

## Chapter 2

# Anti-Immigrant Politics Along with Institutional Incorporation?

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The growth of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe over the last two decades is pushing towards the renationalizing of particular features of membership politics (Baubock et al. 2007; Giugni 2006; White 1999; Vertovec and Peach 1997; Weil 2008; Body-Gendrot and de Wihol de Wenden 2007; Delanty and Turner 2011). Yet, this renationalizing of membership, even when ideologically strong, is institutionally weak given the increased formalization of the EU level. And although the EU level is still thin compared to that of the national state, it is beginning to alter the underlying conditions, which have fed the articulation between citizenship and the national state (Baubock 2006). At its most formal, the institutional development of the European Union and the strengthening of the European Human Rights Court, push the question of political membership towards a kind of European universalism (Jacobson and Ruffer 2006; Rubenstein and Adler 2000). I prefer to think of it as a trend towards the denationalizing of European politics. This is a denationalizing that (a) is fed by the emergence of multiple actors, groups, and communities increasingly keen on broader notions of political membership and unwilling automatically to identify with a national state (Basch et al. 1994; Beck 2006; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) 2002; Knop 2002; Koh 1997; Laguerre 1998; Spiro 2008; Turner 2000; Soysal 1997; Tunstall 2006), and (b) can coexist with virulent nationalisms, a subject I have developed at length elsewhere (2008: ch 6).

These transformations in the EU raise questions about the actual meaning of that renationalizing of membership. Is it an ideational event that can exist even as the institutional settings of membership are becoming partly denationalized? Can growing discrimination against the alien coexist with a strengthening of the right to have rights, as might be the case when the European Court of Human Rights confirms rights of immigrants that the national legislatures had tried to annul or restrict? And can the ideological renationalizing of citizenship inside nation-states coexist with EU wide instruments that strengthen the right to

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membership of non-nationals, albeit non-nationals from other EU countries? Further, we need to ask, how that ideological renationalizing interacts with the multiplication of transnational identities at the ideational level – on vectors of feminism, race, religion, and others not necessarily confined to a nation-state.

These are the larger questions against which this chapter traces the interaction of ideological and structural conditions in Europe's history of migration, subjects explored at length elsewhere (Sassen 1999, 2007: ch 5; 2008: ch 6). Addressing the question of membership and acceptance, across diverse historical phases and diverse national histories, entails a specific stance by the researcher. It is quite possible to posit that at the most abstract or formal level, not much has changed over the last century in the essential features of membership and acceptance of foreigners. In an earlier period the hatred and demonizing we see today regarding immigrants from outside the EU went to other Western Europeans: for instance, the French despised the German and Belgian workers who Baron Haussmann recruited to work in the rebuilding of Paris; the epithets were not unlike what we hear today regarding North Africans or sub-Saharan Africans. The theoretical ground from which I address the issue is that of the historicity of the hatreds and intolerances. One instance of this historicity is their embeddedness in projects of national state construction in the past and in partial national-state deconstruction in the present, notably the strengthening of the European Union and of the European Human Rights Court.

## 2.1 Beneath Virulent Nationalisms...Inter-marriage!

Unlike the “citizen,” the “immigrant” or, more formally, the “alien”, is constructed in law as a very partial, thin subject, often enabling virulent discrimination, from a distance. Yet the immigrant and immigration are actually thick realities, charged with content. In this tension between a thin formal subject – the alien – and a rich reality, lies the heuristic capacity of immigration to illuminate tensions at the heart of the historically constructed nation-state and national citizenship (Sassen 2008: chapters 2, 3 and 6).

These tensions are not new, historically speaking, but as with citizenship, current conditions are producing their own distinct outcomes. Further, the changes in the institution of citizenship itself has implications for the definition of the “immigrant”; this becomes particularly acute at times when citizenship de-borders its formal definitions and national locations. In the current period, confronted with post-national and denationalized forms of citizenship, we might ask what is it we are trying to discern in the complex processes we group under the term immigration? On the other hand, the renationalizing of citizenship narrows what we might refer to as the customary definition of the citizen and thereby that of the immigrant (Knop 2002; Marshall 1977; Ribas-Mateos 2005; Ong 1999; Sassen 2010; Bosniak 2006).

