

Chapter 2

Resilience Theory and Inevitable Change: Che Agency, Identity, and Strategic Reorganization

Who people are, how they see themselves and are seen by others, and the decisions they are capable of making are central to research in the social sciences (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Burke and Stets 2009; Cohen 2000; Farnen 1994; Grossberg 1996; Holland et al. 1998; Jenkins 2008; Meskell 2007; Samaniego and Garbarini 2006; Stets and Burke 2000). A basic question here is “Who.” Who are the people studied from ethnographic, archaeological, historic, and biological perspectives? What are the criteria for distinguishing one group from another? How do we define identity archaeologically, particularly without written records or living descendants? Though it appears simple enough, defining identity is hotly debated, particularly in sociology, anthropology, and psychology, as researchers come to terms with the multifaceted and sometimes contradictory aspects of human identity both past and present (Casella and Fowler 2005; Cohen 2000; Díaz-Andreu et al. 2004; Insoll 2007). This is an important issue in researching Che resilience. Differentiating between “Che” and “Spanish” material culture and being able to discern changes and continuities in the same material culture through time, and to parse its meaning, is key to understanding the effects of interaction, the changes and continuity in the Che cultural system¹ and Che resilience in both time and space.

How people see themselves and others affects the decisions made and actions taken by both individuals and groups. Over the last few decades, researchers have examined the role of agency, or individual and group goal-oriented decision making, in identity creation and cultural development. Decisions are oftentimes based on social identity, power relations, education, and other factors (Archer 2000; Callinicos 2004; Dobres and Robb 2000a; Wolf 1999). Or, *who* people are, as perceived by themselves and others, often determines *what* actions they can perform, *why* they act, as well as *what* is behaviorally expected of them. However, the results of and reactions to those actions and behaviors fall outside their control (Gardner 2004). For example, among the Che, *toqui* war leaders gained power and authority from soldiers and allied kin groups to conduct war based on their military prowess and rhetorical skills. These leaders then used that authority to recruit warriors and direct battles, and would often take positions of prestige in their home

¹ And, indirectly, the changes in Spanish culture as well.

communities at the end of their fighting days (Bengoa 2003; Dillehay 2007). This mixture of authority, power, ability, and knowledge structured how *toqui* acted, not just in military matters but also in accordance with traditional cultural practices. Failure to act in ways acceptable to their followers and based on Che cultural norms could mean removal from the position of *toqui* and loss of power and prestige (Rosales 1674/1989; see also Leon Echaiz 1971). Agency, or the ability to act and be acted upon, is fundamental to any anthropological or historical study, and shaped the nature of Che resilience to the effects of Spanish incursion.

In studying the Che before, during, and after European arrival, identity and agency are important parts of the formation of Che society and culture, perceptions of self and outsiders, and actions taken based on these perceptions. This recursive relationship between identity, agency, and power affected how and why the Che incorporated select Spanish materials and not others while strategically restructuring pre-existing cultural practices. Resilience Theory (RT) illustrates how this may have happened, by combining the long-term processes that create or heavily influence individual and group identity, and the cultural structures that contribute to cultural resilience. Thus, identities, agency, and power form the base for resilience in cultural systems and can be gleaned from the material record, historic documentation, and ethnographic information. I argue that the traditional or pre-Hispanic structures of the Che, both *directing* and *directed* by the actions of internal agents, developed the stability and flexibility over centuries to incorporate useful items and concepts without causing a complete change to the pre-Hispanic culture, or, importantly, autonomous control over the cultural system. In other words, inevitable changes to culture that come with time and exacerbated by culture contact did not affect the Che so much that a different, hybrid society emerged. Rather, the Che maintained *control* over what changed, how it changed, and the nature of their continued cultural development until the nineteenth century. I use RT to hypothesize how the Che and their culture could absorb influences from the Spanish without experiencing the kinds of changes that would create different power relationships, or led to the loss of Che control over political, economic, social, and ideological structures of their culture.

RT is generally defined as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function” (Walker et al. 2004, p. 5). RT, as I use it here, draws heavily on theories of structuration developed by Giddens (1979, 1984), Bourdieu (1977, 1990), Archer (1996, 1988/1996, 2003) and others. RT goes beyond these theories of structuration like those used by Giddens, however, as emphasis is placed not just on the nature of the structures that constitute a cultural system, but also the *flexibility* of systems, individuals, and groups to absorb disturbance. This emphasis on flexibility is contingent upon the identity, agency, and power of the individuals within the system and their ideology: how these actors see themselves, how they perceive the system itself, and how they see others from outside the system affects what they incorporate, what they change, how they do so, and why. Ideology, then, is an important aspect in how actors are able to maintain and restructure a cultural system (Dillehay 2007). Conversely, changes to the ideology, or individual/community

perceptions of the same, can cause a chain reaction with has the potential to disrupt the entire cultural system, as happened with the Che in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries described in Chap. 7.

Below, I further define identity and agency, their interconnectedness, and their relationship to the nature of resilience and RT. I then expand on RT, including facets such as the Adaptive Cycle (AC), and Panarchy, that flesh out the nature of RT, the relationships with agency and identity, and how RT is a useful heuristic not just for studying the Che, but for other cultural systems worldwide.

The Concept of Identity

As sociologist Richard Jenkins stated, “[much] writing about identity treats it as *something* that simply *is*.” (Jenkins 2008, p. 17, emphasis his). That people perceive themselves and others in particular ways is generally taken to be apodictic reality. Human beings, whether through instinct or acquisition, classify themselves based on certain social and physical patterns and in turn apply those classifications to others. Anthropology, sociology, and history, for much of their intellectual histories as disciplines, treated identity matters as something obvious, or to be simply defined by the researcher (e.g., archaeological “traditions” and “cultures”). To classify the world is both instinctive and taught, and part of the human condition irrespective of area of the world or the society/individual under study (Burke and Stets 2009). Identity and identification, *sensu* Jenkins, simply *is*, and many researchers have treated it as a “human universal” (Brubaker 2004). It is difficult to argue against such a position. Ask any person on the street about identity (theirs or others) and it will often be treated as something that just *is*.

