

Chapter 2

Sectors of Security

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is subject to extensive endogenous shocks, such as the social shocks leading up to and during the revolutions (and some of the underlying tensions leading up to these), as well as exogenous shocks (e.g., fiscal shocks as a result of the political and physical instability in a country proper, and those spilling over from neighboring countries in unrest), which lead to low macroeconomic stability—and reciprocally reinforce the endogenous shocks. As a result, this chapter will address some of these sectors of security related to, or arising out of the Arab Spring, albeit briefly, to show these interlinkages with further discussion of broader contexts in the following chapters.

Ideology and Sectarian Conflicts in the EuroMed

The ideological conflicts playing out in the greater Euro–Mediterranean today, and partially reflected in the struggles as part of the Arab Spring, are the continuum of historical events, *inter alia* the division of the Ottoman Empire following World War I which

in the eyes of the Entente partners was two-fold: each among the new nations would have ... a size insufficient to annihilate her neighbors, thus being compelled to look for support to Europe. Also, as all among them would have had a multi-ethnic population, they would be inherently unstable and weak (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 7).

While this plan, even if later modified in the peace treaty, was enacted over “the rage of the Arabs, who under prince Feisal ‘dreamt of a great Arabia’, stretching from Alexandria to Aden, from Jerusalem to Baghdad, as it had been during the Middle Age” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013), Feisal was banned from both Syria and the region of Heggiaz as a result. This territory, “including the governance of the two sacred towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina, was given to the chief of the most extremist among Sunni sects, the Wahabists, Ibn el Saud, which became present day Saudi Arabia” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013).

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic galaxy was deprived “of a single ecumenical religious leader, able to reconcile the different facets of” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013, p. 11) this complex greater Euro–Mediterranean region: while the Sultan was, in fact, “also the ‘Great Caliph of the whole Islam’” (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013), holding the plethora of confessions and sects for the sake of Muslim unity together (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013) until 1921, when he was exiled—without clear successor. The result was a growing split between the two major forms of Islamic identity (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013)—a tension between the Sunnis and the Shia that today is impossible to control (Sanfelice di Monteforte 2013)—and the start of political *perceptions* based on *ideology* to significantly influence the foreign (in terms of e.g., giving to and receiving support from governmental leaders with similar ideological orientations) and domestic (economic, social, and core institutional) policies, such as decisions pertaining to the establishment of theocratic vs. secular institutions (Haass 2013, p. 154), and the degree of commitment for equal civil rights and democratic participation for all population groups in the MENA. This tension evolved *inter alia* between the “expansionist policy of Iran, whose religious leaders were keen to strengthen the ties between all Shiites, settled in what is now called the ‘Shiite Crescent’, from Pakistan to Bahrain, [and] from Iraq to southern Lebanon” (Sanfelice di Monteforte, p. 12)—and the Sunnis, intent on controlling, if not subjugating, the Shiite minorities living in their respective regions. Yet, the image of extremist Islam is not applicable for the majority of Muslims, as the muted response in the Arab world to Osama bin Laden’s death showed: “Al Qaeda, through its violent operations in the Arab states and all over the world, has lost all sympathy” (Amr al-Shubaki, quoted in Deeb 2013, p. 67), in that violence “associated with the Islamic paradigm was detrimental to Arabs and Muslims themselves” (Deeb 2013) in favor of the paradigm of a new generation of a secular, democratic, nonviolent, and nonideological society, whose citizens are nationalist but maintain their Arab and Muslim identities, according to one author (Deeb 2013, p. 68). In late May 2013, one of the most influential Sunni theologians, the Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi, called on all Sunni Muslims globally to fight the regime of Bashar Al-Assad as well as against Hezbollah (Hegghammer and Zelin 2013). Yet, internal violence associated with the domestic democratization and liberalization processes of the Arab Spring was only partially affected by these sentiments: Haass and Lesch (2013, p. 5) write that “perhaps the most interesting issue for post-authoritarian societies in the Middle East and North Africa concerns the relationship between Islam and democracy.” This is not a black and white issue, but one of many shades of gray: the debate ranges from “Islamic democracy” to the establishment of liberal democracies in the post-revolution societies of the MENA, to Islamist parties with various degrees of authoritarian tendencies at times (e.g. post-democratic election under Morsi’s Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood) giving sway to some degree of Shari’a law/theocracy as a national, political, and constitutional roadmap—and with it its nondemocratic tendencies, such as an unequal role for women in business, government, and society.

