

## OnlinePLUS – supplementary material

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### 6.1 Political actors' communication structures and processes

In the following, separate subsections are devoted to each of the eleven political actors in the sample. These subsections feature brief profiles of delegations' *communication structures*, including aspects like overall organizational configuration or contracting of consultants, and – if corresponding findings could be obtained – of their internal on-site *processes*, such as meeting cycles or media monitoring procedures. Additionally, for some actors, further aspects or anecdotes of particular relevance are highlighted. All aspects pertaining to concrete communication strategies and related communication activities are not touched upon in these actor profiles but are instead discussed across actors in the following section (6.2).

#### 6.1.1 Government delegations

Pronounced differences could be found between governments' and NGOs' communication structures and processes at the Cancún summit. Firstly, those of governments are portrayed.

##### 6.1.1.1 Brazil

Brazilian government communication is primarily run by the Secretariat for Social Communication (SECOM), a separate state agency tasked with coordinating public affairs on behalf of the Brazilian president. SECOM comprises distinct departments for national and international communication, i.e. public diplomacy. The head of the public diplomacy branch described his responsibility as “promot[ing] Brazil abroad: Brazil's institutions, economy, our environment, our social issues” (6741, p. 1, 10). In this effort, external consultancy plays a pronounced role. At the time of research, the public diplomacy branch had seven consultants from Brazilian PR firm *Companhia de Noticias* (CDN) at its disposal, who were based at the SECOM offices in the capital of Brasília and supported the work of three civil servants. Additionally, American PR firm Fleishman-Hillard, an associate of CDN, dedicated three to four consultants in its New York office to the Brazilian mandate. This business relationship was the result of a bidding process in late 2008. It is based on a public contract between SECOM and the two firms, and costs the Brazilian government 50 million reais per year (more than 20 million Euros).

The two firms had already supported the Brazilian government in its communication efforts surrounding the previous climate summit in Copenhagen, which was not only thought to be

very successful by SECOM itself but was also awarded an international business award for “best communications campaign of the year on global issues” (Stevie Awards, 2010, ¶ 1). The award jury praised the country’s

“multi-layered communications campaign around COP15 to position Brazil as one of the world’s leading voices on climate change, promote Brazil’s domestic initiatives to fight deforestation, and highlight Brazil’s role as a bridge between developed and developing country interests. As a result of this program, Brazil achieved over six weeks of sustained visibility around the two-week summit and emerged as one of the top voices from COP15” (Stevie Awards, 2010, ¶ 3).

Among other components, Brazil’s COP-15 campaign also included a press trip program that brought *New York Times* journalist Thomas Friedman to the country and caused him to write “three articles about his stay in Brazil and in the Amazon. [...] 70, 80 percent of them were favorable to Brazil” (6741, p. 2, 31).

At the Cancún summit, the international branch of SECOM was represented by three people: the head of the branch and two consultants – one from CDN and one from Fleishman-Hillard. The firms provided daily digests and analyses of relevant coverage in 48 international media outlets as well as comprehensive on-site support when it came to planning Brazil’s communication activities and monitoring those of others:

“We talk about what’s going on [...] in the international press, and also we see the schedule for today, the UN journal, especially the briefings made by the NGOs that we have here now. And we monitor as well all the bulletins from NGOs and from this *ECO* [summit newsletter]. We have plenty of [materials] here to see whether Brazil is being talked about” (6741, p. 4, 18).

The two PR consultants on site not only served as coordinators for interviews but also ran the entire process of preparing and following up on briefings and side-events. For the briefings, invitations and announcements of topics were sent out from PR firm email accounts, as were the digests of the most important points discussed at the briefings – a helpful tool for journalists who missed out on the briefing or wanted to be kept updated more sketchily. The option of getting in touch personally and requesting more information was highlighted in the emails, with the two consultants’ contact details being given as first points of contact. Updates and schedules were also posted on a dedicated website of the Brazilian government, which was set up only for the occasion of the summit.

#### 6.1.1.2 Germany

In contrast to Brazil, German summit communication followed more traditional recipes. It was coordinated by two separate divisions within the communications department at the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety: the media division and the fairs and events division. While the former was responsible for handling journalists’ questions and requests concerning the ongoing negotiations at Moon Palace, the latter operated a small information booth at *Cancunmesse*, where it reached out to the wider

summit public but did not comment on concrete questions regarding the talks. As the booth was run in cooperation with the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, which is in charge of German foreign aid and funding initiatives aimed at developing countries, information on these aspects was also available.

