

Chapter 2

A Theory of Religion and Being Religious

Abstract This chapter offers a theory of religion as a cultural artefact with historical significance that lies beyond historical facticity or the lack of it. An individual or group's religion connotes above all a belief system that constitutes an option among a myriad of options, rather than a single inherent truth based on historical fact. While challenging to institutional religion and its many adherents, it is contended that such an appreciation of religion is not necessarily a threat to either but in fact has potential to be a source of enrichment to both, as well as to religion's enhancement of global harmony. It is when such an appreciation is not present that an exclusivist 'trigger', lying hidden in any religion, can be released and become the cause of immeasurable conflict.

Introduction

Religion is an elusive phenomenon, with agreed definitions hard to find. We will attempt our own definition and try and describe religion in a way that will serve the purposes of this book. We begin however with the notion of culture.

Culture and Multiculturalism

We have become accustomed to the reality that the world is comprised of a variety of human cultures and that problems invariably arise when those different cultures live side by side in the same society. While distant cultures might seem exotic, practical difficulties can ensue when people of diverse cultures live in the same space, a more common occurrence today than ever before. To ameliorate this situation, many modern societies have formulated policies like 'multiculturalism', meant not just as a description of the fact that many cultures might live side by side,

but as the prescription of a program for the harmonious living of differently en-cultured peoples.

In order to understand what multiculturalism entails, the concept of culture itself must be addressed.¹ Culture connotes the total shared way of life of any given human group. Substantially, it refers to that group's modes of thinking, acting, feeling and valuing, facets of culture that are expressed externally by a system of symbols (Geertz 1973).

Culture is a human creation, dependent on human consciousness and memory. Without human beings, there would be no such thing as culture. Some anthropologists would even claim that the reverse is as true, namely that without culture there would be no such thing as a human being; in other words, humanity has been so programmed by the phenomenon of culture that it is hard to imagine what would be left of the species we refer to as the 'human being' without that programming.

Humans impose a construction on events and do so by means of the earlier mentioned system of symbols comprising what we are describing as their 'culture'. This striking dependence on culture is said by some scholars to be species-specific (Lumsden and Wilson 1981). In other words, of all animals, only humans are so dependent on culture for the identity and survival of their species. Humans are directed by their genetic make-up to find order in their lives, their relationships and their engagement with the world. Humans' culture is essential for human development, human dominance and even survival.

Accepting the above, we are still left to wonder if this vital human culture exists in reified form or merely in the human mind. For most humans, especially when their culture is the only one they ever experience, the tendency is no doubt to believe that culture is reified. In other words, it denotes a real set of values, beliefs and behaviours, most likely the only authentic set. It is a natural state of affairs for humans in a particular culture to consider it as the 'true' culture and their way of living to be the most authentic way, probably the only authentic one. In this circumstance, coming into contact with humans of another culture who believe just as firmly that theirs is the most authentic one can be challenging to say the least. Is it possible that there can be more than one authentic set of values, beliefs and behaviours?

Scholars hold that any such universality is illusory (Geertz 1984). According to this view, every culture is unique, formed by experiences in the life of a particular group and variously shaped by non-recurrent historical events. Each element of a culture can therefore only be judged by what it contributes to the totality of that culture. A particular form of government, for instance, cannot meaningfully be compared to another form in another culture; each only has meaning within the total culture of its own group. Ancient Greek democracy, as a cultural form, cannot therefore be compared to any form of democracy in the modern world, and so on.

¹ The material on culture, religion and religious pluralism has been adapted from Crotty, R 2003, *Beyond the Jesus Question: Confronting the Historical Jesus Problem*, PostPressed, Flaxton, Qld.

The same applies to any other cultural feature. This cultural theory is known as 'absolute cultural relativism'.

A middle ground variant that borrows a little from both of the above suggests that while the behaviour patterns of animals are for the most part genetically determined and their genetic code orders their activity within a narrow range of variation, human beings are genetically endowed with a series of very general response capacities. These are not the cultural universals proposed by Spiro, mentioned above, but they are capacities to learn within a restricted range. Thus, for instance, we might possess an innate capacity to speak some form of language, but our capacity to speak English is not innate, but is culturally determined (Pinker 1994). Hence, a human being, with capacities only would be an incomplete animal. It is culture that completes the human being by activating the capacities in a certain way.

Cultural universalist and cultural relativist positions are both open to the charge that critical appraisal of any cultural set from outside that culture is invalid, whereas the moderate relativism described herein allows for such appraisal. This is important because most of us would not want to accept that cannibalism, infanticide or female genital mutilation, for instance, are authentic expressions of either a universalist or absolutely relativist cultural theory. According to the logic of moderate relativism, however, when critiquing an alien culture, the canons of evidence and epistemology proper to that particular cultural discourse need to be respected (Hanson 1979).

What does culture, understood in this way, offer to the human being? The human individual seems to require order in life. To make sense of the universe, self and others, the individual within the group requires a direction, a purpose, a basic meaning, and this is where culture becomes important. All cultural activity takes place in the context of a constructed cultural 'world'. Some of these constructed worlds, shaped according to significantly different configurations of values, power relationships and knowledge, achieve viability because they are supported by a group which, by its general acceptance of that cultural world, offers it plausibility.

The group commits itself to its cultural 'world' and defines its roles and identities accordingly. The constructed world makes sense of human existence for the group members committed to it. In order to find meaning and direction, individuals and groups must adapt to their cultural heritage. When they have achieved meaning and direction, the group acts to retain its cultural heritage with the same tenacity as an individual displays in maintaining personal, physical life. Otherwise they are faced with lack of direction, loss of purpose and little meaning in life.

Attitudes to Everyday Culture

There are two attitudes at diverse ends of a continuum in respect to human culture, seen in this way. These become evident once culturally diverse groups cohabit; they lie dormant up to that point. A mono-cultural society (more and more the exception in today's world) does not outwardly manifest these two attitudes; they are there, but dormant.

One is ethnocentrism: the attitude that only one culture is valid for all human beings. Ethnocentrism is a natural reaction to enculturation; other, different cultures are considered by the ethnocentrically biased to be misplaced, deviant or corrupt. This is a spontaneous reaction, generated by the seeming naturalness of an acquired culture. At the opposite end of the continuum is some form of multiculturalism; this is a program directed towards harmonious and unified co-existence of individuals who are gradually educated to be at ease with a variety of cultural systems.

