

2 The State and the Brotherhood under Nasser and Sadat (1954-1981)

The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian state under the reign of President Mubarak, took its roots in 1954, when the freshly made President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in an almost fatal move against its potent political rival, the Muslim Brotherhood, detained several thousands of its members in only one night. This initialled a more than decade long repression wave, which the organization itself refers to as the “great infestation”. It was also Nasser’s erection of a distinct type of state – which dramatically differed from the monarchy that preceded it, and which largely remained in place under Mubarak – that lay the foundation stone of Brotherhood state relations under Mubarak (even if the level of repression that the organization was exposed to was to fluctuate).¹⁴⁸

This chapter will, thus, start with an introduction of the Egyptian state, looking at how it can be conceptualized and at how it took shape under Nasser and Sadat. It will then proceed to introduce the Brotherhood as an organization from its foundation in 1928 until the Presidency of Nasser and will look at its development under the Presidencies of Nasser and Sadat.

2.1 The State

In 1952 a military coup d’état of the group of “Free Officers” toppled the Egyptian parliamentary monarchy and established full independence from the British. Though the British had granted Egypt formal independence in 1922, it had maintained for itself major influence in vital political as well as economic domains.¹⁴⁹ After a short period of internal power struggles in the ranks of the Free Officers,

148 See for example Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004). Or see Nazih Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). First published in 1995.

149 Four domains had remained fully reserved for the British from 1922 until the coup: “The security of Imperial communications in Egypt; the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression; the protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt; and the Sudan”. Panayotis Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt. From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), 272. 4th edition.

Gamal Abdel Nasser ascended to power in 1954 and erected a specific type of state that has largely remained in place under Mubarak. This section's goal is to describe the nature of that state. Of utmost importance will be the devices and measures that it typically resorted to in its interaction with societal groups, so as to give an idea of what kind of a state it was that the Brotherhood has been struggling with under Nasser, Sadat as well as later under Mubarak.

2.1.1 *The Corporatist Nature of the State*

In conceptualizing the nature of the Egyptian state, many authors have drawn on the concept of corporatism. Nazih Ayubi is one of the prominent examples in that regard. This section will largely refer to his reception of corporatism,¹⁵⁰ as it lends itself well to the purpose at hand. Ayubi regards corporatism as “a useful analytical tool for understanding a whole range of devices for organising and managing state/society relations”.¹⁵¹ Ayubi is also compatible with the approach chosen here, as for him state and society are in a relationship with each other that can transform them both.¹⁵² He draws heavily on O'Donnell's concept of corporatism,¹⁵³ but blends it explicitly with his own insights from Gramsci.¹⁵⁴

In Ayubi's depiction, corporatism emerges in situations of a backward capitalist development, where the state attempts to propel capitalist development through an industrialization that is directed by the state, this, however, brings

150 For Ayubi's notion of “corporatism” see for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 19-35. In his “Over-Stating the Arab State”, Ayubi not only analyses the Egyptian state but looks at the whole variety of Arab states. He views the Egyptian state as not being utterly unique but as largely adhering to one general form of rule dominant in the Middle East, though this form has different variations. For other studies that have engaged with the concept of corporatism with regards to cases other than Egypt see for example Volker Perthes, *The Political Economy of Syria under Asad* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997). Hardback in 1995. For studies that have drawn on the concept of corporatism with regards to Egypt see for example Robert Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism. Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

151 Ayubi, *Overtstating the Arab State*, 20.

152 See for example Ayubi, *Overtstating the Arab State*, 189. Ayubi here refers to O'Donnell's view that corporatism is “bifrontal”. For more on that see also Guillermo O'Donnell, “Corporatism and the Question of the State”, in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 48.

153 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 20. For O'Donnell's conception of “corporatism” as used in Ayubi see: Guillermo A. O'Donnell, “Corporatism and the Question of the State”.

