

Chapter 2

Christian Calling and Volunteering

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Introduction

It may come as a surprise that the word “volunteering” does not appear in well-known and reliable Christian theological dictionaries such as Jean-Yves Lacoste’s *Dictionnaire critique de théologie* (Lacoste 2007). Of course, “volunteering” is a recent word: It originated in a military context and “volunteer” charitable organizations seriously took off only in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, research, as in this volume (Hustinx et al.), points to a positive relation between individual religiosity and altruistic motivations to volunteer: This could be explained by individuals participating in religious communities that further prosocial behaviour (Wuthnow 1991) or by values and convictions about neighbourly love as found in religious belief (Bennett in this volume). In this contribution, we will argue that the absence of the word “volunteering” in the theological dictionaries does not come as a surprise. It reflects a tension between neighbourly love—which, in the Christian tradition, represents the idea nearest to volunteering—and the modern, secularized understanding of the concept of “volunteering”. This tension concerns the role and possibility of free will, a key issue both in secularized modernity, where it is considered a core feature of the autonomous subject, and in Christian theology, where free will is understood relationally and where, therefore, the idea of a fully autonomous and independent free will is criticized. We will explore, from a Christian theological viewpoint that takes into account some of the many Christian traditions—in our case the Lutheran and Ignatian traditions—how free will and neighbourly love as understood by Christians relate to one another and determine a Christian approach to volunteering that, to a certain extent, is at odds with the modern understanding of volunteering. We will provide some idea of how the Christian understanding of

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free will and its role in understanding neighbourly love, from the perspective of a relationship with God and in response to a calling from God, are different from the secularized take on the free will of autonomous human beings that originated with the modern western world and that is characteristic for most of our contemporary understanding of volunteering. As a consequence, we will also highlight the existence of specifically Christian perspectives on volunteering.

Volunteering refers to a complex social phenomenon that can best be understood as a social construct (Hustinx et al. 2010; Wilson 2000). Therefore, it is dependent on its contexts: Definitions of volunteering will vary between different welfare regimes, cultures and historical periods (Dekker and Halman 2003). Nevertheless, in most of the academic discussions and in widely accepted perceptions of volunteering, some common features surface: Volunteering concerns (a) unpaid activities (which is not the same as unrewarded activities as volunteers draw some reward and appreciation from their commitments) that are (b) performed out of free will and (c) for the benefit of others beyond friendship and kinship ties. Moreover, volunteering is often carried out (d) in an organizational context. These common elements appear in a content analysis study of 200 definitions of volunteering (Cnaan and Amroffell 1994; Cnaan et al. 1996) and have been used in cross-national quantitative studies to assess what people perceive when they design activities as volunteering (Handy et al. 2000; Meijs et al. 2003). Qualitative in-depth studies targeting the phenomenology of volunteering confirm these findings (von Essen 2008; O'Reagan 2009).

In our contribution, we focus on the second of these common features: free will. We approach the idea of volunteering through the nearest concept that Christian traditions have to offer, neighbourly love. Theologians cannot but agree that the understanding of free will is crucial in articulating the differences between various Christian traditions, such as Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism: A long history of fierce debates and disagreements on the issue testify to this. Beyond these interdenominational differences, the idea of free will is also crucial to understand the tensions between secularized modernity and Christianity, even if some of the roots of secularized modernity are, from an historical perspective, to be found in theological debates about the relations between God, human beings and nature (see, for instance, Gillespie 2008, p. 12; Sigurdson 2009, p. 120). Therefore, one would expect that an in-depth analysis of the idea of free will is necessary for clarifying the relationship between volunteering, as understood in a modern, secularized environment, and religious faith and commitment.

Surprisingly, only scant attention has been devoted in the academic literature to this aspect of volunteering as constituted of freely chosen actions. There is a lively debate concerning the altruistic character of volunteering (see Haski-Leventhal (2009) for a recent overview of this debate) and there is also an effort to assess the degree of volunteering by the use of a net-cost approach (Handy et al. 2000). Both these research perspectives concern the outlook of human beings as “*homines oeconomici*” and touch upon volunteering as nonpaid work. The understanding of what “free will” is, although it carries an important role in volunteer work and in the motivations for volunteering, has often been assumed as “known” and remains academically understudied. As a consequence, the moral character of volunteering (see Story 1992) is poorly discussed. Academic research has paid even less attention to

the contrasting understandings that secularized western actors and religious actors may have of volunteering and free will, precisely because of the reference of the latter to their faith. However, in a Christian perspective on volunteering, free will is a core issue, and Christian theologians cannot but approach free will and volunteering from the perspective of human beings in their relationship to God.

