressure of public opinion."¹⁰ It is interesting to note that this concept is taken up in 1960 by Morris Janowitz (see the bibliography), who theorizes that political control over the armed forces will be achieved by educating officers in democratic values and their acceptance and a "rubbing off" of such values from national public opinion.

Although little celebrated by military sociologists today, Alexis de Tocqueville appears to be one of the most interesting precursors of our special sociology, not only for the concrete themes that he dealt with, but also for his scientific approach to their treatment. Indeed, instead of using a prevalently historical method for social investigation, characteristic of Comte, de Tocqueville performed a critical analysis of the social aggregate in a single historical period, in which he was interested, a veritable cutaway of a society and a synchronous comparison of it with other societies. In addition to being innovative, this methodological approach appears to be the only one that can justify sociology as a science distinct from social history. It is also worth observing that this methodology leads de Tocqueville to make use of what later came to be called "*sociological indicators*", an innovation in the realm of research tools as well.

Herbert Spencer, too, adopts a prevalently synchronous, transversal method of investigation, but on the one hand his construction appears much more theoretical than de Tocqueville's and on the other his conclusions are quite close to those of Comte. Spencer lays the groundwork of his sociological science using chiefly the comparative method, producing a synchronous examination of societies at different levels of development. As a unifying principle he uses the biological evolution of the species (Darwin) applied to social aggregates: They constitute for him a superorganic world, set in logical and linear succession to the inorganic and organic ones, with no leap in quality.

The general thesis expressed by Spencer in his fundamental work¹¹ is that a law governs the evolution both of living organisms and the groups they form, resulting in a natural and

⁸See Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz below.

⁹That which Harold Lasswell would later call the garrison state (see References).

¹⁰Op. cit., pp. 275-276.

¹¹*Principles of Sociology*, published in three volumes from 1877 to 1896. The edition I refer to here is *Principi di sociologia*, published by UTET, Turin, 1967, edited by Franco Ferrarotti.

necessary process of development. The evolution of human aggregates is conceived as the set of processes and products that involve the coordinated actions of a large number of individuals. The highest form of superorganic evolution is society; the study of society is sociology. Fundamentally important both for the organic world and the superorganic world is the concept of structure, which designates an entity formed by various mutually dependent parts. The model of structure created by Spencer is homeostatic, that is, change in one of the parts entails change in all the others in order to maintain the system's equilibrium. Individuals and aggregates initially develop at least two fundamental structures, one for acting internally, for the purposes of maintenance, and the other for acting externally, in terms of defence and offence. The structure that acts externally is formed and perfected through war, which is thus the matrix of organized society. It is war that necessitates an authority, a leader, the creation of stable government structures, and a process of aggregation of human groups.

As can be seen, although the route is different, the interpretation of society is similar to that of Comte. Spencer, too, identifies a primitive society, typically military, and a more evolved one in which the activities of maintenance and exchange prevail: industrial society. However, he defines them not so much through a historical process but as general typologies into which the different national societies existing at his time fit more or less separately. The evolutionary law employed by Spencer leads to a development of the social industrial type (a superior society because it aims at individual well-being). Unlike Comte, however, Spencer does not hypothesize a linear evolutionary development, but an alternating one, with periods and episodes that can be strongly involucional.

Spencer, like Comte, materializes the antimilitary spirit of bourgeois industrialism, guided by the Enlightenment idea of human progress. However, the outlook is more critical in Spencer, who sees the possibility of involucional processes and warns that peaceful coexistence between societies is not automatically the fruit of the development of industrial society, but derives from the disappearance of militarism. But incomprehension of the real role of the industrial state, which he shares with Comte, prevents him from identifying the terrible war-making potential of industrial society and leads him to focus on militarism as the principal causal factor of war.

Spencer's analysis of the military remains significant, however. Various aspects of it still appear to be present in many current societies which, according to his classifying criteria, incarnate the mixed type of military-industrial society, so that some Spencerian typologies still constitute a tool for reading and understanding the characteristics of military societies.

Gaetano Mosca brings the 19th century to a close for what constitutes our special sociology and is the first scholar to treat a single, specific theme of this discipline, one that more than half a century later will find concrete, significant development in the work of Charles Wright Mills.¹² First and foremost, Mosca goes beyond the positivist optimism regarding the disappearance of war with the advent of the positive (Comte), industrial (Spencer), or democratic (de Tocqueville) society, clearly pointing to the fact that it is not the military institution that causes war. The military function is destined to continue in every type of society because war is only one of the many manifestations of human nature. The military and its historical evolution are thus worthy of serious study in order to understand what its optimum organization should be in the current historical period. In this

¹² Mosca treats the military especially in Chapter 9 of Volume I of *The Ruling Class* (see References), titled "Standing Armies."

regard Mosca reinterprets the evolution of the military establishment of industrial society, already described after a fashion by positivist thought, affirming that "The great modern fact, nearly general in the nations of European civilisation, of large standing armies which are rigid upholders of the law, deferential to the orders of civilian authority, and whose political importance is scarce and indirectly exercised, if not absolutely without example in human history, represents a fortunate exception."¹³ Real political control over the military has therefore been established, but how and why?

In the modern state, says Mosca, writing in 1896, the problem of the supremacy of civilian power is solved in part by the makeup of European armies, where diverse social elements are represented and balance each other, but more particularly by the inclusion of the officer class into what he calls the "*power elite*". In Mosca, the concept of the power elite descends from his identification in society of a number of organized minorities. According to him, in every society there are two classes of people, the governing and the governed; the governing class is a small minority, but it is able to dominate because it is organized. The strength of any organized minority is irresistible, for any individual of the majority who finds him or herself alone and faced with the totality of the minority. According to Mosca it is officers' inclusion in the power elite—the organized governing minority—that ensures armies' loyalty to the state and their subordination to civilian power. This inclusion, with specific reference to American society, will also be registered by Charles Wright Mills over half a century later, but with a different value judgment: While for Mosca the military poses itself as a valid model of development for all of civil society, for Mills the military leadership's increased influence on politics endangers the democratic structure of the state.

