Of Hypocrisy: "Wherein the Action and Utterance of the Stage, Bar, and Pulpit are Distinctly Consider'd"

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THE SECULAR AND THE SACRED: A QUESTION OF PERFORMANCE?

In the early modern era in the West, performance provided an instrument for the scrutiny of religious authenticity, as confessional instruments were deployed to test for proofs of piety. The condition of the soul (or, as the secularist might prefer it, the 'conscience') could be read via a semiotics of the body, with its rich syntax and vocabulary of expressive gesture and demeanour. Of course, it had long been presumed that religious convictions would necessarily make themselves manifest through embodied performance: that is in itself no new phenomenon.[1] Yet consequent to

The quotation in the title of this essay is taken from Charles Gildon's *The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton, the Late Eminent Tragedian, Wherein the Action and Utterance of the Stage, Bar, and Pulpit are Distinctly Consider'd.*

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the Reformation, there is a distinct traffic between secular and religious domains with regard to considerations about persuasions and performance. By the seventeenth century, acting theory begins to be established, and arises in complex ways from the theological debates of the previous centuries.[2] In other words, religious convictions and affective display are mutually regulating.

This is why Betterton's conjunction of the 'Action and Utterance' of 'Stage, Bar, and Pulpit' is significant. A semiotics of feeling is emerging across theatrical, religious and legal platforms. There is, moreover, an emerging sense of 'nation' as both a religious and geographical locus of a set of beliefs and practices. This essay considers how the processes within theological and philosophical debates about belief will come to intersect with new European conceptions of locality. This will have implications for an increasingly naturalized conflation of culture, region and religion. Secularism is, in a way, an attempt to generate an authentic personhood that can reconcile contradictory questions of geography and conviction. Somewhat ironically, secularism itself becomes subject to the codes governing performance and authenticity in ways not wholly dissimilar to those that had marked the sincerity of the believer.

The implications of this complex of beliefs and practices become profound across the following centuries. The revitalized significance of this 'territorialization' of faiths and the staging of secularism surely has significance for our understanding of the recent displacement and geographic relocation of vast communities. To make my case I need to begin by looking at the early modern emergence of a set of persuasions about the relationship between conviction and performance as inner and outer aspects.

Hamlet is depending on a set of givens when he asserts: 'I have that within which passes show' (Act I Sc ii: 85). The Cartesian modelling of the dual person that characterizes the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is here hypothesized as a split between inside and outside. During the dangerous years of religious crisis, it became *natural* to consider the inside as a site of authentic and enclaved truths, while the manifest outside (with its address to an other) is necessarily *faux*.[3]

Within these discursive habits, how might *faith* be staged? Could it be represented through an idiom of theatrics, drawn on to represent a 'true belief'? Should the outside be relied upon to represent the inside? And would the same instruments be deployed in the staging of secularism?

In exploring this riddle, my paper considers a pair of weighty terms that define an emerging set of discourses that cross between religious and secular domains of representation. *Sincerity* and *hypocrisy* are dynamic and productive ideas that cross back and forth, drawing the secular and the sacred realms closer together. More specifically, the early modern history of performance makes evident a doubling of discourses across theatre arts and religious piety. My discussions will explore the ways in which such conceptual categories prop themselves on one another.

In the aftermath of the Reformation, there is a proliferation of meanings linked to hypocrisy. It is well to recall that 'hypocrite' is a term from the Greek word ὑποκριταί, 'hypokrites', the word used to designate a stage actor. The complex idea also carries much divergent meaning: it is used to refer to an interpreter, a sifter of understandings. These are neutral or even positive ideas, many of them, but hypocrisy is also associated with 'one who is undecided'. This, and other negative inflections, make the hypocrite unsuitable for public office. This may be where the word accumulates so much of its negative charge. In the New Testament tradition, from Matthew's Gospel (Chap. 23), the scribes and Pharisees are hypocrites, religious dissemblers, likened to whited sepulchres.

