

## Chapter 2

# A Brief History of LeT

**Abstract** This chapter provides an overview of LeT from their creation to the end of 2011. It describes the goals of the group, other groups in their ecosystem, the types of attacks they have carried out, the internal dynamics of the group, and the relations they have with the Pakistani military and civilian government. It also includes brief profiles of selected LeT leaders.

This chapter provides an in-depth overview of the organization, history, and operations of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The first section describes of the group's foundation and the political and social context of LeT's founding, along with a discussion of LeT's ideology and worldview, and a profile of its founder and leader Hafez Mohammed Saeed. The second section describes LeT operations in Pakistan, including its organizational infrastructure which includes a social welfare arm that administers a network of schools and medical facilities, a communications arm that holds rallies and publishes several magazines, and an extensive fundraising operation. The section also discusses LeT's recruitment strategies and its relationship with the Pakistani government. The third section describes LeT operations against India in Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>1</sup> This section begins with a description of Kashmir's history and geography, and is followed by a survey of how LeT tactics have evolved in Kashmir from massacres, to fedayeen strikes, to hit and run attacks. This section concludes with a description of the infrastructure needed to support LeT's armed operations. The fourth section studies LeT operations in the rest of the Indian sub-continent, beginning with LeT's first major strike into India itself against the Red Fort in Delhi in December 2000. The section discusses the growing militancy among India's Muslim population, and LeT's relationship with Islamist groups in India. The section describes major LeT backed operations in India such as the 2006 Mumbai train bombings (attributed by

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this book, we use the term "Jammu and Kashmir" to refer to that part of Kashmir administered by India. Likewise, Pakistan-administered Kashmir (or Azad Kashmir) is used to refer to that part of Kashmir currently controlled by Pakistan.

different authors to LeT directly or to the Indian Mujahideen which is closely linked with LeT) and the 2008 siege of Mumbai. This section concludes by examining LeT's growing operations in Afghanistan. The fifth section is an overview of LeT's international operations including its links to Islamist terrorists around the world, including al-Qaeda, and the activities of LeT operatives worldwide such as Willie Brigitte and David Coleman Headley. This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the major questions about LeT's future intentions and strategies.

## 2.1 Origins and Overview

### 2.1.1 *What's in a Name?*

Lashkar-e-Taiba (which is variously translated from Urdu as Army of the Pure, Army of the Righteous or Army of the Good) is generally abbreviated as LeT. However it has been known by several other names as well. This is typical for terrorist organizations. Organization name changes and operating through front groups creates ambiguity that can confuse investigators and allow the terrorist groups and their sponsors to have plausible deniability about terrorist attacks.<sup>2</sup>

Initially the group was established in 1986 when Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi merged his militant group with Jamaat ud-Dawa (a small Ahl Hadith missionary group founded by Hafez Saeed and Zafar Iqbal) to form the Markaz al-Dawa Irshad (Center for Preaching and Guidance—MDI) (Tankel 2011a). MDI established an armed wing, Lashkar-e-Taiba a few years later. Though the exact date of LeT's establishment is not completely clear, most analytical histories place its birth around late 1989 or early 1990.

In December 2001, after LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed were accused by India of carrying out an attack on India's parliament,<sup>3</sup> the United States designated both groups as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (FTO) (U.S. Dept. of State August

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<sup>2</sup> A short article describes the emergence of the Pakistani terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) from other groups and how these groups changed their names after one version of the group achieved sufficient notoriety to be classified as a terrorist group by the United States—[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist\\_outfits/jaish\\_e\\_mohammad\\_mujahideen\\_e\\_tanzeem.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm).

The shifting of names and use of front groups is common behavior for terrorist groups. Black September, the Palestinian terrorist group that carried out a number of high-profile attacks in the 1970s, most famously the attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972, was established by Fatah's intelligence unit but did not make public statements in order to avoid tarnishing Fatah's international image. (Karmon 2000).


<sup>3</sup> Although the Indian government held both LeT and JeM responsible for the Parliament attack, the operatives convicted in Indian courts for their role in this attack were all members of JeM. It is possible that individuals affiliated with LeT were involved, but concrete proof has not been advanced in the open source (Tankel 2011a, b).

16, 2011 and U.S. Dept. of Treasury October 13, 2011b). A month later, on January 13, 2002 under U.S. pressure, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf banned LeT. However, weeks before on December 24, 2001, LeT leader Hafez Saeed declared that LeT and MDI were now separated and that he no longer had any affiliation with LeT. Further, MDI reverted to the name Jamaat ud-Dawa (Society for Preaching—JuD). However, while LeT now supposedly restricted its operations to Kashmir, JuD offices in Pakistan were being used as LeT offices, suggesting the separation was in name only (Rana 2006). LeT has also worked through front groups such as Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (Humanitarian Services Institution—IKK), which provides disaster relief both in Pakistan and also in the Maldives after the 2004 tsunami where it helped recruit LeT operatives (Roul 2010a, b). The United States Treasury declared IKK an FTO in April 2006 (U.S. Department of Treasury 2006).

Variations of this strategy repeated itself several times over the decade, with one important exception. In July 2004, JuD reportedly split over disputes within the group's leadership when top leaders were frustrated that Hafez Saeed was appointing family members to top posts in the organization, and established a new group Khairun Naas (which means "the most excellent of people" and also refers to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad—KN) (Rana 2004). Nonetheless, KN failed to emerge as a substantial group in its own right, with most of its leaders reportedly rejoining the LeT fold. Saeed still attempted to use this split to obfuscate LeT responsibility for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, citing the split and claiming that Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the main alleged planner of the Mumbai attack, had been a member of the splinter group (Mir 2008a).

Other LeT splits followed the original pattern of being primarily cosmetic. In January 2009, a group calling itself Tehreek-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awal (Movement for the Safeguarding of the First Center of Prayer) held an anti-Israel protest in Lahore; yet the rally featured leaders of JuD and LeT and attendees waved the JuD flag (The Times of India 2009a, b). Similarly JuD established Tehreek-e-Tahafuz-e-Humat-e-Rasool (Movement for Defending the Honor of the Prophet) to organize protests against the Danish papers that published cartoons of the Prophet (The Economic Times 2010). More recently, JuD established a charity, Falah-i-Insaniyat to collect donations and provide aid to Pakistan's internal refugees from the fighting in the Swat Valley and later from the massive 2010 summer floods (Waraich 2009). Subsequently, LeT has spearheaded the establishment of Difa-e-Pakistan Council (Pakistan Defense Council), which has held mass rallies in Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Karachi protesting American and NATO activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. JuD flags were waved by thousands of attendees and LeT's leader Hafez Saeed was a keynote speaker (Ahmad 2012) (Fig. 2.1).

The exemplar of this policy of artificial splits is that according to reports, in January 2009 the FBI determined that Lashkar-e-Taiba's Kashmir-based spokesman Abdullah Ghaznavi, who interacts with the media via anonymous phone numbers reportedly from Srinagar, was in fact the JuD's spokesman Abdullah Muntazir and based at the headquarters in Muridke (Mir 2009a, b).



**Fig. 2.1** Organizational affiliations

In the description that follows, unless otherwise specified, LeT and its fronts will simply be referred to as LeT.

### ***2.1.2 Historical Context***

The establishment of LeT occurred in the context of a number of historical and geopolitical factors within Pakistan, throughout the broader Muslim world, and internationally. At the same time, specific actions of individuals—leaders in the international Islamist movement, LeT’s founders, and Pakistan’s leaders also played a crucial role in LeT’s establishment and growth as a major terrorist organization. In that regard, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the alliances formed to support the Afghan resistance brought many of these factors together and created the conditions under which Lashkar-e-Taiba was founded and could flourish.

In December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to stabilize the collapsing Afghan Communist government. Shortly thereafter, the United States decided to support the Afghan resistance in the hopes of making the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as costly as possible. By necessity, neighboring Pakistan

became a primary conduit for American support for the Afghan resistance (Coll 2004).<sup>4</sup>

Saudi Arabia, a key American ally, also supported the Afghan resistance. There were obvious geopolitical motivations behind Saudi support. Soviet control of Afghanistan (combined with the recent overthrow of the American-allied Shah of Iran) threatened to weaken America's position in the Middle East, leaving Saudi Arabia vulnerable to Soviet power.

Saudi support for the Afghans was primarily financial. Newly wealthy from the oil crises of the 1970s, the Saudis, as custodians of Islam's holy places of Mecca and Medina, were prepared to use their resources both to support their geopolitical ambitions and spread their version of Islam (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). In Pakistan's President, General Zia ul-Haq, the Saudis found a willing partner. Zia had several motivations for Islamizing Pakistan. Zia had overthrown the elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and needed to establish his regime's legitimacy. Islamization was a national cause that would not be criticized and it shored up support from Pakistan's Islamist parties (Abbas 2005). Zia's use of Islam was not only instrumental, he was personally religious and believed that Islamization would strengthen the country morally and help it better deal with its many economic and social problems (Government of Pakistan nd). Many of Zia's reforms, which called for instituting strict Islamic penalties such as stoning for adultery, were never implemented. However, sectarianism and oppression of religious minorities increased and the government began officially supporting madrassas (religious schools) financially and granting formal standing to the degrees they issued. Substantial funding for these madrassas came from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (Abbas 2005).

Zia's Islamization campaign occurred in the context of a broader resurgence of Islam throughout the Muslim world. For much of the twentieth century, political leadership in most of the Muslim-majority countries of the Greater Middle East was predominantly secular in orientation. By the 1970s many of these regimes were seen as failures—in both the Arab-Israeli conflict (Sageman 2004) and in providing economic prosperity and basic freedoms to their people. Other factors were important as well. The Islamic revolution in Iran inspired many Islamists to consider the possibility of political revolution (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). At the same time, the rise of an Islamist Shia power was a cause of concern to the Sunni regime in Saudi Arabia, which responded by exporting its interpretation of Islam throughout the world. In Pakistan, the Iranian revolution inspired Pakistan's large Shia minority to be more assertive in the public sphere, leading to a reaction by Pakistan's Sunni majority that was exacerbated by the government's Islamization policies (Abbas 2005).

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<sup>4</sup> The story of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the alliance between the United States, Pakistan, and the Afghan resistance has been told in many places, including from a Pakistani perspective (Youssef and Adkin 1992).

This combination of events created a fertile ground for the rise of new Islamist organizations such as LeT. The official Islamization campaign in Pakistan, supported by Gulf Arab money, drew Pakistanis to Islamist organizations. The Afghanistan campaign's importance to Muslims worldwide drew Islamic activists and organizations to neighboring Pakistan, the staging ground for supporting the Afghan resistance. These activists inspired and aided Pakistani Islamists.

The war in Afghanistan also had an important effect on Pakistan's leaders. Indian journalist Praveen Swami explains that supporting the American covert proxy war against the Soviets taught Pakistan's leadership that this strategy could be used to weaken an opponent, while "being calibrated to a point where it was not worth the while of the adversary to punish the sponsor-state by going to war." Pakistan sought to employ this means against its long-standing rival, India, particularly (but not exclusively) in Kashmir, and began nurturing the necessary proxies (Swami 2007). Another lesson the Pakistani military took from the war in Afghanistan was that hardline Islamists were more effective fighters than moderates (Yousef and Adkin 1992), so that state support was directed to Islamist groups such as LeT.

### ***2.1.3 Abdullah Azzam, the Islamist Internationale, and the Founding of LeT***

Abdullah Azzam rode this wave of history. Born near Jenin in the West Bank in 1941, Azzam received a doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence at Egypt's al-Azhar University in 1973 where he met Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, the future leader of Egypt's al-Gamaa Islamiya. Rahman is currently imprisoned in the United States for his role in plotting bombing attacks in New York in the 1990s (Bergen 2001).

Azzam felt that the Muslims of the world needed to return to armed jihad, for example exhorting an audience during a tour of the United States in 1988:

"Whenever jihad is mentioned in the Holy Book, it means the obligation to fight. It does not mean to fight with the pen..." (IPT Investigative Project on Terrorism 2008).

