Content

Appendix A: Omitted Tables and Results

The following tables have been referred to in the text but were omitted in the book.

Chapter 6.5.2, Table 10: Trust and chronic script accessibility, omitted control variables

	Tobit	Robust	GLM
Nfcscale	0.181	0.168	0.744
	(1.02)	(1.14)	(1.2)
Fiscale	-0.0577	-0.0857	-0.217
	(-0.29)	(-0.52)	(-0.33)
Append	-0.0775+	-0.0711+	-0.27
	(-1.47)	(-1.52)	(-1.44)
age3	-0.0142+	-0.0117+	-0.0435
	(-1.48)	(-1.57)	(-1.29)
Sex	-0.0736+	-0.0719+	-0.311*
	(-1.44)	(-1.52)	(-1.71)
Partner	-0.00701	0.0164	0.0338
	(-0.15)	(0.41)	(0.21)

Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Chapter 6.5.2, Table 10: Trust and chronic script accessibility, orthogonal models

	Tobit	Robust	GLM
end	-0.117***	-0.118***	-0.473***
	(-2.60)	(-2.99)	(-2.98)
frame	0.002	-0.007	-0.017
	(0.05)	(-0.17)	(-0.10)
recskala	0.204	0.203	0.805
	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.76)
*end*recscale*	1.253**	1.001**	4.427**
	(2.15)	(2.03)	(2.07)
*frame*recscale*	0.0421	-0.0347	-0.0394
	(0.06)	(-0.06)	(-0.02)
*end*frame*	1.179*	0.857+	3.841*
	(1.84)	(1.53)	(1.65)
*end*frame*recscale*	-1.820*	-1.336+	-5.960*
	(-1.93)	(-1.63)	(-1.76)
trustscale	0.310+	0.281*	1.118+
	(1.46)	(1.67)	(1.63)
nfcscale	0.181	0.168	0.744
	(1.02)	(1.14)	(1.2)
fiscale	-0.058	-0.086	-0.217
	(-0.29)	(-0.52)	(-0.33)
append	-0.078+	-0.071+	-0.27
	(-1.47)	(-1.52)	(-1.44)
age	-0.014+	-0.012+	-0.044
	(-1.48)	(-1.57)	(-1.29)
sex	-0.0736+	-0.0719+	-0.311*
	(-1.44)	(-1.52)	(-1.71)
partner	-0.007	0.016	0.034
	(-0.15)	(0.41)	(0.21)
constant	0.166	0.189	-1.333
	(0.56)	(0.76)	(-1.26)
Pseudo R^2 (ps. *LL*)	0.084	0.1105	-155.2
Wald (full model)	36.28***	44.05***	33.76***
χ^2 Improvement (4*df*)	7.9*	7.38+	7.23+

Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Chapter 6.5.2, Table 11: Trust and chronic frame accessibility, omitted control variables

	Tobit	Robust	GLM
fiscale	-0.076	-0.088	-0.26
	(-0.37)	(-0.50)	(-0.38)
nfcscale	0.202	0.21	0.864
	(1.14)	(1.42)	(1.4)
append	-0.059	-0.058	-0.218
	(-1.07)	(-1.20)	(-1.13)
age	-0.015+	-0.014*	-0.047
	(-1.52)	(-1.73)	(-1.33)
sex	-0.076	-0.072+	-0.308*
	(-1.39)	(-1.50)	(-1.67)
partner	-0.006	0.019	0.034
	(-0.13)	(0.48)	(0.22)

Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Chapter 6.5.2, Table 11: Trust and chronic frame accessibility, orthogonal models

	Tobit	Robust	GLM
end	-0.117**	-0.120***	-0.463***
	(-2.53)	(-2.96)	(-2.89)
frame	0.004	0.0003	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.01)	(-0.06)
trustscale	0.249	0.256	0.926
	(0.98)	(1.18)	(1.15)
*end*frame*	-0.339	-0.123	-1.067
	(-0.66)	(-0.28)	(-0.64)
*end*trustscale*	-0.301	0.001	-0.392
	(-0.54)	(0)	(-0.21)
*frame*trustscale*	-0.231	0.001	-0.517
	(-0.34)	(0)	(-0.24)
*end*frame*trustscale*	0.483	0.122	1.444
	(0.56)	(0.17)	(0.52)
recscale	0.296	0.292	1.066
	(1.01)	(1.15)	(1.04)
fiscale	-0.076	-0.088	-0.26
	(-0.37)	(-0.50)	(-0.38)
nfcscale	0.202	0.21	0.864
	(1.14)	(1.42)	(1.4)
append	-0.059	-0.058	-0.218
	(-1.07)	(-1.20)	(-1.13)
age	-0.015+	-0.014*	-0.047
	(-1.52)	(-1.73)	(-1.33)
sex	-0.076	-0.072+	-0.308*
	(-1.39)	(-1.50)	(-1.67)
partner	-0.006	0.019	0.034
	(-0.13)	(0.48)	(0.22)
constant	0.123	0.097	-1.506
	(0.39)	(0.37)	(-1.39)
Pseudo R^2 (Ps. *LL*)	0.0652	0.0945	-156.54
Wald (full model)	22.31*	29.15***	22.4**
χ^2 Improvement (4*df*)	0.75	0.55	0.81

Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Chapter 6.5.2, Table 12: Trust and activation weight components, omitted control variables

