

## Chapter 2

# Bureaucracy Versus Mobility

### S.O.C.I.A.L. Governance

In late 2011, New York Times columnist, Thomas Freidman, described the convergence of cloud computing, social media, and mobile technologies as the basis of a revolution in governance, giving rise to what one leading industry figure had termed, S.O.C.I.A.L., an acronym for the sorts of changes underway: S, Speed; O, Open; C, Collaboration; I, Individual; A, Alignment; and L, Leadership (Freidman 2011).

Freidman added that in a “social” world, leadership must be both top–down and bottom–up in order to inspire, enable, and empower—the latter a particularly central and pervasive theme to the positive leveraging of social media both within the workplace and externally. Batorski and Hadden (2010) echo the importance of a paradigm shift in leadership as an essential enabler of effective organizational change and value creation in government:

Web 2.0 brings with it a swift pace of change that requires organizational leaders to adopt new ways of thinking and new behaviours (Kobza 2008). Leading change in the Government 2.0 era requires new leadership skills that include listening, influencing, collaborating, and stakeholder inclusion... The key difference in the era of Government 2.0 for leaders is in the need to engage with others, to convert value from the network into meaningful products and services and knowledge, and to identify practical solutions to challenges. (p. 3, Batorski and Hadden 2010)

New forms of collaborative and open leadership are becoming an imperative as an increasingly networked and online society takes hold. Yet, as already noted, the political contours of political life in a digital world are often centralizing in many respects, constraining the emergence and traction of new forms of leadership and new governance models.

Whereas mobility promotes and personifies openness and networks—the sort of “social” environment of which Freidman and others speak—the political and organizational foundations of the “machinery” of government are secrecy and bureaucracy. Understanding this clash is central to dissecting the challenges faced by the public sector today—a precursor to orchestrating any adaptation that must

find ways to refurbish rather than abandon traditional public sector underpinnings with respect to behavioral values and culture and organizational and political structures.

## **Bureaucratic Foundations of Government**

The stability and functionality of the Westminster model of Parliamentary government (in use across the Commonwealth with variants of Parliamentary governance found in much of Europe and parts of Asia) are dependent upon three central, relational compacts: firstly, representative democracy as the compact between the public and elected officials (Parliamentarians); secondly, ministerial accountability as the compact between elected officials and the government on the one hand and the appointed public service on the other hand; and, thirdly, loyalty and hierarchy as the main value and chief organizing principle within the public service for assuring that government plans and policies are executed and implemented (Roy 2008).

The third point has traditionally served as the central pillar of bureaucratic organization within the public sector. An anonymous and quasi-permanent public servant (shielded from direct public scrutiny and answerability and safeguarded by protections and expectations of political neutrality) advises and executes on demand while remaining by and large deferential to Ministerial prerogative and direction. The extent to which any discretionary empowerment of the public service takes place according to strictly traditional customs is a matter solely for determination by Ministers individually and collectively (*ibid.*).

The 2011 case of Statistics Canada and the national census bears this out. Despite some limited legislative autonomy (distinguishing it from a classic line department) and a tradition over past decades of an arm's length operational role from government (viewed as essential to an objective role in gathering and analyzing information), The Government would ultimately reject the agency's advice against the abandonment of a mandatory, long-form census (viewed as essential by the agency for a sufficiently robust sample of the population). The fact that the Departmental Head of Statistics Canada would eventually speak out publicly to clarify his technical advice and views on the policy change was interpreted by politicians and the media alike as an extraordinary act of defiance (and thus accompanied by resignation), contrary to the bureaucracy's traditionally deferential role to the preeminence of elected officials.

While the Westminster Parliamentary model is uniquely inward and centralizing in terms of a role for the public service, the prevalence of bureaucratic structures and mindsets within government is commonplace. In the US, for example, a much more politicized public service of Presidential appointees reflects the Congressional role in both passing legislation and formally scrutinizing administrative plans and actions: a more frontline and visible role for public servants thus ensues. Nonetheless, while some public servants are political appointees—reflecting this duality of legislative authority across the Presidential and Congressional dimensions of

government—the bulk of public staff remain unchanged through election cycles, and the importance of hierarchy and deference to elected officials (albeit multiple sets of elected officials) remains, not unlike the Westminster model in this regard.