As a subject, then, the immigrant filters a much larger array of political dynamics than her status in law might suggest. Working with the distinctions and transformations discussed thus far, we can discern the possibility of two somewhat stylized subjects that destabilize formal meanings and thereby illuminate the internal tensions of the institution of citizenship, specifically the citizen as a rights-bearing subject. (For a fuller development of these two stylized cases see Sassen 2008:

chapter 6.) On the one hand, we can identify a formal citizen who is fully authorized yet not fully recognized. Minoritized citizens who are discriminated against in any domain are one key instance. This is a familiar and well-researched condition. On the other hand, we can identify a type of informal citizen who is unauthorized by the law yet recognized by a potential community of membership, as might be the case with undocumented immigrants who are long-term residents in a community and enact membership they way citizens do. Thus, unauthorized immigrants who demonstrate civic involvement, social deservedness, and national loyalty can argue that they merit legal residency, and often get it. But even if they do not gain legal residency, we can posit a condition akin to informal citizenship that binds long-term residents, even if they are undocumented immigrants, to their communities of residence.<sup>1</sup> Mountz and Kempin (Chap. 6, this volume) explored this issue in terms of refugees, and how the island works to prevent such social connection and embeddedness through various forms of closure and exception.

These are dimensions of formal and informal citizenship and citizenship practices that do not fit the indicators and categories of mainstream academic frameworks for understanding citizenship and political life. Some scholars point to the fact of the multiple dimensions of citizenship and how this engenders strategies for legitimizing informal or extra-state forms of membership (Coutin 2000; Bosniak 2006; Shachar 2009). The practices of these undocumented immigrants are a form of citizenship practices (Sassen 2008: ch 6), and their identities as members of a community of residence assume some of the features of citizenship identities (Sadiq 2007). Supposedly this could hold even in the communitarian model, according to Bosniak (2006), where the community can decide on whom to admit and whom to exclude, but once admitted, proper civic practices earn full membership.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Individuals, even when undocumented immigrants, can move between the multiple meanings of citizenship. The daily practices by undocumented immigrants as part of their daily life in the community where they reside – such as raising a family, schooling children, holding a job – earn them citizenship claims in the US even as the formal status and, more narrowly, legalization may continue to evade them. There are dimensions of citizenship, such as strong community ties and participation in civic activities, which are being enacted informally through these practices. These practices produce an at least partial recognition of them as full social beings. In many countries around the world, including those of the EU, long term undocumented residents often can gain legal residence if they can document the fact of this long term residence and “good conduct.” Liberal democracies recognize such informal participation as grounds for granting legal residency. However, such inclusion is limited in systems where immigrants are not actively incorporated into the body politic, as the chapter on Denmark by Shahamak et al. demonstrates.

<sup>2</sup>According to Coutin (2000) and others, movements between membership and exclusion, and between different dimensions of citizenship, legitimacy and illegitimacy, may be as important as redefinitions of citizenship itself. Given scarce resources the possibility of negotiating the different dimensions of citizenship may well represent an important enabling condition. Undocumented immigrants develop informal, covert, often extra-state strategies and networks connecting them with communities in sending countries. Hometowns rely on their remittances and their information about jobs in their countries of immigration. Sending remittances illegally by an unauthorized immigrant can be seen as an act of patriotism back home, and working as an undocumented can be seen as contributing to the host economy. Multiple interdependencies are thereby established and grounds for claims on the receiving and the originating country can be established even when the immigrants are undocumented and laws are broken.

While migrants' motivations and their countries of origin may have differed from previous flows, the fact remains that all of the current major European countries have taken in immigrants for centuries. And historical demography, notwithstanding its limitations, makes clear that most European nation-states have historically incorporated foreigners. Thus today's populations evince a significant incidence of foreign-born parents and grandparents. How did European nations in the recent and in the remote past negotiate strong discriminations and even hatreds against foreigners and yet, inter-marry and thereby incorporate often a rather significant share of those immigrants? Can we learn something from this integration history?

## 2.2 Europe and Its Migrations

It is a fact that the immigrant groups of the past are today reasonably well absorbed, though there are important differences. These older immigrant groups, dating three or four generations or centuries back, have given us many of today's citizens. They are not at issue in today's debates. But in their time, the picture was very different. They *were* the issue.