154 See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 5-35. Ayubi remarks that also O'Donnell was “inspired by the Gramscian concept of hegemony”. Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 32-33.

with it an “exaggerated [economic] role of the state”,¹⁵⁵ *étatisme*.¹⁵⁶ Also, corporatism – for Ayubi – emerges when class structures are weak, which makes it impossible for a class – that could dominate the others and could establish Gramscian hegemony – to emerge.¹⁵⁷ The state compensates this lack of hegemony by applying, on the one hand, strategies of inclusion and, on the other hand, strategies of exclusion, coercion and control.¹⁵⁸

Inclusion here refers to alliances with social groups that are of particular use for the state, this however automatically involves the exclusion of other groups. Inclusion is then realized through the distribution of economic goods, that create dependency and thus create loyalty to the state in a “tacit political pact”,¹⁵⁹ in which the political voice is given away for material gains.¹⁶⁰ The state’s provision of economic rewards is made possible by its dominant economic role, as well as by its rentier-nature, either as it receives income from resources such as oil or as it receives considerable foreign aid.¹⁶¹ The creation of inclusionary alliances with certain social groups is then often realized through institutions of state or civil society – such as parliament, the bureaucracy or interest groups controlled by the state – which have three major functions: that of “representation, mobilization and control”.¹⁶² As the two latter functions clearly supersede the first, the respective institutions are marked by what has been described as “the politics of simulation”,¹⁶³ where

155 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 13.

156 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*. Ayubi states that “state corporatism tends to emerge in situations of ‘late’ industrialization and development”. Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 216. Ayubi writes that the leaders of the early Arab republics were then “dedicated ‘modernisers’ intent on accelerated industrialisation and fascinated by technologism”. Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 207. For more details on *étatisme* and how it figured in the early Arab republics see for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, page 196-203.

157 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 25.

158 See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 25 in combination with 32-35. It is specifically concerning the inclusionary and exclusionary devices that Ayubi turns to O’Donnell. See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 32-33.

159 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 246. Ayubi here refers to the tacit political pact in the context of the Arab oil monarchies, but talks about a similar mechanism in the Arab republics such as Egypt.

160 See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 246-247.

161 Egypt can be considered as rentier or semi-rentier state as it receives foreign aid. See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 219. In case of the Gulf monarchies, they can be considered rentier-states because of their oil income. See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 224-230.

162 Perthes, *The Political Economy of Syria under Asad*, 170. Perthes here refers to Syria. But Ayubi refers to similar mechanisms being in place in Egypt under Nasser. See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 207.

163 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 213.

the state re-creates certain intermediary organisations and associations from above in its own image, sometimes with the intent of creating an organizational and political vacuum that others may not fill.¹⁶⁴

To enhance the loyalty of such institutions, they are then underpinned by *informal* patronage-networks.¹⁶⁵ These are, again, erected through the distribution of resources and are employed as vertical channels to funnel state-power through mediators that are involved in the alliance-forging at the macro level down to the micro level of the individual.¹⁶⁶

To sum up, the devices and tools that the corporatist state typically uses to deal with societal actors and groupings can be said to be: (1) inclusion or respectively co-optation, realized through the delivery of economic benefits, opportunities or prestige, and (2) exclusion and coercion – for those that are excluded from the privilege of being included.¹⁶⁷ Ayubi then distinguishes several variations of corporatism: “state-corporatism”,¹⁶⁸ found in the Arab republics including Egypt, and “societal corporatism”,¹⁶⁹ found in the Arab monarchies.¹⁷⁰ The latter form of corporatism he argues rests more on inclusionary measures (which the oil-rich monarchies can afford much more than the republics can), is less institutionalised and depends more on informal patronage networks.¹⁷¹ State-corporatism, Ayubi argues, generally deploys more exclusionary measures and is more institutionalised than societal corporatism.¹⁷² Within state-corporatism Ayubi distinguishes two forms.

164 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 213.

