

1 Introduction: Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century

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1.1 Introductory Remark

This book focuses on the *reconceptualization of security in the 21st century* that has gradually evolved since the end of the East-West conflict (1989–1991) and that has been significantly influenced by processes of globalization and global environmental change.

This global turn has resulted in the end of the Cold War (1946–1989), which some historians have interpreted as a ‘long peace’ (Gaddis 1987, 1997) with a highly armed bipolar international order, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and of a competitive global ideology, system of rule and military superpower. These events brought about a fundamental and peaceful change in international order that made the reunification of Germany (1990) and of Europe with the Eastern enlargement of the EU (2004, 2007) possible.

This turn has been portrayed either as a ‘victory’ of US superiority (Schweitzer 1994) or as an outcome of a ‘political learning’ (Grunberg/Risse-Kappen 1992) based on a new thinking (*‘Perestroika’*) of Gorbachev that contributed to the first major peaceful global change in modern history. This ‘global turn’ (1989–1991) has been the fourth major change since the French Revolution that was instrumental for the emergence of a new international order. Three previous turning points in modern history were the result of revolutions (1789, 1911–1918) and of wars (1796–1815, 1914–1918, 1931–1949) resulting in a systemic transformation.

This fourth peaceful turn triggered a peaceful (Czechoslovakia) and violent disintegration of multi-ethnic states (USSR, Yugoslavia); it contributed to the emergence of ‘failing’ states (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan) and to ‘new wars’ (Kaldor/Vashee 1997; Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002, 2005). Besides the events in Europe during 1989, events in other parts of the world had no similar impact on the new global (dis)order during the 1990’s, e.g. the death of Mao Zedong (1976) and the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping

in China (1978–1990); the end of the dictatorships and the third wave of democratization in Latin America; and the many new wars in Africa due to weak, failing or failed states where warlords took over control in parts of West (Liberia) and Eastern Africa (Somalia), as well as in Asia (Afghanistan).

This chapter aims at a mental mapping of the complex interaction between this most recent global structural change and conceptual innovation that have occurred in academia, in international organizations as well as in the declarations and statements of governments since 1990 up to spring 2007. It refers only briefly to the term and concept of security (1.2, see for details chapters 3–9 in this volume), to the contextual context: events, structures, concepts and action (1.3), to the theme of contextual change, conceptual innovation as tools for knowledge creation and action (1.4), to the drivers and centres of conceptual innovation (1.5), to four scientific disciplines: history, philosophy, social sciences, and international law (1.6), to the *Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace* and to the goal of the three related volumes (1.7), to the goals, structure, authors, and audience of this book (1.8) as well as to the expected audience of this book (1.9).

1.2 Object: Term and Concept of Security.

Security is a basic *term* and a key *concept* in the social sciences that is used in intellectual traditions and schools, conceptual frameworks, and approaches. The term ‘security’ is associated with many different meanings that refer to frameworks and dimensions, apply to individuals, issue areas, societal conventions, and changing historical conditions and circumstances. Thus, security as an individual or societal political value has no independent meaning and is always related

Table 1.1: Vertical Levels and Horizontal Dimensions of Security in North and South

Security dimension \Rightarrow Level of interaction \Downarrow (referent objects)	Military	Political	Economic	Environmental \Downarrow	Social
Human \Rightarrow			Social, energy, food, health, livelihood threats, challenges and risks may pose a <i>survival dilemma</i> in areas with high vulnerability		
Village/Community/Society				$\Downarrow \Uparrow$	
National	"Security dilemma of competing states" (<i>National Security Concept</i>)		"Securing energy, food, health, livelihood etc." (<i>Human Security Concept</i>) combining all levels of analysis & interaction		
International/Regional				$\Downarrow \Uparrow$	
Global/Planetary \Rightarrow					

to a context and a specific individual or societal value system and its realization (see chap. 4 by Brauch).

Security is a societal value or symbol (Kaufmann 1970, 1973) that is used in relation to protection, lack of risks, certainty, reliability, trust and confidence, predictability in contrast with danger, risk, disorder and fear. As a social science concept, "security is ambiguous and elastic in its meaning" (Art 1993: 821). Arnold Wolfers (1962: 150) pointed to two sides of the security concept: "Security, in an *objective* sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a *subjective* sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."

For the constructivists, security is *intersubjective* referring to "what actors make of it" (Wendt 1992, 1999). Thus, security depends on a normative core that can not simply be taken for granted. Political constructions of security have real world effects, because they guide action of policymakers, thereby exerting constitutive effects on political order (see chap. 4 by Wæver, 37 by Baylis, 51 by Hintermeier in this vol.). The 'security concept' has gradually widened since the 1980's (Krell 1981; Jahn/Lemaitre/Wæver 1987; Wæver/Lemaitre/Tromer 1989; Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1995, 1998; Wæver/Buzan/de Wilde 2008; chap. 38 by Albrecht/Brauch). For Wæver (1997, chap. 4 and 44) security is the result of a speech act ('securitization'), according to which an issue is treated as: "an existential threat to a valued referent object" to allow "urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat". Thus, the "securitizing actor" points "to an existential threat" and thereby legitimizes "extraordinary measures".

'Security in an objective sense' refers to specific *security dangers*, i.e. to 'threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks' (Brauch 2003, 2005, 2005a) to specific *security dimensions* (political, military, economic, so-

cietal, environmental) and *referent objectives* (international, national, human) as well as *sectors* (social, energy, food, water), while 'security in a subjective sense' refers to *security concerns* that are expressed by government officials, media representatives, scientists or 'the people' in a speech act or in written statements (historical sources) by those who securitize 'dangers' as security 'concerns' being existential for the survival of the referent object and that require and legitimize extraordinary measures and means to face and cope with these concerns. Thus, *security concepts* have always been the product of orally articulated or written statements by those who use them as tools to analyse, interpret, and assess past actions or to request or legitimize present or future activities in meeting the specified security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks.

The Copenhagen School (Buzan/Wæver 1997; Wæver 1997; Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998; Wæver/Buzan/de Wilde 2008), distinguished among five dimensions (*widening*: military, political, economic, societal and environmental), and five referent objects ('whose security') or levels of interaction or analysis (*deepening*: international, regional, national, domestic groups, individual). They did not review the *sectorialization* of security from the perspective of *national* (international, regional) and *human security* (Brauch 2003, 2005, 2005a; table 1.1).

Influenced by different worldviews, rival theories and mindsets, security is a key concept of competing schools of a) *war, strategic or security studies* from a realist perspective, and b) *peace and conflict research* from an idealist or pragmatic view (chap. 40 by Albrecht/Brauch). Since 1990, interparadigm debates emerged between traditional, critical, and constructivist approaches. Within the UN and NATO, different concepts coexist, a state-centred political and

Table 1.2: Expanded Concepts of Security (Møller 2001, 2003; Oswald 2001, 2007)

Concepts of security	Reference object (security of whom?)	Value at risk (security of what?)	Source(s) of threat (security from whom/ what?)
National Security [political, military dimension]	The state	Sovereignty, territorial integrity	Other states, guerilla, terrorism (substate actors)
Societal security [dimension]	Nations, societal groups	National unity, identity	(States) Nations, migrants, alien cultures
Human security	Individuals, humankind	Survival, quality of life	State, globalization, GEC, nature, terrorism
Environmental security [dimension]	Ecosystem	Sustainability	Humankind
Gender security	Gender relations, indigenous people, minorities, children, elders	Equality, equity, identity, solidarity, social representations	Patriarchy, totalitarian institutions (governments, religions, elites, culture), intolerance, violence

military concept, and an extended security concept with economic, societal, and environmental dimensions. A widening and deepening of the security concept prevailed in OECD countries, while other countries adhered to a narrow military concept

Not only the scope of ‘*securitization*’ (Wæver 1997, 1997a) has changed, but also the referent object from a ‘national’ to a ‘human-centred’ security concept, both within the UN system (UNDP 1994; UNESCO 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003; UNU 2002; UNU-EHS 2004), and in the academic security community.

