

Chapter 2

Cutting Your Cake and Having It Too: Or, Is Equality a Distributive Justice Principle?

John T. Scott

Equality has almost universally been treated as a distributive justice or allocation principle in empirical studies of justice beliefs and behavior. Much of this empirical research has been influenced by Deutsch (1975, 1985), who argues that equality is one of the three principles of justice, along with equity and need. Researchers in this field have often also turned to the history of philosophy in order to confirm the pedigree of equality as a justice principle, going back at least as far as Aristotle and also drawing on more contemporary philosophers such as Rawls (1971), Miller (1999), and Dworkin (2000) to understand the role of equality in justice. Certainly, equality is a strong norm in contemporary democratic societies such as the USA where we imbibe the principle of the Declaration of Independence telling us, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal...,” and where social and economic justice movements appeal to the principle of equality when decrying the inequalities we see around us. Indeed, the norm of equality has been progressively expanded from arguments for equality of rights to equality of conditions (Dahl 1989). In short, equality remains the presumptive principle in nearly all modern theories of justice, as well as a central norm in debates over democracy, the social welfare state, and the distribution of income and other goods (Weale 1985).

But is equality actually a distributive justice principle? Or, less strongly, to what extent and under what conditions do individuals employ equality as a distributive justice principle? The goal of this chapter is to raise this question and, at minimum, to provide enough evidence to suggest that we should take the question seriously. In order to do so, I first reexamine some representative treatments of equality in the history of philosophy, specifically those by Aristotle, Hobbes, and Rawls. In doing so, I make two broad claims. First, I show that equality does not in fact play a central role in these political and moral theories, even theories such as Hobbes’

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where equality is asserted to be fundamental. Second, I argue that the conversion of distributive justice claims into procedural justice claims, first seen in Hobbes but brought to its culmination in Rawls, has the effect of privileging equality not as a distributive justice principle, but as a privileged outcome that is the result of treating the allocation problem as a procedural one. Or to put the second claim in particular more pithily: In theory and practice, justice as equality means being able to cut your cake and have it too.

With this reexamination of the role of equality in the history of philosophy in mind, I then turn to a few representative empirical studies of justice behavior in order to raise questions about what is actually going on when we see individuals behave in a way that *seems* to accord with the theoretical expectation that they are treating equality as a distributive justice principle and to suggest that they may not *actually* be doing so. Finally, I conclude with some reflections on the implications of this examination for the empirical study of justice beliefs and behavior and suggest some potentially fruitful lines of further research.

A Brief History of Equality

“Equality” seems at first to be a straightforward and simple concept, but upon examination it turns out to be devilishly complicated. The entry on “equality” in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* admits this complexity from the outset: “In its prescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a loaded and ‘highly contested’ concept” (Gosepath 2011; quoting Dworkin 2000, p. 2). The article proceeds to disentangle the skein of equality, differentiating among formal equality, proportional equality, moral equality, and presumptive equality and then weaves these different strands through a survey of the role of equality of distribution. Working both within and against the highly influential framework of Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* (1971; see Daniels 2003), numerous philosophers have tried to articulate precisely what we should equalize, whether equality of resources or “basic goods” (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981), equality of opportunity or access to advantage (Cohen 1989; Arneson 1990; Roemer 1998), moral capabilities (Williams 1973), or equality of capabilities more tangibly considered (Sen 1992; Nussbaum 1992, 2000). This complexity of “equality” has led some scholars either to worry about the confusion they believe reigns in people’s minds over what they hold to be equal or to accept this confusion as complexity. For example, Hochschild (1981) concludes that Americans confusedly entertain different senses of the term simultaneously. In turn, Rae (1981) decides to speak in the plural rather than the singular, of “equalities” rather than “equality,” whereas Sen (1992) begins his work on welfare economics by first asking “Equality of What?”

