

Contents

1	General Principles of Institution Design	1
1.1	Institutions as a Key Tool in Behavior Management	1
1.1.1	Culture and Institutions as Two Fundamental Tools in Behavior Management	1
1.1.2	Culture and Institutions Must Be Taken Care of at the Same Time	4
1.2	Basic Institution Elements and the Task of Institution Design	6
1.2.1	The Two Key Elements of an Institution: Institution Rules and Institution Implementers	6
1.2.2	The Task of the Designer: Optimizing Institution Structure or Deploying Institution Components of Even Stronger Performance	9
1.3	The Hypothesis of the Rational Man and the Repeatability of Behavior Within an Institution	10
1.3.1	Rational and Irrational Man	10
1.3.2	The Repeatability of Behavior Within an Institution Makes the Hypothesis of the Rational Man the Basis for Institution Design	11
1.3.3	The Difference Between a Comprehensive Concept of the Rational Man and the Classic Concept of the Rational Man	12
1.4	The Difference Between Gaming Within an Institution and Gaming in General	12
1.4.1	Gaming Within an Institution Is Strategic While Individual “Gaming” Behavior Is Simple	13
1.4.2	Commitment in “Announcement” and Commitment to “Realization”: How the Existence of the Institution Is Expressed	13

1.4.3	Individual Makes Behavioral Choice Before Institution Fulfills Commitment	14
	Reference	14
2	The Three Conditions for Behavior, and the Five Behavior Management Measures	15
2.1	The Three Necessary Conditions for Behavior	15
2.1.1	Behavioral Utility	15
2.1.2	Behavioral Resources	16
2.1.3	Behavioral Opportunity	17
2.2	The Five Measures of Behavior Management	17
2.2.1	Reward Measures	18
2.2.2	Resource Measures	19
2.2.3	Behavioral Cost Measures	20
2.2.4	Opportunity Measures	20
2.2.5	Observational Measures	21
2.2.6	The Relationship Diagram of the Three Conditions for Behavior and the Five Behavior Management Measures	22
2.3	Issues to Consider and Resolve When Using Reward Measures	23
2.3.1	The Numerical and Precedence Expectancy of the Reward	24
2.3.2	Issues to Note When Using Reward Measures	25
2.3.3	Reward Interference and Promotion in the Institution	27
2.3.4	Reward Measures Often Need to Be Paired with Bias-Prevention Measures	30
	References	32
3	Observers	33
3.1	Institution Components	33
3.2	Observer Performance	34
3.2.1	Observation Intensity (Sensitivity)	34
3.2.2	Observational Accuracy	35
3.2.3	Cost	35
3.3	Observer Types	35
3.3.1	Direct Observers	35
3.3.2	Indirect Observers	37
3.3.3	Record-Type Observers	38
3.3.4	Response-Type Observers	39
3.3.5	Verification-Type Observers	40
3.3.6	Reward-Type Observers	41

3.4	Measure Selection and Matters to Note	42
3.4.1	The Observability of the Measure	42
3.4.2	Measure Accuracy	43
3.4.3	Measure Rigidity	43
3.4.4	Being Cautious in Weighting: Avoiding Interference	45
3.4.5	Preventing Biases from the Use of One-Sided or Unfair Indicators	45
3.5	Information Bias on the Part of Information Collectors	46
3.5.1	Observers that Make Use of Dedicated Information Collectors.	46
3.5.2	Reporting-Type Observers	47
3.5.3	Observers that Make Use of Objective Information	48
	References	48
4	Promoters	49
4.1	Reward-Type Promoters	50
4.1.1	Fixed-Reward Promoters	50
4.1.2	Variable-Reward Promoters	51
4.1.3	Mixed-Type Promoters	56
4.1.4	Reward-Type Promoter with Output Function	58
4.1.5	Combining Reward-Type Promoters and Observers	58
4.1.6	The Broad Application of Reward-Type Promoters	60
4.1.7	Comparing Rewards—Exchange Utility.	60
4.2	Resource-Type Promoters	62
4.2.1	Resource-Type Promoters Provided <i>Gratis</i>	62
4.2.2	Resource-Type Promoters Provided at a Cost.	63
4.2.3	Combining Resource-Type Promoters and Observers	64
4.3	Opportunity-Type Promoters	64
	References	65
5	Behavior Suppressors.	67
5.1	Reward-Type Suppressors	68
5.1.1	Suppressors for Economic Rewards	68
5.1.2	Suppressors for Reputational Rewards.	69
5.1.3	Suppressors for Rewards Pertaining to Social Standing	70
5.1.4	The Integrated Use of Various Types of Reward-Type Suppressors	71

