
Tacit Knowledge Awareness and Its Role in Improving the Decision-Making Process in International Negotiations

2

E. Thomas Dowd

It is commonly assumed that the negotiation process, whether political or personal, is a rational and aboveboard process, wherein each participant attempts to achieve the best possible overall outcome, is willing to compromise, and assumes that all participants possess roughly equal amounts of good will. But all negotiators bring their tacit cognitive knowledge structures and cultural and social history, as well as their native languages, to the negotiating table. These structures and histories are often very different; yet all participants tend to assume tacitly that their own assumptions are similar to those of the others. In this chapter I shall discuss how these differences, both in initial assumptions and in the resulting decision-making processes, can influence the outcome in profound ways.

The Importance of Culture

Let me first address the impact of culture. Because much of the current psychological literature was developed within the context of western society and embodying the values and assumptions of the European Enlightenment, we tend to assume that these constructs are cultural universals rather than cultural specifics. Within the field of psychotherapy, Freud made the same mistaken assumption,

assuming that the psychological difficulties of affluent nineteenth-century Central Europeans were inherent and invariant to all people everywhere (Dowd 2003). In the immediate post-World War era of unbridled individualism and self-expression, both Donald Winnicott and Heinz Kohut placed the masterful and bounded self at the center of social life (Cushman 1995, p. 211). Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy can be seen as reflecting two cultural aspects of mid-twentieth-century American life: the increasing egalitarianism that reduced the status of the therapist and the increasing material affluence that permitted the leisurely exploration of one's inner life. By contrast Buddhist writings speak of the "imposture of the ego" and argue that the self has no real existence at all. People commonly mistake the transient, impermanent, and constructed self for something enduring and central. True mental health (release from suffering), in Buddhist eyes, involves ending the attachments to possessions, the ego, one's sense of the way things should be, and one's sense of selfhood.

Jeffrey Young (Young et al. 2003) and his colleagues likewise developed their early maladaptive schemas (EMSs) within the context of an American and Western European worldview. They argued that these EMSs were caused by difficulties stemming from early experiences with caregivers and other adults and suggested that everyone has some residual difficulties somewhere. This resulted in the creation of EMSs that would not necessarily be pathological in other

E.T. Dowd (✉)
Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA
e-mail: edowd@kent.edu

societies. For example, enmeshment/undeveloped self (an excessive emotional involvement and closeness with significant others at the expense of full individuation) might be considered normative in cultures not possessing the high level of individualism characteristic of standard American society and even normative in certain American subcultures such as the Amish religious group which stresses individual subordination to the group. Indeed, a major divide between eastern and western societies is the relative emphasis placed on the individual versus the group. Western societies, especially the American, stress the enhancement of individualism and individuation ("Be all that you can be!"), while eastern societies stress conformity to group norms and values. This is illustrated by an American saying, "The squeaky wheel gets the grease." In Japan, however, a comparable saying is, "The nail that stands out gets pounded down." Western societies tend to advocate overcoming one's difficulties, while eastern societies often advocate acceptance.

These tacit cultural assumptions are automatically laid down early in life by our constant interaction with our culture and thereafter only elaborated upon rather than radically changed. They are experienced by people as a "given," so obvious as to require no explanation. If challenged on their tacit cultural assumptions, people tend to say, "but that's just the way things are. That's just reality. Everyone knows that!" In other words, we see what we expect to see and we find what we expect to find. Rather than "seeing is believing," a more accurate phrase might be "believing is seeing." Because these cultural assumptions are so deeply embedded in one's very sense of personal identity, they are defended vigorously and there is a strong tendency to label those whose cultural assumptions are very different from one's own as wrongheaded, stupid, or even malevolent and evil. If these challenges are serious and sustained, however, individuals may experience a crisis, partially decompensate, feel depersonalized, and begin to lose their sense of identity. This may be expressed by statements such as, "I don't know what's real anymore or I don't even know who I am anymore." Some of

these feelings can be experienced by those who are caught between two very different cultures, sharing assumptions of both. In international negotiations these tacit cultural assumptions may surface without either side realizing it.