Multiculturalism, understood in this sense, maintains that there are many humanly constructed cultures, each of which presumably give adequate order and meaning to their constituencies and activate the general response capacities of these constituencies in variant ways. Otherwise, the cultures would not survive. Multiculturalism encourages the preservation of a variety of these cultures. It esteems and promotes the variant configurations of culturally different groups, including, for example, their different patterns of family structure, and their languages. At the same time, it promotes a harmonious co-existence between the groups, one of which will inevitably be dominant.

In a multicultural society, a variety of relationships between the dominant (frequently the majority, but not always) group and the minorities can exist. Minorities can be suppressed by the dominant group and this is frequently found to be the tendency. If however a culturally diverse society should be governed by a degree of consensus rather than coercion, a set of shared values could be evolved that overarch the differences between the various cultural groups. These could be described as an 'umbrella'. Sometimes the 'umbrella' could be constructed by the cultures themselves; sometimes it could be maintained by legal legitimation. Under such an 'umbrella', different cultural groups can still retain certain core values, such as a distinct language or family tradition, while adhering to other values included under the umbrella.

Such a multicultural society would maintain a dynamic equilibrium between the overarching or shared values of a broad-based community, on the one hand, and the separate sets of core values of the constituents on the other. The dominant group in that community would possess its own set of values, many of which would undoubtedly percolate into the overarching framework. The setting of core values within the umbrella would not be regarded, however, as the dominant group's own private domain, but as a procedure open to all separate groups, dominant or otherwise, in the society.

Where the dominant group does enforce its own values as the only acceptable values for all other minority groups within the society, then we are dealing with assimilation. This is, it needs to be said, a common and unfortunate outcome for ethnically and culturally mixed societies. The opposite of assimilation is separatism, where the overarching framework is only vestigial, sufficient only for the most basic interaction, and each cultural group is isolated from the other cultural groups through a form of apartheid. There is little positive interaction between the different cultural groups, with each one keeping to its own values, including endogamy, its own family structure and its own language. Assimilation and separatism are both the result of, and the breeding ground for, the earlier mentioned ethnocentrism and

the attached conviction that only one cultural system (mine!) is valid. The eventual dissipation or suppression of any form of cultural umbrella that might be open to the insertion of values other than those of the dominant group is the blatant aim of ethnocentrism.

Beyond these assimilationist and separatist positions, therefore, lies the vast area that is covered by the label of a program of multiculturalism (meaning more than simply stark co-existence of culturally diverse groups but harmonious co-existence).

Religion and Religious Pluralism

What happens when we look at religion dispassionately as a cultural set, pattern or system? Religion, seen as religious culture, must be appreciated for its vital role in attaining a unique form of order. We have seen that secular culture provides order and that human beings depend on their secular symbol systems for everyday viability in dealing with the vicissitudes of daily living.

Daily living however can change dramatically. Should there be the remotest indication that an everyday culture is unable to cope with a specific human experience—for example, the experience of death or dying, the suffering of innocents, the mystery of the cosmos—then anxiety results. In such a situation, human beings find themselves pitted against what can only be described as chaos; they face an ultimate inability to interpret their own experience. In short, secular culture allows human beings to find order amid common human experience, to explain historical events and to solve problems of identity. There are times, however, such as those posited above, when this is not sufficient.

Hence, there are certain points on the continuum of human experience where chaos could reassert itself. Insuperable ignorance, the experience of suffering and the problem of evil (with the concomitant problem of cosmic injustice) can threaten both an ordered world and the interpretability of human experience. From the earliest periods of human (and quite likely pre-human) civilisation, this sense of impending crisis impels the state of mind that issues in the artefact we know as the religious culture. Such a 'religious culture' facilitates construing the world and self in terms that relate to an ultimate order that ameliorates the crisis. We would contend that all human persons who have reached a level of discretion could be dubbed 'religious persons', although their 'religion' might not necessarily be recognised as a religion in the conventional sense.

At this point, we need to delve more deeply into the mechanism of religious culture² and its link to ultimacy. Ultimacy is understood here as the symbolic representation of that order and meaning that goes beyond everyday order; ultimacy is not postulated as an object in itself, an autonomous reality. While the symbol of

² This material is dependent on the approach of Hick (1973, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1989, 1995, 1997), although it diverges at some points from Hick's own approach.

ultimacy could be and commonly is taken to infer a noumenal reality, such inference is not necessary and does not by any means prove the real and separate mode of existence of ultimacy (Loughlin 1987).

This symbolisation of ultimacy is produced, as would be expected, within the historical and social context of that particular cultural world view into which the individual's life has been integrated. That cultural world view, however, may have borrowed the symbol from an earlier context. A symbol that might have been fashioned in an arid, desert region could be translated to a much more fertile and temperate region. Just as the symbol of Father Christmas in Western secular culture is readily accepted in contexts where snow and fir trees have no part, so God-symbols can be transferred to alien cultural contexts, with the transposed symbol still operating effectively as a focus of ultimacy.

If the world view of a particular group postulates that their ultimate focus and the individual religious human group are widely separated, then the symbol for the focus will be a personal one, such as a personal god or a pantheon of gods that can be named and that possess human-like attributes. By definition, these deities would be distinct from and distant from the individual religious people.

If the world view postulates an intimate closeness between the focus and the individual, a gulf between them that is easy to bridge, then the symbolisation will be impersonal. The symbol does not, in this instance, have human attributes. An example is the Hindu *Brahman*, a symbol that encroaches on an individual's personal space. *Brahman* is not given a personal name; it is not discussed in anthropomorphic language. These symbols act as foci by which the religious observer is able to see ultimate order in the world. Religious cultural activity is about bridging the gulf between the individual and the ultimate focus in order to find that ultimate order and meaning by means of that focus.

The attainment of ultimate order is, of course, an ideal; there is no absolute guarantee that the ideal has been or will be achieved in reality, in any particular case. Because one person or a group of people claim that they clearly see the ultimate meaning of life by means of one or other foci does not necessarily prove the validity of that focus for others.