165 Ayubi argues that clientelistic structures can figure as “pattern of vertical dependency” in a corporatist state. Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State*, 169. He also remarks that Nasser’s Egypt used patronage systems a lot. Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State*, 208. Tripp is making a bit of a stronger point in that direction as he does talk of this phenomena with regards to Iraq, while Ayubi suggests that such clientelistic structures might be of specific relevance only in the conservative monarchies of the Gulf and not so much in the republics. See Charles Tripp, “After Saddam”, *Survival*, 44 (2002-03).

166 See for example Nazih N. Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State*, 169. To denote the informal nature of these networks of people of “personal trust”, Charles Tripp has termed this phenomenon as the “shadow state”. It evolves behind the scenes of the formal institutional set up of the state and represents the true locus of power. Tripp refers here to the case of Iraq. Tripp, “After Saddam”: 26.

167 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*.

168 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 192.

169 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 193.

170 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 189-194.

171 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 224-253.

172 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 196-221 and 339-352

Two Forms of State-Corporatism

For Ayubi's consideration of state-corporatism in Egypt, two specific kinds of corporatism that O'Donnell puts forward are relevant: the first is labeled "populist-corporatist".¹⁷³ Here the basic alliance that is crafted by the state with a societal group is an alliance with the broader society in the sense of the poor masses that are being won as allies via welfare measures.¹⁷⁴ In the same time those social groupings that have previously been dominant are now excluded.¹⁷⁵ Populism is also marked by a special relationship between ruler and ruled:

The relationship between the ra'is [President] and the people is a direct one: immediate, emotional, marvellous, almost 'bodily'. It forms the backbone of the political system, in a situation where political organisations are no more than tools for mobilisation.¹⁷⁶

Ayubi argues, however, that there is an inherent tension in the fact that the state, on the one hand, provides considerable welfare services to the people and, on the other hand, seeks to propel economic development via an industrialization that is led by itself, by the state.¹⁷⁷ O'Donnell has argued that this will turn populist-corporatism into a different form of corporatism: "bureaucratic corporatism".¹⁷⁸ He argues that in this new form of corporatism, the state now increasingly begins to exclude the poor masses and to use repression against them, while it seeks to build an alliance with the private capital.¹⁷⁹ While O'Donnell refers to cases in Latin America, Ayubi argues that in the Arab World the development away from populist-corporatism has unfolded differently: Though he argues that the state indeed is eventually forced to notably reduce its welfarist measures (and thus its alliance with the masses), due to economic stress,¹⁸⁰ and now indeed increasingly seeks an alliance with private capital, Ayubi emphasizes that this shift in alliances and especially the reduction of welfare has been slow: though welfare was reduced it was not completely abandoned.¹⁸¹ Ayubi thus has argued, that in this

173 Ayubi, *Oversating the Arab State*, 196.

174 See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 205-206.

175 See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 201.

176 'Iyad Bin' Ashur as quoted in Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 204.

177 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 219.

178 O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the question of the State", 48.

179 O'Donnell depicts a cycle of populist authoritarianism evolving into increasingly exclusionary and coercive bureaucratic authoritarianism, mainly due to structural economic factors. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the question of the State", 54-64. O'Donnell argues that a hallmark bureaucratic corporatism is the "political and economic exclusion of the popular sector". O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the question of the State", 50.

180 Ayubi, *Oversating the Arab State*, 340.

181 See for example Ayubi, *Oversating the Arab State*, 352.

new, or second form of corporatism, populist-corporatism elements are not completely eliminated and that the state's shift in alliances with societal forces has, thus, not been as clear-cut as portrayed in O'Donnell's depiction and that it is more refined.¹⁸²