Theoretical Context of Sectarianism¹

This book places an emphasis on delineating the sectarian complexities in the greater (inter-) regional EuroMed to highlight their socio-political and economic consequences on multiple security levels, including hard security, discussed in subsequent chapters.

“Traditionally, sectarianism can be understood as an institutional set of arrangements determining familial, local, regional, and even broader kinds of loyalty and affiliation” (Anonymous interview 3 January 2013 in Washington, D.C., quoted in Abdo 2013, p. 5). Within the Arab Spring uprisings, sectarian conflicts in the MENA have increased, following the downfall of the authoritarian regimes suppressing them previously, to gain economic and political power, and the struggle over which interpretation of Islam will dominate society and the new political leadership (Abdo 2013). In fact, “democracy” is being used effectively by suppressed Shia majorities (or at least substantial proportions of the populations) in Bahrain and Lebanon—with the result that some Sunni view it as a subversive Shia agenda... (Abdo 2013, p. 5).

We need to consider, however, that according to some scholars

Traditional *shari'a* law is a kind of divine civil law, not a *political* [emphasis added] law as the one presented by the Islamists. Currently, *shari'a* has become an ideological weapon of political Islam directed against all open-minded Muslims, who wish to see Islamic civilization in a proper place in this ever-changing modern world (Tibi 2005, p. 166).

This makes the discussion of “sectarianism” in the EuroMed more relative—if not less salient in the political discourse of the region.

However, sectarianism in the MENA is not confined to the struggle between the Sunnis and Shia and their respective subsects, but includes something beyond the struggles for political representation of Judeo-Christian populations in the MENA within the Arab Spring as well, of course. Hence, political and sectarian fights cannot be easily separated regionally, or be viewed only as purely sectarian struggles.

There is a growing rise in sectarianism in the Southern Mediterranean, which not only destabilizes this region internally, but also complicates its foreign relations with the Northern Mediterranean as well as the trans-Atlantic relationship within the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC). These religious differences in the Southern Mediterranean and neighboring countries are serious on their own account “and not simply an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation” (Abdo 2013, p. 2). Furthermore, Shia-Sunni

¹ The Sunni-Shia conflict represents unresolved differences dating back more than 1,400 years to the death of the Prophet Mohammad and the debate over his rightful succession as to whether to arise from among his closest companions or strictly from his direct bloodline.

hostilities should not be over-generalized as they show local differentiations², e.g., while the Tunisian and Egyptian conflicts have strong Sunni support—and have added fuel to the sectarian tension in the MENA - the outcome of the current Syrian civil war (and the possible demise of Hezbollah—and simultaneous rise of Al Qaeda—in Syria and Lebanon) will strongly determine this sectarian power balance not only intra-regionally, but also inter-regionally, such as pertaining to Iraq. In other words, outside intervention in the MENA has created a proxy war with Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah on one side, and Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and Turkey on the other (Abdo 2013, p. 4). A practical example of this represents the Al Qaeda-linked break-in of the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad to free a (significant) number of suspected or convicted jihadists who subsequently have made it to Syria. They view the current Syrian war as much more than a struggle against a brutal dictator, but as a war against nonbelievers. Their ultimate aim is the establishment of an Islamic government, both in Iraq and in Syria in this case, over the current nonbelievers that transcend the borders of the modern Middle East (Doornbos and Moussa 2013): As the government of Al-Assad is weakening, they see the opportune moment for their goals approaching.

This intensification of sectarian tensions in MENA followed the uprisings and their undermining of the authoritarian regimes which kept them in check: “People return to their primary identities. And the more religiosity in a society, the more the state is weak” (Fahs 2012, quoted in Abdo 2013, p. 4).

Minorities, whether religious (e.g., Sunni vs. Shiite and their more extremist branches, or Copts, as one of the non-Muslim constituencies) or ethnic (e.g., Kurds), as the “other,” represent the most important internal dimension, in addition to socio-economic factors as discussed further in the section below, and the protest of the suffering the respective minorities experienced during the past decades under oppressive regimes in leading to the tectonic shifts we are currently observing in the Southern Mediterranean. Especially when the party/group in power is not only associated with, but held in power through an outside “force,” such as through foreign (and significantly, military) aid, e.g. to Mubarak in Egypt.