Teaching at a University in Saudi Arabia, Azzam inspired many students including Osama bin Laden. In 1980 Azzam met some of the Afghan mujaheddin fighting the Soviets and decided to devote his energies to supporting the Afghan jihad. He moved to Pakistan where he was initially a lecturer at the Islamic University in Islamabad, before settling in Peshawar. Azzam travelled the world to raise money for the Afghan mujaheddin, recruit Muslims worldwide to fight in Afghanistan, and facilitated their travel (Bergen 2001).

Based in Peshawar, near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Azzam established Makhtab al-Khidamat (Services Office) to coordinate the transfer of recruits to fight in Afghanistan. One of his top organizers and fund-raisers was Osama bin Laden (Bergen 2001). By the end of the decade, Azzam's Services Office had

dozens of bureaus throughout the world (including Europe and the United States) that recruited volunteers, facilitated their travel, raised money to support Islamist causes, and spread Islamist propaganda (Emerson 2002).

While living in Pakistan, Azzam met Hafez Saeed, a professor of Islamic studies at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore. Around 1985–1986 Azzam, Saeed, and Zafar Iqbal (also a professor of Islamic studies at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore) merged their nascent Ahl Hadith missionary group JuD with Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi's militant group to establish the Markaz al-Dawa wal Irshad (MDI), which translates as Center for Religious Learning and Propagation, in order to “organize the Pakistanis participating in Afghan Jihad on one platform” (Kohlmann 2000). Saeed, already a distinguished religious scholar, was essential to bringing religious legitimacy to the new organization (Tankel 2011b). There is an unproven rumor that bin Laden provided seed money to establish LeT (John 2011). One of the organization's first projects was establishing a large center at Muridke, a commercial town near Lahore.

MDI established its armed wing, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) a few years after its founding. According to (John 2011), LeT was established on Feb 22, 1990. Although it established Afghan training camps in Kunar and Paktia, its participation in the Afghan jihad was limited. Only five LeT operatives were killed fighting in Afghanistan and LeT began to withdraw from Afghanistan due to fighting amongst the Afghan mujaheddin (Rana 2006). LeT focused its efforts on another front, the ongoing dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir.

### ***2.1.4 LeT's Top Leaders***

People who have met Lashkar-e-Taiba's founder and leader, Hafez Mohammed Saeed often describe him as jovial and academic in appearance (Kashmir Herald 2002). He is reportedly a gracious host, pressing food on his guests (Fisk 2010). Women who have met with him report that they were required to cover themselves so that only part of their face was visible and there was no risk that a strand of hair would be exposed (Stern 2003).

In the public arena, Saeed is a dynamic speaker who regularly addresses audiences of thousands. Mosques where he appears frequently overflow, with large crowds standing outside listening from loudspeakers. Videos of his sermons show throngs converging to hear him. Saeed's voice rings with passion and elicits vocal responses from his audiences (We are Ahle Hadith 2011; ANImultimedia 2011; TV Gujarat 2010).

Hafez Muhammad Saeed's life has been shaped by the history of Pakistan. His family, which included a number of notable Islamic scholars, moved to Pakistan during the Partition of British India into the modern nation states of India and Pakistan. In the fighting accompanying the partition, 36 relatives of Saeed were killed. Saeed was born in Sargodha in Pakistan in 1950. Ultimately, the family re-



settled in the Mianwali district where a government land grant brought the family renewed prosperity. Saeed is one of seven children, five of whom are living today (Kashmir Herald 2002).

Born Mohammed Saeed, Hafez is a title granted to individuals who have memorized the Koran by the age of 12. By 1974 he had earned a pair of Masters degrees from the University of Punjab (Pakistani Leaders Online 2011). An accomplished scholar, Saeed was sent to Saudi Arabia for advanced studies where he earned a Masters degree from King Saud University. This brought him into contact with leading Saudi religious figures, contacts that would be significant later. Saeed also worked for the Pakistani government's Council of Islamic Ideology (CII). This council advises the "legislature whether or not a certain law is repugnant to Islam, namely to the Qur'an and Sunna" (Government of Pakistan 2011). When Saeed worked for the CII in the 1980s, it was a primary instrument in Zia's Islamization campaign (International Crisis Group 2003a, b). For over two decades Saeed was a professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore.

Saeed is married to a maternal cousin and his father-in-law was a distinguished Islamic scholar. He has a son and a daughter. His son and son-in-law are both involved with LeT. Recently his son-in-law Khalid Waleed has been acting as a spokesperson on Saeed's behalf (Tehelka Magazine 2009). Reportedly, Saeed also married the widow of a Lashkar operative who died in Kashmir. Saeed stated that he married the widow, who is several decades his junior, in order to ensure that she was adequately supported (Stern 2003).

LeT co-founder Zafar Iqbal is not as well known as Saeed, an occasional source of tension within the organization. Like Saeed, Iqbal was a professor at the department of Islamic studies at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore. He was born in 1953 and has been LeT's finance director, playing a critical role in LeT fundraising, as well as directing LeT's extensive network of schools (U.S. Treasury 2011a). Iqbal views himself as Saeed's equal and has clashed with him over the group's leadership. In 1999, they clashed when Saeed appointed Hafez Abdul Rehman Makki (the son of one of Saeed's maternal uncles and the husband of one of Saeed's younger sisters) as External Affairs chief (Tankel 2011a, b). While this conflict was averted through negotiations and Makki became External Affairs chief, another clash occurred in 2004 when Iqbal accused Saeed of preferring members of his Gujjar caste. Iqbal was a member of the Arain caste. Iqbal and other critics of Saeed felt that he was consolidating LeT under his own family. Saeed's son Talha was married to Makki's daughter and Saeed's son-in-law Khalid Waleed, LeT's spokesperson, was believed to be working with automobile smugglers. In this conflict Iqbal also raised Saeed's much younger second wife, although apparently Iqbal had also taken a much younger second wife. This conflict led to LeT splitting, in which Iqbal established his own group Khairun Naas. Ultimately, Iqbal rejoined LeT, and there were allegations that the split was engineered by Pakistani intelligence to reduce LeT's profile (Rana 2004).

Makki's status within LeT appears to be continuing to increase. In April 2012 the United States government offered a \$10 million reward for information leading






Fig. 2.2 LeT leaders & status

to the arrest of LeT’s leader Hafez Muhammad Saeed. At the same time a \$2 million reward was offered for information leading to the arrest of Makki. Born in Bahawalpur around 1948, Makki has effectively become Saeed’s top deputy and is believed to manage LeT’s relations with al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Parashar 2012).

Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi also played a role in the initial establishment of LeT. Born in 1960 in Okara, which is in Pakistani Punjab (U.S. Treasury 2008), Lakhvi was educated at Ahl Hadith institutions and was leading his own small Salafi jihadist group in Afghanistan in his early twenties where he came into contact with international Islamist figures (Roul 2012). Lakhvi and his jihadist group linked with the missionary group established by Saeed and Iqbal. Lakhvi, with no credentials as a religious scholar, did not become the public face of the organization (Tankel 2011). When the missionary group established an armed wing in 1990 Lakhvi emerged as its head. He has been the operational commander, leading LeT’s efforts in Kashmir and overseeing LeT’s extensive training program. Lakhvi has multiple pseudonyms and is referred to affectionately as *chachaji* (uncle) by LeT operatives. Two of his four sons were killed fighting in Kashmir. Lakhvi has also reportedly been the mastermind of LeT’s expansion into India, leading the efforts to build networks in India and helping to plan major attacks including the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. There are also allegations that he played a role in the 2006 Mumbai train bombings although LeT’s role in that operation is unclear (Roul 2012).

India charged Lakhvi in the November 2008 assault on Mumbai and Pakistani authorities arrested him in December 2009. However, his trial has been delayed and Western intelligence sources believe he is continuing to direct LeT operations from prison by mobile phone (Laskar 2011) (Fig. 2.2).

\*SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorist by U.S. Treasury.

### ***2.1.5 LeT's Ideology and Worldview***

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, Azzam's movement (often referred to as the Arab Afghans) was wracked by an internal dispute over the future direction of the jihad. Azzam wanted to continue fighting the "middle" enemy, i.e. non-Muslim rulers of predominantly Muslim populations. But many Arab-Afghans, particularly the Egyptians around Ayman al-Zawahiri wanted to attack the "near" enemy, the governments of Muslim countries that were insufficiently Islamic. Azzam believed in Muslim unity and opposed this direction. Abdullah Azzam and two of his sons were killed by a car bomb on November 24, 1989. The perpetrator remains unknown but there were many suspects including Israel's Mossad, the Soviet KGB, Pakistan's ISI, and Osama bin Laden. Whoever killed Azzam, his death was a turning point in the debate. The Arab-Afghans supported Muslims fighting against non-Muslim rulers all over the world in places such as Chechnya, Bosnia, the Philippines, and Kashmir. But they also supported revolts against Muslim governments in many countries, most notably Egypt and Algeria. Ultimately, Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda decided it was also necessary to attack the "far" enemy—the Western powers that supported the allegedly corrupt insufficiently Islamic governments (Sageman 2004). LeT, however, has, for the most part, adhered to Azzam's worldview, focusing its efforts against India, a non-Muslim power that (in LeT's view) oppresses Muslims. It has refrained from attacking the Pakistani state and its links to sectarian violence in Pakistan have been limited. Publicly, LeT calls for Islamic unity and criticizes conflicts within the Muslim world as weakening the Ummah (international Muslim community) (The MEMRI Blog 2010a, b, c).<sup>5</sup>

LeT is an Ahl Hadith organization. Hadith refers to the teachings and deeds of the prophet, which—along with the Koran—serves as the guide not only for religious practice but also for law and society. The Ahl Hadith movement is closely linked with the Wahhabi or Salafi traditions. These traditions seek to follow the "pure" Islam practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and his initial followers. Ahl Hadith is not the dominant tradition among Pakistan's Sunni population (Sunnis account for about 75% of the whole, while a fifth of Pakistan's population is Shiite). The two dominant Sunni groups are the Deobandis and Barelvis. Both of these sects adhere to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, although their interpretation varies. The Barelvi tradition embraces Sufi mysticism and local folk practices. Deobandism, which emerged in the late nineteenth century, was a reform movement, which sought to purge Islamic practice of these local customs. Ahl Hadith rejects the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence for its interpretations that go beyond the initial teachings of Mohammed. The Ahl Hadith movement explicitly rejects Barelvi practices. They tolerate Deobandis, who reject many of the same Barelvi practices as Ahl Hadith. Although the first Ahl Hadith

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<sup>5</sup> This statement was not unique; in his 1999 interview with Jessica Stern, Saeed stated that the Sunni-Shia conflict was not important.

groups arose in the Indian-subcontinent in the late nineteenth century, they became more prominent starting in the 1980s, because they (along with the Deobandi groups) received state support from the Zia regime. The Ahl Hadith groups in Pakistan have also received funding from Saudi donors (Sikand 2007).

LeT is one of 17 major Ahl Hadith organizations in Pakistan. Some of these groups participate in Pakistan's political system, while others argue that Pakistan's system is un-Islamic. Some groups believe that jihad is a military activity that must be undertaken by all Muslims; while other groups argue some can conduct jihad on behalf of the community. Other groups believe that jihad is primarily about reforming one's own behavior. LeT refuses to participate in Pakistani politics and heavily emphasizes jihad as a military activity that is compulsory for all Muslims. LeT has clashed with one of the largest of the other Ahl Hadith groups, Markazi Jamiat Ahl Hadith (MJAH) which participates in Pakistani politics and takes a less strident attitude towards jihad. In early 2001 Markazi Jamiat Ahl Hadith accused LeT members of attacking its members and at another point of attacking Bareilvi girls. Before he established MDI, Hafez Saeed was invited to join MJAH (Rana 2006).