Corporatism under Nasser and Sadat

Ayubi considers Nasser's rule as a prototype of populist-corporatism that was copied by other Arab states.¹⁸³ The main alliance was one with the poorer classes, that were won into the coalition through the state's provision of welfare.¹⁸⁴ With this alliance Nasser now especially challenged "the traditional domination of rural oligarchies",¹⁸⁵ that had collaborated with the British. The domination of large landowners was broken through land reforms that were implemented already shortly after the toppling of the monarchy in 1952.¹⁸⁶ They had two goals: (i) "their main political objective was to eliminate the power base of the large landlord as a politically influential force",¹⁸⁷ and (ii) their goal was to make capital available to finance the state-led industrialization.¹⁸⁸ Also, the capital that was taken from this class was then spent for welfare policies, that established Nasser's "alliance of popular forces".¹⁸⁹ As Nasser wanted to achieve development and modernization through state-led industrialization and import-substitution,¹⁹⁰ he increasingly embraced socialist economic policies, especially with regard to economic planning.¹⁹¹

182 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 219-221. Ayubi also talks of the fact, that corporatism was now constituted of "more elaborate corporatist arrangements". Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*. No particular term has here been adopted by Ayubi to label this type of corporatism. While Bianchi may be said to have termed it "unruly corporatism". See Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism*. Hinnebusch has simply called it "post-populism". See Raymond Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

183 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 209.

184 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 209.

185 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 217.

186 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 199. These reforms, however, were not radical in the sense that they completely dismantled this class, as it was the case for example in Syria in the 1960ies.

187 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 201.

188 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 202.

189 The Nasserist formula as quoted in Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 215.

190 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 214.

191 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 196-203. Ayubi here argues that only structural measures of Nasser were those used in socialism. But Ayubi clearly states that Nasser did not adhere to socialist ideology but wanted to achieve modernization and development via the state-led industrialization. This then entailed socialist measures.

The populist alliance, however, also implied that those who were included economically through welfare were also to be controlled.¹⁹² This was guaranteed through incorporating people either in the state bureaucracy, that was heavily expanded under Nasser, or in the sole existant political party under Nasser – the Arab Socialist Union – or in interest groups that were tightly controlled by the state, and it was guaranteed through the dominant role of the state’s repressive arms, the military and the police forces.¹⁹³ Tellingly, Ayubi depicts the Egyptian state under Nasser as having

revolved ... around three poles: the President, the army and the party. So that what we had was a combination of a boss-state ..., a security state (to include aspects of the police state or *dawlat mukhabarat*) and a party state ... that dominates over most associations in society [and in which] ... the civil bureaucracy is directed and controlled by all three.¹⁹⁴

A strong relationship between the President and the people was another major part of this system, as Nasser eloquently and vocally promised social justice and progress for the poor.¹⁹⁵ But, however, it would soon grow more difficult for the state to provide extensive welfarist measures, and thus affected the state’s alliance with the poor.¹⁹⁶

The state had sought to provide “both growth and welfare, production and distribution”,¹⁹⁷ but Ayubi argued it is hardly possible to continue both simultaneously in the long-term as they both follow different logics.¹⁹⁸ And while the substitution of imports usually is supposed to work well in the beginning this effect can not be upheld in the long term, as it produces considerable economic difficulties for the state in later stages,¹⁹⁹ making it difficult for the state to finance the extensive welfare. When Egypt faced a severe financial crisis in the sixties – that was further enhanced by the defeat against Israel in the Six Day War in 1967 – this, thus, triggered a shift in state policies.²⁰⁰ The state now in-

192 See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 207 or 217.

193 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 196-221.

194 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 203.

195 See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 204.

196 Ayubi states that “Under the slightest pressure ... the radical Arab regimes were capable of turning their backs on the socialist slogans ... and of overseeing the implementation of economic liberalisation and privatisation programmes.” Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 221.

197 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 214.

198 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 213. For the antipodal logic see Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 214.

199 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 217.