Ironically of course, the uprisings of the Arab Spring resulted in an opposite swing of the political pendulum, e.g., in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood, marginally elected to power in 2012, was opposed to allowing women and Copts to hold the presidency (Rutherford 2013, p. 47/8). A further irony is the fact that Mubarak’s successor after the revolution of 2011 also welcomed Western (e.g., EU and U.S. financial assistance). While this was important to both the EU and the U.S. not only to lessen humanitarian tragedies as a result of the severely compromised economy following the Tahir Square popular revolt, but also to maintain political and economic ties with Egypt and its people, the pragmatism (rather than uncompromised idealism) of the Muslim Brotherhood is noted.

² The Shia question involves *inter alia* the degree to which Persian Shia can have an Arab Shia identity as the Islamist Republic envisions it—or to what extent this political agenda is affected by external actors and factors (compare Abdo 2013, p. 3).

Political Security³

Coup and Post-Coup

Encarnacion (2013) developed the model of a *civil society coup* in 2002, and the ouster of several dictators in the MENA can be analyzed through this paradigm:

Endemic to new democracies, civil society coups entail the removal from power of an elected leader through sustained protest, usually with the aid of the military. Indeed, it is the partnership between civil society and the military—not usually known for acting in concert—that distinguishes a civil society coup from an ordinary one. More often than not, those behind the coup justify it by claiming that they intend to rescue democracy, which is paradoxical since they are, in fact, uprooting it. This is Tocqueville’s civil society gone rogue; rather than working patiently and discreetly toward improving the quality of democracy, it turns angry and restless and plots for sudden and radical political change (Encarnacion 2013, p. 14).

In this sense, Taleb and Blyth (2011, p. 36) suggested that the international treaties which many authoritarian rulers, deposed during the Arab Spring, made for the convenience between them and their patron countries, were without consideration of the populace—and as a result tended not to be supported by the latter. Rather than suppressing political fluctuations, these authors (Taleb and Blyth 2011) quote Rousseau: “A little bit of agitation gives motivation to the soul, and what really makes the species prosper is not peace so much as freedom” and with it “some unpredictable fluctuation...—[:] no stability without volatility” (Taleb and Blyth 2011, p. 36). In other words, the suppression of political expression may create the appearance of stability on the surface, but this suppression will, in the end, result in even greater upheaval or a coup, rather than just letting political thought be expressed *peu à peu* as it arises.

International assistance overall in post-revolution states in the MENA depends on the circumstances of course. Interestingly, the EU, who has the most immediate interest in a re-stabilization of its southern neighborhood, does not necessarily have the financial means: “while European armed forces can do crisis response operations well, they are running out of money to put that wisdom into practice” (Mattelaer 2013, p. 1). Hence, the countries in post-revolution upheaval have to find additional regional assistance (e.g., from the GCC states) or the U.S. to assist them in smoothing the human suffering as a result of the political “restructuring.”

States: Failed vs. Successful

The Western perception of a “successful” state is as one that *inter alia* is conducive to economic growth (rather than stagnation or decline), ideally without extreme

³ The author wishes to thank Inger Andersen of the World Bank and Ralph Chami of the IMF for their invaluable comments at the Harvard Arab Weekend November 7–10, 2013 pertaining to the following sections.

income disparities, to provide constructive (positive sum) international relations, as well as to provide basic public services and jobs to all its citizens (i.e., *inter alia* to all appropriate age and sectarian groups) within the clear, and evenly applied rule of law (including civil freedoms in terms of religion, gender, and ethnic origin), and to allow for a vibrant civil society to support and define the state in this. Yet, these are not universal norms in all countries and societies. Often, the lack of these criteria leads to failed states, and become a challenge for “free and democratic” states to engage in with these for positive sum outcomes on the social, economic, and political levels.

One example of intra-regional cooperation on this level is the EU’s “civilian” border mission in Libya. It is training paramilitary forces in a wider European and U.S. effort to prevent Libya from becoming a “failed state” (Rettmann 2013c) by stopping local militias from interfering with the state’s (legitimate) control of the nation’s security, and thereby assist the Libyan state to “reconstitute” itself into a stable and successful (and democratic...) state—rather than potentially the scene for further trans-trafficking of weapons, drugs, and humans from western Africa into Europe (and the vicious circle this would represent for impeded Libyan political—and social—stability and growth).