Indeed, within the US public sector model, the overriding patterns of vertical silos were most acutely exposed in the aftermath of 9–11; the inability of government agencies to collaborate became a sudden strategic imperative that, though less dramatically, also became a central concern in early e-government efforts to forge interoperable and integrative service delivery efforts (Fountain 2001; Kamarck 2002; Roy 2006). Tellingly, the initial response to 9–11 featured a massive bureaucratic consolidation of agencies and authority within a more unified chain of command (the Department of Homeland Security reporting to its new Presidential appointee), though in more recent years a more nuanced debate has emerged with respect to realizing cross-governmental networks and more flexible governance capacities (the case of cybersecurity is examined in some detail in Chap. 5).

Across other Westminster jurisdictions, we also see efforts to stretch and reform the traditional model and attempt to more formally recognize the roles and plurality of accountabilities that define the workings of the public service (Roy 2008). At the dusk of the twentieth century, such efforts most often centered on market-inspired prescriptions—the basis of new public management and its main tenants that were often pursued in distinct and different ways across jurisdictions. Such reforms generally have included (1) outsourcing government functions or segments of government operations to the private sector; (2) infusing the state sector with business-inspired models more decentralized, autonomous, and focused on outcomes (with a primordial concern for efficiency); and (3), most recently and remaining very much intertwined with digital government efforts, an importation of a customer service mentality into the delivery apparatus of the public sector (Dutil et al. 2010).

For government managers, the thrust of new public management is to lessen bureaucracy rather than banish it—creating an environment where smaller units of government would face competitive pressures and incentives to act more efficiently and in manners more predicated measuring and improving performance than respecting process. New public management would play an important role in terms of e-government's early emergence as a primarily service-driven reform agenda (from the point of view of government), on the one hand, and in terms of seeking greater industry involvement in IT refurbishment on the other hand. In Canada, for instance, early service transformation vehicles across many provincial jurisdictions featured newly empowered and autonomous agencies created to act more “business like,” often partnering with industry to devise mechanisms and processes for online service delivery and back-end integrative processes (*ibid.*).

One example is Service New Brunswick (SNB), a model that partially paved the way for the creation of Service Canada federally: SNB's autonomy as a provincial crown corporation facilitated a more business-like approach and the formation of unique public-private partnerships (*ibid.*). Similarly, the most successful federal agency processing online services—the Canada Revenue Agency—had been previously transformed from a traditional department into an operationally autonomous

agency precisely to add a dose of NPM-inspired flexibility and innovation that would prove effective in championing online tax services (*ibid.*).

Nonetheless, new public management would also encounter important limitations and blockages as e-government took hold, due to pressures for interoperability and more cross-governmental coordination that lead to more recent and centralizing tendencies. In jurisdictions such as Canada which had not shifted far from the traditional Westminster model (unlike, e.g., New Zealand), centralizing political and bureaucratic mindsets remained deeply engrained, readily able to reassert themselves as circumstances warranted. During the previous decade, moreover, a significant federal government scandal involving mismanagement of spending (the so-called sponsorship scandal) would provide fertile ground for advocates of more centralized and bolstered bureaucratic oversight from central agencies (Clark and Swain 2005), reinforcing the vertical segmentation of individualized units less flexible and autonomous to act in their one manner and in concert with one another. The stunted evolution of Service Canada—once envisioned as an autonomous service integrator for the federal government as a whole (akin to SNB provincially) but never having fostered the horizontal governance capacities necessary to do so—illustrates such tensions and the inertia of traditionalism (Flumian et al. 2007; Belanger et al. 2007; Roy 2012b).

### *Secrecy and Control*

Centralizing forces in government also owe much to the interplay of democratic processes and bureaucratic structures initially created and still more suited for a world of information scarcity rather than abundance: in other words information management as primarily about control (Roberts 2006). A parallel of sorts has emerged over the past two decades between the emergence of e-government and rhetoric of wider transparency on the one hand, and augmenting charges against provincial and federal governments in Canada in terms of endemic secrecy on the other hand (Roy 2006, 2008, 2012b). These seemingly contradictory forces are the result of governments embracing the Internet as a platform for openness in specifically controlled ways—especially in terms of service provision, while resisting other demands and opportunities for transparency that for one reason or another may appear threatening or destabilizing (Reddick and Aikins 2012).