	Tobit	Robust	GLM
nfcscale	0.171	0.17	0.743
	(-0.94)	(-1.12)	(-1.16)
fiscale	-0.0585	-0.0765	-0.218
	(-0.29)	(-0.46)	(-0.33)
append	-0.0718	-0.0667	-0.251
	(-1.35)	(-1.40)	(-1.32)
age	-0.0140+	-0.0116+	-0.0426
	(-1.45)	(-1.54)	(-1.26)
sex	-0.0842*	-0.0813*	-0.342*
	(-1.65)	(-1.70)	(-1.87)
partner	-0.00132	0.0209	0.0455
	(-0.03)	(-0.52)	(-0.28)

Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Chapter 6.5.2: Table 12: Trust and activation weight components, orthogonal models

	Tobit	Robust	GLM
frame	0.003	-0.007	-0.012
	(0.06)	(-0.17)	(-0.07)
trustscale	0.330+	0.308*	1.198*
	(-1.52)	(1.84)	(1.69)
recscale	0.304	0.27	1.069
	(1.06)	(1.09)	(1.03)
*frame*trustscale*	-0.153	-0.06	-0.359
	(-0.39)	(-0.19)	(-0.27)
*frame*recscale*	-0.917*	-0.736*	-3.025*
	(-1.83)	(-1.69)	(-1.69)
*trustscale*recscale*	2.933	1.818	6.193
	(0.95)	(0.75)	(0.6)
*frame*trust.*rec**	-1.362	0.213	0.237
	(-0.28)	(0.05)	(0.01)
end	-0.116**	-0.118***	-0.460***
	(-2.51)	(-2.91)	(-2.85)
nfcscale	0.181	0.175	0.77
	(0.99)	(1.13)	(1.2)
fiscale	-0.054	-0.075	-0.205
	(-0.27)	(-0.44)	(-0.31)
append	-0.070	-0.066	-0.245
	(-1.32)	(-1.40)	(-1.28)
age	-0.014+	-0.012+	-0.044
	(-1.49)	(-1.58)	(-1.32)
sex	-0.082+	-0.079*	-0.335*
	(-1.60)	(-1.66)	(-1.82)
partner	-0.008	0.016	0.024
	(-0.17)	(0.39)	(0.15)
constant	0.0835	0.115	-1.591+
	(0.28)	(0.46)	(-1.54)
Ps. R^2 (ps. *LL*)	0.076	0.105	-155.9
Wald (full model)	31.34***	36.68***	28.05**
χ^2 Improvement (4*df*)	4.19	3.56	3.18

Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Chapter 6.5.3: Regression of *reltrust* on processing preferences

Variable	Orthogonal, using *nfcscale*			*Variable*	Orthogonal, using *fiscale*		
	Tobit	Robust	GLM[1)]		Tobit	Robust	GLM[1)]
end	-0.121***	-0.124***	-0.475***	*end*	-0.117**	-0.123***	-0.469***
	(-2.64)	(-3.10)	(-3.01)		(-2.45)	(-3.03)	(-2.90)
frame	0.003	-0.002	-0.021	*frame*	0.004	-0.003	-0.014
	(-0.05)	(-0.06)	(-0.13)		(-0.08)	(-0.07)	(-0.08)
nfcscale	0.122	0.152	0.62	*fiscale*	-0.005	-0.029	-0.093
	-0.61	-0.88	-0.9		(-0.02)	(-0.14)	(-0.12)
*end*frame*	-0.886+	-0.51	-2.75	*end*frame*	0.359*	0.321*	1.268*
	(-1.51)	(-1.03)	(-1.34)		(-1.69)	(-1.87)	(-1.86)
*end*nfcscale*	-0.385	-0.192	-1.189	*end*fiscale*	0.312	0.283	1.086
	(-0.87)	(-0.49)	(-0.73)		(-1.12)	(-1.2)	(-1.13)
*frame*nfcscale*	-0.697	-0.409	-1.926	*frame*fi.*	0.253	0.244	0.741
	(-1.34)	(-0.92)	(-1.09)		(-0.47)	(-0.55)	(-0.42)
*end*frame.*	1.073+	0.601	3.279	*end*frame*	-0.192	-0.0253	-0.434
** nfcscale*	(-1.45)	(-0.97)	(-1.28)	** fiscale*	(-0.37)	(-0.06)	(-0.26)
trustscale	0.268	0.237	0.975+	*trustscale*	0.225	0.135	0.622
	(-1.3)	(-1.41)	(-1.45)		(-0.42)	(-0.3)	(-0.36)
recscale	0.257	0.248	0.938	*recscale*	-0.474	-0.448	-1.475
	(-0.85)	(-0.97)	(-0.91)		(-0.60)	(-0.68)	(-0.56)
age	-0.066	-0.057	-0.234	*age*	-0.068	-0.064	-0.246
	(-1.23)	(-1.21)	(-1.24)		(-1.28)	(-1.41)	(-1.32)
sex	-0.014+	-0.013*	-0.045	*sex*	-0.016*	-0.014*	-0.05+
	(-1.46)	(-1.75)	(-1.31)		(-1.70)	(-1.94)	(-1.47)
partner	-0.082+	-0.079+	-0.342*	*partner*	-0.089*	-0.085*	-0.361**
	(-1.48)	(-1.60)	(-1.84)		(-1.67)	(-1.86)	(-2.00)
append	-0.016	0.013	0.007	*append*	-0.004	0.018	0.042
	(-0.34)	(-0.33)	(-0.04)		(-0.09)	(-0.46)	(-0.27)
constant	0.167	0.136	-1.373	*constant*	0.17	0.208	-1.106
	(-0.53)	(-0.51)	(-1.28)		(-0.65)	(-0.96)	(-1.26)
Ps. R^2 (ps. *LL*)	0.07	0.959	-156.3		0.067	0.095	-156.68
Wald (full model)	25.56**	31.17***	25.85**		22.5**	29.7***	22.14*
χ^2 Improvement (4*df*)	2.52	1.24	2.03		1.94	1.69	1.54

Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. [1)] Effects on log-odds. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Chapter 6.6.4: Omitted figure displaying predicted *logtime*, using model specification (4)



Chapter 6.7.3: Combining accessibility and processing preferences, model specification (6)

Variable	Tobit		Robust		GLM[1)]	
end	-0.100**	-0.104**	-0.110**	-0.111***	-0.409**	-0.435***
	(-2.07)	(-2.20)	(-2.57)	(-2.71)	(-2.52)	(-2.65)
frame	-0.00165	0.0157	-0.0123	-0.00306	-0.0116	0.0369
	(-0.03)	(-0.33)	(-0.30)	(-0.07)	(-0.07)	(-0.22)
recscale	0.567*	0.880***	0.384+	0.667**	1.955*	3.049**
	(-1.79)	(-2.58)	(-1.46)	(-2.38)	(-1.74)	(-2.44)
fiscale	0.011	-0.0537	-0.0284	-0.0863	0.0235	-0.14
	(-0.05)	(-0.23)	(-0.13)	(-0.44)	-0.03	(-0.18)
*end*frame*	10.28***	10.90***	7.018**	7.129**	33.01**	36.58***
	(-2.77)	(-2.9)	(-2.45)	(-2.42)	(-2.56)	(-2.62)
*end*fiscale*	8.641**	9.288***	5.224**	6.129**	25.24**	28.25**
	(-2.53)	(-2.62)	(-2.17)	(-2.34)	(-2.11)	-(2.21)
*frame*fiscale*	2.076	2.593	2.207	2.909	7.376	9.449
	(-0.61)	(-0.73)	(-0.71)	(-0.86)	(-0.65)	(-0.75)
*end*recscale*	9.751***	10.19***	6.154***	6.829***	28.94**	31.22**
	(-2.89)	(-2.94)	(-2.65)	(-2.75)	(-2.49)	(-2.52)
*frame*recscale*	1.926	2.104	2.047	2.429	6.962	7.699
	(-0.58)	(-0.63)	(-0.69)	(-0.79)	(-0.64)	(-0.67)
*recscale*fiscale*	1.81	3.051	1.337	2.564	5.118	10.06
	(-0.61)	(-0.94)	(-0.53)	(-0.9)	(-0.51)	(-0.87)
end frame*recscale*	-15.58***	-16.04***	-10.82**	-10.59**	-49.91**	-53.59**
	(-2.78)	(-2.84)	(-2.49)	(-2.39)	(-2.57)	(-2.56)
*end*frame*fiscale*	-14.55***	-15.60***	-9.832**	-10.30**	-46.48**	-52.29**
	(-2.59)	(-2.72)	(-2.23)	(-2.22)	(-2.38)	(-2.45)
*end*recscale*fiscale*	-13.51***	-14.30***	-8.253**	-9.404**	-39.13**	-43.01**
	(-2.60)	(-2.69)	(-2.24)	(-2.39)	(-2.18)	(-2.26)
*frame*rec.*fis.*	-3.117	-3.472	-3.395	-4.136	-11.39	-12.87
	(-0.61)	(-0.65)	(-0.72)	(-0.82)	(-0.66)	(-0.69)
*end*frame*rec.*fis.*	21.85***	22.76***	15.00**	15.13**	69.67**	75.91**
	(2.58)	(-2.64)	(-2.25)	(-2.18)	(-2.37)	(-2.38)
constant	0.0932	0.0542	0.0542	0.185	-1.414+	-1.806
	(-0.34)	(-0.14)	(-0.14)	(-0.61)	(-1.48)	(-1.36)
Pseudo R^2 (ps. LL)	0.076	0.126	0.084	0.141	-156.58	-152.81
Wald (full model)	22.83**	42.84***	28.85**	47.07***	19.4	35.64**
χ^2 Improvement (11*df*)	15.31+	15.07	16.56+	14.09	12.63	12.08
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. [1)] Effects on log-odds. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Ad table 16: Fitting DT distributions across subgroups

	Fitting Across Experimental Conditions (outliers excluded, N=289)							
	Low/Neutral		Low/Cooperative		High/Neutral		High/Cooperative	
	D=	p=	D=	p=	D=	p=	D=	p=
Lognormal	0.084	0.638	0.088	0.638	0.081	0.710	0.059	0.945
Log-Logistic	0.083	0.646	0.068	0.892	0.078	0.744	0.078	0.715
Inv. Gauss	0.074	0.791	0.081	0.734	0.085	0.641	0.059	0.944
Weibull	0.113	0.283	0.135	0.149+	0.110	0.322	0.081	0.683

Appendix B: Items, Scales, and Instructions

The following tables list the scale items used in the experiment and present all associated measures of reliability. The scales were elicited using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from "fully agree" to "fully disagree," including a "don´t know"-option. The reliability measures obtained refer to the full data sample including N=298 observations. The scales were constructed by computing the average row mean across all items of the scale and normalizing to [0, 1]. Missing values were left out.