The Role of Religion

A major cultural variable strongly influencing one's worldview is that of religion (Dowd and Nielsen 2006). Religious beliefs and other (sub) cultural assumptions can be seen as examples of tacit or implicit knowledge structures that are developed automatically at an early age. The tacit assumptions behind religion affect us all profoundly, even if we no longer practice our cultural religion, and it is very difficult for those raised in and inculcated with the basic assumptions of Christianity to understand just how deeply these assumptions may differ from those of other religions. For example, the Christian notion of sin as the central human problem and salvation as the answer is foreign to other world religions. Furthermore, Christianity is considered to be an incarnational religion, where God became human flesh, and the invitation is to a relationship with Jesus: a construction found in no other religion. But in Islam, the notion that humans are "children of God" (a central Christian assumption) can be seen as an "arrogant conceit" (Dowd and Nielsen 2006, p. 13). In Islam pride is the central problem and submission is the solution; in Buddhism the problem is suffering and the solution is awakening (Prothero 2010). Significant differences can even exist between and among variants of Christianity; for example, the "close cousins" of western Catholicism and eastern Orthodoxy differ significantly on their views of the incarnation and original sin. And Robert Wuthnow (1988) has referred to the conservative-liberal divide in American Christianity as splitting different Christian groups from within, so that liberals in different groups have more in common with each other than with conservatives in their own groups and vice versa. Other religions may possess the same divide. This tendency has been described as "Man creates God in his own image."

Across and even within different religions, there is another issue which can affect how religions determine one's worldview and that is the extent to which individuals take their faith seriously. Gordon Allport (Allport and Ross 1967) referred to this as the distinction between an *intrinsic* and an *extrinsic* religious orientation. The former is seen in people who find great personal meaning and direction in their beliefs, tend to internalize them, try to follow them fully, and live by them. They tend to be exclusivist, in that they see their own religion as being true and complete, whereas others as more or less false and incomplete. By contrast, the latter is seen in people who make use of religion for their own ends. They may find religion useful in many ways: for self-justification, security, comfort, and social connections with others. But the total acceptance and embrace of the specific creeds and religious behaviors are lightly held or shaped to individual needs and they tend to be quite relativistic in their beliefs. The latter tends to be characteristic of religious expression in North America and Western Europe; in fact American religiosity and spirituality has been described as a mile wide and an inch deep. By contrast, people in other societies and adhering to other religions may live their faith in a way secular westerners find uncomfortable. There are even significant differences between the religious assumptions and expressions held by European and North American Christians on one hand and African and Asian Christians on the other. For example, African Catholics tend to be more socially and sexually conservative than those in Europe and North America; the former generally more consonant with current official church teachings. Some African languages are reputed not to have a word for "homosexual." Individuals who possess an extrinsic orientation would not necessarily describe themselves that way because it sounds superficial. But to the extent they do possess an extrinsic orientation; they may find it quite difficult to understand those whose religious orientation is intrinsic, seeing them as rigid, intolerant, and judgmental. By contrast, those possessing an intrinsic orientation may see those of an extrinsic orientation as faithless, irreligious, or worse. One person's strong sense of values can be another per-

son's intolerance. Indeed, should people even tolerate intolerance?

These differences play out even within American society as well as potentially in international negotiations. For example, a major point of current controversy within American society is the degree to which people of "deep religious faith" (i.e., intrinsic religious orientation) can and should be allowed to discriminate against others whose values and lifestyles the former find offensive. This has featured most prominently in the desire of some conservative Christians to refuse services to gay people.

Why are religious expressions important to people and why do they appear to be universal throughout human history? There is a general and a specific answer. Humans are fundamentally meaning makers; their cognitive structures do not easily adapt to ultimate meaninglessness. Indeed, a perceived lack of meaning is deeply frightening to people, and they will go to great lengths to find (or create if necessary) meaning in confusing situations and events. In addition, religion enables people to make meaning out of the fact that they will die. A major message of all religions is that death is not a problem.