In European security discourses, an ‘extended’ security concept is used by governments and in scientific debates (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998). Møller (2001, 2003) distinguished a ‘national’ and three expanded security concepts of ‘societal, human, and environmental security’. Oswald (2001, 2007, 2008) introduced a combined ‘human, gender and environmental’ (HUGE) security concept (table 1.2).

While since the 19th century the key ‘actor’ has been the state, it has not necessarily been a major ‘referent object’ of security which is often referred to as ‘the people’ or ‘our people’ whose survival is at stake (Brauch chap. 3; Albrecht/Brauch chap. 38). From 1947 to 1989 national and military security issues became a matter of means (armaments), instruments (intelligence) and strategies (deterrence). Wæver (1995: 45) argued that environmental issues may pose threats of violent conflicts and that they may also put the survival of the people at stake (e.g. by forced migration) without a threat of war.

Whether a threat, challenge, vulnerability, and risk (Brauch 2005a, 2006) becomes an ‘objective security danger’ or a ‘subjective security concern’ also depends

on the political context. While in Europe climate change has become a major security issue, in the US, during the administration of George W. Bush this problem was downgraded. Labelling climate change a security issue implies different degrees of urgency and means for coping with it.

The traditional understanding of security “as the absence of existential threats to the state emerging from another state” (Müller 2002: 369) has been challenged both with regard to the key subject (the state) and carrier of security needs, and its exclusive focus on the “physical – or political – dimension of security of territorial entities” that are behind the suggestions for a horizontal and vertical widening of the security concept.

The meaning of security was also interpreted as a reaction to globalization and to global environmental change. In Europe, several critical approaches to security gradually evolved as the *Aberystwyth* (Booth, Wyn Jones, William), *Paris* (Bigo, Badie) and *Copenhagen* (Wiberg, Wæver, Møller) schools that led to the development of a *New European Security Theory* (NEST, e.g. Bürger/Stritzel 2005) and a ‘networked manifesto’ (CASE 2006; chap. 38 by Albrecht/Brauch).

1.3 Events – Structures – Concepts – Action

Political and scientific concepts, like security, are used within a complex context (Koselleck 2006). These concepts have a temporal and systematic structure, they embody and reflect the time when they were used and they are thus historical documents in the

persistent change in the history of short events (*histoire des événements*) and long structures (Braudel's (1949, 1969, 1972) *histoire de la longue durée*). Concepts are influenced by manifold perceptions and interpretations of events that only rarely change the basic structures of international politics and of international relations (IR).

The political events of 1989, the rare coincidence of a reform effort from the top and a yearning for freedom and democracy from the bottom, as part of a peaceful upheaval in East Central Europe toppled the Communist governments in all East Central European countries within three months, and thus were instrumental for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Comecon (1991).

The Cold War bipolar order of two rival highly armed political systems with the capability to destroy the globe with its weapons of mass destruction based on nuclear deterrence doctrines became obsolete as well as the traditional security legitimizations with the arms of the other side. This structural change of the international order influenced the security policy agendas and provoked a global political and scientific debate on the reconceptualization of security. This debate has been global, stimulated by many policy actors, scientists and intellectuals. The results of this process are documented in the national security doctrines and strategies (e.g. in the US) and in defence white papers of many countries (e.g. in Germany 1994, 2006). They have also been an object of analysis of the scientific community that gradually emancipated itself from the US conceptual dominance (Wæver 2004; Wæver/Buzan 2006). But these Northern discourses on security have been unaware and ignored the thinking of the philosophical traditions in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and in the Arab world.

While Huntington in his 'clash of civilization' (1993, 1996) succeeded to 'securitize culture' from the vantage point of US national security interests and strategies, the critical responses (Said; Chomsky; Ajami) reflected the cultural and religious diversity of the other five billion people that have been primarily an object of security thinking and policy during and after the Cold War.

This reconceptualization of security has impacts on international agendas and thus on political action on many different levels. UNDP (1994) introduced a 'people-centred' human security concept that was subsequently promoted by the *Human Security Network* (as 'freedom from fear'), and by the *Human Security Commission* (as 'freedom from want'), to which Kofi

Annan added as a third pillar: 'freedom to live in dignity' and the *United Nations University* (UNU) as the fourth pillar: 'freedom from hazard impact' (Bogardi/Brauch 2005; Brauch 2005, 2005a).

An effort of the only remaining superpower to regain control over the security discourse in its 'war on terror' by trying to politically adapt scientific evidence on climate change and to constrain scientific freedom has failed. Other efforts by a leading neo-conservative think tank to pay scientists a fee for challenging the fourth IPCC Report (2007) to downgrade and thus to de-securitize these new dangers posed by anthropogenic climate change may also fail.¹

The increasing perception of global environmental change (GEC) as a 'threat' to the survival of humankind and the domestic backlash in the US against the narrow security concepts and policies of the Neo-cons has widely established a widened, deepened, and sectorialized security concept that increasingly reflects the existing cultural and religious diversity also in the political debate on security as well as in scientific discourses. In this context, this volume has a dual function: a) to map this global conceptual change; and b) to create a wide scientific and political awareness of the new threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks that often differ from the perception of the present political elite in the only remaining superpower.

Thus, conceptualizing security concepts and defining the manifold security interests and preferences, structures the public policy discourse and legitimates the allocation of scarce financial resources to 'face' and 'cope' with major security dangers and concerns that threaten the survival of states, human beings or humankind and thus require 'extraordinary' political action.

1.4 Contextual Change, Conceptual Innovation as Tools for Knowledge Creation and Action

A key analytical question to which all authors were invited to reflect is to which extent the structural change in the global and regional international order

1 See: Ian Sample: "Scientists offered cash to dispute climate study", in: *The Guardian*, 2 February 2007; Elisabeth Rosenthal; Andrew C. Revkin: "Science Panel Calls Global Warming 'Unequivocal'", in: *The New York Times*, 3 February 2007; Juliet Eilperin: "Humans Faulted For Global Warming International Panel Of Scientists Sounds Dire Alarm", in: *Washington Post*, 3 February 2007.

was instrumental, triggered or contributed to this conceptual innovation and diversity in the global security discourse since 1990 or to which extent other events or regional or national structural changes have initiated a conceptual rethinking.

From the perspective of this author, major changes in the international order for the past 500 years have been:

- The *Hispanic World Order*: Expulsion of the Arabs and conquest of the Americas (1492–1618) by Spain and Portugal that resulted in a global order dominated by the Christian ‘civilized world’ that perceived the South as ‘primitive barbarians’;
- The *peace of Münster and Osnabrück* (1648) after the religious Thirty Years War (1618–1648), and the emergence of the Westphalian European order based on territorial states and an emerging international law;
- The *Utrecht Settlement* and the century of war and peace in the order of Christian princes (1715–1814).

After the independence of the United States (1776), the French Revolution (1789), and the wars of liberation in Latin America (1809–1824) and the emergence of many new independent states (1817–1839) in Europe four major international orders and major global structural and contextual changes can be distinguished:

- The *Peace Settlement of Vienna* (1815) and the European order of a balance of power based on a Concert of Europe (1815–1914) in an era of imperialism (Africa, Asia) and the post-colonial liberation in Latin America.
- The *Peace of Versailles* (1919) with a collapse of the European world order, a declining imperialism and the emergence of two new power centres in the US and in the USSR with competing political, social, economic, and cultural designs and a new global world order based on the security system of the *League of Nations* (1919–1939).
- The *Political Settlement of Yalta* (February 1945) and the system of the United Nations discussed at the Conferences in Dumbarton Oaks (1944), *Chapultepec* (January/ February 1945), and adopted at *San Francisco* (April/June 1945).

With these turning points during the European dominance of world history, the thinking on security changed. External and internal security became major tasks of the modern dynastic state. With the French Revolution and its intellectual and political conse-

quences the thinking on ‘*Rechtssicherheit*’ (legal predictability guaranteed by a state based on laws) gradually evolved. With the Covenant of the League of Nation ‘*collective security*’ became a key concept in international law and in international relations (IR).