1. Interpersonal Trust Inventory (Kassebaum 2004), short version

Item	Factor Loading
(1) In der Regel begegne ich fremden Menschen mit großer Vorsicht	0.2564
(2) Die meisten Menschen würden eine günstige Gelegenheit nutzen, um sich auf Kosten anderer zu bereichern	0.6561
(3) Ich gehe in der Regel davon aus, dass andere Menschen mir gegenüber nicht nur gute Absichten haben	0.6724
(4) Institutionen wie Verwaltungen, Behörden, Ämtern usw., kann ich nur sehr schwer vertrauen	0.5265
(5) Ich habe oft Angst davor, dass fremde Menschen mir und meiner Umwelt Schaden zufügen könnten.	0.5159
(6) Im Grunde kann man den Mitmenschen vertrauen.	0.4123
(7) Wenn man seine finanziellen Angelegenheiten nicht weitgehend selbst regelt, muss man befürchten, hereingelegt oder hintergangen zu werden.	0.4511
(8) Manchmal befürchte ich, dass sogenannte "Experten" Entscheidungen treffen könnten, die sich negativ auf mein Wohlergehen auswirken	0.5126
(9) Wenn andere eine Aufgabe für mich erledigen, würde ich mich am liebsten ständig vergewissern, ob sie es auch in meinem Sinne und nach meinen Vorstellungen tun.	0.5078

Factors retained: 1
Eigenvalue= 2.32
Cronbach´s Alpha: 0.77

2. Reciprocity Scale (Perugini et al. 2003)

Item	Factor1 (pos. rec.)	Factor 2 (neg. rec.)
(1) Jemandem zu helfen ist die beste Methode um sicherzustellen, dass man in Zukunft auch selbst Hilfe erhält.	0.4663	0.1154
(2) Wenn mir jemand einen Gefallen tut, bin ich bereit, dies zu erwidern.	0.575	0.2361
(3) Wenn mir schweres Unrecht zuteil wird, werde ich mich um jeden Preis bei der nächsten Gelegenheit rächen.	-0.4957	0.6467
(4) Wenn mich jemand in eine schwierige Lage bringt, werde ich das Gleiche mit ihm machen.	-0.5448	0.617
(5) Ich strenge mich besonders an, um jemandem zu helfen, der mir früher schon geholfen hat.	0.5888	0.3426
(6) Wenn ich jemandem ein Kompliment mache, erwarte ich auch, dass er es erwidert.	-0.1011	0.3017
(7) Ich bin bereit, Kosten auf mich zu nehmen, um jemandem zu helfen, der mir früher schon einmal geholfen hat.	0.5258	0.3354
(8) Ich vermeide es, unhöflich zu sein, weil ich nicht will, dass andere unhöflich zu mir sind.	0.4002	0.0923
(9) Wenn mich jemand beleidigt, werde ich mich ihm gegenüber auch beleidigend verhalten.	-0.2973	0.369
(10) Wenn ich hart arbeite, erwarte ich einen entsprechenden Lohn.	0.2116	0.3542
(11) Wenn mich jemand höflich nach etwas fragt, helfe ich gerne weiter.	0.6541	0.0867
(12) Wenn mir jemand die richtigen Lottozahlen nennt, gebe ich ihm sicherlich einen Teil des Gewinns.	0.3582	0.1695

Factors retained: 2
Eigenvalues: 2.573, 1.495
Cronbach´s Alpha: 0.6520

3. Faith In intuition Scale (Keller et al. 2000)

Item	Factor Loading
(1) Bei den meisten Entscheidungen ist es sinnvoll, sich auf sein Gefühl zu verlassen.	0.6987
(2) Ich bin ein sehr intuitiver Mensch.	0.6248
(3) Wenn es um Menschen geht, kann ich meinem unmittelbaren Gefühl vertrauen.	0.7611
(4) Ich vertraue meinen unmittelbaren Reaktionen auf andere	0.7187
(5) Der erste Einfall ist oft der beste.	0.4887
(6) Wenn die Frage ist, ob ich anderen vertrauen soll, entscheide ich normalerweise aus dem Bauch heraus.	0.589
(7) Mein erster Eindruck von anderen ist fast immer zutreffend.	0.5409
(8) Ich spüre meistens sofort, wenn jemand lügt	0.3725
(9) Wenn ich mir eine Meinung zu einer Sache bilden soll, verlasse ich mich ganz auf meine Intuition	0.5806
(10) Ich glaube, ich kann meinen Gefühlen vertrauen.	0.7095
(11) Ich kann mir über andere sehr schnell einen Eindruck bilden.	0.4972