There is another societal force which may also be fueling the role of religion as a major source of tacit cultural differences affecting international negotiations. In another context, I (Dowd 2005) have referred to the worldwide "clash of cultures" resulting from rapid communication and transportation, as groups previously separated from one another come into close contact. This can be profoundly unsettling and upsetting to people in both cultures, as each argues for its own concepts of goodness and morality and sometimes attempts to force them and their own cultural assumptions on those in other cultures. The intermingling that results can be gentle or it can be harsh. But both cultures are changed in the process, although not necessarily to the same degree. It is easiest to see this cultural clash between two different religions, such as Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism. But it can also exist within the same broad religion, such as between different Christian or Islamic groups, religious liberals and conservatives, or the religious and the spiritual. It has also played a part in

political divisions within the United States, especially around hot-button topics such as abortion and gay marriage which have politico-socio-religious implications. Each group has its own vision of the “good and noble life” which is not necessarily shared by other groups, and it is easy to see the others as not just wrong but as “evil” or malevolent. These tacit religious assumptions have the ability to undermine and poison many international negotiation processes.

Epistemologies in Human Cognition

The role of epistemologies in tacit human cognition is a major source of problems in negotiations. An epistemology is simply a way or method of knowing something, and we all use them even if we aren’t aware of them or can’t define them. Different cultures, subcultures, and even individuals use different epistemologies as a way of understanding and making sense of the world, and they can therefore be a tacit point of contention in the negotiation process. For the purpose of this chapter, I shall identify and discuss several that have implications for tacit cognitive constructs affecting international negotiations.

1. The method of tenacity says something is true because it has always been true. This epistemology is characteristic of traditional, deeply conservative cultures and individuals. It is very difficult to overcome precisely because it is so deeply embedded in the past and in unquestioned assumptions about the nature of reality itself. Isolated cultures and individuals tend to exhibit it the most.
2. The method of authority says something is true because one or more authority figures say it is. This epistemology can be found in many (although not all) religions, especially those which are hierarchical in nature. Problems can develop when different authority figures between or within groups argue for different interpretations of truth or when authoritarian pronouncements change over time (and they do). References to authorities from the past can cause problems in international negotiations, especially if these authorities are religious in nature. Religion involves people’s passions precisely because it is passionately important. But when matters of high principle are at stake, it becomes very difficult to compromise because it can be seen as “selling your soul.”
3. The “a priori” method is that of logic, reason, and intuition. Since the European High Middle Ages, it has been a major and preferred epistemology, especially among philosophers and academics. For example, there have been a variety of proofs of God’s existence which have been offered, as well as those purporting to deny the existence of God. The response of believers has often been that no proof is necessary, while to nonbelievers no proof is plausible. But Western negotiators who rely on logic and reason, especially of a secular nature, and expect others to see the logic of their positions are often confounded by those using methods 1 and 2 and arriving at entirely different conclusions based on entirely different cognitive processes. They are operating on parallel tracks which do not meet.
4. The empirical method has been a favorite of scientists since the Enlightenment; indeed they can often neither see nor admit to any other epistemology at all. It relies on observation and sensory experience and is most obviously demonstrated by those carrying out controlled experiments. A tacit assumption is, “if I can’t see it (i.e., apprehend it with the senses) and measure it, it doesn’t exist.” A major problem with this epistemology is that most of what humans know is not acquired by direct experience but by vicarious experience. In addition, it assumes that reality is fixed and invariant and need only be apprehended. Its use within and against religious assumptions has been very problematical, even within the American society.
5. The fifth method is the most difficult to describe and understand because it directly counters deeply held tacit assumptions of most, if not all, people. It has been known by several labels; postmodernist, antirealist, deconstructionist, and constructivist. Its fundamental assumption is that reality is not

fixed or invariant, as the empirical method postulates and that the other methods tacitly assume, but that it is socially constructed by the human mind existing within a cultural and linguistic community. Postmodernists argue that the final and complete understanding of “truth” is not possible, at least in the sense of that transcending all cultures and time. “Truth” is only possible within a cultural and linguistic community because socially mediated knowledge is produced out of the shared experience of a language and cultural community. Thus, it is not simply solipsism to say, “Your truth is not my truth.” To postmodernists all knowledge is socially mediated.