In LeT's worldview the doctrines of dawa (preaching) and jihad are both required. LeT has an extensive network for propagating its vision of Islam, providing religious training, publishing periodicals (Rana 2006), and publicly calling for the full implementation of Islamic religious law in Pakistan (The MEMRI Blog 2010a, b, c). The dawa mission is intimately linked with the jihad mission. LeT believes that jihad is necessary to purify Pakistan and bring about a proper Islamic state. LeT's vision of jihad is expansive. Although LeT's early violent activity focused on the Kashmir conflict, this was never the organization's ultimate objective. In 1997 LeT leader Hafez Saeed stated, "We feel that Kashmir should be liberated at the earliest. Thereafter, Indian Muslims should be aroused to rise in revolt against the Indian Union so that India gets disintegrated" (Raman 1998). The August 2001 issue of the LeT periodical *Mujjala-ul-Dawa* included an article describing a jihad conference that stated, "Kashmir would become the doorway to jihad in Delhi, Agra, and Kathiawar." Not long before the 2008 Mumbai attack, Hafez Saeed addressed the Kashmir Solidarity Conference in Lahore and said it was an opportune time to take the war onto Indian soil (Mir 2008b). LeT's vision does not end with India. According to C. Christine Fair, who has reviewed LeT propaganda since 1995, the organization has long railed against the "Brahmanic-Talmudic-Crusader" alliance of Hindus, Jews, and Christians who were allied in an effort to destroy the Ummah (Fair 2009a, b). Email updates from LeT disseminated in 2000 and 2001 included frequent references to the Palestinians, a call for Pakistan to detonate a hydrogen bomb to "make the USA yield before Pakistan," and calls for jihad everywhere Muslims are oppressed including Chechnya, Kosovo, and the Philippines (Kohlmann 2006). Unsurprisingly, Israel and Jews are frequent targets of LeT's rhetoric. During Israel's 2009 war in Gaza, LeT organized protests against Israel (The Times of India 2009a, b). More recently, LeT protested a planned mass beard-shaving program in Karachi

organized by Gillette to set a Guinness World Record. LeT referred to the program organizer as the “Jewish Company Gillette” (The MEMRI Blog 2010a, b, c).

According to Jessica Stern, when she interviewed Hafez Saeed in 1999, he presented his international economic agenda in social justice terms claiming that the West uses the World Bank and the IMF to oppress Muslim countries and that globalization is “a prelude to occupation.” In that meeting another LeT leader complained that “Jews are brutalizing Muslims all over the world (Stern 2003).”

When questioned about Islamic terrorist attacks on civilians, the standard LeT response is that it was a plot by the CIA or Mossad. An LeT leader told Jessica Stern that “Anyone who goes against America is labeled a terrorist.” He went on to state that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing must have been a CIA operation. After 9/11 LeT issued the following statement:

...Prof. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed has categorically stated that the terrorist attacks in the American cities were the doing of the Zionists and no Jihadic organization could be involved in such an un-Islamic activity. He said that America was planning [a] massacre of the Afghans under the cover of bin Ladens alleged involvement in the latest terrorist activity. He however added that such an action by Americans would invite even greater divine wrath... Hafiz Muhammad Saeed said that the Zionists and Christians were trying their best to link Jihad with terrorism through their powerful propaganda machinery. He said that undue American interference in the affairs of other countries was bound to have its repercussions (Kohlmann 2006).

More recently, LeT has responded to the Mumbai attacks with a similar trope. A spokesman for Saeed stated, “The Mumbai bloodbath seems to have been carried out by those who wanted to create more problems for Indian Muslims. Deccan Mujahideen is surely a fake name just to create confusion. We do know an Indian jehadi group with the name of Indian Mujahideen but this Deccan Mujahideen is a new thing, which is aimed at implicating the Muslims in the carnage. Even otherwise, let me make it clear that the followers of Hafiz Mohammad Saeed simply do not believe in killing innocent civilians” (Mir 2008a, b).

## 2.2 Pakistan: The Homebase

Depending on the political situation, the turn-off from the fabled and chaotic Grand Trunk Road (built by the emperor Sher Shah Suri who lived from 1486–1545) to LeT’s headquarters ranges from poorly marked to completely un-marked at all. But, near the modest commercial town of Muridke, which is about 30 miles north of Pakistan’s cultural capital Lahore, sits the Markaz (literally center or headquarters) of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the charitable wing of LeT. Sprawling over about 200 acres, the compound includes (as visiting journalists regularly report) a profitable fish farm, cotton fields, horses, dormitories, schools, and medical facilities. The student body is reportedly over 1000 (some reports place it as high as 1600). The facilities include primary and secondary schools, as well as a college, which trains Alim (which is roughly equivalent to holding dual Masters in

Arabic and Islamic studies), all equipped with modern devices including computers. Evidence of martial activity varies with the political climate. Visits are carefully monitored and security guards armed with AK-47s patrol the grounds. In February 1999 Jessica Stern reported seeing an obstacle course intended to prepare students for Kashmir (Stern 2003) and others saw young men practicing martial arts. However, *The Dawn* reported in 2000 that people were educated for jihad at Muridke, but that actual training took place at camps near Muzzafarabad (Siddiqi 2000). With its well-manicured lawns and horses, the Markaz most resembles an elite private school—one reporter described it as “the Eton of Wahhabi Islam” and states that the complex was inspired by Aitchison College, one of Pakistan’s elite private schools (Page 2008). The Muridke complex could also be described as a state within a state, LeT’s attempt to create a perfect Ahl Hadith community. Un-Islamic behavior is forbidden, including smoking and music. Individuals who wish to live in Muridke show their commitment by smashing their television sets (Stern 2003). Establishing these enclosed communities is a common practice among Pakistan’s Islamist movements. Jamaat-e-Islami has a housing society at its headquarters in Mansoorah (Amir 2003) and Jaish-e-Mohammed was reportedly building a fortified complex at Bahawalpur (The Daily Times 2009), but LeT’s center at Muridke is both larger and more secretive than any of the other religious communities.

The Muridke complex is only the largest individual component of LeT’s vast organizational infrastructure throughout Pakistan. It is an infrastructure that includes offices, schools, medical services, and publications.

LeT has multiple departments concerned with outreach to different communities including teachers and students at colleges and universities, labor and farm organizations, a public relations department for managing press relations, and a foreign affairs department linking it with jihadi organizations worldwide. LeT runs its own schools including about 200 al-Dawa Model schools that provide primary education and eleven madrassas providing higher education. Emphasis is on religious studies, but science and modern subjects are also taught, albeit with an Islamist bent by teachers. About half of the schools are in Punjab (Pakistan’s most populous province) with another 30 in the Sindh, and about a dozen each in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Azad Kashmir. Thirty-five of the al-Dawa Model schools in the Punjab are for girls, while all of the rest of the schools are for boys (Rana 2006).

Pakistani journalist Arif Jamal provides more detail. There are three types of schools run by LeT, none of which are (strictly speaking) madrassas because all of them include studies of other topics, particularly science. The al-Mahad Ala li-Dawah al-Islamiyah (High Institute for the Islamic Call) runs 16 institutions around the country, and provides higher education in Islam. There are also a network of schools that focus on memorizing the Koran, the Ma’az bin Jabl schools. This system was established in 1999 and now consists of five schools with over 100 students. The backbone of the LeT’s education system are the al-Dawa Model schools which in 2002 had about 18,000 students and nearly 1000 teachers, including five schools for girls with about 5000 enrolled. All of the teachers at al-

Dawa schools are required to have had jihad training and many have fought in Kashmir. An important component to the growth of these schools has been the poor state of public education in Pakistan combined with the LeT's low fees compared to other private schools. There are schools in wealthy areas that (in 2002) might charge 1500 rupees per month (about \$25) whereas schools in impoverished areas frequently charge about one-tenth of that and will waive fees for those who cannot pay (Jamal 2002).

The schools claim to teach the national curriculum and emphasize science, because it is, according to the principal of the school at Muridke, "Imperative that Muslims should learn science" (Bright 2008). However, the teaching has a heavy Islamist bent. Zafar Iqbal, then head of LeT's education department explained how LeT re-wrote the standard Elementary Reader to better indoctrinate students. He stated, "In the earlier Reader we had 'Alif' for Anar (pomegranate), 'Be' for Bakr (goat) and so on. This has been replaced by the concept of 'Alif' for Allah, 'Be' for Bandoq (gun), 'Te' for toop (cannon) and so on (Rana 2002)."

Although the LeT schools provide a large cadre of activists, only a relative few are dispatched to fight in Kashmir, or elsewhere. LeT ranks jihad and dawa as equally important and seeks to "convert" as many people as possible to its own school of Islam. Those who go through the LeT schools and are then sent on jihad training are believed to be more likely to return to their homes and proselytize on LeT's behalf (Fair 2009a, b).

LeT recruits from across Pakistani society. Many of those dispatched to fight in Kashmir are from impoverished backgrounds and have very little grasp of LeT's worldview, but are motivated by a combination of a desire for adventure (Swami 2005) (Abou Zahab 2007) or poverty. The lone survivor of the Mumbai attackers, Ajmal Kasab, joined LeT because he sought to learn weapons skills and embark on a criminal career and only later sought the fame of being a jihadi (The Economic Times 2008). When young men decide to sign up for jihad, it is relatively easy to find one of LeT's hundreds of offices throughout the country (Rana 2006).<sup>6</sup>

LeT does not recruit heavily from Pakistan's madrassas because they are primarily Deobandi and the Ahl Hadith madrassas are controlled by MJAH, which does not share LeT's position on jihad. LeT does recruit individuals with secular educations, deeming them better motivated and more capable (Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst 2009). LeT also targets individuals from the wealthier upper classes for recruitment. However such recruits are valued for their skills (often they are engineers or are fluent in foreign languages) and are used to build the organization (Stern 2003).

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<sup>6</sup> Rana reported that before January 13, 2002 (when JuD was banned in Pakistan for LeT's role in the attack on India's parliament) there were 1150 LeT/JuD offices in Pakistan. After the ban 116 offices continued to function. Other reports state that there are over 2000 LeT/JuD offices throughout Pakistan. See Rana, *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations*.

LeT also provides medical services, including a hospital at Muridke, mobile medical clinics, and an ambulance service (Al-Jazeera 2010). According to a 2003 report, the JuD's Al-Dawa Medical Mission has 2200 doctors that volunteer their services part-time, includes three hospitals and 47 dispensaries providing a wide range of medical services to thousands of Pakistanis who have little or no other access to medical care. The director of the program states explicitly that these operations both fulfill a religious obligation but also counter the activities of NGOs and Christian missionaries. Under Ahl Hadith rules, only women medical personnel can treat women patients so LeT has established a team of female doctors. LeT affiliated doctors are trained to proselytize as they provide treatment, hand out literature and maintain contact with patients after their treatment is complete. In addition, LeT digs wells to ameliorate water shortages (News 2003). These capabilities have allowed LeT to play a central role in disaster relief in Pakistan. With its training camps in Pakistani Kashmir, LeT (while suffering substantial casualties of its own) was one of the first organizations to provide aid after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake. LeT's rapid response, in comparison to the government's slow reaction helped increase LeT's public standing in Pakistan (Swami 2005). These efforts have been repeated in delivering aid to refugees from the Pakistani Army's 2008 offensive to re-take the Swat Valley from Pakistani Taliban, and in the wake of the devastating 2010 floods during which a JuD spokesman said the group had 2000 members working for flood relief, providing food, clothing and ambulances in NWFP and Punjab provinces. The volunteers were reportedly wearing badges for both JuD and its most recent incarnation Falah-e-Insaniyat (Shah 2010).

A central component of LeT's dawa mission is public outreach that includes print and online publications as well as public appearances by leaders at rallies, mosques, conferences and in the media. LeT publishes multiple publications appealing to different communities such as women and students. The publications feature calls for jihad against LeT enemies and articles that discuss the kinds of training LeT jihadis will receive. They also include general interest articles that attempt to make Islam relevant to modern life such as "Koran and Astronomy," and "Prophet's Medicine: Olive is the Cure for 70 Diseases (Bearak 2000a, b, c)." LeT has an active PR operation and its leaders and spokesman regularly communicate with Pakistan's print and electronic media including making appearances on major Pakistani television networks. On at least one occasion, in the aftermath of the summer 2010 floods, LeT's front group JuD purchased an advertisement in a Pakistani newspaper, calling for donations to support its flood relief efforts (Pakistan Media Watch 2010).