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I have invoked *Hamlet* above, because the text is cited as a threshold for modern conceptions of selfhood. Recent research suggests that Shakespeare's own faith was somewhat ambiguous, not least because there is considerable evidence his father was a recusant who covertly held on to his Catholic beliefs.[4] This itself might suggest why the playwright so subtly explored questions of belief, credulity and scepticism. His plays are rich environments for scrutinizing the semiotics of affect, with accusation, counterargument, conviction and denial all claiming a place on the stage. With the shift in signifying practices during the passage from Catholicism to Protestantism, the apparently 'natural' relation between signifier and signified had been undermined, and a modern conception of the 'arbitrary' character of the sign began to come into the ascendant.

There is a fine scene from Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus* that explicitly links the question of faith to theatricality, the specular, and credulity. The play is one of his earliest works, and he is surely formulating a set of principles about representation and performance aesthetics. The grim play tests various hypotheses about seeming and being. Aaron, a figure of disapprobation in the play, has been captured by the Goths, and is

in their encampment. Lucius interrogates Aaron, seeking through fear to elicit some kind of 'truth'. Aaron, meanwhile, is negotiating for the life of his infant child who has been captured with him. Expecting his own imminent death, Aaron asks Lucius for an oath that the child will be allowed to live. Lucius is bemused—why would Aaron believe his (Lucius's) oath.

Here is the interesting response. Aaron tells us that he *has observed Lucius observe*: 'I have seen thee careful to observe.'

We do not catch the full ironies of the line if we forget that 'to observe' has several distinct etymological strands of meaning: on one hand it signifies 'to see, to watch, to notice'. It also means 'to undertake a religious set of procedures, to follow a routine or prescribed rite, to enact a loyal following'. Aaron's comment is effectively: 'I have observed thee observe.' This constellation of ideas suggests again that within Western metaphysics and language there is an assumption that religious arts are directed at an external viewer as much as they are directed towards the inner being. Aaron's comment continues:

I know thou art religious

And hast a thing within thee called conscience,

With twenty popish tricks and ceremonies,

Which I have seen thee careful to observe. (Act V Sc i)

Aaron's lines are about acts of faith; transactions (rituals, if you will) that manifest, through matter, a belief that matters; because the material artefactual elements of faith are evidence of a metaphysics of longing.

In a curious irony, Aaron goes on to accuse Lucius of fetishism, an accusation which the following 300 years of discursive racism would attribute to the Moor:

Therefore I urge thy oath; for that I know

An idiot holds his bauble for a god

And keeps the oath which by that god he swears,

To that I'll urge him: therefore though shalt vow

By that same god, what god soe'er it be

That thou adorest and hast in reverence (Act V Sc i)

For a contemporary reader, the recent scholarly controversies about Shakespeare's own beliefs render these lines rather unstable. We do not resolutely know where our loyalties should lie, nor is it wholly clear where the writer would situate himself. The world Aaron ridicules is, as it were, animated by belief. The social contract that will honour the bond between Lucius and Aaron is defined by the belief system of the former. Lucius becomes in this Aaron's bondsman.[5] This argument would seem consonant with the thinking of philosopher Charles Taylor (who expressly locates himself inside his own Roman Catholic faith). Moreover, Taylor associates secularism with a 'disenchantment'.

In general, though, contemporary secularists increasingly define their experience not so much as an absence of faith, a loss, but rather as an ontological and political gain: secularism gives rise to a pragmatics through which difference can be negotiated. In the increasingly complex world of contemporary flux, this seems a value of immense significance.[6]

I suspect that we can assent to the melancholy notion that difference is more often tolerated than celebrated. In this, toleration is a critical concept integral to thinking about the secular as a political category. What navigation of selves and beings is facilitating the secularization of states? In light of the world-historical upheaval taking place, with mass migrations of refugees and migrants across the globe, it is an evermore pressing obligation on us to consider what toleration means. How does that idea come to us, freighted with so many predetermined and overdetermined values, obligations and ambitions? Contests abound over the manifestations of cultural identity, integrity. What pressure is placed on our understanding of sincerity with regard to the navigation of our selfhood among others?

Hypocrisy and **Sincerity**, when brought into a constellation of meaning with **Toleration**, are all integral to the emerging conception of the secular. The following pages will explore these mutually constituting concepts.

