

Chapter 2

Methodological Pitfalls

2.1 Inhuman Science

Having situated Heidegger's thought in the epistemological scheme outlined by Foucault in his *Les mots et les choses*, we can discern not only its general contours, but also its limitations. We may even think of possible ways to transgress the limits of the ontological analysis of human existence and try to see mental disorders in a different light. It might be therefore effective to use the critical potential of *Les mots et les choses* to a maximum.

In the following chapter, Heidegger's critique of natural science and its domination in the area of psychiatry, as it is formulated in his *Zollikoner Seminare*, shall be confronted with Foucault's epistemological analysis of the classical thought that is conducted in *Les mots et les choses* and with the picture of classical medicine that Foucault presents in his *Naissance de la clinique*. This confrontation brings to the fore the Cartesian idea of *mathesis universalis* which functions as a general matrix of scientific thought. The play of conceptual identities and differences based on the general matrix of *mathesis universalis*, however, leaves no place for the individuality of human existence. To grasp the individuality of human existence, both phenomenology and medicine must turn away from the conceptual scheme of *mathesis universalis* and from the classical notion of thought. Together with the individuality of human existence, phenomenology also uncovers the phenomenon of the lived body which reflects the psychosomatic nature of human existence. In his *Zollikoner Seminare* Heidegger then integrates the individuality of the human existence with the phenomenon of the lived body in the complex structure of being-in-the-world.

But before we reach the phenomenal structure of human existence, we must understand what prevents natural science from reaching the realm in which human existence finds itself. We need to examine methodological principles of natural science in order to discover the significance of the hegemony of natural science in the area of medicine. Despite an enormous progress in the effectiveness of medical treatment and the huge amount of information about the processes in human

organism, medicine formed by natural science is, according to Heidegger, deceived in its approach to human existence by its very understanding of reality. Only if one arrives at understanding of what is real for natural science, is it thus possible to declare that there are any phenomena beyond the reach of natural science.

The inquiry into the methodic principles of a specific discipline is usually understood as examining the methodology of a scientific work in the relevant field of study. In the case of physics, which in *Zollikoner Seminare* serves as a model of natural science, the key role is played by scientific experiments and theoretical hypotheses. These two aspects of scientific work are essentially interdependent. Inasmuch as the scientific experiment is derived from an underlying theory, its results can lead to a revision of the given theory. With the help of the scientific experiment, it is to be shown whether or not the theoretical hypothesis corresponds to reality. In their reciprocal correlation, experiment and theoretical construction contribute to the co-operative discovery of nature. The two research methods share their scientific exactitude which is manifested in the use of mathematical forms and relations. What physical science finds in application of mathematics is an undisputed confirmation of its general validity and effectuality. The undertaken experiments and formulated hypotheses obtain the hallmark of objective truthfulness as long as they correspond to the spirit of mathematical exactitude.

However, a given means of research, which (just as an experiment or a theoretical construction) is meant to result in scientific knowledge, represents a method only in the “instrumental”¹ sense. From the purely instrumental conception of method Heidegger distinguishes method in the more original sense of the word, substantially different from the methodology of scientific inquiry. As the sense of the Greek words *μετά* and *ὁδός* (the “way from here to there” or the “way toward”) suggests, method in the original etymological sense denotes an approach by means of which the character of the examined area is revealed and delineated.² For the scientific theses and experiments to come into play at all, it is first and foremost necessary to gain access to the area under scrutiny. Only within the framework of an area open and determined by means of a certain method is it possible to invoke incontestable facts, while elaborating on theses and verifying experimentally their validity.

The question of method is therefore of outstanding significance within the realm of physics; the direction as well as the character of the inquiry is determined not by research practices, but primarily by the method that actually allows the implementation of these practices together with their mathematically exact treatment of facts. A similar conclusion is reached by Deleuze in his *Différence et répétition* when he considers the conditions enabling the repeatability of scientific experiments.³ As long as science presupposes the repeatability of processes observed under the same conditions, this is done not so much by applying mathematics to natural phenomena as by operating within the framework of mathematizable relations. Compared to

¹Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 167.

²Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, p. 137.

³Deleuze, Gilles. 1968. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 9–10.

preliminary access to the area under inquiry, the mathematical formality of the means of research is secondary, since the usage of mathematical forms can yield data only in the context of primary measurability. The realm of physical processes is thus always uncovered in advance with regard to their mathematical measurability.

Since the measurability of beings, as this is presupposed by exact science, entails comprehension of a purely quantitative character, physics must disregard the qualitative richness of life and focus exclusively on its mathematically apprehensible factors. Natural entities, stripped of their semantic potential, remain merely the sum of quantitatively recordable and mutually comparable data. However, the impact of the presupposed exact measurability of things is not restricted to their simple quantifiability. What lies in their measurability is also the preliminary calculability of all processes under observation. That is to say, the changes taking place are pre-adumbrated so that different eventualities of their course are predictable.⁴

Besides, Heidegger's exposition of the methodological principles of mathematical natural science shows that the prediction of changes is possible only under conditions that guarantee elementary regularity in nature. In order for such conditions to be met, there must take place idealization, which yields homogeneous space and homogeneous time. Without it the modern conception of physical science as realized by Galileo and Newton could never have been formulated. Galileo's principal point of departure that posits the conditions of empirical inquiry is the supposition in which the occurrence of change is regarded as a regular change of the position of mass-points in homogeneous space and time. What is postulated in this supposition is also causality without which exact predictability would remain inconceivable. The scientific rationalism proper to physics is based on the belief that every occurrence must be the effect of some cause.

However, Galileo's presupposition is something that cannot, unlike the theoretical hypothesis, be proven or refuted by means of undertaking an experiment, since it reaches the ultimate ontological foundations of mathematical physics. In order to comprehend the key principles of mathematical physics, it is necessary to explicate the ontological project that underlies its method.

Heidegger's clarification of the ontological sense of the method of exact sciences derives from the understanding that as soon as there is the continuous motion of mass-points discerned in the process of change, every single thing ceases to be an entity that is present in itself and instead becomes an object. Consequently, the field proper to physical science is created by nothing other than mathematically noticeable objects concatenated in causal relations. Everything that defies this framework is automatically considered as uncertain and as not truly real. Certain, i.e. true, is only what manifests itself in the sphere of objects of observation with a mathematical index to the eye of the observing subject. Nature, articulated as a set of observed objects, is placed in relation to the thinking subject. The dichotomy of the mathematically conceived *res extensa* and *res cogitans* corroborates the vast extent to which the method of mathematical natural science is informed by Cartesian dualism.

⁴Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare*, 135.

Even though the idea of mathematical natural science reflects not so much Descartes' own philosophical system as the whole legacy of his epoch, Descartes still continues to occupy an exceptional place, since it was he who pondered mathematical physics in its ultimate foundations.

Although the objective status of natural beings can seem, with hindsight, thoroughly natural, Heidegger connects it with the historical change of European thought occurring in the seventeenth century. According to him, neither Antiquity nor the Middle Ages were familiar with such a conception of beings: whereas ancient culture comprehended natural phenomena in the sense of the Greek φαίνεσθαι, i.e. as something manifested by means of disclosing itself out of concealment, medieval thought viewed all beings as created by the God. In comparison with these views of reality, objectiveness means a certain modification of the presence of beings. Natural science is made possible by a change due to which natural beings are no longer conceptualized as present in themselves; their presence can be manifested only by virtue of the ideas of the thinking subject. Although the reality of nature is not quite denied or condemned to the sphere of mere seeming or "semblance", the presence of natural beings is thus comprehended as re-presentation.⁵ What in effect is at stake here is the radical reversal in the understanding of being of natural beings – their being is inextricably linked to their representation in the subjective mind.

The foundations of mathematical physics are revealed even further in the 1935/1936 lecture series published under the title *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, where Heidegger tries to explicate the character of the mathematical order (*das Mathematische*) underlying Galileo's and Newton's conception of nature. Here, just as in *Zollikoner Seminare*, it is demonstrated that Galileo's and Newton's natural laws make sense only within the realm that is projected from the outset in terms of measurability and computability of natural beings. For nature to be intelligible by means of mathematics, it needs to be axiomatically determined as equally distributed spatiotemporal nexus of mass-points; therefore, what can be projected into the scientific picture are only bodies integrated into this nexus.

In view of the fact that Descartes had indeed been the one who in an exemplary way pondered what Galileo and Newton achieved in science, a mere glance at his *Regulae* reveals that the mathematical order, out of which modern physical science is derived, must not be conceived of as *mathematica vulgaris*, but rather as *mathesis universalis*. What is at stake is not mathematics itself, but rather a project of the factual essence of beings that allows for a neat classification and gradual transition from the elementary toward the most complex of knowledge. The mathematical order as the principal standpoint of mathematical natural science creates the grounding that allows for the division of unclear and complex sentences into simple theses and, by drawing upon these in a rationally intelligible sequence, results in an understanding of the complex ones. In the overall arrangement and composition of everything within the order of *mathesis universalis* lies the broadest foundation on which mathematical physics is built.

⁵Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare*, 129.

This matrix, claims Heidegger, is not only the origin of mathematical natural science and modern mathematics (Leibnitz's discovery of differential calculus, etc.), but also Cartesian philosophy as such. Descartes' philosophical system is arguably the fruit of deep reflections upon the mathematical order; as if the mathematical tendency in thinking had awoken and grasped itself by considering itself the criterion of all thought and devising the rules it brings forth. It is only on the basis of the mathematical order that the need arises for the discovery of the first, altogether indubitable thesis that could serve as the ultimate axiom for all other sentences, irrespective of what they address. The statement "I think therefore I am" can be the absolute foundation for the certainty of cognition only because it relies on *mathesis universalis* as the basic matrix of the seventeenth century thought. The objectification of all beings present-at-hand would be meaningless without it, for these are put in relation to the subject of the axiom "I think – I am".

It is interesting to note here that the characteristics of mathematically organized knowledge mentioned above converges in many respects with Foucault's picture of the classical episteme. As the epistemological investigation undertaken in *Les mots et les choses* indicates, the arrival of classical science in the seventeenth century marks a rupture in the history of European thought. Not that science would have only at this point acquired a sense of measure and order; what occurred was that an altogether extraordinary importance was attributed to the values which had to some extent already been acknowledged. What is characteristic of the epistemological field of classical science is that measure and order serve as points of departure as well as the ultimate imperatives of thought.

The example of Descartes' *Regulae* clearly demonstrates that it is by virtue of the universal validity of measure and order that not only deductive derivation and clear, purely intellectual observation of a certain thing, but also the comparison between two or more things achieve a new formal status. Apart from comparing quantities for the sake of determining the arithmetical relations of equality and inequality among things, Descartes also acknowledges comparison by means of order, within whose framework the simplest term is found and from there also the progression from simpler to more complex elements. As the measurement of size or amount can be reduced to creating order (since arithmetic and physical quantities may be arranged into a continuous row), both of the types merely represent two different ways of determining the progression from the simple to the complex. Thus, Foucault concludes that it is the idea of *mathesis universalis*, of the overall, rationally observable order, that plays the key role in the classical episteme. No matter how prevalent mathematical formalism might be within certain scientific realms, the plane proper to classical knowledge is not the mathematization of all reality and the concomitant conversion of a qualitative difference into a quantitative one. The mathematization of the empirical asserts itself only in such realms of classical science as the Galilean and Newtonian physics, whereas the relation of understanding to the general order as proposed in *mathesis universalis* also concerns the non-quantifiable. Insofar as classical science as a whole shares some common characteristics, this lies, according to Foucault, in its preoccupation with what he terms "the calculable order" in the broadest sense of the word. The reference to *Regulae* also lays bare another

consequence of general calculability: the possibility of an exhaustive inventory. Whether the issue under consideration is an exhaustive list of all elements of a given set, or a division of an observed field into specific categories, or an analysis of a sufficiently representative specimen, *mathesis universalis* always guarantees the possibility of an exhaustive inventory as well as a continual transition from basic levels of understanding to the most complex ones.

To remain within the field of natural scientific investigation: a good example of a science formed on the basis of classical episteme is so-called “natural history.” According to Foucault, this science that deals with the order in the realm of living beings relies on the idea of a universal calculus, without necessarily resorting to mathematical reductionism. Unlike mathematical physics, natural history does not restrict itself only to quantitatively detectable values and relations, but also records other visible traits of natural beings. However, even here, a substantial reduction of the investigated area still does occur. Natural history does not inquire into the hidden qualities, forces and abilities that had determined the direction of natural scientific inquiry prior to the seventeenth century; nature is here relevant only insofar as it is accessible to the observing gaze.

Even the utilization of such an extraordinary means as the microscope is no exception to this rule. The exposition offered in *Les mots et les choses* proves the contrary: the implementation of the microscope is conditioned by a systematic reduction of the scientific perspective. Smells, tastes, and tactile sensations – all become excluded from the scientific observation. On the other hand, what is overtly privileged is sight, the sense of clarity and extension. Nevertheless, even sight is not accepted without certain limitation: especially the perception of colors is suppressed to the very minimum and what stands in the forefront are lines, areas, forms and surfaces. To observe is thus to determine natural beings with regard to their form, number, size and mode of their placement in space. However, this space is not the natural ambience of living beings, but an abstract space out of which all vital relations have been excluded. Whether concrete pieces of knowledge are ascertained quantitatively, or by means of geometrical forms, or through exact description, it is always within a visual field reduced to pure extension. The theme proper to natural history is therefore extension in which natural beings are manifested. In this respect, natural history is not by any means remote from mathematical physics that finds a guarantee for the quantifiability of natural beings in their position within the realm of *res extensa*.

The epistemological affinity of these two scientific disciplines, which emerges from their connection with *mathesis universalis*, does not, however, reach beyond the emphasis on perfect clarity and controllability of knowledge. Whereas the Galilean and Newtonian physics relies on nothing but mathematically formalized methods, natural history is content with an exhaustive inventory and a description of natural beings, thanks to which a certain specimen in various situations can be depicted in the exact same manner. The key to a reliable recognition of a certain animal or plant is their characteristic trait. Natural history focuses on determining the characteristic traits, thanks to which it states the differences among natural beings and classifies them, dividing them up into genera and species so that every

creature finds its own place in the natural scheme of things. As every category must stand in relation to all others, what is peculiar to a certain specimen cannot be recognized except on the basis of a classification of natural beings. An animal or a plant has no identity of its own; it is that which others are not, as it is discernible only by means of differentiation. To identify a certain specimen is thus to ascertain what it is that sets it apart from other species. Any identification of natural beings encompasses a whole chain of differentiations. When natural history assesses the determination of genera and species of empirical specimens, it is not guided by vague similarities among natural beings. It persistently analyzes the relations of their affinity solely by means of the notions of identity and difference. These notions, however, don't only govern the natural scientific taxonomy; as arithmetical relations of equality and inequality, they are also to be found in mathematical measurement and comparison. Therefore, Foucault can indeed proclaim the classical episteme as a whole to be characterized not only by the universal science of order, but also by the search for identity and difference.

