

Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	The Argument: Individual Choice and State Accumulation	2
1.2	Conceptualization and Operationalization	4
1.2.1	Outcomes of Mobilization	4
1.2.2	Perception of Foreign Threats	6
1.2.3	Domestic Institutions	8
1.3	Case Selection	10
1.4	Nationalism in Present-Day China	13
1.5	Book Organization	14
	References	15
2	Explaining State-Led Nationalist Movements: Individual Choice and State Mobilization	19
2.1	Situating the Theory	20
2.1.1	Rational Elites, Emotional Masses	20
2.1.2	Is a Mass-Based Instrumentalist Explanation Possible?	23
2.1.3	Self-interests and Group Interests	24
2.2	Explaining Mass Nationalist Movements	25
2.2.1	Assumptions	25
2.2.2	Why Does Nationalism Matter?	26
2.2.3	Explaining Participation: What Motivates Individuals to Participate?	27
2.2.4	Explaining Mobilization	29
2.2.5	Bringing the Two Components Together	32
2.3	Alternative Explanations	34
2.3.1	Cultural Symbols	35
2.3.2	Ethnic Animosities	35
2.4	Conclusion	36
	References	37

3 The New Life Movement in Jiangxi: Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority Institutions, and the Limits of Nationalism	41
3.1 Is the New Life Movement a Nationalist Movement?	42
3.1.1 The Rationale of the New Life Movement: From Daily Habits to National Revival	42
3.1.2 Cleaning Up Cities	44
3.1.3 Rehabilitating the Rural Areas	44
3.2 Assessing the Outcome of New Life Mobilization	46
3.2.1 Agricultural Production	47
3.2.2 State Accumulation	47
3.2.3 Cleanliness and Orderliness	49
3.3 The Public's Weak Perception of Foreign Threats	50
3.3.1 Nationalist Mobilization Without a Foreign Enemy	50
3.3.2 Effects on Mobilization	52
3.4 The Restoration of Pro-minority Institutions	54
3.4.1 Returning the Land to the Original Owners	54
3.4.2 Effects on Mobilization	56
3.5 Alternative Explanations	58
3.5.1 Policy Implementation by Local Officials	58
3.5.2 Domestic Contenders	60
3.5.3 The Superficiality of the New Life Movement	60
3.5.4 Top-Down Model	61
3.5.5 Customs and Cultural Symbols	62
3.6 Conclusion	63
References	64
 4 Sichuan During the Sino-Japanese War: Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority Institutions, and the Limited Success of Nationalist Mobilization	69
4.1 The Outcome of Nationalist Mobilization: A Limited Success	69
4.1.1 Industrial and Agricultural Production	69
4.1.2 State Accumulation	71
4.1.3 Conscription	73
4.2 Strong Perception of Foreign Threats and Mass Participation	74
4.2.1 The Industrial Relocation at the Onset of the War	74
4.2.2 Japanese Air Raids and Mobilization in Free China	77
4.3 Pro-minority Institutions and Their Effects on Nationalist Mobilization	80
4.3.1 Pro-minority Economic Institutions	80
4.3.2 Pro-minority Political Institutions	84
4.3.3 Effects on Mobilization	84

4.4	Alternative Explanations	87
4.4.1	Central–Local Relations and Mobilization Implementation	87
4.4.2	Ethnic Animosities	88
4.5	Conclusion	90
	References	90
5	The Lower Yangtze Region During the Korean War: Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-majority Institutions, and Successful Nationalist Mobilization	93
5.1	The Outcomes of Wartime Mobilization	94
5.1.1	Restoration of Domestic Production	94
5.1.2	Increase in State Accumulation	97
5.1.3	State Control over Citizens	98
5.2	Strong Perception of Foreign Threats and Mass Participation	99
5.2.1	The Public’s Perception of Threats	99
5.2.2	Public Fear and State Protection	101
5.2.3	Effects on Mobilization.	102
5.3	Pro-majority Institutions and Mass Participation	104
5.3.1	Labor Insurance System and the Urban Population.	105
5.3.2	Land Reform and the Rural Population.	107
5.3.3	Effects on Mobilization.	109
5.4	Alternative Explanations	112
5.4.1	Emotive Nationalism and Animosities Toward Foreign Enemies	112
5.4.2	State Coercion	114
5.5	Conclusion	114
	References	115
6	The Great Leap Forward in Sichuan: Weak Threat Perceptions, Hybrid Institutions, and the Mixed Outcomes of Mobilization	119
6.1	Evaluating the Outcome of Mobilization	120
6.1.1	Agricultural Production.	120
6.1.2	State Accumulation	121
6.1.3	Small Industries and Construction Projects	122
6.2	Weak Threat Perceptions and Their Effects on Mobilization	123
6.2.1	The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Anti-American Campaign	123
6.2.2	Effects on Mobilization.	126

6.3	Domestic Institutions and Their Effects on Mobilization	127
6.3.1	Collectivization: From Pro-majority Institutions to Pro-state Institutions	127
6.3.2	Effects on Mobilization.	132
6.4	Alternative Explanations	134
6.4.1	Disincentive Effects of Collectivization.	134
6.4.2	The One-Time Game Thesis	135
6.4.3	Unscientific Methods of Agricultural Production	135
6.4.4	Egalitarianism in the People's Commune	136
6.5	Conclusion	137
	References	137
7	Conclusion	141
7.1	A Summary of Arguments.	141
7.2	Implications and Two Additional Minor Cases.	142
7.2.1	The Nationalist Mobilization in Germany Before WWI	144
7.2.2	Spain in the Late Nineteenth Century	146
7.2.3	A Discussion.	148
7.3	Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research	149
	References	152
	Index	155

Individual Choice and State-Led Nationalist Mobilization
in China

Self-interested Patriots

Zha, W.

2015, XVI, 158 p. 1 illus., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-662-46859-3