

Non-traditional Transnational Security Challenges in Serbian, British and Dutch Security Discourses: A Cross-Country Comparison

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Abstract What are a country's traditional and non-traditional security challenges? How are these being discussed and by whom? What is the relevance of security, ethics and human rights to these issues? Questions like these are often addressed in security policies. Yet to date an overview of these concerns does not exist. Research conducted within the project EvoCS fills this gap. This chapter presents an overview of these perceptions across the Netherlands, Serbia and the UK and provides a description of the methodology. The majority of the salient security challenges in all three countries are also prominent in the EU policy discourse. In conclusion, the three analysed countries are surprisingly similar to each other, considering the many differences between them. From a European point of view, this might be seen as an opportunity since future European Security Strategies can better address shared security problems of both EU and (possible future) non-EU members.

Keywords Concepts of security · Policy making · Cross-country comparison · Security dimensions

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1 Introduction

What are a country's traditional and non-traditional security challenges? How are these security challenges being discussed and by whom, and how does this discussion relate to a country's neighbours and a pan-European perspective? What is the relevance of human security, ethics and human rights to these security issues? Questions like these are often addressed in security policies, which are required to be both legitimate and effective and should address the concerns (including ethical) of different stakeholders across the European Union. Yet to date an overview of these concerns does not exist. Research conducted within the FP7 funded project "The Evolving Concept of Security (EvoCS)—A critical evaluation across four dimensions"¹ fills this gap with a cross-disciplinary methodology using empirical methods to measure subjective security perceptions. This chapter presents an overview of these perceptions across the Netherlands, Serbia and the UK and in doing so provides a description of the project's methodology. The present three were chosen in order to facilitate a comparison between two countries which, being in the same region, at first glance seem rather similar (the UK and Netherlands, both in North-western Europe) and an example from South-eastern Europe (Serbia), which due to its historical context may seem very different.

The project comprises four regional case studies which were conducted applying an analytical framework (that will be described in Sect. 2). The four case studies dealt with four model regions in Europe (the "core countries" which are studied in depth are given in brackets, see also Fig. 1):

- West-Mediterranean EU (Italy, Malta, Spain)
- Eastern EU Border (Poland, Hungary, Lithuania)
- North-Western EU (United Kingdom, Netherlands, France)
- South-Eastern Europe (Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey)

The preliminary results of the national case studies for the Netherlands, Serbia and the UK are described in Sect. 3, while Sect. 4 discusses the transnational aspects of the security challenges found in the national case studies.²

¹The partners of this multi-national project are the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies HCSS (The Netherlands), Loughborough University (UK), Procon (Bulgaria), Istituto Affari Internazionali IAI (Italy), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore UCSC (Italy), Tecnalia (Spain), Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych PISM (Poland), and Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento SSSUP (Italy). It is coordinated by Fraunhofer INT (Germany).

²The results of EvoCS are accessible to European political decision makers and security end-users, for example to support the work on future European security strategies by comparing the various national security concepts and the similarities and differences they have and which regional and pan-European conclusions can be drawn from them. Additionally, the results of EvoCS will be used to inform future research projects in Horizon 2020.



Fig. 1 The four EvoCS regions. The colour-coded countries are analysed in the case studies

2 The EvoCS Analytical Framework

Initially, an analytical framework was developed by four teams consisting of multiple country experts to assess national and regional variation in security concepts in twelve countries across Europe. The key objective was to offer a multi-faceted overview of key security concerns amongst various country level constituencies in the European Union (EU). Alongside this endeavour a model has been created which periodically gauges changes in these security concerns based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Transparency and replicability of the methods were therefore indispensable elements of the analytical framework. Another central element is the notion of a security concept as it exists in the eye of the beholder. Security is seen as a socially constructed phenomenon (see for example Buzan et al. 1998). A concept of security consists of five dimensions³: the *core values* which refer to the different aspects of life that actors seek to secure

³Originally, the EvoCS project envisioned only four dimensions. In the course of the project, this number changed to five.

including physical safety and security, territorial integrity and security, environmental and ecological security, social stability and security, cultural identity and security, political stability and security, economic prosperity and security and information and cyber security⁴; the types of *security challenges* that affect these core values which can be either risks, threats or hazards⁵; the *levels* at which security needs to be protected which may include the local, subnational, international, transnational and global level; the *actors* that are involved including—but not limited to—national or local government, the private sector, civil society or the individual citizen; and the *ethical and human rights issues* which manifest themselves in this process. Different beholders prioritise different core values and perceive different security challenges; they prefer these to be addressed by different actors at different levels, and consider different ethical and human rights issues to be a problem. In order to assess these differences empirically, the research process was divided in two stages (see Fig. 2).