However, Jenkins goes on to argue:

Careless reification of this kind pays insufficient attention to how identification works or is done, to process and reflexivity, to the social construction of identity in interaction and institutionally. Identity can only be understood as a process of ‘being’ or ‘becoming’. One’s identity—one’s identities, indeed, for who we are is always multi-dimensional, singular and plural—is never a final or settled matter (Jenkins 2008, p. 17).

Jenkins’ direct criticism of the “careless reification” of identity illustrates the important point that identity, in its myriad forms, should not be taken as simply something that exists in and of itself, or *a priori*, but is a *process*: of creation, destruction, organization, reflection, absorption, and a host of other factors that go into influencing who a person or group is, how they relate to others, and how others relate to them. Identity is also contextual, defined through the life experiences, activities, and interactions between individuals and groups. Who a person is, as seen by themselves and others, changes regularly throughout the life of the individual and throughout the development of the group. Often, identity is modified, challenged, or appropriated even after death (Meskell 2007; Jones 2007). In sum,

identity should not be treated as something that *is*, but as a concept integral to the whole of anthropological and historical research.

In many instances, who an individual is finds definition in whom or what they are *not*, be the distinction social, religious, sexual, genetic, or another mental or physical construct, (Grossberg 1996). Jenkins states, “We need to recognize that identification is often most consequential as the categorization of others, rather than as self-identification” (2008, p. 15). As Meskell (2007, p. 280) suggests:

[self]-definition today coalesces around genealogy, heritage, citizenship, and sameness, but underlying that are also diverse and troubling contemporary concerns about disenfranchisement and difference. The constitutive outside, premised on exclusion and otherness, forms the corona of difference through which identities are enunciated.

In essence, it is through enumerating the differences between “us” and “them,” (particularly “them”), as well as formulating the behavioral expectations of both “us” and “them” that the bulk of personal identity is formed. This is particularly prevalent today as increased globalization has led to the endeavors of countless individuals and communities to define their own identity to confront encroachment from outside influences. Doing so, as shown below, is nothing new.

Defining Identity

Every discussion of identity contains a different definition, some simple and some complex. Perhaps one of the simplest yet encompassing definitions comes from Burke and Stets, who define identity as “the set of meanings that define who one is when one is an occupant of a particular role in society, a member of a particular group, or claims particular characteristics that identify him or her as a unique person” (2009, p. 3). Further, identity is a process of “self-categorization,” that which forms individual and group identity (Stets and Burke 2000, p. 224), and is “rooted in language—to know who’s who and what’s what” (Jenkins 2008, p. 5). Again, the emphasis is on the *process* of identity and identification (Hall 1991, 1996; Grossberg 1996). Identities can be acquired and lost, ascribed and removed, invoked and revoked, explicit and inferred, and all of this by the individual and group from within, and from outside by others (Brumfiel 2003; Grossberg 1996; Russell 2005). Voss (2005, p. 461) points out that “[identities] simultaneously provide ontological security (we know who we are) and are flashpoints in social conflict...” To know oneself provides a sense of belonging as well as psychological and a degree of physical security. To know oneself in relation to others can also provide security, but often leads to antagonism, particularly when resources or ideology come into play (Brubaker 2004).

Forming personal identity begins at birth and continuously evolves over time. I suggest that there are two types of individual identity: biological and psycho-social. Biological identity is rooted in genetic material, exhibited in such diverse forms as sex, height/size, skin/hair/eye color, age, and genealogy, and is closely related to

ethnicity (see below). Biological identity is largely uncontrolled by the individual and immutable—most people cannot change their skin color, nor can they modify their height or age, and even transgender individuals are still genetically male or female—but are closely linked with and often define many aspects of psycho-social identity.

Psycho-social identity is often ascribed to or adopted by individuals, based on the above biological factors and elaborated by as religion, history, class, race, geography, education, and perception imposed by others (Bernbeck and Pollock 1996; Burke and Stets 2009; Brumfiel 2003; Hall and du Gay 1996). It is psycho-social identity that may be the most important, as it is the identity defined by the individual and determines how that person lives their life, how they interact with others including actions and reactions based on behavioral expectations and realities, or how one is *expected* to act versus how one *really* acts and the consequences of both, and how they negotiate changes to or consistency in their identity. Identity negotiation is a daily occurrence both within the individual mind and in social situations, which has repercussions in the individual life and in the lives of others (Hall 1996; Jenkins 2008). In essence, identity is who we are and influences what we *can* do and influences what we *think* we can do. Whether or not we can actually do anything is influenced by the society in which we live with its attendant possibilities, restrictions, and expectations, our understanding of those factors, and our physical abilities themselves.

Identity and Ethnicity

Closely allied with discussions of identity is the concept of ethnicity. Like identity, ethnicity has been a part of the social sciences for quite some time, though it was the work of Barth (1969) that influences ethnicity as an area of study within itself (Cohen 1978; Emberling 1997; Jones 1997). In many respects, ethnicity can be seen as taking to the group level the same concepts and definitions related to individual identity. In most studies, the word “ethnic” is often near the word “group.” Whereas identity can be seen as something wholly individual, depending on the scale of analysis, ethnicity as a concept is often reliant on a larger association (Barth 1969; see also Brubaker 2004 for a critique of the “group” concept). In other words, ethnic *individuals* only exist as part of a larger ethnic *group*, often in particular or situational contexts (Wimmer 2013).

Though work of Barth thrust ethnicity into the social sciences, the concept was much older, as part of anthropological research into “culture areas” (Kroeber 1939), and social boundaries (Evans-Pritchard 1962; Moerman 1965; see Emberling 1997 for a review of research on ethnicity). Barth (1969, pp. 10–11) proposed that an ethnic group be defined to “designate a population which...has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category

distinguishable from other categories of the same order.” In other words, ethnicity is defined by membership in a particular group that self-identifies as having particular traits (language, territory, materials, ancestry, ideology, etc.) unique to that group, and is in turn identified by outsiders as being a unique group.

