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Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and
Mechanism Design Solutions

Narahari, Y.; Garg, D.; Narayanam, R.; Prakash, H.

2009, XXII, 274 p. 45 illus., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-1-84800-937-0