

Contents

1	Historical Introduction	1
	References	8
Part I Liberty: Autonomy		
2	Liberty: Autonomy – Introduction	11
	References	14
3	Autonomy and Practical Reasoning	15
1	Introduction	15
2	The Standard Philosophical Model of Instrumental Reasoning	17
3	Specification and Practical Induction	19
4	Decision Theory: Ramsey and Beyond	23
4.1	Preferences, Preference-Rankings, and Valuations	23
4.2	Valuation, Subjective Probability and Expected Value.....	31
4.3	Desirability, Evidence, and Causation.....	41
4.4	Advantages and Alleged Disadvantages of a Ramsey-Style Decision Theory	44
5	Relevant Recent Developments in Decision Theory	49
5.1	Meta-preference.....	49
5.2	Preference for Flexibility.....	50
5.3	Reasons-Based Preference	51
	References	53
4	Autonomy and Rational Deliberation About Ends	55
1	Understanding Means and Ends	55
2	An Aristotelian Theory of Ends.....	56
3	A Formal, Endogenous, Dynamic Model of Rational Deliberation about Ends	64
3.1	Preferences, Evidence, and Updating.....	64
3.2	Forms of Ends-Deliberation	83
3.3	Modeling Deliberation about Ends as a Dynamic System.....	86

4 Conclusion: On Authenticity	93
References	94

Part II Liberty: Freedom

5 Liberty: Freedom – Introduction	99
1 The Good Life and Valuable Functioning	101
2 The Good Life and Liberty	103
3 The Good Life and the Moral Life	104
References	104
6 The Concept of Individual Freedom	105
1 Introduction	105
2 Concepts of Freedom.....	106
2.1 Negative Freedom.....	106
2.2 Positive Freedom	107
2.3 “Third” Concepts of Freedom	113
3 Christman on Autonomy as Positive Freedom	115
4 Negative Freedom: Against Kramer’s “Neutral” View	119
5 Conclusion: The Conservative Conception of Freedom.....	123
References	124
7 A Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Individual Liberty	125
1 Introduction	125
2 Elements of the Right Account of Individual Freedom.....	125
2.1 Preference.....	125
2.2 Effective Freedom, Capabilities, and Self-Control	126
2.3 Republican Freedom.....	141
2.4 Autonomy-Freedom	142
2.5 Diversity of Choice.....	146
3 Reconciling Autonomy-Freedom and Diversity	151
4 The Freedom to Exercise One’s Autonomy: A Two-stage Approach	154
5 Conclusion: A Compound Conception of Liberty.....	157
References	159

Part III Justice: Distribution

8 Justice: Distribution – Introduction	163
1 Contract Theories	164
2 Goal-Directed Theories	175
References	178
9 Liberty, Equality and Justice	179
1 Introduction	179
2 Theories, Ideal and Non-ideal	180

3	Neutrality, Pluralism and Liberalism.....	182
3.1	The Principle of Neutrality and the Perfectionist Critique	182
3.2	Perfectionism and Liberty	186
3.3	Perfectionism and Distribution.....	189
4	Utility, Priority and Equality	192
4.1	Utilitarianism and Exploitation	192
4.2	Prioritarianism	194
4.3	Strict and Satisficing Egalitarianism	199
5	Equality of What?.....	201
5.1	Well-being, Liberty and Desert	201
5.2	Dworkin's Resource-Based Egalitarianism.....	205
5.3	Rawlsian Equality of Liberty and Opportunity	209
5.4	A Partial Defense of Roemer's "Equality of Opportunity for Welfare"	212
	References	220
10	Beyond the Old Economics.....	223
1	Introduction	223
2	The Limits of General Equilibrium Theory.....	224
2.1	New Keynesian Economics and the Role of Policy	224
2.2	The Question of Stability: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem	226
2.3	The Dynamics of GET	228
3	Evolutionary Economics.....	236
3.1	Revisiting Keynes: Money, Time and Uncertainty.....	236
3.2	Evolutionary Economics and the New Microfoundations.....	240
3.3	The Evolutionary Free Market and Its Limits	242
4	Reviving Old Institutionalism: Limitations of the Evolutionary Model.....	250
4.1	Prices	252
4.2	Persuasion.....	254
4.3	Innovation.....	255
4.4	Public Policy and the Representational Limits of the Evolutionary Model	261
5	Against the Minimal State	264
5.1	The Axiological Defense	265
5.2	The Deontic Defense	265
	References	271
11	The Theory of Equal Liberty	277
1	Introduction	277
2	The Principle of No Resource Waste.....	278