'Toler(n)ation'

In Reformation Europe everyone was hailed, in the Althusserian sense, even if not *called*. What I mean by this, pragmatically as well as philosophically, is that everyone had to come to terms with conversion. One either converted or elected not to. None could remain indifferent.

In such terms, one might say that the contexts of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation jeopardized models of personhood and continuity. Yet somehow this is the period associated with the emergence of the modern Self.[7] What kind of internal agency could be responsible for producing and sustaining a notional self against such sweeping ideological revolution and historical rupture?

It has become an easy habit to sketch the theological rupture of the Reformation in binary terms. From certain perspectives there does persist a compelling narrative of the following kind: that during the Reformation the European mind was bifurcating into Catholic and Protestant sympathies. This is a partial truth, while it is also in ways an ideologically grounded fiction. I would suggest that the very intensity of that discursive split (Catholic/Protestant) masks many internal divisions and contradictions. The great schism that sundered the Eastern and Western Churches in 1054 is one site of such division, and in ways it is masked by the subsequent discourses on the Reformation. So, too, there are splits within and between Catholic orders; while the single conceptual 'Protestant confession' was constituted out of numerous (often antagonistic) factions ranging from Remonstrants, Mennonites, Arians, Cathars, Calvinists, Lutherans, Zwinglians and Anabaptists. These factions become engaged in furious and in some cases murderous disputes, with accusations of heresy between their communities providing the theological justification necessary for acts of violence.[8]

In the first days of the church, certainly, there had been scenes of violent assault and torment of believers. But in the early modern era, the obligation to define and decide on one's religious identity was being tested in new ways. People were executed for their beliefs, but under the changed imperatives of the Inquisition torture was being deployed to try to compel people to reveal a nicety of faith. This is the logic inherited by the Reformation and its heresy hunters. The dialectic between an inner persuasion and an outer authority begins to consolidate as something that might be characterized as a self; perhaps there arises a new sense of an enclaved being, invisible and unreadable to another, one worth

defending. In such terms there might be said to be a conversion experience even for those who do not convert. Faith becomes, for these generations of the upheaval, 'elected' in an invigorating way, giving rise to a profound precipitation of conscience. The Reformation does, after all, give rise to the Counter-Reformation, a movement that was marked by a spiritual renewal, even inside the political opportunism of the times. How then might one attest to the 'sincerity' of a new endeavour that is inconsistent with ends previously held dear? And what precisely is the sincerity of a belief that arises in relation to forces of external compulsion? These are philosophical and political questions. The *aesthetic* question that arises is, how might such an internally modelled 'self' credibly be performed, both on and off the stage?

My sense is that sincerity implies a negotiated settlement between being and styling, and that a managed multiplicity of personhood is what precipitates a newly modern sense of selfhood. The earliest written record of 'sincere' in English that I have been able to locate is from 1532, and the word begins to articulate with and disrupt the figure of the hypocrite, a term and an idea familiar from the Gospel of Matthew where, in Chap. 23, the teachers and Pharisees are characterized as hypocrites.

The tension between the claims of this is well-captured in Thomas More's complex religious and political pieties, and I cite him here because he is associated with the emergence of the word 'sincere' in English. More is in dialogue with the Puritan scholar, John Frith, who had been captured while in flight to Antwerp to join his friend Tyndale, who was engaged in translating the Bible. Frith had been incarcerated in the Tower of London, where the theologically interrogative More visited him. Frith's essay *An Answer to Thomas More* (1532) arises from that confrontation, and the word 'sincere' is transacted between them and used to describe the exemplary life of the fourteenth-century theological scholar Wycliffe. In Frith's text, the word's usage is somewhat distinctive: Wycliffe is 'noted… to be a man… of a very sincere life'. What we can infer is that Wycliffe is living according to his own lights, as we might say. The assertion of Wycliffe's 'sincerity' here renders irrelevant the accusation of heresy or apostasy. This is a rather extraordinary exchange given that in 1415 Wycliffe had been declared a heretic. He had died in 1384, some 30 years earlier; and it took yet another 13 years after 1415 for the Pope to ratify the decree to have his body disinterred from holy ground and burned, a final assault on the remains in 1428,

some 44 years after Wycliffe's death. These theatrics of the corpse utterly exceed even our ghastly contemporary imagination for desecration. It may participate in an older order of logic, that of the relic. The relic does, after all, in many instances circulate in various states of decay and intactness, and is an overvalued and overdetermined physicalization of a mystically potent signifier. In such terms, Wycliffe's remains are an anti-relic, yet perhaps still captive to the relic's economy. It is easy to succumb to the sensationally unfamiliar country of the past, but let us not be persuaded by this grim report about Wycliffe to overlook the comment within the text about his sincerity.