## Overview of LeT publications (Rana 2008)

Publication	Circulation	Schedule	Language	Location & Audience
Mujalla-ul-Dawa	100,000	Monthly	Urdu	Lahore (banned by Pakistani government)
Ghazwa	20,000	Weekly	Urdu	Lahore
Al-Anfal	—	Monthly	Arabic	Lahore
Voice of Islam	—	Monthly	English	Lahore
Zarb-e Taiba	—	Monthly	Urdu	Lahore—youth & students (banned by Pakistani government)
Tayyibaat	—	Monthly	Urdu	Lahore—women
Babul Islam	—	Monthly	Sindhi	Karachi
Rozatul Atfal	—	Biweekly	Urdu	Lahore—children
Nanhay Mujahid	10,000	Monthly	Urdu	Lahore—children

LeT claims it sells 100,000 copies of Mujalla-ul-Dawa a month (sources at the press state that the regular run is actually 50,000 to 65,000) (Sareen 2005)

LeT has been aggressive in employing modern technology to propagate its message. In the late 1990s LeT had websites that allowed individuals to make online donations and read articles and was disseminating its work through list-serves and email (Kohlmann 2006). It also ran an internet radio program al-Jehad (Sareen 2005) and more recently expanded onto Facebook. However, as LeT and its front groups attained higher public profile, their internet presence has been curtailed. Amir Mir reported that after the Mumbai attacks, Pakistani authorities removed LeT and JuD's English and Urdu websites, however other outreach operations continued unabated (Mir 2009a, b).

LeT also holds conferences and rallies throughout the country on a regular basis. The major annual rally, held at the headquarters in Muridke until 2002 (and later held in other locations in order to avoid too much official attention) attracts tens of thousands of attendees (Abou Zahab 2007). Reportedly, Osama bin Laden attended these annual conferences until 1993 and addressed them over the phone in the mid-1990s (Raman 2000). But this rally is only the LeT's largest. LeT clerics give sermons and hold rallies promoting LeT causes all over Pakistan. For example, in 2001, LeT sponsored a rally near the India-Pakistan border in which villagers were invited to hear the message of LeT veteran fighters and huge speakers broadcast their chants across the border into India (Rana 2006). In February 2010, after about a year of relative quiet by LeT leaders since the Mumbai attack, LeT organized conferences and its leaders spoke at mosques on Pakistan's Kashmir Solidarity day. Then, in June 2010 LeT held a series of rallies throughout the country against India's alleged theft of Pakistan's river water (Press Trust of India 2010a, b).

### 2.2.1 *LeT's Finances*

LeT's operations cost an enormous amount of money – consequently LeT has an extensive fundraising operation that extends worldwide. According to one report in 2005, “Almost every third or fourth shop in all the major markets in Pakistan has donation boxes for jihadi groups (Sareen 2005).” Publication sales are a form of income, but the publications also contain exhortations to make contributions. Each unit of LeT runs fundraising operations in conjunction with the department of finance. In 2001 these campaigns raised approximately 200 million rupees (approximately \$3.5 million.) Of course any information about LeT finances must be considered incomplete, but it does provide insight into the scale of the organization's operations. It is reported that many of LeT's wealthy donors, including wealthy Pakistani businessmen, do so anonymously in order to evade financial sanctions from the United States and international authorities. This particularly applies to donations from wealthy Gulf Arabs sympathetic to LeT's Ahl Hadith philosophy, which are believed to be a key source for LeT financing (Rana 2006).<sup>7</sup>

Donations to LeT (and other terrorist groups in Pakistan) are facilitated in a number of ways. After 9/11 international Islamist charities, such as the al-Haramain Foundation, al-Rashid Foundation, and the International Islamic Relief Organization have come under scrutiny for their role in supporting terrorist organizations worldwide, including LeT, (U.S. Dept. of Treasury October 5, 2011). Another method used is the hawala system, an informal financial transfer system that relies on trust. An individual in one city can hand cash to a hawala agent. That agent will contact his counterpart in another city, and on his word, the money deposited will be given to the recipient. There is no connection to the formal financial system (Ganguly 2001) (Jost and Sandhu 2000). The hawala system, while illegal, is a favored method of sending remittances to home countries around the world (Pakistani officials estimate that \$7 billion flow through the country via hawala channels) annually and only a small portion is linked to terrorist activity (U.S. Dept. of Treasury (December 3 2010).

One fundraiser, commonly used by Pakistan's Islamist groups, and other charitable organizations is the collection of sacrificial animal skins on Eid al-Adha, Feast of the Sacrifice. On this festival, Muslims slaughter an animal and donate part of its meat to the needy and eat another part. In 2008, in Pakistan, about 5 million goats and sheep and 1 million cows were slaughtered. Organizations then collect hides and sell them to tanneries, providing about 45% of the needs of Pakistan's tanners. JuD reportedly collected over 100,000 skins and sold them for about \$1.2 million (The Dawn 2010). In addition to corps of collectors, LeT uses a range of methods to convince people to participate in the sacrifice and donate the

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<sup>7</sup> From 2001–2007 the Pakistani rupees was generally valued at about 60 to a US dollar so conversions are made at that rate. Public details about LeT financing are unlikely to be accurate, the purpose is to provide a glimpse into the scale and nature of LeT operations.

hide, including loudspeakers on top of mosques and an internet campaign that allows people to purchase a share of a sacrificed animal from anywhere in world. According to some sources, thousands of British Pakistanis contributed to this event, raising millions of rupees in 2003 (Sareen 2005).

Finally, the Pakistani government provides direct financial support to LeT. A September 2006 report in Pakistan's Herald magazine stated that large jihadi organizations such as LeT received monthly stipends of 2–3 million rupees (\$30,000–50,000) (South Asia Terrorism Portal). Pakistan's civilian government has also provided financial support for LeT. In June 2010, when the provincial government of the Punjab published its annual budget, it had allocated 80 million rupees (about \$1 million) to schools and hospitals affiliated with JuD, which was banned by the UN and the United States as a front for LeT. A spokesman for the Punjabi government insisted that it was overseeing the expenditure and that the operations were strictly humanitarian (BBC News 2010).

### 2.2.2 *Recruitment and Training*

Although LeT recruits from every region, ethnic group, and socio-economic class in Pakistan, the heart of LeT's support base is in northern and central Punjab, where there are even villages in which LeT is trusted to arbitrate disputes (International Crisis Group 2005).

LeT receives its greatest support from Punjabis and Mohajirs (individuals who are descendants of those who migrated from India to Pakistan during the partition of British India in 1947). LeT supporters are usually lower middle-class farmers and traders, LeT martyrs (operatives killed in fighting in Kashmir) write testaments of their life stories. These testaments are used as recruitment tools by LeT, in order to inspire others. They are also a useful source of sociological data about LeT. Mariam Abou Zahab surveyed 100 of these testaments from 2000–2003, taken from LeT's magazine *Mujjala-ul-Dawa* and also taped interviews of individuals recruited by LeT and planning to go to Kashmir as well as interviews with the relatives of the martyrs (Abou Zahab 2007). Many of the LeT recruits come from Punjabi families that migrated from the eastern, Indian part of the province, when partition occurred. This is also the background of LeT leader Hafez Muhammad Saeed. LeT also attempts to recruit from wealthier classes, but these recruits are usually not sent on jihad. Overall LeT recruits are better educated than those of other jihadi organization such as Jaish-e-Mohammed. Some LeT recruits have been to college, and only 10% had been to madrassas. The incentives to join LeT are substantial. Historically, the Kashmir conflict and tales of alleged Indian crimes against the Kashmiri people are a regular feature in Pakistan's media and education system, often with references to the horrors of partition. (With the Kashmir conflict moribund in recent years, fighting in Afghanistan is a now also a theme increasingly used by LeT for recruitment.) Joining LeT gave young Pakistani men an opportunity to take an active role in avenging these alleged atrocities

and provided an opportunity to become famous. Finally, LeT operatives are well paid and the families of martyrs are rewarded. According to one report they are given a stipend of 1500 rupees—about \$25 per month (Rana 2006).

LeT runs multiple training programs for its recruits. The *daura-e amma* and *daura-e suffa* programs are three-week intensive courses of religious education, open to any who wish to attend. Those who complete these programs and perform *dawa* and recruit their friends to LeT may be invited to the *daura-e khassa*, a three-month course of military training. Those selected to fight in Kashmir receive further, more intensive military training (Tankel 2011a, b).

The emphasis on religious training is further evidence that for LeT the *dawa* (proselytizing) function is just as important as *jihad*, and the two projects go hand in hand. LeT's recruitment process involves carefully cultivating the family of the recruit (particularly the mothers) and bringing the recruit's behavior fully into line with LeT's Ahl Hadith philosophy. Relatives report that recruits who underwent LeT training return with greater maturity and seriousness. LeT remains in contact with the families of martyrs and tries to keep them in the Ahl Hadith fold (Abou Zahab 2007).

### 2.2.3 *LeT and the State*

The scale of LeT's activities would be nearly impossible without at least the acquiescence of the Pakistani government and quite often the Pakistani government provides open support. Besides the financial support described above, Pakistani state support includes political and military aid.

The Pakistani military long viewed LeT as its favored proxy in Kashmir. According to Stephen Tankel, the Pakistani army and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency trained LeT's trainers and designed LeT's training program (Tankel 2011a, b). In addition, from the 1990s and into the early 2000s the ISI, the army, and LeT worked together to plan attacks (Tankel 2011a, b). LeT primarily recruits from the same families and neighborhoods as the Pakistani military, leading to informal connections that facilitate this support (Riedel 2012). At times, infiltration efforts received covering fire from Pakistani forces. In other cases, the Punjabi government actively sought LeT's support. In 1998, several ministers both in the Punjabi government and the federal government visited Muridke and sought to enlist LeT's support against the sectarian violence that wracks Pakistan. LeT has had limited involvement in this violence (Abou Zahab 2007).

The Pakistani government and military have periodically clamped down on LeT, both in response to international pressure such as after the 2001 parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attack. The Pakistani government has also restricted LeT operations when it serves its own interests. According to Stephen Tankel, in 2004, when relations between India and Pakistan began to warm, LeT activities were restricted and the army began reducing the *jihadi* ranks. After the July 2005

London subway bombings in which two of the four bombers trained in Pakistan and one, Shezad Tanweer, may have had contact with LeT (The Guardian 2005), the Pakistani government began restricting the Kashmiri jihadists even more severely. Unauthorized infiltrators were arrested when they returned to Pakistan and in some cases their families were threatened if they infiltrated Kashmir (Tankel 2011a, b).

Nonetheless, the government of Pakistan always kept LeT (along with its other proxy forces) a viable option. Activities were restricted, but organizations were never fully closed down. The regular “house arrests” of LeT leader Hafez Muhammed Saeed illustrate the Pakistani military’s double game. Although his movements were restricted and sometimes he was prevented from addressing large rallies, he remained active. For example, in September 2009 he attended an iftar (the feast with which Muslims break their fast during Ramadan) at the headquarters of the 10th Corps of the Pakistani Army in Rawalpindi despite Punjabi police placing restrictions on his movements (The Times of India 2009a, b) (South Asian Terrorism Portal 2011). In the period since the Mumbai attacks, Pakistani courts have not authorized Saeed’s continued detention due to insufficient evidence provided by the Pakistani government and made little progress in trying the seven LeT members it arrested in connection with the Mumbai assault (Curtis 2011).

Finally, whatever restrictions the Pakistani government has placed on LeT, unlike other Pakistani jihadi groups, LeT has never turned its guns on the Pakistani state.

### 2.3 Kashmir: The First Front

In the autumn of 1999, Indian commanders in Badami Bagh Cantonment, India’s largest military base in Jammu & Kashmir, had some justified feelings of accomplishment. In July, the Pakistani army had been forced to withdraw from Indian bases they had seized in Kargil, a strategic mountainous zone along the Line of Control that divided Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s rebuffed offensive had left that country internationally isolated and suffering from internal turmoil, while the state of Jammu and Kashmir was relatively quiet. However, in the evening of November 3, 1999 a team of LeT terrorists infiltrated this supposedly secure zone, entered the unguarded public relations office of the 15 Corps and killed the Public Relations Officer, Major Purushottam, and seven of his staffers. The LeT terrorists then held soldiers at bay for over 10 h before they were killed (Swami 1999) (Rediff.com 1999). LeT claimed to have killed 43 Indian soldiers, including a Colonel and two Majors, and that it had alerted the media using Major Purushottam’s own phone (Rana 2006).

