

Chapter 2

Green Criminology and Brown Crime: Despoliation, Disposal and De-manufacturing in Global Resource Industries

Nigel South

This chapter adopts a green criminological orientation to consideration of several examples of what has been termed ‘brown crime’. In the following, these terms are defined and then the context of current neo-liberal economics is described. In the rest of the chapter, a series of cases are presented to illustrate the consequences and challenges arising from our routine use of our environments, landscapes and planet as a wellspring of economic goods and as a convenient dumping ground for ‘economic bads’.

Green Criminology and Brown Crime

‘Green criminology’ is an umbrella term used to cover and capture the study of ecological or environmental crime or harm, and related matters of speciesism and environmental (in)justice. It provides a perspective and loose framework of theories and methods to apply to the investigation of harms, offences and crimes related to the environment, different species and the planet (see, e.g. Beirne and South 2007; Solund 2008; South 2014; South and Brisman 2013; White, 2008, 2010). Importantly, it is ‘open’ to inter- and multi-disciplinary engagement. For present purposes, it is helpful to quote Walters’ (2010, p. 181) description of ‘eco-crime’ as covering ‘The contamination of drinking water, the degradation of soil and the pollution of air and land (all of which) expose people (usually those in poor and developing countries) to substantial health risks’. As Walters points out, such acts are frequently ‘linked to the poverty and social dislocation, as well as the mental and physical debilitation, of people who are victims of corporations and states that deliberately violate environmental agreements’.

Ruggiero and South (2010) have described the phenomenon of ‘dirty collar crime’ whereby legitimate businesses are involved in semi-legal or wholly illegal

N. South (✉)
University of Essex, Colchester, UK
e-mail: southn@essex.ac.uk

waste disposal operations that can contribute to the creation of environmental and public health harms or disasters, such as the Naples garbage crisis of 2008 and 2010, yet still make significant financial profits and improve their standing through networks of influence and enterprise. The waste dumping at the heart of this particular case is an example of what might be called 'brown crime'. White (2008, pp. 98–99) defines this term as part of a threefold set of 'brown', 'green' and 'white' categories of environmental issues in which 'brown' refers to urban life and related pollution (e.g. air pollution, disposal of toxic/hazardous waste, oil spills, pesticides); 'green' refers to conservation and wilderness issues (e.g. acid rain, biodiversity loss, habitat destruction); and 'white' refers to the impact of new technologies and laboratory practices (e.g. animal testing, cloning, environmentally-related communicable diseases, genetically modified organisms).

The Context of Neo-liberalism

As McCarthy and Prudham (2004, p. 275) observe, 'connections between neo-liberalism, environmental change and environmental politics remain under-explored in critical scholarship' and yet are 'deeply if not inextricably interwoven'. One initial obstacle to such exploration is defining the nature of neo-liberalism which is a discursive and dispersed 'assemblage' of commitments, representations and practices (McCarthy and Prudham 2004). Adopting Jessop's (2002, p. 461) straightforward (although, as he would emphasise, only partial) definition, neo-liberalism can be seen as promoting 'market-led economic and social restructuring' with outcomes for the public sector that involve 'privatization, liberalization and imposition of commercial criteria in the residual state sector', while in the private sector, 'deregulation is backed by a new juridico-political framework that offers passive support for market solutions'.

In the realm of economic ideas, the current influence of neo-liberalism has promoted a set of philosophies and policies that argue 'no-limits growth' is desirable and sustainable. In this view, the enhancement of efficiency and productivity requires the minimisation of regulatory measures and prescriptive arrangements designed, for example to reduce risks to health and safety or negative environmental impacts. In the neo-liberal account, regulation is largely unnecessary as environmental harm is accidental, unintentional and external. Economic growth necessitates the removal of environmental safeguards that act as obstacles. When damaging side effects of growth do occur, this is regrettable but justifiable because these are also products of necessity (Ruggiero and South 2013a, b). Many economic activities impose significant costs on the well-being of humans, other species and ecosystems generally but these are simply seen as the 'costs of doing business'. From the neo-liberal point of view, the planet is a resource available to those who are most capable of exploiting it, and human skills of enterprise, survival and exploitation are seen as evolution's evidence that the restraints and resistance of nature can and should be overcome. This is a contemporary rationale and justification for the ever-increasing plundering and pollution of the planet but also traces a philosophical line of supportive argu-