For Max Weber the analysis of the military is central to the definition of the modern bureaucratic state.¹⁴ Indeed, he defines the modern state as the human community which, within a certain territory, successfully believes it holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. As with earlier scholars, Weber's analysis starts with a comparative historical investigation to define the types of military recruitment and organization characteristic of the different societies and historical periods. Unlike his predecessors, however, he creates typologies of military orders which are not linked to single historical periods or geographic regions or inserted into a process of linear, necessitated social evolution. Among the different typologies, the one of most interest to our field of investigation is the military institution of the modern state where it reaches its full development. In the modern state, characterized by a bureaucratic organization, one does not obey the person, but the rule, instituted in the manner provided by the will of the community. The officer therefore does not differ from the functionary, of which he constitutes only a special category; he, too, must obey a norm which is formally abstract, and his right to power is legitimated by rules that precisely define his role.

For Weber, the bureaucratization of the military is a road on which there is no turning back: Indeed, it is the specific means for transforming community action into rationally ordered social action. The loyalty of the institution is ensured by the fact that the officer is a professional functionary chained to his activity, with all his material and spiritual existence and yet with no power to substantially modify the complex bureaucratic machinery in which he is nothing more than a single cog. This gives birth to military discipline, which is not, for Weber, a social fact in itself, but the *source of discipline in general* because it also

¹³Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 330.

¹⁴See References, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*.

constitutes the ideal model for the modern capitalist company, reintegrated in American scientific management systems and ordinary business discipline. The military, says Weber, having taken many of its organizational forms from capitalism, then restores the objectivity of the concept of discipline to the industrial corporation, which applies it widely. Objectively, because they function equally in service to both a bureaucratic power and a charismatic leader, the duty ethic, conscientious performance, and meticulous training are what make the strength of an army, however it is led, just as they make the strength and competitiveness of a company or factory.

It is interesting to note the profound difference between Mosca's elitist view of the role of the military professional and Weber's bureaucratic view, which will give rise to two distinct schools of thought. We have already described the developments of Mosca's conception; for Weber we can cite the application of his theoretical scheme in the pioneering research on the officer corps conducted by Karl Demeter in 1935 (see References).

In Europe, after Max Weber's studies, the sociology of the military seems to undergo a period of scant interest, where a few treatises (by Joseph A. Schumpeter and Corrado Gini, for example: see References) and empirical studies (see the already cited one by Karl Demeter) still appear, but remain rather isolated. In the United States, by contrast, this discipline still had to find the concrete need that would stimulate a specific study and research. We can thus conclude here, obviously with no pretence of exhaustiveness, the section on the "forerunners" and go on with what I have called the American School to describe that which can be considered the contemporary sociology of the military.

THE AMERICAN SCHOOL

The entry of the United States into the Second World War and the resulting transformation of an army of a few hundred thousand men who lived and operated somewhat on the margins of society into a force of over seven million individuals posed problems to the military that had never before been faced. To solve these problems, the military turned to the social sciences.

There had been earlier sociological investigations on armed forces and conflicts during and after the First World War both in the United States and Europe,¹⁵ but it was an approach that had favored sectoral analyses or study of the phenomena induced by wartime military organization in national societies. These investigations could therefore not constitute a useful precedent for tackling the problems posed to the American administration by the entry into war in 1941. Thus, in 1942 the U.S. Army drew up a Troop Attitude Research Program and formed a Research Branch, to which it called a large team of specialized collaborators, especially sociologists, anthropologists, and social psychologists, headed by Samuel A. Stouffer. At the war's end this group of specialists published a summarizing work which to this day remains as the singular testament to the most extensive field research ever conducted in the social sciences (*Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*; the first two volumes of this work are better known under the title *The American Soldier*; see Stouffer under References). It assembles the results of over 200 reports and interviews with hundreds of thousands of soldiers conducted during the research team's 3 years of work (1942–1945).

¹⁵See, for example, for Europe, under References, Karl Demeter, Corrado Gini.

American sociology at the time featured a recently elaborated theoretical framework too recent and too new to allow full application to the context in which it was formulated or acceptance in university faculties, but which lent itself very well indeed to an application in the area of the military. At issue was the theoretical elaboration of the field studies carried out in the 1930s by the team of Elton Mays at Western Electric's Hawthorne Works in Chicago¹⁶ to determine what particularly affected worker performance. The results of these studies had sharply contradicted previous work that explained the phenomenon of fatigue as linked to psychophysical, physiological, and environmental aspects by demonstrating that the most significant variable affecting fatigue was the behavior of the primary group, that is, the narrow social context in which the worker labored. The primary group therefore became the determinant of individual performance, and attitudes toward the group (the individual's relation to it) proved to be more important than personal aptitudes, which until then were considered the basis for assessing workers' performance. The substitution of the concept of attitude for that of aptitude would be used by Stouffer's research team for sociological investigation on the acclimatization of citizens drafted into the military, and the concept of primary group to investigate the variables that had a bearing on the behavior of combat units. Thus, the research group undertakes the investigation on the acclimatization of draftees,¹⁷ basing itself both on the concept of attitude, understood as the individual's reaction to a social situation, and on that of relative privation in relation to the reference group in which the soldier finds himself. The interest and the fecundity of investigation of this point of view, which overturns the two previous, separate approaches to the problem is evident: Individual behavior as the result of individual aptitudes and the privations of status of the military condition with reference to prior statuses. It both overturns and unites them according to a perspective of investigation proper to social psychology.