Despite its simple design and use of the standard cubicle provided by the host government to any participating organization wishing to present itself at the summit, the booth was planned in cooperation with an event management firm. In the process of preparing the booth's outfit, the dimensions of the standard cubicle were changed twice by the host government – a fact that complicated work. Most materials made available for pick-up at the booth were also developed with support from PR firms, although some of their work is viewed critically inside the ministry. Especially the consideration of aspects of intercultural sensitivity and the portrayal of Germany in an authentic, likeable manner are not regarded as PR firms' core strengths by ministry staffers.

Media relations work at Moon Palace and public outreach at *Cancunmesse* appeared to be separate domains of German summit PR without many structural connections. Media relations focused primarily on the German environment minister's visit during the high-level segment in the second week. Public outreach was conducted over the entire course of the summit without fixed routines. Staffers' daily work at the information booth was primarily structured by ad-hoc occurrences, such as requests from visitors or technical hitches. Generally, the focus in both domains appeared to be on tranquil implementation, with no pronounced strategic tasks being carried out on site. The environment ministry in Berlin continued its usual media monitoring procedures during the summit.

#### 6.1.1.3 India

Similar to the summit communication of Brazil, India's appearance at the event was shaped by a visible amount of self-confidence and eagerness to play a role. However, the particular means by which this was achieved looked vastly different. Instead of stable, professionalized communication structures and processes, Indian summit communication rested on the activity of Indian environment minister and 'public diplomacy star' Jairam Ramesh. The Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests did not have dedicated communication professionals on the site of the summit but had Ramesh himself, his assistants, or negotiators take care of media relations. This was highly visible at a media briefing on December 7, where the minister sat on the panel all by himself and handled attending journalists entirely on his own, without the support of a press secretary or other communication professional. For a politician of his rank, this can be considered uncommon. A lack of reliable communication processes could also be seen in the fact that the Indian information booth at *Cancunmesse* was left abandoned for most parts of the two summit weeks. While its design was certainly more ornate than that of the ordinary booths built into the standard cubicles provided by the host, shortage of personnel or assignment of low priority left the facility mostly unstaffed.

Significantly, the apparent lack of stable communication structures was counterbalanced by the personal work of Jairam Ramesh, who could regularly be seen wandering the halls in traditional attire, gathering journalists around him. Ramesh seemed to seek the role of a facilitator and organizer, establishing a presence at side-events, NGO meetings, or media briefings. Ramesh's closest aide explicitly spoke of a two-layered approach to the summit:

“Our minister was playing a role not so much in the formal negotiations but in the broader discussions with different ministers, with multilaterals, with civil society organizations – just getting a sense where the wind is blowing and where he could make an impact. And having that layer on top of the formal negotiations was actually quite helpful. [...] On a typical day, his calendar would have four or five bilateral meetings with different countries or groupings, it would have just sitting around with some civil society people, understanding where they are coming from, talking to a lot of the press from India and from other places and seeing what the perception there is” (6468, p. 3, 6)

This personality-dependent approach of being visible and connecting actors, listening closely and carefully pitching ideas did not go unnoticed with the NGO community. A senior NGO communicator emphasized the importance of Ramesh's stature for India's image at Cancún:

“He is such a massive PR player! He's so skillful. [...] I think he loves to be in the newspaper or on television. Maybe he has plans, maybe this office is something that he sees as a step to something bigger, I don't know. But there must be some drivers that make him spend a lot of time talking to the press. But it's not just that he only wants exposure, I think he also tries to position himself in a certain way: [...] Ramesh is not always saying the same thing; Ramesh is actually always saying a different thing. And that's very interesting; I think he's probably one of the most skilled PR players who try to describe compromise, who come up with proposals. And he's not just doing that because he's a good guy and he somehow wants these talks to succeed. I think there's also always some sort of strategic Indian interest behind this. He must be a big strategic brain. [...] I think as soon as this guy leaves office and is maybe replaced with somebody who is not such a colorful person and skilled PR person, India will drop again” (9841, p. 15, 12).