Since 1945, this ‘national security’ concept has become a major focus of the IR discipline that gradually spread from iAberystwyth (1919) via the US after 1945 to the rest of the world. The Cold War (1946–1989) was both a political, military, and economic struggle and an ideological, social, and cultural competition when the modern ‘security concept’ emerged as a political and a scientific concept in the social sciences that was intellectually dominated by the American (Katzenstein 1996) and Soviet (Adomeit 1998) strategic culture. With the end of the Cold War, the systemic conflict between both superpowers and nuclear deterrence became obsolete and its prevailing security concepts had to be reconsidered and adjusted to the new political conditions, security dangers, and concerns.

This process of rethinking or ‘reconceptualization of security concepts’ and ‘redefinition of security interests’ that was triggered by the global turn of 1989–1991 and slightly modified by the events of 11 September 2001 (Der Derian 2004; Kupchan 2005; Risse 2005; Müller 2005; Guzzini 2005) and the subsequent US-led ‘war on terror’ has become a truly global process.

The intellectual dominance of the two Cold War superpowers has been replaced by an intellectual pluralism representing the manifold intellectual traditions but also the cultural and religious diversity. In this and the two subsequent volumes authors representing the five billion people outside the North Atlantic are given a scientific ‘voice’ that is often ignored in the inward oriented national security discourses that may contribute little to an understanding of these newly emerging intellectual debates after the end of the Cold War.

According to Tierney and Maliniak (2005: 58–64): “American scholars are a relatively insular group who primarily assign American authors to their students.”² In an overview of three rival theories of realism, liberalism and idealism (constructivism), Snyder (2004: 53–62) listed among the founders of realism (Morgenthau, Waltz) and idealism (Wendt, Ruggie) only Americans but of liberalism two Europeans (Smith, Kant). Among the thinkers in all three schools of realism (Mearsheimer, Walt), liberalism (Doyle, Keohane, Ikenberry) and idealism (Barnett and the only two women: Sikkink, Finnemore) again only Americans

qualified. This may reflect the prevailing image of the 'us' and 'they'. But in a second survey Malinak, Oakes, Peterson and Tierney (2007: 62–68) concluded that:

89 per cent of scholars believe that the war [in Iraq] will ultimately decrease US security. 87 per cent consider the conflict unjust, and 85 per cent are pessimistic about the chances of achieving a stable democracy in Iraq in the next 10–15 years. ... 96 per cent view the United States as less respected today than in the past (Malinak/Oakes/Peterson/Tierney 2007: 63).

A large majority of US IR scholars opposed unilateral US military intervention and called for a UN endorsement. Seventy per cent describe themselves as liberals and only 13 per cent as conservative. Their three most pressing foreign-policy issues during the next 10 years reflect the official policy agenda: international terrorism (50 per cent), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (45 per cent), the rise of China (40 per cent). Only a minority consider global warming (29 per cent), global poverty (19 per cent) and resource scarcity (14 per cent) as the most pressing issues.²

These snapshots refer to a certain parochialism within the IR discipline which made the perception of the global process of reconceptualization of security, and of new centres of conceptual innovation on security more difficult. But the thinking of the writers outside the North Atlantic and their different concerns matter in the 21st century when the centres of economic, political, and military power may shift to other parts of the world (see part IX in this book).

1.5 Drivers and Centres of Conceptual Innovation

The drivers of the theoretical discourse on security and the intellectual centres of conceptual innovation have moved away from both Russia (after 1989) but gradually also from the United States. During the 1980's, the conceptual thinking on 'alternative se-

curity' or 'defensive defence' in Europe was looking for political and military alternatives to the mainstream deterrence doctrines and nuclear policies (Weizsäcker 1972; Afheldt 1976; SAS 1984, 1989; Brauch/Kennedy 1990, 1992, 1993; Møller 1991, 1992, 1995). It was a major intellectual force behind the independent 'peace movement' that called for both disarmament and human rights in both camps (e.g. END, 1980–1989).

In 2007, the discourses on security are no longer a primarily American social science (Crawford/Jarvis 2001; Hoffmann 2001; Nossal 2001; Zürn 2003). The critiques of peace researchers and alternative security experts in Europe during the 1970's and 1980's, but also new national perspectives during the 1990's, e.g. in France (Lacoste, Bigo, Badie), in the UK (Buzan, Booth, Smith, Rogers), Canada (Porter 2001), Germany (Albrecht, Czempiel, Senghaas, Rittberger) challenged American conceptualizations of national security. Since the 1990's in Southern Europe a re-emergence of geopolitics (France, Italy, Spain) could be observed (Brauch, chap. 22). In other parts of the world a critical or new geopolitics school emerged (O'Tuathail, Dalby) but also a spatialization of global challenges (ecological geopolitics or political geo-ecology). In Germany there has been a focus on progressing debordering, or deterritorialization of political processes (Wolf, Zürn) primarily in the EU while new barriers were directed against immigration from the South in both the US (toward Mexico) and in Europe (in the Mediterranean).

Groom and Mandaville (2001: 151) noted an "increasingly influential European set of influences that have historically, and more recently, informed the disciplinary concerns and character of IR" that have been stimulated by the writings of Foucault, Bourdieu, Luhmann, Habermas, Beck and from peace research by Galtung, Burton, Bouthoul, Albrecht, Czempiel, Rittberger, Senghaas, Väyrynen. Since the 1980's, the conceptual visions of African (Nkruma, Nyerere and Kaunda) and Arab leaders (Nasser), as well as the Southern concepts of self-reliance and Latin American theories of 'dependencia' of the 1960's and 1970's (Furtado 1965; Marini 1973; Dos Santos 1978) had only a minor impact on Western thinking in international relations and on security.

Since 1990 the new centres of conceptual innovation are no longer the US Department of Defense or the US academic centres in security studies in the Ivy League programmes. The effort by US neo-conservatives to reduce the global security agenda to weapons

2 They claimed: "The subject may be international relations, but the readings are overwhelmingly American. Almost half of the scholars surveyed report that 10 per cent or less of the material in their introductory courses is written by non-Americans, with a full 10 per cent of professors responding that they do not assign any authors from outside the United States. Only 5 per cent of instructors give non-Americans equal billing on their syllabuses" (Tierney/Malinak 2005: 63). While one third in the US IR field are women, among the 25 most influential scholars are only men, among them many are considered leading security experts.

of mass destruction and to the 'war on terror' has also failed, and many scholars share the scepticism.

However, most journals on security studies (e.g. *International Security*) are produced in the US and the North American market has remained the biggest book market for the security related literature. Since 1990 new journals on IR and security problems have evolved elsewhere, and since 1992 the triennial pan-European Conferences on International Relations (ECPR) in Heidelberg (1992), Paris (1995), Vienna (1998), Canterbury (2001), The Hague (2004) and Turin (2007) have supplemented the Annual International Studies Association conferences in North America where the intellectual debates on both security, peace, environment, and development are taking place. In August 2005 ECPR and ISA with partners in other parts of the world organized the first world conference on international relations in Istanbul.

In the political realm, the US as the only remaining superpower – irrespective of its 48 per cent contribution to global arms expenditures (SIPRI 2006) – has lost its predominance to set and control the international security agenda and US scholars no longer set the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical agenda of the scientific security discourse. In Europe and elsewhere new centres of intellectual and conceptual innovation have emerged in the security realm:

- In Europe, *Aberystwyth*, *Paris*, and *Copenhagen* have been associated with three new critical 'schools' on security theory (Wæver 2004).
- The *Copenhagen School* combined peace research with the Grotian tradition of the English School, integrating inputs from Scandinavian, British, German, and French discourses (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1997; Wæver/Buzan/de Wilde 2008).
- The *human security concept* was promoted by Mahub ul Haq (Pakistan) with the UNDP report of 1994 and then developed further with Japanese support by the *Human Security Commission* (2003) and promoted both by UNESCO and UNU globally.
- Civil society organizations in South Asia developed the concept of *livelihood security*.
- International organizations introduced the sectoral concepts of *energy* (IEA, OECD), *food* (FAO, WFP), *water* (UNEP) and *health* (WHO) security (see Hexagon vol. IV).
- In the US and Canada, and in Switzerland and Norway the concept of *environmental security* as

security concerns emerged during the 1980's and 1990's.