Prior status is not completely neglected, however: difficulties of acclimatization, which generate a differentiation in attitudes (statistically measured), are studied by referring them both to the social backgrounds and personal histories of individuals and to the situation of relative privation. Relative privation, in particular, is investigated by examining the structural elements of the military: social stratification, power relationships, control system, general living conditions, and upward and downward flow of information. The completeness of the analysis enables Stouffer's team to indicate the tools and methodologies for modifying dysfunctional characteristics of the military. This is a conceptually fundamental aspect of the research team's work: here sociology shows itself to be a completely operational science, a scientific base capable of producing "social technologies" suitable for eliciting a desired effect in the real world.

If the barracks situation could be studied effectively by Stouffer's team by examining the individual in relation to his primary group, the area where the concept of group expresses all its potential and importance is in combat situations, to which the entire second volume of *The American Soldier* is devoted.

The research team identifies the combat situation as an extreme condition of stress where nearly all the individual's needs are denied gratification; the threats regard the essential aspects of the person (life and physical integrity); radical conflicts are created in values; individuality is often nullified; and anxiety, pain, fear, uncertainty, and powerlessness prevail: The aggression against the soldier's ego could not be more radical. However, examination of cases of voluntary exit from the combat situation (flight, psychological

¹⁶See Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of Industrial Civilisation*, New York, 1933.

¹⁷*Studies in Social Psychology* . . . , cited, first volume, *Adjustment During Army Life*.

breakdown, suicide, etc.) shows that they are quite rare in percentage terms. There must therefore be some element that offsets all these stress factors and induces the individual to remain in line. Stouffer identifies this element in the primary group and in group cohesion.

The factors of group cohesion, already on display in garrison life, become far more important in the combat situation, where for the individual, deprived of everything, the psychological and affective gratifications offered by the primary group become essential. According to Stouffer, it is essentially the group that ensures the psychological survival of the individual in combat. However, the group could extricate its members from the stress situation without affecting the values of cohesion by getting out of the combat situation altogether. An external factor that prevents the group from fleeing is therefore necessary: the research group identifies this factor chiefly in the existence of a system of interiorized norms, along with a system of real, effective repression exerted by the military. In short, the primary group is induced to fight basically for itself in order to save its existence and internal cohesion in the institutional system in which it finds itself by adhering to those values of the institutional system that it has introjected and inscribed in its own informal code.

The foregoing analysis shows the importance of favoring the natural cohesion of primary groups and avoiding any intervention of the institution that can act as a disaggregating factor. The most important aspect of the group is its defence of its internal cohesion, achieved through a balancing of the roles that the group assigns to its individual members: Among these fundamental roles is that of the natural leader, who is called to carry out a function of active mediation with the institution. The immediate operational indication that follows is the importance of preparing the commander of the smaller unit (noncommissioned officer or lower ranking officer) to become the group's natural leader. He is in the position of being able to assume the natural leadership of the group—provided that he is able to understand and respect the informal code—because he is a member of the group and fully shares in its combat situation, but he is also an element of the institutional hierarchy. The measurable impact—positive and negative—that the publication of *The American Soldier* had on U.S. sociology has been enormous and is demonstrated not only by the vast literature to which it gave rise but also by the application of its methods and results to industrial sociology in the postwar years.

Just as the “American school” produced the first great empirical investigation of the military, it also offered the first great theoretical systematization of the special sociology that studies it. This occurs with Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the state*. Huntington identifies the sector of study as “civil–military relations,” understood as an aspect of national security policy. The theoretical framework that the author gives to the subject partitions national security policy into three areas: military security policy, domestic security policy, and situational security policy, the last one referring to changes in the country's sociopolitical situation. The primary objective of this policy is to develop a system of civil–military relations that can maximize military security with minimum sacrifice of the other social values. But, says Huntington, civil–military relations essentially reflect the political relationship between the state and the officer corps, so it is with this professional corps that he mainly intends to deal.

A profession, according to Huntington, is an activity carried out by a particular type of highly specialized functional group; the features that distinguish it from an occupation are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Having defined the features that typically identify the profession, Huntington applies them to the officer corps. First of all, there is

a specific sector where officers exercise exclusive expertise: the management of violence, which Huntington defines as the direction, operation, and control of an organization whose primary function is the application of violence. The responsibility of the military professional lies essentially in the fact that managed violence must be used for socially approved purposes: the officer's *client* is the state and his fundamental responsibility is to the state. The right to practice the military profession is legally permitted to a restricted, well-defined social body which thereby acquires a strong corporative spirit.

It thus appears beyond doubt that the officer corps unites the chief characteristics of a professional body. In particular, Huntington stresses, we are simultaneously in the presence of both a profession and an organization, both of them bureaucratic. As a profession, the levels of expertise are marked by the hierarchy of ranks; as organization, by the hierarchy of assignments, with the former generally winning out over the latter. But the professionalization of the officer is not an established fact from the outset: it is the historical change of the figure of the officer, taking place over centuries, that has marked the passage in the officer corps from amateurism to professionalism.

After outlining the characteristics of the military profession, Huntington is concerned with determining how civilian control can be effectively exercised over the military power held by the officer corps. He finds the theoretical foundations of his thought in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and in the study of war of Karl von Clausewitz. From the English philosopher, he takes the conception of a human nature that is essentially conflictual and a condition of nature in which each state is potentially at war against all the others. From Clausewitz, Huntington takes the concept of the dual nature of war, an autonomous sector of science on the one hand, a process whose ultimate aims come from politics on the other. From the well-known Clausewitzian supremacy of politics over war Huntington derives the ethical and practical delimitation of the military profession.