Another way of looking at the concept of ethnicity can be though “collective identity,” which is defined by Polletta and Jasper (2001, p. 285) as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution”. Further,

Collective identities are expressed in cultural materials-names, narratives, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, clothing, and so on-but not all cultural materials express collective identities. Collective identity does not imply the rational calculus for evaluating choices that “interest” does. And unlike ideology, collective identity carries with it positive feelings for other members of the group. (ibid)

Ethnicity can be seen, then, as a collective identity, though not all collective identities are necessarily related to ethnicity. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the United States, where different groups vie for the designation of “ethnic.” For example, to be “Hispanic” generally means to have ancestors who came from Central or South America with Spanish and Native American roots, with a specific language (Spanish) and other customs or cultural patterns particular to the country of ancestry though not wholly different from neighboring communities or nations that have similar genealogies. Membership, as with most other ethnic groups, is generally a matter of genetics—though an individual from northern Europe can speak Spanish fluently, live in Latin America, and practice numerous local customs, that individual will never be considered Hispanic.

This suggests up two important points. First, ethnicity is related to genetic identity and lies within the context of a group (Emberling 1997). Ethnic identity, in turn, is often a minority within a larger population and may in fact be defined by that minority status. Ask an average person in the United States of northern European descent to identify their ethnicity and they would likely say “American” or a combination of nationalities (Irish, English, German, Polish, etc.). Ask a minority and they would probably state their ethnic identity and in turn be identified as that ethnicity by outsiders. For the majority of people, ethnicity is synonymous with race, culture, heritage, and language, though it need not be so (Terrell 2001).

This leads to a second point: like individual identity, ethnicity is malleable and situation-based. Though ethnicity as a concept is a part of everyday discourse within the social sciences, it is by no means uncontested (Brubaker 2004; Leve 2011; Shaw 1994). Who gets to define a particular ethnic group? Who defines membership? For example, research among the Lemba of South Africa has suggested a strong genetic relationship with Semitic peoples living in the Middle East, particularly Jews (Browdin 2002). Genetically speaking, the Lemba are Jewish, which concords with their oral traditions, but does not automatically make them Jews, as recognized by the state of Israel or most other Jewish groups. This is due in

large part to traditional Jewish methods of determining descent, cultural practice, and conversion, which the Lemba do not follow (ibid: 325). Another example comes from the United States, where numerous groups attempt to identify as “Native American” for various reasons (Haley and Wilcoxon 2005; Kohl 1998). These identities are debated by governmental agencies and other, more “established” Native American groups, and demonstrates that defining ethnicity, like identity, is no easy feat.

Brubaker (2004), as with identity, critiques the concept of ethnicity and encourages researchers to “rethink” ethnicity as a reality and what that means for a “group” as a whole. He argues that the use of “groups” is a forced concept that does more damage than good. Classifications of “ethnic groups” actually reify the groups instead of acting as a simple definitional schema, which can lead to unnecessary conflict and confusion. Groups, then, are not real: what is real is a shared feeling of “groupness” that defines the membership. In one sense he is correct; groups in fact do not exist outside of the minds of the people who create them. But the fact that the groups do not “exist” makes them no less real. As Jenkins (2008, p. 9) points out, a “group” is a “human collectivity the members of which recognize its existence and their membership of it.” To put it another way:

An ethnic group is not one because of the degree of measurable or observable difference from other groups; it is an ethnic group, on the contrary, because the people in and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the ins and the outs talk, feel, and act as if it were a separate group (Hughes 1984, pp. 153–154).

Thus, reified or not, groups exist to people and therefore affect their own personal identity and affect what they want to do, are capable of doing, and can actually accomplish.

Within the present Che example, identity and ethnicity appear linked across scales and form what it means to “be Che.” By this I argue, as above, that native individuals living at Santa Sylvia and the wider Araucanía before, during, and after Spanish occupation likely self-identified as Che, based on material culture that exhibits continuity in style from pre-Hispanic times. At the same time, these individuals appear to have avoided using most European cultural materials. Individuals and families may have considered themselves part of the larger Che ethnic group, linked by shared language, materials, and interactions across the Araucanía, a “socio-geographic region” (see above). These senses of identity probably influenced those who actively fought against as well as those who allied themselves with the Spanish (*indios amigos*). Identity also structured how certain leaders (*lonko*, *toqui*, *machi*; see Chap. 3) acted in particular ways and times for the maintenance or restructuring of the system. This identity also influenced recruiting others to follow their lead. These formulations of identity and ethnicity may have been less strict in pre-Hispanic times (Boccaro 1999), though still in existence, and were strengthened considerably during the protracted fighting against the Spanish and Chileans. This continued to develop into present Mapuche identity (Dillehay 2007, 2014; Saavedra 2006).

Agency and Structure

Aligned with analyses of identity and ethnicity is the ability of people to move and act in accordance with how they perceive themselves, are perceived by others, and what they are able to do in their social milieu. These abilities and perceptions are often based on relationships of power, control, and negotiation (Wolf 1999). Decision-making processes to move and act, to control and negotiate, is defined by researchers as agency, and has enjoyed an increase in analysis over the few decades (Dobres and Robb 2000b). The concept of agency as an analytical tool, particularly in archaeology, is heavily influenced by the works of Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and Giddens (1979, 1984) who analyzed the structures that create a society and affect individual and group action. These structures, per Giddens, define individuals and societies and are in turn defined by the same individuals and societies (Giddens 1979). Bourdieu perceived these structures as part of *habitus*, or the “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures (Bourdieu 1977, p. 72). In other words, the structures that make up human societies—political, economic, social, and ideological—provide both the structure *for* and are structured *by* human activity and action: “people create the conditions and structures in which they live, largely as a result of the unintended consequences of their actions” (Dobres and Robb 2000b, p. 5). Or, as Silliman (2001, p. 192) states, “...social agents are both constrained and enabled by structure.”