ment to the father of classical liberalism, John Locke (1632–1704). As Broswimmer (2002, p. 57) notes, Locke argued that ‘nature was given to the “industrious and rational”’ and he viewed ‘the whole of nature as a mere resource for commercial exploitation, arguing that “land that is left wholly to nature is called, as indeed it is, waste”’. Broswimmer (2002, p. 57) argues that the legacy of such thinking is that ‘The sanctification of private property in the hands of liberal thinkers has played a crucial part in the emergence of global capitalism. At its very core, the prevailing capitalist ethos and liberal world view of the modern industrial era remained expansionary and imperial involving a calculated form of indifference to the social and ecological order’. McCarthy and Prudham (2004, p. 277) argue it is therefore:

salient to remind ourselves of how centrally and explicitly liberal thinking itself turned on restructuring social relations to nature. This process is most infamously associated with enclosing commons to facilitate the development of increasingly capitalist, export oriented farming operations Such reconfigurations of property relationships amounted to “freeing” up nature, i.e. detaching it from complex social constraints and placing it under the auspices of the self-regulating market ..., whilst jump-starting capitalism through primitive accumulation, or what Harvey (2003) has recently termed, “accumulation by dispossession”. In turn, the emergence of new social relations to nature factored centrally in classical liberal ideological, discursive, and material practices, all of which have parallels in and influences on neo-liberalism.

This chapter presents examples of ‘brown crimes’ or harms that arise from modern excesses of neo-liberalism, as it demands and leads to processes and problems of despoliation, disposal and de-manufacturing that are central to global resource industries: oil pollution; dispersal of residues of dangerous and radioactive waste; chemical warfare and its legacies; asbestos dust and effluvia; and harms and hazards related to the global recycling economy. It concludes with some observations on the power of offenders to disregard or disempower regulatory governance, and some signposts to future challenges and responses.

Oil Crimes and Spoiling of the Environment in Nigeria

This first section describes problems related to gas flares, oil spills and pollution, poverty and abuse of rights which can be described as ‘environmental racism’. To explain the problem, gas flares are the result of burning unwanted ‘associated gas’ that is produced during the process of pumping oil from the ground. This flaring produces toxins in the atmosphere that rain into the swamps, creeks and forests, acidifying the rain and polluting the soil. According to Howden (2010), ‘Medical studies have shown the gas burners contribute to an average life expectancy in the Delta region of 43 years. The area also has Nigeria’s highest infant mortality rate’. Flaring has been illegal in Nigeria since 1984 and three deadlines to cease the practice have been missed so far. Instead, new facilities and sites of flaring have been established as, for example in 2010 in the Niger Delta. Howden quotes Alagoa Morris, an investigator with a local Environmental Rights Action group, who describes this continuing pollution of air, water and land as ‘environmental racism’ and who says ‘What we are asking is that oil companies should have to meet the same standards in Nigeria that they do operating in