What becomes clear is that Ramesh's exposed activity led India to levels of visibility and prominence comparable to, or even higher than, those of other BRICS countries – but certainly through different means. Taken at face value, Indian summit communication might confirm the assumption that BRICS countries are coherently engaging in self-confident and professionalized public diplomacy. In the Indian case, however, this was the achievement of one ambitious and talented politician and not a product of stable communication structures; Ramesh's aide even described the management of communication as “something that I am learning on the job” (6468, p. 5, 28). The Indian delegation's lack of dedicated communication staffers – let alone external consultants – was certainly compensated by Ramesh's eagerness to play a role as well as his appropriate charisma.

#### 6.1.1.4 Mexico

Mexican summit communication was run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The underlying communication structure should be viewed as exceptional, as it had to accommodate two distinct roles at the same time: that of the host government and, hence, close partner of the UNFCCC and, secondly, that of another self-confident emerging economy wishing to present itself on the world stage.<sup>1</sup> Generally, the overall coordination of Mexican government communication lies with a communication office that is part of the office of the Mexican president. This communication office cooperates with various agencies throughout the entire apparatus of the federal government, among them the communication offices at the various ministries. The Directorate-General of Communication at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for looking after Mexico's worldwide reputation. It includes the position of the Director of International Information, a dedicated public diplomacy position tasked with taking care of the international press corps based in Mexico and working with press attachés at Mexican embassies and consulates around the globe.

This communication structure was partially adjusted for the occasion of the climate change conference. For the duration of the summit, the Director of International Information was tasked with acting as so-called 'host-country media liaison', a position required by the UNFCCC at any COP and filled by a communication professional of the hosting government ideally holding some international experience. The host-country media liaison supports the UNFCCC in its media relations efforts aimed at domestic media based in the respective host country and provides for the kind of in-depth knowledge of the respective domestic media landscape that an international actor like the UNFCCC does not possess. This knowledge is also important when it comes to distributing resources at the media center. Hence, the Director of International Information, who is usually in touch with international media, was looking after national media for the occasion of COP-16. He, in turn, was supported by a 'local media liaison' provided by the local government and possessing particular knowledge of and contacts to media outlets from the Cancún region.

Questions and requests by international media outlets regarding the Cancún summit as a whole were handled by the UNFCCC's conference spokesperson. However, as international media often had the summit covered by their regular Mexico correspondents who were used to working with the foreign ministry's Director of International Information, he also acted as first point of contact for many international media – contrary to his formal assignment to national media only. He described his routines at the Cancún summit, where he was based in a temporary office in the media center, as constituting a job completely different from his tasks at the foreign ministry. There, he and his five to six coworkers would closely look after a limited number of foreign journalists and manage their supply with information:

"It was silly to think that we could control all that press as we controlled normally a small group of the sort that comes [...] to the ministry every day. The thing was

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<sup>1</sup> While Mexico is not included in the BRICS quintet of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, the country is often referred to as an aspirant (see O'Neil, 2001).

to give them all the information that they needed and to let them free, so that worked very well for us, because the UN went that way as well. There was liberty of putting your camera wherever you liked, to interview whenever you liked whomever you liked. [...] All the press could go everywhere; they could even sleep next to the room of a delegate, because the hotel was open for everyone. That worked very well” (0240, p. 6, 11).

Being a communication official for a host government and temporarily occupying a different communication position required by the UNFCCC might also involve adjusting to different routines and understandings of how to deal with journalists.

According to the Director of International Information, Mexican summit communication was run without any assistance by PR firms or consultants, although it is not clear if this also applied to public outreach at the *Pabellón de Mexico*. In the domain of media relations, no major external service provider was hired besides the local production company tasked with running technical infrastructure at the IBC (and assuming the role of the host broadcaster) and Eurovision Americas distributing the video signal (see 5.2.3). External communication consultants do not enjoy the best reputation with Mexican government communicators. External assistance is usually only brought in on a ministerial or even presidential level for purposes of personal counsel.

#### 6.1.1.5 South Africa

South African summit communication at Cancún was run by the Department of Environmental Affairs, although in addition to the minister of the environment, the minister of energy, science and technology and the minister of transport were also present. Cancún operations were directed by the department’s Chief Director of Communications, who oversees three units within the communication department. The primary task of the external communications unit is running media relations, while the corporate communications unit looks after the development of publications and marketing material. The stakeholder engagement unit, thirdly, coordinates outreach programs with local communities. For the occasion of the Cancún summit, the Chief Director described his job largely as getting the members of his delegation into the media: “allowing political principals, like members of parliament, an opportunity to give their perspective in terms of the talks and what South Africa’s expectations are with regards to the talks” (1807, p. 1, 22).