Numerous critiques of Giddens and Bourdieu have focused on their uses of structure and agency as essentially co-equal, or a chicken-and-egg approach to which comes first. Archer (1996, 1988/1996) states that both agency and structure should be treated as separate entities and analyzed as such, so-called “analytical dualism.” She states that agency and structure “are neither co-extensive nor co-variant through time, because each possesses autonomous emergent properties which are thus capable of independent variation and therefore capable of being out of phase with one another in time” (Archer 1996, p. 66). Archer further argues

...methodologically it is necessary to make the distinction between [structure and agency] in order to examine their interplay and thus be able to explain why things are ‘so and not otherwise’ in society. This interplay between the two is crucial for effective theorizing about the social world, whether our concern is with everyday personal dilemmas or with macroscopic societal transformations....It is only through analyzing the processes by which structure and agency shape and re-shape one another over time that we can account for variable social outcomes at different times (ibid, p. 64)

Thus, both structure and agency, though separate, are intrinsically connected. In defining a structure, Callinicos (2004, p. xxiii) states a “structure is a relation connecting persons, material resources, supra-individual entities (social institutions of some kind), and/or structures by virtue of which some persons (not necessarily those so connected) gain powers of some kind.” Structure and agency are thus tied closely to relationships of power, or who can do what within the confines of particular structures, or can act outside those structures.

The processes behind modifications to cultural systems and shifts in power relationships come in many forms. I argue that four components or structures compose a cultural system: *political*, *economic*, *social*, and *ideological* (see also (Dillehay 1981; Foucault 1977; Wolf 1999)). Each of these has institutions or organization within that flesh out their nature and the practices of each, but every culture contains these four structures as a base that gives form to the resulting institutions and positions of power. *Political structures* deal with issues of governmentality, from small egalitarian groups to large states and empires, how laws are enacted and enforced, decision making at the group level, and other factors. *Economic structures* are those that direct how individuals and groups support themselves, including subsistence strategies, exchange/trade networks, and technology. *Social structures* comprise the settlement strategies, inter- and intra-group social organization, gender relationships, and hierarchy. *Ideological structures* include religion, beliefs, and associated activities and organizations, which particularly affect individual and group perceptions of the group and outsiders. It is how these structures are maintained and controlled, and by who, that affects the long-term resiliency of a cultural system. Importantly, these structures are highly connected or intertwined. Effects to one invariably affect the others. This is readily apparent in political and economic structures—although for the sake of definition, and that many of the institutions within the respective structures are distinct, both politics and economy affect each other the most. A shift in political structures generally includes a shift in economic structures as well, as the new political system seeks control over the economic practices and institutions. Eventually, the social and ideological structures change as well.

Bourdieu (1977) argued that individual action is generally “unconscious” or the day-to-day result of habit or instinct, and that most (not all) human action is unintentional in nature. Giddens, on the other hand, states that “humans are neither to be treated as passive objects, nor as wholly free subjects” (1979, p. 150; see also Silliman 2001, p. 192). Despite the instinctive nature of actions, in many cases, and contrary to Bourdieu, they are not specifically unconscious acts, but rather sub-conscious, available for later review and reflection by the actor or actors (Dornan 2002; Throop and Murphy 2002).

It may be a semantic argument to differentiate between “subconscious” and “unconscious” actions, though subconscious, at least in this research, allows for more personal control. Unconscious action is more instinctive and uncontrolled, whereas subconscious action is more indicative of the ability of the actor to control their actions. Though the individual may not be wholly aware of the action they are taking, they note it on some mental level. Unconscious acts, then, are not given to review—one cannot stop the beating of a heart, or the twitch of a muscle, even though they are acts—whereas subconscious acts can be reflected upon and will be used to define, constrain, and affect action in the future.

This aspect of agency is very broad. In one sense, all people are agents unto themselves. If all individuals are agents, the concept of agency loses much of its expository ability. Like identity, agency can be applied to everything to the point that it means nothing (Archer 1996; Ortner 2001; Silliman 2001). To strengthen the

concept, then, theorists have inserted the importance of goals, for how agents move and accomplish activities. Hodder (2000, p. 22) further refines this by stating that agency can be “seen in terms of the resources needed in order to act” along with a degree of “intentionality.” “Action is the doing, the mobilization of resources to have an effect” (Barrett 2012, p. 61). For an individual to have agency, they must have knowledge of and access to the resources that will allow the achievement of goals via direct action, negotiation, and so on. Some of these actions can be small scale, such as a farmer needing the knowledge and materials to plant a crop and reap a successful harvest, or for a politician to use money, material, and an understanding of their constituency to get elected. Some actions can be large scale, such as rebels acquiring access to weapons in order to overthrow a regime, or a cabal of individuals working to destabilize a government. In any case, the fundamental precursor to action is knowledge of who the individual is (or what the group is), how the society is organized, what their role is, and how they can move and act based on that organization. Thus, individuals (*sensu* Silliman 2001) are “both constrained and enabled” by their understanding of self (identity), relationships to others (ethnicity), power structures, knowledge, and other factors to bring to pass change or maintain the *status quo*.

Agency, then, is the ability of individuals to exercise power to act, based on who the person is, what they believe they can do, and what others are willing to let them do (i.e., how others perceive them). Some aspects of agency are actionary and reactionary: individuals act in one way, which causes others to react to those actions in another way. For example, the construction of Santa Sylvia was an act on the part of the Spanish *encomendero*, as well as the decision by some Che to be *indios amigos*. Che leaders near Santa Sylvia and throughout the Araucanía chose to act to expel the Spanish. Other Che chose to follow these leaders in those efforts and to maintain autonomous control over traditional cultural structures and practices (Ercilla y Zúñiga 1569/2003; Rosales 1674/1989). Che leaders, those who chose to follow them, and the Spaniards moved and acted based on their identity as perceived by themselves and others, and through the cultural structures which they viewed as the most appropriate way to do things. More broadly, Che leaders strategically restructured the system in different ways (such as the increased importance of *ayllarehue* and *butanmapu*), adjusting to the necessities of the continued war, the incorporation of new materials and refugees, and the concurrent increase in the concept of “being Che” (Bengoa 2000, 2003; Boccara 2007; Dillehay 2014). Thus, Che and Spaniards appear to have acted in specific ways based on their knowledge, abilities, and perceptions of themselves and the others.