What can be concluded from the developing theory thus far is as follows. The human group has a general response capacity, in the sense defined above, for the ultimate ordering of life and experience and seeks instinctively to achieve it. In this way, the individual seeks a form of liberating order and meaning that goes beyond day to day cultural artefacts. For this reason, humans have turned to the artefact we describe as religion. As part of it, they adopt a symbolic network that allows for manipulation of their own relationship with the object of their focus, normally a deity variously named. They then come to see their own life experience and the cosmos generally according to the terms of the symbols they have adopted.³ Such

³ This is what John Hick means, we think, when he speaks of the religious person focusing on the cosmos from a 'reality'-centred vantage point, rather than a 'self'-centred one.

symbolic systems have come and gone in forms too many to count since human-kind dawned some 200,000 years ago.

Awareness of the historical variety of religious cultures raises the issue of religious relativism, just as was considered in the matter of cultural relativism above. Obviously, there are differences and disagreements between rival religious symbol systems. Disagreements can relate to belief symbols or to practical symbols, the instruments used by the religious systems to achieve contact with the object of their particular system, their spirits or deities.

Some of the disagreements can be relegated to historical differences of opinion: for example, Jesus died on the cross (Christianity) as against Jesus did not actually die on the cross (Islam). Historical evidence could (in theory at least, probably not by historical research) reconcile such disagreements, but they are not of vital importance in comparing rival cultural systems. Historians readily accept similar differences of opinion about past events within secular cultures too. For example, a Japanese history of World War II will invariably differ from an American one.

Other disagreements, on the surface more substantial, are really quasi-historical: for example, reincarnation is possible (Hinduism) as against reincarnation is impossible (Christianity). It might be possible (even if unlikely) to conceive some sort of an historical test, such as improbable evidence from someone who has been reincarnated, that could substantiate one or other side of this argument. Once again, however, such disagreement, as with the case of historical difference, does not affect the effectiveness of the religious system.

Religious cultures nonetheless do differ substantially in their ways of symbolising ultimacy and relating to it. The symbolisation and the determination of the mode of relationship are always moderated within a specific world view (although thereafter there can be migration from that world view). As a result, ultimacy has been variously symbolised within different world views as YHWH, Abba, Allah, Nirvana, the various designations of The Dreaming in Aboriginal Australian religions, and so on. These might well be similar but they are certainly not identical. Such symbolic forms are culturally-conditioned responses, each activating the single universal capacity that requires an ultimate focus for human cognition.

Once again, the distinction needs to be drawn between ultimacy in itself, 'out there' as it were, and ultimacy as humanly conceived within a particular religious group. Ultimacy, seen in this way, is capable of neither validation nor disproof. It is a reality in the sense of being a real focus, putting events and experiences into ultimate order for a human group of adherents, but it lies beyond the realm of scientific or historical validation.

Ultimacy, as humanly conceived in symbolic form within a particular group, will be unique. In other words, *Allah* is unique and can only be understood or critiqued within the context of the religious culture and worldview of Islam. The same is true of The Dreaming in the context of Aboriginal Australian groups or Nirvana in the Buddhist worldview, etc. The differentiation of religious cultures, therefore, is primarily dependent upon these variant, human constructions of ultimacy. They differentiate the religions. While there are obviously family resemblances between them, each religious tradition remains unique, disparate and, to some extent,

incommensurable. This includes the symbolic systems about which we are most concerned in this book, namely the ones broadly known as the 'Abrahamic religions'. The Abrahamic religions have family resemblances as far as their structures are concerned but each of them is unique and each is incommensurable.

Attitudes to Religious Culture

Granted the incommensurability of one religion vis a vis another, several stances towards religious cultures, analogous to those found with regard to secular culture, can be taken. These can broadly be described as exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. This typology is an analogue of ethnocentrism-multiculturalism in everyday culture.

Exclusivism is the attitude that only one particular religious culture is valid, possessing the only true symbolisation of ultimacy and the only legitimate mode of maintaining contact with that symbol of ultimacy. *Inclusivism* describes the attitude that one religious culture, with its symbolisation of ultimacy and its mode of maintaining contact, is certainly valid and true but that other religious cultures may share, partially and perhaps inadequately, the truth of the one valid culture, its symbolisation and mode of maintaining contact. Exclusivism is usually accompanied by supersessionism, the belief that one religion has permanently displaced another and is superior to it.

Pluralism would maintain that all religious cultures that do enjoy, or have enjoyed, currency are true. They all embody variant symbolisations of ultimacy and variant systems of relating to ultimacy but, in the eyes of the pluralist, these are all valid so long as they have the support of a human constituency. They are incommensurable and no value judgement can adjudicate between them. No one symbolisation of ultimacy has proven noumenal existence. Choice between one symbol and another one would be dependent on an individual's life circumstances, prior enculturation and the individual having some degree of personal choice. Any critique of one of these religious cultures, or even comparison between them, must be performed within that religion's cultural context.

So, what happens when religiously diverse groups, with their religious cultures described as above, cohabit? We have made certain correspondences between attitudes in the secular cultural sphere and analogous attitudes in the religious cultural sphere. As in the example of secular culture, there is the possibility of separatism or apartheid where exclusivism or inclusivism reigns. Each religious cohort, in this case, would live its own life with its own symbols and its own attitude towards making contact with a focus.

There is the further possibility of assimilation. A dominant religious culture may enforce its symbols and its mode of contact on others. Roman religion required their subject people, in many cases, to identify their gods *apropos* the Roman gods and to align their rituals with Roman rituals.

Religious Pluralism

Religious pluralism can be seen to resemble multiculturalism, as described above. This can mean many things and is best described, as was multiculturalism, in terms of the overarching umbrella. At the lowest level, individual functioning religious communities can co-exist, grouped under some form of this cultural umbrella. Often these communities are distinguishable by their ethnic core values, but this is not necessarily the case. For example, Roman Catholics, whose ethnic origins differ one from the other, can exist side by side and recognise each other as Catholics. Some Catholics might hark back to Anglo-Saxon or Hibernian roots who are easily distinguished from those whose forebears were Italian or Middle Eastern. They may even worship separately and make use of customs stemming from the home culture. Irish Catholics can recognise that Italian Catholics are different, but there is general agreement that, as far as religious culture goes, they are very similar. They hold to much the same sort of system of belief and practice; they have the same symbolisation of ultimacy.

