

## Chapter 2

# Extending the Dialectics of Secularization Eastward: Scriptural Hermeneutics and Discursive Insights from Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Taoist Philosophy of Language

**Abstract** In light of Habermas's recent development of a socio-evolutionary account of the emergence of ritual introduced by the Axial Period, I focus most directly on the communicative ethic of achieving mutual understanding with a second person. I explore potential Eastern Axial contributions to this process providing a microanalysis of the interaction of discursive subjects in four traditions: for Hinduism, epistemic authority; Buddhism, right speech; Confucianism, the rectification of names; Taoism, truth disclosure. For the Hindu dynamic, I will examine the stages in dialectics of the second-personal reversal of social roles found in its axial period scriptures as they detail differentiation of sites of authority. Firstly, the Vedanta scriptures introduce the axial shift from ritual to cognitive transcendence via the rationalization of sacrificial rites. Secondly, the role of the renouncer transcends the worldly orientation of the caste hierarchy. Next, the appeal to Buddhist linguistic proprieties argues that true linguistic claims reflexively point to the moral and ontological status of the speaker more so than merely make factual claims about the world. The Confucian section provides a comparative analysis of its use of normative semantics to that employed by Habermas. Lastly, the Taoist portion of the argument highlights the holistic incompleteness of attempts at final closure upon the procedures and institutional contexts in which communicative action takes place. I conclude with reflections concerning the breadth that the Eastern traditions contribute in their relative comfort with experimental cross-Axial hybrids as compared to Western exclusivist norms of toleration.

**Keywords** Axial age • Communicative action • Epistemic authority • Jurgen Habermas • Karl Jaspers • Mandate of Heaven • Pragmatic presuppositions • Reciprocal role-taking • Rectification of names • Right speech • Second person • Transcensus • Truth disclosure

## 2.1 Introduction

Jurgen Habermas's pronouncement that we have entered a postsecular age runs a grave risk of philosophical distortion of its basic motivations (Habermas 2008b). Habermas outright rejects the potential misunderstanding of a postsecular age as

bringing about a miraculous resurgence of spiritual commitments in the most secularized of European and Western states. He maintains in his *Dialectics of Secularization* that neither the modern state in its original form nor the many emergent transnational political regimes require faith-induced sources of moral solidarity. However, his ultimate rejection of any thick pre-political moral basis as the grounds for legitimacy does not thereby preclude foreclosure of the rational legitimacy of opting for or against faith in making contributions to public debate.

On the one hand, the achievements of modernity have rapidly spread species-wide through globalization (Eisenstadt 2003b). The global spread of state neutrality to religion necessarily entails the steady de-confessionalization of the nation-state. On the other hand, this secular achievement of neutrality becomes the very condition for the possibility of spiritual contributions to public debate. The growing recognition of the potential moral contributions of the great axial traditions to social solidarity also opens innovative epistemic, moral, and ethical inputs to shared problematic circumstances. The enigma in understanding the full import of Habermas's position rests upon the simultaneous opening of ethical and epistemic options for or against faith as equally rationally justifiable positions.

The ensuing problem with deriving a truly polycentric, multi-vocal, and inter-Axial politics of communicative action that begins with his Western-oriented and—nonetheless avowedly transcendently ideal—theory is twofold (Habermas and Ratzinger 2006). Primarily, when dealing with non-Western traditions, we may be at risk of building into the pragmatic presuppositions of the discourse theory the sorts of Western outcomes we want them to produce. In order to alleviate some of the inevitable parochial biases of readers trained in critical theory and contemporary Western political theory, I will begin in critical theorist fashion with reconstructing the pragmatic presupposition of communicative action internal to the non-Western Axial traditions. The hope would also be to prevent reading the Abrahamic traditions into what ideally would constitute an impartial mode of analysis.

Secondly, while the program of cosmopolitan justice may disclose innovative species-ethical justifications that contribute to the legitimacy of non-Western social orders, when moving from genealogy to transcendental implementation, they may fail pragmatic tests for rational universality originally cherished as a primary epistemic virtue. If misconstruing the cognitive motivations of those described as taking up these practices, we are left with a series of gaps between our expert transcendental theorizing and the more locally inscribed social imaginaries. In its worse forms, this could constitute yet another continuation of a hegemonic Westernization of not really taking up these alternative civilizational discourses on their own terms. Imposed transcendental justifications from the outside would lend further credence to the warranted bias that objectively impartial theorizing becomes another mode of surreptitious neo-colonialization. The dubious portrayal of law and universal morality as neutral will ultimately fail tests of legitimacy if not subjecting expert discourses to the rational assent or rejection of those most immediately affected by both our descriptive facts and prescriptive norms (Asad 1993).