Institutional Capacity

While many of the now defunct authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Middle East inhibited independent or divergent political opinion, often stymieing striving civil society through their (often brutal) secret services, this lack of a broad civil society now represents a difficult handicap post-authoritarianism in developing effective participatory democratic institutions to serve all segments of their society. Some well-organized groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood are, nevertheless, not in a position to take over the functions of the state, as exemplified by the absence of basic public services, e.g., the lack of public security, in Egypt, as was apparent under Morsi’s rule. Additionally, the “oil and gas shortages, and a weakening level of a regime resulted in mounting ungovernability” (EuroMeSCo 2013, p. 7) as Morsi’s reign showed as well. Though post-Morsi the state has made a strong comeback in Egypt, it embodies “a lack of [a] consensual culture of nation building” (EuroMeSCo 2013) at the time of writing.

There are parallels with Tunisia, such as the deep political divisions between “the Troika-structured coalition government and the Tunisian Salvation Front since the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, a member of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly” (EuroMeSCo 2013), resulting in “an obsession with the state” (EuroMeSCo 2013), which prevented “the country from adopting durable solutions and a new paradigm for the long term” (EuroMeSCo 2013).

In this context, the role of the militaries in the MENA during the Arab Spring continues to be significant. It suffices to say that the military has been supportive of (or at least not interfering with) the popular *revolts* in some countries, such as in Egypt during the Tahir Square protests, and of the *regime* (such as in Syria).

By contrast, in Turkey, the military was for many decades the guardian of its democracy, just as the military, from its perspective, was in ousting Morsi in Egypt. This was ostensibly because the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was not conducting an *inclusive* government once they had been democratically elected—and the military's actions could, in this sense, be interpreted as supportive of democracy as well. The civilian–military balance to assist in internal stabilization (as militaries tend to resist chaos) will need to coalesce in the MENA as the new democracies are consolidated, with strong institutions as checks and balances to avoid either military dictatorships—a line which Turkey toed often—or sectarian autocracies. Israel is unique in that its military acts as the great equalizer of a very culturally (though not religiously) diverse immigrant population with its universal conscription (while many countries rely on volunteer armies today).

Democracy

The dictator we know vs. the future we don't know
(anonymous)

The revolutions of the Arab Spring brought a great sense of optimism and hope for social and democratic reform in the MENA region - masking the differences in underlying causes for the uprisings in each country, many related to the degree of authoritarianism in each country. However, as the dynamics shifted into a tenuous relationship between Arab transnational Islamist movements, now often having evolved into political Islamism on the one hand and nation-states plus their societies on the other, becoming an often existentialist debate, which was previously repressed by authoritarian regimes, there are more questions than answers for guaranteeing the security of the state and its society with such multiple relationships on all levels.

Regardless of the specific state-forms countries take after the upheaval of the Arab Spring, reforms are the “A and O” in the post-revolutionary phases, often similar between countries, some differing: political transparency and inclusiveness of the entire electorate, regardless of gender or religious orientation, are urgent on the political level, however.

Legitimacy: Ruling in Accordance with the Mandate/Political Promise

For post-revolution countries to become successful, institutional deficits in public governance (e.g., legal frameworks, constitutional modalities) need to be remedied to meet the aspirations of the people. In the absence of these, the consequences will translate into stunted economic growth, affecting (inclusive) growth to meet the immediate social and economic challenges internally, with this “disintegration” further spilling over into neighboring countries, as Syria exemplifies.

Scattered populist actions (e.g., subsidies for petroleum and bread) do not build up social fairness in the longterm, but may result in macroeconomic challenges without reforms. The threat to stable governance after revolutions is that on occasion the transition governments perceive not having adequate time to finalize the myriad of reforms necessary until a firm legitimate government is in place, but that these populist actions may buy temporary stability, if only for a short time. Balancing immediate material needs with longterm inclusive growth will buy trust and increase equality. A population can accept the necessary sacrifice to rebuild a holistic society easier if the longterm payback of prosperity and stability is explained to them. To fail to do this could mean frustration and dissatisfaction with the transition process, which would make a reversion to dictatorial times more likely.