The structure of the classical episteme must have left its traces in many other disciplines, including medical thought – however, not only by means of the physicalization of the human body, as one might suspect, but in a manner much more subtle than that. The analysis of classical thought which is presented in *Les mots et les choses* shows that the idea of the body as a physical mechanism, as this is widespread thanks to the influence of Descartes', has dominated medicine only for a relatively brief time period. Natural scientific thought found its fulfillment in medical science, but it was natural history rather than mathematical physics that provided the model for scientific thought in this area. Its influence on medical thought is traceable on the pages of *Naissance de la clinique*, where Foucault addresses the so-called classificatory medicine. Similarly to natural history, classificatory medicine cannot do without a taxonomical system, within whose framework diseases are classified and hierarchized into various genera and species. What is important for its concerns is not so much the mechanical functioning of the corporeal apparatus or exact measurement of its blood pressure and temperature as the precise diagnosis of the type of disease and its ranking within the classifying system of diseases. The task of the classificatory medicine is to discern in the vast profusion of symptoms certain traits, to differentiate them from other pathological phenomena and to undertake their precise identification. In quest of the precise identification of pathological changes, the medical gaze functions as an instrument of scientific cognition that reveals, on the basis of the botanical model, the rational order of disease. The understanding of this "pathological garden," a reliable knowledge of specific types of diseases and their mutual differences, functions as the foundational guideline for the doctor and, at the same time, as the indispensable prerequisite of a successful treatment. Whether classical medicine conforms to natural scientific classification or to Cartesian mechanicism, it never loses its elemental relation to *mathesis* as the universal science of measure and order.

In the light of these observations, Heidegger's evaluation of the natural scientific mode of reasoning that is presented in *Zollikon Seminars* requires a certain adjustment. It is not problems of mathematical physics, but rather the foundational

character of the mathematical project of beings as such that is to receive attention. In relation to the primary mathematical project, physics remains only one of the realms in which *mathesis universalis* has shaped itself as the cardinal standpoint to beings in general. Heidegger himself is very clearly aware of it in his *Die Frage nach dem Ding* where he stresses that the question of whether the utilization of mathematical procedures is indeed justified with regard to immediately present nature is not so important as the decision concerning the verification and limits of the mathematical order as such. It is not enough to confront the will to render nature quantifiable on the one hand, and nature essentially recalcitrant to it on the other. Behind the dilemma between mathematical formalism and the clarifying view of natural beings looms the question of limits beyond which the idea of *mathesis universalis* loses its justification.

From the perspective of the mathematical order itself the critical reflection on *mathesis universalis* may indeed seem to be a highly problematic undertaking. The mathematical order as the overall arrangement and distribution of observed beings has no limits, as it concerns both quantifiable and unquantifiable beings. Rather, *mathesis universalis* itself, from which not only mathematical natural science but also other scientific fields including philosophy evolve, is what determines the limits of scientifically exact reasoning. After all, any conceptual thought outside of the frame of measure and order is impossible, and so is any kind of science!

However, before accepting this presupposition, it is necessary to clarify what is understood by conceptual thought. In *Zollikoner Seminare*, the special position and function of scientific concepts receives careful scrutiny.⁶ Scientific thought, derived from the mathematical project of beings, requires in the first place that the concepts should be thoroughly unambiguous. Any ambiguity is to be excluded by means of a clear definition of every single notion. A correct definition proceeds in such a way that characterizes an entity by means of primary generality and secondary specificity; a general definition of an entity is accompanied by a characteristic trait that differentiates a given entity from other entities of the same kind. Definition thus proceeds from a higher category to the delineation of a specific difference. By virtue of this procedure, it is possible to single out and delimit one entity as opposed to all others.

So far, a conceptual definition wouldn't be different from the way in which the Ancient thought used to differentiate various categories of beings. What is important, however, is to realize that conceptual thought as constituted on the basis of *mathesis universalis* is inextricably linked with representation. Heidegger claims a concept to be a re-presentation of something. The very word "concept" (*der Begriff*) inherently echoes "capture" or "concentration" which becomes, on the basis of the mathematical project, a representation of something. However, what is represented within the framework of conceptual representation is not a singular entity, but that which is common to all beings of a certain type. This representation is what remains identical in all individual cases.⁷ Only with regard to identity that is contained

⁶Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 169–73.

⁷Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 171–2.

within every scientific concept is it possible to comprehend individual beings as representatives of relevant species. Although a concept is a representation of what is identically the same, it is still impossible to speak of this identity in positive terms. The identity represented in a concept has a sense only in relation to differences arranged within the overall system of understanding. Thus, the structure of *mathesis universalis* within the framework of conceptual thought is manifested as a complex order of identities and differences.

Nevertheless, conceptual thought grounded upon *mathesis universalis* runs against its limits once it is expected to comprehend the unique or the ambiguous. Since every notion must be absolutely unambiguous, it cannot grasp reality in its multitude of meanings. Faced with an ambiguous situation, the scientific notion becomes a hindrance in thinking. The same applies to every thing that needs to be shown in its irreducible singularity. To grasp what is peculiar to one single entity by means of concepts that assert themselves within the framework of *mathesis universalis* is altogether inconceivable, for their function is to highlight that remains identical in many beings. Even though abstraction as such does not quite explain what brings about the uncompromising unambiguousness of scientific notions, the necessity to disregard all singularities remains a side effect of conceptual thought. Any singularity gets lost by necessity in the interminable interplay of identities and differences.

It is this problem that Foucault alludes to while considering in his *Naissance de la clinique* the ambivalent attitude that classificatory medicine takes toward human suffering: as long as the view of medical science aims to penetrate through the plethora of pathological symptoms to their invariable foundation, it must suppress the uniqueness of every individual case and highlight what is common to all cases of the same kind. In order to pinpoint the basis of pathological disorder correctly, classificatory medicine must keep its distance from the individual experience of the patient and bracket all unclassifiable factors such as innate dispositions, temperament, or age. A qualified medical treatment cannot do without a perfected command of the classifying system of diseases that serves as a preliminary guideline of cognition, whereas the patient's individuality is merely a negative attribute of the illness. Rather than the personal uniqueness of the patient and the unmistakable nature of his individuality, what is really important is the precise identification of the disease and its differentiation from all other elements of the nosological system. The individual side of human ordeal, including the peculiar multivocal nature of the space in which the doctor meets the patient, is thus bound to stay in the background of theoretical interest. Although classificatory medicine does not remain altogether blind to these phenomena, this is not due to its methodical effort to identify and differentiate the various kinds of pathology, but rather in spite of this.

Since Cartesian medicine is no less dependent on the clearly structured schema of identities and differences, the same applies to it as well. One might object that Cartesian philosophy at least maintains a relation to individual experience that is echoed in the foundational tenet of "I think." However, as Heidegger observes in *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, the "I" as based on the mathematical order and promoted to the paramount status of the thinking subject contains nothing particular or unique.

The subjectivity of the “I” lies only in the sheer necessity of its presupposition. In every utterance or act of thinking there is always presupposed the *ego* that thinks. The *ego* is what is always already present prior to any representation. Thus, the basis of the Cartesian “I” is not the individuality of a specific human being, but the permanent presence of the thinking subject. The “I” means nothing more and nothing less than *res cogitans*, out of which all qualities except for the ability to think have been abstracted.

Of course, the ability to represent is not restricted only to conceptual determination. Another mode of representation is to be added to the conceptual utterance, and that is sensual perception. In both cases, something is rendered present for the conscious “I” by means of representation. Although this “I” does not have to be always explicitly aware of itself, it must necessarily retain its substantial identity. In relation to the “I” regarded as the subject of thinking, all other things appear as objects. The objective status of the observed beings is nothing given *per se*, since it follows from the turning point in the understanding of the being of beings as brought about by Descartes on the basis of the mathematical order. The so-called objective reality is an ontological construct arising from the quest for the absolute certainty of understanding. As soon as this certainty has been found in the constant presence of the substantial “I,” all beings lacking the character of the “I” are regarded as objects.

It is nonetheless disputable whether such an ontology can in fact be adequately applied to human being. The exposition presented in *Zollikoner Seminare* most resolutely testifies against this possibility. Heidegger does not miss a single opportunity to point to the fact that an ontology that understands being from the viewpoint of representation does not do justice to human existence. In his opinion, the peculiar character of human existence cannot be understood as long as human being is rendered an object about which scientific thought obtains data by means of conceptual representations. The inadequacy of this approach is demonstrated by the fact that human experiences and moods are not objects within the sphere of *res extensa*, something which was already known to Descartes. It is insufficient to proclaim human existence to have, in addition to its somatic part, also a part pertaining to the realm of *res cogitans*, and go on to examine their mutual effects. The multivocal shades and minute nuances of mental life cannot be understood once converted into representations in the consciousness of an abstractly conceived subject. The same applies to the human body which can be imagined as a physical mechanism and whose components can be subjected to physiological inquiry, but only at the cost of losing all human uniqueness. What then remains of it is an object torn out of its relation to its environment, an object resisting inner development and changes that have to do with aging. At best, ageing can manifest itself as dilapidation or imperfection that science may manage to remedy one day, but not as a natural principle of life.

Although this reduction concerns every biological organism, it is most clearly conspicuous in relation to human being. Natural history and mathematical physics, which both rely on *mathesis universalis*, can perceive human being only as a natural species or as a mathematically intelligible object. However, once the question is raised as to who human being is and how it exists, both disciplines are faced with

the limits of their possibilities. The way in which human being as the unique individual relates to things, to others, to itself and to its own end remains by necessity beyond the reach of their understanding.

In general, one can say that this limitation applies to all scientific fields based on mathematical project of being of beings. The mathematical order asserted itself within Western thought not because it enabled us to unveil the peculiar character of human existence, but because it guaranteed a lucid classification of all realms of knowledge, irrespective of the specific character of the beings under observation. The universal order based on the idea of *mathesis universalis* is not only a visible arrangement of things, not only a symmetrical configuration of their proportions and relations, but the modus of being attributed to them prior to every empirical inquiry. The question of the peculiar character of human existence is neither the central theme nor the guideline of scientific thought. It is therefore no wonder that human existence, recalcitrant both to classification by means of conceptual identification and differentiation, and to preliminary objectification, stakes out the limits beyond which the mathematical order can no longer guarantee an adequate understanding.

With regard to the central role played by the idea of *mathesis universalis* within the whole scope of classical knowledge, it is self-evident that to inquire into the boundaries of the validity of the mathematical project of beings is to contemplate the outer limits of the classical episteme. The universal science of measure and order acknowledges only its inner boundaries, beyond which all non-scientific opinions and confused utterances are brushed aside. Nevertheless, the mere fact that classical science has its historical beginning implies that one day it is bound to reach its end. The idea of universal calculability as born in the seventeenth century does not necessarily have to perish together with it, but it most definitely must be deprived of its claim to absolute validity. In that very moment, the question of the limits of the universal science of measure and order becomes topical.

It would therefore be inane to regard Heidegger's critical reference to the inadequacy of all attempts at thematisation of human existence by means of a method that is grounded upon preliminary objectification and conceptual identification of observed beings as an expression of ill-concealed enmity to science as such. Heidegger himself refuses such a suspicion when claiming: "By no means should our discussions be understood as hostile toward science. In no way is science as such rejected."⁸

However, what remains questionable is that the ideas grounded upon *mathesis universalis* assert themselves within a field where human existence is at stake. Pushing into forefront the question of human existence, Heidegger strives for nothing else but rendering human existence understandable and explicable out of itself. Judged by the prism of *Les mots et les choses*, an attempt at directing attention to what concerns man himself and what by necessity eludes him in the sieve of objectifying ideas reflects the rupture between classical and modern knowledge. On the epistemological plane, the philosophical critique of the mathematical

⁸Heidegger. *Zollikon Seminars*, 110. Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 143.

project of beings, especially as far as its principal incompatibility with the human way of being is concerned, appears possible only by virtue of the rupture whereby the theme of human being breaks into the visual field of scientific inquiry. As long as classical discourse fuses the representation and the being of beings with the same certainty with which the *cogito* allies with the *sum* of the thinking subject, the question of human existence cannot be raised. The formulation of the question of human existence is thus accompanied with the retreat of thought from the space of representation and the breakup of the general project of *mathesis universalis*. With the arrival of modern episteme, a rearrangement occurs within whose framework the structure of the calculable order, and together with it the formal disciplines such as mathematics and physics, stands on one side, and in opposition to it is the realm within which interpretive disciplines such as hermeneutics and clinical diagnostics evolve.⁹

However, the very breakup and substantial narrowing of the sphere of *mathesis universalis* does not guarantee an adequate thematization of human existence. The mere discovery of the theme does not mean the final victory, but rather poses an interminable task. For the adequate approach to human existence to be safeguarded, it does not suffice to merely register details and personal peculiarities of individuals. Heidegger is well aware of the fact that attention to the human individual and its unique qualities alone cannot lead to anything quite yet. Insofar as human existence is to be thematized in an adequate manner, it is first of all necessary to find a method that would discover the way into the realm where human existence can be encountered as such.

This path cannot be procured by empirical observation, but only by philosophical inquiry. A real, and not merely illusory, approach to human being requires a philosophical method that would be fully appropriate to the specifically human way of existence. The demanded method must strictly adhere to the mode in which human existence shows itself, and leave it at that. A method that meets the given criterion and allows for the thematization of human existence without inadmissible distortion or confusion is found in phenomenological description. According to Heidegger, phenomenology provides us with the optimal approach to human existence whose reach qualitatively surpasses the mode of thematization based on *mathesis universalis*.

However, the peculiar mode of phenomenological description is to be strictly differentiated from a description used in, e.g., botanical classification. First of all, phenomenology is not a procedure for acquiring pieces of scientific knowledge, but a method in the original sense of the word, i.e. a way that opens a certain realm of beings. Moreover, human being from the phenomenological point of view does not manifest itself as a specimen of a certain species, be it a categorical determination of an entity traditionally defined as *animal rationale*. Unlike science shaped within the horizon of representational thought that reduces all phenomena to objects of conceptual comprehension, phenomenology strictly forbids such reductionism. Phenomenological description does not lie in the representation of facts stated in the

⁹Foucault. *Les mots et les choses*, 88–9, 358.

sphere of *res extensa*; its orientation is rather subjected to manifesting every phenomenon in terms of what is peculiar to it. Since they are not representations woven into any well established network of identities and differences, and their sense is drawn directly from what they speak of, phenomenological notions can reveal both the uniqueness and the ambiguity of concrete phenomena.¹⁰ Although phenomenology is not devoid of the character of conceptual thought, its notions are not so much based on the uniform matrix of *mathesis universalis* as they are on the uniqueness and ambiguity of what manifests itself.