On behalf of Habermas's increasing openness to imbue the universal with more localized ethical and cultural content, practical indeterminacy in the face of novel

global problems can itself be turned into an epistemic virtue as a wellspring of species creativity. For instance, normative learning and ongoing reflexive redaction can be reconciled with compelling contemporary research into neonate and infant capacities for second person participation. An enriched contemporary understanding of our unique capacities to participate in another person's stance toward problematic circumstances can thereby heighten our sensitivity to providing more accurate rational reconstructions of how these universal capacities have been and continue to manifest themselves in non-Western communicative practices. In particular, the neonate practical capacity for joint attention precedes the later emergent of capacities for linguistic and propositional understanding (Pinsent 2012, p. 56). We will search for non-Western iterations of these practical capacities behind healthy cognitive flourishing and moral maturation as a means to encourage prolonged second-personal experimentation with both disclosing and resolving newly emergent species-wide problematic circumstances. In most general terms, the micro-level discourse analysis feeding into the project of cosmoipolitan justice presupposes neonate counterfactual experimentation with multiple realities as the very precondition for healthy individual and species moral maturation (Gopnik 2009, pp. 19–46, 86–91; Buber 1970/1923, pp. 75–79; Bellah 2011, pp. 1–11, 91–97). The collective learning process of ascribing shared propositional understandings for problems itself must always already include a reflective component when facing novel problems that yet require vocabularies for fully capturing their common species ramifications. I argue that such a dispositional comportment necessary for successful joint attention requires constant re-socialization as cognitive, moral, and affective buffers to our increasingly intense pressures to engage only in instrumental compartments to a shared social world. Without second person reflexive testing, we risk lapsing into either instrumental or objectivigating orientations of civilizing persons into linguistic practices that may do more cosmic, psychological, moral, and cognitive harm than good (Donald 2012; Bellah 2011).

The associated linguistic and communicative remedies I propose would be to render as a normative project Eisenstadt's empirical descriptions of both the tradition-preserving and revolutionary components common to the salvation impulse of all the axial traditions (Eisenstadt 2006). The initially unsuccessful Axial Age social movements projected disparate hopes for alternate civilizational orders. As the concomitant traditions have still survived, I will recast them more optimistically as the major drivers in realizing cosmoipolitan justice as an ongoing species vision of communicative experimentation with multiple potential realities subject to constant redaction. While the revolutionary movements were originally localized and elite-driven, the pragmatic presuppositions behind all the axial social imaginaries presumed potential communicability to a universally encompassing audience. Any person could be taken as at least a potential participant in communication, not just in reference to common objects of joint attention, but also in presuming the shared capacity to reshape a world of common reference as always already socially constituted. These revisionist emendations will draw upon Habermas's theory of communicative action as the best available template for this experimental syncretism of comparative analysis.

Learning by redaction through social protest and through creative extensions of millennia of tradition will also be transposed upon the initial species-wide rite of passage that Jaspers associates with the advent of the Axial Age. Instead of Habermas's original *TCA*-informed Weberian abstraction to a linguistification of the sacred that slowly progresses toward the methodological atheism of a more fully mature modernity, upon reconstructing the basic pragmatic presuppositions of the axial period, we will actually find the richer genealogy (to follow in the next two chapters) to comprise opposite trends away from convergence. Again, allowing for some degree of necessary abstraction, we will instead presume (along with Eisenstadt, Taylor, and Casanova) the pre- and post-Axial linguistic/theoretical social imaginary as always already mimetic, inherently ritualistic, and politically constituted, via institutionalized transmissions of tradition and social protest in their performative address as second-personal.