Anti-immigrant sentiment and attacks happened in each of the major immigration phases in all these countries (see Sassen 1999 for detailed accounts; Noiriel 2007; Marshall 1977). No labour-receiving country survives closer investigation with a spotless record – not Switzerland, with its long admirable history of international neutrality, and not even France, the most open to immigration, refugees and exiles. French workers killed Italian workers in the 1800s. But there were always, as is the case today also, individuals, groups, organizations, and politicians who believed in making our societies more inclusive of immigrants. History suggests that those fighting for incorporation in the long run won, even though only partly. Just to focus on the recent past, a third of the French have a foreign-born ancestor three generations up, as do 40 % of Viennese.

Part of the difficulty for Europe is, ironically, the lack of a historical perspective. Europe has a barely recognised history of several centuries of internal labour migrations. This is a history that hovers in the penumbra of official "European History," dominated by the image of Europe as a continent of emigration, never of immigration. Yet, in the 1700s, when Amsterdam built its polders and cleared its bogs, it brought in Northern German workers; when the French built up their vineyards they brought in Spaniards; when Milan and Turin developed they brought in workers from the Alps; when London built its infrastructure for water and sewage, it brought in Irish. In the 1800s, when Haussmann redid Paris, he brought in Germans and Belgians; when Sweden re-started its monarchy and needed some good looking palaces, they brought in Italian stoneworkers; when Switzerland built the Gothard Tunnel, it brought in Italians; and when Germany built its railroads and steel mills it brought in Italians and Poles to do the work.

At any given time there were multiple significant intra-European migration flows. All the workers involved were seen as outsiders, as undesirables, as threats

to the community, as people that could never become part of that community. But significant numbers did become part of the community, even if it took more than two generations; typically, it seems, it took three. Even when they kept their distinctiveness, they were members of the community: part of the complex, highly heterogeneous social order of any developed society. But at the time of their first arrival, they were treated as outsiders, racialised as different in looks, smells and habits, though they were so often the same phenotype, broad religious group and broad cultural group. They were all Europeans: but the differences experienced were as overwhelming and insurmountable, as they are today.

In the 1990s and especially since the 2000s, the argument against immigration may be focused on questions of race, religion, and culture, and might seem rational – that cultural and religious distance is the reason for the difficulty of incorporation. But in sifting through the historical and current evidence we find only new contents for an old passion: the racialising of the outsider as ‘other.’ Today the ‘other’ is stereotyped by differences of race, religion and culture. Equivalent arguments were made in the past when migrants were broadly of the same religious, racial and cultural group: they were seen as not fitting in with the receiving society, as having bad habits and the wrong morals. Migration hinges on a move between two worlds, even if within a single region or country – such as East Germans moving to West Germany, who were seen as a different ethnic group with undesirable traits. There is strong evidence of a cyclical character to anti-immigration politics and the clouding of the issues that comes with it. For centuries Europe’s major economies have gone through rapid cycles of great demand and then severe expulsion, only to fall back into high demand a few decades later. In the recent past, a country like France had a desperate need for immigrants during the first world war (using Algerian immigrants in its armies) and the reconstruction in the 1920s, only to move into aggressive anti-immigrant politics in the 1930s, to then wind up once again with acute needs for foreign workers in the late 1940s, and so on. In my reading of the features of that history and the current conditions described above, this cyclical history may well still be playing its part. If we consider the growing demand for low-wage workers and sharp population decline in today’s EU states, it is easy to see that we might actually switch to a phase of active import or acceptance of more immigrant workers within a decade.

Let me note here that beyond these cyclical ups and downs, many European countries in fact continuously employ “foreign” workers or their equivalent, such as members from minoritized communities; in many cases this has held for several centuries (Sassen 1999). Examples of these permanent minoritized workers in the contemporary period are second or third generations of diverse communities, depending on the country: of Turks in Germany, of Algerians in France, of Jamaicans in the UK, to mention just a few nationalities and a few countries. Perhaps the sharpest version of this minoritized labour reserve is the Roma.

When Italy, Spain, and Portugal became part of the EC free movement area, it meant integrating what had been major senders of migrants to the north, and who had been barred by 1973 from further entries for work. The policy change

generated widespread fears of invasions by masses of poor workers and families. In retrospect we can see how wrong this fear was. In fact, more immigrants returned home to Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal, and fewer emigrated to the North than had been expected. This was partly because they were free to circulate and partly because their economies were developing in ways that incorporated their people.