3	The Goals of Equal Liberty	281
3.1	Equality of Basic Functioning.....	283
3.2	Equal Opportunity and Encouragement for Autonomy Development.....	285
3.3	Equality of Opportunity for Autonomous Capability Choice and Development.....	291
3.4	Equality of Capability Subject to Effort and Capability Choice	294
3.5	Equal Freedom for Capability Exercise	298
3.6	Maximin of Achieved Functioning Subject to Effort and Accepted Risk	298
4	The Social Market Economy: A Policy Program for Equal Liberty	314
5	Conclusion	320
	References	321

Part IV Justice: Authority

12	Justice: Authority – Introduction	325
1	Autonomy-Freedom and Moral Freedom.....	326
1.1	The Hohfeldian Analysis of Rights	326
	References	329
13	Moral Reasons and Moral Duties.....	331
1	Introduction	331
2	The Problem of Moral Duty	332
2.1	Anscombe’s Challenge.....	333
2.2	A Starting-Point: Raz’s Theory of Practical Authority	333
2.3	Raz’s Rights-Based Theory of Moral Duty.....	336
2.4	Authority, Natural Reasons, and the Principle of Reasons-Isomorphism.....	338
3	The Structure of Natural Moral Duty	339
3.1	A Closer Look at Pre-emptive Reasons.....	339
3.2	The Exclusionary Component of a Pre-emptive Reason.....	341
3.3	Reasons for Action	347
4	Neo-eudaimonism Part I: Meta-ethical Background.....	350
4.1	Interests as the Ground of Reasons for Action.....	350
4.2	Neo-eudaimonism as Aristotelian Pragmatism	351
4.3	Neo-eudaimonism and Constructivism	370
5	Neo-eudaimonism Part II: Contrasting Criteria of Rightness	371
5.1	Neo-eudaimonism vs. Virtue Ethics	371
5.2	Neo-eudaimonism vs. Moral Perfectionism.....	372
6	Neo-eudaimonism Part III: Endorsing Moral Particularism.....	373
	References	380

14 From Moral Duties to Moral Rights	383
1 Introduction	383
2 The Concept of a Moral Right.....	383
3 Neo-eudaimonism Part IV: Interests, Virtues, Duties and Rights.....	385
3.1 Undirected Imperfect Duties	386
3.2 Directed Imperfect Duties	397
3.3 Perfect Duties	399
3.4 Moral Duty and Particularism	400
3.5 Exactable Duties and Rights.....	402
3.6 Defending the Direction of Explanation	405
4 Neo-eudaimonism Part V: Deliberation, Ethical and Otherwise	406
4.1 A Closer Look at the Virtue of Phronesis.....	406
4.2 Particularism Meets Bayesianism	408
4.3 Ethical Deliberation, Side Constraints, and Ends-Deliberation.....	412
4.4 Eudaimonia and Iustitia.....	418
4.5 Moral Institutionalism	421
5 Conclusion	431
References	432
15 The Moral Justification of State Authority.....	435
1 Introduction	435
2 Rights and Authority.....	436
3 The Service Conception	436
4 Edmundson on Legitimacy	439
5 Three Problems with the Service Conception	441
5.1 Legitimate Authority and Enforceable Duties.....	441
5.2 Practical and Theoretical Authority.....	442
5.3 Pre-existing Moral Duties	444
6 Incorporating the Service Conception.....	445
7 Objections and Replies	452
8 The Problems Resolved	454
8.1 Legitimate Authority and Enforceable Duties.....	454
8.2 Theoretical and Practical Authority.....	454
8.3 Pre-existing Moral Duties	455
9 Conclusion	457
References	457
16 The Scope and Limits of State Authority.....	459
1 Introduction	459
2 Mill's Utility-Based Argument and Its Defects	460
3 Raz's Autonomy-Based Argument	466
4 Failed Objections to Razian Perfectionism	468
4.1 The Manipulation Argument	469
4.2 The Paternalism Argument.....	471

5	Raz's Perfectionism and the Contingency/Efficiency Problem.....	482
6	The Value of Liberty	485
6.1	The Value of Freedom	485
6.2	The Value of Liberty.....	490
7	Equal Liberty and the Authority of the State.....	493
7.1	The Moral Ground of State Authority	493
7.2	A Liberty-Based Interpretation of the Harm Principle.....	496
	References	503
	Conclusion	505
	Index	507



<http://www.springer.com/978-3-319-28276-3>

Renewing Liberalism

Sherman, J.A.

2016, XIX, 516 p. 2 illus., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-28276-3