We must therefore concur with Voegelin (and Bellah 2011), that while from hindsight we may execute rational reconstructions that delineate stages of enhanced reflexivity, 'nothing is ever lost' as the ritual stages of tradition can just as easily become cognitively imbued with new rational content when transmitting their originally embodied *habitus*. As communicatively transmitted, they may also become reflectively redacted via protest to give voice to the novel problems of the present. Pre and post-axial remnants of ritual socialization are thereby indelibly bent toward enduring degrees of prolonged reflexivity upon transcendence-immanence tensions from the outset. In the final analysis, I will construe each axial breakthrough as proposing a particular species-ethic fully embedded within the historicity of its mimetic and mythic ciphers. On this side of the particular, the performative attitude of a second-personal social imaginary must allow the first-person articulation of either transmitting prior socialized content or initiating axial protest—pairing both together as shared movements that belie too subjective of a construal of historical change. Here, while trading off the Axial Age simultaneity of distinct cultural transformations for his conventional stance of methodological atheism, we need not reinvent all aspects of Habermas's communicative ethic. Since we must allow for an adequate contextualization for our first-person articulations of responsible subjectivity, we can still follow the general spirit of Habermas's twofold linguistic turn laid out in *TCA*. First, we can provide even more detailed and tradition-specific rational reconstructions of the Durkeimian organic genesis of solidarity from the residues of the religious imaginaries. Secondly, we can also commit ourselves to adopting Mead's pragmatic maxim that 'individuation proceeds through processes of socialization' by applying neonate and adult linguistic capacities to the learning mechanisms required to reach mutual understanding. However, under the wider axial rubric of cosmoipolitan justice and the entailed project of presuming multiple modernities, we need not presume a single monolithic or hegemonic narrative of species maturation and must at least proffer the notion of never achieving convergence of background justifications and/or legal juridification when faced with the prospect of multiple world histories.

In recasting the communicative impetus of Habermas, we also must readdress the most likely critical query to arise. In proposing such an experimental overhaul

of the critical theorist affinity for a methodologically atheist theory of communicative action, why revisit the positions of Jaspers? Why resuscitate his existential leanings from philosophical and social scientific obscurity—indeed if not ever as an all out replacement—but as among the foremost to consider as a viable emendation to social science traditions stemming from Weber?<sup>1</sup>

In response, since our capacities for second personal comportment are potentially unlimited, Jaspers had the keen insight to argue that a truly universal project of species communication must be presumed to have always already been intra-axial and the inter-axial. In ascribing the present perfect sense to its theoretical warrant in *On the Origin and Goal of History*, his multi-vocal and decentered social imaginary presumes having always already started as an experimentally pragmatic project owing ultimate origin to the simultaneous emergence of an elite-driven republic of republics of letters from multiple civilizational sites. However, now, via globalization, the initially elite-driven process of inter-axial borrowing has truly become a live option for the wider public in both William James' and Taylor's senses. The practical efficacy of an alternative vision of social order rests upon breaching the elite horizon. Reaching the common understanding of realizing innate capacities for unlimited communication can only come about through the critical theorist hope for an educated and properly socialized global public. In reply to the 'why Jaspers?' question, we can also trace a clear line of development of insights taken to be found in Jaspers originally—inspired by his own explicitly anti-imperial rejection of an institutionally imposed Eurocentric global order to correct the myopic excesses of the original Eurocentric world histories found in both Hegel and Weber. As contemporary confirmation of the nascent global philosophy originally prognosticated by Jaspers, we can now appeal to the non-Eurocentric works of Eisenstadt, Bellah, Talal Asad, Onuma Yasuaki, Sen, and others to continue the realization of his social imaginary as a project that he also correctly predicted would create healthy empirical and normative dissonance in its development rather than ideological uniformity.

As Taylor has shown in the meandering narrative that comprises *A Secular Age*, even the European movements of social transformation characteristic of Latin Christendom had roots in alternate modernities that were always already imbued with thickly divergent cultural contents (see also my Chaps. 3, 4, and 5 for a longer development of this theme). However, instead of the adapting a neo-Weberian (and lopsidedly Protestant) subtraction narrative of cultural content as already ideological—that is, if owing its genealogy to Latin Christendom—the second-personal orientation of both furthering tradition and stirring on protest instead presumes persuasive attempts at rational justification as legitimate grounds for communicative action. Taylor interprets these movements of protest as second person appeals to a species-wide capacity for the rational warrant behind inter-axial epistemic claims:

The background understanding which makes this act possible for us is complex, but part of what makes sense of it is some picture of ourselves as speaking to others, to which we are related in a certain way—say, compatriots, or the human race. There is a speech act here, addresser and addressees, and some understanding of how they can stand in this relation