6. In philosophy, the most famous of the deconstructionists are Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Friedrich Hayek. In cognitive psychology, the constructivist movement is exemplified by Walter B. Weimer (1977), who argued that the human mind is an active and constructing organ (motor theory of the mind), rather than simply an apprehender and organizer of reality “out there.” In psychotherapy constructivism is represented most strongly by the narrative therapy movement and by such thinkers as Michael J. Mahoney (1991). Its basic and tacit assumption is that people construct their own unique realities out of their lived experiences in the world. These concepts begin to approach Buddhist notions of emptiness and impermanence.
7. A pure form of constructivism is very difficult for anyone to hold in the mind for very long. It is possible to deconstruct anything into its culturally and socially relative constituent parts; even the deconstructionist’s arguments can themselves be deconstructed, a task of which not even the deconstructivists approve. Metaphorically it is like finding one’s self with no place to stand, with no fixed ideas about anything from which to operate. It is like a cognitive form of the infinite regress. One keeps coming back, because one must, to one’s own tacit social, religious, and cultural assumptions. This can cause problems in international negotiations, especially between negotiators from very different societies. However much they

may attempt to understand the positions of the other negotiators, they still fall back on their own tacit assumptions.

Comparison and Contrast in Human Cognition

“In a universe in which everything is blue, we could have no concept of blueness.” “A fish is the last creature to know it is wet.” Statements such as these, attributed to Benjamin Whorf (1956), nicely illustrate a central component of tacit human thinking processes; that in order to form concepts, we must postulate an opposite or an alternative. Thus, in order to form a concept of God as the ultimate good, we must also create a concept of ultimate evil, variously known as Satan, the Devil, Beelzebub, Mephistopheles, etc. It is then typical to see ourselves as typifying the good whereas other people, to the extent they disagree with us, are seen as personifying evil (i.e., not good). Likewise, in order to decide who is in a group (our people), we must decide who is outside the group (“the others”). Groups develop markers to identify who is in or out; for example, the Catholics make the sign of the cross from left to right, while the Orthodox make the sign of the cross from right to left. Who is in and who is out can and will change over time, but the fact that there must be insiders and outsiders remains constant. Thus, all human societies must have an enemy or opponent of some kind if they are to remain organized and cohesive. For example, during the fall of the Soviet Union, one Russian official told his American counterpart, “We are going to deprive you of an enemy!” If societies do not have an opponent or enemy of some kind, internal divisions may surface and weaken the society. This can have profound implications for international negotiations because the different sides may have a vested interest in not arriving at a solution lest they no longer have an opponent/enemy with which to provide cohesion and internal organization to their group. Negotiators can hardly admit this, of course, and may not even be able to consciously articulate it, but this issue may be a cause of intractable and protracted

negotiations that drag on endlessly without resolution.

Language as Tacit Knowledge

The languages of the negotiators can also hamper negotiation processes, especially if they are radically different from each other. This is illustrated by the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (Kay and Kempton 1984), which states that there are certain concepts and ideas of individuals in one language that cannot be understood by those who use another language. The hypothesis states that the way people think is strongly affected by their native languages. It postulates that structural differences between languages are paralleled by nonlinguistic cognitive differences, so that language affects basic cognitive processes. Furthermore, language structure can strongly influence the entire worldview (used in generating and applying knowledge) of those who speak that language. This may be more difficult to see in languages closely related to each other, for example, those of Indo-European origin, but it becomes increasingly obvious in languages that possess entirely different structures and concepts. Thus, the Inuit are capable of talking more comprehensively about snow because their language contains more snow-related words and concepts. Many European languages, such as French, Spanish, and German, still use a formal–informal distinction in personal address, which English no longer uses, leading perhaps to Americans' famous informality which many Europeans still find unsettling. Some African languages may not possess words like "homosexual." Likewise, certain languages have words and structures which reflect (and perhaps determine) a concept of fate (e.g., *inshallah*; "if Allah wills it" or "God willing") which is at variance with the highly individualistic American language and culture that stresses the power of individual agency. Thus, languages may not contain words or expressions which their societies find culturally problematical and languages in turn shape the thinking processes of those who use them.