Part of this complexity, if not confusion, concerning equality is due to the polyvalent character of the word “equality” itself. This polyvalence can be seen clearly in the Greek term *isos*, which means both “fair” and “equal.” As Aristotle writes in his examination of distributive justice: “If, then, the unjust is unequal [or: unfair], the just is equal [or: fair], which is in fact what is held to be the case by everyone,

even without argument” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 5.3.1131a (2011, p. 95)).¹ I will turn to Aristotle’s argument momentarily, but for now it suffices to note that “equality” can mean, at minimum, either absolute or numerical equality or proportional equality. That is, two things can be absolutely equal, as Smith and Jones receiving US\$ 100 each in a given distribution, or proportionately equal, as Smith receiving US\$ 200 and Jones receiving US\$ 100 where Smith has for example done twice as much work as Jones or owns twice as many shares in a company. This dual meaning of *isos* is central to Aristotle’s theory, but whereas he offers a certain order or solution to the problem that takes advantage of the two senses, ambiguity—intentional or unintentional—pervades both theoretical and empirical examinations of equality. This ambiguity is part of what lies behind Rae’s (1981) “equalities” and Sen’s (1992) “Equality of What?” It is likewise seen in the empirical literature, sometimes directly inspired by Aristotle (e.g., Mellers 1982), where the term “equality,” meaning the principle that outcomes should be proportional to inputs (as reward proportionate to contribution), is used instead of the potential synonyms “desert” or “merit” (e.g., Adams 1965; Deutsch 1975, 1985; Messick and Cook 1983). Since the term “equity” can also mean “equality,” the ambiguity of usage that stems in part from the polyvalent character of the term “equality” has perhaps needlessly, even if understandably, led to confusion.

A full analysis of the theoretical debate over the term “equality” is not my purpose here. Rather, the purpose of the present analysis is to question the role of “equality” as a distributive justice principle in both the history of philosophy and in empirical justice research, so I will restrict my analysis to “equality” as absolute or numerical equality: $1 = 1$, $100 = 100$, etc. Indeed, one result of this analysis will be to show how over the course of the history of philosophy the proportional sense of equality (or equity or desert) is quietly subsumed within the absolute sense of equality. By beginning with the absolute sense of the term, we will be in a position to witness this transformation.

Aristotle on Inequality

The title of this section is not “Aristotle on Equality” for a simple reason: Aristotle in many respects begins from the assumption or observation of *inequality* rather than *equality* among human beings. In this regard, Aristotle might even be said to be representative of premodern thought in general. This characterization of Aristotle is too strong, and I will point out places where he is arguably more egalitarian than we might at first think, but it is not entirely misleading. Further, since Hobbes later characterizes his predecessor as privileging inequality, this characterization of Aristotle is useful for analyzing how Hobbes and other modern philosophers have transformed the relationship between equality and distributive justice, in large part in direct opposition to Aristotle.

¹ Subsequent references to Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* will include only the standard referents to book, chapter, and Bekker page number.

The pervasiveness of inequality in Aristotle's philosophy is signaled from the outset of his *Politics*, where he outlines the various "partnerships" (*koinōnia*) that make up the city or *polis*: man and woman, parent and child, and, most tellingly, master and slave. Aristotle articulates a central principle of his approach to human things when he explains with reference to master and slave that there is "naturally ruling and ruled," for "that which can foresee with the mind is the naturally ruling and naturally mastering element, while that which can do these things with the body is the naturally ruled and slave" (*Politics* I.2.1252a (1984, p. 36)).² This argument is part of Aristotle's more general position concerning natural rule, which is ultimately derived from his teleological theory of nature: "For whatever is constituted out of a number of things—whether continuous"—e.g., soul and body in an individual human being—"or discrete"—e.g., master and slave—"and becomes a single common thing, always displays a ruling and ruled element" (1.5.1254a). In his ensuing discussion of natural slavery, Aristotle defines the natural slave in the following terms: "one who does not belong to himself by nature but is another's, though a human being, is by nature a slave" (1.4.1254a). Likewise, he concludes: "Accordingly, those who are as different from other men as the soul from the body or man from beast—and they are in this state if their work is the use of the body, and if this is the best that can come from them—are slaves by nature" (1.5.1254b).