According to Huntington there are two types of political control that can be exerted over the military: subjective control and objective control. The first is exercised by maximizing the power of one or more social groups over the armed forces; the second is chiefly based on the recognition of an autonomous military professionalism and on a rigid separation of the latter from the political sphere. The theoretical bases of Huntington's thought make him lean toward this second type of political control: Once the supremacy of politics is accepted, if the military is an autonomous sector of science and knowledge, the officer must enjoy a professional autonomy of his own. The necessity of minimizing the political power of the officer corps is thus resolved by Huntington by a thoroughgoing professionalization of the corps which renders it politically sterile and neutral while at the same time preserving the elements of power that are necessary for fulfilling the institutional task. Made historically possible by the emergence of a military profession, objective control is the only one that guarantees the supremacy of civil power, precisely because it separates the two spheres of expertise and prevents any political involvement of officers.

The distribution of power between civilian groups and the military group varies, for Huntington, according to the compatibility of military ethics with the prevailing political ideology. The historical model for the relationship between military power and civil power to which this author seems chiefly to refer is that of the German imperial period from 1871 to 1914: His thought shows careful study and deep admiration for the German-Prussian general staff, for its professional approach, and for its relations with the civil power.

Huntington's work in the theoretical and structural organization of the sociology of the military would provide fertile ground worldwide, especially due to the extensive use by subsequent scholars of his systematic structuring of the subject, delimitation of fields,

and identification of problems. It would also give rise to criticism and negative reactions, particularly on the issue of political control over the armed forces, where he is the head of one of the two lines of thought that would dominate American military sociology in the ensuing years. Indeed, the publication of *The Soldier and the state* is followed a few years later by Morris Janowitz' work, *The Professional Soldier* (see bibliography), which lays the groundwork of a different and opposing model of political control over the armed forces.

Janowitz's central thesis is that the military institution must be examined in its process of change because it must necessarily change with the changing conditions of the society to which it belongs. After the Second World War the international context was deeply modified, producing a situation in which military action had much more sensitive politicosocial consequences than in the past: This contributed to a convergence of civilian and military interests and spheres of activity. But the individual national societies were also changed internally, and in the face of this complex of changes the military was called upon to find a series of adaptations.

The first change in the military recorded by Janowitz was a new way of exercising authority. This exercise was closely bound up with the specific role of the armed forces where new conditions of use have accentuated decentralization, dispersion in the field, and autonomy of command at lower levels. This situation caused a gradual mutation of the exercise of authority through certain and precise forms of obedience in a search for consensus and manipulatory procedures. Profoundly changed also was the recruitment of the professional soldier, identified by Janowitz as the career officer. By means of precise statistical analyses, he shows a substantial widening of the officer recruitment base in the United States,¹⁸ due both to the increased size of the military organization and to the growing demand for specific technical skills. This means that the officer corps was no longer a representative entity of a particular social stratum, but rather a separate organism, better represented in the national political reality as a pressure group. The broadening of the recruitment base, along with the growing prominence given to commercial values in democratic societies, led to a change in the motivations of professional choice of the officer corps, where one saw a growing number of officers who considered the military profession more an occupation like any other than a mission. A further consequence of this broadening, says Janowitz, was the diminished social integration of the officer, which naturally descended from his belonging, from birth, to a well-defined social class. And finally, the terms of political control over the armed forces also changed, owing to the growing involvement of the military elite in the country's political choices. This whole complex of changes and their particular impact on the officer corps led Janowitz to give special study to the military profession.

A professional, according to Janowitz, is someone who, as a result of prolonged training, acquires a skill that enables him to render specialized services.¹⁹ The officer is therefore a professional and his professionalization occurred gradually, developing especially in the 19th century. The professional soldier is not, however, definable according to a unique ideal: The traditional "heroic" type, who personifies martial spirit and personal bravery, has been progressively flanked by the managerial type, who reflects the pragmatic and social dimensions of modern warfare. In the years following the Second World War yet a third typology emerged, the technological one, which can also be considered as an offshoot of

¹⁸This is true for the other Western nations as well.

¹⁹Op. cit., p. 5.

the managerial type. All three typologies are present in a modern army, differently balanced percentagewise, but the emergence of the managerial and technological types seems to have significantly narrowed the difference between military and civilian. Contemporary society thus sees a convergence between these two spheres, which Janowitz judges to be positive and necessary. In this convergence it is the military that draws closer to the mainstream of the society to which it belongs, gradually and continuously incorporating the values that gain broad acceptance in society.

For Janowitz, therefore, contemporary officers must not constitute a separate body from civil society, but be profoundly integrated with it. In the impossibility, and unreasonableness, of isolating the professional soldier from the country's political life, he proposes having representatives of the national political parties participate in the officer's political training. In such a framework the officer will be favorable to civilian political control because he will know that civilians appreciate the tasks and responsibilities of his profession; in addition, he will be integrated in civil society because he shares its common values.

As one readily sees, this is a completely different conception from that of Huntington, one that creates, in the American School (which is not only American), a different and opposing current of thought, particularly on the crucial problem of political control of the armed forces. This gives rise to a dialectic between the divergent model (Huntington) and the convergent model (Janowitz) of the military in its relations with civil society. According to Huntington, divergence is needed for the military to be able to carry out its tasks effectively; according to Janowitz, convergence is necessary, since today's professional soldier is too involved in the country's political choices and needs the full consensus of the society to which he belongs.