5.2	Opportunity-Type Suppressors	71
5.2.1	Opportunity-Type Suppressors that Work Through an Admittance Mechanism	71
5.2.2	Opportunity-Type Suppressors that Work by Masking or Hiding Information	72
5.3	Resource-Type Suppressors	73
5.4	Cost-Type Suppressors	75
5.4.1	Cost-Type Suppressors that Have Formed Naturally	75
5.4.2	Designed Cost-Type Suppressors	75
5.5	Suppressors by Drive Type	76
5.5.1	Designing an Automatic-Response Suppressor	76
5.5.2	Designing a Response-Type Suppressor.	77
5.6	Suppressor Failures	77
5.6.1	Limit Failures	78
5.6.2	Compensatory Failures	79
6	The Sun Diagram and the Five Basic Institution Structures	81
6.1	The Significance of the Sun Diagram	81
6.2	Definitions of Various Terms Used in the Sun Diagram	82
6.2.1	The Actor	82
6.2.2	Behaviors and Behavior Set.	83
6.2.3	Institution Components	83
6.2.4	Line Segments	84
6.3	Symbols for Institution Components and Behavior Set in the Sun Diagram	84
6.3.1	Consequences (Outcomes).	84
6.3.2	Promoters	85
6.3.3	Suppressors	86
6.3.4	Observer or Classifier or Probability Device.	88
6.3.5	Symbols for the Actor and Behavior Set	90
6.4	Numbering Rules for Behaviors and Components.	92
6.4.1	Numbering Rules for Behaviors	92
6.4.2	Numbering Rules for Institution Components.	93
6.5	Drawing Rules for the Sun Diagram.	94
6.5.1	Positioning Rules	94
6.5.2	Rules Regarding Component Terminals.	94
6.5.3	Rules Regarding Line Segments (Directionality).	95
6.5.4	Rules on the Omission of Behavioral Cost.	96
6.6	The Five Basic Institution Structures in the Sun Diagram	97
6.6.1	The Basic Structure of the Behavior Management Institution	98
6.6.2	The Three Basic Institution Structures for Task Sharing Institutions.	99

6.6.3	Benefit Distribution Institutions: The Competitive Institution	101
6.7	Some Improvements and Variations on the Five Basic Institution Structures.	102
6.7.1	A Variation on the Binary or Two-Dimensional Penalty Institution: The Ternary Penalty Institution	102
6.7.2	Improving the Reward-Sharing Institution: The Use of Cost Subsidies.	103
6.7.3	A Variation on the Reward-Sharing Institution: The Parallel-Cooperation Institution	103
6.7.4	Improving the Cost-Pooling Institution: The Application of Tax Collections	104
6.7.5	Improving the Competitive Institution: The Competitive Institution “with Cop”.	105
7	Institutions of Behavior Management	107
7.1	Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice	108
7.1.1	Basic Features of the Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice	108
7.1.2	Sun Diagram Within a Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice	109
7.1.3	Institution Parameters and Conditions for a Valid Institution	109
7.2	Typical Parameter Example for Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice, Part I: The Presumption of Innocence	110
7.2.1	About the Institution of the “Presumption of Innocence” and Its Widespread Use	110
7.2.2	Characteristics of, and Sun Diagram for, the Institution of the “Presumption of Innocence”.	111
7.2.3	Institution Parameters and Conditions for a Valid Institution of the “Presumption of Innocence”	112
7.3	Typical Parameter Example for Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice, Part II: Penalty Institutions Designed to Tackle Corruption.	113
7.3.1	The Concept of Corruption (Corrupt Behavior).	113
7.3.2	Characteristics of, and Sun Diagram for, Penalty Institution Designed to Tackle Corruption	113
7.3.3	Institution Parameters and Conditions for Penalty Institution Designed to Tackle Corruption	114
7.3.4	Institution Parameter Principles for Various Policy Measures Against Corruption in Management Practice	114