Foundational for democratic governance of any form, the importance of openness has been articulated in a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997:

The overarching purpose of access to information legislation...is to facilitate democracy. It does so in two related ways. It helps to ensure, first, that citizens have the information required to participate meaningfully in the democratic process and secondly, that politicians and bureaucrats remain accountable to the citizenry. (p. 80, Reid 2004)

Although there is no standardized definition of what it means for the public sector to be transparent, a useful starting point is to equate transparency with some degree of openness to those with either a right or an expectation of being able to

scrutinize and understand government decision-making and policy action. Transparency thus underpins accountability, and the emergence of the Internet has heightened expectation for more government transparency as an informationally empowered citizenry alters its views on authority and power, shunning deference and attaching far less importance to traditional representational roles and structures (McNutt 2009; Roy 2010, 2011, 2012c).

Here lies a major foundational shift for power relations and democratic governance. A world of information scarcity is one that is highly conducive to bureaucratic power and organizational secrecy within the state (central elements of the Westminster model) and representational democracy outside of it (Roy 2008, 2012a). A world of mobility, by contrast, is far less conducive to both hierarchical control and information secrecy.

Reliance on secrecy begins at the apex of power, where Cabinet meets in the closed confines of a forum designed to contain but also paradoxically share information and insight. Secrecy was originally viewed as a means to facilitate open deliberation among Ministers in order to generate consensus on actions and policies that, in turn, would be presented to Parliament for further debate prior to legislative adoption—often in modified form. As Savoie and others have aptly demonstrated, Cabinet secrecy has since become less deliberative and more dictated by Prime Ministerial direction (as policy debates previously housed in Cabinet have since been dispersed across numerous venues both inside and outside of government). Key to this evolution is the desire to package decisions for subsequent communication—not to Parliament but rather directly to the electorate as a whole. Parliament's role is thus greatly diminished (Aucoin et al. 2011; Savoie 1999).

With Parliament viewed as less relevant (and more adversarial) and external points of scrutiny and influence multiplying, Cabinet secrecy has become more pervasive (much like the usage of Executive Privilege within the Presidential model) despite escalating challenges and costs in preserving such a cloak. The result is a systemic culture engrained in the executive branch predicated on the presumption that information must be contained and managed (Roberts 2006). Ironically, online channels—often viewed as drivers of transparency—may well be leveraged primarily by governments in power as new tools to convey and spin partisan messages (as described in the introduction and a theme returned to in later chapters).

Such is the schizophrenia displayed in the UK where the Blair Government was credited with both introducing the country's first comprehensive access to information law (in 2005) while forging a sophisticated communications and media relations apparatus viewed as aggressive and often manipulative in shaping and limiting such openness (Roberts 2006). Indeed, Blair would later reflect on such legislation as one of his worst mistakes (due to its cyclical impacts of media suspicion and exposure, government defensiveness, and public cynicism).<sup>1</sup> Similarly contrasting

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<sup>1</sup>These sorts of struggles have continued unabated through successive Labour and Coalition Governments cresting with 2011 scandals involving phone-tapping by various media outlets and close relationship between the Murdoch media empire and political officials (leading to a formal public inquiry in 2012).

portraits of Prime Minister Harper reveal similar pledges before taking office to pursue greater systemic openness, some initial legislative steps in such a direction, and subsequent regressions into defensive secrecy and centralizing efforts to contain information and shape messaging (Martin 2010).

In short, the Internet's explosion of information and mobilization externally has also fueled a reinforcement of hierarchy and control internally—due to the powerful inertia of traditional structures and culture of government. Bureaucracy is thus both challenged and fortified, often simultaneously. The steady expansion of Web 2.0, mobility, and “social” governance trends (to return to Freidman's terminology at the outset of the chapter) nonetheless strengthens the case for an alternative governance ethos—rooted in contrasting first principles and realities.

## **An Alternative Governance Ethos**

With respect to crafting an alternate prism to bureaucratic machinery, Thomas (2008) provides a useful starting point in contrasting “government” with “governance”:

Government has become increasingly centralized, vertical and personalized through the focus on the person and the office of the Prime Minister...Governance is a related, but wider process than government. It involves sweeping, impersonal forces of economic, technological, social and political change. Governance involves dispersed, connective and shared leadership operating through decentralized shifting, networked relations.