At a second level, such a broad Roman Catholic grouping is linked, more tenuously still, with other groups. Roman Catholics, stemming from a variety of such disparate origins, can link as one cultural entity with other Christian groups in ecumenical dialogue. Roman Catholics can thus co-exist with Anglicans, Churches of Christ and Lutherans. Each of these groups might have much the same differences among themselves as did the Catholics, but they acknowledge that there is a common cultural bond at the same time. They also acknowledge that there is some common Christian culture shared by them all, although they have difficulty in putting their common beliefs into mutually acceptable language. They have cultural commonalities such as the esteem for the Christian Scriptures, some common rituals such as Baptism and Eucharist, common beliefs in the creation of the world, the incarnation of Jesus and the redemption of humanity by Jesus. These symbols, beliefs and values percolate into a shared Christian cultural umbrella.

At a third level, this religious grouping of Christians can be linked with other conventional world religions, such as Islam or Buddhism, and philosophies, such as Marxism, that act as surrogate 'religions', in the way defined above. Each of these would have their own disparate sub-groups. The overarching umbrella has by this point become stretched and the core values would be very broad and inclusive. They might include belief in a power beyond matter, ritualised concern for the world and for other people. In this case, the umbrella would not be so different from what is shared by all humans, apart from being phrased in a different language.

Ethnocentrism and Religious Exclusivism

Let us return once again to secular culture. Public display today of ethnocentrism, in its more gross presentation, is not as socially acceptable as once was the case, at least in most Western settings. Legally, it is often outlawed only if it has physical

outcomes and ends in mayhem under the legal designation of 'vilification'. Its appearance in a multicultural society is usually attributed to ignorance or intolerance, or even derived from an aberrant personality trait. The model of an overarching framework of values would, however, point to another interpretation of ethnocentrism.

Ethnocentrism is the rejection of, and refusal to comply with, any common overarching cultural umbrella. A culture, once firmly established, (correctly) sees other cultures as threats to its unchanging perpetuation and its superior status. History has often been witness to violent struggles that resulted from differing cultural groups coming into close proximity. The final outcome aimed at by such violence is the ascendancy of one cultural group over others. Instinctively, the victors safeguard their advantage by ethnocentric practices which protect their own culture and negate the establishment of an overarching umbrella of values.

These ethnocentric practices can become part of the cultural heritage that is handed on in the society. Ridicule of alien cultural behaviour and the call to ban 'ethnic' languages can be, and indeed are, transmitted as cultural values making up this heritage. Ethnocentrism becomes the instrument for maintaining not only cultural but also social, economic and political dominance. An established ethnocentrism can be subsequently revitalised whenever a situation threatens the hegemonic superiority of the dominant group. This is a vital point in consideration of possible harmonious co-existence or *Convivencia*.

As long as this strategy of domination remains unrecognised and unchallenged, there is no sense in combating individual 'ignorance' or 'intolerance'; the root cause is elsewhere. It is more profound and it is solidly entrenched in the culture itself. These reflections could provide a program for eliminating ethnocentrism, but that is not the purpose here. We are interested in the analogue of ethnocentrism, namely, religious exclusivism.

Religious exclusivism is, in contrast to ethnocentrism, usually legally protected and socially acceptable, so long as there is no open violence. A deeply committed Christian cannot physically attack other religionists, but can make inflammatory statements about the validity of other religious systems and the consequent fate of their adherents. Religious exclusivism works in the same way as ethnocentrism. A religious culture can instinctively perceive the danger of challenge to superiority or syncretism. It can recognise when its cultural configuration and social dominance are under challenge from another religious tradition. It will, at least initially, want to eschew any sharing of a religious umbrella.

Exclusivism, the negative reaction towards any religious overarching umbrella, is usually enshrined as a core value in a religious culture. It becomes a 'belief', coded in formulas such as 'There is no God but *Allah*, and Muhammad is his prophet', or '*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*' ('Outside the Church there is no salvation') or 'We are his Chosen People'. The belief formula is handed on as part of the religious cultural heritage; a strategy of domination, based on these formulae, is pursued relentlessly. Even when the exclusivist formula becomes dormant, it can always be revitalised on subsequent occasions when the dominant religious group is

under challenge. These are the religious sleepers, so dangerous to world order, to harmonious society and to human life itself.

One particular form of religious exclusivism is Christian anti-Semitism, enshrined in such belief statements as 'The Jews killed Jesus'. Such a formula can be readily mined from, and justified from within the gospels. Yet, anti-Semitism did not arise from these gospel texts such as: His (Jesus') blood be on us and on our children! (Matthew 27:25), or even from a misunderstanding of gospel texts. It was spawned as a result of the Christian endeavour to dominate in the post-70 CE disruption, the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, that eliminated Jewish central power. Christians wanted to dominate in the lead-up to the Constantinian state, and then to maintain religious dominance within later Western Europe. They rightly saw the Jews as competitors for attaining that dominance. By the Middle Ages, Christians had derived from their religious heritage a sleeper: "Outside of the Church there is no salvation."

Anti-Semitism, a much broader category than the diatribe against mainstream Judaism that rejected Jesus, used the gospel texts to justify a stance that had nothing to do with textual interpretation. Once consolidated, Christian anti-Semitism, through ready-made gospel formulae (such as 'You are from your father, the Devil', 'whitened sepulchres') has been available as an instrument for those who would use it to further their own social, economic and political ambitions.

'We are the Chosen People' is yet another formula of exclusivism. Jews have interpreted their own Hebrew Scriptures to substantiate this dictum. They were 'the chosen ones' in the biblical Stories of Abraham, Moses and David. The dictum has been used, perhaps less frequently than the exclusivist dicta of Christianity and Islam, to give backing to Jewish attitudes to other peoples. In particular, it has been used in modern times to further land claims. Most contentiously, it has provided the foundation for the attitude of many Jews towards the Palestinians and their land rights in the State of Israel. The exclusivist formula controls the attitude of the modern Jewish State towards control of territory, building settlements and legal rights. It too is a dangerous sleeper.

Yet another example would be the religious motivation behind Islam's initial subjection of the Arabian Peninsula and subsequent penetration of the Near East. This action was rationalised by Islam's claim to religious exclusivism. Its formula describing the division of the world into *dar ul-islam* (the sphere of Islam) and *dar ul-harb* (the sphere of war), with the obligation of *jihad* or 'striving' interpreted as belligerent expansion, defiantly expressed this religious ideology. This religious exclusivism became a cornerstone of Islamic religious culture, utilised in periods of political and social tension to galvanise general Islamic support. At the same time, there have been long periods during which the exclusivist formulae have remained dormant.