In addition to being the founder of a school for his conception of the military professional, Janowitz is important for having anticipated and understood the development of the military's functions from the traditional "shooting war" and the more recent function of deterrence to those tasks of international policing for the prevention and resolution of conflict situations that did not reach full development until the end of the 20th century. His is the conception of a *constabulary soldier*, constantly ready to intervene in any part of the world, dispensing the necessary minimum of organized violence with the aim of achieving an acceptable set of international relations rather than victory in the field. This predicted development also gives rise to his other prediction of a decline in mass armies²⁰ in favor of leaner armed forces based on voluntary recruitment and increased professionalization. Last, Janowitz's initiatives have had significant impact on the organization of social scientists interested in the study of the military and on the internationalization of the American School.

Outside the currents of thought of these two influential scholars, but operating more or less in the same years, two other American sociologists who elaborated significant theories for this special sociology should be cited: they are Charles Wright Mills and Erving Goffman.

Charles Wright Mills is important for having developed an elitist conception of power that had a wide following in the 1960s and included the officer corps (see also Gaetano Mosca above).²¹ With the centralization of the media and of power, contends Mills, certain men come to occupy positions from which they are able to look down, as it were, on the daily

²⁰See References, *The Decline of the Mass Army*.

²¹See References, *The Power Elite*.

lives of ordinary men and women and profoundly influence them with their decisions. In contemporary society these men are found especially in the corporate, political, and military sectors, each an area that underwent a process of structural broadening, bureaucratization and centralization of decision making during and after the Second World War. The similarities of the processes and the close-knit relations between the three sectors then led to interpenetration among them. At the top of these three sectors are men who constitute the elite in business, politics, and the military; but since the three sectors converge, these elites tend to unite and act in unison. According to Mills, membership in this power elite is determined not so much by birth (Gaetano Mosca's ascriptive hypothesis) but by the direct, personal selection carried out by the current ruling class: family, college, and the private club are the milieus in which the persons destined for the upper echelons of politics, business, and the military are shaped and selected.

Throughout the world, the relationship between the three sectors that make up the power elite has changed profoundly since the Second World War, says Mills, when reality began to be redefined and thought in military terms and civilian supremacy began to crumble, creating a political vacuum that brought the "warlords" to the top. Indeed, having postulated a military definition of political reality, the rise of the generals to the highest levels of the power elite becomes a necessity. A second consequence is the politicization of the armed forces: thus, in the United States, the existence of Republican generals and Democrat generals is recognized and accepted, says Mills, while in 1951, for the first time, the celebrated MacArthur case called the supremacy of the government over the military into question. A third result of this process of integration is the decline of traditional diplomacy and, in its place, the development of a foreign policy managed mainly according to the ideas of military leaders. This complex of causes and effects has allowed the military leadership to extend its influence in the country to a greater extent than it would have achieved with an actual coup, claims Mills, and could lead to the creation of the Lasswellian garrison state (Lasswell, 1941).

Mills's power elite theory gave rise to a series of studies and researches on the subject, where the most noted intervention is John Kenneth Galbraith's essay, *How to Control the Military* (Galbraith, 1969). But what appears most interesting and current in Mills's work is his pointing to a new and different military professionalism, as well as his approach to the problem of the changed relationship between the officer corps and national society and the related aspect of political control over the armed forces. His arguments are an important contribution to the dialectic opened in American military sociology by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz.

The theory of the total institution elaborated by Erving Goffman²² has not been studied exclusively for the military, but has been widely applied to it in subsequent studies and much research and is thus of basic interest to anyone dealing in the sociology of the military. The environment in which Goffman's conception of the total institution develops is American sociology of the 1950s, where the theories of organization²³ became firmly established. In these theories, which precede it both logically and historically, the total institution finds both a classifying definition and a ready-made conceptual scheme.

For Goffman a total institution is a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of

²²See References, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*.

²³For all, see the works of A. Etzioni and T. Parsons under References.

time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered routine of life. Subdivided into five different classes, the examples given by the author include orphanages, psychiatric hospitals, seminars, and prisons, as well as two installations typical of the military: barracks and ships. One of the fundamental social aspects of modern civilization, says Goffman, is that people tend to sleep, amuse themselves, and work in different places, with different companions, under different authorities, and with no rational overall pattern. By contrast, the chief characteristic of total institutions is the breaking down of the barriers that separate these spheres of life: total institutions are thus contained in a single place (seminary, prison, ship, barracks), are regulated by a single authority according to a rational plan, and unfold in contact with the same group of people; generally a much more numerous group than one's sleep or leisure are shared with in normal life. Last, the total institution is characterized by a dual structure: on one side there is a numerous group of controlled persons (inmates, in Goffman's terminology) and on the other the staff, a much more restricted nucleus which has the task of controlling.

Total institutions, Goffman asserts, are places in which people are forced to become different. The process begins with the destruction of their previous identity: To do this the institution first raises a barrier between the inmates and the outside world (gates, locked doors, walls, fencing, etc.), creating a separateness that leads to the loss of some of the subject's roles. Other losses are produced by the typical admission procedure: the haircut, the medical examination, the shower, the photograph, the confiscation of one's customary clothing, and the assigning of a number and of a place. These operations, also for the way in which they are usually carried out, seem designed to mould the newcomer like an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the institution for processing and smoothing by routine actions.

Once the inmate has been stripped of what he possesses, the institution carries out a replacement: just as it does in the physical sense for clothing, so it does in a moral sense for one's identity. The assignment and acceptance of the type of identification desired by the total institution are favored by means of a system of privileges. Basically, the gratifications that the individual was used to in civilian life and now largely denied are replaced by a system of surrogate gratifications that is generally more modest according to a scale of civilian values, but promoted by the institution and therefore less anxiety generating. Reinforcement is supplied by the institution of punishments, which are generally more severe than any experience the individual has had in the world of his family.