Inasmuch as phenomenology is led by the striving for thematization of pure phenomena, it remains to be clarified what is understood by the notion of “phenomenon.” Heidegger’s answer to this question is derived from the differentiation between the ontic and the ontological phenomenon. It is generally true that a phenomenon is what shows itself, but it can show itself to us in various ways. Therefore, phenomena shown to our senses are, according to *Zollikoner Seminare*, placed on the one side, and phenomena sensually imperceptible on the other.¹¹ Whereas the ontic phenomenon relates to sensually perceptible beings, the ontological phenomenon concerns the being of beings that can be observed only in its sense. The being of beings can be manifest only through thought that relates to it with understanding. Even though the being of beings does not show itself as such in the beginning, the preliminary evidence of its sense is a prerequisite for any ontic register. Compared to ontic phenomena, ontological phenomena therefore occupy the foundational position and are of primary philosophical importance. Since being as such often remains concealed behind beings that freely offer themselves to our attention, the task of phenomenology as Heidegger conceives of it is to bring being to its explicit manifestation.


The phenomenological effort to thematize the being of beings does not at all mean that beings are to be completely ignored. Heidegger is rather concerned with our relation to beings so that the being of these beings emerges thematically. This hermeneutic engagement in the relation with immediately manifest beings aims to overcome the obfuscation of ontological phenomena that remain hidden under a layer of philosophical tradition or merely filtered through it in the form of phenomenologically unclarified seeming. The need for penetrating to what remains unthought-of within the philosophical tradition necessarily leads to a revision of this tradition, and especially to a critical evaluation of the conceptual structures grounded upon the principle of *mathesis universalis*.

Heidegger’s critique of ideas derived from the mathematical project of beings asserts itself most conspicuously in the destruction of Descartes’ philosophical system. Against the unwavering certainty of *cogito – sum* that places being next to representation, *Zollikoner Seminare* focuses its scrutiny on the character of that *sum*. As Foucault in his *Les mots et le choses* claims that phenomenology is not so much a continuation of the tradition of Ancient thought as an expression of the rupture between the classical and modern episteme, the same applies to its Heideggerian

¹⁰ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 184.

¹¹ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 7–8, 234, 281.

version.¹² Despite the proclaimed return to the Greek conception of phenomenon as that which shows itself from itself, what is corroborated here is the original connection of phenomenology with the question of the human way of being, and together with it occurs also a certain consummation of the analytics of the finitude of this being. Instead of the objective observation of a human being or a retreat to a predetermined, closed-off subject, the phenomenological approach to human existence entails a hermeneutical entry into an open relation with what encounters and addresses us. The starting point of the phenomenological approach to human existence is thus our unmediated sojourn (*der Aufenthalt*) with beings. The exceptional character of man's sojourn (*der Aufenthalt des Menschen*) is not given by occurring at some place, but rather follows from an openness toward the world that is peculiar to human existence. Our sojourn has an essentially worldly character, as it evolves within the significative whole of the world. Being-in-the-world must therefore be shown as the foundational ontological feature of human existence. In order to adumbrate the preliminary ontological structure of sojourning as formed by being-in-the-world, Heidegger uses a simple graphic schema¹³:



This sketch makes the point of suggesting that human existence has nothing to do with an isolated, withdrawn subject which only secondarily relates to worldly beings. What is essential to sojourning is its openness to the possibility of addressing beings that manifest themselves in the horizon of the world. A verbatim translation of the German “sich aufhalten” (where “auf” refers to a certain openness, whereas “sich halten” means “to hold on to”) suggests that the ontological character of sojourning lies in its maintaining an open horizon of the world, within whose framework significative and motivational connections present themselves in the shape of concrete beings. In the context of a disclosed and cleared sphere of the world, the sojourn always relates to that by which it is encountered and summoned to act. The sojourn finds itself always already in the world and only as being-in-the-world can it relate with understanding to specific beings as to its own possibilities.

Since we relate to our possibilities not only spiritually, but unveil them mostly by its practical action, the question of the bodily character of human existence cannot be avoided. Should the human body be regarded as an entity occurring in a certain

¹² Foucault. *Les mots et les choses*, 336–7.

¹³ Heidegger. *Zolliker Seminar*, 3.

place in space, or is it to be comprehended from the viewpoint of the ontological structure of being-in-the-world? Heidegger resolutely opts for the second option when distinguishing the lived body (*der Leib*) from the corporeal thing (*der Körper*). The lived body is not a mere material given, but a factual expression of being-in-the-world. The facticity of our existence remains both in its openness to the world and in its bodiliness (*die Leiblichkeit*). The lived body is a natural center of gravity in our relating to possibilities around which the differences between near and far, up and down, right and left are organized. Corporeal things, on the contrary, have no relation to space at all, they merely occur in it.

The phenomenological description of the lived body can therefore not simply postulate it and go on to derive from this various directions and trajectories, but rather must persistently stick to the open spatiality of being-in-the-world. A dynamic transitional nature of the bodily existence can assert itself only on the basis of openness that characterises being-in-the-world. The peculiar character of this transitivity can be best illustrated by the fact that the boundaries of the lived body don't align themselves with the boundaries of the body in the sense of a mere corporeal thing. Whereas our corporeal frame ends with our skin, the lived body transcends this limit.¹⁴ However, one can speak of a transcendence only in the phenomenal sense, since it reflects our ecstatic relatedness to surrounding beings. As hearing, speaking and seeing constitute an essential part of our lived body, its only limit is the horizon of our world. Unlike our corporeal frame whose content can change only by growing, gaining or losing weight, the horizon of our world is freely transmutable, and thus capable of vastly surpassing all tactile sensations, as well as receding in reverse into a single intensive feeling of physical pain. What then remains after our death is only *Körper*, whereas our lived body ends together with our existence.

If natural science derived from the mathematical project of beings neglects the lived body, it is because it mistakes it from the very beginning for a corporeal thing, ontologically interpreted as an object. With the help of measurements, causal-mechanical schemata and conceptual categorization, one can indeed track down many objective items of knowledge concerning the human body, but never understand the ontic aspects of the lived body. Pain, blushing with shame or weeping, all elude the view adjusted to facts represented within the realm of *res extensa*, and yet they remain inherent to the basic possibilities of our bodily existence. In order to find adequate access to these possibilities, it is not enough to consider them as traces of human psyche; it is rather necessary to understand them as various modes of being-in-the-world. After all, a sudden blush is not an expression of psychic processes, as it makes sense only in relation to some specific situation in the world. The same applies to all physical postures and gestures. All ontic phenomena that express our bodily existence have thus neither a psychic, nor a somatic, but a psychosomatic character. To split human existence into its psychic and somatic parts is for Heidegger to completely fail to regard their original whole as formed by being-in-the-world.

¹⁴Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare*, 112–3.

What is also bound with the overall unity of sojourning with beings is the fact that the lived body, unlike the anonymous corporeal thing, is endowed with a genuinely individual character. The lived body is always mine; or rather, I am my own body. It would be utterly absurd to contend that the eye sees, the mouth speaks, the hand works and the brain thinks, since it is always I myself who sees, speaks, works and thinks. Equally erroneous would be the assumption that the lived body presents a sort of substratum upon whose basis human individuality is sustained. This is evident from Heidegger's statement: "If the body as body is always my body, then this is my own way of being. Thus, bodying forth is co-determined by my being human in the sense of the ecstatic sojourn amidst the beings in the clearing [*gelichtet*]." ¹⁵

That human being exists as an open being-in-the-world does not mean that its existence disintegrates into an incoherent welter of sensations, gestures and attitudes. In spite of remaining open to an address on the part of innerworldly beings, my relation to these beings is necessarily one and the same with the performance of my own existence. When coining in his *Sein und Zeit* for man's sojourn the notion of "being-there" (*das Dasein*), Heidegger says nothing of it except that it is myself, that being of being-there is in each case mine (*je meines*). ¹⁶ And the task of the ontological analysis of being-there is to reveal the locus of its peculiar individuality. Since being-there never has the character of an entity which is present-at-hand and whose qualities can be simply postulated, its individuality cannot be determined by marking out an essential substance. On the contrary, the ontological analysis must display the self in the various modes of its existence. That being-there exists as an individual follows only from the ecstatic nature of its relatedness to beings which it encounters. Heidegger's concept of the individuality is thus sharply different from the Cartesian conception of the "I" that remains identical throughout the incessant succession of its cognitive acts. While the subjective consciousness remains cut off from the world to which it is related, being-in-the-world ontologically belongs to our self. The "I" understood as individual being is not an isolated, abstract subject, but rather the specific "I am in the world."

Since individual existence does not remain detached from change, but actively engages in it, the difference between such existence and the Cartesian subject most conspicuously manifests itself on the temporal plane. The Cartesian "I" is posited as what is always already present-at-hand; that is to say, it is a substance that cannot be affected by time. The existential constancy of the self is, on the contrary, essentially connected with time. As Heidegger puts it, "[t]he constancy of the self is temporal in itself, that is, it temporalizes itself. This selfhood of [being-there] is only in the manner of temporalizing [*Zeitigung*]." ¹⁷ Ultimately the phenomenological description of the self thus extends to temporality which gives our existence its original sense. The ecstatic relatedness to beings in which our existence evolves is not

¹⁵ Heidegger. *Zollikon Seminars*, 87. Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 113.

¹⁶ The expressions *Aufenthalt* and *Dasein* (or *Da-sein*) are used by Heidegger basically as synonyms, and therefore we can use their English equivalents in the same way.

¹⁷ Heidegger. *Zollikon Seminars*, 175. Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 220.

“carried” by anything other than its own temporality. The ecstatic relatedness to beings that binds the future, the having-been and the present into one whole, ensures the essential coherence of existence, thereby endowing it with its individual constancy.¹⁸ Much as this individual constancy remains open to change and existential rupture, it is also an expression of the fact that human existence always somehow understands its being, that it comprehends it as its own and, to some extent, as always the same.

The phenomenological description of the temporal unity of existence thus arrives at the idea of sameness which is irreconcilable with the epistemological character of classical rationality. Sameness, which encompasses in itself both constancy and change, which steps out of itself and becomes other, is according to Foucault’s testimony one of the crucial components of modern episteme.

However, one must not forget that phenomenology is not the only mode of thought that on its quest for what is not identical with itself gains an understanding of individual life in its changes and duration. The revelation of human individuality is not a prerogative of only philosophical inquiry, but occurs in the much broader context of European thought, which has had its repercussions also within the field of clinical medicine, as it is documented in *Naissance de la clinique*. Ever since the eighteenth century, that is to say, with the arrival of modern episteme, medical thought has become increasingly appreciative of the importance of all unclassifiable factors that had thus far been supplanted by the classifying system of diseases. Individual dispositions, age or way of life have moved into the focal point of medical attention and, together with them, the specific human individual sees the light of day. Thanks to the reversal in the relation between the classifiable and the unclassifiable, the human individual becomes visible in its own singularity. Thus, according to Foucault, medicine is transformed into a science dealing with the ill and healthy individual. In spite of the fact that within the nosological system, the model of natural scientific classification is still utilized, there nonetheless occurs a shift that enables clinical medicine to penetrate into the inside of the human organism and reveal the dark depth of bodily existence. Only when pathological anatomy assumes the pivotal position within medical knowledge can medicine arrive at an understanding of a living organism, its development, aging and death. Rather than a classificatory table of diseases, what should henceforth be the focal point of medical interest is to be found in the various ways in which an ill organism resists or succumbs to pathological decomposition. The virtual boundaries between the disease and the patient are gradually wiped away to the point of vanishing, so that what remains is the patient and his pathologically transformed existence. Classical medicine of natural species is thereby changed into the medicine of pathological reactions.

The fact that empirical investigation of human health and disease, similar to phenomenological description of temporal sojourning, addresses the individual character of human existence does not imply that Heidegger’s ontological analysis has nothing to offer to modern medicine. What gives phenomenology the hallmark of

¹⁸ Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare*, 84–6.

exceptionality is both its understanding of the principal role of temporality and its sense of the integrity of the being-in-the-world that enables it to thematize complex psychosomatic phenomena without having to derive them from the functioning of the biological organism. The phenomenon of the lived body that obtains its sense against the backdrop of the overall structure of being-in-the-world is substantially different from the anatomical constitution of the human organism or the structure of the organic tissues. Even though modern medicine has marked a breakthrough in the understanding of inner development of organic structures, the lived body still remains inaccessible to it. The lived body, which forms an integral component of the ontological whole of being-in-the-world, is the key to the understanding of many psychosomatic disorders about which clinical medicine is still in the dark. Thus, the articulation of being-in-the-world can be regarded as the most important result of the phenomenological method for medicine.

The phenomenological approach to human existence is highlighted in *Zollikoner Seminare* especially in connection with psychiatry and psychotherapy which gradually free themselves from postulates determining mental disorder as a specific entity, situating it within the framework of the psychic totality of man instead. The phenomenological method can provide these disciplines with the needed philosophical foundation enabling them to adequately thematize not only the unity of psychic acts, but also the original unity of psychosomatic totality. With regard to the topic of the present study, we shall focus on the question of how, on the basis of ontological description of being-in-the-world, the nature of psychopathological disorders can be understood.

2.2 All-Too-Human Science

The focus of this chapter is Binswanger's psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*, which represents the first attempt at the application of Heidegger's philosophy in psychiatry. The exhaustive study of Binswanger's concept of mental health and illness is followed by its criticism formulated by Heidegger in *Zollikoner Seminare*. Heidegger reproaches Binswanger for his anthropologism and for the complete misunderstanding of the ontological analysis of human existence. In order to avoid such misunderstanding, it is necessary to expound the ontological view on being-there to its full extent. While Binswanger understands human existence only as sojourn with beings, it is necessary to grasp it as sojourn in the openness of being. Sojourn is not only sojourn among beings, but – above all – sojourn in the openness of being. Only in this way can the individual character of our existence be understood properly. However, the question remains how to grasp the nature of mental disorders including the disintegration of the self that occurs in the most serious cases. This issue becomes even more crucial if we realize the limits of the ontological analysis of human existence that are highlighted by its confrontation with Foucault's notion of Unreason and by Deleuze's critique of Heidegger formulated in *Différence et répétition*.

As regards the possibilities offered by the phenomenological description of our existence within the framework of psychiatric and psychological investigations Binswanger's work was indeed pioneering. Long before the Zollikon seminars took place, this philosophically educated psychiatrist attempted to work with the stimuli gained from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and, based on these, to create a new conception of mental disorders. The result of his effort was the so-called psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*, which drew upon the ontological analysis of being-there (*das Dasein*).

Even though no explicit mention of psychopathological phenomena is to be found in *Sein und Zeit*, Binswanger came to realize that the ontological analysis of being-there is of eminent importance for the realm of psychiatry. Psychiatry had already in his time achieved the understanding of mental disorders as having a reality and making sense only when treated as an inner disorder of the personality; however, it still lacked the means for thematizing the pathological aspects of the interaction between the human individual and his/her environment. In the given state of affairs, with medicine strictly distinguishing mental pathology from organic pathology, the overall position of the specific individual in the world, as well as his/her psychosomatic unity, remained an unsolved problem. In order to explicate pathological changes of personality without extracting it from its immediate standing in the world, Binswanger made use of the phenomenological interpretation of being-there, which highlights the individuality of our existence and considers being-in-the-world its inseparable component. It was against this background that the variegated forms of psychically disturbed behavior could be outlined and explained as various modes of being-in-the-world.