7.3.5	Case Study 1: The Institutional Root of Corruption in the Qing Imperial Household Department	116
7.3.6	Case Study 2: The Impact of Improving Observer Performance.	121
7.4	Typical Parameter Example for Penalty Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice, Part III: Penalty Institutions Designed to Tackle “Loafing on the Job”	126
7.4.1	Loafing	126
7.4.2	Characteristics of Penalty Institution Designed to Tackle Problem of Loafing on the Job.	126
7.4.3	Institution Parameters	128
7.4.4	Institution Conditions	129
7.4.5	Case Study of a Penalty Institution Against Lazy Behavior: The Penalty Institution Against Cheating at Exams	129
7.5	Bonus Institution of Binary Behavioral Choices	139
7.5.1	Basic Features of the Bonus Institution of Binary Behavioral Choices.	139
7.5.2	Sun Diagram for Bonus Institution of Binary Behavioral Choice	140
7.5.3	Institution Parameters and Conditions	140
7.5.4	Applicability of Penalty and Bonus Institutions	141
	Reference	142
8	Behavior Probability Under the Behavioral Management Institution	143
8.1	The Definition and Significance of Behavior Probability	143
8.1.1	Definition of Behavior Probability	143
8.1.2	Significance of Behavior Probability	144
8.2	Behavior Probability Model Based on Behavioral Utility.	146
8.2.1	The Basic Model	146
8.2.2	Significance of Parameters.	146
8.3	Example of Calculating Behavior Probability.	147
8.3.1	Probability of Cheating in Exams Before the Improving of the Penalty Institution.	147
8.3.2	Probability for Cheating in Exams After Institution Refinement.	149
9	Task Sharing Institutions	151
9.1	The Basis for Comparing Effort Levels of Respective Individuals Under Various Task Sharing Institutions: Group-Optimal Levels	151
9.1.1	Individual’s Output Function	152
9.1.2	The Group’s Output Function	153

9.1.3	Individual's Cost Function	153
9.1.4	Group Cost Function	153
9.1.5	Group Utility Function	153
9.1.6	Individual Effort Levels When Group Utility Is Maximized	154
9.2	Institution with Reward and Cost are Both Independent: Production with No Externalities	154
9.2.1	The Concept of, and Sun Diagram for, the Double-Independent Institution	154
9.2.2	Equilibrium Model and the Equilibrium Point of Effort Level	155
9.2.3	Characteristics and Applicability of the Double-Independent Institution	157
9.3	Reward-Sharing Institutions: Production with Positive Externalities	158
9.3.1	The Concept of, and Sun Diagram for, the Reward-Sharing Institution	158
9.3.2	Equilibrium Model and the Effort Equilibrium Point	159
9.3.3	Characteristics of the Reward-Sharing Institution: Insufficient Individual Effort	161
9.3.4	Measures to Enhance Individual Effort Levels Under the Reward-Sharing Institution	162
9.3.5	Case Study 1: The "Race to Be Last"	162
9.3.6	Key Conclusions	163
9.4	Improving the Reward-Sharing Institution: The Use of Cost Subsidies	163
9.4.1	The Concept of, and Sun Diagram for, the Reward-Sharing Institution with Cost Subsidies Applied	164
9.4.2	Equilibrium Model and the Effort Equilibrium Point	164
9.4.3	Characteristics and Applicability of the Reward-Sharing Institution with Cost Subsidies Applied	167
9.5	The Serial-Cooperation Institution: A Variation on the Reward-Sharing Institution	167
9.5.1	The Concept of the Cooperation Institution	167
9.5.2	The Serial-Cooperation Institution	168
9.5.3	The Sun Diagram for the Serial-Cooperation Institution	169
9.5.4	Mathematical Model for the Serial-Cooperation Institution	170