Che agents are individuals who have an understanding of the system and one or more of its structures, and are able to navigate the same to meet their own or wider social goals, such as removal of the Spanish and emphasis on ancestor propitiation for success in that effort. “Action depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to ‘make a difference’, that is, to exercise some sort of power” (Giddens 1984, p. 14). Agency is not simply the ability to move and to act, but to do so with a purpose, or with the potentiality of

achieving a certain design or goal. Agency, knowledge, ideology, and power are inextricable: to be an agent means to have knowledge and power to move and act; to have knowledge provides the potentiality to be an agent with power; and to have power means to know how to act and move in a particular sphere (Mann 2012; Wolf 1999, 2001).

Within the conceptual framework of RT, agents are the prime movers who affect and are affected by the structures and broader cultural systems. Structures and systems only exist inasmuch as people *make* them and are recursively made *by* them (Giddens 1984; cf Archer 1996). For a system to be maintained, or to “absorb disturbance while retaining essentially the same function” (Gunderson and Holling 2002) depends on the actions of agents within. If the agents had failed to act, or acted in a way detrimental to the system, the traditional structures would have shifted to the authority and power of the Spanish. RT provides a framework for understanding this interplay between structure, system, agency, and action. By applying this to the Che example, a richer understanding of how the Che could and did resist the Spanish and maintained independence comes to light. Analysis of the material correlates along with oral and written histories, Che resilience can include (1) a continuation of a pre-existing or traditional system that included political, social, and economic patterns and (2) the incorporation of useful Spanish goods, such as foodstuffs and animals, with a concurrent avoidance of foreign control and influence.

Cultural systems, through actions inside and outside, pass through developmental cycles or phases (the Adaptive Cycle, or AC; see below): growth, conservation, release, reorganization/rebound, and reorganization/exit (Fig. 2.1). Resilience is thus more than resistance, or “oppositional behavior” (Hollander and Enwöhner 2004), and more than structural functionalism (Murdock 1949; Parsons 1960). RT incorporates stability, flexibility, absorption, restructuring, and importantly agency and ideology. These aspects influence how actors experience and incorporate change into their cultural systems, while at the same time maintaining the base structures or traditions (Thompson and Turck 2009). This research further hypothesizes that for the Che, these facets of RT (flexibility, absorption, modification) came about through the actions of agents on *their* terms, not Spanish terms, which aided in avoiding




Fig. 2.1 The adaptive cycle

hybridized or syncretized cultural practices, perpetuating the Che cultural system and ideology for nearly four centuries.

In a counterexample to the Che, the Pueblos of central New Mexico in the United States, like the Araucanians, managed to expel the Spanish in a revolt that lasted from 1680 to 1692 after having been subject for nearly 100 years (Barrett 2002; Bowden 1975; Kessell 2002; Liebmann 2010; Silverberg 1994). The Pueblo Revolt, however, was not sustained for multiple reasons, notably changes that came to their traditional economic (increased reliance on Spanish goods), social (movement away from prior settlements to Spanish towns and forts and the introduction of a mestizo class), political (pueblo chiefs allying themselves and their peoples with Spanish governors) and ideological (introduction and adoption of Catholicism) systems from AD 1598 to the revolt in 1680 (Liebmann 2012; Preucel 2002; Riley 1999; Weber 1999; Wilcox 2009).² Even though the Pueblos managed to expel the Spanish for a decade, the accumulated effects from years of Spanish authority had already shifted their culture system into a new social structure, one that could not sustain the efforts to return to previous forms and autonomy. Power relationships had shifted, alliances changed, and concepts of identity were transformed. Attributes of the previous system persisted, such as some religious practices, settlement patterns, and kin relationships (Adams 1991; Roberts 2004), but overall a new cultural system came into being in new AC, along with new identities, recognitions of ethnicity (including the growing mestizo class; Dobyns 2001), and different avenues of agency and power.

In sum, RT can frame the processes that constitute the maintenance, sustainability, and resurgence (“synthesis in time of reproduction and variability,” Sahlins 1985) of cultural systems and structures against outside disturbance. RT works as a conceptual device useful for understanding the development and maintenance of cultural systems and structures while incorporating elements of agency and power as part of the explanatory framework.

Resilience Theory

Overview

The basis of RT is derived from the work of economist Joseph Schumpeter, who analyzed the stability of the capitalist economic system in the mid-twentieth century (Schumpeter 1928, 1950/1976, 1991). Schumpeter argued that the capitalist system was one of “creative destruction” wherein new goods and services would enter in the system, thereby “destroying” the old ways via new creativity (Schumpeter

² And, like the Che, the Pueblos experienced intergroup fighting, but in the case of the Pueblos the infighting was widespread enough to limit the ability of revolutionary leaders to maintain the revolt (Haas and Creamer 1997; McGuire and Saitta 1996).

1950/1976). However, the overall structure of the capitalist system remained, incorporating these outside “disturbances” into the pre-existing structure (Schumpeter 1928). He further argued, particularly in his discussions on Marxism and Socialism, that sociological effects could have the impetus to destroy the capitalist system if pushed to that level, as seen in the Russian and Chinese Revolutions (Schumpeter 1991). Schumpeter’s argument, then, suggests that social and economic interests are inextricable, and that a system could be resilient if it could absorb outside disturbance without experiencing fundamental systemic change.

Schumpeter’s arguments found limited use in anthropological or sociological circles and the RT model did not work into a general theoretical schema until the 1970s. In 1973, ecologist C.S. Holling first defined RT, specifically in the management of ecological systems. Holling argued that some ecological systems tended toward being “resilient” rather than “stable,” by which he meant that stability would tend to lock a system into a pattern that, when perturbed from the outside, would be unable to maintain systemic integrity and would morph into a new system. A resilient system, on the other hand, would be able to take in outside disturbance without experiencing the systemic shifts seen in less-resilient systems. Stability, though seemingly desirable, would not be conducive in the long term to managing or maintaining a system because all systems, at one point or another, are affected by some sort of outside disturbance (Holling 1973). This is similar to how all cultures are in contact with and influenced by others (Wolf 1997).