The theory of the total institution has been widely studied, applied, and also criticized by those who, following the publication of *Asylums*, devoted themselves to the analysis of the military. In Europe, in particular, it had a fortunate period in the decade following 1968, when the student movement subjected all institutions to radical criticism. Insofar as it is of interest here, the criticism basically pointed out that for the military the theory is applied only to a peacetime situation; it analyses only a few particular structures of the institution (ship and barracks); and, as regards the Western countries, it is more of historical value than an interpretation of current reality. In other words, in the past, conscription led to phenomena and situations that can be interpreted by drawing on the theory of the total institution, but this situation already appeared to be outdated in these countries when Goffman published his study.

At the height of the divergence/convergence debate, an interesting attempt was made in the United States to reconcile the two sides through a "pluralistic" theory, or "segmented model," as it has also been called. In a sociology of the military that was becoming increasingly mature in the United States in the early 1970s, numerous scholars contributed to

these efforts to reconcile the two theories,²⁴ but one of them stood out for completeness of formulation and the theorist's marked scientific personality: Charles C. Moskos, Jr. Nowadays, when speaking of the pluralistic model, reference is normally made to Moskos.

Actually, this scholar had already attracted attention with a work that, presented as an investigation on the enlisted man,²⁵ ended up being a far-reaching analysis of the organizational and institutional aspects of the U.S. armed forces. However, since his initial international renown came for the pluralistic theory that he asserted and developed, that is what I address first. The most complete formulation of this theory appears in a paper that Moskos presented in 1972 at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in Chicago and published the following year in a specialized journal (see References). In it Moskos proposes that the historical transformation of the military be interpreted as a dialectic evolution in which institutional persistences (divergent) react against the pressures toward assimilation to civilian life (convergent) present in society at large. In this process of change, the military establishment passes through historical phases of divergence and convergence with respect to civil society.

Even if the phase following the Second World War would seem, according to Moskos, a phase of convergence, this does not mean that it is Janowitz's thesis that is destined to prevail. In reality, says Moskos, a sectional view of the armed forces in transformation does not present a homogeneous institution, but a pluralistic organism where sectors with marked characteristics of assimilation to civil society coexist with sectors that preserve a more traditional military habitus, far removed from civilian mentality. According to this scholar, in the current context the pluralistic solution offers the best probability of combining the two fundamental requisites of a modern military in a democratic country: operational efficiency and political accountability to civilian authority. From this theoretical framework originates the author's best-known contribution to military sociological thought, i.e. his creation of the institution/occupation interpretive model.

Moskos defines as institutional environment the one in which the soldier enters the armed forces mainly through a calling; He identifies with the good of the collectivity, for which he is willing to sacrifice himself; and he looks more for moral than material incentives; and he manifests his possible dissatisfaction vertically along the hierarchy. By contrast, an occupation is defined in market economy terms, with a prevalence of monetary retribution over other forms of gratification; the individual is much more concerned with his own interests than those of the collectivity and he tends to organize and protect himself through pressure groups; the soldier's responsibilities and duties are contractual. Moskos conceives this as an evolutionary model that can be applied to the concrete situation of a given national context to determine the position of the country's military (or parts of it) along a continuum ranging from institution to occupation. For this purpose he developed a series of sociological indicators capable of concretely measuring the above.²⁶ The ease of practical application of Moskos's scheme to concrete situations roused much interest among

²⁴ Among whom Zeb Bradford and F. Brown (1973), Amos Jordan and William Taylor (1973), Edwin Deagle (1973), William Taylor and Donald Bletz (1974) (see References).

²⁵ See References, *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*.

²⁶ The model is first enunciated by Moskos at a conference of the Inter-University Seminar in Alabama in 1976, later published in the article "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization" in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 4, No. 1/1977, pp. 41-50. A subsequent reelaboration was presented in "Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update" in *Armed Forces and Society*, 12(3), 1986, pp. 377-382.

military sociologists, not only in America but more or less all over the world. The interest of many later scholars polarized around Moskos's model, in part with critical tones²⁷ that led him to make adjustments in subsequent editions of it.

If Moskos takes up different positions from Janowitz regarding the professional military model (pluralistic model versus structuralist model), he appears to be his direct descendant regarding predictions on the future use of the military and its future physiognomy, bringing Janowitz's constabulary concept to concrete development. Moskos begins his analysis of contingents in peacekeeping operations starting with *Peace Soldier* (see References) the result of a field survey conducted in Cyprus in the framework of United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Examining the modes of action of peacekeeping units, Moskos immediately recognizes that the point where the departure from traditional military ethics is most marked regarding the use of force. In the rules laid down for UNFICYP, the limitations on its use are extremely circumscribed and detailed. This results in the emergence of a new, "constabulary" ethic, and Moskos attempts to outline its features and developments, which come into being more in the field than in a theoretical or conceptual setting. But this constabulary ethic clashes with the traditional military ethic. Instead of pointing to a basic contradiction in this clash, Moskos sees an evolutionary process. His thesis is that the glory of war is not an essential ingredient of military honor and if one understands the tendencies internal to national armed forces, where forms of absolute authority have gradually given way to forms of managerial leadership based on persuasion, one must also see peacekeeping as a progression of military professionalism along managerial lines. Also, on the surface, there is a transition from the use of force to the use of persuasion.

Remaining faithful to what was said in the introduction, and therefore ending this historical overview with the 1980s, the last significant contribution by this author that I cite here is his careful classification of the sociology of the military and the bibliographic review that he presents in some later works published between 1976 and 1981.²⁸ However, it is not possible to conclusively summarize a scholar who is still, in the year 2002, at the height of his research activity and who has demonstrated a singular ability to have a profound influence on various sectors of investigation of the sociology of the military.