Personal experience also dictates both tacit cognitive activity and linguistic structure,

nowhere better illustrated than by the investigations of Alexander Luria and Lev Vygotsky in Soviet Central Asia in 1931–1932 (Luria 1976). They collected data on the cognitive processes of remote villagers in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. They looked at the villagers' thinking processes in the areas of perception, generalization and abstraction, deduction and inference, reasoning and problem-solving, imagination, and self-analysis and self-awareness. They found that in these cultures, the thinking and linguistic processes were closely tied to immediate, practical, and concrete experiences and that the villagers were unable to think abstractly and to generalize from experience in a way that is commonplace for those with a Western education. Furthermore, they were not able to imagine or fanaticize well, a common activity among Western children. They were not as aware of themselves as separate beings and when asked what they were like as people tended to describe what they possessed or lacked in material possessions. Their cognitive and linguistic activities were devoted to solving and dealing with the normal and concrete tasks of their everyday lives. By contrast, much or most of Western education is devoted to training students to think abstractly and to form cognitive concepts. This is not a matter of intelligence but of education and training. The conclusion is that cognitive processes, including language, are the result of direct experience, and it is difficult for individuals raised in one cultural and linguistic community to communicate easily with those raised in very different cultural and linguistic communities.

In an earlier chapter, I (Dowd and Roberts Miller 2011) described some cognitive heuristics individual negotiators use that can affect the negotiation process. A heuristic is a cognitive rule that assists individuals in making sense of the world and/or deciding on a course of action. Here I would like to describe some additional heuristics that may also determine the negotiation process.

Gigerenzer and Brighton (2011) have summarized a number of heuristics for which there is evidence of utility. Several have implications for the international negotiation process.

Tit for Tat Use of this heuristic directs one to cooperate first and then imitate your partner's last behavior. This can be useful if the other negotiators also play tit for tat. The rules of this game make it difficult to divorce one's self from the process regardless of the proximal and distal outcomes. Initially cooperative behaviors may lead to more of the same, but if one negotiator responds with competition, the other will too. Any change will lead to a resulting charge from the other side. Once in this mode it can be difficult to extricate one's self from it.

Imitate the Majority Use of this heuristic directs one to consider the views and behavior of the majority of one's peer group and imitate it. Thus, if a majority of the negotiator's peer group favors a certain point of view or behavior, it is to that end the negotiator will push.

Imitate the Successful Use of this heuristic directs one to consider the views and behavior of the most successful member, not the majority. Thus, the negotiator might imitate the most successful member of the group or the most successful previous negotiator. This heuristic has been shown to be especially effective, outproducing the *imitate the majority* heuristic (Garcia-Retamero et al. 2011).

de Dreu et al. (2001) have described several heuristics that may affect the negotiation process, as well as individual differences in the use of these heuristics. Of particular interest is the concept "need for cognition." Individuals lower in this need have been shown to engage in less systematic, thorough processing of relevant information to the judgment or decision than those higher in this need. They simply rely less on cognitive heuristics and are more likely to engage in "hasty encoding" or jumping to conclusions (Dowd and Roberts Miller 2011).

Individuals also differ in their "uncertainty orientation." Those with high certainty orientation prefer to stick to tried and true beliefs (see the earlier discussion of the Type 1 epistemology) to achieve maximum clarity. Individuals with low certainty orientation seek new information to attain this clarity. Both individuals with

high certainty orientation and those with a low need for cognition are more likely to rely on cognitive heuristics for judgments and decisions. Using these data, Ari Kruglanski (e.g., Kruglanski and Webster 1996) argued that there exists a single dimension, termed "need for cognitive closure." Those high on this dimension tend to exhibit cognitive impatience, rigidity of thought, and use inconclusive evidence. Those with low need for closure prefer to suspend judgment, search extensively for information, and can generate multiple interpretations of fact. Perhaps different types of individuals may be more or less useful in different types of international negotiations, although it is likely that those with a low need for cognitive closure may be useful in more situations. In particular, those who are low in need for closure should fare well in negotiation situations characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty. de Dreu et al. (2001) also report that negotiators who have a high need for cognitive closure make smaller concessions when their opponent is in a competitive group than when their opponent is in a cooperative group, thus demonstrating an interaction effect between person and situation.

There is also an important situation-based variable and that is fear of invalidity, of making invalid and incorrect decisions. When this fear is high, individuals tend to postpone judgments until they have processed all the available information or they have depleted their cognitive resources (Kruglanski and Webster 1996). Essentially they all tend to exhibit less need for cognitive closure, regardless of their preferred style. Fear of invalidity is particularly high when the task is personally involving and the outcomes are important, a situation perhaps characterizing all or most international negotiations. In this case, individuals resist premature closure and engage in as thorough information processing as they can.