Although LeT had been sending fighters into Kashmir for the better part of the decade and its social activities within Pakistan were extensive, it had maintained a low profile in Jammu & Kashmir (Indian Express 1999). However, the attack on

the 15 Corps HQ at Badami Bagh and other dramatic fedayeen<sup>8</sup> missions were seen as restoring Pakistan's wounded honor and helped propel LeT into the front ranks of jihadi organizations in Kashmir.

### 2.3.1 *Kashmir in Time and Space*

Kashmir has, since ancient times, been a strategic crossroads. Although the terrain is forbidding there are many key passes through the mountains and Kashmir sat astride important trade routes, linked to the great Silk Road, that have been traversed by caravans between east and west for thousands of years.

At the same time, it is a defensible area, which could be secured against all but the most intrepid invading armies. One noted sixteenth century chronicler, described Kashmir's advantageous strategic position:

On all the sides mountains, which raise their heads to heaven, act as sentinels. Though there are six or seven roads, yet in all of them are places where if some old women rolled down stones, the bravest of the men could not pass (Kalhana's *Rajatarangini* 1900, translation by M.A. Stein).

With its commanding heights, possession of Kashmir provided an immense advantage to those seeking to infiltrate the Indian sub-continent. The British sought to secure Kashmir to prevent Russian infiltration during their rule, thus making Kashmir the focal point of the "Great Game" described in Rudyard Kipling's *Kim*.

Kashmir is also very beautiful. The Vale of Kashmir, an ancient lake basin about 84 miles long and 20–25 miles wide, ringed by towering peaks on all sides, is verdant and temperate. Under the Mughals and later the British, the valley became a favored refuge against the heat of the Indian plains. One Mughal emperor on his deathbed reportedly said he wanted, "Nothing but Kashmir." Sir Francis Younghusband, Britain's resident in Srinagar in the early twentieth century said, "Each spot in Kashmir one is inclined to think the most beautiful of all, perhaps because each in some particular exceeds the rest."

Kashmir is now a central point of contention between Pakistan and India. As Indian independence movements grew in the early part of the twentieth century, British India's Muslim leaders became concerned that in an independent Hindu-dominated India they would become a permanently disadvantaged minority. This led Muslim leaders to argue for two Indias, one consisting of the provinces with Hindu majorities and the other consisting of provinces with Muslim majorities. India's Muslim majority nation was referred to as Pakistan, an acronym for some of the Muslim majority provinces (Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sindh). In Farsi, Pakistan means "land of the pure".

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<sup>8</sup> Fedayeen attacks are attacks in which the attackers expect to die, but unlike a suicide bombing, they do not die by their own hand but instead are killed in the fighting.

When the partition of British India occurred in 1947, both sides sought the accession of Kashmir, which was a semi-independent principality. Pakistan argued that as a predominantly Muslim province it should rightfully be part of the homeland for India's Muslim population. However, the maharaja of Kashmir was a Hindu and India's leader Jawaharlal Nehru was of Kashmiri descent and had forged a close personal relationship with Sheikh Abdullah, the most popular leader of the Kashmiri people.

The maharaja avoided making a decision. As these events were unfolding, Muslims in the Poonch district rebelled against the maharaja, a revolt that was put down sharply and with substantial bloodshed. In October 1947 Pashtun tribesman from Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, hearing reports about the Muslim revolt and the ensuing harsh response, declared jihad and invaded Kashmir where they went on a rampage of looting (Schofield 1996). Praveen Swami, a leading Indian journalist on intelligence and security affairs argues that the 1947 invasion was a pre-cursor of future Pakistani efforts in which irregular forces were supported with advanced military equipment and intelligence while the government officially denied any role (Swami 2007). However, it is worth noting that in its early years, Pakistan's army was commanded by British generals, which limited the options of the leaders of the new Pakistani state (Haqqani 2005). Regardless, with the collapse of his rule the maharaja signed an agreement of accession to India and Indian troops arrived to stop the tribesmen.

The fighting left India in control of the greater part of Kashmir, including the Vale, which includes Srinagar (the largest city) and the majority of Kashmir's population. Pakistani forces controlled over 32,000 square miles. Mountainous Gilgit and Baltistan were incorporated into Pakistan as the Northern Areas, consisting of about 27,000 square miles. The Pakistani government organized the slender strip of over 5000 square miles it occupied directly across the 1948 ceasefire line (known as the Line of Control or LoC) as Azad (Free) Kashmir—Indians refer to this area as "Pakistan Occupied Kashmir" or POK.

Just as important as the physical outcome of the fighting is the perception of the events by the participants (each of whom regarded themselves as being in the right.) The core legal dispute is over the authority of the maharaja to sign the letter of accession to India. Pakistan argues that the maharaja did not possess this authority and that accession should have been determined by plebiscite. But the Kashmir question took on far greater resonance for both sides. From a strictly strategic standpoint, a Pakistani general observed, "Kashmir's accession to Pakistan was not simply a matter of desirability but of absolute necessity for our separate existence." He went on to explain that Indian control of Kashmir would allow Indian troops to easily cut critical transit routes and place India in control of crucial water sources (Khan 1970). Pakistan's founding leaders were despondent at the prospect of an Indian-controlled Kashmir. Pakistani leaders felt that India, aided by Britain, sought to stifle Pakistan's viability as an independent nation from the start (Schofield 1996). This perception, that Pakistan was never given a fair chance is a crucial component of the Pakistani worldview (Cohen 2004).



Further complicating this situation were the feelings of the Kashmiri people themselves. The maharaja's line had been established in 1846 when, under the Treaty of Amritsar a Hindu nobleman purchased the Vale of Kashmir from the British East India Company and merged it with the territories he already controlled—Jammu and Ladakh. Their century of rule had not been perceived as benevolent and the Muslim majority felt that they had been oppressed (Schofield 1996).<sup>9</sup>

After the partition, Pakistan's leaders began plotting a covert war in Kashmir designed to spark a popular revolt. Praveen Swami chronicles these efforts, but prior to the 1980s they had limited impact. In one important respect, Swami found Pakistan's strategy of subversion was effective. The low-level conflict helped imbue India's Kashmir policy with a pervasive sense of crisis that led to hardening positions and strong-arm policies (Swami 2007). It led to a policy in which, in the words of political science professor Sumit Ganguly, "the national political leadership, from Jawaharlal Nehru onwards adopted a singularly peculiar stand on the internal politics of Jammu and Kashmir: as long as the local political bosses avoided raising the secessionist bogey, the government in New Delhi overlooked the locals' political practices, corrupt or otherwise (Ganguly 1997)."

In addition, there were two large-scale open wars between India and Pakistan. In 1965 Pakistani forces attempted to seize Kashmir and were defeated. In 1971 India supported the independence movement in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), which resulted in a clash between India and Pakistan. India was victorious and Pakistan was split into two countries. Although this war was not fought in Kashmir, it left Pakistan shattered and divided. Pakistani efforts to infiltrate Kashmir declined in the short-term, although the defeat also reinforced the feeling among many Pakistanis that they would never receive their due place in the international order. Pakistan's strategic establishment remained interested in undermining India. Events within Jammu and Kashmir created their opportunity.

With Pakistan's 1971 defeat, their allies in Jammu & Kashmir were discredited. However, a small cadre continued to support an independent Kashmir and carried out low-level attacks. In 1987 elections were held in Kashmir, but the results were disputed due to allegations of widespread fraud resulting in mass protests in Kashmir. Allegations of heavy-handed Indian responses, which allegedly included curfews, several incidents in which Indian soldiers allegedly fired on protesters killing dozens, and allegations of gang-rape by Indian soldiers, poured gasoline onto these fires. Kashmiris may have been further inspired in 1989 by the sudden collapse of the dictatorships of Eastern Europe (Habibullah 2008).

The leading pro-independence group, the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), expanded its operations and Jammu and Kashmir descended into chaos (International Crisis Group 2003a, b). Pakistan seized the opportunity to re-initiate

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<sup>9</sup> For one account of the rule of the Hindu dogras (see Schofield 1996 pages 49–117) which includes multiple accounts of British officials calling for the rulers of Jammu and Kashmir to institute reforms and foster development.

operations in Jammu & Kashmir. Since its 1971 defeat, Pakistan had acquired substantial assets for a new round of conflict. First and foremost Pakistan was now a de facto nuclear power, which raised the costs of India applying its military superiority in a conventional war. Second, Pakistan had benefited greatly both in equipment, skills, and confidence from its alliance with the United States in the drive to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Finally, India was suffering from violent internal secessionist conflicts (most notably, rebellious Sikhs in Punjab, who were actively supported by Pakistan) (Swami 2007) (Gill 1997).

Pakistani intelligence worked with the JKLF, but found them unsatisfactory allies because their focus was on obtaining independence for Kashmir. Just as the Afghan conflict was winding down, Islamist groups in Pakistan began focusing on the Kashmir conflict. The Pakistani Directorate of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) began cultivating Islamist groups as an alternative. The first major beneficiary was Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) the armed wing of the Pakistani Islamist party Jamaat Islami. HM had a strong network of supporters in the valley and actually turned its guns on the JKLF (with Pakistani support.) As HM bore the brunt of Indian counter-insurgency, the ISI fostered other Pakistani Islamist groups including LeT (Swami 2007).

### ***2.3.2 Initial Involvement and Massacres***

According to LeT's propaganda, operations in Kashmir were initiated on January 25, 1990 with an ambush on a jeep carrying Indian Air Force personnel. Five pilots were killed. An LeT leader, stated that this target was chosen for symbolic reasons because it was the Indian Air Force that flew the Indian soldiers into Kashmir during the partition (Abbas 2002). As the JKLF reduced its militant actions and in 1994 laid down its arms, LeT expanded its operations. In 1993, LeT operatives struck an army base in Poonch and in 1994, LeT reportedly ambushed an Indian Army convoy, abducting and killing five. LeT operations were heavily focused on the Poonch and Rajouri regions of Jammu & Kashmir. This area is just across the Line of Control from Pakistani territory. It was relatively easy for LeT to infiltrate because the area is west of the Pir Panjal Mountains that protect the valley. The inhabitants of the area are ethnically similar to the Punjabis, the LeT operatives know the language and blend in more easily (Sikand 2007). This area also includes substantial Hindu populations, which LeT, in conjunction with other groups including HM, targeted with massacres. These massacres were intended to spark a Hindu exodus, fuel communal tensions, provoke reprisals, and intimidate local populations (Tankel 2011a, b). From the mid-1990s onward LeT carried out numerous massacres of Hindu communities. Praveen Swami, then the intelligence correspondent for the Indian daily *The Hindu* wrote, after a massacre in August 2000:

The massacres should surprise nobody, for the Lashkar-E-Taiba has traditionally used such violence to sabotage peace initiatives. Seven people were killed at BalJalaran in Rajouri on the eve of [then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari] Vajpayee's visit to Lahore in February 1999, through the Wagah border, in the first of three communal massacres that night. Another family of four was killed at the Mohra Fata hamlet of Khorbani... a remote village in Rajouri district. Nine members of a family, three of them infants, were killed the same night at Barhyana in neighbouring Udhampur district. Signals intelligence personnel listening in on frequencies used by the Lashkar-e-Taiba heard controllers telling field units to "turn the snow red". The hamlets, which dot the hills of the Jammu province, are almost impossible to defend in strength.

In the wake of the Pokhran II nuclear tests [conducted by India] in 1998 [followed by Pakistan's nuclear tests], the Lashkar-e-Taiba used communal killings with good effect to signal the group's determination to use the new de facto parity between India and Pakistan to escalate violence. On July 27 that year, 17 villagers were lined up and shot dead at Sarwan and ThakrainHor villages in Kishtwar, Doda. Jewelry and cash were looted from the dead. The same group murdered 26 construction workers and injured 11 persons on August 3, 1998, at Kalaban...

Each communal massacre in the State has been met by Hindu communal mobilization. Critics have pointed out that both the Hindu and Islamic right feed off communal massacres. As mass killings provoke migrations, Hindus and Muslims tend to consolidate into ethnic ghettos, a development that obviously serves communal politicians well. Each backlash against the massacres, in turn, deepens the fissures between communities.... (Swami 2000a, b).