In the first stage, country teams assessed currently prevailing security concepts in their respective countries across six principal security discourses: government, parliament, academia, media, the private sector and the NGO sector.⁶ These discourses were selected because they reflect important contributions to societal debates about concepts of security from different angles. For each discourse in each country, a similar set of documents was retrieved based on a set of predefined criteria and a set of detailed retrieval instructions. The documents were then manually coded; this process relied on a uniform coding scheme in order to elicit various concepts of security. The results were then recorded in a centrally managed online data repository to which all country team researchers had access. Both the set of criteria and instructions as well as the coding scheme were the product of multiple online and offline discussions between the researchers. The outcome of

⁴In identifying these dimensions and taxonomies we looked at a wide range of academic and policy documents. In the latter category we examined official security policy documents of France, Great Britain, Poland and the Netherlands. We have also drawn extensively from the European Trends and Threats in Society (ETTIS) project which analysed security discourses in academic sources and official security policy documents of European countries. See ETTIS consortium (2012).

⁵Risks, threats and hazards are three related but distinct concepts. A threat is a “potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or activity of an intentional/malicious character”, in contrast to a hazard, which is non-directional in nature. Neither a threat nor a hazard involves the element of chance of the threat or hazard materialising involved. Risk is the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences”. Risk thus not only looks at likelihood but also takes into account both the vulnerability of the target of the risk. The relationship could be described as follows: *Possibility of threat/hazard occurring * (threat/hazard * vulnerability of target) = Risk*. In popular security discourses, they are sometimes used interchangeably, which is why we decided to first record them as security challenges. See European Commission (2011b) and DHS Risk Lexicon (2010).

⁶As our objective is to assess national perceptions of security, international governmental organizations (IGOs) do not appear on this list. IGOs certainly affect national concepts of security, but only indirectly through one of the sources on this list.




Fig. 2 The analytical framework

these discussions was subsequently codified in the ‘Assessing Evolving Concepts of Security: Coding Handbook’ (see Sweijts et al. 2015), which was employed by country team researchers during the entire coding process. In order to promote inter coder reliability, country teams first coded a small batch of documents, discussed the results and calibrated their approach in case of disagreement. Inter coder reliability in the North Western Europe team was 87 % for a set of 20 documents selected from the different discourses. During the process, any ambiguities or uncertainties were flagged and discussed, and kept a written record of in an online document in order to improve the accuracy of the coding and maintain consistency.⁷ In total, over 3425 documents across 12 countries have been analysed.⁸

Stage one of the research process thus yielded a semi-quantified overview of prevailing security concepts across and within different countries. Stage two served to both corroborate and substantiate the findings yielded in stage one. In stage two the findings were then further analysed in desk research and a series of workshops which were held around Europe in early 2015. Here the principal purpose has been to get a more granular understanding based on in-depth qualitative analysis of the findings unearthed in stage one. For each country, further analysis was undertaken of the core values that are perceived to be affected by particular security challenges, of the levels of action which are singled out and the actors which are involved, as well as the ethical issues which are at stake. Salient differences between discourses within and across countries were then highlighted and further explored in order to

⁷To this purpose two internal working documents *Coding Better* and *Coding Changes* were shared in the online repository and regularly updated. These documents are available upon request.

⁸Our raw data are available upon request and interested researchers are cordially invited to make use of what we consider to be a treasure trove of data.

provide a better understanding of thinking about security in different countries. Also in stage two, the evolution of country concepts of security over the past decade was described qualitatively to get a better grip on the recent historical context in which it emerged.

For the purposes of this book chapter, we have used this dual track approach drawing on quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify the salience of non-traditional security challenges in security discourses in the Netherlands, Serbia and the United Kingdom.⁹ Each section first succinctly describes some of the key findings for security discourses in these three countries (and their transnational aspects) and proceeds by identifying key non-traditional security challenges, the core values they affect, the actors and the levels of appropriate action and the ethical and human rights issues that are singled out across the three countries.

2.1 The Human Rights and Ethical Aspects of the Analytical Framework

Ethics and human rights are often perceived as incompatible with or unrelated to security (see for instance Balzacq and Carrera 2006; Weinblum 2010), as if they were mutually exclusive or the pursuit of security could be achieved without respecting fundamental rights and ethical principles. However, ethics and security are not irreconcilable precisely thanks to the recognition and codification of human rights at regional and international level in the course of the past seventy years.

Human rights are values and legal guarantees grounded on the recognition that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (United Nations General Assembly 1948). Human rights are universal, inalienable, indivisible, and interrelated (United Nations General Assembly 1993). Besides being codified (*de jure*), they must be safeguarded and enjoyed (*de facto*). In this regard, States have to respect, protect and fulfil fundamental rights in their jurisdictions.¹⁰ Moreover, ethics and human rights are inextricably linked: the recognition of human rights is closely related to coeval trends in philosophy, according to which ethical reflection ought to provide principles *viz.* general guides of action, whose aim is to “provide a standard of relevance or ‘reasonableness’” (Carlberg 2008) for human conduct. As

⁹The authors of this chapter were the lead researchers on the three country case studies. The three countries share substantial similarities as well as substantial differences in terms of their size, history, security culture and geographic location. As such this concise assessment of prevailing key security concepts illustrate what a cross country comparisons of security concepts across the Europe Union can yield. Interested readers are invited to visit the EvoCS website at <http://evocs-project.eu/>.