It is to an analysis of the idea of “free will”, particularly from a diversified Christian viewpoint, that we want to invite the readers of this contribution: We hope, in doing this, to also deepen our understanding of the complex dimensions of volunteering. In this book, other authors will focus on non-Christian religions (see the contributions of Roos and Fazlhashemi). We will, therefore, not present a comparative interreligious study here.

Basic Structural Features of Neighbourly Love

If volunteering displays the above-mentioned common features and aims to benefit others, really different others, then one of the Christian ideas closest to it is the love of neighbour, the call to “love one’s neighbour as oneself” (Matthew 22: 39). We will present the common basic structural features of the idea of neighbourly love in Christian thought although there exists a variety of interpretations and traditions on the matter. A brief analysis of the iconic parable of the good Samaritan (Luke 10: 29–37)¹ helps us to grasp the idea narratively:

²⁹But wanting to justify himself, he asked Jesus, “And who is my neighbour?” ³⁰Jesus replied, “A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell into the hands of robbers, who stripped him, beat him, and went away, leaving him half dead. ³¹Now by chance a priest was going down that road; and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. ³²So likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. ³³But a Samaritan while traveling came near him; and when he saw him, he was moved with pity. ³⁴He went to him and bandaged his wounds, having poured oil and wine on them. Then he put him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, and took care of him. ³⁵The next day he took out two denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and said, ‘Take care of him; and when I come back, I will repay you whatever more you spend.’ ³⁶Which of these three, do you think, was a neighbour to the man who fell into the hands of the robbers?” ³⁷He said, “The one who showed him mercy.” Jesus said to him, “Go and do likewise.”

Those listening to Jesus may have been shocked. Of course, they knew about the importance of neighbourly love: Luke (10: 25–28) presents the parable of the good Samaritan as part of Jesus’ answer to the question of a lawyer—the “he” in the initial verse of the story—about what should be done to inherit life. In the parallel texts of Mark (12: 28–34) and Matthew (22: 34–40), this question is phrased in terms of the search for the most important of the commandments. Jesus teases the answer out of the lawyer: “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbour as yourself.” To Jesus, the parable illustrates how the two most important commandments of what Christians have come to call the First Testament, Deuteronomy

¹ Biblical passages are quoted from the New Revised Standard Version.

6: 4–5 (“you shall love the Lord your God...”) and Leviticus 19: 18 (“you shall love your neighbour as yourself”), are intimately connected: The love of neighbour springs from God’s love for creation. The commitment to others, therefore, is an expression of the faith in God and commitment to God, as God commits to human beings in God’s creation. Those listening to Jesus knew about these commandments: They were a crucial part of their tradition.

None of this is very shocking thus far. The surprise lies in the fact that both the priest and the Levite—persons with a leadership status and who in the Jewish culture of that time were expected to proclaim and put into practice the commandments of the Law—pass by the wounded man. A Samaritan, who was not a part of the faith community and who belonged to a group frowned upon, is the unexpected person who, out of pity, takes care of the wounded man. That comes as a first surprise: Not the priest, not the Levite, but a despicable Samaritan shows mercy. Moreover, and here comes a second surprise, Jesus asks a twisted question that provokes his hearers: Who of those who walk along the road “was a neighbour to the man who fell into the hand of the robbers”? This is unexpected: We expect the wounded man to be called “neighbour”, not the Samaritan. By asking who is a neighbour to the wounded man, Jesus seems to invite his hearers, and the readers of the parable, to hear a call: “Can I be, as the good Samaritan, moved by pity, a neighbour to my fellow human being?” and, in the context of our contribution, we are tempted to add here: “and volunteer to help him and take care of him?” The parable is a call to become neighbours: Our response to the challenge that is set before us reveals our free decision and our humanity. In the process it is clear that the wounded man becomes a neighbour, when we respond to the call to become a neighbour. Being or becoming a neighbour, therefore, to Christians means taking responsibility for others out of compassion—not the easy, emotional compassion, but the tough, demanding compassion that answers the call to commitment. That is why the Roman Catholic Jesuit theologian Jon Sobrino (1992) speaks about the principle of compassion and the Lutheran theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1989) claims that grace (in this case the call to take care of others) is costly and demanding. Compassion is a “principle” as it does not depend merely on the autonomous decisions of individuals but reflects the structure of reality itself, one that calls on individuals to commit: The freely made decision is in answer to the compassionate structure of reality.