Despite LeT's bloodthirsty attacks, the overall situation in Jammu and Kashmir was beginning to stabilize. Civilian deaths, overall deaths, and number of incidents were declining and in 1996 elections were held in Jammu and Kashmir indicating the improving security situation (Habibullah 2008). India and Pakistan's civilian leaders had begun discussing confidence-building measures. At this point, in spring 1999, backed by several of its proxies including LeT, the Pakistani army seized Indian positions in the mountains overlooking the Kargil region. The Indian and Pakistani armies had an unwritten understanding that both sides abandoned their positions during the winter because weather conditions made the mountains uninhabitable. It was during this period that Pakistani troops, with support from the various Islamist proxies including LeT, took the Indian positions and fortified them (Habibullah 2008). The Pakistani incursion was meant to draw international attention to the Kashmir conflict. But, a vigorous Indian response and an absence of international support forced Pakistan to withdraw. Ultimately, the United States provided Pakistan with only a minimal, face-saving gesture (Abbas 2005).

### 2.3.3 *Fedayeen*

The first fedayeen attack was not the infiltration of Badami Bagh described above. It occurred several months earlier, in July 1999 shortly after the defeat in Kargil. A pair of LeT operatives attacked the Border Security Force Headquarters in Bandipura with grenades and gunfire—killing the Deputy Inspector General (LeT claims to have killed 13 Indian soldiers) (Rana 2006). Over the next several years

there were dozens of these attacks including attacks on key security targets such as the Police Special Operations Group HQ in December 1999 in which 12 security personnel were killed, or a November 2002 attack on a Central Reserve Police Force Camp that killed six. However, LeT did not restrict its attacks to security targets. On January 5, 2001 a squad of six LeT operatives, using a stolen car from the State Forester, attempted to enter Srinagar Airport wearing police uniforms. Several months later in August, three LeT fedayeen began shooting inside the Jammu Railway station, killing 11; two of the fedayeen escaped (South Asia Terrorism Portal).

Overall, LeT has carried out many of these attacks in Jammu and Kashmir. These dramatic attacks spread terror while embarrassing Indian security forces (and restoring some of the lost Pakistani honor in the wake of Kargil and other defeats). They also burnished LeT's reputation as being in the vanguard of the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. These attacks caused a controversy in Islamist circles because suicide is forbidden under Islam. However, LeT argued that fedayeen are not committing suicide, like those who strap bombs to themselves and detonate them. In fedayeen strikes, small units attack superior forces, typically with firearms and grenades and are prepared to fight to the death, but can and will escape if the opportunity presents itself. In their house organ *Mujala al-Dawa* in May 2001, LeT leader Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki wrote that the fedayeen encounter death only at the hands of their attackers, not by their own hand (Rana 2006). In this, he argued that the fedayeen follow in the footsteps of the Companions of the Prophet whose actions are inherently legitimate.

Although LeT leaders claimed that they only attacked military targets, LeT in Jammu & Kashmir continued to engage in large-scale massacres. Perhaps the most notable of these massacres occurred on March 20, 2000, the eve of President Clinton's official visit to India. In that massacre LeT terrorists, aided by HM, massacred 35 Sikhs at Chattisinghpora, Anantnag. The attackers were dressed in Indian army uniforms. In an interview, one of the accused LeT killers stated, "*The Koran* teaches us not to kill innocents. If Lashkar told us to kill those people, then it was right to do it. I have no regrets." (Bearak 2000a, b, c).

LeT developed sophisticated bomb-making skills, planting IEDs targeting Indian security forces on roadsides, in abandoned vehicles, and overhanging branches. LeT also sought to disrupt the 2002 Jammu & Kashmir elections, issuing threats to discourage citizens from voting and assassinating political leaders (Chalk and Fair 2002). Expanding operations required local infrastructure and resources. Most of LeT's operatives were Pakistani and there was little support for LeT itself among the Kashmiris. LeT expanded its efforts to recruit Kashmiris, but with limited success. The Ahl Hadith practices were in opposition to the dominant Sufi practices in the valley and the sect was peripheral in Kashmir and had difficulty attracting adherents (Sikand 2007).

An article by N.S. Jamwal, a Border Security Force Commandant based on personal experience and interviews with colleagues, provides some insight into the logistical details of jihadi operations in Jammu & Kashmir (Jamwal 2003).

Following is a summary of the article's findings. Indian security forces have found Kashmiri terrorists have generally maintained operational security in their communications and use a mix of high and low tech means to communicate from satellite phones and hand-held radio sets with encryption technology, smoke signals and informal substitutions of words. Most of the funding for operations comes from the Pakistani wing of the organization or the ISI and is transferred to operatives via the informal hawala networks. Perhaps 10 % of the operating funds are raised in J&K itself, often by coercion and intimidation. Kashmiris serve jihadi networks as guides and by providing information (such as observing movements of local security forces), shelter, and food. Women are the preferred support operatives because they are less likely to be searched unless female security personnel are present. The threat of massacres or of threats to property are used to guarantee a given population will at least be neutral and not report terrorist movements to security forces. Terrorists have found shopkeepers in remote areas to be useful in providing information, supplies, and money. In some cases shopkeepers providing support for terrorists were identified when they were carrying goods such as expensive shoes, IED components, and dry fruits. Terrorist sympathizers who provide active support are known as "Over Ground Workers", or OGWs. The most useful OGWs are socially prominent figures who have extensive social contacts and can provide terrorists with useful information and connect them to resources. Kashmir, a vast area with varied geography, which includes forbidding mountains, dense jungles, and areas that are inaccessible for many parts of the year, creates multiple opportunities for terrorists to establish hidden bases and supply caches (Jamwal 2003).

### ***2.3.4 After 9/11***

In the wake of 9/11, international scrutiny focused heavily on Pakistan-based terrorist groups. This was augmented after the December 2001 attack on India's parliament for which the Indian government held JeM and LeT jointly responsible. In response, the Musharraf administration clamped down on cross-border infiltrations—although LeT had a sufficient presence in Jammu and Kashmir to continue operations without the infusion of new cadres and supplies from across the Line of Control. A positive January 2004 meeting between Pakistan's President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee led to a resumed dialogue process and Pakistan sought to de-militarize some of its proxy forces. Violence never stopped, but decreased overall (although LeT's share of the violence in Jammu and Kashmir expanded). The July 2005 tube bombings in London, in which some of the bombers had links to Pakistan and may have had links to LeT again brought international pressure on Pakistan, which in turn reduced LeT activities. According to Tankel, at one point LeT operatives who infiltrated across the LoC without permission risked arrest and even their families were threatened (Tankel 2011a, b). LeT changed its tactics in Jammu and Kashmir to adapt to its

reduced resources. According to Indian security officials, LeT was less likely to undertake complex attacks against hard targets in Srinagar. Instead, LeT was sending young men to toss grenades at soft targets (Fair 2007).

Although the intensity of the Kashmir conflict declined substantially, LeT remained active in J&K and occasionally carried out large-scale attacks. In winter 2009, only months after the 2008 Mumbai attacks brought LeT international notoriety, there were multiple gun battles between Indian security forces and LeT (The Daily Excelsior 2009). In January 2010, LeT carried out a fedayeen operation, storming a hotel at Lal Chowk in Srinagar leading to a 22-hour siege in which a policeman and a civilian were killed (ExpressIndia.com 2010). LeT continues to attempt to intimidate Kashmiris. In April 2012 LeT placed posters in the Pulwama district threatening local leaders as part of a campaign to undermine upcoming elections (Times of India 2012). Nonetheless, these dramatic incidents are the exception rather than the rule, by all metrics violence in Kashmir has declined dramatically since the height of the Pakistan-backed insurgency in the early 2000s. According to Indian government statistics in 2011 Jammu and Kashmir averaged less than one terrorist incident per day, as opposed to seven incidents on average per day in 2004. In 2011, 64 civilians and security were killed in Jammu and Kashmir, whereas in 2004 that number was nearly 1000. (Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India 2012).

## 2.4 LeT in India

On December 22, 2000 LeT conducted its first fedayeen attack in India beyond Jammu & Kashmir when a pair of gunmen assaulted the Red Fort in Delhi leaving three Indians dead. The LeT gunmen entered the Red Fort complex after 9 PM, when the regular sound and light tourist show held at the Red Fort was finished. The attackers killed a civilian employee of the Indian military and a soldier, who served as the unit's barber. They then entered the Army barracks and killed another soldier, while injuring two others. After a 45-minute gun-battle, the LeT operatives escaped (The Hindu 2000). LeT quickly claimed responsibility for the attack, insisting the strike was on a military target since the Red Fort was administered by the military and there were military offices, interrogation centers, and barracks housing several hundred soldiers on the premises (Bearak 2000a, b, c).

The Indian government and people were shocked, but Indian security should not have been surprised. After the Kargil war, and a year before the Red Fort attack, Hafez Mohammed Saeed, had threatened to "unfurl the Islamic flag on the Red Fort (The Times of India 2003)." In fact, threats to attack the Red Fort had been a regular part of Islamist rhetoric since the partition itself. The Red Fort was not merely a military base or tourist attraction. It is a symbol of Indian identity, but it was also a symbol of the period of Muslim dominance in India. In the words of English author and journalist William Dalrymple, "The Red Fort is to Delhi what the Colosseum is to Rome or the Acropolis to Athens: it is the single most famous

monument of the city. It represents the climax of more than six hundred years of experimentation in palace building by Indo-Islamic architects, and is by far the most substantial monument—and in its day was also by far the most magnificent—that the Mughals left behind them in Delhi.” Dalrymple goes one to explain that during “the apex of Mughal power, the golden age when most of India, all of Pakistan, and great chunks of Afghanistan were ruled from the Red Fort in Delhi. It was an age of unparalleled prosperity: the empire was at peace and trade was flourishing (Dalrymple 1993).”

On the Eid after the attack, LeT re-enacted the Red Fort attack before a huge crowd at Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore (Abou Zahab 2007).

Pakistani intelligence and LeT had long sought means of encouraging disgruntled minorities within India to revolt, in the short-term to keep pressure on India and tie down its forces—in the long-term, according to Pakistani doctrine—to cause the state to dissolve. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pakistan supported Sikh separatists in Punjab (Gill 1997). Pakistani intelligence and LeT believed that Indian Muslims were an ideal target for subversion because of their social and economic grievances against the Indian state.

Discontent among India’s Muslims was stoked by the destruction of the historic Babri Masjid Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 by a Hindu mob. This destruction was followed by communal riots in which over 2000 people (primarily Muslims) were killed. Again, the ISI sought to capitalize on India’s internal disorder. The ISI worked with Mumbai crime lord Dawood Ibrahim (no longer believed to be in India, with unsubstantiated reports placing him in several Pakistani cities, Dubai, as well as Malaysia) who is believed to have engineered a series of 13 bombings across Mumbai that took over 250 lives on March 12, 1993 (King 2004). LeT was also beginning to make inroads and establish its own networks in India. In 1992, before the riots, Mohammad Azam Cheema, a former academic colleague of Hafez Muhammad Saeed was dispatched to India. LeT’s first attack in India was held exactly one year after the destruction of the Babri Masjid, a series of small bombings in several cities across India that killed two (Swami 2008a, b). While Indian police arrested some LeT operatives, LeT was not yet well-known known to Indian intelligence agencies (Tankel 2011a, b). However, as the decade continued, LeT built more extensive networks in India that carried out numerous low-level attacks, primarily bombings and stabbings. In a May 2000 article Praveen Swami describes the activities of an LeT cell in the city of Hyderabad that claimed to bomb theaters that showed pornography and attacked Hindu shopkeepers (Swami 2000a, b).

Essential to building networks in India were local recruits from India’s Muslim population. One source for recruits was Indian Muslims who traveled to the Gulf states to work. In the Gulf they came into contact with Pakistanis and, if they expressed interest, could be surreptitiously transported to Pakistan for further training and indoctrination. LeT also established connections with organized crime syndicates run by Indian Muslims (such as Dawood Ibrahim) and built networks in Bangladesh and Nepal to ease communications with and move operatives into and out of India (Tankel 2011a, b).