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Eduardo Mendieta for have initially raised this question to me to address.

to each other. There are public spaces; we are already in some kind of conversation with each other. Like all speech acts, it is addressed to a previously spoken word, in the prospect of a to-be-spoken word. The mode of address says something about the footing we stand on with our addressees. The action is forceful; it is meant to impress, perhaps even threaten certain consequences if our message is not heard. But it is also meant to persuade; it remains this side of violence. It figures the addressee as one who can be, must be reasoned with. (2007, p. 174)

Regarded in light of continuing the initial calls for radical social transformation initiated by the collective rites of simultaneous protest that came with the Axial Age, cosmoipolitan justice as an institutional program for practical realization therefore need not draw its hope from capacities outside the scope of healthy species functioning. Insofar as they are always already latent to healthy individuation via processes of socialization, we instead need to reconstitute new public spaces that redefine the political in a manner that better conforms to our most enduring cognitive, affective, and moral capacities.

In light of a more comprehensive review of the micro-level philosophy of language that informs Habermas's discourse theory, I will first briefly reconstruct how his defense of communicative action depends upon his rejections of strategic-instrumental and objectively-theoretical reason. Then, following his call for a multi-faceted purification in the West whereby secular and religious commitments are subjected to mutual critique, in the remainder of this chapter, I explore potential epistemic contributions of Eastern axial traditions to moving beyond myth to the more reflective employment of logos, particularly via Habermas's growing interest in providing a discourse-theoretic account of the emergence of ritual at the onset of Jaspers' Axial Age.

In initially focusing my attention upon the Eastern contributions to this process, I will provide a micro-analysis of the interaction of discursive subjects in four traditions: for Hinduism, epistemic authority (as presuming capacities for joint attention) when applied to social role differentiation; for Buddhism, right speech; for Confucianism, the rectification of names; Taoism, truth disclosure. At the more macro-level of entire civilizational orders, I will also show how each overcomes various cultural manifestations of political crises by encouraging diverse forms of contestation, protest, and periphery to center critiques of the social distribution of coercive administrative power and material wealth.

## 2.2 Habermas on Recasting the Second-Person Grammar of Communication

Although Habermas's theory of communicative action has undergone numerous amendments, revisions, and multi-disciplinary supplements over his prolific career, in these brief remarks I will restrict my focus in the first two sections to the enduring constant to his view: the paramount importance of achieving mutual understanding with a second person. Then, in the last part of this section will I take on his most

recent engagement with evolutionary theory and the great Axial traditions in so far as these new developments bear the most direct significance to his critical theorist ongoing commitment to bringing historical materialist modes of assessment to bear upon the institutional challenges of the present.

### 2.2.1 *Pragmatic Presuppositions of Mutual Understanding*

While perhaps his most pioneering work bears the somewhat misleading title “*Theory*” of *Communicative Action*, he finds that by observing normal everyday communication, we can reconstruct a weakly transcendental argument for the pragmatic presuppositions behind the successful achievement of mutual understanding. As it will bear on my analysis of the great axial traditions, if second person achievements of mutual understanding are truly species universal, we ought to find them emerge in *all* the world religions, specifically not in just Western culture nor by beginning a biased reconstruction with the Greeks, with European enlightenment, or the preferred stance of methodological atheism, for that matter.

In his potentially cross-cultural, pragmatic, and idealized reconstructions, Habermas employs the grammatically-driven, linguistically universal orientation toward achieving mutual understanding that requires that persons address one another in the performative attitude of a ‘you.’ In turn, in order to serve as a legitimate norm of concerted action, the party/parties addressed as a second person in communication must hold the capacity for either (a) accepting or (b) rejecting the proposed norm-generating behavior. For Habermas, the very thin neo-Kantian assumption of never involving another in a scheme of action to which they could not in principle consent thereby serves as the self-reinforcing basis for the legitimacy of moral-practical norms of collective action. In other words, he resists the necessity of any thicker basis of shared solidarity that would necessitate a commitment to natural law, theological underpinnings, or richly shared cultural resources as the motive for acting on behalf of one another.