The same is likely to hold with the much-feared migrations from the new EU members in the East. Indeed the latest figures show that one-third of the Polish migrants who came to the UK after EU enlargement have recently returned to Poland. People with deep grievances in their home countries are far more likely to emigrate permanently than those who might be low-income but are fully-fledged members of their communities. We have considerable evidence showing that being low-income is not enough by itself to leave your community. We also know that many low-income migrants want to come every year for a few months and then go back to their communities. Thus enlargement will enable far more circular migration and reduce trafficking. Perhaps the best story here is that of the Polish women who teamed up to take care of cleaning and housekeeping in Berlin households. Each wanted to spend a minimum amount of time in Berlin, no matter its comforts, and then go back and live their real life. So teams of four organized for each to spend 3 months in a given household, and rotate annually. The best strategy for the rich EU countries, so worried about receiving masses of low-wage, poorly educated workers from the new EU member states, is to do whatever can be done to ensure broad based development in those states, while at the same time facilitating the movement back and forth of low-skilled migrant workers.

There is one set of communities for whom this will be inadequate: the Roma. Europe has failed the Roma for centuries. All of the struggles fought in the name of civil society and civic rights fundamentally excluded the Roma. This will have its own backlash effect, and inevitably, the Roma will come. As Malecki's chapter illustrates, today we are paying the price for our historic neglect and, often aggression. There are significant numbers of very poor in some of the new EU member countries, and centuries of exclusion have left their marks. Enlargement must be a wake-up call: we need to think of the Roma as part of our future.

At the same time, the Roma also illuminate a key feature of our history of migrations in Europe: it has usually been particular groups who are at the core of a country's emigration, rather than massive generalised flows from poverty to prosperity. In the early 1990s after the wall went down, Germany received over two million migrants from Eastern Europe and Russia, but the vast majority were ethnic Germans and the rest mostly Roma. There were no high numbers of other nationalities. Similarly, the Turkish emigration to Germany, for instance, consisted largely of particular groups of minoritised Turkish, including Turkish Kurds. In brief, these were not indiscriminate movements from poverty in the East to wealth in the West. These two groups were motivated by very specific and long-standing historical conditions.

## 2.3 Migration as Embedded Process

Migrations are embedded in larger systems. That is to say, it is not simply a matter of the poor deciding to come to rich countries.<sup>3</sup> If this were the case, we should plan on well over three billion people engaging in such movements, when in fact today there are only about 100 million who have migrated to rich countries (including North America), less than 4 % of the world's poor. Further, since only a very small share of the poor become immigrants, we can see that poverty by itself is not enough to explain emigration. It is, then, not helpful for politicians to think that all the poor will come: it is an incorrect datum and it leads to the wrong policies.<sup>4</sup>

Establishing whether labour migration is an integral part of how an economic and social system operates and evolves, rather than merely a decision by individuals to migrate is, in my view, critical to develop the politics of membership. The logic of this argument is, put simply, as follows: If immigration is seen as the result of individuals in search of a better life, the receiving country governments can shrug off immigration as an exogenous process, formed and shaped by conditions outside the receiving country. The receiving country would then be a bystander to the process of immigration, rather than one of the actors in the making of the conditions and/or the bridges for emigrations to happen. The immigrant-receiving country is then merely a nice or not-so-nice receiver or rejecter of those immigrants; it bears no responsibility for the immigrants. In this view, as poverty and overpopulation grow, there may be a parallel growth in immigration, at least potentially, because those are the main causes of emigration. The receiving country conducts itself as if it were a passive bystander to processes outside its domain and control, and hence with few options but to tighten its frontiers if it is to avoid an 'invasion.'

If, on the other hand, immigration is partly an outcome of the policies and practices of so-called "receiving" countries, both inside and abroad, it should be recognized in immigration policy. This is the case with certain types of war refugees: the war on Vietnam led the US, and earlier France, to accept Vietnamese as refugees from a war carried out by the US (and, earlier, France). But there is no such recognition for economic immigrants, in good part because the connections are often far

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<sup>3</sup>At some point we are going to have to ask what the term immigrant truly means. People in movement are an increasingly strong presence, especially in cities. Further, when citizens begin to develop transnational identities, it alters something in the meaning of immigration. In my research I have sought to situate immigration in a broader field of actors by asking who are all the actors involved in producing the outcome that we then call immigration. My answer is that it's many more than just the immigrants, whereas our law and public imagination tend to identify immigrants as the only actors producing this complex process.