LeT was also held responsible for the December 13, 2001 attack on India's parliament. In this attack, five terrorists entered the grounds of India's Parliament House in New Delhi. Parliament was not in session, but five police officers, a security guard and a civilian, along with the five attackers, were killed. India was outraged and held Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba responsible. The attack set off a lengthy confrontation between India and Pakistan in which hundreds of thousands of soldiers faced each other across the India-Pakistan border. Pakistan banned Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, the first of many perfunctory bans. LeT formally denied responsibility for the parliament attack. LeT leader Hafez Mohammed Saeed claimed that LeT operations were more competently organized and that the Parliament was a civilian target and LeT does not attack civilians (Abou Zahab 2007).

While Hafez Saeed's denial may seem dubious, many who have studied LeT, including Stephen Tankel who did extensive field work interviewing LeT members, note that none of the individuals ultimately convicted for the Parliament attack were from LeT. Also, a former ISI head, speaking to Pakistan's Parliament, blamed JeM for the attack. However, Tankel explains it is possible that individuals with links to LeT provided logistical support for the attack (Tankel 2011a, b). This reflects the reality that the affiliations of India's Islamists were fluid. Other Pakistani Islamist groups were recruiting Indians, and many of the Indian Muslim recruits came from Indian Islamist organizations, leading to substantial inter-connections between groups.

#### ***2.4.1 Local Allies: TIM, SIMI, IM and D-Company***

Radical elements among India's Muslim population began organizing of their own accord. LeT's first Indian recruits came from Tanzim-Islahul-Muslimeen (TIM—Organization for the Improvement of Muslims) a self-defense group formed as communal tensions grew in the 1980s (Swami 2000a, b).

Ultimately, a far greater source of recruits was the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which was initially founded in 1977 as the student wing of the Islamic party Jama'at Islami Hind. However, inspired by the same events that were affecting Islamists everywhere, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and Zia's Islamization policy in neighboring Pakistan, the SIMI activists became increasingly radical. These global causes were tempered by local concerns, particularly discrimination suffered by India's Muslims at the hands of the Hindu majority and a lack of access to jobs and education. Initially SIMI organized protests and distributed propaganda. But by the late 1980s, in the face of rising communal tensions, SIMI began moving towards violent confrontation with India's Hindu majority. After the 1992 destruction of the Babri Masjid Mosque and communal riots, SIMI began advocating for armed jihad in India. At its 1999 rally, one speaker declared, "Islam is our nation, not India (Swami 2008a, b)." However, the group was only banned after 9/11 because of its links to the Taliban

and al-Qaeda (it challenged the ban in court, but without success). In its last public rally in 2001, it attracted 25,000 supporters and before the ban it had 400 workers (Sikand 2006).

LeT recruited from SIMI, developing a network to support its operations and providing training to SIMI members, although SIMI remained a distinct and independent organization (Tankel 2011a, b).

C. Christine Fair, investigating the current status of SIMI and a related group, the Indian Mujahideen (IM) found that many Indian security analysts believed that they were effectively the same group. Others analysts, including Fair, believe that the groups are linked, but distinct. In about 2004, IM emerged from the most radical members of SIMI and it engaged in an armed campaign. IM's members included a number of people with computer skills and many of its members had personal experience with communal violence. In 2007, IM began issuing manifestos via email and carrying out major attacks in its own name. Among these attacks were nine simultaneous blasts in markets in Jaipur in May 2008 that killed over 60 people. In July 2008, IM claimed credit for multiple synchronized bombings in Bangalore and Ahmadabad that claimed at least 40 lives. In Delhi in September 2008 five bombs in markets killed 30 people. Fair also notes that identifying the perpetrators of many attacks in India is difficult. Indian officials are sometimes accused of publicly crediting LeT as the culprit in order to emphasize the Pakistani hand, while de-emphasizing its domestic terrorism problem (Fair 2010). Stephen Tankel summarizes the LeT/IM relationship, writing, "...most Indian militants did not perceive themselves as proxies for either Lashkar or Pakistan.... In other words, the group [LeT] was a force multiplier for Indian militancy, rather than a key driver of it. Further, while Lashkar was the chief external outfit providing support for Indian jihadism, it was not the only one (Tankel 2011a, b)."

Another important possible source of support for LeT operations in India is believed to have come from D-Company, the criminal organization led by Dawood Ibrahim, the suspected perpetrator of the 1993 serial bombings in Mumbai. Although Ibrahim's whereabouts are unknown (though he is suspected to be in and out of Pakistan), his criminal network extends throughout south Asia and into the Middle East. Heavily involved with smuggling and particularly the heroin trade, Ibrahim is believed to be a major donor to LeT. Further, his smuggling networks have been used to help LeT move operatives and material into and out of India (Clarke 2010) (King 2004).

### ***2.4.2 LeT Strikes India***

While LeT built relations with Indian Islamists and helped them develop their offensive capabilities, it also targeted India directly to pursue its own agenda. On the afternoon of September 24, 2002 a pair of LeT gunmen stormed the Akshardham Temple, one of the largest temples in Gujarat. When LeT attacked, firing

their guns and throwing grenades, the temple was packed with worshippers. Over thirty people were killed, including several security personnel, and more than seventy people were wounded before commandos killed the attackers the next morning about fourteen hours after they had entered the complex. Like other LeT fedayeen attacks, the two attackers came prepared for a long siege, carrying dozens of grenades as well as supplies of dried fruits and chocolate to maintain their energy levels (Joseph 2002). The attack occurred six months after communal rioting in Gujarat took hundreds of Muslim lives and was intended to avenge these attacks on India's Muslims (Press Trust of India 2010a, b).

LeT's next attack was also against a symbol of India's economic development. On December 28, 2005 a pair of LeT fedayeen entered an auditorium of the Indian Institute of Science campus in Bangalore during a conference. Throwing grenades and firing assault rifles, a professor visiting from Delhi was killed and five attendees were injured. The target was selected carefully as Bangalore had been at the center of India's booming high-tech sector and the Indian Institute of Science is one of India's foremost scientific institutions (Rajmohan 2006).

### ***2.4.3 Targeting Mumbai***

LeT's largest attacks however, were unleashed on Mumbai. A sprawling city, Mumbai is the financial capital of India and its expansion parallels India's growing international stature and economic power. Mumbai was no stranger to mega-terror. In March 1993, Pakistani intelligence working with the organized crime network known as D-Company (with close links to underworld don Dawood Ibrahim) set off 13 bombs across the city killing 257 people. Mumbai suffered many smaller terror attacks in the decades since including a double-car bombing (attributed by Indian security to LeT) in August 2003. One bomb was detonated near the tourist attraction Gateway of India and the other detonated near the jewelry market Zaveri Bazaar (Waldman 2003). In 2004 Indian security disrupted an attack planned on the Bombay Stock Exchange (in Mumbai) (Fair 2009a, b). On July 11, 2006 mega-terror returned to Mumbai when seven bombs exploded within minutes of each other during the afternoon rush hour in the first class sections of commuter trains throughout the city. Over 200 people were killed and over 700 were injured. The bombings were generally seen as a joint operation of SIMI and LeT, possibly with support from the ISI. The attack was both seen as avenging the anti-Muslim pogroms of 2002 and it occurred as Indian-Pakistani relations were warming. While Pakistan and India did go on to establish a formal counterterror information sharing mechanism, the achievement was more a symbolic an effort to keep the talks between the countries from being completely derailed (Tankel 2011a, b).

Although more people died in the July 2006 attack, the November 2008 siege of Mumbai captured international attention as television screens across the globe broadcast images of a major city under attack for several days. Previous LeT fedayeen attacks in India involved two man teams. The Mumbai assault included

10 gunmen who divided into five two-man teams. Departing Karachi by sea on November 22, 2008 the Mumbai attackers took their first Indian casualties when they hijacked the Indian fishing trawler MV Kuber and killed four of its crew. The captain was kept alive to pilot the ship closer to Mumbai. On the afternoon of November 26, when the MV Kuber arrived about four knots away from Mumbai, the attackers killed the fishing trawler's captain and boarded a small dinghy for their final approach. The attackers failed to sink the hijacked ship, which later provided evidence about how the Mumbai attack was organized (Government of India 2008).

The attack teams systematically divided up and hit a series of pre-planned targets including the train station, two of India's most iconic hotels, a restaurant known to be frequented by international visitors, and the Nariman House, a facility run by a Jewish religious group that provides meals and hospitality to Jewish travelers. The attack was carefully planned. Targets had been scouted beforehand. The focus on targeting Westerners and particularly Americans and Israelis was also notable. Most of the targets were well known as symbols of Mumbai as a cosmopolitan, international city. Targeting the little-known Nariman House highlights the extent to which LeT was willing to go to include Israelis among its victims. Additionally, the attackers used Thuraya satellite phones and Voice over IP technology to remain in contact with their Karachi-based handlers (Government of India 2008)<sup>10</sup> who monitored events on television and relayed intelligence to the gunmen in real-time. When Indian security forces regained control of the city after three days on November 29, over 166 innocent people were dead (along with 9 of the 10 attackers).

The targets and timing of the Mumbai assault highlight various LeT motivations. Striking major tourist hotels in Mumbai was an effort to undermine India's growing international prominence and wealth, both by targeting Indian elites and international travellers. In targeting the Nariman House, LeT was explicitly targeting the growing Indian-Israeli alliance. But, perhaps most significantly, the attacks occurred during a period in which some Pakistani leaders were attempting to pursue warmer relations with India. The Mumbai assault brought this process to an immediate halt (Riedel 2012).

Much of what is known about the planning of the Mumbai attack and the internal workings of LeT comes from the testimony of David Coleman Headley. Born to an American mother and Pakistani father, Headley had served prison time in the US for drug dealing, been an informant for the Drug Enforcement Agency, and ultimately fell into the orbit of LeT. A charming individual who was comfortable in Western society, Headley's American passport made him an ideal operative for a heavily monitored terrorist group, and conversely he embodied the nightmare of Western intelligence agencies. Headley scouted targets in Mumbai

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<sup>10</sup> (Government of India 2008) Page 3 of the report describes the retrieval of GPS instruments and a Thuraya satellite phone. Page 12 of the same report describes the use of VoIP technology by the terrorists.

for LeT. Headley also travelled to Denmark to examine the feasibility of attacking the newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, which, in 2005, published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed—an act that outraged many Muslims worldwide. After his arrest, Headley pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Tahawwur Rana, who ran a Chicago immigration-consulting firm that provided cover for Headley's travels. Headley's testimony, which was covered in extensive detail by *ProPublica* reporter Sebastian Rotella, revealed, among other things, that all of the group's major operators have ISI handlers (Rotella 2011a, b). Headley's testimony alleged the existence of LeT's "Karachi project," which, in the words of Indian analyst Animesh Roul, "entails Pakistan-based militant groups training and deploying Indian Muslims for attacks in the Indian heartland (Roul 2010a, b)."

Although the Mumbai attack led to LeT being banned in Pakistan and to international opprobrium, the organization continued to attack India. On February 13, 2010 a bomb went off near a popular German bakery in the city of Pune, killing 17 and injuring over 60, in an area frequented both by affluent Indians and foreigners. This blast may have been the work of LeT's local allies or it may indicate that LeT is in fact running a "Karachi Project" (Roul 2010a, b).

#### 2.4.4 *LeT in Afghanistan*

Although LeT had been founded to support the Afghan jihad, when that campaign ended with the Soviet withdrawal, LeT also reduced its presence in Afghanistan. LeT avoided participating in the Afghan civil war and as an Ahl Hadith organization was not comfortable with the Deobandi philosophy of the Taliban. LeT's strongest allies in Afghanistan were the Salafis of the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, who also had a difficult relationship with the Taliban (Tankel 2011a, b). LeT co-founder Zafar Iqbal told a reporter, "Taliban is a group of misguided people and we have a much higher standard and principles (Rana 2006)." After 9/11, as an organization, LeT attempted to steer clear of the fight in Afghanistan, but individual members sympathized with the Taliban and took leave to fight in Afghanistan. By 2004–2005, the organization began to provide formal support to its fighters heading to Afghanistan. One important source for this change was frustration in LeT's ranks at the organization's acquiescence to the American-Pakistani alliance. Allowing fighters to confront Westerners in Afghanistan was one outlet for this tension within the organization (Tankel 2011a, b). By 2008 LeT units were regarded as among the most effective confronting international forces in northeast Afghanistan. LeT forces participated in a July 2008 attack in which insurgent forces nearly over-ran a US base in Wanat, Nuristan (Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor 2008).