Individuals also differ in their relative degree of cooperation and competition. There appear to be three types: cooperators (prosocials), individualists, and competitors (de Dreu et al. 2001). The first try to maximize joint outcomes, the second try to maximize their own outcomes, while the third try to maximize their advantage over

others. Furthermore, prosocials have been shown to frame their arguments in terms of good versus bad (morality), whereas competitors frame theirs in terms of weak versus strong (might). Not surprisingly, prosocial negotiators have a preference for cooperative heuristics, while individualists and competitive negotiators prefer competitive heuristics.

There is another variable of interest and that is the extent to which negotiators use System 1 or System 2 (Kahneman 2011) thinking. System 1 is fast, intuitive, and emotionally oriented, while System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and logical. Each has its strengths and weaknesses; System 1 thinking can result in faster decisions but is more prone to error, while System 2 thinking is often more accurate but requires considerably more cognitive effort, which most people find distasteful. There is also a greater aversion to losses than an attraction to gains, so that negotiators are more keenly aware of what they will give up than of what they will gain. Furthermore, there is typically an anchor point from which negotiations begin—usually the status quo but sometimes a reference point in a mythical past. These negotiations are especially difficult if the pie (the total amount available to all) is static or is shrinking because then the potential losses become even more painful and the gains minimal. In other words, it's not easy to manage decline!

Implications for International Negotiations

There are a number of implications which flow from the previous discussion. All international negotiators begin (because they must) the negotiation process from within the structure of their own tacit assumptions about the nature of reality and the best practices regarding those negotiations. From a Western perspective (American and Western European), these negotiators may begin with several assumptions:

1. All parties to the negotiating process want to reach a solution. They are willing to compromise to make that happen. There is overlap in their respective positions. But for some

negotiators, their tacit assumption might be, "If I am weak I can't afford to compromise. If I am strong, why should I compromise?" For others the negotiation process may be more about trumpeting old grievances, especially for internal consumption, than about reaching a real solution.

2. The other negotiators are enlightened secularists for whom the role of religion in their lives is secondary to their primary goal of living and prospering in their society. But for some negotiators, religion may play a central role in their assumptive world and can lead to absolutist thinking.
3. The other negotiators are abstract and conceptual thinkers and are not bound by the cognitive structures of their concrete daily experiences. But for some negotiators concrete and immediate experiences are paramount.
4. The other negotiators share a language and corresponding linguistic structure similar to English or other Indo-European languages conceptually. It is mostly a problem of translation of words and phrases into other languages which are similar structurally. But some languages are structurally and conceptually so different from Indo-European languages that a shared meaning structure becomes difficult.
5. The American culture especially is relatively new on the world scene and American negotiators may tend to think ahistorically. Most Americans derive from Europe or European-oriented cultures and likely understand the world in those terms. They may not understand the deep history and historical sense of triumph and grievance which can be characteristic of other, often very different, cultures with a long history.
6. Western negotiators may tend to be empirically or constructivistly oriented epistemologically. They may find it very difficult to understand those from cultures which are more oriented around authoritative and traditional ways of knowing. Indeed, they may not see those epistemologies as leading to knowledge worth having or even as knowledge at all, simply as unbridled superstition. The data-

based attitude and open-mindedness characteristic of many American and European negotiators simply may not be found in negotiators from very different cultures. Indeed it is difficult for me to write about this without demonstrating my own cultural bias because the opposite of open-minded is closed-minded and that has a very negative connotation in American society. But it is important to remember that one person's perceived rigidity is another's strong sense of values and responsibility. It truly is in the eye of the beholder.