Jihad has been interpreted within Islam as a state of personal striving (claimed to be its more original meaning). But, in recent times, the exclusivist formula has been revitalised from its dormant state to act as the rallying cry for expansive political domination by martial force, or to provide support to throw off Western imperialism

and cultural values. It accompanies the exclusivist sleeper: 'There is no God but *Allah*, and Muhammad is his prophet.' This has never been more apparent than in recent claims by ISIS, ISIL and the so-called 'Islamic State'.

What can be said about the exclusivist formula? First, it needs to be reiterated that we are not questioning any of the sleepers within their religious context. We are questioning their use specifically as sleepers, to ignite fires of violent confrontations with others. *Jihad* is enshrined in the written canon of Islam. There are 35 references in the *Qur'an*. Some meanings are ambiguous, while others have an apparently belligerent reference. However, the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith* both refer to another *jihad*, the struggle to achieve an upright religious life despite the baser instincts of the human (Cook 2005). Further complicating ease of interpretation, some Muslim scholars have maintained that the martial *jihad* can only be carried out by those who have achieved the greater *jihad* of self-discipline. The formula that includes *jihad* can be interpreted in an exclusivist or a non-exclusivist way. It is only in a particular context that it has actual meaning. In a context where Muslims seek to control others, its belligerent interpretation is useful. *Jihad* remains a complex and highly contentious aspect of Islam (Kabbani et al. 2006; Khadduri 2007).

Religious exclusivism and, to some extent, religious inclusivism, are dangerous attitudes. They cannot be substantiated by academic argument. They contain within their spheres the sleepers that are capable of even more dangerous external action.

Summarizing Religious Exclusivism

These three examples show that exclusivisms or sleepers can be hidden within the very structure of the religious culture. There is not much advantage in deciding whether the exclusivist formula was original to the tradition or acquired at a later date. There is no advantage in analysing the psychological profiles of those who use them to perpetrate violence. We need to accept the brute fact that the exclusivist sleepers lie dormant within the structure of the religious tradition, waiting for revitalisation that will be brought about by a perceived need for dominance. The important factor that needs to be investigated is: what revitalises a religious exclusivist formula at any particular point in time?

The religious exclusivisms, with the devastating social ills that they bring, will not therefore be removed by an objective study of religious cultures, a study of other religions different from that maintained by the student; nor will they be removed by understanding the psyche of aberrant personalities. These exclusivisms are strategies embedded in a cultural system for maintaining social, political and economic dominance. In short, religious exclusivism is not an accidental accretion to a religious tradition, just as ethnocentrism is not an unfortunate by-product of ignorance in a social group.

Exclusivism is ever present, always haunting a religious culture. The claim to the right to dominate produces both ethnocentrism and religious exclusivism. The

symbols of ethnocentrism and religious exclusivism live on, within a particular secular or religious culture, far beyond their original point of construction. They are available in times of tension and confrontation in order to justify some new claim to domination. The exclusivisms can be set off by a number of triggers which are devoid of an impartial meaning (e.g. “outside the Church there is no salvation”—for those who have committed themselves to Jesus) but which can be activated in an exclusivist fashion when the need arises. The need can be political, economic, social, or religious. With the activation, the past can be reinterpreted and re-read so that it provides justification for the exclusivist practice of the present.

The immediate requirement is to discover possible ways in which these exclusivisms, the sleepers and their accompanying triggers, can be deactivated. There should be remedies which can be used to remove the triggers and calm the activation of exclusivisms. This will not happen instinctively; the religious groups, faced with sleepers and triggers, should be encouraged to seek remedies. This is not easily achieved. Others can assist people to acknowledge the dangers of religious exclusivism and to recognise the triggers that revitalise it.

We intend to examine historical exemplars within Judaism, Christianity and Islam where the sleepers were inoperative and, as a result, the realisation of the likes of *Convivencia* was allowed. What were the conditions that prevented or did not call for the invocation of exclusivism? How can we educate and policy-build for the kinds of conditions that are required for the realisation of *Convivencia*? This will be the task of the rest of this book but we need to continue building our own theory before moving to that point.

Religious Collectivities

In order to speak with any authority to the religious traditions of today, more needs to be said about the actual structure of a religious collectivity, that is precisely what each Abrahamic religion is. We are not dealing and never have been dealing with religious traditions that exist in a vacuum or that have simply emerged from nowhere. Religious traditions are organically connected with human constituencies. They give meaning and direction to these human groups. What makes up a religious collectivity?

Specific religions offer people forms of order, including ultimate order in culturally diverse ways by adopting a particular culturally constructed focus such as Jesus, Muhammad or Moses in the Abrahamic religions. We need now to analyse a religious culture in broader detail. The central feature of any religion would not be its sacred text (if it should be a literate society) nor its ethical system nor its doctrinal teaching, but its religious experience, the quality of human reaction that is aroused by a deep-felt moment of contact with the numinous, via the appropriate focus. That is what religion is about.

We will concentrate first on the Abrahamic religions since these have been selected as the specific area of our survey. An identifiable religious experience is central, for example, to Islam. Its main sacred Story recounts that at a certain

moment the central character, Muhammad, while deep in meditation on a hill outside Mecca, perceived a new focus on ultimacy, that which is beyond normal human perception, which he identified as *al 'ilah*, 'The God' or *Allah*. Previously, he had adhered to a tribal religion and presumably used a number of gods in a hierarchy for his focus. He found the experience to be more engaging, satisfying and challenging. *Al 'ilah* became a new religious focus.

Seeking new meaning in life, he used this new symbolisation as a focus; he underwent the deepest human experience of *Islam*, submission and awareness of human frailty. He saw himself, his human condition and his surroundings with a new and ultimate perception. By his total submission to *Al 'ilah*, he achieved an ultimate order in his life. His life, his relationships, his view of the cosmos had a renewed sense. At the same time, the story suggests that he was relieved of a deep sense of alienation that had burdened him up to that moment. This complex reaction of submission and fulfilment, of fear and attraction,⁴ was the paradigm of the typical Islamic experience, an experience that subsequently the Islamic religion would offer perennially to its adherents. Muhammad's religion became the religion of *Islam* or 'submission', its typical religious experience, and its adherents became *Muslims* or people 'submitted' to *Allah*.