- Since 1990 the epistemic community of the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC) provoked a global scientific and policy debate on climate change.
- The *Earth System Science Partnership* (ESSP) and its four programmes: IHDP (*International Human Dimensions Programme*), IGBP (*International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme*), WCRP (*World Climate Research Programme*) and *Diversitas* and its project GECHS (*Global Environmental Change and Human Security*) resulted in global scientific networks that address new security dangers and concerns.

Trends in the *reconceptualization of security* that will be mapped in the Hexagon Series are:

- *widening, deepening, and sectorialization* of security concepts;
- shift of referent object from the state to human beings or humankind (*human security*);
- perception of *new security dangers* (threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks) and *securitization* of new security concerns due to an articulation by national and international organizations, scientific epistemic communities, and an attentive public with a progressing decentralization and diversity of information control through the internet;
- search for new non-military strategies to face and cope with these newly perceived security dangers and concerns and new environmental dangers, hazards, and disasters that pose no classical security dilemma (Herz 1950, 1959, 1962) for states but a 'survival dilemma' (Brauch 2004, chap. 40) for people.

These new drivers and centres of conceptual innovation have fundamentally challenged the narrow state-focused security concept of the traditionalists and realists in the Cold War.

1.6 History, Social Sciences, Philosophy, International Law

Events, structures, and concepts stand for three different historical approaches of:

- a *history of events* (of states and government elites) in diplomacy, conflicts, and wars focusing on the activities of states during wars;

- a *history of structures* (history of ‘longue durée’ and of conjunctural cycles) in the accounts on social, societal, and economic history;
- a history of ideas (*‘Ideengeschichte’*) and concepts (*‘Begriffsgeschichte’*).

1.6.1 Contextual Change and Conceptual History

The history of concepts was instrumental for a major German editorial project on key historical concepts (Brunner/Conze/Koselleck 1972–1997). Koselleck (1979, 1989, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2006) addressed the complex interlinkages between the temporal features of events, structures, and concepts in human (societal) history but also the dualism between experience and concepts (chap. 3 by Brauch). ‘

Conze (1984: 831–862) reviewed the evolution of the meaning of the German concepts security (*‘Sicherheit’*) and protection (*‘Schutz’*) that evolved – based on Roman and Medieval sources – since the 17th century with the dynastic state and was closely linked to the modern state. Since 1648 internal security was distinguished from external security which became a key concept of foreign and military policy and of international law. During the 17th and 18th centuries internal security was stressed by Hobbes and Pufendorf as the main task of the sovereign for the people.

In the American constitution, safety is linked to liberty. During the French Revolution the declaration of citizens’ rights declared security as one of its four basic human rights. For Wilhelm von Humboldt the state became a major actor to guarantee internal and external security while Fichte stressed the concept of mutuality where the state as the granter of security and the citizen interact. Influenced by Kant, Humboldt, and Fichte the concept of the *‘Rechtsstaat’* (legally constituted state) and *‘Rechtssicherheit’* (legal predictability of the state) became key features of the thinking on security in the early 19th century (Conze 1984).

The concept of ‘social security’ gradually evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries, especially during F.D. Roosevelt’s New Deal as a key goal to advance the security of the citizens: “the security of the home, the security of the livelihood, and the security of the social insurance.” This was addressed in the *Atlantic Charter* of 1941 as “securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security.” In 1948 social security became a key human right in Art. 22 of the General Declaration of Human Rights.

The ‘national’ security concept in the US resulted in the emergence of the American security system (Czempiel 1966), or of a national security state (Yergin 1977). It was used to legitimate a major shift in the mindset from the isolationism of the 1930’s to the internationalism in the post-war years, i.e. from a fundamental criticism of military armaments to a legitimization of an unprecedented military and arms build-up and militarization of the mindset of post-war foreign policy elites.

The changes in the thinking on security and their embodiment in security concepts are also a semantic reflection of the fundamental changes as they have been perceived in different parts of the world and conceptually articulated in alternative or new and totally different security concepts. Competing securitization efforts of terrorism or climate change are behind the transatlantic and global security policy debate and the global scientific conceptual discourse.

1.6.2 Conceptual Mapping in the Social Sciences

In the social sciences, the security concept has been widely used in *political science* (chap. 37 by Baylis in this vol.), and *economics* (chap. 36 by Mursheed and 43 Mesjasz) that focus on different actors: on the political realm (governments, parliaments, public, media, citizens); on society (societal groups) and on the business community (firms, customers, economic and fiscal policies). In political science, the security concept has been used in its threefold context: *policy* (field of security policy), *politics* (process on security, military, and arms issues), and *polity* (legal norms, laws, and institutions on the national and international level). The US National Security Act of 1947 (Czempiel 1966, Brauch 1977) and its adjustments has created the legal and institutional framework for the evolution of the ‘national security state’, sometimes also referred to as a military-industrial complex (Eisenhower 1972). This evolution has been encapsulated in the US debate on the concepts of ‘national’ and since 2001 also ‘homeland’ security.

1.6.3 Analysis of Concepts and their Linkages in Philosophy

The evolution and systematic analysis of concepts has been a major task of political philosophy and of the history of ideas. In German several philosophical publications documented the contemporary philosophy and its concepts in its interrelationship to their hi-

storical structure and the sciences.³ From a philosophical perspective after the end of the Cold War, Makropoulos (1995: 745–750) analysed the evolution of the German concept ‘Sicherheit’ from its Latin and Greek origins and its evolution and transformation during the medieval period, after the reformation as a concept in theology, philosophy, politics and law, with a special focus on Hobbes, Locke, Wolff, Rousseau, and Kant. In the 20th century he reviewed the prevention and compensation of genuinely social and technical insecurity as well as new social risks. While this article briefly noted the concept of ‘social security’ the key concept of ‘national security’ or the more recent concepts of ‘human security’ were not mentioned.

1.6.4 Security Concepts in National Public and International Law

Since the 18th century the security concept was widely used in the context of constitutional or public law for the legal system providing ‘*Rechtssicherheit*’ for the citizens in their engagement with the state. The concepts of ‘international peace and security’ have been repeatedly used in the Covenant and in the UN Charter where Art. 1,1 outlines its key purpose:

to maintain international peace and *security*, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace ... 2. to develop friendly relations among nations ... 3. to achieve international cooperation ... [and] 4. to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Wolfrum (1994: 51) points to the subjective and objective elements of ‘international security’, the pursuit of which “implies a transformation of international relations so that every state is assured that peace will not be broken, or at least that any breach of the peace will

be limited in its impact.” In addition he referred to the “defining characteristic of the concept of collective security [as] the protection of the members of the system against a possible attack on the part of any other member of the same system,” and he noted that “the distinction drawn between the concepts of collective security and collective self-defence has been blurred to some extent in practice, and it also has lost relevance with respect to the United Nations” because due to the universal nature of the UN system “any distinction based upon external or internal acts of aggression [have been rendered] meaningless.”

1.6.5 Debate on Security Concepts within the United Nations

In a report of the Secretary-General on *Concepts of Security* (UN 1986)⁴ that was prepared by government experts from Algeria, Venezuela, Sweden (chair), China, GDR, Romania, Uganda, USSR, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Malaysia, India and Australia security was defined as:

a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress. International security is thus the result and the sum of the security of each and every State member of the international community; accordingly, international security cannot be reached without full international cooperation. However, security is a relative rather than an absolute term. National and international security need to be viewed as matters of degree (UN 1986: 2).

Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar noted that “concepts of security are the different bases on which States and the international community as a whole rely for their security” and he observed that “the

3 See e.g. the historical dictionary of philosophy (*Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*) published first in 1899 by Rudolf Eisler, and its fourth edition (1927–1930). A different approach was pursued in the new *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, launched and edited by Joachim Ritter and written by a team of more than 1,500 scholars that has been published in twelve volumes between 1971 and 2004. It includes four types of contributions: a) terminological articles, b) key concepts with minor changes in history, c) combined concepts in their systematic context (e.g. in logic), and d) historical method for more detailed articles that track the continuity and change of concepts from Classical Greek to contemporary philosophical treatments.

4 The GA in Res. 37/99 of 13 December 1983 called for “a comprehensive study of concepts of security, in particular security policies which emphasize cooperative efforts and mutual understanding between states, with a view of developing proposals for policies aimed at preventing the arms race, building confidence in relations between states, enhancing the possibility of reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament and promoting political and economic security (UN DOC A/40/533).” This resulted in several reports published by the Secretary-General on the “Relationship between Disarmament and International Security” (Disarmament Study Series No. 8, 1982); on “Concepts of Security” (Disarmament Study Series No. 14, 1986) and on “Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies” (Disarmament Study Series No. 26, 1993).

group recognized the different security concepts [that] have evolved in response to the need for national security and as a result of changing political, military, economic and other circumstances.” He summarized the group’s common understanding on six elements of a security concept:

- a) All nations have the right to security.
- b) The use of military force for purposes other than self-defence is no legitimate instrument of national policy.
- c) Security should be understood in comprehensive terms, recognizing the growing interdependence of political, military, economic, social, geographical and technological factors.
- d) Security is the concern of all nations and in the light of the threat of proliferating challenges to global security all nations have the right and duty to participate in the search for constructive solutions.
- e) The world’s diversities with respect to ethnic origins, language, culture, history, customs, ideologies, political institutions, socio-economic systems and levels of development should not be allowed to constitute obstacles to international cooperation for peace and security.
- f) Disarmament and arms limitation...is an important approach to international peace and security and it has thus become the most urgent task facing the entire international community (UN 1986: v-vi).

Since 1990, Secretaries-General Boutros Ghali (1992, 1995) and Annan (2005) have conceptualized ‘security’ and ‘human security’ that according to Annan’s report *In Longer Freedom* is based on ‘freedom from want’, ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom to live in dignity’.

For the post Cold War (1990–2006) years, Michael Bothe (chap. 35) reviewed the changes in the use of the concept of security in UNSC decisions on activities that have been considered as threats to ‘international peace and security’ or as ‘breaches of peace’. Jürgen Dedring (chap. 46) reviewed the introduction of the ‘human security’ concept in the deliberations of the Security Council as a result of the activities of Canada on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts while Fuentes (2002; 2008) analysed the activities of the Human Security Network in the promotion of a common human security agenda within and outside of the UN system.

In the scientific disciplines reviewed in this volume, key changes could be noticed in the meaning of the concept of security as well as in the five dimen-

sions of a wider security concept. This process of re-conceptualizing security since 1990 could also be observed in statements of international organizations (UN, OSCE, EU, OECD, NATO) and in the interfaces between security and development. Much evidence could be found for the working hypothesis that the global turn has resulted in a reconceptualization of security.

1.6.6 Reconceptualization of Regional Security

New security concepts have been adopted with the *Declaration of the Organization of American States* in October 2003 in Mexico (chap. 69 by Rojas), with the *European Security Strategy* of 2003 (chap. 51 by Hintermeier) by the European Union, by the United Nations in 2005 (chap. 47 by Einsiedel/Nitschke), as well as by NATO (chap. 55 by Dunay; chap. 56 by Bin) but also new collective security tasks have been taken up by the UN Security Council.

However, this retrospective analysis is not sufficient. With the ongoing globalization process, new transnational non-state actors (from transnational corporations, to terrorist and crime networks) have directly affected objective security dangers and subjective concerns. It is not only ‘international terrorism’ that has become a major new security danger and thus the major object of securitization in many US national security policy statements and in numerous UN and other resolutions by IGOs, threats to ‘human security’ in other parts of the world are also posed by the impact of global climate change via an increase in the number and intensity of natural hazards and disasters (storms, cyclones, hurricanes but also drought) that are caused by anthropogenic activities that are partly responsible for the misery of those affected most by extreme weather events (e.g. by cyclones in Bangladesh or by drought in the Sahel zone). These events have contributed to internal displacement and migration and have thus reached the North as new ‘soft’ security problems (Brauch 2002; Oswald 2007).

All these developments caused by global environmental change have contributed to the emergence of a new phase in earth history, the “anthropocene” (Crutzen 2002; Crutzen/Stoermer 2000; Clark/Crutzen/Schellnhuber; Oswald/Brauch/Dalby 2008) that poses new security dangers and concerns, and for many people in the South and for some of the most vulnerable and affected also a ‘survival dilemma’ (Brauch 2004, and chap. 42).

Thus, besides the global turn of 1990, several regional and national structural changes, the impacts of globalization, and with global environmental change a new set of dangers and concerns for the security and survival of humankind are evolving. The perception of or the securitization of these new security dangers as threats for international, regional, national, and human security have all contributed to a reconceptualization of security.

1.7 Three Volumes on Reconceptualizing Security

This book is the first of three volumes that address different aspects of an 'intellectual mapping' of the ongoing process of reconceptualizing security. The two related volumes address:

- *Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts;*
- *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security – Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks.*

These three books in the *Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace* (HESP) aim to achieve these scientific goals: a) a global *North-South scientific debate on reconceptualizing security*; b) a *multidisciplinary debate* and learning; and c) a *dialogue between academia and policymakers* in international organizations, national governments and *between academia and nongovernmental actors* in civil society and in social movements on security concepts. These three volumes focus on the conceptual thinking on a wide notion of security in all parts of the world that is used to legitimate the allocation of public and private resources and to justify the use of force both to 'protect' and to 'kill' people in the realization of major values.

The 'hexagon' represents six key factors contributing to global environmental change – three nature-induced or supply factors: soil, water and air (atmosphere and climate), and three human-induced or demand factors: population change (growth and decline), urban systems (industry, habitat, pollution) and rural systems (agriculture, food, nature protection). Throughout the history of the earth and of the homo sapiens these six factors have interacted. The supply factors have created the preconditions for life while human behaviour and economic consumption patterns have contributed to its challenges (increase in

extreme weather events) and fatal outcomes for human beings and society. The Hexagon series will cover the complex interactions among these six factors and their extreme and in some cases even fatal outcomes (hazards/disasters, internal displacements and forced migration, crises, and conflicts), as well as crucial social science concepts relevant for their analysis.

Issues in three research fields on environment, security, and peace, especially in the environmental security realm and from a human security perspective, will be addressed with the goal to contribute to a fourth phase of research on environmental security from a normative peace research and/or human security perspective (Brauch 2003; Dalby/Brauch/Oswald 2008). This book series offers a platform for scientific communities dealing with global environmental and climate change, disaster reduction, environmental security, peace and conflict research, as well as for the humanitarian aid and the policy community in governments and international organizations.

1.8 Goals, Structure, Authors and Audience of this Book

The basic research questions this global reference book addresses are threefold:

- Did these manifold structural changes in the political order trigger a rethinking or *reconceptualization* of the key 'security concept' globally, nationally, and locally?
- To which extent were two other global processes instrumental for this new thinking on security: a) the process of economic, political, and cultural *globalization* and b) the evolving perception of the impact of *global environmental change* (GEC) due to climate change, soil erosion, and desertification as well as water scarcity and deterioration?
- Or were the changes in the thinking on security the result of a scientific revolution (Kuhn 1962) resulting in a major paradigm shift?

1.8.1 Theoretical Contexts for Security Reconceptualizations

The first two chapters introduce into the international debate on reconceptualizing security since 1989. *Czesław Mesjasz* approaches the reconceptualizing of security from the vantage point of systems theory as attributes of social systems.