¹⁰The obligation to respect entails that States refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights; the obligation to protect requires States to protect both single individuals and groups against human rights abuses and the obligation to fulfil implies that States take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. See for instance Freeman (2011).

a result, ethics provides a heuristic tool (or a critical and reflective lens) (Schön 1983) enabling us to understand how we can fulfil a meaningful life and a properly ‘human’ existence (See Ricoeur 1992; Sen 1979; Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Nussbaum 2001, 2011; Hursthouse 2012). In this perspective, ethics is—just like human rights—based on human dignity (see Kant 1785; Oviedo convention, 1997, art. 1), as a notion endowed with ‘normative’ relevance. This means, that human dignity is something that *ought* to be pragmatically fostered in compliance with specific ethical principles and operational guidelines.¹¹

The recognition of human rights has contributed to acknowledging that secure states could be inhabited by insecure people and that global security needed to be conceived to include the protection of people against those challenges threatening their survival and well-being in their daily lives (see United Nations 1992; Commission on Global Governance 2005). This allowed shaping the notion of security as human-centred and multi-dimensional. Human security entails freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. It implies protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations (see United Nations Development Program 1994; Commission on Human Security 2003). Such a paradigm calls for responses which need to be people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented, aimed at strengthening the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security 2009). In this regard, as underlined by the European Agenda on Security “security and human rights are not conflicting aims but consistent and complementary policy objectives” (European Commission 2015).¹² Security and human rights are mutually reinforcing: on the one hand, a secure environment is conducive to the enjoyment of human rights; on the other hand, the respect, protection and fulfilment of fundamental rights contributes to the maintenance of peace as well as to enhancing security in peoples’ daily lives. In particular, the recognition of the human dimension in the security discourse has profound implications, as it reconsiders security in terms of ‘security of whom?’ ‘security from what?’, and ‘security by what means?’ (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

Thus, human rights and ethics provide a ‘normative’ framework and an overall perspective thanks to which it is possible to understand, interpret and eventually assess specific events as well as overall trends related to security. Since security is inextricably related to ethics and human rights, EvoCS investigated the extent to

¹¹Indeed, the philosophical reflection of the last centuries encouraged an understanding of the ethical dimension through the lens of concepts, such as universality, equality, individuality, human flourishing, which were practically operationalized into corresponding ‘normative’ claims and guidelines. See among others: Rawls 1971; Bobbio 1996; Nussbaum 2011; Reis Monteiro 2014; Loretoni 2014; Wolters 2015.

¹²This implies that “All security measures must comply with the principles of necessity, proportionality and legality, with appropriate safeguards to ensure accountability and judicial redress” (European Commission 2015).

which the security discourse, both at national level and in the four regions, considered ethical and human rights principles.¹³

3 Preliminary Results from the Case Studies

3.1 The Netherlands

Concepts of security abound in the Netherlands. The Dutch government codified its interpretation of national security in its 2007 ‘Strategy National Security’ (SNS) [*Strategie Nationale Veiligheid*] (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, *Strategie Nationale Veiligheid* 2007). Here it defined national security to consist of five vital interests: (1) territorial security, (2) physical security, (3) economic security, (4) environmental security, and (5) social and political stability. National security is only affected when one of these five vital interests is threatened to such an extent that there is potential societal disruption. The SNS has been reflective of a broader evolution in various Dutch security discourses in which (national) security is understood not only with reference to traditional security risks but also in relation to an array of challenges within a multifaceted concept of security. In this concept, not only robust capabilities for security and defence forces, but also communal trust and societal resilience are acknowledged to be essential pillars of security across different discourses. The government continues to be considered—both by itself but also by other actors—as a pivotal player in the protection of security, as we found in our analysis of hundreds of documents within the EvoCS research project.¹⁴ But increasingly, the private sector and civil society writ large are seen not only as consumers but also as producers of security (Oosterveld et al. 2015). Sharing the burden of responsibility for security at the domestic level is actively encouraged by the government—and not only in the cyber domain—even if this is not always

¹³In order to make ethics and human rights operational, a list of relevant human rights and ethical principles has been provided to the researchers, namely: rights/human rights/fundamental rights, ethic* (ethics, ethical), dignity, non-discrimination, human security, autonomy, privacy/integrity, equality, liberty/freedom (of assembly, of association), transparen* (transparency, transparent), universal* (universality), equality/diversity (as a value). No hierarchy exists among these principles, since “all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated” (see United Nations General Assembly 1993). The coding process produced an outcome in terms of the following three codes: ‘main topic’, if ethical and human rights principles are the primary focus of the piece of evidence; ‘mentioned’, if they are present; ‘absent’, if there is no consideration of ethical and human rights principles. Subsequently, a pondered assessment allowed investigation of the reasons behind the outcome of the coding process.