Note that Aristotle's definition of the natural slave is not a statement about the actual existence of such beings, but a definition of what such a being would be. While Aristotle does conclude that *some* human beings meet his definition (how many is not clear), he wields his argument concerning natural slavery *against* the existing practice of slavery, arguing explicitly that someone being a slave by *law*, whether through purchase or conquest in war, for example, does not mean that they are slaves by *nature* (1.6.1255a–b). In this light, Aristotle's remark at the outset of his discussion of natural slavery is telling: "Let us speak first about master and slave, so that we may see ... whether we cannot acquire something in the way of knowledge about these things that is better than current conceptions" (1.3.1253b). The interpretation of Aristotle's position on natural slavery, and on similar subjects such as women, is hotly contested (see, e.g., Dobbs 1994). Nonetheless, even if the ultimate thrust of his argument concerning slavery is more egalitarian than it may at first appear, his fundamental position on relations of authority between natural unequals remains intact.

In what respects equality and inequality among humans are relevant for politics and morals becomes thematic in Aristotle's investigation of the various political regimes. Aristotle outlines the six forms of regime, or the authoritative form of the city that determines who is allowed to participate in the offices of the city or who is a citizen, in terms of the number of citizens (one, few, many) and whether the aim of the regime is "correct"—that is, oriented toward the common advantage—or

² Subsequent references to Aristotle's *Politics* will include only the standard referents to book, chapter, and Bekker page number. I have also eliminated the brackets included by the translator to indicate words or phrases which he interpolates to make Aristotle's highly compressed prose make sense in translation.

“deviant.” The three deviant forms are tyranny, oligarchy (essentially, the rule of the rich), and democracy (essentially, the rule of the poor). The three correct forms are kingship, aristocracy, and what he terms “polity,” which is the rule of the many in a proper way and in practice a mixed regime of democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy (3.7–8.1279a–1280a). Each of these regimes, he argues, espouses a certain understanding of justice in terms of competing notions of equality and inequality.

In order to examine the different claims by these contenders for rule, and especially oligarchs and democrats, since they are the two regimes he claims are empirically pervasive, Aristotle frames and then examines their claims in terms of their arguments concerning justice.

It is necessary first to grasp what they speak of as the defining principles of oligarchy and democracy and what justice is from both oligarchic and democratic points of view. For all fasten on a certain sort of justice, but proceed only to a certain point, and do not speak of the whole of justice in its authoritative sense. For example, justice is held to be equality, and it is, but for equals and not for all; and inequality is held to be just and is indeed, but for unequals and not for all; but they disregard this element of persons and judge badly. The cause of this is that the judgment concerns them selves, and most people are bad judges concerning their own things (3.9.1280a).

In other words, both oligarchs and democrats are “partial” in the dispute, both in the sense of having a “partial” or interested point of view and in the sense of seeing only a part, and not the whole, of justice. In this context Aristotle references his treatise on ethics, to which I shall turn momentarily, but for the present he lets his claimants make their cases. “For the ones, if they are unequal in a certain thing, such as goods, suppose they are unequal generally, while the others suppose that if they are equal in a certain thing, such as freedom, they are equal generally. But of the most authoritative consideration they say nothing” (3.9.1280a). Aristotle explicitly rejects the oligarchs’ claim, saying that their argument that their unequal possession of goods entitles them to an unequal share in rule would be correct if they were a joint business venture whose end was to make money, but it is incorrect because they mistake the end of the city (3.9.1280a). The end of the city is not “to live” but rather to “live well,” meaning the full completion and exercise of human capacities, or “virtues,” and thus happiness (3.9.1280b–1281a; see 1.2.1252b). Goods are necessary for “living,” but they are only the necessary condition, if that, for the ultimate end of “living well.” Aristotle does not explicitly reject the democrats’ claim that their equal freedom entitles them to an equal share in ruling, but he would undoubtedly offer a similar argument about freedom being necessary but not sufficient for the true end of the political partnership. It is the aristocrats—aristocrats properly speaking, that is the virtuous—who in fact have the best claim to rule, but these just claimants do not tend to press their case (see 3.13.1283a). The theoretical argument for understanding justice in relation to political rule is clear: Those who are unequally suited to attaining the true end of the city, “living well,” have the most just claim to rule. The case regarding merit that Aristotle raises in this context as being supposedly analogous is telling: “If someone were preeminent in flute playing ... the outstanding flutes ... ought to be given to him” (3.12.1282b–1283a). Thus, for Aristotle the just distribution of political power might in principle be quite