South African summit communication at Cancún was run without the help of external consultants, although the need for bringing in outside communication expertise was acknowledged for the planning of the subsequent climate summit, COP-17, in late 2011, to be hosted by the South African government in Durban:

“We have not used any external service provider in the past, but going forward, there will be a need to bring in one, because if we are hosting a COP, it’s a big, it’s an international campaign, you can’t drive it on your own, you need to get people on board who will assist you in terms of making sure that the messages are customized to a particular audience and that the responses are picked up as well.

So [...] yes, we are exploring that option [of hiring an international PR agency]” (1894, p. 7, 23).

Even though no specific PR expertise was brought in from the outside, the ministry did collaborate with some external entities. In cooperation with the City of Durban, it ran the only country booth at Moon Palace (all others were located at *Cancunmesse*), where information on the infrastructure and logistics of COP-17 were made available. At *Cancunmesse*, a booth operated by the South African tourism agency promoted the country as a tourist destination. The role of South Africa as host of the next COP was regularly pointed out in media relations, often with reference to the Durban booth. In that way, South African media relations and public outreach were more closely integrated than in the case of other countries.

#### 6.1.1.6 United States

US summit communication was mainly directed by two offices within the State Department, the Office of the Special Envoy for Climate Change and the Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science. The number of communication officials dedicated to working with the media was limited: The spokesperson for Todd Stern, the US chief negotiator, acted as the prime point of contact for all questions and requests by the media. He was supported by a senior communication officer from the Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science, who often chaired media briefings and also dealt with minor media requests.

For its on-site communication at Cancún, the US delegation did not rely on external expertise. In general, they seemed to follow classic recipes – similarly to Germany, another established industrial country present at the talks. Media relations were done in unspectacular fashion without the help of consultants, and public outreach at the ‘US Center 2010 Cancun’ – the delegation’s country pavilion – appeared a bit arbitrary and little innovative. It seems like traditional routines very much determined the delegation’s communication activities at Cancún, as was pointed out by one interviewee:

“They are old hands at doing this; they have their system, their way of doing it” (3843, p. 4, 27).

In another similarity to the German case, media relations and public outreach at the Center had little to do with each other. Media relations were much oriented towards current actions and statements by Todd Stern and his deputy Jonathan Pershing. The Center, in contrast, presented an array of activity by various government agencies on the issue of climate change but failed to convey a clear, negotiation-related message. Rather than a public diplomacy instrument, it appeared to be set up as a multi-purpose base camp for Americans at COP-16.

#### 6.1.2 NGO delegations

In contrast to governments, NGOs operated more elaborate and complex communication structures and processes at the Cancún summit:

#### 6.1.2.1 Climate Action Network (CAN) International

Many of the communication activities that NGOs undertook at the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference were coordinated under the roof of two alliances: the Climate Action Network (CAN) International and the Global Campaign for Climate Action (GCCA). Both organizations do not hold their own base of individual members (not counting the small staffs at the respective secretariats) but are made up of other NGOs. They serve as platforms for coordination and aggregation of interests among NGOs and, in doing so, have developed distinct profiles: While GCCA sees its role in facilitating member NGOs' campaigning and communication efforts, CAN International has focused more on bringing together the policy stances of its over 700 member organizations and on synthesizing them in the form of joint positions and strategies. Despite these different foci – CAN International does policy, GCCA does communication –, the Director of CAN International claimed that “communications is maybe even half” (3148, p. 1, 4) of what his alliance does at summits. There generally existed significant overlap between the communication structures and processes of both alliances in Cancún, which appeared to slightly dissolve the above-mentioned division of profiles.

The organizational structure of CAN International is tailored towards enabling exchange among member NGOs regarding which policies to advocate in response to the climate threat:

“We as CAN staff try to help facilitate things to happen and try to help spur activities of our members. But at the end of the day, it's absolutely the members that produce things” (3148, p. 2, 1).