1.8.2 Security, Peace, Development and Environment

Hans Günter Brauch (chap. 3) introduces a conceptual quartet consisting of *Security, Peace, Environment and Development* that are addressed by four specialized research programmes of peace research, security, development, and environmental studies. After an analysis of six linkages between these key concepts, four linkage concepts will be discussed: a) the *security dilemma* (for the peace-security linkage); b) the concept of *sustainable development* (for the development-environment linkage); c) *sustainable peace* (peace-development-environment linkage) and the new concept of a d) *survival dilemma* (security-environment-development linkage). Six experts review the debates on efforts to reconceptualize these six dyadic linkages: 1: peace and security (chap. 4 by Ole Wæver); 2: peace and development (chap. 5 by Indra de Soysa.); 3: peace and environment (chap. 6 by Úrsula Oswald Spring); 4: development and security (chap. 7 by Peter Uvin); 5: development and environment (chap. 8 by Casey Brown); and 6: security and environment (chap. 9 by Simon Dalby).

While since the French Revolution (1789) many political concepts (including *peace* and *security*) were reconceptualized, the political concepts of *development* and *environment* have gradually evolved since the 1950's and 1970's on national and international political agendas. The authors of chapters 4 to 9 were invited to consider these questions:

- a) Has the peace and security agenda in the UN Charter been adapted to a global contextual change with the disappearance of bipolarity and the emergence of a single superpower? Has the understanding of the classic concepts affecting peace and security: sovereignty, non-use of force (Art. 2,4) and non-intervention (Art. II,7 of UN Charter) changed with the increase of humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations?
- b) Which impact did the increase in violence in Europe since 1991, the emergence of new asymmetric, ethno-religious, internal conflicts, and the challenge by non-state actors in a rapidly globalizing world have on the theoretical debates on the six dyadic linkages?
- c) Which impact did the change in the peace-security dyad have on environment and development concepts? Did environment and development policies benefit from the global turn? Was it instrumental for the increase in 'failing states' (Somalia, Afghanistan)?

- d) Have the summits in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED, 1992) and in Johannesburg (UNSSD, 2002), and the formulation of the *Millennium Development Goals* benefited from the turn?
- e) Has the attack of 11 September 2001 on the US changed the priorities of security and development policies, nationally, regionally and globally?

Not all authors have responded to these questions, rather they discussed questions they considered the most relevant from their respective scientific and research perspective. They have widened and deepened the concepts from disciplines and have introduced southern perspectives to the security discourse.

1.8.3 Philosophical, Ethical, and Religious Contexts for Reconceptualizing Security

During the Cold War national and international security was a key policy concept for allocating financial resources and legitimating policies on the use of force. During this period the thinking on security of American and Soviet scholars dominated the paradigms and conceptual debates in the West and East, but also in the divided South. With the end of the Cold War this conceptual dichotomy was overcome. In the post Cold War era, prior to and after 11 September 2001, theoreticians have reconceptualized security in different directions.

Samuel P. Huntington's (1996) simplification of a new 'Islamic-Confucian threat' used cultural notions to legitimate military postures to stabilize the Western dominance and US leadership. Huntington provoked many critical replies by scholars from different regions, cultures and religions. Instead of reducing 'culture' to an object for the legitimization of the military power of one country, the authors in part III have been asked to review the thinking on security in their own culture or religion as it has evolved over centuries and has and may still influence implicitly the thinking and action of policymakers in their region.

Introducing part III, *Úrsula Oswald Spring* (Mexico, chap. 10) compares the thinking on peace in the East, West, and South. Eight chapters were written by authors representing different cultures and religions: *Eun-Jeung Lee* (Korea, chap. 13 on: Security in Confucianism and in Korean philosophy and ethics); *Mitsuo and Tamayo Okamoto* (Japan, chap. 14 on: Security in Japanese philosophy and ethics); *Naresh Dadhich* (India, chap. 15 on: Thinking on security in Hinduism and in contemporary political philosophy and ethics in India); *Robert Eisen* (USA, chap. 16 on security in

Jewish philosophy and ethics); *Frederik Arends* (Netherlands, chap. 17: security in Western philosophy and ethics); *Hassan Hanafi* (Egypt, chap. 18: security in Arab and Muslim philosophy and ethics); *Jacob Emmanuel Mabe* (Cameroon/Germany, chap. 19: Security in African philosophy, ethics and history of ideas); *Georgina Sánchez* (Mexico, chap. 20: Security in Mesoamerican philosophy, ethics and history of ideas); *Domício Proença Júnior* and *Eugenio Diniz* (Brazil, chap. 21: The Brazilian view on the conceptualization of security: philosophical, ethical and cultural contexts and issues); while *Michael von Brück* (Germany, chap. 11: security in Buddhism and Hinduism), and *Kurt W. Radtke* (Germany/Netherlands, chap. 12: Security in Chinese, Korean and Japanese philosophy and ethics) compare the thinking on security in two eastern religions and the thinking in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese philosophy and ethics. The authors were invited to discuss these questions:

- a) Which security concepts have been used in the respective philosophy, ethics, and religion?
- b) How have these concepts evolved in different philosophical, ethical, and religious debates?
- c) What are the referents of the thinking on security: a) humankind, b) the nation state, c) society, or d) the individual human being?
- d) How are these concepts being used today and do these religious and philosophical traditions still influence the thinking of decision-makers on security in the early 21st century?
- e) Did the global contextual change of 1990 as well as the events of 11 September 2001 have an impact on the religious, philosophical, and ethical debates related to security?

The goal of this part is to sensitize the readers not to perceive the world only through the narrow conceptual lenses prevailing primarily in the Western or North Atlantic debates on security concepts and policies. Rather, the cultural, philosophical and religious diversity that influence the thinking on and related policies may sensitize policymakers.

1.8.4 Spatial Context and Referents of Security Concepts

During the Cold War the narrow 'national security' concept has prevailed (table 1.2). Since 1990 two parallel debates have taken place among analysts of *globalization* (in OECD countries) focusing on processes of de-territorialization and de-borderization as well as proponents of new 'spatial' approaches to international

relations (*geo-strategy*, *geopolitics*, *geo-economics*). There was no significant controversy between both schools. Both approaches may contribute to an understanding of the co-existence of pre-modern, modern and post-modern thinking on sovereignty and its relationship to security. The major dividing line between both perspectives, often pursued in the tradition of realism or pragmatism, is the role of 'space' in international affairs (see chap. 22 by Brauch).

In the Westphalian system sovereign states may be defined in terms of a) territory, b) people, and c) government (system of rule). Thus, the territorial category of 'space' has been a constituent of modern international politics. No state exists without a clearly defined territory. 'Spatiality' is the term used to describe the dynamic and interdependent relationship between a society's construction of space on society (Soja 1985). This concept applies not only to the social level, but also to the individual, for it draws attention to the fact that this relationship takes place through individual human actions, and also constrains and enables these actions (Giddens 1984). During the 1960's and 1970's, spatial science was widely used in geography and it attracted practitioners interested in 'spatial order' and in related policies (Schmidt 1995: 798–799). However, the micro level analyses in human geography are of no relevance for international relations where the concept of 'territoriality' is often used as:

a strategy which uses bounded spaces in the exercise of power and influence. ... Most social scientists ... focus on the efficiency of territoriality as a strategy, in a large variety of circumstances, involving the exercise of power, influence and domination. ... The efficiency of territoriality is exemplified by the large number of 'containers' into which the earth's surface is divided. By far the best example of its benefits to those wishing to exercise power is the state, which is necessarily a territorial body. Within its territory, the state apparatus assumes sovereign power: all residents are required to 'obey the laws of the land' in order for the state to undertake its central roles within society; boundaries are policed to control people and things entering and leaving. Some argue that territoriality is a necessary strategy for the modern state, which could not operate successfully without it (Johnston 1996: 871; Mann 1984).