Factors retained: 1
Eigenvalue: 4.079
Cronbach´s Alpha: 0.8462

4. Need for Cognition Scale (Keller et al. 2000)

Item	Factor Loading
(1) Ich finde es nicht sonderlich aufregend, neue Denkweisen zu erlernen.	0.4915
(2) Ich finde wenig Befriedigung darin, angestrengt stundenlang nachzudenken	0.6279
(3) Abstrakt zu denken reizt mich nicht.	0.6438
(4) Die Vorstellung, mich auf mein Denkvermögen zu verlassen, um es zu etwas zu bringen, spricht mich nicht an.	0.478
(5) Ich würde lieber etwas tun, das wenig Denken erfordert, als etwas, das mit Sicherheit meine Denkfähigkeit herausfordert.	0.7355
(6) Denken entspricht nicht dem, was ich unter Spaß verstehe.	0.6099
(7) Ich trage nicht gern die Verantwortung für eine Situation, die sehr viel Denken erfordert.	0.6588
(8) Ich versuche, Situationen vorauszuahnen und zu vermeiden, in denen die Wahrscheinliohkeit groß ist, \par dass ich intensiv über etwas nachdenken muss.	0.5581
(9) Es genügt, dass etwas funktioniert, mit ist egal, wie oder warum.	0.5359
(10) Ich akzeptiere die Dinge meist lieber so wie sie sind, anstatt sie zu hinterfragen.	0.5924
(11) Es genügt mir, einfach die Antwort zu kennen, ohne die Gründe für die Antwort auf ein Problem zu verstehen.	0.377
(12) Wenn ich eine Aufgabe erledigt habe, die viel geistige Anstrengung erfordert hat, fühle ich mich eher erleichtert als befriedigt.	0.5053
(13) Das Denken in neuen und unbekannten Situationen fällt mir schwer.	0.6109

Factors retained: 1
Eigenvalue: 4.345
Cronbach´s Alpha: 0.8588

5. Item/Scale Intercorrelations

	recscale	*trustscale*	*fiscale*	*nfcscale*
recscale	1			
trustscale	-0.2064	1		
fiscale	0.0842	0.1672	1	
nfcscale	-0.1054	0.201	-0.0078	1

6. Instructions used in the experiment

The following instructions were used in the experiment. They are listed here in the order in which they were presented to the participants. Any reference to the two experimental manipulations is highlighted, and the alternative formulation is presented [in brackets]. This section includes the (1) general written instructions which participants found in their booth, and screenshots of the actual experiment, the (2) welcome screen, (3) on-screen instructions of the investment game (4) the control question stage, and (5) the decision stage. An English translation of the instructions is available from the author on request.

(1) General Instructions, presented on paper when seating participants in computer booth:

Allgemeine Erklärungen für die Teilnehmer:

Auszahlungen

Sie nehmen nun an einem Experiment der Universität Mannheim teil. Im Laufe des Experimentes werden Sie Entscheidungen treffen und können dabei Punkte verdienen. Die Höhe des Betrages hängt von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen und von den Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer ab.

Am Ende des Experiments wird *eine* der Aufgaben, die Sie bearbeitet haben, zufällig ausgewählt. Die Entscheidungen in dieser Aufgabe werden dann zur Berechnung der endgültigen Auszahlung herangezogen. Dazu werden die Punkte im Verhältnis 1:1 in Euro umgerechnet. Der Betrag wird am Ende der Sitzung in bar ausgezahlt.

Hinweis

Während des Experiments ist es **nicht gestattet**, mit den anderen Teilnehmern des Experiments **zu kommunizieren!** Falls Sie Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Wir kommen dann zu Ihnen und beantworten Ihre Frage. Eine Missachtung kann zum Ausschluss führen.

Dateneingabe

Dezimalzahlen werden bei der Eingabe von Daten mit einem Punkt getrennt (z.B. 6.5).

Ablauf

Zu Beginn des Experiments werden alle Personen zufällig aufgeteilt. Dabei bilden Sie und ein Partner [ein anderer Teilnehmer] ein Team [eine Gruppe] aus zwei Personen. Weder vor noch nach dem Experiment erfahren Sie, mit wem Sie in einem Team [einer Gruppe] waren. Ebenso wird Ihr Partner [der andere Teilnehmer] Ihre Identität nicht erfahren, d.h. alle Entscheidungen bleiben anonym.

Instruktionen am Bildschirm erläutern die Aufgaben. In jeder Aufgabe treffen Sie nur eine Entscheidung. Bevor Sie eine Entscheidung treffen, können Sie deswegen die Dateneingabe üben und beantworten Kontrollfragen, die Ihnen helfen, die Aufgabe zu verstehen.

Wenn Sie diese allgemeinen Erklärungen gelesen haben, klicken Sie „Weiter…“, um mit der Bearbeitung der Aufgaben am Bildschirm zu beginnen!

(2) Screenshot: welcome screens (presented while reading the general instructions)

(a) Cooperative framing intro screen

(b) Neutral framing intro screen

(3) Screenshot: Instructions of the investment game (cooperative framing manipulation and high incentive treatments highlighted, the neutral framing / low incentive conditions were established by replacing the fields with the corresponding formulations (i.e., “Teilnehmer” [participant], “Gruppe” [group] and low initial endowments of 7)



Aufgabe 1:

In Aufgabe 1 werden Sie mit einem zufällig ausgewählten Partner in einem Team spielen. Sie sind in **Rolle A**, Ihr Partner ist in Rolle B. In diesen Rollen sind unterschiedliche Entscheidungen zu treffen. Das Gesamtergebnis ist jedoch von *beiden* Entscheidungen abhängig.

Jeder erhält am Anfang eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 40 Punkten für die Teilnahme an der Studie.

1. Schritt: Sie entscheiden zu Beginn, ob und in welcher Höhe Sie mit Ihrem Partner in dem Team kooperieren wollen. Um dies zu tun, können Sie in 0.5-Schritten (0, 0.5, 1,...) jede Menge zwischen 0 und 40 Punkten geben. Diese Menge wird dann *verdoppelt* und an Ihren Partner geschickt.