their own countries'. Morris, says Howden, 'regularly risks arrest to monitor activities at the heavily guarded oil and gas installations'. Considerable attention has been drawn to this ongoing problem by the NGOs and journalists, but oil companies have failed to act to cease or effectively remedy damage done, instead resorting to techniques of neutralisation of the problem, acknowledging its past significance but minimising its current impact. So, for example as Shell Global (2013) stated: 'Oil fields produce a mix of oil, water and natural gas. In the past it was standard industry practice to burn off, or flare, the gas if there was no market for it. But this was a waste of a valuable resource and produces carbon dioxide'. In a fine example of corporate under-statement, Shell Global continued, 'It can also cause disturbance to local communities that have often grown up around the flare pits'. The acknowledgment of the sizeable scale of the problem comes in a separate statement that seeks approval for how well they are doing in reducing it: 'SPDC (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria) reduced flaring volume from its facilities by about 75% between 2003 and 2012 and flaring intensity (the amount of gas flared per barrel of oil produced) by around 60% over the same period' (Shell companies in Nigeria 2014). Continuing work on reduction of flaring is being supported and Shell asserts that 'When all this work is completed it will cover over 90% of the SPDC's production potential'. (Shell Global 2013). Overall, this is reminiscent of many corporate narratives of neutralisation—'yes, it was a problem but we are working on it and when we've finished it won't seem such a problem after all'. But the situation also reflects three other issues. First, the possibility of alternative but unacknowledged explanations for the reductions achieved. So, as Howden (2010) notes, although Nigerian officials have claimed 'record reductions in the amount of gas flared, independent oil and gas experts believe flaring is, in fact, reaching historic highs. Many observers attribute ... [a] much-trumpeted reduction' in 2009 to the effects of militant action against oil companies in the Niger Delta which led to the halving of oil production. Second, denial of the damage already done. Howden reports that what has happened in the Niger Delta is, according to independent oil and gas expert, Chris Cragg, a 'continuing economic, political and environmental disaster [and] one of the largest single pointless emissions of the greenhouse gas on the planet, with obvious implications for climate change that will not only affect Nigeria, but also the rest of the world'. And finally, of course, there should be a genuine motivation to now do something about this 'pointless' flow of emissions—even if not for environmental then at least for profit-motivated reasons. If the amount of wasted, flared natural gas were captured and cycled through a modern power station the volume produced 'could fuel about a quarter of Britain's power needs' being 'equivalent to more than one third of the natural gas produced in the UK's North Sea oil and gas fields' and enough to 'meet the entire energy requirements of German industry'. So the gas could be profitably productive instead of generating pollution that 'has been measured at up to 50 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, with unknown quantities of the far more damaging greenhouse gas: methane' (Howden 2010). Neither the Nigerian government nor the oil companies have been sufficiently motivated by the prospect of this possible source of profit, but have been de-motivated by tough investment and infrastructure challenges and so simply continue to take the easy route to profitable extraction while leaving the pollution costs to be paid by the local people and the environment.

In 2011, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) reported on over 50 years of pollution as a result of oil production in Ogoniland, in the south-east of the Niger Delta region, and pointed out that the Nigerian Government has failed to follow or enforce its own laws and requirements. This is an example of the kind of ‘secondary green crimes and harms’ described elsewhere (Carrabine et al. 2014, p. 391, pp. 404–405) as ‘the violation of rules that attempt to regulate environmental harm and to respond to disaster’ and that can include ‘major and minor practices whereby states violate their own regulations (either by commission or omission) and in so doing contribute to environmental harms’. As Vidal (2011) reports, Audrey Gaughran of Amnesty International has argued that ‘Oil companies have been exploiting Nigeria’s weak regulatory system for too long’.

In fact, regulatory systems allow oil companies to provide key measures of the extent of oil spills and this (unsurprisingly) may often yield an under-estimate of the true extent of spill and damage (Shrope 2013). And this, of course, relates to cases that are known and reported. In many cases, oil spills, whether deliberate or accidental, occur with no known identified source and if they occur at sea then unless the effects are noted by others at sea or from the air, the original location of the pollution will be unknown although the results of spillage such as damaged and dead birds and fish, as well as pollution arriving at the shore, will eventually indicate an incident (see, e.g. Morris 2013, p. 4). There are spills, leaks and ecological damage occurring on a highly regular basis across the world—the majority never attracting the kind of publicity attached to the BP Deepwater Horizon/Gulf of Mexico. In fact, writing one month after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, Vidal (2010) pointed out that the Niger Delta suffers more pollution *every* year than had been caused at that point by the Deepwater Horizon disaster and that the contrast in reactions was striking: ‘the Niger delta ... is the world capital of oil pollution. Life expectancy in its rural communities, half of which have no access to clean water, has fallen to little more than 40 years over the past two generations. Locals blame the oil that pollutes their land and can scarcely believe the contrast with the steps taken by BP and the US Government to try to stop the Gulf oil leak and to protect the Louisiana shoreline from pollution’ (see also Pegg and Zabbey 2013). Occasionally, compensation is paid as agreed in January 2015 when Shell announced it would pay out £ 55m to 15,600 Ogoni locals whose farming and fishing were devastated by oil spills in 2008 and 2009. The money will be split between the individuals and the community, but as Vidal (2015) reports, the settlement ‘avoids Shell having to defend a potentially embarrassing London high court case which was due to start shortly’. And as Vidal also reports, a separate development reflects welcome remediation, but also the possible persistence of the tendency, noted above, to under-estimate the depth and breadth of pollution problems. In this case,

the company’s Nigerian subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) said it expected to start to clean up its pollution in the Bodo fishing grounds and swamps “within months”. Shell had initially estimated that around 4,000 barrels of oil were spilt in ... two events, but oil experts calculated from film footage that it could have been 60 times as much. According to Amnesty International, Shell had intentionally underestimated the spills in an attempt to minimise compensation payments. This was denied by Shell.