This very notion of the 'territoriality' of the state has been challenged by international relations specialists. Herz (1959) argued that the territorial state could easily be penetrated by intercontinental missiles armed with nuclear weapons. In the 1970's, some globalists announced the death of the state as the key actor of international politics, and during the recent debate some analysts of *globalization* proclaimed the end of

the nation state and a progressing deborderization and deterritorialization have become key issues of analysis from the two opposite and competing perspectives of globalization and *geopolitique* but also from critical geopolitics. For the deborderized territories a new form of *raison d'état* may be needed.

The authors of part IV have been invited to address the following questions:

- a) Has the debate on security been influenced by the two schools focusing on globalization and geopolitics as well as by pre-modern, modern, and post-modern thinking on space?
- b) To which extent have there been changes in the spatial referents of security, with regard to global environmental change, globalization, regionalization, the nation state, as well as sub-national actors, such as societal, ethnic and religious groups, terrorist networks, or transnational criminal groups active in narco-trafficking?

The authors of the twelve chapters address two competing approaches of globalization vs. critical geopolitics or ecological geopolitics vs. political geo-ecology (chap. 22 by *Hans Günter Brauch*); on a structural setting for global environmental politics in a hierarchic international system from a geopolitical view (chap. 23 by *Vilho Harle* and *Sami Moiso*); the role and contributions of the Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) project within IHDP (Chap. 24 by *Jon Barnett*, *Karen O'Brien* and *Richard Matthew*); globalization and security: the US 'Imperial Presidency': global impacts in Iraq and Mexico (chap. 25 by *John Saxe-Fernández*); and on: Globalization from below: The World Social Forum: A platform for reconceptualizing security? (chap. 26: by *Ürsula Oswald Spring*).

Mustafa Aydin and *Sinem Acikmese* (chap. 27) discuss identity-based security threats in a globalized world with a focus on Islam, while *Björn Hettne* (chap. 28): in world regions as referents reviews concepts of regionalism and regionalization of security. *Bharat Karnad* (chap. 29) addresses the nation state as the key referent with a focus on concepts of national security, while *Varun Sahni* (chap. 30) provides a critical analysis of the role of sub-national actors (society, ethnic, religious groups) as referents. *Gunhild Hoogensen* (chap. 31) focuses on terrorist networks and *Arlene B. Tickner* and *Ann C. Mason* (chap. 32) on criminal narco-traffic groups as non-state actors as referents and finally *Jacek Kugler* (chap. 33) offers his ideas on reconceptualizing of security research by integrating individual level data.

1.8.5 Reconceptualization of Security in Scientific Disciplines

The security concept is used in many scientific disciplines and programmes. In this part *Jean Marc Coicaud* (chap. 34) contemplates on security as a philosophical construct, *Michael Bothe* (chap. 35) offers an empirical review of the changing security concept as reflected in resolutions of the UN Security Council, while *S. Mansoor Murshed* (chap. 36) discusses the changing use of security in economics, *John Baylis* (chap. 37) reviews the changing use of the security concept in international relations, and *Ulrich Albrecht* and *Hans Günter Brauch* (chap. 38) reconstruct the changes in the security concept in security studies and peace research. The authors were invited to discuss these questions:

- a) Did a reconceptualization of security occur in these scientific disciplines and programmes?
- b) Did the global turn of 1990 and the events of 11 September 2001 have an influence or major impact on a reconceptualization of security or have other developments (e.g. globalization or demography) or events been more instrumental?
- c) Which other factors were instrumental for a reconceptualization, e.g. of risk, risk society and modernity, that directly influence the scientific debate on security?

1.8.6 Reconceptualizing Dimensions of Security since 1990

Laura Shepherd and *Jutta Weldes* (chap. 39) introduce into the sixth part by discussing security as the state (of) being free from danger, and *Hans Günter Brauch* (chap. 40) contrasts the state-centred 'security dilemma' (Herz 1959) with a people-centred 'survival dilemma'. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) distinguished among five sectors or dimensions of security of which they analyse in this book the military (*Buzan*, chap. 41), societal (*Wæver*, chap. 44), and environmental (*de Wilde*, chap. 45) security dimensions while the political one is discussed by *Thomaz Guedes da Costa* (chap. 42) and economic one by *Czesaw Mesjasz* (chap. 43). They were invited to reflect on these questions:

- a) To which extent have new theoretical paradigms, approaches, and concepts in different parts of the world influenced the reconceptualization of security dimensions?

- b) To which extent have different worldviews, cognitive lenses, and mindsets framed the securitization of the five key sectors or dimensions of security?
- c) To which extent has the conceptualization of the five sectors or dimensions of security been influenced by the global turn of 1989 and by the events of 11 September 2001?
- d) Has there been a fundamental difference in the perception of the impact of both events in Europe, in the USA, and in other parts of the world for the five security dimensions?
- e) Has the policy relevance of different security dimensions contributed to competing security agendas, and were they instrumental for the clash among conflicting views of security in the UN Security Council since 2002, prior to and after the war in Iraq?

1.8.7 Institutional Security Concepts Revisited for the 21st Century

With the end of the Cold War, the bipolar system that relied primarily on systems of collective self-defence (Art. 51 of UN Charter) has been overcome with the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1991. In a brief interlude from 1991–1994, the systems of global and regional collective security were on the rise, and even NATO, the only remaining system of collective self-defence, was ready to act under a mandate of the CSCE, or since 1994 of the OSCE. However, with the failure of the UN and OSCE to cope with the conflicts in the post Yugoslav space, since 1994 NATO's relevance grew again, and with its gradual enlargement from 16 to 27 countries, NATO has again become the major security institution for hard security issues while the role of the UN system and of its regional collective security organizations expanded also into the soft 'human' security areas.

Since 1994, when UNDP first introduced the human security concept, this concept has been debated by the UN Security Council (see chap. 46 by *Jürgen Dedring*), in reports by the UN Secretary-General (chap. 47 by *Sebastian Einsiedel*, *Heiko Nitzschke* and *Tarun Chhabra*) and has been used by UNDP as well as by UNESCO and other UN organizations such as UNU (Bogardi/Brauch 2005, 2005a). The reconceptualization of security in the CSCE and OSCE since 1990 is documented by *Monika Wohlfeld* (chap. 49).

Four chapters review the complex reconceptualization of security by and within the European Union, from the perspective of the chair of the EU's Military Committee (Chap. 50 by General *Rolando Mosca*

Moschini) who presents its comprehensive security concept, while *Stefan Hintermeier* (chap. 51) focuses on the reconceptualization of the EU's foreign and security policy since 1990 and *Andreas Maurer* and *Roderick Parkes* (chap. 52) deal with the EU's justice and home affairs policy and democracy from the Amsterdam to The Hague Programme and finally *Magnus Ekengren* (chap. 53) focuses on the EU's functional security by moving from intergovernmental to community-based security concepts and policies.

Two chapters focus on the reconceptualization of security in NATO since 1990 (*Pál Dunay*, chap. 55) and on NATO's role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East after the Istanbul Summit (*Alberto Bin*, chap. 56). The security and development nexus is introduced by *Peter Uvin* (chap. 8), the coordination issues within the UN system is addressed by *Ole Jacob Sending* (chap. 48) and the harmonization of the three goals of peace, security, and development for the EU by *Louka T. Katseli* (chap. 54). From the perspective of Germany *Stephan Klingebiel* and *Katja Roehder* (chap. 58) carry the considerations further by discussing the manifold new interfaces between development and security, while *Ortwin Hennig* and *Reinhold Elges* (chap. 57) review the German Action Plan for civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peace consolidation as a practical experience with the reconceptualization of security and its implementation in a new diplomatic instrument. The authors of part VII were asked to consider these questions:

- a) Which concepts of security have been used by the respective international organizations in their charter and basic policy documents? To which extent has the understanding of security changed in the declaratory as well as in the operational policy of this security institution? To which extent was the global turn of 1989 instrumental for a reconceptualization of security by the UN, its independent global and regional organizations and programmes?
- b) Has there been a shrinking of the prevailing post Cold War security concept since 11 September 2001, both in declaratory and operational terms? To which extent has there been a widening, a deepening or a sectorialization of security since 1990 in OSCE, EU and NATO, and to which extent has this been reflected in NATO's role in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East? And to which extent did the security institutions adopt the concepts of environmental and human security in their policy declarations and in their operative policy activities?