Although European and, in some of his works, profoundly Dutch, I include Jacques Van Doorn in the American School because his training and thrust, his points of reference, seem to move within this current of thought (and he is not the only European to do so, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s). Van Doorn reworks Huntington's conception of the military professional as a manager of organized violence. For Van Doorn, war is an abnormal situation, an interregnum between two periods of normality during which only one institution is suited to act, the armed forces: In the final analysis, a study of military problems is a study of violence. The essential function of the military professional is therefore the control and exercise, tendentially monopolistic, of organized collective violence.

Van Doorn approaches the military as a student of complex organizations.²⁹ This approach leads him to a natural comparison of the two emerging organizations in modern and contemporary times, the military and the industrial company.³⁰ For both of these organizations the search for improved efficiency is of utmost importance; both have

²⁷ See, for example, under References, G. Caforio, *The Military Profession: Theories of Change*.

²⁸ See References; in "Armed Forces and Society," published together with Gwyn Harries-Jenkins in *Current Sociology*, 1981.

²⁹ For his most significant works for the sociology of the military, see References.

³⁰ Theorizing what had already been done concretely by the team of *The American Soldier*, which had borrowed models elaborated in the area of industrial sociology in order to apply them to the military.

implemented a breakdown of human activities into simple, coordinated, organized elements. Indeed, both have changed their criterion for the selection of executive personnel from the ascriptive type to the acquisitive.

So if the military is a complex organization, is one who works for the military on a nontemporary basis a professional or a bureaucrat? For Van Doorn the officer corps is an excellent and perhaps unique example of integration between profession and organization and with a history long enough to allow complete observation of the blending process.

Van Doorn carefully analyses the two concepts: he first identifies common characteristics, such as the fact that both professions and organizations are based on special knowledge and skills, according to individually standardized models; both of them require the actors to refrain from personalizing the problems dealt with; in both models the individual positions are acquired through comparative selections of ability. However, according to Van Doorn, the differences are substantial as well: The professional exercises a calling focused on essential values for society, he therefore acts on the basis of a precise code of ethics, while the activity of the bureaucrat consists in relating means to ends following written rules more than a moral code. The professional's loyalty is to his profession and he is judged mainly by his colleagues, while the bureaucrat's loyalty is to the organization and the judgment that counts is that of his superiors. The structure of a profession is horizontal, while that of an organization is vertical, a hierarchy. Applying this analysis to the officer corps, Van Doorn finds that the military is undoubtedly an organization because its structure is rigidly vertical and hierarchic. At the same time, however, officers display the salient characteristics of professionals: a calling centered on important social values, social responsibility, and corporateness.

But the professionalization of the officer corps is something that developed over time, a phenomenon that, for Van Doorn, can be explained only by the intervention of the state. One characteristic of the military organization is that the state is its client; professionalization was therefore imposed by this essential client in its own interest. This interest is the importance of having a military leadership that is united by a rigorous code of ethics legalized through official recognition and educated through the creation of professional training academies. Consequently, a radical dichotomy internal to the military institution developed between the officer corps and other military personnel, a dichotomy that has survived until recently, with few problems for the institution thanks to a rigid, Goffmanian type of isolation of military society from civil society.

The present (1970s and onward) sees a decline in mass armies brought on by both changed warfare techniques and the crisis of the concept of conscription. Van Doorn analyzed the necessary passage from the draft to the volunteer army and examined all its consequences, with special emphasis on the decline in the social representativeness of the military, as well as the inclusion of values and mentalities typical of the industrial world, such as low mobility of personnel, wage demands, and unionization. This phenomenon, perceptively identified by Van Doorn at its first appearance,³¹ spontaneously led to still greater similarities between the military organization and the industrial organization (already theorized by this author), posing to the military a sizeable set of new problems which, prior to its transformation, were germane only to industry.

Jacques Van Doorn's most significant contribution consists in combining the concept of the military profession as an exercise in organized violence with that of the ongoing change in the institution and the profession. These two threads are present in all his work,

³¹ It would come to full development in Europe as well nearly 20 years later, in the 1990s.

leading him to largely anticipatory analyses that lend themselves to concrete applications and continue to be appreciated by contemporary scholars.³²

WORLDWIDE DEVELOPMENTS

The extraordinary development of the American School of thought in the sociology of the military encouraged numerous studies and much research throughout the world and, particularly in the Western countries, also of autonomous studies. Outside the United States, however, the differing dimensions of both national states and their military institutions have resulted in the most significant currents and developments occurring more within international organizations than in individual countries. International organizations continue to play an essential role in the debate and development of the sociology of the military and therefore knowledge of them is important for students and scholars alike.

This section, dedicated to developments in the sociology of the military worldwide, therefore confines itself to outlining the historical development of three international institutions in which broad give-and-take occurs to this day. The array of scholars working in this sector of sociology is too vast and too recent to allow summarizing their efforts in a brief outline such as this.

Research Committee 01

Research Committee 01(RC01) *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution*, is one of the 53 research committees into which the International Sociological Association (ISA) is subdivided, each dedicated to a special sociology. It was initially called *Armed Forces and Society* but was renamed in 1980, when its program was expanded to include the field of conflict research. The first meeting of what was to become the RC01 took place at a conference on armed forces held in London in 1964 and chaired by Morris Janowitz. The conference was sponsored by the Research Committee on Political Sociology and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society of Chicago and brought together scholars from the United States and Western European countries.