200 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 214.

creasingly sought to ally itself with private capital,²⁰¹ and in the same time gradually decreased its welfare measures under Nasser's successor Sadat, who took power after Nasser died in 1970.²⁰² However, Arab aid after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, as well as US aid after Egypt's signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1978/79 allowed the Egyptian state to sustain welfare policies to the degree that was necessary to guarantee the state's survival.²⁰³ In line with the state's seeking to build an alliance with private capital, Sadat started to gradually reverse Nasser's socialist elements of economic policy and slowly opened the door for Egyptian as well as foreign private capital.²⁰⁴ However, in Sadat's economic opening (*infatih*) business opportunities were only given to those who were loyal to the state.²⁰⁵ The state's alliance under Sadat now shifted from a *predominantly* populist one, to be based increasingly on the state's bourgeoisie and on "private parasitic capital (financial, commercial, industrial)".²⁰⁶

This was paralleled by the fact that Egypt moved away from the Soviet Union, a partnership with it had been established under Nasser and had tightened as he had increasingly adopted socialist economic policies. Under Sadat, Egypt moved towards the West. Already in 1972, Egypt expelled its Soviet advisors,²⁰⁷ but the shift towards the West was then only finally completed with Egypt's signing of the Camp David accords in 1979.²⁰⁸ Sadat's change from a predominantly populist alliance to an alliance that centred more on private capital as well as his new strategic alliance with the West also markedly affected the legitimacies on which Egypt's rulers had strived to base their rule upon.

2.1.2 *Legitimatory Discourses of the State*

Though the Egyptian state as an authoritarian state naturally has a legitimacy deficit, Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Hesham Al-Awadi, for example, have argued that legitimacy is not unimportant in the Egyptian context, but has always been

201 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 221.

202 See for example Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 219-221, or 340, or 352. For the economic liberalization under Sadat see Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 339-352.

203 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 219.

204 See Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 339-352.

205 Interview with Expert 7 (2010). See also Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 339-352.

206 Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics. Culture, the State and Islamism* (London: IB Tauris, 2006), 51. First published in hardback in 2003. See also Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 219-221 and 339-352.

207 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 202.

208 See for example Annette Büchs, „Dreißig Jahre Camp David: Separatfrieden mit ambivalenten Auswirkungen“, *GIGA Focus Nahost* 3 (2009).

given due attention by the respective presidents.²⁰⁹ In that sense this section will look at these claims made by Nasser and Sadat.

Nasser's legitimacy discourse and his charisma reverberated with large segments in Egypt as well as across Egypt's boundaries into the broader Arab world.²¹⁰ Nasserism, however, did not start as a detailed worldview.²¹¹ Instead, it was driven especially by the following components: its opposition to the British and to the Egyptian King.²¹² Promising to eliminate the social injustices – that the collaboration of the colonialist British and the corrupt Egyptian king had brought to the Egyptians at large²¹³ – Nasserism promised social justice and equality and development to the people.²¹⁴ In that thrust socialist elements,²¹⁵ were mixed with pan-Arab nationalism,²¹⁶ and Third Worldism.²¹⁷ But Nasser sought not only to speak for Egypt alone but understood Egypt to be part of a larger Arab entity, that shared a common language and culture as well as a struggle for independence and against the colonialist West.²¹⁸ Nasser aimed to present Egypt as the vanguard of this panarab and anti-imperialist project – and not without success: his nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 did indeed thrust him to the top of popularity not only in Egypt but also in large parts of the Arab world.²¹⁹

In the anti-imperialist struggle, the issue of Palestine came to play a crucial role.²²⁰ As Palestine was seen as part of the western imperialist project, freeing

209 Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy. The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 7. And: Hesham al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy. The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000* (London: Tauris Academic Studies), 8.

210 See Henner Fürtig, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“, *Informationen zur politischen Bildung* 317 (2012): 28.

211 See for example Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 30-31.

212 Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 31.

213 Fürtig argues for example that the lower middle class were frustrated and humiliated under the rule of the British and the Egyptian king. See Henner Fürtig, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“, *Informationen zur politischen Bildung* 317, 4/2012: 28.