Civil Society

There are indications among several countries (e.g., Morocco and Tunisia) involved in Arab Spring rebellions that civil society has become more de-politicized since the revolution, as they cannot tackle major political issues (and to the contrary, their space in society is shrinking during the political restructuring) (EuroMeSCo 2013, p. 11). Especially the young have not had a chance during this reshuffling to obtain actual political office (which generally stayed in the hands of very senior politicians), and often have to resort to make themselves heard for the very causes which they fought for by using civil societal outlets, such as a myriad of art forms (whether art/graffiti, poems, songs, or online blogs) to voice their continued political frustrations for which many of their peers had already perished during the revolution.

Similarly, the implementation of EU assistance frequently did not fail during the post-revolution phases for lack of theoretical planning, but in their implementation phase by not being able to adequately engage with the local population and their political liaisons. In this phase, concrete assistance for socio-economic reform, constitution-building, and the establishment of law and order are perceived as primary needs before the “luxury” of devoting themselves to freedom of media and speech (EuroMeSCo 2013, p. 12).⁴

⁴ On a more positive note, compare a travel report about the EU’s Head of Delegation to Morocco, Ambassador Rupert Joy’s, survey trip in that country: “in Chefchaouen, the ambassador was struck by the commitment and dynamism of local actors.” *“The elected officials, the people in charge of national education, water and forests, the civil society in the fields of education, sustainable development, environment and preservation of architectural and cultural heritage show a strong will to improve the daily lives of the population, by setting up innovative and concrete actions in the field,”* he reported after his visit.

He reminded that rural development and the sustainable management of natural resources are among the priorities of EU budget support to Morocco, with a funding program of 400 million dirhams, signed last May.

The visit to the Rif enabled the ambassador to see first-hand how the EU is helping the region to catch up with more developed parts of the country. *“I travelled along the road connecting Chefchaouen to the coast at Oued Laou, and the spectacular 100-kilometre section of the Rocade*

In terms of the EMRSSC, military cooperation (ranging from officer training to military hardware sales as well as shared security operations, such as with the U.S.' Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and cooperation in the War on Terror (WOT), such as with Morocco) has traditionally equaled economic cooperation trans-Atlantically between the U.S. and the MENA, even when politically there are disagreements at times.

Economic Threats

Social Justice: Material and Political Inequalities— Privatization and Extreme Income Divergence

After the initial euphoria in the MENA, the complexities of constructing new systems to address old grievances are rearing their head: There is a widening fiscal imbalance of the oil-importing countries (e.g., Egypt and Jordan) post-Arab Spring, which is a fuse waiting to be ignited—together with continuing triggers, such as high youth unemployment, especially of females (and the waste in talent this represents to a country's utilization of its human resources, e.g., to start a business). When the Arab Spring began, the Eurozone crisis had just occurred, and the EU could not step in with significant assistance.⁵ Inter-regional efforts, such as by Turkey, Saudi Arabia/the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the U.S. filled this void in part. Yet, a reliance on financial aid is not sustainable, and more complex measures need to be undertaken to avoid economic collapse, and exacerbate further political instability of most post-Arab Spring nations. This instability reduces private sector confidence and makes a country unattractive to foreign direct investments (FDIs).

Reforms beyond those in governance need to involve improved service delivery, checks that resources (such as those via World Bank assistance to make the transitions holistic) are being used efficiently in re-building post-conflict countries in the MENA and break out of this cycle. The recommendations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank address in particular reforms, such as the end to subsidies of essentials, as they help the top earners the most—not through an instantaneous halt, but a gradual phasing-out, as e.g., Indonesia successfully accomplished some years ago. Without structural reforms leading to inclusive growth (e.g., access to finance, and a social safety net to support those groups of the population

Mediterranéenne between Jibha and Ajdir. These roads, financed by the EU at a cost of € 145 million, are crucial enablers of socio-economic development in this remote mountain region.”

The EU funded the construction of a 103 km stretch of the Tanger-Saadia highway, connecting El Jebha and Al Hoceima. This € 145 million funding represents the most important infrastructure funding by the EU in North Africa” (EU Neighborhood Info Center 2013).

⁵ Of significant help would be for the EU to open its internal market to (especially agricultural) products from the MENA. However, progress on this goal continues to be elusive.

which are hit the hardest by the phasing-out of subsidies) and increased governance, even a relatively wealthy country, such as Libya, will start to sustain deficits. Hence, formulating a social justice vision in post-revolution countries is absolutely essential. It should not become a victim of irrational reflexes, but needs to be part of their new governance to yield optimal solutions to their longterm socio-political and economic outlook - together with strengthened public institutions.