9.5.5	Equilibrium Point of Individual Effort and Factors that Affect Effort Level During Serial Cooperation	172
9.5.6	The Problem of the “Wait” When Individual Effort Levels e_k Are Higher Than e_i	174
9.6	The Parallel-Cooperation Institution: Another Variation on the Reward-Sharing Institution	174
9.6.1	The Parallel-Cooperation Institution and Its Sun Diagram	174
9.6.2	Mathematical Model for Parallel-Cooperation Institution with Equal Distribution	176
9.6.3	Individual Effort Equilibrium Point and Factors that Affect Its Level in a Parallel-Cooperation Institution with Equal Distribution	178
9.7	The Cost-Pooling Institution: Production with Negative Externalities.	179
9.7.1	The Concept of and Sun Diagram for the Cost-Pooling Institution.	179
9.7.2	Equilibrium Model and Effort Equilibrium Point.	180
9.7.3	Characteristics of the Cost-Pooling Institution: Excess Individual Effort	181
9.7.4	Measures to Lower Individual Effort Levels Under the Cost-Pooling Institution	183
9.8	Improving the Cost-Pooling Institution: Application of Tax Collections	183
9.8.1	The Concept of and Sun Diagram for the Cost-Pooling Institution with Tax Collections	183
9.8.2	Equilibrium Model and the Effort Equilibrium Point.	185
9.8.3	Key Conclusion: Significance of Tax Collection.	187
9.9	The Composite Task Sharing Institution	187
9.9.1	The Complexity of Reality.	187
9.9.2	The Composite Reward and Cost Functions.	188
9.9.3	Individual Utility Function and Effort Equilibrium Point Under the Composite Task Sharing Institution	190
9.9.4	The Transformative Relationship Between the Composite Task Sharing Institution and the Three Basic Institution Types	191
9.9.5	Chapter Conclusions	192

10	Benefit Distribution Institution: Competitive Institution	195
10.1	Competitive Institution	195
10.1.1	About the Competitive Institution	195
10.1.2	Sun Diagram for a Competitive Institution	198
10.1.3	Some Real-Life Examples of Competitive Institution	199
10.1.4	Mathematical Models for the Competitive Institution	201
10.1.5	Equilibrium for the Level of Effort Put in by Individuals Within the Competitive Institution	204
10.2	The Impact and Significance of the Number of Individuals in Symmetric Competition on the Equilibrium Point	206
10.2.1	Symmetric Competition	206
10.2.2	Competition Is Most Intense Where There Are Only Two Competitors in the Field	206
10.2.3	The Greater the Number of Competitors, the Smaller the Benefits	208
10.2.4	The Practical Significance of the Symmetric Competition Equation in Terms of Employee Motivation	208
10.2.5	The Significance of the Equation of the Symmetric-Competition Equilibrium Point for Tackling Unhealthy Competition	209
10.3	Synchronized Competition Model and Unnecessary Costs	210
10.3.1	The Equilibrium Point in Synchronized Competition	210
10.3.2	Unnecessary Costs in Competition	211
10.4	Inhibiting Unhealthy Competition: A Competitive Institution with a “cop”	212
10.4.1	The Concept and Sun Diagram of the Competitive Institution “with cop”	212
10.4.2	Equilibrium Model and the Equilibrium Point of Effort Level	214
10.4.3	Key Conclusion: The Social Significance of the “cop”	216

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