Before we embark on elucidating the various forms of psychically disturbed behavior, we must raise the question concerning the way one actually encounters that which common language describes as insanity. The reflections summed up in the collection of several casuistries, published under the title *Schizophrenia*, depart from the discovery that the primary encounter with insanity is an encounter not with mental illness but with otherness.¹⁹ The lay view governed by the standard rules of social behavior regards certain comportment as crazed or deranged when inappropriate to the given situation. When, for example, Binswanger's patient Ilsa puts her hand inside a red-hot oven in order to show her father how far true love can go, her gesture is far-fetched to the point that none of her relatives can imagine themselves acting as she does. Others view her act not as a loving sacrifice but rather as senseless self-violence, which prevents them from identifying with it even hypothetically. The anxious fear of gaining weight felt by Ellen West, or the panic dread of being pursued sensed by Suzanne Urban – both seem equally foreign to “sane” reason. All of these patients of Binswanger's move away from their fellowmen in the same degree to which they alienate themselves from the stimuli and possibilities that spring from the framework of the everyday world of practical intentions and tasks. Thus, the inevitable lot of any individual whose action is not governed by the

¹⁹ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 44–6.

unwritten rules and requirements of everyday reality is to rupture the bonds that connect him/her to others.

Although behavior that defies the commonly shared semantic contexts is assumed to be deranged in a given situation, it could nevertheless seem perfectly normal in a different social situation or cultural context. What is accepted as a common or even desired way of behavior in one cultural environment is considered unacceptable in another. Whereas in the secular society, messianic visions, conversations with angels or deep dejection arising from the awareness of one's sinfulness are regarded as expressions of religious derangement, in a religious community these can be assigned the highest value. According to Binswanger, the significance attributed to insanity varies depending on the cultural environment: where modern rationality discovers symptoms of mental illness, the previous centuries had found signs of possession by the devil, fallenness and malediction. In the so-called primitive cultures, however, an individual can become a shaman only on the basis of his/her ability to confront others with something "beyond" their comprehension.

Irrespective of the system of social and cultural norms, insanity always first manifests itself in the form of a behavior devoid of sense. Since the deranged behavior does not correspond to the semantic context of everyday world, it must appear to others as unreasonable; its motives remain opaque and intentions inscrutable. As the madman's speech does not emerge from the context of the commonly shared world, it does not lay bare what it speaks about, but rather conceals it. Its nature is not apophantical but cryptic. The madman thus confronts others with the possibility of losing their mind and simultaneously lets them peer into the dark abyss that gapes beyond the boundaries of their understanding.

Only out of the primary encounter with the disturbing otherness of the insane could European culture have given birth to such sciences as psychology and psychiatry. The extent to which the encounter with un-reason had been constitutive of both disciplines was shown by Foucault in his early treatises *Maladie mentale et psychologie* and *L'histoire de la folie*. Binswanger is also aware that the primary point of departure of psychiatric inquiry is the alarming otherness manifested in the madman's behavior. Just as the layman, the psychiatrist sets out from the original strangeness of this conduct (*die Fremdheit dieser Handlung*).²⁰ Unlike the lay public, the psychiatrist must not content himself with a mere statement of the nonsensicality of a certain behavior but must seek to understand it. His task is to penetrate into the welter of unclear motives and obscure intentions, trying to find his way around it and to discover the hidden sense of the pathological experience.

In order for that to be accomplished, psychiatry must resist the temptation to reduce the madman's otherness to the mere object of scientific inquiry. Scientific objectification would thereby only widen the gap between the doctor and the patient. Therefore, Binswanger refuses the naturalistic view of pathological phenomena derived from the legacy of classificatory medicine. It is by no means fortuitous that Foucault notes in his *Naissance de la clinique* that the tendency to conceive of a disease as a specific entity which can be integrated into a classifying system on the

²⁰ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 46.

basis of its qualities does not come to an end even with the arrival of the nineteenth century. Psychiatry is also very slow to shake off the conviction that, thanks to the nosological system that makes it possible to divide illnesses just as natural entities into specific groups and subgroups, the culturally conditioned criteria of normality and abnormality can be surpassed and supplanted with relatively unequivocal benchmarks. If the psychiatrist should positively state the diagnosis, i.e. precisely discern the type of illness in each case, he/she needs a *Bezugssystem* different from that of the cultural norms, which he finds in the classifying system of the natural scientific sort. With the help of such a system, one can proceed from the original strangeness of the pathological behavior to the specific nosological unit with the same certainty with which the botanist regards a plant as belonging to the correct genus and species. Even though the psychiatrist does take into account the patient's individual dispositions, including various aspects of his personal history, and observes the deranged behavior in the subtlest of its shades and variations, he always betrays the original experience of un-reason from which he departs. Within the framework of the classificatory system of illnesses, the immediate evidence of un-reason is converted into a sort of foreign ingredient that impresses upon human existence a shape different from the one it has had so far. Instead of searching for the true sense of a deranged behavior, its meaning is predetermined as a pathological deficiency: contrary to health, mental illness is comprehended as a deficient state that jeopardizes the affected individual, while preventing him/her from carrying out certain life functions. In this respect, psychiatric medicine that relies on a given classificatory table of illnesses is no different from organic pathology.

Insofar as the medical gaze regards mental illness as a functional defect, it also implies that this dysfunction must be rooted in something that surpasses all observable symptoms, determining their pathological character. Pathological symptoms, such as stereotypical behavior, anxiety or hallucinations, are thus grasped as signs pointing to some hidden essence. To determine the right diagnosis is therefore simply to judge the symptoms correctly and to decide the type, nature and anticipated course of the given illness.

However, such explicated symptoms have nothing to do with the phenomenon as understood by phenomenology. The incompatibility of the phenomenon and the pathological symptom is also noted by Heidegger, claiming in his *Sein und Zeit* that the phenomenon is what shows itself as such, whereas symptoms of a certain illness merely indicate that which lies concealed behind them.²¹ Insofar as insanity is to manifest itself as a phenomenon, nonsensical behavior must not be regarded as a pathological symptom, but must be brought to light out of itself. Encountering the phenomenon of insanity requires that the empirical evidence of un-reason should not be evaded, but rather approached with the hope that it will show its meaning some day. More precisely, what is at stake is to explicate the phenomenon of un-reason, while thematically exposing that which, preliminarily and concurrently, remains evident only non-thematically.

²¹ Heidegger, Martin. 1993. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 29.

Part of this resolution is Binswanger's decision not to regard un-reason through the prism of clinical categories. Since his times the medical conceptualization of psychopathological disorders has changed significantly, and the jargon he uses is therefore obsolete, but we should not be too concerned about this, as he, instead of adopting purely functional criteria of the distinction between health and illness, prefers a different viewpoint – the ontological constitution of being-in-the-world. Nonsensical behavior, and, together with it, an entire set of personal, physiological and biographical data characteristic of a certain individual, must be, in his opinion, interpreted against the backdrop of the ontological structure of being-in-the-world and its temporal constitution. An integrated constitution of being-there functions as a unifying principle on whose basis all the seemingly disparate elements can be connected into a single whole, their meaning restored, and what eludes common understanding comprehended.

Taking the structural order of being-there (*die Gefügeordnung des Daseins*) as his point of departure, Binswanger is able to thematize specific traits that characterize the pathologically altered being-in-the-world as various modes of disturbance in this overall composition.²² By virtue of paying heed to the ontological constitution of being-there, ontic features characteristic of an ill individual's being open themselves to his gaze as various forms of disarrangement and ruptures of the structural moments of sojourning amidst beings. However, this breach entails no disintegration into singular, mutually heterogeneous elements, but rather a change in the way the structural moments of sojourning combine, forming a united whole. Therefore, the original sense of psychopathological disorders manifests itself not in the loss of certain existential moments, but rather in the overall modification of existence as such. As long as human being exists, none of the constitutive moments of its existence can be absent; being-in-the-world, the lived body and individual being form an inseparable whole that ontologically conditions all ontic changes as described in psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*.

As long as phenomenological psychiatry is to thematize pathologically disturbed modes of existence reflected in the behavior of an individual, it must not content itself with a mere list of aspects due to which this behavior is labeled as deranged, exaggerated or eccentric. In this fashion, it would merely summarize the impression which the insane individual makes on others, without taking into account his/her own existence. Instead of the normative comparison of the "mentally ill" with the healthy, what is necessary is to explicate his/her behavior in the light of his/her own existence. To enter into an encounter with insanity in the way demanded by Binswanger is to cancel the distanced attitude, to cease to regard the ill merely "from the outside", and instead to try to view his/her situation from his/her own perspective. This is the only way to traverse the abyss of non-sense that divides the ill from other people, thus attaining the very center of pathological motives and intentions.

Nevertheless, the way in which the phenomenological view reaches beyond the framework of everyday reasonableness is, in the *daseinsanalytical* interpretation, by

²² Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 12.

no means what the clinical psychiatry understands as empathy. In order to comprehend the situation of Binswanger's patients such as Ilsa, Ellen West or Suzanne Urban, it is definitely not enough to merely empathize with their minds. What is at stake in the search for the meaning of pathological experience is not to describe the mental states of certain individuals, but to discover the ways their worlds are structured. Binswanger emphasizes that phenomenological psychopathology explores not so much subjective experiences as pathologically modified modes of being-in-the-world, which makes it possible to overcome the difference between the mental states with which one can empathize and those with which one cannot. Insofar as the ability to empathize is conditioned "subjectively," as it varies in each of us, phenomenological description can render pathological experience understandable, even if the world of the mental illness is profoundly different from the commonly shared world, as is the case with various forms of schizophrenia. For the motives and intentions of pathological behavior to become understandable, there is a need to relinquish the semantic context of our everyday world, to find our way around in the significations of the pathological world, and to map the way this world is projected.

The notion of the world-project (*der Weltentwurf*), used by Binswanger in this respect, derives from Heidegger's text *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, where it denotes the fundamental act by which we project our own possibilities. However, there is nothing in the world-project itself that would derive from the tentative plan or outline; its "tentativeness" lies in its preliminary opening of the world as the horizon of significance, within whose framework the singular beings can become manifest as things with which one can set about doing something. Such a world-project is not given by some particular volitional act either, as it is only the world-project that makes possible our relation to beings. In this sense, the world-project is constitutive of all of our decision-making, thought and action.

Since the horizon of significance, which remains open through the world-project, confronts us with certain possibilities while excluding others, it reflects finitude as well as the individual diversity of being-in-the-world. As long as "individuality is that which is its world," as claims Binswanger, every individual can be understood on the basis of his/her world-project that determines the overall style of his/her existence.²³

This discovery is important especially in the case of psychopathological disorders, in which the significative whole (*das Bedeutungsganze*) of the commonly shared world of everyday existence undergoes considerable changes. What is characteristic of manic excitations, for instance, is the feeling of boundless breadth, freedom and ease that shows everything in bright colors; a world of unlimited possibilities opens where "nothing is impossible", and therefore nothing is brought to a conclusion, since once one possibility has been seized upon, human being is lured to seize upon ten others that are even more tempting. An individual prone to depression, by contrast, experiences states of utmost dejection, in which all things and people are drowned in monotonous grayness and grime; his/her world is akin to a

²³ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 149.

gutter, a wasteland, or an underground tomb, where all plans are stillborn and where nothing seems worth embarking on. Both the flamboyant world of celestial breadth and the underground world of dirt and decay are poles apart from the social and habitual bonds of the everyday world, in which action is governed by practical purposes and possibilities refer to one another without forming a vicious circle. With regard to the fact that the manic world of glamour and ease usually encompasses a reference to the dark depth of depression, it is of essence to grasp the individuality of existence thus structured on the basis of the alternation of two opposing, and yet innerly bound modes of being-in-the-world.

Other specific modifications of being-in-the-world and the correspondent individual dispositions, which determine the pathological form of existence, can be described in a similar way. In this respect, the phenomenological inquiry into world-projects goes even further than those branches of psychopathology that work with the notion of *personality*. This can be documented by Binswanger's confrontation with the clinical view of schizophrenic attack, which was common in his times.²⁴ The psychopathological concepts that focus on the investigation of personality disorders usually expound schizophrenia as the disintegration of personality, i.e. as a disturbance of psychic totality and an inner disorganization of its structures, with special emphasis on the feeling of lability that coerces a schizophrenic to seek support in some idea which could serve him as a point of reference, ridding him/her of his/her inner insecurity. Thus, schizophrenic delusions are conceived of as refuge and buttress of an innerly insecure personality, without raising the question of whence its essential insecurity actually springs. By what else could this insecurity be given if not by the insecure position of human being in the world? Therefore, psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* addresses the schizophrenic experience in order to find in its gaps and discontinuities the expression of the fragility and unstableness of being-in-the-world. Explicating the inconsistency of experience observable in most schizophrenics, Binswanger inquires not about its causes, but about its structural conditions, which he finds in the world-project that is infiltrated by destructive intrusions of the Horrible, the Sudden and the Sinister.

The immensity of these destructive intrusions are far beyond whatever is usually an object of fear for human being. Therefore, the basic affective tuning of the schizophrenic world is not fear but anxiety, which unlike fear is not fixed upon a definite entity, but rather encompasses being-in-the-world as a whole. The correlate of the immediate presence of the Horrible, the Sudden and the Sinister, claims Binswanger, is anxiety, since nothing but anxiety can account for the fact that together with its intrusion there occurs the disintegration of the significative structure of the world, with which the individual is familiar. Anxiety carries the individual away from its familiarity with the world and casts it into uncanniness (*die Unheimlichkeit*), where all possibilities of action disappear and all beings fall into insignificance.

However, this frightful uncanniness must not be reduced to a common feeling of anxiety or anxious affect; its genuine character does not surface until the fundamental

²⁴ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 452–4.

form of being-in-the-world is seen in the utter insignificance into which the world is submerged. Even though anxiety is a strange way of being-in-the-world, it is to be viewed as the fundamental disposition of being-there. The primary guideline in this direction is Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, in which anxiety is grasped as the fundamental phenomenon of being-there, whose source is not some external threat, but being-in-the-world as such. Anxiety confronts being-there with the bare fact of its own existence by means of unveiling it in its original uneasiness and precariousness.

The dark side of being-in-the-world announced in uncanniness is experienced by the schizophrenic in its worst form, that is to say, as exposure to the sheer horror of the loss of all possibilities and the rupture all significative connections. With the so-called normal individual, anxiety, if permitted at all, can always be overcome, whereas in the case of the schizophrenic, it becomes all-encompassing and inescapable. Instead of resolutely accepting the fact of his/her existence as his/her very own possibility, the schizophrenic is, over and over again, cast into a situation where his/her individuality becomes reduced to the pure capability of suffering. Out of the repeated confrontation with the traumatic experience of "the end of the world" evolves the overall mode of existing, marked by the persistent effort to piece together out of the shattered shreds of the significative whole of the world at least some sort of provisional space, within which one could freely move and breathe.