In Nigeria, state military forces and private mercenary companies have been involved in operations to secure oil facilities thereby protecting the interests of those who benefit from oil wealth and assert a right to pollute at the expense of the living standards and human rights of those who live in these oil producing areas. Importantly, while some oil wealth remains in the country, distributed among a small elite much, of course, also leaves the country and benefits the corporate owners of such national subsidiaries.

Around the world, whether in developing or developed nations, communities live on dangerously polluted land and suffer the daily consequences and long-term legacies of damage to environments and health caused by the industrialisation of hazard. From the people of Jharia, India who live on top of an open-cast mine that is permanently burning above ground (Global Journal 2012) to workers and residents affected by the depleted uranium contamination left behind after a factory closure in Colonie, in upstate New York (Rose 2007), to the involvement of organised crime groups in disposing of hazardous wastes by mixing it with materials ‘to make bricks or resurface roads, and use raw materials to make fertiliser which subsequently transfers chrome, cadmium, lead and nickel up the food chain’ (Liddick 2010, p. 139). In the next section two cases of such ‘routine’ disposal of waste are outlined, one with devastating consequences for members of the community, and the other representing a strategy of ‘denial of danger’ offered by simply dumping waste at sea.

Disposal and Dispersal of Dangerous Waste

The Corby Case

In the UK, from 1940s onward, Corby in Northamptonshire was the home of a massive steel works which over the 46-year history of operational life ‘produced a dizzying array of dangerous waste—nickel, chromium, zinc, arsenic, boron and cadmium’ (Gordon, 2009). At the end of the life of the site, when British Steel closed it in 1980, the local authority took control and was faced with the challenge of disposing of the waste. This they proceeded to do, ‘in the back of open lorries, sludge spilling onto the public roads of the town’, with one local remembering ‘the smell and the metallic taste of it, and how if you drove behind one of the lorries, your car always ended up covered in a light film’ (Gordon 2009). Reporting as the High Court heard a group litigation case against Corby Borough Council at the end of July 2009, Gordon (31 July, 2009) records that the court heard how: waste was dumped all over Corby by staff that Mr Justice Akenhead described as being ‘unqualified and insufficiently experienced’ and how a waste management expert who saw how the materials were disposed of, was said to have been ‘appalled’. At the time that the land was being ‘reclaimed’, an auditor described the operation as ‘naïve, cavalier and incompetent’. After a 10 year battle, the Judge ruled that Corby Borough Council had been negligent and that the dumping of toxic material may have caused birth defects in children. This was a case described by lawyers acting for the affected families as: ‘the biggest child poisoning case since Thalidomide’ (Gammell 29 July 2009). Nearly 1 year later, in April 2010, Corby council withdrew

its legal challenge and reached an agreement to pay compensation to the affected children albeit without accepting liability in the case.

Radioactive Waste Dumping in the English Channel

Walters (2007, p. 188 and *passim*) has drawn attention to the eco-crime links between nuclear industry activities and disposal of radioactive waste, noting the variety of ‘risks associated with commercial enterprises in research, power production, telecommunications, medicine and pharmaceuticals as well as state activities in military defence and war’ that ‘all utilise varying degrees of radioactive substances that produce waste’. Although radioactive waste may be recycled in some forms and can be exported legally or illegally, and while it has a high value for some purposes, it is a hazardously difficult commodity to manage, posing complex logistical and expensive challenges for proper storage. One way to avoid these challenges has been to simply bury it or dump it at sea (Ringius 2001; Parmentier 1999). In the past, the Russian navy has disposed of submarine reactors and nuclear waste in the Barents and Kara seas, while in 2000 Greenpeace exposed a UK policy operating between 1950 and 1963 that meant containers of nuclear waste were simply dumped near the Channel Islands. Approximately 28,500 corroding containers were discovered, with this being just one of many dumpsites used before the global banning of the practice in 1993 (Greenpeace 2000). In this respect, such disposal is a stark example of the disregard of hazard and the denial of consequences: of all the materials humanity may choose to dispose of in the sea, radioactive waste and functional but decommissioned reactors must be high on a list of indicators of ‘lack of care’.