unequal. Even if this conclusion is warranted in principle or in theory, however, it is superseded for Aristotle by the practical consideration that all but a vanishingly small number of cities contain elements (virtuous, rich, free) that have claims to participating in rule that are incommensurate in nature and are impractical or unsafe simply to ignore (3.12.1283a; 3.13.1283b). In sum, once again even if Aristotle's ultimate practical solution is to give equality its due in politics by advancing the democrats' case or by arranging for their participation in rule, the ultimate thrust of his argument concerning justice in political life is generally egalitarian.

This brief examination of Aristotle's treatment in the political realm of justice understood as equality and inequality is useful for understanding how his conception of justice cashes out, and will also be useful when we turn to Hobbes in order to see how he challenges Aristotle's argument on behalf of equality. But it is Aristotle's systematic analysis of justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that is most important for understanding how he conceives the relationship between justice and equality. Aristotle's examination of the virtue of justice in the *Ethics* is rich and complex; and although the present analysis of how he conceives of justice in relation to equality will necessarily not do justice to his argument, it is still worth sketching out briefly.


At the outset of his discussion of justice in Book 5 of the *Ethics*, Aristotle remarks on the complexity of the concept, but he focuses immediately on the notion that justice is said to be a kind of equality and injustice a kind of inequality (5.1.1129a–b). Once again, in order to comprehend his point fully, we must recall that the word being translated as “equal” in this context is *isos*, which also means “fair.” Since Aristotle casts his analysis of justice in mathematical terms, treating justice as a kind of middle term in a geometric proportion in the case of distributive justice or in an arithmetic proportion in the case of corrective justice, however, the sense of *isos* as “equal” is central to his discussion.

Distributive justice is Aristotle's first order of business, in large part because it is for him the most important consideration for politics and morals, and once again it is inequality, not equality, that is paramount. Aristotle describes distributive justice as a kind of geometric proportion between at least two things (people, goods, people and goods, etc.). In simplified form:

$$A:B :: c:d \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{c}{A} : \frac{d}{B}$$

Where *A* and *B* are persons, and *c* and *d* some sort of good. In this case, for example, if $A = 2B$, then $c = 2d$, or *A* receives twice as much as *B* of the relevant good. Alternatively, if $A = B$, then $c = d$, or *A* and *B* receive an equal amount of the relevant good (3.3.1131a–b). The important thing to note with regard to Aristotle's discussion of distributive justice here is that equality is only a *special case* within a proportion that is otherwise not assumed to be equal. In other words, an equal distribution is just *only* in the case where the persons happen to be equal in the relevant respect. Equality understood as absolute or numerical equality has no privileged position in Aristotle's treatment of distributive justice, and in fact his treatment of distributive justice as a kind of proportion appears to assume inequality.

Equality does, however, play a central role in Aristotle's treatment of what he terms "corrective" justice. Corrective justice is either voluntary, as in commercial transactions or exchanges, or involuntary, as in punishing crimes. Rather than being akin to a geometric proportion, however, corrective justice is akin to an arithmetic proportion, which is concerned with absolute rather than proportional equality or differences in equality. "The just in transactions is a certain equality, and the unjust, a certain inequality, yet not in accord with the proportion just indicated but in accordance with an arithmetic one. For it makes no difference at all whether a decent person robs a base one, or a base person a decent one, or if a decent or a base person commits adultery. Rather, the law looks only at the difference that stems from the harm done, and it treats people as equals: if the one person acts unjustly, the other suffers injustice; and if the one did harm, the other was harmed" (5.4.1131b–1132a). Appealing to the sense of "unjust" as meaning "unequal," Aristotle treats corrective justice as one person creating an inequality through committing a wrong, for example when a thief robs someone of a certain amount of money so that the victim suffers a loss and the thief has an equivalent gain. This relationship might be represented in the following way:



In this example, *A* and *B* are persons and the lines represent the amount of some good they each have after *B* has stolen a portion of *A*'s amount of the good represented by the length of the line from *e* to *f*. *B*'s theft has created an inequality where there was previously equality. The "just" thing to do in this case, then, would be to restore equality by restoring the portion of *B*'s line from *e* to *f* to *A*. As Aristotle states, the law in this case is indifferent to any other attributes of the persons involved in the "transaction," *A* and *B*, and treats them both as equals. Aristotle examines "voluntary" exchanges such as commercial transactions in a similar way in this context, but the important point about this examination for the present analysis is that he similarly treats the two parties to the exchange as equals. Although Aristotle does not develop a concept of procedural justice in this context, one might rearticulate his theory of "corrective" justice in this manner, with the key point being that procedural justice likewise treats the parties to a dispute or a transaction as equals. Recasting his theory in this way helps prepare us for grasping the transformation of distributive and procedural justice that will happen in Hobbes' hands.

Hobbes on Equality

If Aristotle's philosophy is premised on inequality, then Hobbes is perhaps the first philosopher to premise his thought on equality. Or so it seems at first. Closer examination of Hobbes' position on equality and justice reveals that his argument for equality is deceptive and is instead advanced for political purposes rather than as a substantive argument, or at least not as the substantive argument he initially seems to advance. Likewise, and related, his argument concerning distributive justice is meant to evacuate inegalitarian claims concerning justice, such as those found in Aristotle, of any meaning or force, again for political purposes. Hobbes instead converts essentially controversial and irresolvable questions of distributive justice into issues of procedural justice that take individuals as equal and are resolvable as matters of simple exchange or sovereign will or law.

Hobbes begins his famous chapter in *Leviathan* (1651) "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind" with a seemingly straightforward argument for the natural equality of human beings: "Nature hath made men so equal..." (1994 [1651], p. 74). The consequences of this argument are monumental: our natural equality contributes to making the state of nature a state of "war of all against all;" every human has an equal and unlimited right to self-preservation, and therefore the way out of the state of nature is a contract of everyone with everyone to relinquish those rights and obey a sovereign that has authority to make laws which everyone is obliged to obey. Many of these arguments are directed at Aristotle, for Hobbes denies that any particular human being has a natural authority or just claim to rule over others due to virtue or some other quality. He likewise asserts that "there is no such *Finis ultimus* (utmost aim) nor *Summum Bonum* (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers" (1994 [1651], p. 57), Aristotle foremost among them. He thereby challenges Aristotle's teleological theory of nature, human nature, and politics, thus robbing anyone of the claim that they merit being rulers because they are most able to achieve the proper end of the political association, for there is no such end. Finally, and to similar effect, Hobbes denies Aristotle's claim that humans are by nature political animals (1994 [1651], p. 108). All this is true about Hobbes, but none of it is ultimately premised on an argument for human equality. Indeed, Hobbes' actual argument concerning human equality never establishes this equality, at least in the way it first seems. A closer examination of his argument is therefore necessary.

Hobbes' argument for equality comprises the first two paragraphs of the chapter "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind." He begins:

Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself. (1994 [1651], p. 74)

Note first that Hobbes actually admits inequality of both body and mind: “though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another...” His point, then, is not that humans are equal, but that the inequality among them does not matter decisively. No one is so unequal as to be able to “claim” anything for himself that everyone else might not claim. Or, to put this in the strongest possible terms, the terms Hobbes later uses in describing the state of nature: “in such a condition every man has a right to everything, even to one another’s body” (1994 [1651], p. 80). In other words, every human has an equal natural right to everything, and therefore no one individual has an exclusive right or “claim” to anything—even himself! Hobbes thereby evacuates natural right or justice of any specific claim to anything. Hobbes’ argument concerning our equality in terms of our bodies is likewise not quite what it at first seems. For while admitting inequalities in bodily strength, his point is that despite these inequalities everyone is equally physically *vulnerable*, that is, vulnerable to being killed. If fear of violent death is the greatest fear, according to Hobbes, then everyone ought to be equally afraid. Anyone who is not so afraid, for example because he is so prideful as to consider himself as so unequal in body or mind so as not to be vulnerable, is deceiving himself.