Discernment

Each of the three persons walking along the road took a decision, to ignore or to care for the wounded man. All three of them had seen him, all three were challenged and each one made up his mind. One would expect the Levite and the priest to take care of the wounded man. But they were free to do otherwise and they did otherwise. The Samaritan, who was not really expected to take care, does take care, in a consistent and even somewhat extravagant way. He is the real neighbour, i.e. he reflects the fitting relationship with God and answers God’s call to love. In a Christian perspective, ideas such as neighbourly love and free will are always understood in terms

of the relationship to God. Christian decision processes—some Christian traditions, like the Ignatian spiritual tradition,² use the expression “discernment”³—involve free will, but a free will that is always embedded in the relationship to God, as revealed in the life of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ who, in the eyes of Christians, embodies decisively in his life and words both human and divine love. From a Christian point of view, human beings are centres of decision-making in which free will plays a crucial role.⁴ The use of free will involves a heuristic endeavour in which account is taken of God’s call as it appears in realities that challenge us and in texts that reflect the Christian tradition in Jesus Christ, inspiring people to follow Jesus Christ, to act as he did, albeit in new circumstances. In the Christian perspective, there is always the question as to which spirits or inner movements are moving us when using our free will to reach decisions: Are we moving in line with God’s call as we perceive it and as supported by tradition or are we moving against that call? In terms of the technical notion of discernment: Are we in consolation or in desolation? In their volunteer commitments, Christians will gauge how they use their free will and how it relates to their relationship with God: Free will is never merely that of an autonomous, unrelated and unconnected human being; it has a relational context—with God, with other human beings, with nature and with the world. Such processes of discernment are not easy, they require self-knowledge, the willingness to listen to others, the humility to accept that mistakes can be made and the awareness that sometimes one will go against the direction of the discernment because of inner resistances or desires. It is not surprising, therefore, that free will decisions are considered by Christians to have a distinct spiritual and relational character.

It will be clear from what has been said that the idea of “free will”, from a Christian perspective, does not refer to human subjects fully on their own, with a capacity to decide for themselves without taking others into account, in particular, wounded and excluded others—including also an awareness that is growing today, of created beings different from human beings—nor without taking into account their relationship with the one they consider to be the other. Although the creativity of human beings as centres of decision-making is certainly not denied, processes of free will always involve relationships that belong to the very core of a definition of free will. If volunteering is a decision of the free will, then, for Christians, this volunteering will be embedded in the call that emerges from their relationships with the (broken) world and with God. Their volunteering, therefore, will always be the answer to a call, which in their eyes provides them with the relationships necessary to exercise this free will. The extent to which this call leaves them space to move against it provides for never-ending discussions in the history of theology and of various Christian traditions, discussions that have been subsumed under the theological area of the tension between “grace” and “nature”.

² Meaning the tradition starting with Ignatius of Loyola, in the sixteenth century. It will be used further on in the article to illustrate the Roman Catholic approach to free will.

³ The idea and practice of spiritual discernment represents a long and solid tradition in Christianity. See, for example: (Ruiz Jurado 1994; Guillet et al. 1957).

⁴ The early theology of Origen of Alexandria (ca. 185–254) illustrates this point. See, Crouzel (1989).

Creation, Incarnation and the Kingdom of God

In their desire to understand what is going on in processes of discernment, Christians attempt to articulate intellectually—theologically, they would say—their relationships with God. Various types of relationships can be distinguished, of which we will discuss three: creation, incarnation and the vision of the Kingdom of God. We will also consider how various traditions in Christianity have variously evaluated the impact of God in the processes of decision-making: How can the collaboration of God and human beings be understood and what does this mean for our understanding of free will? Does God's grace—God's free, loving commitment and action—leave human nature free to decide and act? Does creative human nature allow for the work of God's grace in the world?