The need for establishing and maintaining a sort of refuge, and thus escaping the uncanniness of anxiety, can lead, among other things, to the tendency to objectify this uncanniness in the form of imminent jeopardy or the omnipresent enemy. Faced with a looming catastrophe or hostile machinations, one can at least do something, whereas the uncanniness of anxiety leaves no chance at all. No matter how perfect safety measures the schizophrenic may take, when turning his/her world into a fortress under strict surveillance, he/she can never escape out of his/her highly uncertain world-project, constantly at the risk of being exposed to disintegration and nothingness. That is why Binswanger likens the way one of his patients exists to walking on thin ice which can break any moment; in her world, to take one wrong step is to cause everything to tumble into an ice-cold dark depth.²⁵ Unlike the person that has, as it were, both feet firmly on the ground, the schizophrenic existence finds itself incessantly on the verge of a dismal abyss, in need to grasp at straws.

The schizophrenic therefore necessarily seems foreign and incomprehensible to a secured existence which confidently relies on the outer world. What comes into play then is condemnation, blaming the schizophrenic's behavior on his/her imbecility, mental defectiveness, or some other form of pathological deficiency. Understanding the meaning of the original anxiety of being-there (*die Daseinsangst*) within the schizophrenic experience, on the contrary, enables us to find the path to the world-project split between the desire for a safe haven where one can feel at home and the horror of falling into the abyss of uncanniness.

With reference to the sinister abyss of anxiety, psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* can then unveil the essential insecurity also in the ideal of perfect safety, happiness and harmony to which the schizophrenic existence clings. The idealized world of beauty,

²⁵ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 312–3 (the case of Lola Voss).

peace and order encompasses in its essence a reference to its opposite, to the dark world of uncanniness that is masked only imperfectly and provisionally. This receives its corroboration whenever the created ideal is doubted, which inevitably throws the person into the subjection to the very contrary of its ideal: the craving after leanness, delicacy and beauty, of which Ellen West keeps dreaming, can become reversed into bestial voracity; the desire for aristocratic nobleness and social recognition that permeates through the life of Jürgen Zünd turns into an uncontrollable downfall into the proletariat and social scorn; and finally the longing for total safety, which forces Lola Voss to make use of security rituals and superstitious practices, cannot ward off the arrival of “something horrible.”

From this Binswanger concludes that the exaggerated ideal to which the schizophrenic clings offers no real way out of his/her situation, but merely conserves his/her state, preventing it from any possible development. The schizophrenic is incapable of stepping out into the future and seizing new possibilities, since he/she, bound by anxiety, is incessantly drawn down to what has already been. The paradoxical corroboration of this observation is also the suicide in which Ellen West, after 13 years of futile striving, found her last recourse.

Not only those pathological modes of being-in-the-world classified by psychiatry as “psychoses”, but also those belonging to the sphere of “neuroses” can be expounded with regard to the basic anxiety of being-there. Anxious distress or panic appear in individuals suffering from such personality disorders as phobia, just as the various forms of compulsive or obsessive states.²⁶ In all of the aforementioned cases, anxious distress emerges as a clinically ascertainable symptom, influencing to a larger or lesser extent the pathological experience. Nevertheless, this crucial symptom could never surface without a much more original phenomenon that precedes, as well as retrospectively explains, all pathological structures. Anxiety, hidden in the foundations of being-in-the-world as the inner testimony of its unanchored and unsecured character, is the key prerequisite for even the usual fear to arrive; a phobia-stricken individual is then exposed to anxiety in an incomparably more radical way, as the extent of his/her “subjective” jeopardy is far beyond that of the real danger. What is at work here is not this or that threatening entity, but dread of something inexpressibly terrible, more precisely, horror of uncanniness, under whose onslaught the significative whole of the world collapses. Unlike the schizophrenic, whose existence is essentially marked by the collapse of the significative whole of the world and by the striving for a makeshift reconstruction, an individual suffering from phobia maintains a familiarity with the surrounding entities at least as long as he/she manages to evade encountering the object into which all of his/her anxiety has been incarnated. Insofar as the so-called psychosis manifests itself, from the *daseinsanalytical* perspective, as boundless exposure to uncanniness, neurosis must then be grasped as endangering anxiety and defense against this endangerment.²⁷ In the neurotic’s world, anxiety plays a different role than in the psychotic’s world: whereas in the first case, one seeks to displace and conceal it, or lives it in the form

²⁶ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 272.

²⁷ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 465.

of anxious expectation of frightful evil, punishment, incurable disease and inevitable death, in the other case it is directly exposed to the damaging effects of the awesome uncanniness that deprives his/her existence of all support. Hallucinations or the system of paranoid delusions, in which the whole world is laden with unclear threats and hostile schemes, have their place only within a world-project governed by anxiety. Nevertheless, both psychotic and neurotic disorders are connected by what Binswanger terms heightened susceptibility (*die Empfänglichkeit*) to the anxiety of being-there.

One must not forget, however, that anxiety is not only an expression of a pathological disorder, but also lies at the very heart of individual existence; it is that which lies hidden inside of being-in-the-world as its own otherness, endowing it simultaneously with its unique sense. Only in relation to it can we comprehend the facticity that differentiates the individual existence from others, lending it the character of *Jemeinigkeit*.

How can pathological proclivity to anxiety thus be discerned from determined confrontation with the uncanniness that is the prerequisite for discovering and developing one's very own possibilities of being-in-the-world? Is it merely a question of the extent of susceptibility and resistance, or are there two totally different modes of being-in-the-world at stake here?

This dilemma can be resolved only if we observe it from a temporal perspective. Speaking of "the weakness of existence" in connection with schizophrenic individuals, Binswanger has in mind the squeamishness of the temporal structure of their existence that prevents them from maintaining a genuinely open attitude toward the future.

For instance, the temporal continuity of Suzanne Urban's experience is so labile as to become incapable of integrating any new situation that would pertain to her familial environment.²⁸ Even though new experiences from other spheres present no serious problem for her, her family matters must remain the same; above all, no-one must ever fall ill, otherwise the temporal continuity of her existence is in jeopardy. Until her psychotic breakdown occurs, Suzanne Urban worries about the health and prosperity of her relatives, since any grave illness would entail a total catastrophe for herself. Characteristic of the pre-psychotic phase of her existence is her effort to take precautions against the breakdown of the temporal continuity of her existence that leads to the "self-denying" nursing of her ill relatives, especially her mother. Thus, what this family cult attests to is not so much a real mature love as it is the insecurity of her own existence. The news about her husband's incurable disease then necessarily comes as a devastating blow. As Suzanne Urban is incapable of processing this piece of information and integrating it within the order of her experience, she is inevitably cast into the abyss of sheer dread. The bottomless horror of the given situation, according to Binswanger, leads to an unprecedented torpor corresponding, on the temporal level, to time coming to a halt. Consequently to the extreme experience of total paralysis and loss of all security, paranoid delusions arise which enable temporal ecstasies to develop, but only at the cost of the overall

²⁸ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 425–8.

order of experience being tied to the awesome uncanniness of anxiety. Every new experience that Suzanne Urban shall henceforth make is a mere confirmation of dark suspicions and unclear threats, all evolving from the primary theme of the persecution of her family. Her existence does not stand open to the new, does not project into the future, but is trapped in a vicious circle, which corresponds to the peculiar cyclicity of its temporality. No matter how unproblematic, consequential and inwardly sure this experience might seem, it always finally collapses under the onslaught of anxiety, which it itself brings to the surface by means of its cyclicity.

Binswanger notes a similar unreliability of experience with other schizophrenics, whose time is repeatedly shattered by the sinister proximity of the Sudden and the Horrible. The inconsistency of experience, which manifests itself in the multifarious forms of delusions and hallucinations, is merely another expression of the disruption of temporal continuity that occurs under the onslaught of anxiety. The peculiar form of temporalization, marked by intermittence, sudden leaps and irregularities, is described by Binswanger as urgency (*Dringlichkeit*), i.e. as a state of latent catastrophe, in which the individual existence is constantly jeopardized by destructive collisions and turbulences.²⁹ Instead of an unproblematic, fluent temporalization, the individual must exert all its strength to induce at least some semblance of continuity. The exhausting attempts at reinstating the temporal continuity of existence and piecing together the whole of experience keep casting the patient into increasingly emptier timelessness where nothing ever happens. The final stage of the futile effort to regain the temporal continuity of existence is thus the empty eternity, in which the exhausted individual wholly resigns from the active involvement in his/her own existence. "The schizophrenic process," claims Binswanger, "is in the first place a process of existential emptying and impoverishment in the sense of a gradual stiffening ('coagulating') of free self into an increasingly less free ('more dependent') object alienated from itself. From this perspective only can it be truly understood. The schizophrenic thinking, speech, and action are all merely partial expressions of this fundamental process."³⁰

However, the reification and self-alienation in the empty timelessness where nothing happens any more does not by any means pertain to the ontological plane of being-there. The change in the overall way of existence that occurs in schizophrenia is of a purely ontic character; that is to say, it is an empirically evident modification, not a transformation in the ontological sense of the word. Binswanger outspokenly emphasizes that the ontological structure of being-there, and together with it the overall unity of temporality remains preserved, even if the schizophrenic existence is marked by a considerable degree of disturbance.³¹ As being-there is primarily characterized by the ecstatic unity of its temporality, this unity can never be wholly absent; should that happen, the being-there would cease to be what it is, becoming *Nicht-mehr-Da-Sein*. Even the extreme self-alienation observable in many

²⁹ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 255–6.

³⁰ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 165.

³¹ Binswanger, Ludwig. 1957. *Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie*, 11.

schizophrenics does not mean that the schizophrenic would cease to be a being with an interest in its own potentiality-of-being as described by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*.³² Even though the incessant onslaughts of the awesome uncanniness shatter the schizophrenic's world to such an extent that he/she finds nothing by means of which he could understand himself/herself, what still remains with him/her is bare being as sheer horror of the emptied being-in-the-world. The disintegration of the self, of which Binswanger speaks in connection with the schizophrenic collapse of the significative whole of the world, does not invoke a total loss of interest in one's own being, but rather opens a whole series of defense mechanisms which aim for a reconstruction of the world and retrieval of one's self. All objective materializations of the awesome uncanniness that appear as foreign, hostile powers are to be understood primarily as attempts at self-determination and preservation of whatever remains out of its world-project and its own self. And even if the one becomes utterly incapable of an independent performance of one's own being, as is the case with the complete dissociation of personality, this does not mean that he/she has ceased to be being-there in the ontological sense of the term, but rather that he/she has distanced himself/herself from the possibility of a continuous existence open to the future, and of the correspondent individual being (*das Selbstsein*). The total collapse of individual existence, attested to by the catatonic torpor and mechanical movements repeated *ad infinitum*, is merely the extreme variation of weakness that prevents the individual from unraveling the autonomous existence, confident in his/her world and in himself/herself.³³ With regard to the possibility of a resolute existence oriented toward the future which does not shrink from even the potential threat of anxiety, it becomes evident to what extent the schizophrenic way of being lags behind the potential hidden within the ontological structure of being-there.

Since the psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* departs from the united ontological composition of being-there, the schizophrenic's unstable being-in-the-world can appear only as a deficient mode of existence.³⁴ Against the backdrop of the temporal unity of existence, the intermittent and re-composed temporal continuity of experience looms as a deficient form of temporalization. The shakiness of the temporal structure interferes with the ability to maintain a truly open attitude toward new possibilities, which leads to a considerable narrowing of the openness to one's own possibilities. The sphere of possibilities that Ellen West is left with after she has clung to the ideal of leanness is so limited as to lead Binswanger to liken her life to the circling of a lioness that seeks in vain a way out of a latticed cage.³⁵ Instead of the primary orientation toward the future, what comes into view is anxiety related to the idea of obesity that binds her existence into an increasingly narrow range of possibilities. Urgency as a special form of temporalization rids the schizophrenic existence of its freedom, subjecting it to pathological compulsion;

³² Binswanger, Ludwig. 1965. *Wahn, Beiträge zu seiner phänomenologischen und daseinsanalytischen Erforschung*. Pfullingen: Neske, 24–6. Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 415.

³³ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 261–2.

³⁴ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 19.

³⁵ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 104–5.

the repeated outbreak of temporal discontinuity supplants the freedom of one's continuous projecting oneself toward new possibilities with the unconditioned necessity to ward off the uncanniness that emerges from within the very basis of being-there. In Binswanger's opinion, the dependence and impotence of this mode of existence manifests itself all the more clearly, the more exposed to the pathological world the individual becomes, trying to save himself/herself from the destructive onslaught of anxiety. The extreme expression of the absorption in the world is the state, where the schizophrenic wholly succumbs to delusive images and sounds; "turning worldly" (*die Verweltlichung*) is here so radical that the schizophrenic perceives himself/herself merely as an object manipulated by the influence of external forces.

Regardless of the specific forms of the absorption in the world, all schizophrenic casuistries attest to the inability to accept one's existence as genuinely one's own and to live through it in a corresponding manner. Binswanger does not, however, forget to stress that the strange absorption in the world, observable in schizophrenic individuals, is incomparable with the everyday entanglement in the world where we are also prone to forgetting our own being, searching instead for the sense and support in what we are preoccupied with. The crucial difference lies in that the everyday existence always operates within the frame of an unproblematic familiarity with the world, whereas the pathological world to which the schizophrenic stands open is time and again subject to onslaughts of the awesome uncanniness. The individual settled in the familiarity with the world is thus always capable of overcoming his/her self-alienation and finding the way back to himself/herself, whereas the schizophrenic remains incapable of coming back to himself/herself, nor is he/she able to find reassurance and security in his/his world.

A different situation prevails in the case of pre-psychotic states and the so-called neurotic disorders, where the process of falling prey to the world still has a character of everyday being-together-with innerworldly beings. Since the familiarity with the world is not overtly disturbed and the consistency of experience does completely fail to disintegrate, the individual is able to find certain guarantees in his/her world, even though the shakiness of the temporal structure of his/her existence foists upon it a most rigid attitude toward all new experience, which brings the awesome uncanniness of anxiety to the surface. Just as the psychotic, the neurotic also remains incapable of fully taking over his/her own existence. From out of his/her heightened susceptibility to the anxiety of being-there springs the peculiar falling prey to the world, marked by compulsive actions or various phobias.

What is characteristic of all pathological modes of being-in-the-world is thus the greater or lesser extent of deficiency in the performance of the individual existence. Despite refusing the functionalist view on mental disorders, Binswanger does eventually arrive at addressing the phenomenon of existential deficiency which is common to all pathological modifications of being-in-the-world. However, as long as phenomenological psychiatry finds a certain deficiency in pathological modes of existence, this deficiency springs from neither the functional notions of health and illness, nor the basic application of the system of social norms, but from the overall ontological structure of being-there.