To contrast with communicative action, Habermas proposes strategic action as a strictly first-person attempt to achieve an instrumental aim. In simplest terms, this type of linguistic claims fails to prove communicative, since its means-end orientation focuses almost exclusively on strategic success of the end under pursuit regardless of the acceptance or rejection of those affected by the proposed action. In accord with his characteristically neo-Kantian commitments, even if it were descriptively true that we can daily take notice of multiple instances in which we or others have successfully involved ourselves or others in schemes of action that did not receive the rational consent of those affected, we nonetheless ought normatively to regard these as morally illegitimate practices of communicative intercourse.

As an additional contrast with communicative action, he presents objective-theoretical reason as the concerted effort to employ third-person observer descriptions of a state of affairs upon others, irrespective of explicit consultation whether they could endorse such descriptions about them. In other words, while he

finds the empirical work of objective scientific research indispensable to technological progress and necessary for any data-driven theoretical enterprise, the reduction of communicative action to the third-person perspective fails. The long litany of multi-disciplinary examples he subjects to such critique include his rejections of neuronal-scientific observations of brain functioning, the grand historical evolutionary narrative of a purely biological rendition of the species, or even dubious appeals to the social-scientific expert authority of the objective social engineer. For Habermas, each of these examples will ultimately fail on two fronts. On the one hand, communicative action presupposes among each actor the cognitive, social, and moral capacity simultaneously to switch between observer and participant roles in the same communicative interaction. What the objective-theoretical perspective overlooks is our capacity to play participant role, and thus take 'yes' and 'no' stances upon the observed claims that social and empirical sciences make concerning the intentional states of the observed. On the other hand, he finds the observer-theoretic perspective to belie a basic pragmatic assumption of free consent that we must presuppose in attributing responsible moral action to the observed behaviors of others.

As a neo-Kantian supplement to his rejection of first-person and third-person accounts of communicative action, he presents the performative attitude as weakly transcendental. Although it can be extended to an unlimited potential communicative community, since the idealization represents a species-wide capacity for healthy psychological and moral socialization, (he claims) it does not surreptitiously impute Western biases upon non-Western cultural contexts. Habermas regards the second person performative attitude as a presupposition behind many common culturally-universal daily behaviors, including but not limited to, getting and clarifying directions to an uncertain destination, establishing the normative framework upon which a new relationship will be guided, as an analogy for the efficient learning mechanism of any collectively coordinated problem-solving scheme that requires the competence of more than one agent for its successful employment, and as a presumptive capacity held by both speakers and hearers in social movements of protest that seek to derive their basis for rational legitimacy from the force of the better argument.

### ***2.2.2 Three Media of Social Integration: Macro-level Discourse***

Corresponding to the micro first-person instrumental, second-person performative, and third-person objective grammar of reasoning are three media for the macro wide-scale coordination of social action: the economic market (first-person), social solidarity (second-person), and bureaucratic power (third-person), respectively. In the first-person instrumental sense of reason, (whether local, state, or global) market satisfaction presupposes strategic self-interest of a particular individual or corporate entity as the prime motivational factor. In contrast, the second-person sense of communicative action oriented toward mutual understanding, presupposes a motivational source of affective trust as the socially learned empathetic capacity for role-reversal characteristic of rational reflexivity. The un-coerced extension of



empathetic trust will thus be required and presumed in order to act on behalf of the common good of one's fellow citizen or fellow member of the literate global public. Lastly, in the third-person mode of bureaucratic power, the impersonal logic of coercion via power-oriented social steering mechanisms function according to the motivating factor of efficient management of coordinated behavior across mass levels of complexity, scope, and scale of jurisdiction.

While he concedes that markets and bureaucracy are indispensable dimensions of any modern complex society, if social solidarity does not or could not confer consent upon the spheres of interaction in which market and bureaucratic functions are then steered by law-generating norms of communicative action, then the state and market incursion into the social realm has lost its legitimating normative force. In his consistently pragmatic approach, the only solution to such a crisis in legitimation would be to regain the communicative steering of the other realms either through (a) passing them through the filters of procedurally legitimate channels or (b) as a last resort, to initiate wide-scale movements of social protest until the procedures themselves have undergone the requisite degrees of legitimate transformation.