The faith in God as Creator of the universe invites Christians to reflect on the idea of creation. Theologians have often discussed whether or not creation refers to a temporal beginning of the universe, but all agree in saying that creation certainly means that the world as we know it cannot be disconnected from its Creator, even if this world seems to work according to its own laws and dynamics that can be studied as if there were no Creator involved. Christians are also sensitive to the fact that the world as creation is an interconnected whole, of which human beings, even if they may occupy a special place, are a part. There is no otherness that is not relational otherness, i.e. otherness that would allow an escape from mutual responsibility. This awareness of the underlying interconnectedness of all things and beings created, however different from one another these beings may be, points to a fundamental and crucial interrelationship of all in God. From this perspective of creation, human free will cannot be disconnected from the call to interconnectedness and interdependence that shapes all existence. Committing to this interconnectedness, assuming responsibilities amidst interrelatedness is, therefore, a challenge to human free will and shapes the willingness to volunteer. Volunteering is, in this perspective, committing to the interconnected world as creation, particularly there where the sense of interconnectedness is broken. Not surprisingly, Christians often want to engage in the struggle against poverty and exclusion or in the attempts to build a more sustainable world. Indeed, neighbourliness reflects this deep creational challenge to caring interconnectedness.

The incarnation points to God's own self-commitment in Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ. To Christians, the mystery of human life is opened up in the life, actions and words of Jesus of Nazareth as a gift from God and a full commitment of God to our world. To Christians it is imperative, therefore, to know the life of Jesus and to connect to it, to recognize in it the deep calls that constitute human life. Jesus teaches—God in Jesus teaches—by living human life to the full and in all its consequences. It is, so to say, a call that comes from the inside and reveals what it means to be a human being, not some external force imposed on human beings. Following Jesus Christ, therefore, is not in the first place following a set of rules that he would have put on the agenda, but, rather, coming to know him so that this knowledge transforms us by leading us into deeper human life and a commitment to creation and fellow human beings. The narrative structure of the Gospels lures its readers

into this process of assimilation, in which they recognize both who God is in Jesus of Nazareth and what a human being is: God's reality and the deepest essence of human life are revealed together. A story about Jesus' life that may help us to better understand the meaning of the incarnation can be found in Mark 7:24–30:

²⁴From there he set out and went away to the region of Tyre. He entered a house and did not want anyone to know he was there. Yet he could not escape notice, ²⁵but a woman whose little daughter had an unclean spirit immediately heard about him, and she came and bowed down at his feet. ²⁶Now the woman was a Gentile, of Syro-Phoenician origin. She begged him to cast the demon out of her daughter. ²⁷He said to her, "Let the children be fed first, for it is not fair to take the children's food and throw it to the dogs." ²⁸But she answered him, "Sir, even the dogs under the table eat the children's crumbs." ²⁹Then he said to her, "For saying that, you may go—the demon has left your daughter." ³⁰So she went home, found the child lying on the bed, and the demon gone.

We avoid a full exegetical discussion here, which would draw on the place of this passage in the overall gospel of Mark and on the existing parallel text in Matthew's gospel (15: 21–28), to concentrate on its narrative power. Initially, there is a clear refusal of Jesus to engage—we are tempted to say: to volunteer—into helping the Syro-Phoenician woman: She is an "other", not part of Jesus' own faith community, a Gentile. Jesus resists the call that arises from her and rebukes her harshly. The response of the woman, turning Jesus' analogy against him, changes the situation: Jesus recognizes that her faith, i.e. in her God—the one whom Jesus called his Father—challenges him. God is already committed to this woman and that is the call that moves out towards Jesus and to which he responds by caring. As a consequence, God is recognized in an even more profound way: The child is healed from its demon. Incarnation can be understood from this text: being drawn into a commitment to the world, out of an encounter with God and so that this encounter with God can be deepened. In his diary (1971), an important Flemish mystic, Egied van Broeckhoven, a Jesuit worker and priest, describes how in his contacts with fellow workers, whose lives he wanted to share by sharing their working conditions, friendships deepened and how this allowed the self-revelation of God to unfold in a profound way. Commitment to the world and to fellow human beings and the self-revelation of God work hand in hand. So, volunteering from a Christian perspective is an answer to a call addressed to us by God in the midst of reality, a call we follow and that allows us to discover more deeply who Godself is. Volunteering, then, is also, in the eyes of Christians, the search for a God who is recognized in the call directed at them by their fellow human beings and in whose work they participate by engaging in the care for these fellow human beings.