That is why besides a small secretariat staff of six (CAN International, 2011), the alliance features various policy working-groups and regional networks, in which member NGOs interact. Some of the coordinators of these working groups and networks were present at the Cancún summit and – along with secretariat staff and other key figures – formed a body of political analysts called political coordination group (PCG) that met daily for intelligence-gathering and discussions of the progress of negotiations. Another daily meeting was open to the entire network and provided a platform for the wider announcement of negotiation updates and the voicing of opinions by participants. The purpose behind this regular meeting was to get everybody on the same page and to facilitate unity:

“There is a lot of effort at doing that, because we think – my view and I think it's shared by our membership is – that a unified voice from NGOs, from as many NGOs as possible, is going to have the greatest influence, because there are so many actors in these negotiations, so many actors with much more money than we have and resources, and so we need to be efficient and unified wherever we can” (3148, p. 2, 16).

In yet another daily meeting, the communication officers of member NGOs present in Cancún came together and coordinated their communication strategies. This communications working-group served as the hub for all communication planning beyond individual NGOs. Here, NGOs' PR professionals developed and harmonized their short-term messaging, synchronized communication activities to avoid overlaps or contradictions, and briefed each



other on media fallout or governments' communication moves. While being part of CAN International's routines, the communications working group appeared to be formally hosted by sister alliance GCCA with its focus on international climate campaigning.

The meetings of the communications working-group – as well as all communication activities of CAN International at the summit – were led by an external communication consultant, who had been working with the alliance as freelancer for several years and was hired once again for running CAN International's Cancún communication. Holding considerable experience in non-profit communication, he appeared rooted in and accepted by the NGO community, despite his role as an external consultant. On the site of the summit, he was the only dedicated communication professional of CAN International, although the alliance's Director – and former communications director of the US Climate Action Network – should also be regarded as having occupied a communication role.

At one meeting of the communications working-group on December 6, which I could attend as part of this research, the first minutes were devoted to feedback on the communication activities of the day before. Here, issues like a perceived lack of coordination between the speakers on the press panel or technicalities like a breakdown of the translation service were discussed. Next, larger strategic questions were debated, such as when NGOs should start their 'endgame messaging' and how exactly it should look like. It was decided that the communication consultant would develop a proposal for the rhetoric. More concretely, an upcoming media briefing was planned and possible panelists brainstormed – always with an eye to their national and NGO background, subject expertise, English-language skills, and potential representation of minorities. The set of panelists that emerged was then agreed on unanimously. Despite its rather informal setting on the floor of a quiet hallway, the course of the meeting appeared highly structured and disciplined.

#### 6.1.2.2 Friends of the Earth International (FOEI)

As one of the largest environmental NGOs, Friends of the Earth is organized according to a federal structure. 76 national chapters are headed by an international secretariat based in Amsterdam and operating under the label 'Friends of the Earth International'. In the field of communication, the secretariat assumes coordinating roles and does PR for the federation as a whole but attempts to involve national spokespeople whenever possible. Concrete campaigns and programs – such as those of the Energy and Climate Justice working-group, under whose auspices Friends of the Earth's Cancún activities were conducted – are run by individual members based in national chapters. The international secretariat, which has only a small staff at its disposal, remains in a facilitating and coordinating role.

For the PR function, the international secretariat employs three to four dedicated communication professionals. Only one of them – job title: Media Coordinator – was sent to Cancún, where she was joined by several communication professionals from national chapters who were asked to devote some of their time to working on behalf of Friends of the Earth International. Communication structures of the international secretariat and national chapters

were hence closely interwoven. Overall, the Cancún communication team comprised about ten communicators besides the Media Coordinator: national press officers, bloggers, and photographers /videographers. External communication expertise was only integrated in the form of a clipping service, which monitored English-language coverage over the course of the summit, and a small design firm, which generally helps FOEI with branding and design. Not all members of the communication team held UNFCCC accreditations; some worked from downtown Cancún, where they organized protest marches or discussion rounds in cooperation with Friends of the Earth's closest ally, the peasant movement *Via Campesina*.