¹⁴This is based on a manual coding of the most recent national security strategies issued by the government, transcripts of 100 Parliamentary debates about security, a sample of NGO, academic and corporate publications on security, as well as 200 articles from two leading newspapers (*De Volkskrant* and *De Telegraaf*) in the period 31 Oct 2013–1 November 2014. For more information see Sweijts et al. 2015

matched by the allocation of adequate resources. Self-reliance (*'Zelfredzaamheid'*) and resilience meanwhile have transformed from buzz words into mainstream concepts in both popular and political security discourses. Yet, the expectations of citizens and corporations with regards to what the state can and will do for them in this field, are sometimes pointed out to be excessively large (Dutch Court of Audit Algemene 2014, 22). When it comes to the locus of responsibility for security provision, the key trend for the Netherlands can be characterised as evolving from an accelerated push towards the privatisation of responsibility for security in the 1990s and early 2000s, to bringing the state back in as a response to terrorist attacks abroad and political assassinations in 2002 and 2004 at home. In the 2010s, there is an incremental but still nascent transition to a whole-of-society approach in which various actors acknowledge that they will have to play an active part, even if there is disagreement about the appropriate scope, reach and division of these responsibilities.

Across different Dutch security discourses, the four most salient core values identified in our coding for the EvoCS project are physical safety and security, economic prosperity and security, territorial integrity and social stability and security. The tragic downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine on 17 July 2014—in which close to 200 Dutch citizens lost their lives—and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, have shifted the focus from internal to external security challenges, both for government, the private sector and civil society. Whereas previously profits and principles were dominant themes in various Dutch security discourses, peace has once again returned to the forefront.¹⁵ In government and media security discourses, there has been a discursive shift of attention towards challenges to physical safety and security but also to territorial integrity, which have complemented rather than substituted those challenges affecting economic prosperity and human rights.¹⁶

In our analysis for the EvoCS research project, we found a wide array of security challenges that are identified, with their salience varying significantly across different sources. Both media and government give ample attention to physical safety and security and social stability. Government and corporate actors worry about

¹⁵Here we're paraphrasing an oft used characterization of Dutch foreign policy to consist of a mix of Peace, Profits and Principles as coined by Joris Voorhoeve in his 1979 book that carried the same title.

¹⁶As codified in the Dutch Constitution one of the core tasks of the armed forces is to uphold international law. Article 97 of the Dutch Constitution reads: 'There shall be armed forces for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.' (<http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vvihlf299q0sr/vgmdb9f5vzi>, last accessed 13 May 2015) Rather than being considered a relic of times past, official justifications for the deployment of armed forces always involve arguments about how it contributes to the strengthening of human rights. See Sweijjs (2009) at <http://www.hcss.nl/reports/dutch-military-intervention-decision-making-revisited-getting-a-constitutional-grip-on-21st-century-wars/28/>.

economic prosperity and security with especially the latter singling out cyber security challenges as a source of concern. Key security challenges include, but are not limited to:

- The Russia-Ukraine conflict (physical safety and security and economic prosperity and security)
- Transnational religious violence (physical safety and security and social stability and security)
- Cyber vulnerabilities (economic prosperity and security)
- Natural hazards (physical security and economic prosperity and security)

These EvoCS findings are also corroborated by a representative bi-annual survey called the *Ipsos Risk and Crisis Survey* [*Risico—En Crisis Barometer*] commissioned by the Office of the Coordinator of Terrorism and Security (Dutch acronym: NCTV) to map security concerns of Dutch citizens (NCTV 2014). In late 2014—the latest edition at the time of writing—security concerns about potential spill-over effects from the transnational conflict in the Middle East topped the list of concerns, followed by concerns over challenges to economic prosperity. The participants in the survey were also presented with a prefabricated list of security challenges and asked to express the depth of their concern. Both interestingly and characteristically, ten out of thirteen security challenges on this list—which was compiled under the aegis of the NCTV—could be classified as non-traditional security challenges. The challenges included, but were not limited to, an economic crisis, epidemics, cyberattacks, accidents with hazardous substances, disturbances of vital (electricity, gas water or ICT) infrastructures and flooding (NCTV 2014). Concerns about spill-over effects of an international crisis affecting the Netherlands topped the list.