The primary prerequisite of such a way of thematization is Binswanger's assertion that the ontological structure of being-in-the-world has no invariant character, as every individual performs and experiences his/her own existence in slightly different way.³⁶ Insofar as all modes of being-in-the-world are never completely the same, it is then possible to demonstrate the individual differences in the arrangement, "consistency," "materiality," "tint" and temporality of existence arising from this or that world-project. Every mode of being-in-the-world that uncontrollably lags behind the possibility of an integrated, autonomous existence oriented toward the future appears, against the background of the formal ontological arrangement of being-there, as an example of "miscarried being-there" (*missglücktes Dasein*).

A deviation from the norm determined by the ontological composition of human existence is by no means always irreversible. Given that the patient's being-in-the-world has not deteriorated to the extent to which it would prevent him/her from entering an understanding relationship with the psychotherapist, the therapeutic conversation can endow him/her with the understanding for the fundamental character of his/her world-project and show him/her where and how he/she has confused, deranged or derailed himself/herself in the framework of its structure.³⁷ In this way the ill individual can step out of their pathologically distorted, insecure world, and find their way back to the integrated, autonomous being-in-the-world. The objective of the *daseinsanalytic* therapy is to rid the mentally ill of all pathological inhibitions by revealing to them those structural possibilities of being-in-the-world that are essentially their own. The point is to bring them, by means of a therapeutic conversation, to the determination to take over their own existence and to independently develop their very own possibilities, without necessarily entertaining the paranoid need to ward off the influence of others.

The psychotherapeutic effort to open for the mentally ill their very own possibilities of being-in-the-world is all the more important in that the notion of "miscarried being-there" – Binswanger's coinage for psychopathological states – denotes not only a deviation from the norm resulting from the ontological composition of being-there, but also carries within itself a reference to the eudaemonistic dimension of human existence. Opposed to the miscarried being-there is the "successful being-there," which uses being-in-the-world to the maximum of its ontological potential, leading to fulfillment of life. In psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*, one can speak of a real fulfillment only when human existence is characterized not only by a bold orientation toward the future, but also by the possibility of love and friendship. Especially love as absolute openness to the other is considered here an existential moment that requires the ability to overcome one's own boundaries and rise to new possibilities. It is this ability that the "mentally ill" lack, expending most of their strength for protection against the awesome uncanniness of anxiety. If there is love in schizophrenic individuals, claims Binswanger, then it occurs merely in a deficient form, such as pathological jealousy and the ensuing need to possess the other.³⁸ When

³⁶ Binswanger. *Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie*, 11.

³⁷ Binswanger. *Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie*, 33–4.

³⁸ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 19.

Suzanne Urban devotes all her life endeavor to struggle for the well-being of her loved ones, or when Ilse shoves her hand into a red-hot oven in order to show her father the strength of real love, neither of these do so out of love, but rather out of the need to brace themselves against the onslaught of anxiety that coerces them to close themselves off from others, captivated by their outlandish ideal.³⁹ Their action is led not by love but rather by the care for themselves that leaves no room for openness to others.

A similar self-centeredness, resulting from the jeopardy of their own existence, is discernible also in other mentally ill individuals, who lack the ability of fully opening themselves to the other and create what the psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* refers to as the “dual modus” of a common existence. The dual modus of being, manifested in the phenomenon of love, is according to Binswanger something more than purely singular mode of being-in-the-world that does also encompass coexistence with others, but the individual existence never surpasses in relation to them the primary interestedness in itself that springs from its original *Jemeinigkeit*.

By such a suggestion, however, Binswanger clearly leaves the line of Heidegger’s thought, setting out in his own direction. His contemplation of the love phenomenon aims primarily to show where the phenomenological thematization of human existence, as sketched in *Sein und Zeit*, ends in an impasse. The crucial problem of the phenomenological description of being-there, in Binswanger’s opinion, is the fact that it regards only the individual modus of being-in-the-world, while leaving aside the dual modus of being, consummated in loving relationships. The ontological project of being-there departs from the structure of *Jemeinigkeit* which reflects from the very beginning the finitude of one’s own existence. If individual existence has a character of being-toward-death, it means that it always anticipates the possibility of its own end, which lays bare its essential loneliness. One can either accept this loneliness as one’s own lot that is to be fulfilled by a determined and independent choice of one’s own possibilities, or flee from it by falling prey to the possibilities of the everyday world that are offered to everyone. Whether being-there accepts its original loneliness, or rather in that it yields to the temptation of a convenient dependent existence, governed by how “they” live and by what “they” say, its existence always has an individual character. Only on the basis of the original *Jemeinigkeit* of existence is it possible to distinguish between both of the modes of being, the authentic and the inauthentic existence.

However, the *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* states that love is incompatible with both the authentic and the inauthentic existence, as it exceeds the limits of individual existence as such.⁴⁰ The dual modus of being, at which the human being arrives in loving harmony with the other, is allegedly incompatible with being-there that primarily cares about its own existence, while relating, incidentally, as it were, to other beings. If Heidegger terms the structural whole of the individual existence interested in itself as “care,” love must stay outside of the

³⁹ . Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 269–70.

⁴⁰ Binswanger, Ludwig. 1964. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 4th edition. München/Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 58.

framework of existence thus determined. The very notion of care in the Heideggerian sense, which implies the idea of a cumbersome burden and personal effort, is for Binswanger a denial of the essential character of love.

Further inquiry also leads to the discovery that care does not remain in itself, but is borne by temporality. The structural whole of care, and so the individual character of being-there, is ultimately based on the ecstatic unity of temporality. But since one cannot proceed from individual existence to a single “us,” love cannot be adequately thematized even on the basis of temporality that constitutes the ontological whole of care.

As long as love is to be comprehended as a certain mode of human existence, claims Binswanger, it is necessary to seek its uniqueness in that it surpasses the original loneliness of individual existence resulting from its being-toward-death. Despite failing to render it immortal, love enables human existence to cut the bonds of its own finitude and, merging with the other, to rise to the infinite. However, when touching the infinite in this way, human existence never reaches beyond time. Rather, what is conferred on the dual being of love is a peculiar temporality that temporalizes itself in the form of eternity. Unlike the empty eternity into which the schizophrenic descends, what is at work here is not the ontic modification of the original ontological unity of temporality, but rather a completely new type of temporality that has the character of the eternal moment. This is the reason why Binswanger considers love the ontological contrary of anxiety, which exposes the individual existence to uncanniness, giving it the feeling of its own loneliness, insecurity and finitude.⁴¹ Anxiety appears, especially when the individual has fallen into despair, incessantly having to tackle uncanniness of being-in-the-world, as is corroborated by the casuistry of Ellen West and Jürgen Zünd.⁴² Love, on the contrary, extricates us from the snares of uncanniness, as the encounter of two lovers creates the open space of trust and secureness that cannot be shattered even by the inexorable certainty of death. This encounter oscillates as the eternal moment of love, in whose intimacy the lovers find their real home.

What is typical of the dual mode of being, whose temporal basis is formed by the eternal moment of love, is the fact that one no longer exists solely for one’s own sake, but for the sake of “both of us.” In love, we care about “our common” being, which is in *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* attributed the character of *Unsrigkeit*. Just as the *Jemeinigkeit* characterises the individual existence, *Unsrigkeit* belongs to the loving co-existence.⁴³ In Binswanger’s opinion, it is only on the basis of *Unsrigkeit* that it is possible to comprehend the integrity of one’s own existence that gives itself to the other in a loving relationship, while accepting it at the same time.⁴⁴ The integrity of the loving co-existence is corroborated not in the determined acceptance of one’s own loneliness that springs from the finitude of human existence, but in the faithful sharing of common *Unsrigkeit*.

⁴¹ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 54.

⁴² Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 135–6, 230–2.

⁴³ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 59.

⁴⁴ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 126.

Depicting the eternal moment of love and the associated space of trust and secureness, Binswanger goes so far as to speak not of being-in-the-world, but of being-beyond-the-world (*Über-die-Welt-hinaus-Sein*). This expression means that the loving existence rises above the purely utilitarian sphere of practical possibilities, offered by the everyday world. Being-beyond-the-world is different from practical action, within whose framework things manifest themselves as what they are used for, others as those who handle them, and the individual as the one who can concern himself/herself with one thing or another. Unlike the everyday being-in-the-world, in which a certain possibility is understood only insofar as the individual existence finds in it a concretization of its own potentiality-of-being, being-beyond-the-world is governed not by what we can do but by what we are allowed to do.

By claiming this, Binswanger occupies himself not so much with wordplay as with a much more substantial revision of Heidegger's ontological project of being-there that allegedly adheres too strictly to the logic of power for it to open the pathway to the ontological character of love.⁴⁵ As long as being-in-the-world in its whole is imbued with the idea of power, manifested both in the consummate sovereignty with which one takes care of one's own existence, and the fatalism with which one embraces his/her own finitude, being-beyond-the-world, necessarily stands beyond all power and powerlessness. The crucial moment of being-beyond-the-world is not the individual determination to take over the burden of one's own existence or the effort to shun it, but a gift that renders individual existence richer and more complete than it could ever become on its own. This gift is not given by our loving counterpart either, as it is given to both of us. The act of giving, occurring in love, happens as a revelation, as self-manifestation of the infinite and eternal intimacy. Those to whom the gift is given are not required to do anything but to remain gratefully in the openness that is revealed in the loving encounter.

As regards Heidegger's ontological analysis of being-there, Binswanger claims that "the beginning with the *Jemeinigkeit* of being-there cannot be overcome by prudence or reason, but by something quite different, namely by imagination".⁴⁶ If phenomenology is to arrive at a dual mode of being, then imagination, whose scintillation binds together the loving "I" and "you", must stand in its focus. Opposed to the understanding of one's own existence that involves the understanding of other beings one is dealing with, it is the shared being-beyond-the-world that is imbued with imagination, by whose virtue the we dwell in the sphere of loving trust, safe intimacy and eternity.

Imagination, however, must not by any means be mistaken for mere phantasy, let alone illusion. Binswanger repeatedly emphasizes that love is not a passionate affection or some other psychic process, but rather the fundamental feature of human existence that has its own "reality." More precisely, love requires for itself a special ontological status, one that springs from the dual mode of existence. In view of the fact that the ontological nature of the dual mode of existence is exhaustively described on the 700 pages of *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*,

⁴⁵ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 147.

⁴⁶ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 14.

it is no exaggeration to call this work the phenomenological book of love. As opposed to Heidegger's phenomenological description of being-there, which primarily emphasizes the moment of practical understanding, the erotic *Daseinsanalysis* explicates the dual modus of existence as the cardinal phenomenon.

Binswanger's phenomenology of love is tangible also in the works such as *Schizophrenie* where the notions of eternity, safe trust or being-beyond-the-world refer to that which the pathologically disturbed existence painfully lacks. It would therefore be mistaken to surmise that Binswanger highlights love as an isolated phenomenon. The crucial motif that directs his intellectual work is the effort to obtain the overall picture of human existence. While Heidegger's thought is governed by a purely ontological interest, as its primary focus is nothing but the question of being and accordingly omits many aspects of human existence, Binswanger situates his conception within the anthropological realm. As he points out, his aim is to supplement the ontological description of being-there so that it captures the whole of human existence in its completeness.⁴⁷

This prompts the need to broaden the ontological picture of human existence by including therein not only loving imagination, but also the ability of imagination that gives rise to the work of art. One can mention in this connection that both types of imagination stand quite near each other within Binswanger's anthropological conception, as they both surpass the pragmatic context of being-in-the-world in a similar way. Both the artistic and loving imagination accomplishes the full scope of its dimension when it ascends from being-in-the-world to being-beyond-the-world.⁴⁸ Despite their consubstantiality, the two types of imagination are to some extent different from each other, which is given by the fact that loving imagination, unlike the artistic imagination, functions as a linking element within the loving harmony between "I" and "you."⁴⁹ That is not, however, to say that the creative imagination should close itself off in an ivory tower of its own images. The creative genius opens through the imagination to the totality of beings, without becoming fixed upon a specific entity as something to be utilized practically. In the light of this inspiring encounter, the genius appears as one who traverses from the intimate closeness to the world into the "height above the world," into a genuine eternity of loving harmony with nature, mankind and God. Dealing in his *Schizophrenie* with the question of genius, Binswanger notes that his exceptionality consists in the ability to bring beings in general into a completely new connection and revelation.⁵⁰

In an absolutely different situation is the madman, who lives in the world as an emergency asylum or banishment from which there is no escape. Incapable of ascending to being-beyond-the-world, the madman is doomed to a barren, lonesome being-in-the-world, which stands in the way of both the loving encounter with the other and the act of creation. Whether a schizophrenic, depressively or neurotically structured individual, the madman is incapable of opening to a real encounter,

⁴⁷ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 640.

⁴⁸ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 14, 158.

⁴⁹ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 505–6.

⁵⁰ Binswanger. *Schizophrenie*, 252–3.

clinging instead to ideas or things at hand in order to seek in them the support for being-in-the-world jeopardized by anxiety. The incessant tension between the understanding being-in-the-world and the imaginative being-beyond-the-world that stands in the primary focus of Binswanger's anthropological conception is thus translated into his interpretation of the "diametrical opposition" between the madman and the genius.

Unfortunately, however heavily the psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* and the resulting concept of love and artistic genius draw upon a vast wealth of experience, this approach cannot stand the test of strict philosophical criteria. Leaving aside the psychopathological dimension of human existence for the moment, one can start by mentioning the critical notes of Paul De Man, who occupied himself with Binswanger's work in the context of literary theory. His observations summed up in the essay "Ludwig Binswanger and the Sublimation of the Self" concern especially the doubtful role played within Binswanger's conception by the phenomenon of the self, but what does not pass unnoticed either is the problematic status of imagination, asserted in artistic or loving enthusiasm.⁵¹ Both of these difficult questions, according to De Man, have to do with the overall humanistic orientation of phenomenological description of the creative and the loving mode of being. Cognate with this is the normative tendency manifested in the emphasis on the ideal of a balanced, fully harmonious existence.

De Man arrives at this discovery against the background of Foucault's archeology of the Western thought which puts phenomenology into the context of the modern episteme. Insofar as the epistemological inquiry undertaken in *Les mots et les choses* reveals the bond that ties phenomenology to the fate of modern knowledge, what it implies is that even phenomenology is not safe from the fundamental jeopardy designated by Foucault as "anthropological sleep." What the modern episteme brings into focus of all knowledge is human being, perceived as the empirical object on the one hand and as the transcendental precondition of all knowledge on the other. Therefore, phenomenology must continuously combat the temptation of anthropologism that springs from this empirical-transcendental bifurcation. The basis of anthropologism, according to Foucault, consists in the fact that "[a]ll empirical knowledge, provided it concerns man, can serve as a possible philosophical field in which the foundation of knowledge, the definition of its limits, and, in the end, the truth of all truth must be discovered."⁵² Once we relate the mentioned criterion to Binswanger's conception, it becomes crystal clear that what we are dealing with here is a model case of falling into the trap of anthropologism.