The tensions between centralized government and decentralized governance are heightened by the public mood of mistrust and weak confidence in governments. This fundamental shift towards governance from the traditional processes of government has numerous implications for the future role of the public service, many of which cannot be clearly foreseen at this point. (p. 4, Thomas 2008)

In terms of a “government” ethos, then, as Thomas indicates what we typically see within Parliamentary democracies is the traditional Westminster doctrine of administration and democracy that places the emphasis squarely on control and communication. By contrast, within an emerging mobility context—where Web 2.0 denotes a set of technological, social, and organizational forces—the premium is placed upon collaboration, participation, and consultation (much more about governance in Thomas's depiction above).

This alternate post-bureaucratic ethos interwoven with mobility (and underpinning calls for “Government 2.0” though in line with Thomas's notion of “governance”) is driven by a massive expansion of the means to both produce and share information and knowledge. This knowledge, and the shared learning, that results is an important component of service design and effective delivery in a world of mass collaboration and distributed governance models (Flumian 2009; Dutil et al. 2010; Meijer 2011).

Even as Thomas's depiction captures much of the essence of today's governance dichotomy between traditional and new, many of its elements in the latter realm have long been recognized as important attributes in overcoming the limitations of

bureaucratic specialization and hierarchical control. For instance, the centrality of learning, greatly unleashed by the power of mobility and collective intelligence, has long been viewed as a critical determinant of governance resilience for organizations and societies alike. Schon puts it well:

We must... become adept at learning. We must become able not only to transform our institutions, in response to changing situations and requirements; we must invent and develop institutions [and societies] that are “learning systems,” that is to say, systems capable of bringing about their own continuing transformation. (p. 30, Schon 1971)

With respect to the public sector and a more networked canvass of public, private, and civic actors, Paquet’s notions of the “strategic state” and “distributed governance” point to new and more collaborative directions very much post-bureaucratic in culture and form (Paquet 1997, 2004). A stable state is bureaucratic, whereas a strategic state is adept at adaption and navigation in less certain and more contested surroundings. Public servant must thus become able to orchestrate conditions for learning and engagement and the sort of continual transformation sought by Schon and others like him (Hubbard et al. 2012).

Seeking to move beyond bureaucratic rigidity on the one hand and the market and competitive doctrine of new public management on the other hand, British theorists have instead turned to public value management (PVM) as a governance prism better suited to more complexity, collaboration, and consultation both within and outside of government. Stoker describes the essence of PVM, in contrast to traditional public administration and new public management, as one which creates new sets of expectations for a more empowered, consultative, and discursive public servant outwardly engaged in a complex environment:

Unlike the creation of value in the private sector, public value has no bottom line, so in the ‘Government world’ the creation of public value needs to be assessed through the collective democratic processes and dialogue between citizens, politicians and managers about what is provided at what cost.

...the idea of public value management is posited as an alternative to and development from NPM with the latter’s narrow focus on squeezing out inefficiency and meeting performance targets. The public value framework reflects a desire to move on from a sterile debate between dichotomous views of public bureaucracy as either passive and responsive, as in a hierarchical commissioning environment, or self-interested and therefore in need of quasi market disciplines to ensure efficient delivery.

...The ability of public managers to anchor, or broker, a conversation between citizens and politicians in order to ensure efficient, appropriate and innovative public service provision is taking place in a more complicated delivery environment. In particular, four developments are identified which impact upon the ability of public managers to follow a public value approach: the pluralism of policy advice, overlapping accountabilities, greater pressure to deliver and complex patterns of vertical integration in governance. (p. 6, Stoker 2005)

Within bureaucratic settings, collaborative and learning strategies designed to improve internal decision-making often featured tools and information systems that created prospectively shared platforms for shared decision-making. Such efforts often characterized, for instance, the initial phases of e-government in attempting to bundle services across previously separate agencies and departments, often with



mixed results (Roy 2006; Borins et al. 2007; McNutt and Carey 2008; Reddick 2011; Roy 2013; Reddick and Roy 2013). Without a sense of community and engagement, however, such platforms cannot be harnessed into sources of collective innovation and shared governance.