Having established our equal claim to everything and our equal physical vulnerability, Hobbes turns in the second paragraph to the qualities of mind:

And as to the faculties of the mind— setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially ... science (which very few have, and but in few things), as being not a native faculty (born with us), nor attained (as prudence) while we look after somewhat else— I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength. For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto.... (1994 [1651], pp. 74–75)

Note again that Hobbes does not argue that humans are in fact equal in mind, for at least some people acquire science and therefore potentially much great power of mind. Science is not a “native faculty,” however, and Hobbes seems to imply that naturally all humans’ mental faculties are equal before any acquisitions. However, in his discussion of intellectual virtues a few chapters earlier, he notes that people’s minds differ in their quickness or “celerity” for various reasons (1994 [1651], p. 38). All humans are therefore not as equal in mental faculties as Hobbes seems at first to argue. His position on prudence, which seems to be directed at Aristotle in particular, is curious, for it seems an odd claim that prudence is simply experience, “which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto.” His claim would make sense, however, if we take him quite literally as saying that individuals would *in principle* be equally prudent *if* they have equal “time” or experiences and especially *if* they equally apply their minds to matters requiring prudence. This position would be reconcilable with our actual experience that individuals are not in fact equally prudent. However this may be, the continuation of this passage is quite revealing about Hobbes’ actual argument:

... That which may make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar, that is, than all men but themselves.... For they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share. (1994 [1651], p. 75)

Rather than this proving that humans are in fact equal instead of unequal in terms of mind, Hobbes has in fact established that they are equally *vain*.³

In short, in his argument for equality, Hobbes has actually established that humans are equal in having an equal claim to everything, being equally vulnerable to death, and being equally vain. It is therefore no coincidence that, after this argument, Hobbes identifies the three principal causes that make the state of nature a state of war of all against all: competition, diffidence, and glory (1994 [1651], p. 75). These three causes of quarrel directly parallel the three respects in which humans are actually equal: There is competition in principle among humans because they all have an equal claim to everything; humans are "diffident" (that is, wary such that they anticipate threats and strike first) because they are equally vulnerable; and they are equally glory-seeking or prideful because they are equally vain about their own capacities. All of this is not to deny that Hobbes' actual arguments concerning human equality have no bearing, for they certainly do. They have a crucial bearing in at least two ways. First, the natural right of everyone to everything carries with it the proposition that no one has any natural authority over anyone else, which means that authority comes from contract, not nature, which is crucial to Hobbes' theory (and opposed to Aristotle's theory). Second, equal vulnerability and equal vanity are aspects of human nature that Hobbes believes we must acknowledge in order to be amenable to his solution of the social contract. The present point is that Hobbes does not actually argue what he at first seems to with regard to human equality, namely, that we are equal in some substantial way.

Why, then, does Hobbes offer a misleading argument about human equality? His purpose in doing so is one of necessity: in order to achieve the political outcome he believes necessary for the relief of man's natural estate. This purpose becomes clear two chapters later in his discussion of the laws of nature. "The question 'who is the better man?' has no place in the condition of mere nature, where (as has been shewn before) all men are equal," Hobbes begins his discussion of the sixth law of nature, against pride. He then reveals that it is Aristotle he is opposing: "I know that *Aristotle* (in the first book of his *Politics*, for a foundation of his doctrine) maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command (meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy), others to serve ..., as if master and servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit; which is not only against reason, but also against experience." Hobbes is referring to Aristotle's argument concerning natural slavery, and putting aside the *ad hominem* attack and unfair characterization of Aristotle's argument (whether he is aware that it is unfair

³ Descartes makes the same misleading argument at the beginning of Part One of his *Discourse on Method*.

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