214 See for example Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State*, 204.

215 See for example Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State*, 197. Ayubi here says that Nasserism used some socialist terminology but was not wholeheartedly adhering to a socialist ideology. See Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State*, 196-203.

216 Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State. Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 154. First edition 1989, published as revised paperback edition 1993, reprinted in 1995 and 2001.

217 See for example Reinhard Schulze, *Geschichte der islamischen Welt im 20. Jahrhundert*, (München: C.H. Beck, 2003). 2nd (special) edition. First edition 1994. In combination with Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State*.

218 See Henner Fürtig, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“, 28.

219 See Fürtig, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“.

220 See Reinhard Schulze, *Geschichte der islamischen Welt im 20. Jahrhundert*, 169. Schulze writes that as early as 1945 the Palestine issue became framed as an important or even a key Arab issue within the Arab League.

Palestine was part of the Arab struggle for independence and was, thus, portrayed to be of high concern for Nasser.²²¹ The dramatic Arab defeat against Israel in the Six-Day-War of 1967, in which Egypt lost the Sinai and control of the Gaza-strip to Israel, accordingly sent a fatal blow to Nasserism and panarab ideology at large.²²²

While Nasser's legitimacy strategy relied primarily on a secular form of nationalism,²²³ he did not refrain from employing Islamic rhetoric as a means to bolster his legitimacy.²²⁴ He had been "far from embarking on the 'secularization' for which some yearned".²²⁵ Instead Nasser subordinated the country's religious establishment to the state,²²⁶ and instrumentalized it as he "felt free to resort to its [Islamic] slogans and rhetoric in his speeches, and to use it [Islam] as part of state propaganda".²²⁷ However, his lavish but piecemeal referral to Islam – in which Islam in the end always remained subordinated to secular notions of nationalism and was ultimately seen as nothing more than a *cultural trait* of the "Arab nation" – was deeply offensive to some.²²⁸

After Nasser's death and the taking of power by Sadat, legitimacy discourse changed. Sadat lacked Nasser's popularity and now sought to build his own legitimacy claim on the fact that he was the *legal* successor of Nasser, and that he would erect the rule of law.²²⁹ The avowal to establish the rule of law was also in line with Sadat's previously described reshuffling of corporatist alliances and with his "economic liberalisation" and his rapprochement with the West.²³⁰ Sadat now "reformed the Constitution, stressed the supremacy of the law, and declared Egypt 'State of Law'. He [also] promised a new period of judicial autonomy".²³¹ However, this did not establish constitutionalism in a democratic sense in Egypt, as the political system remained authoritarian, and the process of liberalisation remained

221 See for example Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 32.

222 See Fürtig, „Ägyptens Gloria unter Nasser“.

223 For example Zubaida writes that Pan-arabism was the strongest component of Nasserism – as well as socialism, which is also secular. Zubaida, *Islam – The People and the State*, 154.

224 See Zubaida, *Islam – The People and the State*, 154. Also al-Awadi referring to Majda Rabi' says that "Islam was a powerful tool for Nasser". Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 35.

225 Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam* (London: SAQI, 2005), 51. Originally published as *Le Prophète et Pharaon* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1984). English version first published in 1985 as *The Prophet and Pharaoh*.

226 Zubaida, *Islam – The People and the State*, 154.

227 Zubaida, *Islam – The People and the State*, 154.

228 Zubaida, *Islam – The People and the State*, 154. In combination with Interview with Ex-MB 4 (2010).

229 Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 35. In combination with Interview with Expert 7 (2010).

230 See Gudrun Krämer, *Ägypten unter Mubarak: Identität und nationales Interesse* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986), 45. Krämer writes that Sadat's claim to establish the rule of law should have made Egypt an attractive partner for the West in terms economic and political cooperation.

231 Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 36.

The Muslim Brotherhood and its Quest for Hegemony in
Egypt

State-Discourse and Islamist Counter-Discourse

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