National internal differences add a further layer to necessary socio-economic reforms, e.g., Tunisia's "other," especially during the recent uprisings, was not so much an ethnic or religious minority, but rather the tremendous historical urban "coast" population vs. the impoverished populations inland. Post-Arab Spring, the economic bases in many countries in the MENA are severely weakened as a result of actual physical destruction of modes of production, infrastructure, and loss of human capital due to hundreds of thousands having fled or having perished or become disabled. While many countries in the MENA have overall well-educated youths, their skill set, like that of students in many countries in the West, needs to match the present economic opportunities to empower especially this population group to prevent them from becoming a "lost generation."

Human Security

The shifting identities of religious, gender, and national tribal affiliations post-conflict need to rise above an endless circle of instability and violence into anarchy. The power vacuum due to polarizations of some parties compared to the lack of organization of new parties, such as Islamists, allowed the latter to win some elections after the uprisings compared to liberals and elites, but led to more instability on many occasions.

The indirect social threats, many triggered by the uprisings in the first place, such as high unemployment, the erosion of the social welfare net, and rising prices of gasoline and food not only make structural economic reforms difficult but run the danger of repeating the dangers of the past by becoming a mutually reinforcing vicious circle, often leading to emigration and the loss of human capital this represents to a country.

Migration

From the perspective of the Northern Mediterranean, the political instability on its southern borders has led to increased migration across the Mediterranean into the EU. Controlling illegal migration continues to be a challenge to EU security, as it seeks to secure its southern borders. Despite the application of advanced technology, such as that beyond national coast guard controls, e.g., Spain has installed a network of thermal infrared cameras along most of its coast line to detect at least the larger vessels (leading to a reduction of illegal immigration

via this route by nearly 90% in 2012 over 2006 (Minder and Yardley 2013⁶) - only to lead illegal immigrants to resort to the use of rubber dinghies at a substantially increased risk to their survival of the crossing from (mostly) North Africa (in terms of the south–north migration). The human tragedies occurring during illegal crossings were highlighted again in early October 2013, when two boats capsized by being overloaded with desperate migrants off the coast of Lampedusa, killing several hundred people, after one caught fire when the migrants lit flares to signal other ships off the coast for assistance.

Europe is losing its credibility in the immigration question: Are only the rich welcome?⁷ According to the UN Refugee Agency, over 2,000 poor refugees have perished in the Mediterranean since the beginning of 2011, as Fortress Europe is vigorously defending itself against poverty-stricken refugees by all means (Hecking 2013).

Other neighboring regions of countries in upheavals have seen their resources stressed from immense streams of migrants across their borders, like the migration of almost 2 million Syrian refugees to Turkey. This prompted the latter to build a two meter-high wall along those parts of its border with Syria, which are particularly susceptible to fighting and the resulting refugee stream, “bypassing its checkpoints and [to] prevent smuggling” (Pamuk and Coskun 2013, p. 1), such as in the border district close to the Syrian town of Qamishli, where Kurds, rebel units and Arab tribes regularly clash (Pamuk and Coskun 2013), although Turkey vows to continue be open to Syrian refugees *per se*.

Food Security

There are many sectors of security according to Buzan et al. (1998), depending on the securitization of the sector at a given moment and location. Food security was one of the significant triggers during some revolutions of the Arab Spring, such as in Egypt (compare further details in the country-specific section on Egypt). What the “bread wars” there have shown is that the international community should encourage domestic food production, i.e., their agricultural sectors, rather than,

⁶ With drones and satellites planned to detect illegal migrants

⁷ In Spain, a new law came into force in early October 2013 providing a residence permit to foreign investors who invest at least € 500,000 in property (Hecking 2013), benefitting the real estate sector—infamous for parking moneys to be laundered. Since summer 2013, Greece has been giving 5-year permits to anyone investing € 250,000 in property. Technically, the permits only allow non-EU citizens to spend 90 out of every 180 days in other Schengen states, but virtually no one checks this in practice. Since October 2012, Portugal has offered a “golden visa” in exchange for at least two years residency in exchange for a real estate investment of at least € 500,000. Hungary’s right-wing nationalist government, normally eager to keep foreigners from precious Hungarian soil, also created a “Residence Permit Bond” in July 2013, whereby foreigners need to invest at least € 250,000 in the country in addition to “administrative fees” of about € 40,000 payable to dubious partner companies of the Hungarian government (based in offshore tax havens like the Cayman Islands or Cyprus) (Hecking 2013).