<sup>4</sup>Immigrants are estimated to be under 3 % of global population. From an estimate of 85 million international immigrants in the world, or 2.1 % of world population in 1975, it rose to 175 million or 2.9 % of world population by 2000, and an estimated of between 185 and 192 million in 2005 (International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2005, 2006). It is important to note the increased concentration of migrants in the developed world, and generally in a limited number of countries. About 30 countries account for over 75 % of all immigration; 11 of these are developed countries with over 40 % of all immigrants.



vaguer between the actions of the “receiving” country and the fact that a migration takes place; for instance, receiving countries need to recognize that when they outsource jobs to low-wage countries, they are building bridges for future migrations from those countries, often in the form of the middle class employees involved in managing outsourced jobs. Elsewhere I have researched the making of such bridges by the receiving countries, bridges that are eventually used by migrants from those countries (Sassen 1988, 2007: ch 5). Familiar bridges are the diverse imperialisms, both old and recent; thus Algerians have long migrated to France, Indians and Bangladeshi to the UK, and so on. These patterns are indicators of deeper articulations between the countries involved.

Besides the bridges that receiving countries have built into the countries where immigrants originate, there are the facts about labour-demand patterns of receiving countries and the search for cheap labour. The issues are familiar: jobs that natives do not want, attempts to lower costs of production in the name of competitiveness, the search for docile/vulnerable workers, and more. The demand for low-wage service workers in the new growth sectors of developed economies is a growing source of demand for immigrant or minoritized workers.

In both the bridging role and the labour-market role, the “receiving” country is far from the passive bystander to the immigration process suggested by this term. It is an active participant in the making of immigrations. Yes, immigration happens in a context of inequality between countries, but inequality by itself is not enough to lead to emigration. Inequality needs to be activated as a migration push factor – through organised recruitment, neo-colonial bonds, or destruction of domestic income opportunities in the emigration country, etc.

The economic, political, and social conditions in the receiving country contribute in many ways to set the parameters for immigration flows. Immigration flows may take a while to adjust to changes in levels of labour demand or to the saturation of opportunities, but will always tend eventually to adjust to the conditions in receiving countries, even if these adjustments are imperfect. Thus there was a decline in the growth rate of Polish immigration to Germany once it was clear that the opportunities were not as plentiful, and this movement was replaced by circular migration in many East to West flows, including from the former East Germany to West Germany. The size and duration of flows is shaped by these conditions: it is not an exogenous process shaped only by poverty and population growth elsewhere, and hence autonomous from the accommodation capacities of receiving countries. In fact, governments are responsible for the active role of policy instruments designed to bring in particular immigrants/labour migrants and not others.

If size and duration are shaped overall by conditions in receiving countries then there is the possibility of reasonably effective immigration policies. Managing a patterned and conditioned flow of immigrants is a rather different matter from controlling an ‘invasion’. Implementation of an effective policy does not necessarily mean perfect synchronisation between conditions in the receiving country and immigrant inflow and settlement. This will never quite be the case. Immigration is a process constituted by human beings with will and agency, with multiple identities and life trajectories beyond the fact of being seen, defined and categorised as



immigrants for the purposes of the receiving polity, economy and society. There is no definitive proof in this matter. But there are patterns, and past patterns, that have lived their full life. They can tell us something about the extent to which immigration has consisted of a series of bounded events with beginnings, endings and specific geographies – all partly shaped by the operation and organisation of receiving economies, politics and societies.

## 2.4 Cross-country Regularities

My examination of the past two centuries and the vast scholarly literature on immigration in Europe points to a number of cross-country regularities (Sassen 1999, 2007: ch 5; 2011).<sup>5</sup> The purpose here is to establish whether immigration flows today have geographic, temporal and institutional boundaries that indicate a definition of the ‘where’, ‘when’, and ‘who’ of immigration. These cross-country regularities contribute to a far more qualified understanding of immigration and hence of policy options. This, clearly also depends on the type of legislation states engage in; MOUs between sending and receiving states suggest a specific kind of governance of migration, one where both sides win (e.g. Hennebry et al.’s, Chap. 5, in this volume). The critical issue is that governments and policy makers should recognize that there is far more patterning and far more room to understand what engenders a new migration flow, and the likelihood that migrants might want to be circular migrants more than current policy recognizes.