RT has gained traction amongst ecologists over the last 30 years, particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Gunderson 1999; Gunderson and Pritchard 2002; Pritchard and Sanderson 1999; Walker 1995). Other researchers with interests in human-environment interactions began to adapt and expand the theory to analyze the interactions between human society and ecological systems, particularly how humans could learn to manage the environment for the purposes of sustainability (Walker and Salt 2006, 2012). The formation of The Resilience Alliance in 1999 brought together researchers from various disciplines to study the effects of humans on the environment and vice versa, and to develop the methodologies for governance and maintenance of so-called “social-ecological systems” (or SES; Berkes et al. 2003b; Folke 2006; van der Leeuw and Aschan-Leygonie 2001).

To the present day, most studies using RT tend to focus on SES analyses, since “[systems] of people and nature co-evolve in an adaptive dance” (Gunderson 2003). These interdisciplinary studies center on the interplay between humanity and ecology. Though ecological studies using RT are often treated alone, rarely do these studies look at the social systems by themselves without an ecological viewpoint. This has been the case in recent archaeological uses of RT (Hegmon et al. 2008; Nelson et al. 2006; Redman 2005; Redman and Kinzig 2003). Like SES studies, RT in archaeology grew from analyses of human-environment interactions in ecological and landscape anthropology and archaeology (Crumley 1994; Hirsch and O’Hanlon 1995; Redman 1999; Redman et al. 2004; Stewart and Strathern 2003). In some instances, researchers have used RT without defining it as such (Nelson and Hegmon 2001; Upham and Plog 1986). My focus here is on using RT for strictly social phenomena, rather than the incorporation of ecological information.

Archaeology is particularly suited for using RT, due to the long-term views used in most research. Redman (2005, p. 70) states that, in studying the interactions between different aspects of human society, “[these] interactions can best be understood from a perspective that takes those long-term dynamics into account and addresses question from an integrated, often interdisciplinary, perspective on human societies....” Further, archaeology “permits more in-depth monitoring of the slow processes and low-frequency events that appear to be the key to ultimate system resilience” (ibid). Thus, archaeology is in the unique position to provide *longue-durée* analyses that bolster the theoretical strength of RT (Redman and Kinzig 2003). However, as Redman (2005) points out, RT should be used from an “integrated” and “interdisciplinary” perspective. Therefore, studying the Che, particularly during the era of Spanish contact (AD 1550–1602), must use archaeology, ethnography, and ethnohistory to view the development of culture and resilience through time, and the applicability to other Araucanian groups during the same time period elsewhere in south-central Chile.

Specifics of Resilience Theory

RT itself has been defined by The Resilience Alliance and by most users of the theory as:

1. The amount of change [a] system can undergo and still retain the same controls on function and structure, or still be in the same state, within the same domain of attraction;
2. The degree to which [a] system is capable of self-organization; and
3. The ability to build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation (Berkes et al. 2003a, p. 13)

Simplified, Walker et al. (2004, p. 5) define RT as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.” A system is resilient if, when exposed to strong outside forces, it can absorb or adapt to that change in such a way as to retain the overall pre-existing structural form with limited effects to the system, or without the base components of the system being modified into something new. The change that comes to a system, also called a “regime shift,” may have strong similarities to the previous system or subsystems, but at some level its nature has changed. As it is applied in this research, a regime shift signifies a change in power relations from one group to another, or when a culture reorganizes and political, economic, social, and/or ideological authority is vested in a foreign group. For the Che, I argue that a regime shift did not transpire until the late nineteenth century (see Chap. 7).

My use of RT emphasizes the flexibility of a system, as well as its adaptability and transformability as directed by goal-oriented actors and their ideology. This sets RT apart from other, similar social theories such as structure-functionalism or Systems

Theory described by Bourdieu, Giddens, and others (Gunderson et al. 2010; Redman and Kinzig 2003; Thompson and Turck 2009). The ability of a system to “absorb disturbance” and “retain...the same function” is largely based on the actions of agents with particular ideologies, which provides stronger ontological security for theorizing cultural continuity and change than other concepts by themselves. RT incorporates, in the vein of Giddens (1979) and Archer (1996), human agency in mitigating disturbance, strategic modification, and systemic maintenance and perpetuation.

More specifically, Walker et al. (2004) include four “crucial aspects” of resilience that can “apply...to a whole system or the subsystems that make it up.” These are

1. *Latitude*: the maximum amount a system can be changed before losing its ability to [rebound] (before crossing a threshold which, if breached, makes [rebounding] difficult or impossible).
2. *Resistance*³: the ease or difficulty of changing the system; how “resistant” it is to being changed.
3. *Precariousness*: how close the current state of the system is to a limit or “threshold.”
4. *Panarchy*: because of cross-scale interactions, the resilience of a system at a particular focal scale will depend on the influences from states and dynamics of scales above and below. For example, external oppressive politics, invasions, market shifts, or global climate change can trigger local surprises and regime shifts.

These four aspects will be explored in more depth below, but serve to point out that systems are usually multiscale, and that disturbances can have both bottom-up and top-down effects on the system, structures, individuals, and groups. For example, in the Che system some disturbances might be identified at the household (*ruka*) level which can radiate upwards to the *lof*, *rehue*, *ayllarehue*, and *butanmapu* levels. These *ruka*-level disturbances may exhibit agency, as the *ruka* acts to rectify the disturbance by calling on kin relations and networks. If the disturbance is strong enough, those networks can expand to incorporate greater organizational levels. From the top-down, leaders of *butanmapu* and *ayllarehue*, recognizing an encroaching threat, might use their own networks to call upon warriors from various *rehue* and *lof*, which eventually affects the *ruka*-level organization (see Chap. 3).