If phenomenology cannot completely evade its fateful proclivity for anthropologism, this does not mean that it must fall prey to it. This is clearly attested to by *Les mots et les choses* itself, where phenomenology is grasped as not only an attempt to bridge the empirical and the transcendental regions, but also the place of birth of a

⁵¹ De Man, Paul. 1983. *Blindness and Insight. Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 36–50.

⁵² Foucault. *Les mots et les choses*, 352. English edition: Foucault, Michel. 1970. *The Order of Things*, ed. Ronald. David Laing. London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 341.

new ontology. Despite its rootedness within the transcendental realm of thought, phenomenology falls apart from within and becomes the description of experience, which is still empirical, and ontological inquiry, focusing on the question of being as such.⁵³ The lion's share in this split within the phenomenological project belongs to Heidegger, who decidedly rejects the Husserlian theme of transcendental consciousness, replacing it with the question of being. In his case, what is at stake is no longer the search for the transcendental foundation of the empirical contents of knowledge, but rather the fundamental ontology accessible through the ontological description of individual being. Although Heidegger's fundamental ontology does depart from the *Jemeinigkeit* of being-there, its main aim is not so much the empirical inquiry into the human individuality, but rather the ontologically purified description of being-there that pays heed only to those existential moments that are tied to the openness of being. Insofar as individual existence relates to its own being with understanding, this relation cannot be mistaken for the egoistic preoccupation with oneself, as it always already encompasses the understanding of being as such.

On the other hand, the effort to supplement the ontologically strict description of individual being with the phenomenological description of a creative genius and a loving encounter rests on purely empirical foundations, which De Man condemns as an inadmissible blending of the empirical with the ontological subject matter. In spite of relying on the ontological analysis of being-there, Binswanger cannot resist the "tendency to forsake the barren world of ontological reduction for the wealth of experience."⁵⁴ As a consequence, his phenomenological project lapses into the very anthropologism Heidegger seeks to avoid.

It is therefore not surprising that Heidegger resolutely distances himself from Binswanger's psychiatric-erotic orientation. Even though it is Binswanger's merit that the phenomenological way of thinking had been introduced into the psychiatric realm, his work is assessed in *Zollikoner Seminare* with extreme severity. The very attempt at supplementing the ontological insights demonstrated in *Sein und Zeit* with a phenomenological treatment of love is subjected to harsh criticism. The reason for declining the effort to complement the individual with the dual mode of existence lies not in the very fact that Binswanger supplements the ontological description of being-there, but rather in the fact that being-there is rendered in a way that is full of distortions.

To see how Heidegger rectifies Binswanger's anthropological conception, it is important to remind ourselves that in *Zollikoner Seminare* the concepts of being-there (*Dasein*) and sojourn (*Aufenthalt*) are used as synonyms. As being-there relates not only to its own being, but to being as such, its basic structure lies in the understanding of being. The understanding of being is not only a side, abstract addendum to sojourning with beings, but rather the key to comprehending our sojourn as such, notes Heidegger with an emphasis on the important role played by this fundamental determination in the overall clarification of being-there and its

⁵³ Foucault. *Les mots et les choses*, 336–7.

⁵⁴ De Man. *Blindness and Insight*, 49.

existentials.⁵⁵ The description of existential structures, whether of being-in-the-world, care or being-toward-death, is carried out in *Sein und Zeit* solely with regard to the understanding of being.

In opposition to that, Binswanger completely disregards the understanding of being and contents himself with the general designation of human existence as being-in-the-world, care and being-toward-death. Nevertheless, all these formal classifications obtain their true sense only against the background of the principal delineation of being-there, i.e. the understanding of being. Therefore, Heidegger observes that “[p]sychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*’ operates with a mutilated being-there from which its basic characteristic has been cut out and cut off.”⁵⁶ Approaching being-there without paying respect to its original relatedness to being, the psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* changes all its ontological features into purely anthropological classifications. When being-in-the-world, care and being-toward-death have become parts of the mosaic out of which the overall picture of human being is to be composed, it seems only logical that the irresistible need arises to supplement them with love and its corresponding being-beyond-the-world that rises even above the certainty of death.

Once, however, being-in-the-world, care and being-toward-death have been comprehended on the basis of the understanding of being, such supplementation would immediately turn out to be redundant, as the understanding relation to being already encompasses all empirically differentiated modes of behavior, including – among others – love. We can even concur with Heidegger in that through the understanding of being, one can arrive at a much deeper and richer grasp of the phenomenon of love than the one offered in the picture of the loving being-beyond-the-world.⁵⁷ Due to the fact that the sojourn relates to being, it can see the other also in a non-expedient and non-pragmatic way. For such a change of perspective to be thematized, it is imperative to stick consistently to the restrictive character of the ontological description of being-there and set out only from those structures revealed by fundamental ontology.

Ignoring the understanding of being leads also to the incorrect interpretation of the role played by the moment of transcendence. As the fundamental moment of our existence, transcendence is established by our relation to being that remains different from all beings, and yet essentially concerns every single one of them. Insofar as transcendence in the common sense of the word denotes proceeding from one level to another, Heidegger specifies it further as proceeding from beings to being. Our existence is in the process of transcending only inasmuch as it advances beyond the framework given by beings and relates to the *being of beings* that radically differs from all beings. Transcendence occurs as advancing from beings in their discoveredness toward being, which guarantees their discoveredness; it can be, in other words, characterized as ecstatic dwelling in the difference between beings and being. Without transcending in precisely this way, without having secured in

⁵⁵ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 236.

⁵⁶ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 237. English edition: Heidegger. *Zollikon Seminars*, 190.

⁵⁷ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 237–8, 287.

advance access to being in its utter difference from all beings, we could discover no beings at all. In order to arrive at beings, we must always already advance from beings toward the being of beings.

As beings in their unmediated discoveredness are not that “toward which” our existence advances, but that “from which” our existence advances, a transcendence of this delineation can have nothing to do with the relation of the subjective consciousness to reality. Insofar as the subject-object division is surpassed solely by means of the structure of being-in-the-world in which the understanding of being is omitted, as is the case within psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*, the temptation cannot be resisted to consider being-in-the-world only as a new determination of the subjectivity of the subject and regard transcendence only as an act by which the consciousness reaches reality. Both being-in-the-world and transcendence are thus extracted out of the context of fundamental ontology, playing once again the roles of transcendental structures of consciousness, where they serve as a foundation for the empirical investigation of human being.

Failing to think the movement of transcendence through to being itself, Binswanger also misses the phenomenon of disclosedness (*die Erschlossenheit*), characteristic of being-there. The fact that being-there is essentially open for the encounter with beings, is understandable only on the basis of its primary disclosedness. In order to encounter some beings, being as such must stand open to us. The disclosedness of being is tied to our existence as that which makes possible the discoveredness of beings. Insofar as the transcending existence always advances from beings to being, insofar as it moves on the edge of the ontic-ontological difference, it simply advances from the discoveredness of beings to disclosedness of being.

The meaning of the disclosedness of being is manifest with special prominence in the phenomenon of anxiety, whose uncanniness removes individual existence from its familiarity with beings, thus allowing it to experience the fearful emptiness of its openness. The disclosedness of being-there remains misunderstood within psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*, despite the numerous passages analyzing the pathological aspects of uncanniness that deprives the individual existence of all common certainties and confronts it with the bare fact that “it is.” Even though the disclosedness is briefly dealt with in *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, Binswanger does so only to point out its purely individual character.⁵⁸ In order to grasp the phenomenon of a loving being with the other, it is, according to him, necessary to rid the disclosedness of the limitation springing from the focus of the individual existence purely on itself, substituting it with an openness pertaining not only to “myself,” but to “both of us.” However, precisely this statement testifies to a total misunderstanding of the ontological disclosedness and of how it is bound with the overall structure of being-there. The possibility of its most radical individuation might well lie in the act of transcendence, but what is made accessible to individual existence in its relation to disclosedness is not only its own being, but being as such. Disclosedness is also not so much an attribute of the individual existence as an open dimension in which it belongs. Being-there is not a proprietor of

⁵⁸ Binswanger. *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, 34.

this open dimension; it is merely allowed to dwell in it. Being-there is someone who remains in the openness of being, and only as such can it encounter that which is; its sojourning with beings is possible only as dwelling in an open dimension in which beings can at all be present.

In order to see being-there in the right light, one must not view it only as sojourn with beings, but rather grasp it as a sojourn in the openness of being.⁵⁹ Insofar as Heidegger terms our existence as being-there, this “there” denotes precisely the open dimension of being. The determination “there” refers to no locality within space, but to the openness of being in which being-there dwells.

Only when human existence is explicated as a dwelling in the openness of being is it possible to explain how its *Jemeinigkeit* belongs to it. One’s own self is maintained as self-collected dwelling in the clearing of being.⁶⁰ Only individual being thus explained allows one to shun his/her individual role, to get enmeshed in beings and lost in the possibilities offered by the world. Nothing but such being can also give it the opportunity to meet the other as partner and together go beyond what has hitherto been considered given and possible. Falling in love, one departs not from an isolated subject, but from the world in which we find our possibilities and where we play our social and sexual roles. Nevertheless, a possible step beyond the framework of the given and certain presupposes the preliminary disclosedness of being, without which the question of how one can abandon one’s world and build a new one amidst the ruins would be unanswerable. For love and other crucial moments of human life to be adequately thematized, we need to see that the phenomenon of disclosedness vouches our existence not only for its “being-open” (*das Offen-sein*), but also for its “being-free” (*das Frei-sein*), thanks to which one can break free from all the habitual roles, adopted possibilities and accepted interpretations of one’s own existence.

It is this phenomenon that gets lost in Binswanger’s concept of the world-project, which forms the cornerstone of his empirical inquiries in the field of psychopathology. When psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* describes the pathologically structured world-projects determining the character of this or that individual existence, it remains therefore unclear how one can abandon the pathologically distorted world and advance toward new, hitherto inaccessible, possibilities, which is a necessary prerequisite of an effective therapy. Binswanger contents himself with the statement that the psychotherapeutic treatment can be successful once the patient realizes the deficient structure of his/her own world-project, which is a realization that the psychotherapist can facilitate.⁶¹ This, however, gives the impression as if the world-project were the working of some transcendental consciousness which can merely be confronted with its own creation in order to evoke the revision of its relation to the world.

Despite referring to *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, where the world-project is conceived of as the fundamental act by which being-there confronts its own possibilities, Binswanger still neglects the very understanding of being, which in the first place

⁵⁹ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 188–9.

⁶⁰ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 240.

⁶¹ Binswanger, Ludwig. 1955. *Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Bd. II: *Zur Problematik der psychiatrischen Forschung und zum Problem der Psychiatrie*. Bern: Francke, 293, 306.

allows anything to be understood. “[O]nly in the illumination granted by our understanding of being can beings become manifest in themselves, (i.e., as the beings they are and in the way they are),” claims Heidegger.⁶² However, in psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*, the world-project is considered only with regard to the discoveredness of beings that manifest themselves within its framework, not as regards the disclosedness of being that makes it possible for beings to appear as something that is. This leads to an incomplete picture of the phenomenon of being-in-the-world, in which its ontologically constitutive dimension is omitted, and thus the overall image of being-there distorted.

The misunderstanding of the overall structure of being-in-the-world occurring in psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* affects not only the general exposition of being-there, but also the phenomenological interpretation of the specific forms of the pathological being-in-the-world. Inasmuch as the world-project determines the way in which beings manifest themselves, what this means according to Binswanger is that it determines the configuration, consistency, materiality and tenor of the concrete being-in-the-world. However, Heidegger objects to this, claiming that materiality, consistency or tenor are not determinations of the world as such, but mere designations of beings that appear therein. To consider these qualities moments of the world-project is therefore to mistake that is discovered within the world for the structural alignment of the world as such.⁶³

A similar confusion of being-in-the-world with the innerworldly beings occurs when Binswanger describes the temporal continuity of existence which is in jeopardy once being-in-the-world has been pathologically disturbed. The weakening of the temporal continuity can for him be manifested in the forms of phobic fear, compulsive behavior, or eventually the schizophrenic inconsistency of experience, where the fluent temporalization of existence is disturbed by the irresistible onslaughts of the Sudden and the Fearful. However, the key problem of this exposition is the fact that the expression “continuity” does not correspond to the phenomenological structures of the sojourning in the openness of being. The notion of continuity corresponds rather to one’s own self-understanding that gets lost in the innerworldly beings, grasping one’s own existence according to their criteria. By no means does the idea of continuity, or the possibility of “time coming to a halt” as a consequence of a shock, belong to the phenomenological description of being-in-the-world. “To speak about a break in continuity here, or to characterize the [existential] projection of the word by the category of continuity, as Binswanger does, is a formalization of [being-there’s] existing emptying it of any factual [existential] content,” says Heidegger.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, this critique of psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* does not imply in the least the necessity of relinquishing the possibility of grasping pathologically

⁶²Heidegger, Martin. 1949. *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 169. English edition: Heidegger, Martin. 1998. On the Essence of Ground. In *Pathmarks* (trans: McNeill, William). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 130.

⁶³Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 253.

⁶⁴Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 257. English version: Heidegger. *Zollikon Seminars*, 206.

disturbed being-in-the-world in its empirical evidence. According to Heidegger, the fundamental presupposition of such a thematization of psychopathological disorders which, unlike psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*, does not lapse into the anthropological picture of human existence is to pay heed to the overall ontological composition of sojourning in the openness of being. In order to prevent the structures that characterize the sojourning in the openness of being from appearing as merely isolated elements, but rather to allow them to emerge in their original interconnectedness, what one must reveal is their temporal constitution. The temporality proper to being-there has nothing to do with the uninterrupted, homogeneous sequence of moments following one another; its character is given only by the fact that being-there is always already somewhere and somehow situated, that it relates to its own being and being as such, and still is together with beings to which its proclivity is to fall prey. In spite of the fact that the situatedness amidst the understanding of and being together with beings do not as such form temporality, they refer to the dimensions of the having-been, the future, and the present, in which our existence temporalizes itself. It temporalizes itself in that it encompasses the having-been, the future and the present that form together the integral unity of temporality.

Only when the sojourning in the openness of being is considered on the basis of the inseparable unity of the three temporal ecstasies can it be shown where its primordial unity and integrity lie. The existential *Jemeinigkeit*, which encompasses not only the possibility of an integrated individual existence, but also the possibility of self-oblivion and self-evasion, is thus grasped as the ecstatic unity of temporality, in which the overall dwelling in the disclosedness of being becomes constituted. What is also corroborated by this observation is that the threat of the breakdown of the temporal continuity Binswanger speaks about when dealing with psychopathological disorders does not correspond to the phenomenal contents of being-there, since its temporal unity is bound to remain intact during the whole existence. As long as the ontological unity of temporality is preserved, one cannot speak of a factual disintegration of temporality, not even on the ontic level of experience.