Inside and outside communicators met every morning at seven for a communications meeting at Friends of the Earth's hotel, where everybody's tasks for the day were briefly clarified. At a larger meeting at the summit venue open to any FOE member present on site, the day's activities were discussed in more detail; in the field of summit PR, this especially meant planning the daily media briefing. Every briefing was put under a specific heading, either related to an aspect in the negotiations or to a study that the NGO had conducted. Particular importance was given to the composition of the panel. As a self-declared voice of the Global South, Friends of the Earth aimed at having at least four world regions represented on each panel, thereby avoiding dominance of representatives of the North. Spokespeople were also chosen for their competence as public speakers. Some friction in preparing media briefings was recognized by FOE staffers, especially with regard to internal authorization procedures. Two further meetings with relevance to summit PR took place during the day: a short afternoon round among communicators for the purpose of mutual updating and a more executive meeting of senior FOE personnel in the evening at the hotel.

#### 6.1.2.3 Global Campaign for Climate Action (GCCA)

Besides Climate Action Network (CAN) International, NGOs active on the climate issue are also organized in another alliance: the Global Campaign for Climate Action (GCCA). As already suggested by its name, the function of this alliance is to coordinate the communication and campaigning efforts of its 300 member organizations. GCCA explains its difference from CAN International as being on the 'outside track', as being light on policy work and instead building a public face and general story for NGOs' climate action. CAN International, on the other hand, is on the 'inside track', coordinating policy initiatives among members and being more active in analyzing and influencing the actual negotiations. The name 'GCCA' is only used internally; the alliance presents itself as the 'TckTckTck' campaign to the outside – alluding to the ticking of a countdown and thereby emphasizing the urgency of the issue of climate change.

As an organization entirely devoted to communication, it would not make sense to attempt to discern a dedicated communication team within the anyhow rather small secretariat. The GCCA secretariat comprises 15 staffers, who are spread out on several continents and, as an alternative to face-to-face teamwork, do most of their collaboration via email and Skype. Working under an Executive Director, the team comprises a Campaigning Director and a Communications Director, who were both present at the Cancún summit. While the

campaigning team is more concerned with short-term activities surrounding particular events (such as COPs) and aims at achieving high visibility, the communications team maintains a more long-term perspective and inserts the right words or images into campaigning activities, so that an enduring narrative is formed.

At the Cancún summit, the communication structures and processes of GCCA were largely intertwined with those of CAN International. As described above, two daily meetings constituted the main platforms for communication planning: that of the political coordination group (PCG), hosted by CAN International and tasked with gathering political intelligence and paving the way for political action, and that of the communications working-group hosted by GCCA and bringing together the communication officers of those NGOs present at the Cancún summit with dedicated communication staff. As facilitator and service provider to other NGOs, the amount of communication activities that were carried out under the TckTckTck banner was limited. Especially in terms of media relations, GCCA did not seek recognition as an independent actor but instead aimed at helping member NGOs with getting into the media. The alliance did not hold media briefings on its own but instead contributed to the preparation of CAN International's daily media briefings or assisted individual NGOs by pitching their stories to journalists. This approach of providing service to member NGOs is also behind GCCA's focus on online communication:

“We figured out that many of our member organizations are very strong with traditional media and that's not necessarily where we add value, but in this fast-changing space of digital campaigning and communications, many of our members are at the very beginning. And I wouldn't say that we are so much further, but at least that's where we feel we can add more value as a secretariat for the alliance” (2135, p. 2, 7).

As much as the GCCA secretariat acts as a kind of consultant to member NGOs, it draws on some external expertise itself. On artwork and branding issues, the secretariat cooperates with a PR firm, which provides its services on a pro-bono basis. In GCCA's experience, PR firms are generally eager to provide free assistance to reputable NGOs, as this usually allows them to be more creative and provocative than when working on commercial clients' accounts. These more innovative compositions can then also be submitted to trade competitions. In addition to these firms, GCCA also outsources smaller tasks, like the authoring of op-eds to be placed in newspapers, to individual freelancers.

#### 6.1.2.4 Greenpeace International

While the organizational structure of Greenpeace International at first sight resembles that of other NGO federations – national chapters coordinated by an international secretariat –, its international secretariat seemed to play a much larger role in Cancún than was the case for other NGOs, for example Friends of the Earth. While the latter's international secretariat sent only one communicator to the Cancún summit and relied on communication officials from national chapters, Greenpeace's international headquarters in Amsterdam dispatched a communication team of about seven to Mexico. The team was led by a Media Coordinator,

who was a freelance communication consultant and hired by the secretariat's international communications division for preparing and managing the NGO's summit communication. Specialized in communicating climate change, she had been working with Greenpeace on temporary contracts for twenty years and occupied similar positions at previous COPs. This constellation is similar to that found at CAN International, whose summit communication was also directed by a freelance communicator possessing considerable NGO experience. Generally, Greenpeace International is not opposed to incorporating external expertise; the general Cancún messaging approach was partially developed by a London-based consultancy.