7. There is a strong tendency in all people to reason backward, that is, to arrive at their conclusions first and then marshal evidence in support of those conclusions. While we all do this to some extent, it is easier to see it in others than in one's self. This tendency is most pronounced in areas of great personal meaning. International negotiations usually involve areas of great personal meaning for at least some of the participants so that they may tend to come to the negotiating table with assumed conclusions in mind.
8. It is often not appreciated by negotiators just how much all sides in the negotiation process may need an external opponent, foe or enemy to foster their own internal cohesion and organization. If agreements truly are reached, the search may then begin for another opponent.
9. The construct of "need for cognitive closure" may be useful in screening those who would be appropriate negotiators in different situations. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) have developed the *Need for Closure Scale* which should be useful. Those high in need for closure may tend to use System 1 thinking while those low may tend to use more System 2 thinking. It would also be helpful to screen potential negotiators for their relative degree of cooperative/prosocial versus competitive orientation.
10. There appears to be a strong tendency for negotiators to reflect the views and behavior of those in their larger society and especially the more successful. The negotiators may also play off each other in a "dance for two." This can make it difficult to reach new agreements

because old ideas and past negotiations that have not been productive are simply rehashed endlessly. It is the process, not the outcome or agreement, which is the goal.

A Tentative Training Project for International Negotiators

In this section, I would like to frame the development of a negotiator and mediator training program to foster awareness of these tacit knowledge structures and how they might affect the negotiation process. In addition, another goal is to use this awareness to change the ways in which negotiators and mediators operate.

A cursory Google search of the Internet revealed a number of programs and degrees in negotiation and conflict resolution. These include the Program on Negotiation, including international negotiations, at Harvard Law School, the Master of Science in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at Columbia University, the Influence and Negotiation Strategies Program at Stanford University Graduate School of Business, the International Mediation and Conflict Resolution Program at Creighton University, and the Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Program at the UCLA School of Law. There are also negotiation training programs run by organizations. Rather than attempting to replicate these programs, I'd like to offer some ideas that flow from the tacit knowledge structures described in this chapter.

Tacit knowledge, by its very nature, is not immediately accessible to people's conscious experience. Following Freud's famous goal of psychoanalysis as making the unconscious conscious, a goal of training for international negotiators is to make their tacit knowledge structures and cultural values explicit. That is, time should be spent helping negotiators in training to understand the tacit cultural and linguistic knowledge from which they operate. One methodology for doing that is reflection training, based on Sternberg's theory of practical intelligence (Matthew and Sternberg 2009). Matthew and Sternberg asked a group of military officers and a

group of college students to undergo brief training interventions in the form of guided critical reflection thinking exercises. They found modest support for the efficacy of this training in improving practical problem-solving. This reflection could be about either the condition or action aspects of the problem. In addition, explicit training in different epistemologies, the structure of their native language (e.g., English), and their cultural and religious assumptions could be followed by a guided reflection by the participants on their own tacit knowledge in these domains.

Another useful framework for training is that developed by Rogers et al. (2013) on fostering complexity thinking. They advocate deep reflection providing for transformational learning and internalization of not only intellectual complexity (knowing) but also lived complexity (being and practicing). They developed a list of frames and habits of mind for fostering complexity. These include:

1. Openness, which they described as a willingness to accept, use, and internalize different perspectives to be encountered when dealing with diverse participants in an interdisciplinary situation. Openness requires conscious acceptance that notions such as ambiguity, unpredictability, serendipity, and paradox are as important as knowledge, science, and fact.
2. Situational awareness or the appreciation of context and time in complex systems. This makes it more difficult to take cognitive refuge in eternal truths that are always applicable. As an example, all ethics are situational ethics.
3. A healthy respect for the restraint/action paradox. They argue that leadership and decision-making in complex systems constitute a balance between the risks associated with practicing restraint and the risks in taking action. Negotiators require time to let the process unfold but need courage to act in the face of uncertainty and the absence of an objectively correct decision. There will never be a perfect time or a perfect decision.

They argue that critical habits of mind to encourage include holding one's strong opinions lightly and adopting a slowness of cognitive and

behavioral operations, which together open time and space for shared reflection and learning.

All individuals use both System 1 and System 2 thinking processes, but few are aware of the differences and fewer still are aware how they themselves use these two systems and under what conditions. After training in their conceptual and practical differences, guided reflection should help negotiators understand how and when they use each. Because the use of System 2 is more effortful, extra practice would be useful.

Initial screening of negotiators on dimensions important for the negotiation process should also be performed. The Webster and Kruglanski (1994) need for closure scale is an obvious choice. Also useful may be the Personal Need for Structure and the Personal Fear of Invalidity scales (Thompson et al. 2001). At the least, these scales and others like it may help potential and actual negotiators understand their tacit cognitive processes better.