2. Schritt: Nachdem Sie Ihre Entscheidung getroffen haben, wird Ihr Partner über die Entscheidung informiert und die verdoppelte Menge zu seiner Ausstattung an Punkten hinzugefügt. Daraufhin kann Ihr Partner in 0.5-Schritten (0, 0.5, 1,...) jede Menge zwischen 0 Punkten und seinem Gesamtguthaben zurückgeben. Diese Menge wird unverändert zu Ihrer verbleibenden Ausstattung addiert.

Endgültige Auszahlungen nach beiden Entscheidungen:

Sie erhalten:	40 Punkte	-	Menge an B	+	Menge von B
Ihr Partner erhält:	40 Punkte	+	2 * Menge von A	-	Menge an A
			1. Schritt: Ihre Entscheidung		2. Schritt: Entscheidung von B

Weder vor noch nach dem Experiment werden Sie erfahren, mit welchem Partner Sie in einem Team gespielt haben.

Weiter...

(4) Screenshot: On screen control questions stage (cooperative framing treatment)

(5) The decision stage of the experiment (high incentive and cooperative framing treatments highlighted and presented here)



Appendix C: Deriving Interaction Patterns

This section will demonstrate how the set of admissible *interaction patterns* that were used to guide the empirical analysis in chapter 6 can be analytically derived. The procedure can be adapted to other contexts and situations as well, by following the two steps listed below.

1. Set up bridge hypotheses

The analysis begins by linking processing modes to observable outcomes. This is the first and most important step in the analysis. Ideally, the outcome variable differs between the rational and the automatic processing mode. Thus, using such a link, we can infer the processing mode from the observed data. In the present case, the following bridge hypotheses were used:

B1 (automatic mode): Unconditional trust leads to a complete transfer of resources, X=E.

B2 (rational mode): Conditional trust supports any transfer between zero and the initial endowment, $X\varepsilon[0, E]$.

B3 (rational mode): Distrust leads to a transfer of zero, X=0.

B4 (decision time): The decision time in the automatic mode is shorter than the decision time in the rational mode.

B5 (corollary): Unconditional trust results in a shorter decision time than conditional trust.

Thus, the model predicts relatively lower transfers and relatively longer DT in the case of the rational mode, and relatively higher transfer decisions and shorter DT in the automatic mode. Of course, these bridge hypotheses can be criticized on empirical and theoretical grounds. In the present case, one can argue that rational mode decisions may lead to full trust, and likewise, that automatic mode decisions can lead trustors into distrust as well. The argument that was advanced in chapter 6.1 and 6.3 is that, *on average*, the proposed relations will hold. This proposition is based on a review of previous studies and empirical findings. Overall, the step accomplishes that the results of mode-selection (automatic mode, rational mode) are linked to the two dependent variables and the data collected in the experiment.

Next, to simplify the mode-selection threshold and reduce the number of variables that vary along with the treatment conditions, any remaining parameters will be held constant for. A number of additional bridge hypotheses are needed for those variables. In particular, the following additional assumptions were made when testing the model:

1. A trust frame is linked to an appropriate script, that is, $a_{j|i}=1$ (A1)
2. The script regulates action to a high degree, such that $a_{k|j}=1$ (A2) (see chapters 4.6 and 4.7)
3. Situational cues are *significant* symbols with respect to indicating the appropriateness of the trust-related frame F_t, such that $l_i=1$
4. There is a potential gain involved in preventing inference errors which outweighs the costs of processing, such that $C<p*U$

Importantly, a *randomization procedure* as part of the experimental design can be regarded as an important device to guarantee that these assumptions are met (or, to be precise, to ensure that their violation is not systematic). Randomizing subjects into treatment conditions ensures that any unobserved heterogeneity is evenly distributed among all treatments, and systematic influences can be ruled out. The statistical control of remaining parameters for which a control measure exists adds additional information to the statistical analysis, but is not necessary.

2. Join experimental conditions and processing modes

In a second step, it is necessary to determine the potential outcome of mode-selection in each experimental condition, varying all variables under scrutiny at their potential levels. In the present case, the experimental factors vary on two levels, yielding a 2x2 between-subject design. The experimental treatments change two parameters of the threshold. First, the cooperative *versus* neutral context is designed to influence the presence of situational cues o_i, as part of the match $m_i = m_i(o_i)$. Second, the high *versus* low incentive treatment is designed to manipulate cognitive motivation $U = (U_{rc}+C_w)$. The third parameter depends on the concrete model specification. For example, in model specification (1), the chronic accessibility of a trust-related script is varied along with the experimental treatments. What does the model tell us about the interaction between the two parameters, the interaction between each parameter and the chronic accessibility a_j of a reciprocity script, and the joint interplay of all three variables? Neglecting all constant parameters for the moment, we can write:

$$\mathbf{o_i} * \mathbf{a_j} > 1 - S / \mathbf{U}$$

where S is the constant derived from (C/p). Obviously, the threshold depends on all three parameters at the same time, and whether a single parameter change "tips over" the threshold balance crucially depends on the specification of all other parameter values. That is to say, the model predicts two- and three-way interactions between U, o_i and a_j. In a statistical model, we would have to include not only main effects U, o_i, and a_j, but also interaction terms $(U*o_i)$, $(U*a_j)$, $(a_j*o_{i'})$ and the three-way interaction $(U*a_j*o_i)$. But what is the predicted sign of these effects?