Additionally, some disturbances are immediate and acute, while others may percolate for a period of time before affecting the system. “A key insight is that... resilience is mediated and lost due to the interaction of variables that operate at distinctive scales of space and time” (Gunderson et al. 2010, p. xvii). RT becomes highly useful as an analytical and heuristic tool for archaeologists and historians dealing with long cultural sequences with multiple variables and impacts. The

³ Not resistance in the same sense discussed above (see Hollander and Enwöhner 2004; Ortner 1995).

construction of Santa Sylvia itself can be perceived as an “immediate and acute” event for the Che living in the area, while in the wider Araucanía the effects of one settlement may not be seen to be as affecting the overall cultural system, but the general Spanish incursion does. After the expulsion of the Spanish from the area in the late sixteenth century, the prolongation of tensions and fighting along the Bio Bio frontier to the northwest was then “immediate and acute” in that area but does not appear to have exerted the same degree of effect on the Santa Sylvia area in the subsequent seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. RT can be used to describe these multi-faceted and multiscale effects of Che and Spanish interactions on the overall Che system and the interactions between individuals and communities.

The four intertwined system structures⁴ mentioned above compose the bulk of system organization. Each structure functions separate from but in concert with the others under an overall cultural system, and the loss of control one or more has the potential to alter the others and the system as a whole. Again, changes to the political and economic structures may have a limited effect on social organization or religious practice, but changes to the former structures can modify the cultural system as a whole, eventually bringing change to the latter and altering, often irrevocably, the total system. These structures function together to structure the cultural system, to absorb and distribute disturbance or mitigate the effects of the same on the structure as a whole. These structures are created and maintained by agents, acting in particular ways based on their knowledge, identity, ethnicity, ideology, and goals. They are not in existence by and for themselves, but as part of the cultural system composed of individuals and related communities or groups.

The Adaptive Cycle

Because of its diachronic nature, RT is cyclical, or the result of actions and reactions to multiple disturbances at various scales over time (Folke 2006; Gunderson and Pritchard 2002; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Redman 2005). This is illustrated in what Gunderson and Holling (2002) term the abovementioned “Adaptive Cycle” (Fig. 2.1). The Adaptive Cycle (AC) illustrates the stages through which a system passes and can be expanded to fit various connected scales, known as *Panarchy* (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Walker et al. 2004). The cycle is seen as a Mobius strip of four phases: growth, conservation, release/revolt, and reorganization, to which have been added “rebound” and “exit” subcomponents to better illustrate the ability of the system to return to the previous AC without experiencing a regime shift (*sensu* Thompson and Turck 2009). Though illustrated as passing from one to another, systems can in fact skip phases based on disturbances or events and are not locked into a particular sequence, e.g., a system can pass from growth

⁴ These are also what Walker et al. (2004, p. 2) call “nested dynamics operating at particular organization scales.”

directly to release and reorganization, bypassing the conservation phase. There is also no time limit to these phases, the conservation phase perhaps being the longest of the four in a given cycle. If a system, through the agents within, navigates disturbances to the system in the other phases, during the reorganization phase the system can “rebound” back into the same AC. Additionally, an exit may exist within the reorganization phase for the creation of a new system if the former system cannot rebound, entering a new RC. This is known as a “regime shift,” or movement to a new “stability domain” (Gunderson et al. 2010; Holling et al. 2002b; Walker and Salt 2006).

In a generic culture system, the growth phase usually involves the initial development of cultural attributes, particularly population increase and the creation of particular material culture elements. It can also include the development of trade and exchange networks (economic structures), household- and or kin-level patterns and interpersonal relationships (social structures); inter- and intra-community relations (political structures); and religious activities (ideological structures). Archaeologically speaking, the development of these systems can include or be suggested by attendant material correlates. For example, the early United States borrowed heavily from Great Britain for social foundations, but after independence developed separate trade networks, social hierarchy, political organization, and religious patterns, which could be seen in money, the construction of Washington D.C., road networks, the flag, and church diversity, among many other indicators of a “regime shift” from the British system to the new American system (Wood 1998).

The conservation phase generally continues systemic development from the growth phase, which can be seen as the amassing of political, economic, social, and religious capital, or overall “cultural capital” (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990).⁵ In this phase, the system continues to operate in a state perhaps more stable than before as the base structures have been in place and function with minor modifications. Modifications may include the adoption of a new style of pottery or other technology, the transition from one governing individual or body to another, overall population increase, trade with a new partner, and so on. In essence, however, the fundamentals remain the same overall.

During the conservation phase, the system has the potential to enter into what is called a “rigidity trap” or what Holling initially viewed as a “stable system” (Holling 1973; Holling et al. 2002a; Hegmon et al. 2008). Hegmon et al. (2008, p. 314) state that “[rigidity] traps may be unintended consequences of repetitive acts that reproduce or extend the structure (i.e., a bureaucracy). In other cases, some segments of society may contribute to the creation of a rigidity trap by intentionally attempting to maintain a situation that they perceive to be beneficial.” In essence, during the conservation phase the system has some degree of *latitude* (see above) to change and adapt, and if a system becomes too rigid then the latitude decreases (Walker et al. 2004). There can be multiple ways that social systems can fall into a

⁵ Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) consider cultural capital to be separate from political, economic, or social capital.

rigidity trap, including strict ideology, lack of innovation, the aforementioned bureaucracy, and others, both internal and external to the system and agents. These can cause the system to be increasingly *resistant* to change which can be seen as detrimental to the system. For example, the Rappite religious sect in the eastern United States during the early nineteenth century believed that sexual intercourse would lead to “disharmony” and thus practiced an extreme form of celibacy. Their numbers increased somewhat through the mid-1800s, but with no children being born into the sect the number of adherents declined rapidly. Though some advocated sexual activity for the purposes of procreation, sect leadership refused and the group eventually became extinct by the beginning of the twentieth century (Sutton 2003). Rigidity traps, perhaps centered in the ideology of actors within the system, inhibit how the system “absorbs disturbance” and maintains integrity against outside influence. Rigidity traps may be the primary cause behind systemic shifts into new stability domains (Gunderson 1999; Holling et al. 2002b).