It becomes thus evident that the thematization of psychopathological phenomena which is meant to be adequate to being-there cannot do without clarifying the relation between the ontological analytic of being-there and the empirical inquiry into mental disorders. Whereas the ontic investigation adheres to empirically ascertainable phenomena, in which the experiences and attitudes of a certain individual manifest themselves, the ontological inquiry pertains to the being of beings; that is to say, in the relation to human existence, it deals with the phenomenal structures that are accessible not sensorially, but only by means of hermeneutic exposition. The hermeneutic interpretation of being-there must not be confused with the understanding of a specific individual, since what occurs in the first case is the ontological interpretation of basic structures of sojourning in disclosedness, whereas what is at stake in the second case is the understanding of a situational context in which the given individual exists.

Insofar as they strive to understand the patient's situation, a psychiatrist or psychotherapist can unveil the ontic phenomena and their interconnections, but the

ontological phenomena as such are accessible only to philosophical inquiry. Therefore, Heidegger stresses that one can, in connection with the psychopathological and psychotherapeutic problematic, speak of “phenomenology” only in the sense of an ontic examination that focuses on the specific possibilities and modes of behavior in the world, not in the sense of the ontological inquiry into being-there.⁶⁵ The investigation of pathological symptoms of a certain individual, however, can be guided by the ontological phenomena as unveiled by the hermeneutic exposition of being-there, though it has no right whatsoever to be their master and corrector. This right pertains only to philosophy that reveals the very ontological composition of being-there.⁶⁶ Psychiatry and psychotherapy with a *daseinsanalytical* orientation should never lose sight of the fact that their relation to ontological analytic of being-there is that of dependence. As long as the empirical investigation of psychopathological disorders should correspond to the basic character of being-there, it is on Heidegger’s view necessary for all the diagnostic and therapeutic action to operate in the light of human existence projected as dwelling in the openness of being. Otherwise, one is in danger of going astray as Binswanger did, seeking on the basis of empirical data to arrange and supplement the ontological structures obtained within the frame of the analytic of being-there.

However, to do him justice, one should note that Binswanger later became aware of his “productive misunderstanding” of the hermeneutic exposition of being-there and tried to make amends. Especially his lecture titled *Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie* testifies to his effort to rectify the relation between the ontic and the ontological level of inquiry, and thus to prevent the ontological description of being-there from becoming contaminated by items of medical knowledge and observations. Apart from confusing the ontological structure of being-in-the-world with ontic phenomena treated by psychiatry or psychotherapy, what is refused here is the anthropological picture of human existence which Heidegger surpasses by determining being-there purely on the basis of the understanding of being.⁶⁷

No matter how steadfastly phenomenological psychiatry may cling to the overall ontological composition of sojourning in the openness of being, the question remains how it can on the basis of the understanding of being explicate the phenomenon of un-reason to which Binswanger alludes in his treatise on schizophrenia. Thematizing that which originally appears as un-reason and non-sense, the psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis* relies on the ontological structure of being-there that remains invariable in its nature; all changes occurring in the course of pathological disorders pertain merely to the ontic plane of experience. Nevertheless, the emphasis laid on the ontological unity of being-there ultimately leads to a normative view of psychopathological phenomena, as the pathologically altered being-in-the-world is perceived as a deficient mode of being. Despite rejecting the normative approach to psychopathological disorders as used in the framework of clinical medicine and turning instead to the primary encounter with un-reason, Binswanger brings his

⁶⁵ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 279–81.

⁶⁶ Heidegger. *Zollikoner Seminare*, 255.

⁶⁷ Binswanger. *Der Mensch in der Psychiatrie*, 21–2.

psychiatric conception again to the notion of deficiency, this time deficiency in the ontic structure of being-in-the-world that is reflected against the background of the integral structural whole of being-there.

The way in which the primary experience with un-reason is depicted in Foucault's *Histoire de la folie* or *Maladie mentale et psychologie*, however, is totally different. The prefix "un" in the word un-reason is understood here not in the negative sense, but rather as an expression of a positive difference. It is no privative negation, by means of which someone is labeled as "devoid of reason," but rather a primary otherness that looms at the limits of our experience. Un-reason and non-sense show themselves no longer as mere shortcomings of sane reason, but as original, non-derived phenomena. It can be concluded from this that the normative view of psychopathological disorders is unnecessary and non-self-evident, and corresponds not so much to un-reason itself as to Binswanger's own psychiatric orientation.

Is it, however, possible to evade the normative view of psychopathological phenomena if at the same time one is to adhere strictly to the ontological description of sojourning in the openness of being? Is it possible at all on the basis of the dynamic structure of existence, created by the understanding of being, to reach a thematization of insanity that would reveal un-reason as its initial and ultimate truth? Inasmuch as every relation with beings is grounded upon the understanding of being, insanity can appear as a certain form of entanglement and absorption in beings, not as un-reason in the strong sense of the word. Insofar as Heidegger derives the ontological character of being-there from the understanding of being, it is possible that this understanding remains concealed, but it can never turn into total non-understanding. Being-there always somehow understands its own being and being as such.

Moreover, what is also reflected in the understanding of being is the exceptionality of human existence, since there is nothing else but this existence that could relate to the disclosedness of being. Animal, unlike the material nature, relates to its environment, but still is not exposed to the openness of being. The uniqueness of human existence manifests itself even where it forgets its innermost character, which is the dwelling in the openness of being, losing itself in its absorption in beings.

In spite of evading the temptation of anthropologism, Heidegger still ensures for the human existence a prominent position in the whole of knowledge, which corresponds to the rootedness of his philosophy within the modern episteme, as described by Foucault in *Les mots et les choses*. From this also springs the emphasis on the constancy of the individual existence that is maintained in the advancing from the discoveredness of beings to disclosedness of being. As the analytic of being-there attributes to it the character of *Jemeinigkeit*, it also secures its individuality in the ecstatic unity of temporality. In the light of *Jemeinigkeit* thus conceived, it is perhaps possible adequately to thematize the neurotic shunning of one's own existence; but once we are faced with the stark reality of un-reason that is manifested in the form of schizophrenic depersonalization, the phenomenological description of sojourning in disclosedness has little to offer. The only remaining possibility is to grasp the schizophrenic disintegration of personality as a deficient form of the self-collected individual existence that implicitly refers to the unity of the integrated and autonomous existence. On this point Heidegger's view of the

pathologically structured individual existence is no different from Binswanger's psychiatric *Daseinsanalysis*.

If we are to attain the taciturn and disquieting truth of un-reason, we have no option but to turn to a source of inspiration other than fundamental ontology and the ontological project of sojourning in disclosedness. In order to view even so extreme a form of un-reason that manifests itself in the schizophrenic breakdown, where the occurring "end of the world" is accompanied by the disintegration of the individual existence, as an original phenomenon, we need to bring to our aid a conception capable of problematizing the idea of the temporal unity of existence, with which the phenomenological conception of individual existence stands or falls.

The example of Binswanger warns us that, rather than psychological or psychiatric literature, we should prefer the philosophical work which alone can serve for a possible revision of the pillars of Heidegger's ontological project of being-there. In order to avoid the trap of anthropologism, in which one can get stuck by deducing the transcendental structures of human experience from the specific empirical data, we must seek a work that examines and thus already surpasses the boundaries of modern episteme. With regard to a selection thus narrowed, what appears as the most suitable besides Foucault's examination of the relation of Western culture to un-reason is Deleuze's thematization of the extreme forms of thought, not the least of which is insanity. Already in Deleuze's first great oeuvre – *Différence et répétition* – insanity is characterized in such a way that is far from the normative approach to psychopathological disorders. Instead of the clinical view of the mental disorder that reduces it to a mere empirical fact, what comes to the forefront is the effort to grasp schizophrenic, compulsive behavior and dementia as well not only as something observable in human being, but as an outstanding possibility of thought. As the very extremes and limits of thought, all these phenomena fall into the region in whose foundations Deleuze discovers non-sense. Within the framework of thought, non-sense is not a deficit. It does not stand in the same relation to thought as error to true cognition. Both error and truth belong to the region of sense, where they refer to each other. Non-sense, on the contrary, defies all categories of error, deception and non-truth, as it can be neither true nor false. As non-sense stands in the relation to sense as its extreme otherness, what it thus reflects is the finitude of thought as such.⁶⁸

In order for this peculiar finitude to be explicable, it is necessary to reinterpret the traditional picture of thought and of the thinking individual. The first step is to dismantle the idea that thought is a performance of the subject that preserves its constant identity. The thinking subject, whose own identity is the guarantee of the identity of all objects, which creates the prerequisite for their reliable recognition, allows for only one form of cognitive failure – error; other lapses of thought are then understood as mere consequences of outer circumstances. Insofar as the manifold forms of non-sense are to be taken seriously, it is imperative that the question of the condition of their possibility be raised, which Deleuze deems hidden in the link between the process of thinking and the process of individuation. This link has

⁶⁸ Deleuze. *Différence et répétition*, 199–201.

nothing to do with the structure of *ego cogito*, as it occurs on a plane where no “I” exists. Through individuation, the individual only becomes instituted, but even that is still far away from the constant identity of the thinking subject, as this is open to breaks, changes or encounters that are irreducible to mere recognition of a certain object. In all these situations where the other appears as other and not as representing the identical, what comes into play is a-subjective individuation, and it is its unquiet relation to thought that renders the act of thought a risky venture that can at any moment fall in the bottomless abyss of non-sense.

However, it is not only the constant identity of the thinking subject, but also the phenomenologically projected individuality of human existence that renders unfathomable the dimension proper to non-sense. No matter how resolutely fundamental ontology diverges from the Cartesian picture of thought, it still fails to comply with the requirements of philosophical inquiry into the conditions enabling insanity, which can be documented by the example of *Sein und Zeit*, where the transcending relation to being is connected with the possibility and necessity of “the most radical individuation.”⁶⁹ Individuation in this context occurs within the framework of the advancing from the discoveredness of beings to the disclosedness of being. Being-there individuates itself in the instance of abandoning its settled-ness amidst things and its social bonds with others which incessantly tempts it to lose itself in them and forget its very own character that consists in dwelling amidst the openness of being. Advancing from the familiarity with beings condemns being-there to solitariness, throwing it into to uncanniness where nothing addresses it in terms of what it has thus far understood. It is only this total solitariness that gives being-there the experience of that in which the foundation of its personal uniqueness lies. In this way it is enabled to re-discover and re-assume itself. Individuation in *Sein und Zeit* is thus conceived of as lonesomeness that opens up a path from self-oblivion back toward individual being-there and its irreplaceable position in the openness of being.

As regards uncanniness Heidegger also adumbrates the dimension of the abyssal depth, but Deleuze ventures even further when he links individuation to the loss of ground (*effondement*) that reveals beneath all grounding the bottomless, formless chaos, where relatedness to oneself is no longer possible. The process of individuation as expounded in *Différence et répétition* presupposes a much more radical getting “outside-itself” than is the case in the ecstatic advancement toward openness of being. What is at stake there is not only the turning away from worldly matters. Nor is it only the loneliness in the depth of uncanniness, but the uncertain search for coherence and stability that may, and then again may not, turn out successful. What is at play here, instead of the polarity of self-oblivion and self-discovery, is the much more radical vacillation between disintegration and reintegration that form the two opposing moments in the process of individuation.

The specificity of an individuation conceived in this manner lies in its impersonal character, as the processes of disintegration and reintegration occur already at a pre-personal stage. The individual, constituted in the field of individuation, is not indivisible, but on the contrary keeps constantly going through moments of

⁶⁹Heidegger. *Sein und Zeit*, 38.

decentralization and disorganization, after which there must come the phase of re-consolidation.⁷⁰ The ceaseless alteration of disintegration and reintegration attests to the fact that individuality as such is not a lifelong permanence, but only temporary and provisional.

Thus, the conception of individuality as delineated in *Différence et répétition* is substantially different from the phenomenological project of individual being that guarantees beforehand its unity and constancy. Despite the possibility of forgetting its own existence and losing itself in the innerworldly beings it encounters, being-there always retains the character of *Jemeinigkeit* that enables it to re-discover itself at any instant. This unflagging possibility essentially springs from the temporal unity of sojourning in the openness of being. The individuation that occurs in the advancement from the familiarity with beings does not actually run any real risk, as it merely reveals what being-there always already is. Not even the uncanniness into which the solitary existence lapses can explicate the possibility of non-sense unless the temporal unity of existence, and together with it the individual structure of existence, becomes jeopardized. Moreover, as long as the process of individuation is united with the understanding of being that foregrounds sojourning in disclosedness, the mystery remains how something like non-sense and un-reason could appear there.

It may seem that the ontological project of being-there that binds the understanding of being with the ecstatic unity of temporality has its justification insofar as it enables the unveiling of the ontic-ontological difference that occurs in the advancement from the discoveredness of beings to the disclosedness of being. However, one may object to this that even the ontic-ontological difference cannot be adequately comprehended unless the ecstatic unity of temporality that bears the whole structure of the understanding of being is challenged.

As much as he appreciates that Heidegger liberates the ontological difference from the entrapment of representation reducing it to the negative aspect of identity, Deleuze adds in one breath that this step as such is not enough. The first step, which is the realization that being is characterized not by any sort of negativity, but only by its difference from all beings, must be followed by the second step which shall show the ontological difference without any reference to a given unifying principle, be it the unified ontological composition of sojourning in the openness of being.⁷¹ The individual, according to Deleuze, can stand in relation to the total otherness of being only insofar as it is a disintegrated individual, whose moments disassemble and re-assemble themselves on the basis of temporal structures.

What it means in the context of the analytic of being-there is that the advancing from the discoveredness of beings to the disclosedness of being corresponds to the self which is not unified, but rather shattered, by its temporality. But as long as he persistently clings to the temporal unity of individual existence, Heidegger remains incapable of seeing the ontological difference in its purity, as he subjects it to the principle of the Same; in spite of abandoning the notion of identity, to which

⁷⁰ Deleuze. *Différence et répétition*, 331.

⁷¹ Deleuze. *Différence et répétition*, 89–91.

difference is bound merely as its additional complement, and inquiring instead after the Same which encompasses difference as such, Heidegger does not go far enough, for he still explicates difference on the basis of sameness.⁷²

This view leads Deleuze to the necessity of surpassing the Heideggerian philosophy of ontological difference, which serves in *Différence et répétition* as one of the landmarks, and substitute it with a new conception of a pure difference that can do without reference to any *a priori* unity or sameness whatsoever.⁷³ From this point there thus evolves his philosophical collaboration with Guattari, within whose framework the model of individuality falling apart and a-personal individuation is further worked out.

As this brief and global evaluation necessarily evokes a certain mistrust, our next task will be to show the extent of the validity of the above-mentioned assertions and the extent to which there are exceptions to the given “rule” in Heidegger’s philosophy. It may as well be that fundamental ontology already encompasses a certain awareness of the problems that Deleuze points out, and the following stages of Heidegger’s thought exhibit various attempts at their solution. Before coming back to the problem of psychopathological disorders, we shall therefore have to explicate in detail the ontological structure of sojourning in disclosedness, especially with regard to the phenomenological project of being-there as adumbrated in *Sein und Zeit*.

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⁷² Deleuze. *Différence et répétition*, 188, 384.

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