The vision of the Kingdom of God, presented by Jesus in images of natural growth, banquets and judgement—as well as articulated in his actual life—provides us with a third approach to Christian perceptions of the relationships between human beings and God. The Kingdom offers a vision of the ultimate reconciled and fulfilled future for the whole of creation, a future that human beings, as part of this broken and fallen world—i.e. a world that has moved away from its rootedness in the relation to God—cannot bring about but will receive as a gift from God. It is a promise that invites these human beings to already commit fully to this promise in their actions: Inspired and strengthened by the life of Jesus of Nazareth, who em-

bodies the Kingdom, human beings attempt to act to realise the Kingdom, in view of the Kingdom. The relationship with God in Jesus, therefore, focuses Christians on the future community of the Kingdom even if they have difficulty imagining it in the twisted, unjust and harsh present world: The Kingdom lies within reach only because it is God's gift on which human beings can rely. Volunteering, from a Christian perspective, therefore, aims at a future that lies beyond human reach but that nevertheless, as a promise within the relationship with God, works as a powerful attractor that empowers human beings to change and transform the twisted world of which they are a part. Christian volunteering, ultimately, focuses towards this vision of a healed world and fulfilled community of solidarity and care, in response to all exclusions and injustices in the contemporary world. Volunteering is thus a response to immediate needs from the perspective of God's promise of the Kingdom: It arises out of the faith and trust in God's promise as the natural thing to do.

Creation, incarnation, the vision of the Kingdom of God: These three key elements of the Christian faith unwrap features of the relationships between God and human beings that are crucial in a Christian understanding of neighbourly love and of volunteering. The commitment of Christians as volunteers receives strength from their faith in a God who creates the world, who commits fully to the world in the life of Jesus of Nazareth and who guarantees a vision of the future for the world. In that perspective, God could be said to be the first volunteer: God chooses to create and to bind Godself to the created world; God chooses to enter into a difficult and risky, concrete relationship with a troubled world by sharing the life of this world; God chooses to commit Godself in the promise of the Kingdom of God. Even if Christians never articulated God's actions in terms of volunteering—they prefer to speak about “love”—the four main features of volunteering as given at the outset of this contribution seem to be met: unpaid, out of free will, for the benefit of others and with structural features. When Christians become volunteers, their volunteering should be understood in the context of their relationships with the God-volunteer and this determines their understanding of free will, making it explicit. The free will of a Christian is not the free will of a human being who would have the capacity to isolate him- or herself from the rest of the world, so as to take a fully autonomous decision about what to do. Christian free will results from relations that articulate a complex call: the call that arises out of the fact of belonging to an interdependent, networked world (creation); the call that becomes visible in the face of fellow human beings, particularly those who suffer (incarnation) and the call of the vision of a reconciled community for a broken world. This call can be understood as an “imperative of belonging” that shapes human free will.

Two Theological Perspectives

The understanding of the “imperative” character originating out of the relationship with God, conditioning human free will, has proven to be a tricky and contentious issue for Christians: How do God and human beings relate to one another, within

the foundational relationship of creation upon which all Christians seem to agree. Thomas Aquinas spoke about a “*relatio quaedam*”, a very special relationship, as God has a priority in it: God founds the very relationship in which God and human beings interact.⁵ But should the relationship between God and human beings then be understood as a competitive reality, where human freedom has to be asserted over against God’s oppression? Should priority be given to God’s action, given the vulnerable, mediocre, egoistic and sinful character of human beings, who are not capable of doing good of their own accord? Or should one be careful not to over-stress this superiority of God, so as not to damage the creative and good resources of human beings who can do good, at least some good, out of themselves and will be measured and judged on the basis of the good they do? Or should one avoid to think in such competitive terms and rather emphasizes the complex and delicate balance between God’s actions and the actions of human beings? These questions constitute the framework for discussions that arose and continue to arise throughout the history of Christianity and that also, to a large extent, explain some of the differences between various Christian traditions.