Every other religion could discourse similarly on such a typical religious experience. Christianity extols its experience of *agape*, unconditional love; Judaism has recorded its experience of *hesed*, loving kindness or 'covenant love'; in another line of religious tradition, Buddhism speaks about its experience of enlightenment. But at this point we are still talking about the experience of a founder, not of a collectivity.

How is the transition made from the unique religious experience of an individual founder, such as Muhammad, to the religious experiences of subsequent followers of this founder? When the founder dies, what remains? It will be shown that it is religious myth and ritual that normally generate the specific religious experience for subsequent adherents, and this experience brings ultimate meaning and direction into the adherents' lives. Myth and ritual become carriers of the focus (Campbell 1973, 1991).

Religious Myth

Myth or sacred story⁵ is the dominant discourse of religion. All religious traditions have a fund of mythical Stories. Sacred Stories are not necessarily historical Stories:

These Stories usually tell of the creation of the world, the appearance of the first people, ancestral heroes and their achievements, and the glorious beginnings of society as a people experience it. Terrain, village patterns, shrines, temples, cities, and kingdoms are often set

⁴ This fits in well with the well-known general description of religious experience stated long ago by Rudolf Otto: *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* (a fearful and attractive mystery).

⁵ The term 'sacred story' can include religious myth, legend and parable. Often, the term is used as a synonym for the technical word myth which is how it is used here.

in place or planned at the beginning of time. Scholars understand these myths as the distillation of human-interest Stories first told in the course of routine patterns of living together, then rehearsed for many generations. Telling Stories about one another is what we do. It belongs to the life and work of maintaining human relations and constructing societies. (Mack 1995, pp. 13–14)

This can be applied equally to the sacred Stories of religious societies as diverse as Hinduism, Aboriginal Australian religions and the Abrahamic religions. In everyday usage, myth is taken to mean something that is untrue; a ‘true myth’ in everyday parlance is as much an oxymoron as a ‘straight curve’. However, in its technical usage in the study of religion, myth means that type of sacred story that is really real, which is true above all else. In this sense, a myth might be in its literary form historical, ahistorical, real or fictional—but it is always true.

Myth therefore is a metaphor that conveys the most profound spiritual truth, a truth not communicable by everyday language. It communicates the essential features of a religious culture in story form.

At the same time, myth does much more than recount details. It recreates the original ‘world’ of the ‘time of the beginnings’, the primeval world, in which the way of life of a human group, the fund of its common understandings and its principal values, were established. This world cannot now be directly accessed by humans in historical time and space. Myth provides the charter for how things should be, for what needs to be done and what needs to be avoided; myth provides the means for access to the world of any believing group’s origins. What was said and done in the ‘time of the beginnings’, as the myth relates it, effects and affects the way of life of the religious group here and now.

Myth may guide the group as to how life should be led, informs the group as to how reality came to be the way it is, and it warns the group of the threatening darkness that cannot be readily perceived. Myth evokes and directs the deepest human energy. Myths are public dreams; like all dreams, myths are vehicles of communication between the conscious and the unconscious. If myth is not true, then nothing is true.

Myths convey information to the group about the cosmos’s link with ultimacy (‘creation’ or Beginning Stories), about alienation from ultimacy (Stories about a primordial fall, an initial distancing of the group from the sacred), about the possibility of the group’s own reinstated link with ultimacy (for example, the Jesus myth or sacred Stories of other founders such as Moses or Muhammad), about the possibility of final reconciliation with ultimacy or distancing from it (Eschatological Myths).

This academic idea of a myth will be important in what follows. We will be tracing the path of an essential myth, the Story of Abraham/Ibrahim and his son(s), and will treat this Story with the greatest respect. By using the phenomenological method and bracketing out any prior convictions of our own, we will ensure that our account remains true to and conveys the most earnestly held meanings to be found within the three Abrahamic religions.

Sacred Ritual

Myth is organically connected with sacred ritual. Ritual is sacred drama, a dramatic portrayal acted out in special language, dance, music and colour. A core ritual is the re-enactment of that past event, when contact was initially made between a founder or founding group and the sacred world in which the founder found ultimate meaning and direction. Ritual, like myth, can only be understood when it is acknowledged to be essentially and inextricably directed towards religious experience.

For example, the Jewish Passover is the dramatic, ritual portrayal of the Exodus out of Egypt. The ritual of Passover brings the past Exodus event into the present for the believing group. It is as if a particular group of Jews, gathered in the home on the festival of Passover, becomes part of the original Passover people, led by Moses, and personally experiences the same saving, guiding, comforting presence of its YHWH. That Exodus-event was considered to be the founding experience of Judaism, and celebrating Passover brings the experience of the past event into the present. Whether the account of the Exodus-event is historically reliable is immaterial. It is part of the myth and re-enacted in the ritual.

Likewise, for Christians, the celebration of the Eucharist is the dramatic, ritual re-enactment of the death and resurrection of Jesus. Jesus as the new Moses and Son of God had passed from this suffering life to eternal life, a return to the Father. His was a paradigmatic 'return', establishing a mode of future human contact with ultimacy. The symbolic ritual of the Eucharist lies at the foundation of Christianity. Jesus was the first to make the New Exodus journey. Those Christians who ritually eat the bread and drink the wine in the prescribed manner share the event with him in anticipation of the final reality.⁶ Other Christian rituals derive their relevance from this core ritual. Those who search for an historical Jesus are not assisting this insight into the Jesus ritual. No matter what the 'historical Jesus' might have said or done (or not), the ritual nonetheless works to achieve its essential aim for the group of believers.

For Muslims, there is the great ritual of the *Hajj*. One of the five Pillars requires Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime so long as they are physically able and can afford the trip. Those who arrive in Mecca go through a ritual cleansing of the body and wear a seamless white garment. Garments that indicate class or superiority are not allowed; all Muslims making the Hajj are equal. They visit the sacred mosque and perform a sevenfold circular walk around the *Ka'aba*, the sacred cube in the centre of the Mosque which was cleansed of its false gods by Muhammad. They the pilgrims await the beginning of the official ceremonies. After prayers at the *Ka'aba*, the pilgrims go out to an extensive plain called

⁶ Some Christians have obscured the ritual by endeavouring, from the Middle Ages until now, to isolate the presence of the past in the present by elaborate theories such as transubstantiation. This latter theory maintains that Jesus is bodily present in the elements of bread and wine.