As one senior Australian public servant frames it, organizational capabilities must be modular, scalable, and shared, accompanied by efforts for “the removal of barriers and the creation of the behavioral systems, symbols, skills and structures in our organizations that will enable successful collaboration, strong networks and stronger communities” (p. 6, Treadwell 2007). Examining the emergence of precisely these sorts of new capabilities in New Zealand (as well as more widely), Lips articulates a basis for “public administration 2.0” that seeks to align the complexities of technological design with fluid and collaborative administrative and political realities consistent with the advent of PVM (Lips 2012).

Accordingly and central to the argumentation of this book, mobility and the emergence of more participative governance schemes, such as those described here, are premised on a preference and indeed necessity for empowerment rather than containment and bureaucracy’s penchant for control.

The resulting emphasis on complexity and chaordic governance arrangements facilitated by learning and adaptation suggests a public sector less controlled from the center (both politically and centrally). The former Canadian Deputy Minister responsible for the creation of Service Canada recognizes this logic, characterizing a shift from viewing and treating the public as customers via a mass production (and mainly transactional) paradigm to one that views the public as “prosumers” more directly engaged in service design via open and collaborative communities (termed ecosystems):

Traditionally, governments design services and roll them out to citizens who are expected to comply with the terms and conditions of a program. Typically, the service is the same for everyone. It is always linear. Outputs are the metrics for the model: how many cheques got in the mail, how many people got back to work, how many calls got answered. Compliance with the service design’s rules and regulations is paramount, especially in transactional services.

The new model of service is not a mass production machine. Instead, in a more holistic fashion, service is directly connected to outcomes. Enabled by powerful information systems and ongoing interactions that help build a profound understanding of service needs, service providers and service users collaborate to creating services together. They use the ‘information ecosystem’ created by Web 2.0 technologies to re-calibrate the relationship between service providers, service users and the evidence of service outcomes. Information fuels collaboration on the way to achieving a goal. (p. 10, Flumian 2009)

This alternative depiction of governance—more bottom-up, learning driven, collaborative, and networked—fits well with today’s digitally and socially networked landscape. In terms of government, however, such forces are novel and often contrary to the more historically embedded bureaucratic foundations premised upon hierarchical leadership and information control. It is, therefore, useful to examine how such counterforces are also to be found in typically younger governance models of private sector companies driving technological change and the advent of the mobility paradigm.



## Google, Facebook, and Familiar Tensions

In North America, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Research in Motion (RIM) have all faced related tensions in balancing a relentless emphasis on innovation and collaboration with strong and centralized leadership. While RIM revamped its corporate governance regime and Apple has taken modest steps to increase shareholder democracy, Facebook is viewed by some as potentially overly centralized around the directive control of its founding CEO (Carmody 2012).

The specificities of each example notwithstanding, two profoundly important differences distinguish the organization and conduct of technology companies and those of governments. Firstly, internally, such companies have been recently created from anew in an organizational and social environment (i.e., Silicon Valley<sup>2</sup>) that largely shuns hierarchy and embraces flexibility and workplace empowerment as its starting point. Even alongside highly concentrated leadership at the apex of such organizations, governance arrangements are much more fluid and novel than what is typically found in government where traditions of control and risk averseness run deep. Moreover, the systemic traditionalism of government is closely engrained with paper-based processes, an important vice on the more mobile and collaborative workforce found in the technology sector—and built upon the very devices and processes being created and marketed by these same companies.

Secondly, and externally, despite a widening range of stakeholder engagements and pressures to improve corporate governance, market-driven accountability regimes remain less complex than those of the state. Whereas technology companies are catering to, and working in concert with, a subset of society embracing technological change, governments must remain relevant to not only these individuals but also typically larger segments of their populations more trepid or hostile to online and digital innovation.

Despite such differences, it is notable that the flagship companies leading the digital and mobile revolution have been confronted with a similar and paradoxical set of choices concerning their own internal and governance schemes—namely, tensions between centralization and democratization. Perhaps most telling in this regard is the case of Google and its surprising and seemingly counterintuitive portrayal by Nicolas Carr as a proponent of many of the same bureaucratic principles that have shaped government's evolution, notably specialization and automation.