e.g., send surplus food from the U.S., as the growth of local industries not only lifts people out of poverty more effectively than any other sector but also literally feeds them instead of increasing their dependency on the often exorbitant prices of imported food (Ciezahl 2011, p. 5).⁸

Tetreault et al. (2012) propose redefining food security in terms of securing vulnerable populations from the structural violence of hunger. This framing offers both conceptual and practical value for efforts in confronting the problem of increasing and widespread hunger. In the MENA, different countries face different degrees of threat to their food security (depending on climate and soil, as well as wealth, as money can buy imported foods), and hence, the degree in which hunger contributed to the anxiety and restlessness of a population as triggers leading up to revolts during the Arab Spring vary.

There are many unfinished revolutions within each country in the EMRSC—each country experiencing it directly, or at least having shifted indirectly; revolutions which take time, but which need solutions to some immediate priorities. Beyond the elimination of hunger by 2030 as a UN goal, especially following the uprisings, prosperity needs to be boosted in particular for the bottom 40% of the populations in the region.

Human Security and the Syrian Civil War

The issue of human security specifically—and the legal bases to ensure it operationally during one of the most glaring examples during the Arab Spring, Syria—will be detailed in this section. By autumn 2013, there were at least 2 million Syrians who have fled their country as a result of the civil war, and live in refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, while around 5 million Syrians are refugees in their own country, either because their homes and businesses (including agriculture) were destroyed during the civil war, or they are trapped in their own neighborhoods, cut off through military blockades from the fighting government and opposition forces. They have exhausted food (as agriculture is severely disturbed) and medicines (leading, among many other untreated illnesses, to a shortage of vaccines, with the consequence that, *inter alia* by early autumn 2013, there were at least ten confirmed polio cases among children in Syrian refugee camps), and are isolated from aid shipments as winter 2013/14 approached. As this crisis is becoming longterm, it is exhausting the \$ 1.5 billion international aid effort (on top of efforts by the World Food Program, UNICEF, the WHO, and others) (Barnard 2013), laying bare the complex security relationships of this unsolved conflict, partially due to international actors having made Syria the theater of their own political and sectarian agendas whose human consequences they now cannot assuage. Valuable time was lost in making international assistance available, partially due to the fragmentation within

⁸ President Obama has taken steps by summer 2013 toward specifically ending this practice from the side of the U.S.

opposition forces and the polarization of the country overall. This interferes with the efficient delivery of aid and emphasizes the worsening humanitarian crisis—and the necessity for a decisive, pragmatic, and agreeable solution to deal with Syria’s likely very difficult post-civil war future.

The current civil war became more acute on international foreign policies agendas in August 2013, when the use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime towards its civilian population (leading to more than 1,500 deaths of not only suspected opponents to the regime, but also women and children), was determined with great likelihood by UN inspectors, following an alleged small-scale use of chemical weapons in the spring of 2013. While Russia and China were uncertain to approve (GlobalSecurity.org 2013, p. 3; DiploNews 2013) a military intervention under Articles 39⁹ and 42¹⁰ of the UN Charter in response in Syria (though both “resolutely oppose” chemical weapons use as signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention), the Obama administration studied the legal precedent for Responsibility to Protect (R2P)-action (set by the intervention to the genocides in Kosovo by the Slobodan Milosevic regime against the Serbians in 1999) under the Chemical Weapons Convention,¹¹ and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-mandate under Resolution 1973¹² for military intervention in Libya in 2012, for a limited intervention in Syria without escalating this incident into a wider regional conflict.

What happened to the victims, including many children, is not only a violation of international law—it is also a danger, beyond the regional and inter-regional, to global security. The following section will address in somewhat greater detail the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the EMRSSC, especially in the context of the Arab Spring.

⁹ “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

¹⁰ “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate, or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, or other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”

¹¹ The international ban on chemical weapons following the experience during World War I was later codified by the 1925 Geneva Convention (which also included a ban on the use of biological weapons—though it did not ban or limit the production and stockpiling of WMDs—a shortcoming rectified in the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention) (Kasapoğlu et al. 2013, p. 2).

¹² The operational paragraph is “...authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi....”