At the Sixth World Congress of Sociology in Evian (France, 1966), two groups were devoted to the subject. One dealt with "Conflict Resolution and Research in Conflict Resolution" and was headed by Robert C. Angell (United States). Eleven papers were presented and two were published in *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III: Working Groups and Round Table Papers*. The other, a working group on "Militarism and the Professional Military Man" headed by Morris Janowitz, became the nucleus of the Research Committee. It was attended by about 70 scholars from Western and Eastern Europe, the USSR, the United States, South America and the Far East, and 36 papers were delivered. The keynote paper by Janowitz appeared in *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. II: Sociology of International Relations*. A volume of many of the papers presented appeared in *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), edited by Jacques Van Doorn (The Netherlands). A steering committee was established, chaired by Morris Janowitz and including the participation of Jacques Van Doorn. The group was given the status of ISA Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society at the Seventh World Congress in Varna (Bulgaria, 1970).

³²One of Van Doorn's fundamental works, *The Soldier and Social Change* (see References), receives, for example, a warm introduction by Morris Janowitz.

In 1980 it was proposed to change the Committee's name to reflect the views of some members whose interests lay primarily in nonviolence, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution. The ISA Executive Committee approved the change at a meeting held in Budapest in September 1980 and the Research Committee's new name became *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution*. Since then, RC01 has taken part in all the World Congresses organized by the ISA and has held many interim meetings between one World Congress and the next. The presidents of RC01 have been Morris Janowitz (United States, 1966–1974), Jacques Van Doorn (The Netherlands, 1974–1978), Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (United Kingdom, 1978–1982), Charles Moskos (United States, 1982–1986), Bernhard Fleckenstein (Germany, 1986–1994), David Segal (United States, 1994–1998), and Giuseppe Caforio (Italy, 1998–2002). The objectives of RC01 are as follows: (1) to stimulate research on armed forces and conflict resolution, (2) to establish and maintain international contacts between scientists and research institutions, (3) to encourage the exchange and discussion of relevant research findings, (4) to support academic research and the study of military-related sociology, and (5) to plan and hold research conferences. Membership in RC01 is open to all scientists active in research and/or teaching in military-related social sciences and conflict resolution.

Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society

Morris Janowitz was also the founder of the Inter-University Seminar (IUS) on Armed Forces and Society, initially based in Chicago. Founded in 1960, the IUS today constitutes an international "invisible college" that includes academics, military officers, students, and researchers in a variety of institutional settings, both public and private. They represent various disciplines, including political science, sociology, history, psychology, economics, international relations, social work, anthropology, law, and psychiatry. The core premise of the IUS is that analyses of military institutions require intellectual collaboration across university, organisational, disciplinary, and national lines. Seminar Fellows provide new perspectives on the study of military professionalism, civil–military relations, social composition of the armed forces, organizational change within armed forces, public policy on defence issues, peacekeeping, arms control, and conflict resolution. The Fellows of the Seminar differ widely in their strategic and political outlooks, but they all hold the common view that objective research on military institutions is a most worthy goal for which we should continually strive. They believe that such research, conducted along scholarly lines, makes an invaluable contribution to citizen understanding of armed forces.

The current (2002) president of the IUS is David Segal of the University of Maryland. The IUS has an elected Council representing various regions in the United States and abroad. The IUS edits a journal, *Armed Forces & Society*. The IUS was the first international organization to bring together scholars of the sociology of the military from different countries; however, it has always been American-led and has moved according to patterns and research themes of fundamental interest to the American School.

European Research Group on Military and Society

As the sociopolitical characteristics of the United States, as well as the size and tasks of its military, are quite different from the European reality, a group of European scholars met in 1986 in Le Lavandou (France) to found a European research association. This association

was given the name *European Research Group On Military And Society* (ERGOMAS). ERGOMAS is an association of European social scientists who study the relationship between the military and society and related phenomena. Joint transnational research and intercultural comparisons in thematically oriented interdisciplinary working groups constitute the core of the association. ERGOMAS promotes empirically and theoretically oriented European research cooperation and international scientific communication. Its purposes are pursued through the activities of Working Groups and the association's Biennial Conferences. Indeed, the founding philosophy of ERGOMAS was to create an organizational framework suitable for promoting the constitution and activity of international thematic study groups within a European framework. The association is thus composed of a centralized organizational body, directed by a chairperson, and several research structures (the Working Groups), which operate in a coordinated manner but are completely independent from the scientific standpoint.

As stated above, the Working Groups are thematic and obviously vary in number depending on the researches in progress. They always have a multinational composition (all research is comparative or supranational) and remain active until the research on the theme has been exhausted. The current (2002) Working Groups are as follows: WG "Public Opinion, Mass Media and the Military," Marjan Malesic, Coordinator; WG "The Military Profession," Giuseppe Caforio, Coordinator; WG "Women in the Military," Marina Nuciari, Coordinator; WG "Globalisation, Localisation and Conflict," Donna Winslow, Coordinator; WG "Morale, Cohesion and Leadership," Paul Bartone and Andreas Pruefert, Coordinators; WG "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces," Hans Born, Coordinator; and WG "Warriors in Peacekeeping," Mathias Schönborn, Coordinator.

Since 1986 ERGOMAS has been chaired by Ralf Zoll (Germany), Willem Scheelen (The Netherlands), Lucien Mandeville (France), Marina Nuciari (Italy), Karl Haltiner (Switzerland), Maria Vlachova (Czech Republic), and Marjan Malesic (Slovenia).

For completeness, it should be added that, in the last quarter of the 20th century, many countries (especially in the West) have created national study and research institutes in the military sociology sector; most of them are governmental,³³ but there are also private ones (for more details, see Chapter 3: "*Social Research and the Military*"). In addition, this discipline now constitutes a subject of study in military academies throughout the world and often has an important formative role in officers' basic education.

³³One can cite, by way of example, the German Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, the French Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense, the Italian Centro di Studi Strategici e Militari, and the Polish Military Institute for Sociological Research.



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