Note that each experimental condition and parameter constellation will provide for some range [0,a*]==A_{low} and [a*,1]==A_{high} of a_j in which the activation weight AW(A_{high}|o_i,U) > RHS, and AW(A_{low}|o_i,U) < RHS, that is, the threshold defined by the right-hand side (RHS) is reached for A_{high} and it is not reached for A_{low}. The threshold-value a* can (but need not) be different for all four experimental conditions (thus, denote each a* with A1-A4). What is more, an accessibility-value larger than a* may *not* be sufficient to "tip over" the threshold balance because the remaining constant parameters have an unfavorable specification. We need to ask whether a change in o_i or U is *sufficient* to induce a shift from the rational to the automatic mode in either range of a_j, whether both parameters are jointly *necessary* to induce this shift, or whether their joint effect is *not* sufficient. The threshold condition may even remain unfulfilled when both factors support the automatic mode, because the constant parameters (opportunity p, link l_i, cost of reflection C, temporary script accessibility $a_{j|i}$) push the balance into an unfavorable region where the effect of a parameter change disappears. All these possibilities have to be taken care of when thinking about the potential outcomes in each experimental condition (see Kroneberg 2006a, 2011b).

The following table summarizes the hypothesized impact of the experimental treatments on the threshold value along with chronic accessibility ranges A_{low} and A_{high}. It shows all effects of a parameter change on the left-hand-side (displaying the activation weight, AW) and the right-hand-side (RHS) of the mode-selection threshold, along with the resulting outcome, which is either the rational or the automatic mode. Every experimental condition or a shift in accessibility can "tip over" the threshold balance and trigger the rational *or* the automatic mode. For the incentive treatment, assume that U take the values $U_{low}<U_{high}$; for the context treatment, assume that $o_{neutral}<o_{coop}$ (table 1):

Table 1: Experimental treatments and changes in the mode selection threshold

	RHS= 1- S/U AW= a_j*o_i	Incentives U_{low} RHS decreases	AW= a_j*o_i	Incentives U_{high} RHS increases
Context Neutral $o_{neutral}$	$A1_{low} * o_{neutral}$	1. > → automatic	$A3_{low} * o_{neutral}$	9. > → automatic
		2. < → rational		10. < → rational
	$A1_{high} * o_{neutral}$ LHS increases	3. > → automatic	$A3_{high} * o_{neutral}$ LHS increases	11. > → automatic
		4. < → rational		12. < → rational
Context Cooperative o_{coop}	$A2_{low} * o_{coop}$ LHS increases	5. > → automatic	$A4_{low} * o_{coop}$ LHS increases	13. > → automatic
		6. < → rational		14. < → rational
	$A2_{high} * o_{coop}$ LHS increases	7. > → automatic	$A4_{high} * o_{coop}$ LHS increases	15. > → automatic
		8. < → rational		16. < → rational

Note: Outcomes of mode-selection are presented as a function of experimental conditions U (initial endowments) and o (framing condition) in conjunction with chronic accessibility a*.

With the help of simple logic, we can exclude all combinations from the total of $2^8 = 256$ different outcome patterns which are contradictive and therefore not feasible. For example, it is not possible that (1/4/6/8) is reached simultaneously, because the automatic mode was selected in the most unfavorable condition (1) already, and the activation weight on the left-hand-side can never decrease in conditions (4), (6) or (8); thus the rational mode can never become selected given that (1) is true. In this way, we can logically exclude the pairwise combinations 1/4, 1/6, 1/8, 3/8, 5/8, 9/12, 9/14, 9/16, 11/14, 11/16, 13/16, 2/9, 4/11, 6/13, 8/15, 4/9, 8/13, which restricts the potential interaction patterns to a number of 17 admissible patterns:

1. 1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15 (always automatic)
2. 1,3,5,7,10,11,13,15
3. 1,3,5,7,10,12,13,15
4. 1,3,5,7,10,12,14,15
5. 1,3,5,7,10,12,14,16
6. 2,3,5,7,10,11,13,15
7. 2,3,5,7,10,12,13,15
8. 2,3,5,7,10,12,14,15
9. 2,3,5,7,10,12,14,16
10. 2,3,6,7,10,12,14,15
11. 2,3,6,7,10,12,14,16
12. 2,4,5,7,10,12,13,15
13. 2,4,5,7,10,12,14,15
14. 2,4,5,7,10,12,14,16
15. 2,4,6,7,10,12,14,15
16. 2,4,6,7,10,12,14,16
17. 2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16 (always rational)

In the following, I will present a graphical solution to the problem of predicting interaction patterns. The results will be demonstrated using pattern number 16, which is selected here at random for presentational purposes only. The principal setup and procedures are similar for any other admissible interaction pattern. A full list of all graphical solutions to the derived patterns can be obtained from the author on request. Given that pattern 16 is statistically observed, we can update the table to show all mode-selection contingencies (table 2):