Arafat, about 24 km outside Mecca. There they perform the 'standing' ceremony, during which they listen to a sermon which commemorates the Farewell Sermon of Muhammad to his people, delivered on this plain during the last year of his life.

On the return journey the people stop at a small town called Mina, where there are three stone pillars that represent *Shaytan* (Satan, in Hebrew), who originated evil. They throw seven pebbles at these pillars to show their disdain for *Shaytan*, and then return to Mecca for the final ceremonies. After once more going around the *Ka'aba*, the pilgrims leave Mecca.

The ritual re-presents the founding experience of Muhammad in Mecca. By following in the footsteps of Muhammad, the believing group experiences the enlightenment that came to him in the presence of *Allah*. Was this the exact ground-plan of Muhammad's founding movements? Who knows and does it matter?

Myth, together with ritual, provides the context for the religious experience; in turn, this experience evokes ultimate meaning and gives ultimate direction to the participants by activating the specific focus of a religious culture. We can say that a particular religion devolves from the specific experience generated by the religious cultural discourse inherent within a set of myths and the action of its core rituals. In point of fact there are many religions and individuals are free, at least potentially, to select between them or combine aspects of them at will.

Religion cannot be understood without ritual in its broadest sense. We will be maintaining that the three Abrahamic religions, seemingly so different in their ritual, in fact have much in common, including in the ways they utilize ritual to celebrate their shared myths and convey their central beliefs.

Mediation

Finally, we come to the religious notion of mediation between ultimacy, the wholly other, and a human community. This is at the very centre of the religious activity. Without mediation, religion is not operative. It will eventually wither and die.

The creation of a specific religious experience helps to overcome a fundamental alienation between human flux and ultimate ordering. Humans have an ability to bridge that gap. When the bridging occurs to an individual's satisfaction, the experience is profound and has been variously described. Some attempts at definition have included the idea of 'salvation' or 'being saved'. A more neutral, less theological term, would be 'mediation'.

The religious discourse not only presents the possibilities; it also imposes an authority, a requirement to choose in this way and not that. That authority may be associated with other cultural features such as 'race', local environment, schooling, etc. Indians may be expected to be Hindu; Cornish people may be expected to be Methodist Christians; children attending Catholic schools may be expected to be

practising Roman Catholics. Individuals are confronted in the religious discourse with a ready-made pattern which is given plausibility by a 'founder' who has authority in the group and represents the socio-cultural context and structures of the religious group. The choice comes as a package, ready-made and authorised.

In the Abrahamic religions, this 'founder' is presented as a person—Moses, Jesus or Muhammad. The 'founder' is not presented as actually establishing a religious culture out of nothing, but as adapting, renewing or fulfilling an existing religion, since while religions may have birthdates, religion has none that is known. It may be that humankind and religion are co-existent.

We can take up again the example of Muhammad and the founding of Islam. Muhammad did not come from a neutral, non-religious background. The religious cultural discourse to which he had access included elements of tribal religion, Judaism and Christianity, in what proportion is a matter of conjecture. We have seen that, according to the sacred Story, at a certain moment he underwent a profound religious experience. From infinite, possible permutations, he made an individual and new choice. Presented with a new, ultimate focus, he chose it ahead of his previous focus within the tribal religion. He at once experienced the resolution of his own alienation. While his personal situation was stabilised, the question was open as to whether that experience could be replicated. If not, then this individual religious culture, wonderful as it might have been, would be aborted.

We would now propose that the question of replication is the most vital element in the establishment of a religion. Can the founding experience have a successor? Can the founding mediation be experienced by others? 'Founders' are like artists. Many people have profound experiences of life, nature, human relationships. These experiences are usually incommensurable and incommunicable. The artist in the everyday world is that gifted individual who is able to use a medium—whether the medium be in the form of words, paint, musical sound—to communicate an original experience. There are many profound human experiences that live and die with the individual human because there is no mechanism, such as the use of an artistic medium by which that experience can be handed on.

By analogy, the religious 'founder' is the individual who has undergone religious mediation and is able to establish a mediatorial system which can convey the original religious experience. Sometimes the person or an original group disappear and the experience is thereafter conveyed by a myth and ritual process or a text. This is the case with Hinduism. At other times, the individual or individuals remain personally identified with the system, as was the case with Moses and Judaism, Jesus and Christianity, and Muhammad and Islam.

The Mediatorial System

We will now see how the myth and ritual system of a particular religion gives rise to a religious experience and allows the religious participants to make contact with ultimacy. This is what we term 'mediation'. It is at the core of religion. We will

now see how this comes about in practice. All religious cultures offer the possibility of some form of contact with an ultimate focus. Contact is primarily brought to effect through the recitation of myth and enactment of ritual, the purpose of which is to establish a privileged area where such interaction can effectively take place. However, there is the need for sacred expertise, derived from tradition or in other ways, whereby the symbol of the ultimate focus can be activated in the myth and ritual context. Hence, there is a role for sacred persons, sometimes associated with sacred place and sacred time. Through these myths, symbols and rituals often in association with special persons, a religious community can experience a replication of the primordial mediation experience of the founder. This is called a 'theophany' (a manifestation of the divinity) in some traditions. Experiencing the presence of, or connection with the numinous, the transcendent, indicates that the mediatorial system is functional.

Mythical descriptions of the primordial theophany of a particular religious culture may include the mediatory intervention of a central figure—a founder who can take the guise of a culture hero, the First Human, the First King, for example. Thereafter, there will be a corresponding construct, in the social structure of a historically identifiable community, designating sacred personages who continue the role of those central figures. This is the domain of sacred kings, hereditary priests and prophets, among other more impersonal structures.

There are certain elements that emerge from the study of primal and ancient religions with more clarity than would be the case with contemporary, evolved religious traditions. The two main constants in the religious construct are the symbolised ultimate focus, as it has been presented in and through the principal myth and ritual, and within the cultural life of the currently existing human community. The human community is seen to be composed in such a way that the ongoing respect for and acknowledgement of the sacred figures is maintained. Having recognised these factors in existing religions, whether of the past or the future, we can outline the main facets of the mediatorial system. Mediation, linking the human community to the ultimate focus, is required in a community to allay religious fear at the possibility of universal chaos, while it also bestows more positive understandings. The contact between the human community and the focus takes place in a theophany, a religious experience proper to this community. The paradigm for this theophany is the founding experience—Muhammad coming into contact with *Allah*; Moses meeting YHWH on Mount Sinai and in the burning bush; Jesus as the Word-Made-Flesh meeting his Father.