For a variety of economic, cultural and geographical reasons, the intertwining of external and internal security challenges as well as the non-traditional nature of many of them, is both explicitly and implicitly recognised in the Netherlands. The official 2013 international security strategy titled “A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World” as well as its 2014 update make this point before mentioning a variety of non-traditional challenges affecting Dutch security interests, including—but certainly not limited to—the transnational nature of religious violence and organised crime, the changing composition of the world economy, the global implications of climate change, and water and resources scarcity (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2013, 2014). Our analysis for the EvoCS project shows that in Dutch security discourses, the appropriate level of action to deal with these challenges is not only identified to be national, local, and international, but that also the global and the transnational levels are relatively often mentioned.

In addition to recognising the external and internal security nexus, the relationship between traditional and non-traditional security challenges is increasingly emphasised, in wider societal discussions as well as in some of the documents analysed in the context of the EvoCS project. Most poignantly this is illustrated by a series of earthquakes in the Northern part of the Netherlands which set off a discussion about how to deal with the relationship between safety, energy security, prosperity, physical security, and ethics and human rights. Following years of

minor earthquakes in the Northern part of the Netherlands, in 2015 the Dutch government finally acknowledged that the quakes were the result of gas drilling in the area. This has not only led to a curtailing of some of the drilling activities, but it has also prompted an ongoing debate about how this will affect Dutch energy dependencies internationally, specifically vis-à-vis Russia.¹⁷ In the debate about the future of gas drilling, various security concerns receive ample attention: shielding Dutch citizens from man-induced natural disasters, safeguarding economic security, reducing energy dependency, protecting the physical security of Dutch citizens travelling on international air lines of communication, and identifying and bringing to justice those responsible for the events of 17 July 2014. Whether the Dutch will opt for peace, for profits or for principles remains to be seen for now; but it is clear that the relationship across these different domains—as well as the tradeoffs between them—is well understood.

In sum, our analysis finds that non-traditional and transnational aspects of security challenges are well represented across various Dutch security discourses, both official and non-official ones. In addition to recognizing the internal and external security nexus, the intricate relationship between traditional and non-traditional security challenges is increasingly acknowledged as a quintessential characteristic of the contemporary security landscape.

3.2 Serbia

The Republic of Serbia published its national security strategy back in 2009 (see Government of Serbia 2009). Comparing this with the results of the Serbian coding exercise represents a challenge, since the coding mostly provided a snapshot of the end of 2013 and 2014. However, since national security strategies normally have a very long-term perspective, the comparison led to some interesting leads regarding security, its perception and discourse in Serbia. The coding showed that both long-term and short-term security challenges were part of the security discourse. In this context short-term challenges are those which are characteristic for the years 2013/2014 but were not prominently present roughly before or after that period (one example being lengthy discussions on a new Serbian law on traffic security which was passed in 2014). Long-term challenges, on the other hand, are those which have been part of the security discourse for a much longer period. Some of them were also mentioned in 2013 and 2014, some were not.

¹⁷Relations between the Netherlands and Russia had already significantly deteriorated in the wake of Russia's *Blitzanschluss* of the Crimea. But they reached an all time low following the downing of flight MH17, which—it is widely asserted in various societal discourses, although the Dutch government reserves judgment for now—may have happened by accident, but was executed with some form of Russian involvement.

The most prominent core values discussed in Serbia in those years were physical safety and security, followed by economic prosperity and security and social stability and security. Physical safety and security is a core value that comes up very often in the national case studies. One probable reason for this is that it is a much broader category than, for example, information and cyber security. The security challenges that lie behind the core values are varied, some of them mentioned in the national security strategy some not (e.g. the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one risk mentioned in the national security strategy but was not discussed in the Serbian context in 2013/2014). Generally, one can cluster the Serbian security challenges into two categories, both including short-term and long-term security challenges:

1. “Traditional” security challenges like corruption, natural hazards and man-made disasters, organized crime, discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities and hooliganism. Some of these are transnational in their nature (for example organized crime).
2. “Non-traditional” security challenges (as understood in the present book) some of which are “unique” to Serbia, at least in the context of the Southeast European region. The conflict with Kosovo, the very high number of refugees in Serbia and Serbia’s geopolitical situation are part of this category as well as information and cyber challenges.

Since this book chapter focusses on the non-traditional and transnational security challenges, we will take a closer look at the contents of the second category. Some of the challenges of category 1, however, are also transnational in their nature and will be mentioned where reasonable:

- **Conflict with Kosovo:** This security challenge includes both judicial aspects (the question of the legitimacy of the declaration of independence) and the situation of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, which is very often discussed as part of the physical safety and security core value. The latter is quite interesting, because originally, this challenge was probably part of the core value on territorial integrity and security. It seems that seven years after the declaration of independence the security has shifted from the judicial aspects (which are still important, but less so than before) to the practical daily life of citizens living in Kosovo.
- **Effects of the Yugoslav civil war:** One of the aftereffects of the Yugoslav civil wars, which mostly took place in the 1990s, is a very high number of Serb refugees in Serbia who fled from the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.
- **National and religious extremism:** This security challenge is explicitly mentioned in the national security strategy. Apart from the aspects of this challenge that are tied to the first two mentioned in this list, a new one has been shown in the coding exercise: Serbian citizens (and/or Kosovar citizens) that travel to Iraq and Syria to join the Islamic State (IS) and later on return to their country. This is a challenge that Serbia shares with its European neighbours, even though the problem is much more prevalent in Kosovo than in Serbia proper.