1. *Emigration always encompasses a small share of a country’s population.* Except for terror-driven refugees, we now know that most people are quite reluctant to leave their home villages or towns. Most Mexicans have not left their country and moved to the US and most people in Poland are not going to try to come to Germany, nor will most Algerians try to come to France. In fact, the evidence shows that even when there is a massive flow, it often is a persecuted people who dominate such flows. Thus most emigrants from the East to Germany in the early 1990s when the wall came down, were Roma people from Romania and ethnic Germans, two populations with very specific reasons for migrating. There are individuals and groups who are determined to come (pent-up demand) and will come no matter what. But this is not the typical case. There is a grey area of potential emigrants who may or may not leave, depending on pull factors; but the vast majority of people in a poor country are not likely to consider emigration.

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<sup>5</sup>The EU adds its own complexity to boundary questions given continually redrawn jurisdictional boundaries to mark the relative authority relations among the diverse administrative levels and domains. This brings with it shifts in the meaning of who is incorporated, who is not, and who falls in-between. See Murad’s and Geiger’s, Chaps. 13 and 14, in this volume on how the recent accession states play in this process in that they provide migrants and become corridors for those outside the EU.

This was already the case in the nineteenth century when borders were not controlled because the state lacked the technical capacities to do so. Even then emigration was confined to a minority of people. This holds even when we consider sub-national regions. For instance, some of the historically highest emigration levels were reached in several southern Italian districts. When we specify such districts in very limited geographic terms, we find that the highest rates were only 40 per 1,000 at the height of mass emigration from Italy to the Americas.

Within the EU today, when EU nationals can easily move to another country and there is still considerable variation in earnings levels across member states, EU figures for both the pre- and post-enlargement period show little cross-country migration among EU residents, going from 5 to 5.5 %.

*2. Immigrants are typically a minority of a country's population.* According to the latest available data (Eurostat 2006), 25 million non-nationals (residents who are not citizens of the country where they live) lived in the EU25 in 2004, or 5.5 % of the population. In half of these countries, non-nationals were under 5 % of the population; they were over 10 % of the population in Luxembourg, and, mostly due to the long term former Soviet residents, in Latvia, and Estonia. A good share of non-nationals are from other EU countries. The highest increases in non-nationals from 1990 to 2004 were in Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Ireland and Austria, with declines in Belgium. In the pre-enlargement period, immigrants were 5 % (18.8 million) of the EU population. Then and today, third country immigrants count for a minority of the total European population. For instance, pre-enlargement, eight major EU countries had a total immigrant population of 2.5 million from the Maghreb, a group that has engendered considerable debate around questions of cultural and religious obstacles to incorporation. This was 13.3 % of the total immigrant population in the EU, less than 1 % of the total European population. These levels have not changed much, even if the numbers may have grown, as has the total EU population, from 350 million to about 470 million. Similar concern has been raised about Turks. The vast majority of all Turkish immigrants in the EU are in Germany, where they are 2.4 % of the German population.

In the old EU member states, the incidence of non-nationals is not particularly high. In the UK, non-nationals were 4.2 % in 1990 and 4.7 % in 2004, with the Irish the largest single group. And in Ireland by 2004 non-nationals were 7 %, with British the largest single group. In the Netherlands they were 4.3 % and in France 5.6. Overall, the levels are not quite an invasion, as is so often suggested.

*3. There is considerable return migration,* except when the military-political situation in countries of origin makes this unfeasible. For example, we now know that about 60 % of Italians who left for the US around the turn of the century, returned to Italy. The incidence of cross-border residence by EU nationals has declined since 1970, partly as a function of the return of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese immigrant workers to their home countries (see Mandres, Chap. 11, this volume). We are seeing generally more and more circular migration in the Mediterranean, and, until the US government militarised the border with Mexico,

also in the Americas. This all suggests that return migration may become a different phenomenon – not a definitive return, but a circular movement. It calls for considering the sending and receiving areas as part of a single economic, social and political system. It is within this system that immigrants make their own individual decisions and take action.