1.8.8 Reconceptualizing Regional Security for the 21st Century

A major reconceptualization of security has been triggered by the fundamental global contextual change that occurred with the end of the Cold War. The narrow Hobbesian view of security threats posed by the military capabilities and intentions of the other military alliance has been overcome and replaced by a widening, deepening and sectorialization of the regional thinking on security. The security concepts offer a framework for the analysis of hard security threats and manifold political, economic, environmental security challenges, vulnerabilities and risks. The redefinition of security interests by security institutions as influenced by the conceptual lenses that influence the subjective security perception.

Among the authors of part VIII are the foreign minister of Nigeria *Joy Ogwu* who offers a regional political security perspective from and for Western Africa (chap. 62) while *Alfred Nhema* and *Martin Rupiya* (Zimbabwe, chap. 63) provide a grim regional security perspective from and for the Horn, Eastern and Southern Africa, and *Naison Ngoma* and *Len le Roux* (Zambia, South Africa, chap. 64) offer a regional security perspective from and for Southern Africa.

The regional security in Europe in the 21st century is analyzed by *Sven Biscop* (Belgium, chap. 59), while *Mustafa Aydin* and *Neslihan Kaptanolu* (Turkey, chap. 60) discuss three concepts of regionalization of great power security concerns for the intertwining between the new neighborhood, the near abroad, and the greater and wider Middle East while *Bechir Chourou* (Tunisia, chap. 61) contributes a regional security perspective from and for the Arab world. Three regional security perspectives for three sub-regions in Asia are offered by *Navnita Chadha Behera* (India, chap. 65) for South Asia, by *Eu-Jeung Lee* (chap. 66) for China, South and North Korea and Japan and by *Liu Cheng* and *Alan Hunter* (China/UK, chap. 67) for China for the early 21st century. *Kevin P. Clements* and *Wendy L. Foley* (Australia, New Zealand, chap. 68) review the regional security debate in the South Pacific on peace and security with alternative formulations in the post-Cold War era and *Francisco Rojas Aravena* (Chile, chap. 69) assesses the key regional security issues on the American continent, its challenges, perceptions, and concepts and *P.H. Liotta* (USA) and *James F. Miskel* (USA) offer thoughts for an ethical framework for security. The authors of part VIII were invited to consider these questions:

- a) Which impact did scientific and political security discourses and communication processes have on the reconceptualization of regional security?
- b) How relevant have security concepts been for the formulation of security interests in international politics and international relations? Which role has the rethinking of security in the new millennium played in regional debates on peace and security in Europe, in the Neighbourhood, Near Abroad, and Greater or Wider Middle East?

1.8.9 Reconceptualizing Security and Alternative Futures

This part will carry the discussion on security concepts into the future from a theoretical perspective on prediction in security theory and policy by *Czesaw Mesjasz* (chap. 71), from the vantage point of two military officers, *Heinz Dieter Jopp* and *Roland Kaestner* (chap. 72), and of an environmental and hazard specialist *Gordon A. McBean* (chap. 74) who discusses the role of prediction with regards to natural hazards and sustainable development. *Heikki Patomäki* (chap. 73) debates from a hypothetical scenario on learning from possible futures for global security.

1.8.10 Summary Conclusions

In this final part *Úrsula Oswald Spring* and *Hans Günter Brauch* (chap. 75) summarize the results of this global mapping of the rethinking on security. Based on the analysis of the trends in global thinking the authors discuss the policy relevance of security concepts for the structuring of the security debate and for policy-making both in national governments and in international organizations.

1.9 Editorial Process

As indicated above (1.7) this book differs from available publications on security by aiming at a fourfold dialogue. Such an ambitious effort may transcend the narrow professional or institutional horizon of some reviewers who often expect that such a project should be developed within the mainstream methodological approaches of international relations.

The editors pursue three goals: a) to contribute to *problem awareness* for the different security concepts in North and South, on hard and soft security issues, on non-military, primarily environmental challenges and environmental security problems; b) to stimulate

and encourage interdisciplinary scientific research and political efforts to resolve, prevent, and avoid that environmental factors may contribute to violent conflicts (both scientific and political *agenda-setting*); and c) to contribute to a better understanding of the complex interactions between natural processes, nature and human-induced regional environmental changes (*learning*).

While power has once been defined by Karl Deutsch (1963, 1966) as not having to learn, during the 20th century the resistance to any *anticipatory* learning by those who control the resources over outcomes has been significant. In history, it often required severe foreign policy and domestic crises (e.g. in the US in the 1970's during the Vietnam War and in the former Soviet Union in the 1980's during the Afghanistan War) to stimulate major re-assessments of existing foreign and security policies and to launch fundamental revisions.

Several scientists (E.U. von Weizsäcker 1989; E.O. Wilson 1998) have described the 21st century as the century of the environment. For the new century, Edward O. Wilson (1998a) has referred to a growing *consilience*, i.e. the interlocking of causal explanations across disciplines, what implies that the interfaces of disciplines become as important as the disciplines. Ted Munn (2002), in his preface to the *Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change*, argued based on Wilson:

that this interlocking amongst the natural sciences will in the 21st century also touch 'the borders of the social sciences and humanities'. In the environmental context, environmental scientists in diverse specialties, including human ecology, are more precisely defining the area in which that species arose, and those parts that must be sustained for human survival (Wilson 1998).

Anticipatory learning must acknowledge this need for a growing *consilience* that causal explanations across disciplines may contribute to new understanding and knowledge that will be needed to cope with the challenges of the 'international risk society' (Beck 1992, 1999, 2007).

All authors of this and subsequent volume were specifically invited by the lead editor in consultation with John Grin and Czesaw Mesjasz to contribute to three workshops on reconceptualizing security at the:

- 45th Annual ISA Convention in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 17–20 March 2004⁵;
- 20th IPRA Conference in Sopron, Hungary, 5–9 July 2004⁶;

5 See the presentations at: <http://www.afes-press.de/html/download_isa.html>.

- Fifth Pan-European Conference on International Relations (ECPR) in The Hague, the Netherlands, 8–11 September 2004.⁷

At these workshops all papers were critiqued by discussants and by the audience. All chapters in this volume have been peer reviewed by at least two anonymous reviewers, and subsequently all chapters in this volume have been revised by the authors.

This book is not addressed *only* to the political science, international relations, strategic studies, peace research, development, and environmental studies community in the OECD world. Its scope is broader and more ambitious. It intends to broaden the scope and to sensitize the reader to the thinking in different disciplines, cultures, and global regions, especially on nature and humankind. The editors have worked hard that these three related books on 'reconceptualizing security' will be of relevance for scholars, educators and students and the more generally academically trained audience in many scientific disciplines, such as: *political science* (international relations, security studies, environmental studies, peace research, conflict and war studies); *sociology* (security conceptualization and risk society); *economics* (globalization and security); *philosophy, theology, comparative religion and culture* (security conceptualization); *international law* (security conceptualization), *geosciences* (global environmental change, climate change, desertification, water), *geography* (global environmental change, population, urbanization, food); *military science* (military academies).

The global thinking on security is also of importance for policymakers and their advisers on the national and international level in: a) foreign, defence, development, and environment ministries and their policy-oriented think tanks; b) international organizations: NATO, European institutions, UN, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, UNDP, UNEP, IEA, UNU, et al.; c) for the *Human Security Network*; d) for the environment and security network of the representatives of 27 EU foreign ministries; and in e) nongovernmental organizations in the areas of foreign and defence, development and environment policies; as well as for f) diverse social and indigenous movements. The thinking on security and on the specific security policies of countries, alliances, and international organizations are also a special focus for educators (at all levels) and media specialists.

6 See the presentations at: <http://www.afes-press.de/html/download_sopron.html>.

7 See the presentations at: <http://www.afes-press.de/html/the_hague_programme.html>.

Globalization and Environmental Challenges

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