Falling into a rigidity trap can facilitate cycling into the release phase of the AC, yet any form of strong disturbance can lead the system into the release/revolt phase, which Holling et al. (2002b, p. 34; drawing upon Schumpeter 1950/1976) also call “creative destruction.” This phase exhibits the *precariousness* of the system. In some cases, particularly ecological, the system becomes increasingly fragile during the conservation stage, and the introduction of disturbance forces the system to either adapt or reorganize (Holling et al. 2002a; Walker and Salt 2006, 2012). In social systems, internal pressures can be the stressor that facilitates systemic change, though often it is external disturbance that throws into relief the fragility or rigidity of the system and structures (Redman 2005; Redman and Kinzig 2003; Walker et al. 2004). As will be discussed below, the principal stressor for indigenous groups in North and South America was the arrival of European colonizers who brought new structures and basins of attraction, and attempted to impose these on the native groups encountered.


After releasing/revolting, or experiencing “creative destruction,” a system and its agents have two options: exit to a new, different AC, or maintain systemic fundamentals and rebound back into the AC. A different AC as part of a new stability domain is, in essence, a new system as some facets of the system structures have changed. This is often seen in a change in the power relationships within the system. The vestiges of the previous fundamentals are there, but overall the society in question exists with new structures and power relationships. With the same Rappite example, after the system could no longer be self-sustaining, the remaining followers exited to a new system. They likely adhered to many of the previous tenets and propagated those beliefs, but the general Rappite system and attendant structures were abandoned. The power that leaders had over adherents was lost, and the movement became extinct (Sutton 2003). Again, the internal and external effects on a system and movement through the different phases of RC come about because of the actions of individuals and groups, not because of the system itself.

Panarchy

Mentioned above, RT and ACs are also a matter of *scale*, and generally involve a consistent interaction between various scales, both top-down and bottom-up. Additionally, these scales can and do move at different speeds. Sometimes large-scale changes take time to reverberate down to the small scale and vice versa. This scalar- and speed-based analysis is known in RT as *Panarchy* (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Holling et al. (2002b, p. 74) define Panarchy as “a cross-scale, nested set of [resilience] cycles, indicating the dynamic nature of structures....” (see also Berkes et al. 2003b; Folke 2006; Folke et al. 2004; Redman and Kinzig 2003; Walker 1995).

Panarchy, illustrated in Fig. 2.2, shows the interconnected, scalar nature of adaptive cycles. All cultural systems operate in scales, whether it be a hierarchy or heterarchy within, or how the system relates to exterior stimuli, including other social systems and the environment. Some scales change rapidly, others slowly, depending on the aforementioned interior or exterior disturbances each with a connected AC and the action of agents (Holling et al. 2002b). Smaller scales are generally affected the most by disturbance, moving into the release phase more often, which can eventually affect higher levels. Ripples of disturbance can continue to reverberate and affect increasingly higher levels if not contained or acted upon. This may be illustrated by a town such as Nashville, Tennessee being affected by a disturbance such as the flood of 2010, which effects reverberated to the regional level of Middle Tennessee. If the system is resilient, the state of Tennessee should be able to mitigate the effects of the disturbance (the “remember” in Fig. 2.2) and return Middle Tennessee and Nashville to a stable state (reorganization in the AC). If the system breaks down at the state level, then the Federal level steps into aid in return to a stable state. If the effects are so great that the various scales break down, then the entire system and Panarchy will exit the previous system and reorganize anew (a new overall AC).

Fig. 2.2 Panarchy



This example is overly simplistic, but illustrates the nested nature of human cultural systems within an RT framework. These can be broken down into smaller scales per investigative needs. Scales are important in the Che example as local and regional connections, interactions, and differences aided actors in overall Che system resilience. “No [system] can be understood by examining it at only one scale” (Walker et al. 2004). Though I emphasize here what the Che did at Santa Sylvia during a particular time, they were nonetheless part of larger Che cultural system that extended geographically through kinship relations and other networks, seen in the sharing of artifact styles, religious practice, and settlement patterns across distances; oral and written histories; and modern ethnographies. Thus, Santa Sylvia is a part of the broader context of the Che culture system and within the wider scope of the RT framework. Distinct but similar processes of adaptation and Panarchy happened elsewhere in the Araucanía, such as in Purén-Lumaco (Dillehay 2014; Dillehay and Zavala 2013), which, through social networks, affected Che living in Pucón-Villarrica, and vice versa.

Summary

Human systems, then, are affected by disturbances from both the inside and outside. Sometimes, the decisions made by agents within affect the system. Other times, the outside disturbance affects the system, or exerts such an influential “pull” that there is nothing the members can do to avoid changes to the system resulting in a loss of autonomy and a switch to a different AC. Most times, though, it is a combination of the outside disturbance and the decisions of the agents in the system that can determine whether or not the system avoids a new domain, state space, and AC. Critics of RT have questioned normative issues of “good” versus “bad” resilience—whether or not the shifts to new cycles or spaces is beneficial to the system or not (Duit et al. 2010; Leach 2008). In human systems, such debates can tend to the philosophical minutiae of moralizing “right” or “wrong” aspects of culture. On the one hand, if decisions made within an AC maintain an oppressive political regime (see Duit et al. 2010), then the argument may be valid to say that such resilience is “bad.” Decisions made within that political regime that cause a shift to a new basin of attraction leading to an exit from the AC, making the previous system not resilient may be seen as “good.” In either case, Resilience Theory can be used to explain the various scales, shifts, attractions, decisions, and actions that go into make a system resilient or not, while emphasizing how agents within the culture system are the prime movers in how changes come about. This also incorporates the nature of identity and ethnicity, as individuals are more willing to enact or accept changes based on who they perceive themselves to be, and how they perceive and are perceived by others.

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The Archaeology and Ethnohistory of Araucanian
Resilience

Sauer, J.J.

2015, XIII, 193 p. 32 illus., 22 illus. in color., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-09200-3