On-site planning of communication activities took place in a series of daily meetings, such as a morning meeting of the media team, the above-mentioned communications meeting under the auspices of GCCA and CAN International, a larger Greenpeace meeting, and a smaller coordination team meeting in the evening. As part of this process, it was also decided who would represent Greenpeace at the CAN International media briefings, at which the NGO would usually have a spokesperson on the panel:

“It's a matter of prepping that person for the press conference, making sure they got all the right messages, making sure that their sound-bites are good, that they are not going to speak for 15 minutes, they only speak for three” (5356, p. 2, 1).

Besides such preparatory processes, the Media Coordinator described her Cancún routines as “ad-hoc, random” (5356, p. 2, 22), essentially dominated by handling media requests and pitching stories to journalists. She seemed to act as one of the few true ‘information brokers’ in the NGO community (see 7.1.1.1), constantly mediating between journalists and sources and inserting ideas and interpretations. In between, she did personal media monitoring by reading up on particular journalists considered influential and kept in touch with Amsterdam.

#### 6.1.2.5 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) International

In a similar fashion to Friends of the Earth International, the bulk of WWF International's summit communication came out of a dedicated program within WWF operating across national boundaries: the WWF Climate and Energy Initiative. It includes different teams – such as for energy policy or for business cooperation – working with their respective counterparts in national WWF chapters as well as a number of positions tasked with managing the overall work within the Initiative. As one of these positions, the Head of Communications and Campaigns, usually based at the WWF International's headquarters near Geneva, was responsible for steering WWF's summit PR in Cancún. He led a team of eight communication professionals: three were delegated from WWF Mexico, five came from WWF International. No external expertise was used, as the ideas and compositions of PR firms that had been commissioned early on in the planning process turned out to be rather dim and depressing and therefore did not match NGOs' new messaging approach (see 6.2.2). As with other NGOs, Cancún routines for WWF International were shaped by a series of meetings throughout the day, such as a general meeting of all 40 WWF delegates present in Cancún, two meetings of the communications team (one in the morning, one in the evening),

the GCCA/CAN International communications meeting mentioned above, and a more senior steering group meeting.

Partially due to a lack of resources, WWF's general approach was to focus on what is perceived to be one of its core strengths – making use of its close ties to journalists –, while leaving other forms of communication activity to other actors. The NGO generally saw the summit as a place where processes of cooperation with other NGOs were to be strengthened. As part of its involvement with CAN International and GCCA, it envisioned a 'rapid-response mechanism', in which particular developments within the negotiations could be reacted to quickly on two parallel tracks: at the site of the negotiations through stunts and lobbying and, at the same time, in negotiators' home countries through mobilizations for demonstrations or ad-hoc campaigns via phone and social media. Expressions like 'taking it outside the Bubble' ('the Bubble' standing for the tightly sealed off summit venue) or 'spreading it out' were used for describing that envisioned mechanism, although it remained unclear how this was to be different from established strategies of mounting pressure 'back home' and whether this was implemented and monitored in a systematic way. Possibly, the new element in this was more the extent to which ad-hoc campaigning efforts were coordinated across NGOs:

"We work together with other NGOs, because actually together we are faster, we have more critical mass. So Greenpeace has a workshop where things can be built. GCCA is coordinating this whole thing. Avaaz is incredibly creative and has six million people waiting out there to do internet campaigning. 350 has not as many but is also pretty powerful in internet campaigning. We have the information, we understand stuff and we have organizations on the ground that can make things happen in the media or with governments. So working together is very exciting and we're actually entering a new dimension here" (6280, p. 7, 22).

The readiness to cooperate with other NGOs and to adhere to a division of tasks in the spirit of 'everybody does what he does best' was indeed pointed out frequently throughout all interviews with NGOs' PR professionals. Especially with the emergence of GCCA in recent years, NGO cooperation in the area of communicating and campaigning on climate change seems to have become significantly more stable and trust-based.

Communication Strategies of Governments and NGOs  
Engineering Global Discourse at High-Level  
International Summits

Adolphsen, M.

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