- **Geopolitical situation:** Serbia has declared military neutrality, tries to become part of the European Union and traditionally has strong ties to Russia. This unique mix is discussed in the context of security.
- **Organized crime:** This security challenge is one of the most often mentioned in the security discourse. Drug and human trafficking, money laundering and smuggling all are crimes that have a transnational character, even though the security challenge as such is a rather “traditional” one.
- **Cyber and information challenges:** While these security challenges are normally considered to be non-traditional, the Serbian discourse on them is rather national. Spying on citizens and the Serbian president, hacker attacks on ATM machines and video surveillance of traffic are some examples for what is being discussed.
- **Natural hazards:** This is another example of a traditional security challenge that has a transnational character. Once a natural hazard takes place (like the floods in northern Serbia in May 2014), it becomes part of the security discourse but it also gradually fades away again. In case of some of these natural hazards, the transnational character becomes apparent when the natural hazard is of a magnitude that hits more than just one country. In this context, the national security strategy also mentions global warming as one of the central risks to Serbia. However, it is not mentioned very often in the security discourse.

Summing up Serbia’s non-traditional security challenges (and the traditional ones that have a transnational character) and adding to it the fact that most of the security discourse takes place on a national level, one can say that Serbia shares such security challenges as natural hazards, cyber and information challenges and organized crime with many of its direct and wider European neighbours. Others, like the ones dealing with the effects of the Yugoslav civil war are shared with direct neighbours like Croatia or Bosnia & Herzegovina and are typical for the Southeast European region. Finally, security challenges like the situation in Kosovo are unique to Serbia and are only seldom transnational (if one excludes the question of whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence was legitimate or not), e.g. when one deals with citizens that leave the country to fight for IS. From an ethical and human rights point of view, Serbia’s security discourse often deals with discrimination against religious, ethnic or the Serbian lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community. This is relevant in view of the recent past and it highlights the need to protect and promote minorities’ rights in order to build an inclusive society.

During the regional workshop on Southeast Europe, one participant remarked that from his point of view Serbia sees itself “surrounded by enemies” (Jovanovic et al. 2014). Comparing this to the overview of the security challenges one has to wonder whether this is still the case. Similar to other countries, Serbia’s traditional security challenges are becoming more and more transnational in their nature while the number of non-traditional security challenges is also growing. However, Serbia’s national security strategy includes most, if not all, of the challenges which were found during the coding exercise. This speaks for the strategy but also for a closer examination as to whether the mentioned security challenges have actually been addressed.

3.3 United Kingdom (UK)

The term “national security”—whilst widely used—is not specifically defined by the UK Government. It has been the policy of successive Governments and the practice of Parliament not to define the term, in order to retain the flexibility necessary to ensure that the use of the term can adapt to changing circumstances (MI5 2014). As a matter of Government policy, the term “national security” is taken to refer to the security and well-being of the UK as a whole. ‘Security policy’ had remained as an abstract concept till the New Labour Government came into power in 1997, and was mainly based on foreign and defence policy (Clarke 1998). The overarching principles of security have changed with the Conservative and Liberal-Democrat coalition Government coming to power in 2010, and are now focusing on ‘all-encompassing’ national security that addressed security ‘in the round’ incorporating linked areas of policy including counter-terrorism, international aid and diplomacy, border and cyber security, and homeland defence (as opposed to a security strategy that was primarily focused on defence and Armed Forces) (Almandras et al. 2010).

The EvoCS coding exercise has demonstrated that the most prominent security core values in the UK are physical safety and security, economic prosperity and security, and environmental and ecological security. The most prominent security challenges identified using the EvoCS coding methodology align with the UK security challenges emphasised in the National Security Strategy (NSS) (HM Government 2010):

- **Terrorism** is listed as the highest priority risk with the principal security challenge being international terrorism, however different types of attacks are expected (including ‘lone wolves’, residual terrorism groups etc.).
- **Cyber-attacks** are also the highest priority risk which government, the private sector and citizens are prone to, with the risk emanating from both hostile states and individual criminals. Cyberspace is integral to the UK economy, thus providing various opportunities as well as threats.
- **Energy and food supply** appear to be lower risks; they are defined as ‘*disruption to oil or gas supplies to the UK, or price instability, as a result of war, accident, major political upheaval or deliberate manipulation of supply by producers*’ and ‘*short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources (e.g. food, minerals) essential to the UK*’ respectively (HM Government 2010).
- **Climate change** is not included in the tiers of risks but is considered a security issue (which is aligned with EC security concerns): “*Our security is vulnerable to the effects of climate change and its impacts on food and water*”, concluding that “*the physical effects of climate change are likely to become increasingly significant as a ‘risk multiplier’, exacerbating existing tensions around the world*” (HM Government 2010).