The attempts to understand the relationship between God and human beings (or between the God and the human being in Jesus the Christ) have shaped the history of Christian theology right from its beginnings. They are a constant feature of Christian history, usually spoken about, amongst theologians, as the tensions between “nature” and “grace”.⁶ How do God and human beings cooperate or compete? How free are human beings, when they are totally dependent upon God? And how free is God in God’s relationship to human beings? Free will has been a core debate in the history of Christian theology, internally and in the debate with modernity. Indeed, modern secularization tends to understand human free will as in opposition to, or independent of, God’s will, as modern people feel the need to escape the domination of a despotic God so as to unfold their own creativity, capacities and potentialities. From an historical point of view, this emergence of the autonomous human being—autonomy seen in opposition to dependence upon God and the social structures and institutions that claim to authoritatively transmit the divine will and order—lies at the core of modernity. This struggle becomes fully visible when medieval political theology came to an end in the seventeenth century and politics became separated from theology, as was the case in the thought of Thomas Hobbes, for example (Lilla 2007).

We will now briefly analyse two different and, at that time, competing Christian approaches to free will, which contrast with the emerging modern understanding of free will seen as indicating the autonomous human being. Martin Luther (1483–1546) and Ignatius Loyola (1491–1556) both struggled with the new modern

⁵ See, for an analysis of Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the foundational relationship of creation; Sertillanges (1949).

⁶ Theological discussions of “nature and grace”, to which also belong in-depth analyses of anthropology and of the sinful condition of human beings, usually harbour substantial chapters on ancient, modern and contemporary history. For an introduction—from a Roman Catholic point of view—see, for example: (Haight 1991).

understandings of human freedom and emphasized, although in different ways, the importance of the relationship with God in the understanding of human freedom. Their understanding of free will, when applied to today's views on volunteering, connects with the refusal to make profit—in volunteering, Christian volunteers are not seeking gain or merit but responding to God's call—and, more fundamentally, relativizes the autonomy of the volunteer as a human being to situate this human being in the context of God's call to participate in God's loving commitment to this world.

The Lutheran Perspective

First we concentrate on the writings of Luther concerning the question of free will and continue by discussing how he formulates the Christian calling to neighbourly love in relation to his view on the conditions for salvation. This means that we will not primarily take into consideration the theological tradition as it developed after Luther in Lutheran orthodoxy and was practiced in Lutheran Churches. Our aim is to demonstrate how the Christian perspective on volunteering and free will as described above arises from the theological position of Luther, in which God is omnipotent and has priority over human beings and nature, and in which the outlook of human beings and the restrained will follow from this ontic ordering.

Luther's position on the question of the free will and human autonomy in relation to God is developed in *On the Bondage of the Will*. This text from 1525 is his answer to Erasmus in their debate over free will. The importance of this issue and the hot-tempered tone of the text is due to the fact that Luther's central theological insight is at stake here, namely that human beings are justified and saved by nothing other than grace received in faith (*Sola Gratia*). If Luther were to have admitted that human beings enjoy a free will that leaves them autonomous in relation to God, there would have been a possibility for human beings to save themselves by their own works, for instance by doing good deeds out of neighbourly love. In his answer to Erasmus, Luther wanted to refute precisely such human capacity for self-salvation.

In the beginning of *On the Bondage of the Will*, Luther maintains that it is "... plain evidence that free choice is a pure fiction" (Luther 1989, p. 176). This assertion sets the theme and the tone for the whole text. Firmly rooted in the Bible, Luther argues against the idea of free will and that human beings are capable of making free choices. He makes it clear that this applies to all human beings, regardless of whether they are excellent and righteous: Free choice is ungodly and wicked; it deserves the wrath of God. This means that the condition of the free will is not dependent on a certain higher faculty that could be more refined in some persons than in others. Instead, original sin "...leaves free choice with no capacity to do anything but sin and be damned" (Luther 1989, p. 203). According to Luther, we encounter here a fundamental aspect of the human condition: Human beings are totally dependent on God. What human beings perceive as free choices is an illusion

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