Proliferation of WMDs

While Syria (together with Egypt and Israel and four other countries) is not party to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, it is bound by the Geneva Convention, banning the use of chemical weapons. These are some of the rationales for a coalition intervention to punish the Al-Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons leading to these deaths in August 2013, and preventing it from resorting to their use in the future. This would likely lead to a change in the balance of power domestically, and give opposition parties a democratic—or even more extremist (such as ISIS, which continues to operate there and increase their military gains)—opportunity in Syria.

President Obama (2013a) stated the considerations of an international response in the following speech to this threat to not just regional, but international peace—well within the parameters of the Powell Doctrine—in that

if we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop using chemical weapons. As the ban against these deadly weapons erodes, other tyrants and authoritarian regimes will have no reason to think twice about acquiring poison gases and using them. Over time, our troops could face the prospect of chemical warfare on the battlefield. It could be easier for terrorist organizations to obtain these weapons and use them to attack civilians. If fighting spills beyond Syria's borders, these weapons could threaten our allies in the region.

So after careful deliberation, I determined that it is in the national security interests of the United States to respond to the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons through a targeted military strike. The purpose of this strike would be to deter Assad from using chemical weapons, to degrade his regime's ability to use them, and make clear to the world that we will not tolerate their use.

Though I possess the authority to order these strikes, in the absence of a direct threat to our security I believe that Congress should consider my decision to act. Our democracy is stronger when the President acts with the support of Congress—and when Americans stand together as one people.

Over the last few days, as this debate unfolds, we've already begun to see signs that *the credible threat of U.S. military action may produce a diplomatic breakthrough* (emphasis added). The Russian government has indicated a willingness to join with the international community in pushing Assad to give up his chemical weapons and the Assad regime has now admitted that it has these weapons, and even said they'd join the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits their use.

It's too early to tell whether this offer will succeed, and any agreement must verify that the Assad regime keeps its commitments. But this initiative has the potential to remove the threat of chemical weapons without the use of force.

Meanwhile, I've ordered our military to maintain their current posture to keep the pressure on Assad, and to be in a position to respond if diplomacy fails.

This speech gives a brief overview over the extraordinary difficulty in curbing the use of chemical weapons in this case, even with two superpowers, the U.S. and Russia, giving this problem priority attention. The U.S. and Russia reached an agreement on September 14, 2013 in Geneva, under which Syria will declare its chemical weapon stocks to be destroyed by mid-2014, after it submitted the paperwork to join the Chemical Weapons Convention in advance. Although this resolution did not contain a UN Chapter VII mandate, and the Convention was designed for a country to join voluntarily rather than being coerced into it to renounce

its chemical weapons, the French, UK, and U.S. foreign ministers jointly declared in Paris “that they would seek a ‘strong’ resolution with ‘serious consequences’ if Syria fails to turn over its chemical weapons” (FP Morning Brief 2013). This would allow the use of military force if Syria does not comply with its provisions, and dispelled suspicions, both in the Arab world and in Europe, Asia, and Russia about a possible U.S. lack of interest or resolve in easing human suffering as a result of the Arab Spring, or lack of ability by the Obama administration (in this case especially Secretary of State John Kerry) to accomplish this.

Obama rightly took credit for responding to the threats by exhausting non-military political and economic approaches, which in turn successfully led to the Russian proposal, and corresponding UN Resolution 2118 (2013) of September 27 for Syria to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and related manufacturing facilities. Initial progress by UN chemical weapons inspectors of “site inspections and the disabling of equipment at production sites” (FP Mideast Daily 2013b) was encouraging.

The extraordinary challenges presented to the international community to reign in the use of chemical weapons was preceded by the efforts of the Arab League, which is seeking to implement a completely WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Of the region’s violent history, the most troublesome violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have occurred in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain an urgent concern, although Iran has expressed its interest in a WMD-free zone in the region. Scholars have been frustrated over decades to achieve a WMD-free zone in the Middle East to open doors for cooperation and a security dialogue among the states of the region, by inducing an atmosphere of trust in working towards lasting peace here. Criticism is directed at the failure in fulfilling the obligations states accepted in negotiations at the 2010 NPT Review, partially due to the lack of political will, and an alleged cavalier attitude by the U.S. in the past in not facilitating the achievement of a WMD-free zone in the MENA. However, the latest negotiations between Iran, Russia, and the U.S. (“Geneva II”) have brought the greatest advance in this respect in several decades, even though the latest round of talks in the middle of November 2014 was not yet successful.

The Arab Spring

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