- Climate change goes hand in hand with another security challenge—**natural hazards**. Flooding, for instance, is the highest priority risk due to the potentially high impacts and disruptions such events can cause. Whilst the NSS only focuses on floods, the ‘National Risk Register’ also lists storms and gales, drought, severe effusive (gas-rich) volcanic eruptions abroad, low temperatures and heavy snow, heatwaves, and severe wildfires (Cabinet Office 2013).

The comparison of security challenges noticed in the NSS and in the popular discourse demonstrates that security challenges in the latter tend to be long-term; they have been acknowledged as such for a number of years, and there is no indication that they will be removed from the agenda in the nearest future. Radicalisation (i.e. ‘radicalised Britons’) is not mentioned in the NSS but has become prominent very recently (from 2014) and has captured the newspaper headlines as well as being prominent in political statements. Cyber security is becoming increasingly important, largely due to the use of cloud computing. Whilst the Cyber Security Programme is ending in 2016, it is most probable that new frameworks will be developed as cyber threats impact upon the economic development of the UK and will do so more in the future, with the Internet playing a prominent role in business development.

Climate change and natural hazards will also remain prominent but to a different extent. Depending on the priorities of the next UK Government, climate change may receive less attention as its impacts are not deemed to be immediate or obvious. In addition, climate change is hard to securitise because it is understood very differently by different government departments (with the environmental side of it being predominant). Natural hazards on the other hand are—although reactively—increasingly being viewed as relevant to the security agenda, particularly after the floods in winter 2013. Whilst UK energy and food supply systems are believed to be relatively resilient, there are a number of risks (e.g. severe weather, terrorism, technical failures, industrial action) that can be mitigated but cannot be avoided entirely. Energy supply has also received a lot of attention in 2014 due to the deterioration of the political relationship with Russia, when a specific question on whether UK supply will be able to meet the UK demand in the future was posed. In 2013 the UK’s net energy import dependency climbed to 47 %, the highest level since 1975, and energy exports reached their lowest level since 1980. In the same year, coal was the source of 36 % of UK electricity generation, gas contributed 27 %, nuclear 19 %, renewables 15 %, and others contributed 3 % (DECC 2014). Given the fall in domestic energy production, the rise in the UK’s energy import dependence and particular reliance on Russia for coal imports, it is vital to find ways to secure the supplies of energy. Food supply is similarly a long-term security challenge: the current strategy is already discussing the threats that may affect the UK food supply in 2030. This security challenge is closely linked to the threats posed by climate change, natural hazards and energy supply.

Whilst human rights and ethical issues are mentioned with regards to all of the threats, they are hardly discussed in relation to cyber-attacks. This is surprising as with the discourse on data loss and communications interceptions, cyber-attack

could be seen as the most ethically relevant one.¹⁸ This could be consistent with the securitization approach according to which in presence of non-traditional security challenges of highest priority risk by hostile states or criminals, greater focus is put on the alert rather than on a reflection regarding the ethical and human rights implications.

All sources raise human rights and ethical issues, however different publications find different threats as a matter of human and ethical concern. For instance, newspapers purely focus on terrorism, whereas parliament publications mention human rights and ethical issues across all of the threats. Overall, human rights and ethical issues are not perceived to be a salient part of security discourse in the UK.

When comparing the national political debates and popular discourses, a number of UK security features become apparent:

- ‘Hard’ (which mainly include physical) security challenges are often prioritised over other security challenges: as such general events that don’t affect the wider population directly (e.g. the murder of Lee Rigby) can trigger a determined political discourse that receives more attention than the events that directly influence citizens (e.g. impacts of natural hazards).
- Security is a ‘reactive’ process (events disrupting trends): Security appears to be about knee-jerk reactions, but ideally should be about being able to accommodate events within consistent policy frameworks.
- Globalisation of security: Events that occur outside of the UK—and Europe—can have direct impacts upon the security situation in the UK. Globalisation has a direct impact on security thinking.
- The phenomena of ‘widening security’: Non-security events have become securitised, because in doing so it can make it possible to quickly mobilise resources. For instance in securitising ‘climate change’ it could make it more ‘justifiable’ for policy makers to mobilise resources to deal with the impacts of a changing climate.