In this latter case, the dumping programme was an authorised way of managing an industrially produced contaminant. The next two examples show, first, how dangerous uses can be deliberately developed from promising research with a very different starting point. In this case, the chemical regulation of plant growth, originally stimulated by experiments to address gaps between population growth and agricultural output (Zierler 2011, pp. 35–42). And, second, how identified dangers have long been associated with the use of what was seen as a ‘miracle material’ but were ignored or contested.

Chemical Hazards, Toxicity and Legacies

Thousands of new chemicals are introduced into products reaching the market every year. These are the outputs of what Zierler (2001, p. 47) calls a staggeringly influential industry which has adopted an aim of being able to offer ‘control of an unruly natural world through chemicals’.

However, it is difficult to estimate the long-term effects of having so much chemical presence and exposure in our environments and research on debilitating or deadly effects of such substances is hampered not only by lack of funding for studies that

may be critical and lead to controls but also because violators are often successful in presenting violations of laws and regulations as ‘accidents’ thereby eroding accumulation of evidence that such research is needed (Pearce and Tombs 1998).

Toxic Chemicals: The Case of Dow and the Legacy of Agent Orange

Dow Chemical was founded in 1947 and in 2001 merged with Union Carbide (a company not without its own history of catastrophic accident). The company is a global operator, producing chemicals and plastics for a variety of different markets and, as Katz (2010) points out, can call on more financial and legal resources than any agencies charged with the task of regulation. Katz provides a helpful history of Dow Chemical’s involvement in the production of herbicides that then found particular utility as a military weapon (Zierler 2001, pp. 46–47). In the 1960s, Dow developed these substances for use as the main ingredients in Agent Orange, the toxic defoliant used during the Vietnam War between 1961 and 1971 to destroy food crops and jungle cover. At least 20 million gallons (as well as other herbicides) were sprayed over ‘enemy territory’ in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and affected 8600 square miles of jungle and cropland, (The Week 2012; there is a parallel history of the development and use of napalm with 388,000 tons dropped on Indochina between 1963 and 1973: see Neer 2013).

The effects and legacies were a crime against humanity and against the environment. In 1971, results of tests conducted by the US National Institutes of Health showed chemical contamination from Agent Orange caused birth defects in laboratory animals and in response the USA ceased use. However, by then the chemicals were responsible for both immediate impacts as well as a lasting legacy with 100,000s of civilians and soldiers (Vietnamese and American) exposed, and waterways, soil and the food chain compromised and affected. Leukemia and blood disorders, heart disease, children with birth defects (e.g. spina bifida, limb and bone defects) were all reported health consequences (The Week 2012). And the legacy is still significant today, as acknowledged by the USA which has committed to spending \$ 44 million between 2012 and 2016 ‘to remove dioxin residues around the former US airbase in Danang, where most Agent Orange barrels were stored. Some 2.5 million ft³ of soil and sediment around the airport will be dug up and heated to very high temperatures, breaking down the toxic compounds. These are “the first steps to bury the legacies of our past”, said US Ambassador David Shear’.

Asbestos Processing and Pollution

The mining, chemical and industrial processing of asbestos provides a case of what was once seen as a ‘miracle material’ or ‘magic mineral’ (Bowley 1960; Tweedale 2000), widely used since the days of the early Greek and Roman civilisations. And

yet asbestos presents dangers at all stages of its extraction and preparation and this has been noted for centuries (Mesothelioma Center 2014). In relation to primary extraction and processing, it is potentially lethally harmful to workers and damaging to entire local communities as dust is distributed beyond sites of production and drifts into the surrounding environment, where dust and fibres are inhaled and also settle on land and water. A more formal recognition of the potential health hazard posed by asbestos was provided in Britain by the Factory and Workshop Inspectorate officers as long ago as 1898 (Tweedale 2000) but the properties and versatility of asbestos have undoubtedly explained its long use and the denial of problems associated with its production and the deterioration of the material which loosens the fibres. During the 1990s, the European Environmental Agency (EEA) estimated that during the course of the twentieth century, up to that point, around 4 million people had died in Europe from asbestos-related illnesses. In 1999, the use of asbestos was banned by the European Union, 101 years after official observation of its dangerousness. Yet the legacy has remained, as illustrated by the prosecution of the managers of the Eternit Company between 2009 and 2012. Eternit opened its first asbestos production plant in Italy, the biggest in Europe, in 1907 in Piemonte and although it had been scientifically shown and known since 1962 that asbestos dust causes asbestosis and malignant diseases, the company failed to take precautions to safeguard workers or communities (BBC News 2012). Eternit is not the only asbestos company with a poor health and safety record but is a rare exception in facing well publicised, serious and successful prosecution (although see Tweedale (2000) on the Turner and Newell litigation in England).