Carr's assertion is that Google's inherently Taylorian mission for society as a whole is to transform most every decision previously undertaken and reflected upon by humans into an algorithm-inspired calculation:

More than a hundred years after the invention of the steam engine, the Industrial Revolution had at last found its philosophy and its philosopher. Taylor's tight industrial choreography—his "system," as he liked to call it—was embraced by manufacturers throughout the country and, in time, around the world. Seeking maximum speed, maximum efficiency, and

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<sup>2</sup>With the exception of Research in Motion, based in Waterloo, Canada, a region known in Canada as Silicon Valley North.

maximum output, factory owners used time-and-motion studies to organize their work and configure the jobs of their workers. The goal, as Taylor defined it...was to identify and adopt, for every job, the "one best method" of work and thereby to effect "the gradual substitution of science for rule of thumb throughout the mechanic arts."

Taylor's system is still very much with us; it remains the ethic of industrial manufacturing. And now, thanks to the growing power that computer engineers and software coders wield over our intellectual lives, Taylor's ethic is beginning to govern the realm of the mind as well. The Internet is a machine designed for the efficient and automated collection, transmission, and manipulation of information, and its legions of programmers are intent on finding the "one best method"—the perfect algorithm—to carry out every mental movement of what we've come to describe as "knowledge work."

Google's headquarters, in Mountain View, California—the Googleplex—is the Internet's high church, and the religion practiced inside its walls is Taylorism. Google, says its chief executive, Eric Schmidt, is "a company that's founded around the science of measurement," and it is striving to "systematize everything" it does. Drawing on the terabytes of behavioral data it collects through its search engine and other sites, it carries out thousands of experiments a day, according to the Harvard Business Review, and it uses the results to refine the algorithms that increasingly control how people find information and extract meaning from it. What Taylor did for the work of the hand, Google is doing for the work of the mind.

The company has declared that its mission is "to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful." It seeks to develop "the perfect search engine," which it defines as something that "understands exactly what you mean and gives you back exactly what you want." In Google's view, information is a kind of commodity, a utilitarian resource that can be mined and processed with industrial efficiency. The more pieces of information we can "access" and the faster we can extract their gist, the more productive we become as thinkers (Carr 2008).

This portrayal, not surprisingly, ignited a firestorm of debate and exchange and led to one major American research body to probe the viewpoints of various experts with regard to Carr's assertions and the actions and societal influences of Google. The case for the company's democratization ethos was perhaps best put forth by a company executive in terms of empowering widening segments of the global populous with access and opportunities previously unattainable:

I would (also) like to say that Carr has it mostly backwards when he says that Google is built on the principles of Taylorism [the institution of time-management and worker-activity standards in industrial settings]. Taylorism shifts responsibility from worker to management, institutes a standard method for each job, and selects workers with skills unique for a specific job. Google does the opposite, shifting responsibility from management to the worker, encouraging creativity in each job, and encouraging workers to shift among many different roles in their career.... Carr is of course right that Google thrives on understanding data. But making sense of data (both for Google internally and for its users) is not like building the same artifact over and over on an assembly line; rather it requires creativity, a mix of broad and deep knowledge, and a host of connections to other people. That is what Google is trying to facilitate." (Peter Norvig, Google Research Director)<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup><http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1499/google-does-it-make-us-stupid-experts-stakeholders-mostly-say-no>

Does Google contribute to an automation of cognitive processes—thereby reducing freedom and flexibility—or instead unleash wider opportunities for both individual and collective learning and engagement? Is Google a model of machinery (albeit in a new form) or a driver of greater empowerment and mobility?

Such questions implicitly pervade subsequent chapters while underscoring how bureaucracy remains a prevalent theme of the emerging mobility era, not only within government but across all sectors of society. Most any organization—private, public, or nonprofit—faces not a stark choice between bureaucracy and networks but a much more nuanced set of design choices across both realms, with the nature of government accountability rendering the pace of change in this sector often more incremental and contested.

In shifting from machinery to mobility, then, the overriding public sector challenge is not complete abandonment of bureaucracy but instead one of embracing and mobilizing the forces of new governance (outlined in this chapter) into more responsive and adaptive governance systems both administratively and politically. Such is the task at hand and the focus of the next chapter.



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