This overview of the most prominent security challenges demonstrates that the UK is gradually moving from the ‘traditional’ security challenges towards a more inclusive and broader security framework, which is motivated by the increasing complexity of inter-sectoral issues. With a large number of actors involved in, and affected by, security challenges at different levels, it is becoming more and more difficult to clearly identify security dimensions (Chmutina et al. 2015). The political, governance, economic, physical, social, environmental and other security core values are interconnected and form a complex system of inter- and intra-dependent networks that mutually support each other.

¹⁸This finding may be a result of a methodological limitation, as human rights and ethical issues were only coded when explicitly stated.

4 Discussion and Conclusions

The three case studies presented in this chapter are but a part of a total of 12, which were compiled in the EvoCS project.¹⁹ Overall, the results of these case studies demonstrate that the existing threats will remain salient in the near future and addressing them requires thinking about the global context that can become a driver of the negative influences upon national and local security. Security has been re-framed from national interest to a more local human security-oriented discourse, but at the same time national, even regional interests are becoming important again. Some security challenges are either unique to a country (e.g. the conflict with Kosovo) or to a region (e.g. the effects of the Yugoslav civil war). The same is true for some challenges like the protection of the physical security of Dutch citizens travelling on international air lines (e.g. flight MH17), which has had a major influence on the Dutch security discourse and cannot be found in other EU countries.

On the other hand, some softer security challenges, which have only recently been securitised (e.g. environmental and ecological security issues such as climate change) are much more prominently discussed in the North-western countries. Here they are discussed not only as a threat multiplier that is already putting greater pressure on the stability of fragile societies, but also as a significant challenge to the physical security and economic prosperity of these littoral states itself due to rising sea levels (opposed to the landlocked Serbia which perceives less immediate danger).

The three countries, however, have much in common, from the point of view of security challenges and their public discourse. Both the UK and Serbia intensively discuss the core values of physical safety and security and economic prosperity and security and so does the Netherlands. The former might be due to the broad definition of this core value.

In all three countries, non-traditional security challenges are becoming more and more important and are discussed accordingly. These non-traditional security challenges such as religious violence, organised crime and cyber-attacks, natural hazards and climate change are also similar in all three countries, and are gaining prominence in the security discourse. Also, the national security strategies in all three countries address most, if not all, of these non-traditional security challenges and there exists a shift towards “transnationalisation” of the security challenges.

One of the most interesting findings of this coding exercise is the realisation that whilst theoretically—and on the European level²⁰—human rights are suggested to play an important role, this issue is not prominent in most of the security discourses. Whilst the majority of the sources acknowledge human rights and ethics related issues, these are hardly ever discussed as the main topic; instead they seem to be

¹⁹For the detailed project deliverables, please visit <http://www.evocs-project.eu/deliverables>.

²⁰A special section in the new European Agenda on Security (2015) is given to addressing human rights, which are the key for the security strategy.

used as an add-on. The main reason for this is that the present-day security discourse highlights a dialectical tension between opposing trends: notwithstanding its theoretical reframing into a human security-oriented perspective (which entails the relevance of human rights and ethics, along with the support granted by transnational institutions, like the EU), in the political and mass-media discourse the notion of security seems still to rely on a conventional, basically pragmatic, competitive and State-centred conduct coping with challenges threatening States. It is noteworthy to mention that, at least according to their national security strategies (Government of Serbia 2009; HM Government 2010; Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2013), in UK and the Netherlands this second trend appears to be stronger than in Serbia. In the latter case, it is interesting to note that the actor that addresses ethical and human rights issues by far the most often is civil society. Similarly, in relation to the number of sources coded, Serbian NGO sources were the ones that most often referred to ethical and human rights issues.

The majority of the salient security challenges in all three countries are also prominent in the EU policy discourse, and are becoming more so as the new EU Strategy is being implemented. The overall findings refer not only to the threats of terrorism and cyber-crime, but to other salient threats listed in Sect. 4.1: the EU has implemented an Energy Security Strategy (EC 2014); it runs a Food security thematic programme aimed at internal and external food supplies (EC 2011c); and has developed an extensive EU Adaptation package with the EU Strategy to Climate Change at its heart (EC 2013). However some differences were also found. For instance, as expected, the EU level documents promote cooperation among the member states as well as with the third country partners, however the specific countries that should, for instance, take a lead on addressing a particular challenge are rarely named. On the contrary, the case study countries—whilst mentioning cooperation, focus largely on their own efforts, capacities and capabilities in addressing various challenges.

In conclusion, the three analysed countries are surprisingly similar to each other, considering the many historical and political differences between them. Of course, there are some typical national and regional challenges in Serbia, but the similarities to the North-western countries seem to outweigh the differences. From a European point of view, this might be seen as an opportunity since future European Security Strategies can better address shared security problems of both EU and (possible future) non-EU members.

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