The cases described so far are largely problems of production, related waste disposal and industrial hazard that have been occurring across a globalising world for more than a century (Sellers and Melling 2011). However, the massive boom in production and consumption of electronic goods of the past few decades has intensified existing trends while creating new problems, markets and industries based on 'de-manufacturing'.

De-manufacturing, Dumping and Disposal

Dumping, disposal and dispersal of waste and the unwanted are familiar practices and problems. But a major development of the last few decades is not simply removing and relocating waste from the developed world to the developing world to dump there as worthless disposables, but now re-locating it as *resource-rich disposables* to be de-manufactured and recycled. Recycling is obviously 'good' but 'de-manufacturing' means that paradoxical problems arise. The recycling of the waste produced through consumption by the wealthy has consequences of concern for the labouring and scavenging poor of China and India and these consequences include both damage to the environment and damage to health and life (human and non-human).

Most particularly the USA, but additionally all developed nations, now consumes an astronomical amount of electronic goods which are manufactured and sold in a market that is premised on relentless replacement of the old by the new. Products may become obsolete by virtue of ceasing to function effectively or be desired affectively. Devices are sold on the understanding they will soon be redundant, and designed to be disposable. However, they are still valuable for their content. In principle, recycling of such materials is environmentally good but in practice a new 're-cycling for profit' 'boomerang industry' has now developed which means that waste electronic items may be exported to China where they are de-manufactured, with various parts (such as rare earths, precious metals) then reused in new electronic goods which are shipped back to advanced markets. In China, towns, factories and scrap-yards specialising in servicing this global market now store, sort and process imported items, employing a formal workforce and also creating a shadow scavenger workforce in an informal economy based upon picking over the waste of what is leftover. All are exploited in a low-paid and dangerously unhealthy industry. While the recycling and reuse of valuable resources makes sense, what is less defensible are the conditions under which the 're-cycling' occurs or the need for such a boomerang market at all. These electronic goods do not need to be disposed of so rapidly, new ones do not need to be produced and marketed with such urgency and intensity, and the environmentally good strategy of recycling should not be a cloak for an example of bad multinational exploitation in the process of which land and air are polluted by use of hazardous chemicals, and the effects on the health of workers and communities include serious diseases, some with cancer links. Huo et al. (2007) reported on hazardous chemicals released from e-wastes through disposal or recycling processes and noted that 'Past studies have reported soaring levels of toxic heavy metals and organic contaminants in samples of dust, soil, river sediment, surface water, and groundwater of Guiyu Residents' and that this has led to a 'high incidence of skin damage, headaches, vertigo, nausea, chronic gastritis and gastric and duodenal ulcers, all of which may be caused by the primitive recycling processing of e-waste'. Lead is widely used in this process and leads to a variety of health hazards, entering 'biological systems via food, water, air and soil' with children being 'particularly vulnerable to lead poisoning...' (see also Chen et al. 2011).

Discussion

'Toxic tragedies' (Cass 1996, pp. 110–112) are commonplace but difficult to prosecute due to problems of gathering evidence that ties commercial operations to specific illegal offences, cases of corruption and strong industry 'profit-at-all-costs' motivations. These cases reflect 'institutionalised insensitivity to right and wrong' (Simon 2000, p. 635) and represent profound and damaging forms of environmental injustice. Economic and environmental regulations are viewed by the neo-liberal lobby as overly costly and anti-growth. One alternative and critical view might

Hazardous Waste and Pollution
Detecting and Preventing Green Crimes
Wyatt, T. (Ed.)
2016, XI, 179 p., Hardcover
ISBN: 978-3-319-18080-9