Training in the cultural assumptions of the negotiators on the other side could be very helpful in assisting one's own negotiators in understanding their counterparts' culture from the inside out. Likewise training on the linguistic structure of the other negotiators native language could be helpful. I emphasize that this is not simply a translational process but a process of deep understanding of the internal structure of the language. Training in the cultural history and religious and cultural assumptions of their counterparts should also be useful.

These and other training strategies should help to prepare negotiators for the increasing complex task of international negotiations.

References

- Allport, G. W., & Ross, J. M. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 5, 532–443.
- Cushman, P. (1995). *Constructing the self, constructing America: A cultural history of psychotherapy*. Cambridge, MA: DaCapo Press.
- de Dreu, C. K. W., Boles, T., Koole, S., & Oldersma, F. L. (2001). Motivated information processing in interpersonal negotiations: Implications for theory and practice. In F. Butera & G. Mugny (Eds.), *Social influence in social reality* (pp. 86–100). Boston, MA: Hogrefe.

- Dowd, E. T. (2003). Cultural differences in cognitive therapy. *The Behavior Therapist*, 26, 247–249.
- Dowd, E. T. (2005). Elements of compassion in cognitive therapy: The role of cultural specifics and universals. Invited Address, 5th Congress of the International Association for Cognitive Psychotherapy, Gothenburg, Sweden.
- Dowd, E. T., & Nielsen, S. L. (2006). *The psychologies in religion: Working with the religious client*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Dowd, E. T., & Roberts Miller, A. (2011). Tacit knowledge structures in the negotiation process. In F. Aquilar & M. Galluccio (Eds.), *Psychological and political strategies for peace negotiation* (pp. 75–86). New York, NY: Springer.
- Garcia-Retamero, R., Takezawa, M., & Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Does imitation benefit cue order learning? In G. Gigerenzer, R. Hertwig, & T. Pachur (Eds.), *Heuristics: The foundations of adaptive behavior* (pp. 2–27). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2011). Homo heuristicus: Why biased minds make better inferences. In G. Gigerenzer, R. Hertwig, & T. Pachur (Eds.), *Heuristics: The foundations of adaptive behavior* (pp. 2–27). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking fast and slow*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Kay, P., & Kempton, W. (1984). What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis? *American Anthropologist*, 86, 65–79.
- Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing”. *Psychological Review*, 103, 263–283.
- Luria, A. (1976). *Cognitive development: Its cultural and social foundations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mahoney, M. J. (1991). *Human change processes: The scientific foundations of psychotherapy*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Matthew, C. T., & Sternberg, R. J. (2009). Developing experience-based (tacit) knowledge through reflection. *Learning and Individual Differences*, 19, 530–540.
- Prothero, S. (2010). *God is not one: The eight rival religions that run the world*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
- Rogers, K. H., Luton, R., Biggs, H., Biggs, R. O., Blignaut, S., Choles, A. G., et al. (2013). Fostering complexity thinking in action research for change in social-ecological systems. *Ecology and Society*, 18, 31.
- Thompson, M. M., Naccarato, M. E., Parker, K. C. H., & Moskowitz, G. (2001). The Personal Need for Structure (PNS) and Personal Fear of Invalidity (PFI) scales: Historical perspectives, present applications and future directions. In G. Moskowitz (Ed.), *Cognitive social psychology: The Princeton symposium on the legacy and future of social cognition* (pp. 19–39). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Webster, D., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67, 1049–1062.
- Weimer, W. B. (1977). *Perceiving, acting, and knowing*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Whorf, B. L. (1956). *Language, thought and reality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wuthnow, R. (1988). *The restructuring of American religion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Young, J. E., Klosko, J. S., & Weishaar, M. E. (2003). *Schema therapy: A practitioner's guide*. New York, NY: Guilford.

<http://www.springer.com/978-3-319-10686-1>

Handbook of International Negotiation
Interpersonal, Intercultural, and Diplomatic
Perspectives

Galluccio, M. (Ed.)

2015, XLIX, 438 p. 7 illus., 3 illus. in color., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-10686-1