Depending upon the community's symbolic forms and its resultant view of the world order, the gulf between the ultimate order of things and the human order will be more or less wide. From the side of divinity, the gulf can be partially bridged by other-worldly intermediaries, such as divine messengers or subsidiary gods, and from the side of the human community by this-worldly intermediaries who function as the sacred personages mentioned above who, depending upon the social structure of the community, can fulfil either a personal or communal role such as a divine

king, a Jewish High Priest, a Muslim Caliph or a Christian Pope, or indeed a written *Qur'an* as presented to Muhammad. In short, a religious community, through its sacred leaders, great and small, takes up a particular stance or posture before an intermediary that leads it to encounter/experience a manifestation of ultimacy. In this way, the individuals can derive ultimate meaning.

The history of religions however provides instances not only of this indirect mediatorial system but of another which could be termed an ‘immediate system’ which is more or less identifiable with what most scholars would term the mystical religious tradition. Mysticism describes a consistent pattern of immediate union with ultimacy without recourse to an intervening system or institution. It is quite possible, however, for mysticism to become institutionalised in the same way as indirect systems. The Kabbalists in Judaism, the Sufis in Islam and the mystics in Christianity all made use of such an immediate system. Thus, there are at least two possible systems whereby a religious group can achieve ultimate order.⁷

We will refer to the indirect-mediatorial system and the immediate-mediatorial system. Normally, the Abrahamic religions follow an indirect-mediatorial system. Comparing the two models of religious culture, we have the following (Fig. 2.1).




Fig. 2.1 Mediatorial systems

⁷ Various terms have been used by those who have perceived the distinction. So, Smart (1968) refers to numinous and the mystical structures, while King (1968) distinguishes between symbols of relationship and symbols of identification.

There are sufficient examples to show that one model can be commuted into the other. Each stands at the end-point of a continuum. Charismatic and millenarian movements within established indirect-mediatorial religions can be transformed into immediate-mediatorial systems. The immediate-mediatorial system is simply a short-circuited version of the indirect-mediatorial system. When, for some reason, confidence is lost in the ability of an indirect-mediatorial system, where the ultimate focus is on the way to becoming a *deus otiosus* or functionless focus, it is possible for the short-circuiting to take place. The community associated with an immediate-mediatorial system is less stable and structured than its counterpart, however, and there will always be the tendency for the re-forming of an indirect-mediatorial system. We are thus able to outline the three structures of the Abrahamic religions in the following way (Figs. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5).

First, the Jewish religion is structured as follows. There is a legitimate question as to when the Jewish religion came into this form. No matter whether an early date




Fig. 2.2 Jewish mediatorial system

(before 1200 BCE, the usual opinion on the matter) or a later date (between 500–300 BCE, as argued by the ‘minimalists’) is proposed, the figure of ‘Moses’ is central. ‘Who is Moses for us today?’ was always the central, driving question for Jewish religion. The answer differed from generation to generation and fostered different community shapes.

Second, the Christian religion is structured in this way. The variety of this-worldly intermediaries (and there are more possibilities) depends upon the particular denominations of Christianity. The Roman Church determined that ‘Peter’ was the vicar of Jesus and that his successors were the this-worldly intermediaries. Other Churches, for example the Reformed Churches of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, chose the written Christian Scriptures as the living embodiment of ‘Jesus’.




Fig. 2.3 Christian mediatorial system

Third, Islam expresses its adhesion to an earlier form of religion, one that was abrogated by Judaism and Christianity, and a strictly Islamic form. The former way, dating back to ancient times, is as follows.




Fig. 2.4 Earlier Islamic mediatorial system

While the 'Abrahamic Community' took several monotheistic forms throughout time (including through Judaism and Christianity), some of these forms (most notably, Judaism and Christianity) went astray and gave themselves over to infidelity of one form or another. True monotheists therefore needed to re-find the true focus. The correction came with formation of a structure at the time of Muhammad, fulfilling the original Abrahamic structure. In Muhammad's time, this form became known as Islam. After Muhammad, Islam is therefore structured in this way.




Fig. 2.5 Strictly Islamic mediatorial system

According to the Islamic sacred Story, the eternal *Qur'an* was the book of *Allah*, written on gold plates. A copy of the *Qur'an* was dictated to Muhammad by the Angel Jibril and became the written *Qur'an* in the Arabic language. The *Ummah Wahida* of Islam is the Muslim community established by Muhammad, submitted to *Allah* and his eternal *Qur'an* and the recipient of the sacred law of the *shari'ah*. It represents the original community (People of God) promised to Abraham, presaged in Judaism and Christianity, and now completed in Islam.

It is clear that there are structural differences between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Each perceives its structure as the correct one. There are nonetheless obvious similarities that offer potential as means of accord and, indeed, for quite profound mutual understanding.

It is against the backdrop of these indirect-mediatorial systems of the Abrahamic religions that the phenomena of religion can be satisfactorily classified and organised. Other religions could be used but these are the three being examined here. Religious experience stands out as the dominant phenomenon in any religious culture. Religious experience serves to replicate the founding 'event'. Its replication is vital for the perseverance of the religious system and the replication is achieved by the recitation of myth (and other supporting sacred Stories) and the performance of ritual. In symbiotic relationship, myth and ritual bring the past into the present. This coalescence of myth, ritual and experience is explicated in belief statements, summarised for believers in symbols and protected in literate societies by sacred texts.

Nonetheless, these religious phenomena do not exist apart from a human community. The members of a community are the bearers of the phenomena. A human community is structured in part by the way it takes up a posture vis-à-vis its ultimate focus. Jews, Christians and Muslims take up such postures. Each of these religious communities through their own structures has a stance in relation to ultimacy; in turn, this leads to the establishment of a religious status and an ethical mode of behaviour. So, the central phenomena of any religious system are constituted of: religious experience, religious myth, sacred ritual, sacred beliefs, sacred texts, sacred symbols, social structure. These human communities within the history of the Abrahamic religions now require more consideration.

Reconciling Islam, Christianity and Judaism
Islam's Special Role in Restoring Convivencia

Lovat, T.; Crotty, R.

2015, XIII, 137 p. 4 illus., Softcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-15547-0