More recently, LeT has turned to high-profile strikes against major Indian targets in Kabul, Afghanistan's capital. Here too, LeT is suspected of receiving ISI assistance. Pakistan casts a wary eye on India's growing presence in Afghanistan, concerned that a Delhi-Kabul alliance will leave Pakistan encircled by hostile

states (Weinbaum and Harder 2008). These attacks included a July 2008 suicide car bombing of India's Embassy in Kabul in which 54 were killed including four Indian diplomats and guards. The attack was blamed on the Haqqani network, but it was LeT which had originally recruited the bomber (Swami 2008a, b). LeT is also suspected in a December 2009 bombing near a Kabul hotel hosting Indians. In February 2010 LeT operatives, along with gunmen from the Haqqani network, combined a carbomb attack and a fedayeen strike on guesthouses in Kabul hosting Indians. Eighteen people were killed including nine Indians. In an echo of the Mumbai assault, the attackers used cellphones to coordinate the attack with handlers outside of Afghanistan (Brulliard 2010) (Rubin 2010).

## 2.5 LeT International

In April 2004 the Indian newspaper *The Hindu* reported that British forces had arrested five LeT personnel near the Iraqi city of Basra. Their leader Danish Ahmed, was well known to Indian intelligence as an LeT recruiter and for coordinating LeT infiltration into India. LeT had rhetorically opposed the American intervention in Iraq, but the deployment of a high-profile operative such as Danish Ahmed was a sign that LeT was expanding its operations beyond the Indian sub-continent (Swami 2004). Although many LeT recruits sought to travel to Iraq, LeT did not ultimately send a large number of operatives to Iraq. Few LeT members were fluent in Arabic and LeT's links to the clandestine networks for smuggling operatives into Iraq were limited (Tankel 2011a, b). Nonetheless, the event highlights LeT's growing international presence. This international network has primarily been used to support activities on the Indian sub-continent, but it is a capability that could also be used should LeT choose to engage in international terror. Figure 2.3 presents a succinct summary of LeT's international operatives, while Fig. 2.4 shows a summary of some known LeT operatives in the USA.

### 2.5.1 *LeT and the Islamist Internationale*

LeT was integrated into the international Islamist terrorist movement from its foundation. Throughout the 1990s there was a complex network of Islamist organizations and individuals that sought to continue the jihad that started in the war against the Soviet Union. The network included formal organizations with extensive infrastructure such as LeT, clandestine organizations such as al-Qaeda, and Islamist charities that could direct recruits and resources to conflict areas while raising money and recruits from Muslim populations worldwide. The Arab Afghans felt that they had played a central role in the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and that they were riding the wave of history. Their call to reestablish the caliphate and the glory days of Muslim civilization through jihad had tremendous

Lashkar-e-Taiba International Chart





Fig. 2.3 LeT international

appeal to disaffected young Muslims worldwide, both in the greater Middle East, where many lived under oppressive corrupt regimes, but also in the West where some young Muslims felt disaffected from the modern secular democracies.

LeT was an important component of this network, both receiving assistance from around the world and providing support for other organizations. Peter Bergen describes meeting an LeT spokesman who had been examining a web site for the Chechen rebels, which LeT was supporting with its own fundraising efforts (Bergen 2001). Sheikh Abu Abdel Aziz (known as Barbaros for his thick reddish-orange beard), who was praised by Hafez Saeed for his efforts in helping to establish LeT by liaising with Saudi donors and establishing training camps, went on to fight in Bosnia and claimed to have fought in Africa and Kashmir as well (Post and Brand 1992). Foreign recruits came to LeT's training camp both to participate in the fighting in Kashmir, but also to learn skills they could take elsewhere. Charitable organizations such as the Saudi Arabia-based al-Haramain Islamic Foundation had offices all over the world and an estimated budget of \$50 million. It provided financial and logistical support to al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups worldwide. Its office in Pakistan was designated as financing terrorist organizations including LeT (U.S. Dept. of Treasury, *Protecting Charitable Organizations*). Other components of this network were less organized, Azzam Publications was little more than an individual running a group of websites that



**Lashkar-e-Taiba International Chart: USA****Fig. 2.4** LeT's US activities

directed donors and recruits to jihadi, organizations—one of his recommended groups was LeT (*Azzam Publications* 2001).

After 9/11, individuals seeking to join the Islamist jihad sought out LeT. Whereas al-Qaeda became less accessible, LeT retained a prominent public profile. LeT's new recruits included members of Pakistan's diaspora, other Muslims, and Western converts to Islam. LeT's status rose particularly with the Indian parliament attack which came so soon after 9/11 (although, as stated above, LeT was blamed, but is probably not responsible for this attack) and also because, with its recruiting offices throughout Pakistan, it was relatively easy for would-be jihadis from around the world to find them. As international counter-terror measures became more effective, jihadi hopefuls had greater difficulty joining LeT both because of international scrutiny, but also because LeT became rigorous in establishing the identity and intentions of recruits in order to prevent infiltration by Western intelligence agencies. Before 9/11 for example a group of Virginians could travel to Pakistani for training (they became known as the Paintball Jihadis because they maintained their skills playing paintball in suburban northern Virginia) (*Associated Press* 2004). Even after 9/11 Willie Brigitte, a French convert to Islam, could train with LeT in Pakistan before moving to Australia to establish an operational cell (*BBC News* 2007). However, later in the decade this became more difficult. An American from Georgia, Syed Haris Ahmed, traveled to Pakistan for training and was denied entrance into LeT camps (*Associated Press* 2009).

Some operatives with LeT links carried out, or nearly carried out terror attacks. After training in Pakistan, LeT paid for Willie Brigitte to move from his native France to Australia. In Australia he linked up with Pakistani-born Faheem Lodhi, who had also trained in LeT camps. Together, they began scouting targets in Australia on LeT's behalf. They attempted to obtain chemicals for bomb making and information about Australia's military and electrical grid (Brenner 2011).

Two of the London subway bombers of July 7, 2005 had traveled to Pakistan and may have had links to LeT. Richard Reid, the al-Qaeda shoe bomber, who attempted to destroy a plane shortly after 9/11 may have also had LeT links (Tankel 2011a, b). However, these links to international terror were often counter-productive for LeT because they resulted in increased pressure on the Pakistani government, which in turn hampered LeT operations.

LeT's links to al-Qaeda and its affiliates also remained active. Even before 9/11 LeT guesthouses had hosted Ramzi Yusuf (the ringleader of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and nephew of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) and Mir Amal Kansi, who attacked a checkpoint outside of CIA headquarters (Abou Zahab and Roy 2004). LeT provided support and safehouses to fleeing al-Qaeda members after the US invasion of Afghanistan. The most famous of the al-Qaeda fugitives was Abu Zubaydah, a top operational commander who was captured in March 2003 at an LeT safehouse in Faisalabad, along with 16 LeT operatives who Pakistani police later released (Harrison 2002). In September 2003, at a Karachi madrassa linked to LeT, Pakistani authorities captured a group of students from Indonesia and Malaysia, including the brother of the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombing (Tankel 2011a, b).

The Headley case may be a harbinger of a new trend in which LeT operatives begin to link with other groups to carry out operations, sometimes operating independently. After his work scouting targets in India, Headley, on his own initiative, made contact with al-Qaeda and Ilyas Kashmiri, who further encouraged him to begin scouting targets in Copenhagen (Riedel 2012).

## 2.6 Conclusions

Even before the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, LeT was the subject of serious scrutiny by academics and journalists. However, important information about the organization's operations and decision-making remains opaque. Much of the information that is obtained is through LeT itself, which has a sophisticated media arm and tries to manage its public image. More comprehensive data about the membership and finances of LeT would be welcome, for international security analysts the critical issue is developing better mechanisms for predicting major LeT attacks.

(Clarke 2010) argues that LeT has built extensive networks of its own, and thus is no longer limited by the Pakistani government's ambitions and is increasingly pursuing an independent global agenda. Clarke concludes:

Although LeT was a key component of Islamabad's regional strategy in the past, the organization is growing beyond Pakistan's control and is undertaking its own independent operations. ...LeT has forged selective partnerships with fellow Pakistani and other militant groups, as well as criminal syndicates, whose activities undermine Pakistan's own security, escalate terrorism campaigns throughout South Asia, and increase the risk of inadvertent war between India and Pakistan. ...it appears that LeT leaders no longer feel that they are accountable to their former patron as a whole, but rather to themselves and a few select officers in ISI and the Pakistani military (current and/or retired). However, if support for LeT from the Pakistani intelligence and military establishment continues unabated, LeT will become a multinational organization that determines its own agenda as it will have a wide range of sponsors and sources of funding, and will have fighters and other vital resources spread throughout several regions (Clarke 2010).

Stephen Taniel is also concerned about expanded LeT terror regionally and internationally as well as the Pakistani state's long-term decreasing control over LeT. However, he argues that LeT's social services network and public presence has been an important source of leverage for the Pakistani government in reining in LeT:

...Lashkar controls a robust infrastructure and operates in plain sight.... This freedom of movement carries with it a number of benefits... but also serves as a leverage point that can be used to constrain Lashkar's activity.

However, Taniel is not sanguine about LeT's potential for international or expanded regional terror. He states, "The leadership's ongoing relationship with the ISI and the susceptibility to state pressure robs it of legitimacy in the eyes of some jihadis, who respect the sacrifices al-Qaeda leaders have made and the forthright manner in which they challenge the US as well as its many allies." Taniel argues that this creates tension within the organization to prove its commitment to jihad. Taniel states that this tension may have led LeT to launch the November 2008 assault on Mumbai, begin scouting targets in Denmark, and expand its operations in Afghanistan. Further, LeT (or LeT operatives working on their own) could render assistance to other terrorist groups, while maintaining ambiguity about its own role (Taniel 2011a, b).

Policy responses to constraining LeT are limited. In his conclusions, Taniel discusses the possibility of inducing LeT to abandon violence. He argues that settling the Kashmir issue to the satisfaction of Pakistan's leadership would be an important step to achieving this goal, but not sufficient to guarantee that LeT would abandon violence (Taniel 2011a, b). Other scholars studying the issue have discussed the possibility of weaning LeT militants away from violence by working with their extended families and providing alternative opportunities (Nawaz 2010). Increased counterterror cooperation between the US and India combined with pressing Pakistan to reduce its support for LeT may reduce LeT's capabilities. But many analysts believe that this is unlikely because LeT is simply too important to Pakistan's leadership (Tellis 2010) (Fair 2011).

What follows is an alternative approach to answering these questions using temporal probabilistic models of LeT's behavior. The models, as discussed in previous chapters, are based on data not only about LeT's behavior since the

organization's founding, but also the circumstances (social, political, economic, military) surrounding those behaviors. The temporal probabilistic rules are not hand-crafted—they are learned automatically from the data in a manner that is provably guaranteed to satisfy various mathematical and statistical conditions. The temporal probabilistic rules can be used to provide predictions about likely group behaviors given a set of conditions, shed light on the drivers of LeT's actions, and possibly point to potential policies to mitigate the threat presented by LeT. While this is a new approach to understanding terrorist group behavior, major corporations already use such data analytic tools to better understand and serve their customers. Much of Google and Yahoo's revenues are based on automated ways to classify the behaviors of individuals who are using their service. Policy-makers responsible for critical national security functions should have comparable tools available.

This work, however, goes beyond the derivation of temporal probabilistic rules that provide a better understanding of LeT's behavior. Chapters 10 and 11 of this book develop methods to generate policies designed to rein in LeT. None of these policies is simple—each contains 17 or more “do's and don't's” that jointly constitute a policy. These policies also use the “big data analytics” technologies used by major corporations like Google, Yahoo, and Amazon. These companies try to identify ways that would induce a certain user behavior (e.g., clicking on an ad)—analogously; this project leverages big data analytics technology to identify ways to induce a certain behavior from LeT (e.g., reduction in different types of terrorist acts).

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Dickerson, J.P.

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