4. *One important tendency is towards the formation of permanent settlements* for a variable share of immigrants, but never all. This tendency is likely even when there are high return rates and even when a country's policies seek to prevent permanent settlement. We see this happening in all countries receiving immigrants, including extremely closed countries such as Japan (with illegal immigration from Philippines, Thailand and other Asian countries, as well as legal immigrations from several Latin American countries) and Saudi Arabia, as well as in the more liberal Western nations.

No matter what political culture and particular migration policies a country adopts, *unauthorised immigration has emerged as a generalised fact in all Western economies in the post World War II era*, including Japan. This has raised a whole set of questions about the need to rethink regulatory enforcement and the sites for such enforcement. Although the fact of such unauthorised immigration suggests that it is possible to enter these countries no matter what policies are in place, the available evidence makes it clear that the majority of unauthorised immigrants are from the same nationality groups as the legal population and are typically fewer in number than the legal population. Again, this signals a measure of boundedness in the process of unauthorised immigration and the possibility that it is shaped by similar systemic conditions as the legal population, thereby similarly limited in its scope and scale.

5. *Immigration is a highly differentiated process*: it includes people seeking permanent settlement and those seeking temporary employment who circulate back and forth. The two major patterns that are emerging today are circular migration and permanent settlement. Circular migration was a key pattern in the nineteenth century before border controls were instituted in any systematic way. We also know that there was a significant increase in the permanent resident immigrant population after borders were closed in EU countries in 1973–1974, suggesting that some of this growth might not have occurred if the option of circular migration had existed. Much migration has to do with supplementing household income in countries of origin rather than with permanent settlement. Given enormous earnings differentials, a limited stay in a high-wage country may be sufficient.

One important question is whether recognising these differences might facilitate the formulation of policy today. There is a growing presence of immigrants who are not searching for a new home in a new country; they think of themselves as moving in a cross-border and even global labour market. We know that when illegal immigrants are regularised, they often establish permanent residence in their country of origin and work a few months in the immigration country, an option that becomes available when they can circulate more freely. We know that some of the Polish women who now work as cleaners in Berlin out of financial necessity only want to

do this work for 3 or 4 months a year and then return to their home towns. This is also the case with some of the African migrants in Italy. The share and numbers of those who seek to become permanent residents seems to be considerably smaller than the numbers of the total resident foreign population suggest.

## 2.5 Conclusion

Europe's history of anti-immigrant sentiment shows us that it is a recurrent event, one with variable degrees of virulence. We have been here many times before. It also confirms that over the generations of each immigration cycle we have incorporated vast numbers of immigrants so that today we are actually a mix: the *they* have become the *us* over our five centuries of intra-European migrations. But these facts are easily forgotten in the heat of anti-immigrant sentiment.

From the perspective of nation-based citizenship theory, this trajectory of racisms and incorporations seems a parallel history, one exogenous to that of formal political membership. The effort in this essay was to destabilize this binary. First, European history shows us that the excluded also contribute to the expansion of the politics of membership and, further that they can benefit from a type of informal citizenship often not granted to minoritized citizens. Second, history also shows us that the effort to negotiate the incorporation of the outsider, often in contexts of virulent and deadly anti-immigrant passions, actually contributed to expanding the civic.

In brief, out of such struggles around inclusion of both immigrants and minoritized citizens, have emerged some of the institutions we most admire and count on in our Western tradition – institutions enabling the members of our communities, no matter how poor- or ill-educated to have access to civil and social rights, even if not always political rights. It was not easy, and at the time, when one reads the record, problems and challenges seemed insoluble. They were never perfectly resolved, nor were remedies immaculately executed. But it did leave Europe with strong institutions that can function as tools to ensure reasonable outcomes when it comes to the politics of membership.

At the same time, it is precisely this highly developed sense of civic and political community that has historically made incorporation of outsiders more difficult. Now, more than ever, it seems we do not like the new and the different. But when has it not been the case in Europe that just about everyone who was not in, was an outsider? Incorporating many, albeit never all, immigrants over the generations always took hard work. Reading the record, it often seems an impossible struggle by those sharing this aspiration – typically some insiders and immigrants themselves. And it took generations to achieve. But we did it, if imperfectly, over and over again across the centuries. These struggles strengthened our civic and political institutions. Racism is still alive and well, but so are the membership rights that can enable inclusion.

The public debate today neglects this history of hard work: it assumes that if there is no ready-made fix, there is no solution. Have we become consumers rather than crafters of inclusion?

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