Table 2: Predicted interaction pattern #16 and mode selection contingencies

	RHS= 1- S/U / AW= a_j*o_i	Incentives U_{low} RHS decreases	AW= a_j*o_i	Incentives U_{high} RHS increases
Context Neutral $o_{neutral}$	$A1_{low}$ * $o_{neutral}$	1. > → automatic	$A3_{low}$ * $o_{neutral}$	9. > → automatic
		2. < → rational		10. < → rational
	$A1_{high}$ * $o_{neutral}$ LHS increases	3. > → automatic	$A3_{high}$ * $o_{neutral}$ LHS increases	11. > → automatic
		4. < → rational		12. < → rational
Context Cooperative o_{coop}	$A2_{low}$ * o_{coop} LHS increases	5. > → automatic	$A4_{low}$ * o_{coop} LHS increases	13. > → automatic
		6. < → rational		14. < → rational
	$A2_{high}$ * o_{coop} LHS increases	7. > → automatic	$A4_{high}$ * o_{coop} LHS increases	15. > → automatic
		8. < → rational		16. < → rational

How would the conditional effects on the level of trust (*reltrust*) in each experimental condition look like, given that this pattern is observed? From the table we can see that:

(1) The conditional effect (CE) of a_j is zero in the low incentive / neutral context condition
(2) The CE of a_j is positive in the low incentive / coop. context condition (cells 6 to 7)
(3) The CE of a_j is zero whenever incentives are high (neutral and cooperative context)
(4) The CE of the context o_i is positive in the low incentive / A_{high} condition (cells 4 to 7)
(5) The CE of the context o_i is zero in all other conditions (high incentives or A_{low})
(6) The CE of incentives U is negative in the coop. context / A_{high} condition (cells 7 to 16)
(7) The CE of U is zero in all other conditions (neutral context or A_{low})

Using these conditional effects, we can graphically pin down all outcomes and interactions. First, fix one variable at one level. In a graph, let the x-axis display the level of the second variable, using the y-axis to graph *reltrust*, using the bridge hypotheses proposed above as a guide. The CE of the second variable can be graphed for each level of the third variable. In the following table, each graph refers to another way of displaying the information that can be obtained from table 2, holding constant one variable and varying the remaining two each time. In this way, derive the predicted sign of all two-way interactions for each experimental condition and factorial combination. The sign of the three-way interaction can be inferred from observing all two-way interactions and their common direction of change (see table 3):

Table 3: Predicted interaction pattern #16 and *reltrust*

Constant: A_{low}	Constant: $o_{neutral}$	Constant: U_{low}
		
CE o_i = zero CE U = zero	CE U = zero CE a = zero	CE o_i = zero if A_{low} = positive if A_{high} CE $a_{j\|i}$ = zero if $o_{neutral}$ = positive if o_{coop}
Interaction Effect = zero	Interaction Effect = zero	Interaction Effect = positive
Constant: A_{high}	Constant: o_{coop}	Constant: U_{high}
		
CE o_i = positive if U_{low} = zero if U_{high} CE U = zero if $o_{neutral}$ = negative if o_{coop}	CE U = zero if A_{low} = negative if A_{high} CE a_j = positive if U_{low} = zero if U_{high}	CE o_i = zero CE a_j = zero
Interaction Effect = negative	Interaction Effect = negative	Interaction Effect = zero

IE Change: zero → negative	IE Change: zero → negative	IE Change: positive → zero

a_j	≥ 0	
U	≤ 0	
o_i	≥ 0	
U x o_i	≤ 0	
a_j x U	≤ 0	
a_j x o_i	≥ 0	
a_j x U x o_i	**< 0**	(inferred from the IE changes presented above)

Note: CE = Conditional Effect; y= predicted level of *reltrust*; A_{low} (A_{high}) = level of chronic script accessibility aj below (above) a*; U= incentive treatment, varying on two levels U_{low} , U_{high}; o_i = context treatment, varying on two levele $o_{neutral}$ and o_{coop}; The table displays the conditional effects of remaining parameters, holding one parameter constant at a time. The constant parameter is indicated in the top of each box. The CE can be inferred from the contingency table, as presented above. The two-way interactions can be inferred from graphing each CE within each condition.

This procedure can be repeated for all remaining interaction patterns. The resulting set of interaction patterns has been presented in section 6.3.3 already, it is repeated here for completeness (see table 4 below):

Table 4: Predicted interaction patterns for *reltrust*

	Predicted Interaction Patterns (Main- and Interaction Effects)																
Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
a_j	0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	$= 0$	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	0
U	0	≤ 0	≤ 0	≤ 0	< 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	≤ 0	≤ 0	≤ 0	< 0	$= 0$	≤ 0	≤ 0	$= 0$	≤ 0	0
o_i	0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	$= 0$	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	$= 0$	> 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	0
$U \cdot o_i$	0	≥ 0	> 0	≥ 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	≥ 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	≤ 0	< 0	$= 0$	≤ 0	0
$a_i \cdot U$	0	≥ 0	$= 0$	≥ 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	≤ 0	≤ 0	≤ 0	≤ 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	≥ 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	≤ 0	0
$a_i \cdot o_i$	0	≤ 0	$= 0$	≥ 0	$= 0$	< 0	≤ 0	≤ 0	≤ 0	≥ 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	≥ 0	$= 0$	> 0	≥ 0	0
$a_i \cdot o_i \cdot U$	0	≤ 0	$= 0$	> 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	> 0	> 0	> 0	> 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	> 0	$= 0$	$= 0$	< 0	0

Note: The table presents predicted interaction patterns between chronic script accessibility a_j, situational cues o_i and motivation U to predict transfer decisions (*reltrust*) in the investment game

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