### ***2.2.3 Evolutionary Origins: Axial Ritual, Civilizational Critique, and the Second Person***

As cautioned briefly in the first chapter, we must avoid being initially misled down the path of third person naturalistic reductionism. Habermas's most recent appeal to an evolutionary account of ritual offers an historical, empirical, and anthropological attempt to trace out the biological origins of communicative action. However, Habermas has repeatedly resisted reductionist functional accounts as capable of delivering on their promise to give an exhaustive reconstruction of cognitive functioning.<sup>2</sup> In terms of the grammar of communicative action mentioned in the earlier section: we are caught in a performative contradiction if we believe we can give a fully adequate third-person account of the second-person attribution of moral responsibility to another agent in communicative discourse. The contradiction resides in claiming to those being described that this objective account applies to *you*, while foreclosing the prospect that they—particularly when dealing with behaviors of a moral motivation—can, from a first person stance, accept or reject the account as legitimate provided by the third person observations of the expert theoretician.

Likewise, by appeal to historical, archeological, and empirical data concerning the evolutionary process as it bears on the initial formation of ritual, Habermas does not think a third person description of facts will capture the unique linguistic, moral, and social achievements of the species-wide practices of individuation via process of socialization that constitute the correct performance of these behaviors. While offering a precise historical date of their evolutionary development goes far

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<sup>2</sup> In Eisenstadt's own biographical reflections, he reveals his discontent with evolutionary functional approaches predominating early in his intellectual career. Eisenstadt's postulation of multiple modernities served for him as an explicit attempt to resist the generalization of diverse sociological and empirical observations into a single grand-historical narrative.

beyond his motives (and beyond what he believes can be inferred from the incomplete relevant archeological and historical data), he follows Jaspers in arguing that the species-wide rite of initiation into these historical modes of socialization has found their fullest expression in the Axial Period (800–200 BCE) that had birthed the great world religions (Habermas 2003, p. 40).<sup>3</sup>

What can we now make of these cursory programmatic themes for how they bear on his current interest in the non-Western traditions that had emerged in the Axial Period? For starters, one might find such a turn in his scholarly interests to the great Axial traditions surprising for a critical theorist of a Marxist heritage, deeply committed to eradicating material injustice as the means to widening the overall scope of human emancipation from ideology in every possible form. In addition, contributing to the counter-intuitive thrust of this new research program, from his growing collection of writings on processes of secularization in contemporary societies, we do know that although second-personal forms of socialization may have had their emergence in the rituals of the great axial traditions, the onset of a postsecular age *does not* mean he thinks the modern state requires any pre-political moral (and/or religious) foundation for its legitimacy. However, since his large book on these themes still remains under construction, for some further clarification of his other impending motives and themes for a large-scale book specifically addressing these themes, we might be better briefly to return again to one of his earlier writings in *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (1976) that can begin to pull together otherwise disparate trends within his wider corpus of writings.

Let us start with an opening necessary presupposition of a materialist motivation: for Habermas, the moral equality conferred to individuals via social rites must tie directly to the resource equality of institutionalized modes of production and the free rational endorsement of increasingly differentiation forms of labor. In other words, as a consistent Kantian, gains incurred via the new socialization statuses brought about by the unique Axial evolutionary stage, lose their transcendental legitimacy if bought at the price of a decrease in moral and resource equality. Perhaps best expressed in Habermas's own words, his earliest attempts to resuscitate historical materialist modes of critical social analysis must not be cast as the hapless and/or arbitrary processes guided by autopoietic structures immune from cognitive steering:

If we are not free then to reject or to accept the validity claims bound up with the cognitive potential of the human species, it is senseless to want to “decide” for or against reason, for or against the expansion of the potential of reasoned action. For these reasons I do not regard the choice of the historical-materialist criterion of progress as arbitrary. The development of productive forces, in conjunction with the maturity of the forms of social integration, means progress in learning ability in both dimensions: progress in objectivating knowledge and in moral-practical insight. (Habermas 1979, p. 177; Bellah 2011, p. 573–574)

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<sup>3</sup> While I follow Habermas in using the description of the Axial Age birthing the great world religions, I still retain the skepticism voiced in Chap. 1 on the use of religion in Latin Christendom that does not accurately translate across traditions. In this respect, I agree with Casanova that the term religion caused more problems in these contexts than it solves. Particularly, the term itself, on my reckoning, fails communicative tests for universal translatability across axial traditions.



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Cosmoipolitan Justice  
The Axial Age, Multiple Modernities, and the  
Postsecular Turn

Bowman, J.

2015, X, 315 p., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-12708-8