In a letter from More to his close confidant Erasmus from 1533, we read More's comment:

> I considered it my duty to protect the *integrity* of my *reputation*... After resigning my office, I waited until the opening of the new term, and, so far, no one has advanced a complaint against my integrity. Either my life has been so spotless or, at any rate, I have been so circumspect that, if my rivals oppose my boasting of the one, they are forced to let me boast of the other. As a matter of fact, the King himself has pronounced on this situation at various times, frequently in private, and twice in public.[9] (My emphasis)

'Integrity' to a modern sensibility is associated with the management of a private demeanour, while 'reputation' we generally hold to be the defence of the public being.

There are two forms of the word 'boast' in this short fragment, a fact that itself captures something of the texture of the times. It is also worth bearing in mind that Thomas More here is writing a letter, a document that participates in ambiguity, straying as it does between private and public spaces as it circulates. Letters from the era can strike a twenty-first-century reader as disquieting, given our sense (in an era of WikiLeaks, and digital circulation) of the porousness of all documents, public and private. Machiavelli, on 17 May 1521, had written to his long-time friend, the historian and brilliantly duplicitous Francesco Guicciardini:

> for a long time I have not said what I believed, nor do I ever believe what I say, and if indeed sometimes I do happen to tell the truth, I hide it among so many lies that it is hard to find.[10]

In the decades that followed, personal convictions became territorialized, as I have suggested.[11] For Protestant regions in Germany after the Peace of Augsburg (1555), the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* ('Whose region, his religion') became operative and citizens had to follow the doctrines of their Prince or relocate. Faith and Nation were co-emerging. (The long future of that set of determinations would cast its pall over succeeding generations.)

Furthermore, the Peace of Augsburg had only made accommodation for Lutheranism, and did not acknowledge such Reform movements as Calvinism, which remained subject to heresy charges. Calvin himself, increasingly invested in the policing of boundaries, was a fierce antagonist of individuals he deemed heretics. He was, on such grounds, responsible for the execution of Michael Servetus, a brilliant converso who was accused of Arianism. (Arianism was a considered a major heresy, because it held that Christ was not coeval with God the Father, but rather was 'created by the Father'. In such terms, Arianism was held to be a rejection of one of the fundamental tenets of the Church: that God was a Trinitarian Being consisting of three Persons: Father, Son and Holy Ghost.) Servetus avowed that his medical practice and his study of scripture had both persuaded him that there was neither physiological nor theological evidence for the Trinity.

More or less coincident with the crisis of schism (from the early sixteenth century) there was in England the emergence of a new rhetoric of sincerity, which began to agitate the discourses of hypocrisy. The accusation of religious hypocrisy was, from the first days of the church, an accusation against an unpersuasive performance of righteousness, but in the early modern era it was deployed as a 'necessary instrument' and hypocrisy became associated with strategic religious dissembling. Conversion became identified, contradictorily, both with religious integrity and with its opposite.

Caravaggio, a principle iconographer of the Counter-Reformation, returned to the theme of conversion on several occasions, his most celebrated being the figure of the conversion of St Paul on the Road to Damascus. The 'conversion painting' grapples with a representational problem which is evident across a range of Caravaggio's works. I will formulate that representational problem in the question, 'What language is appropriate for the staging of "sincerity"?' This is, at the same time, a dilemma for philosophy, the law, the church, the theatre (including

the emerging idiom of opera), as well as the plastic arts. I would assert that several of Caravaggio's paintings, while exploring apparently different thematics, are still discursively embedded within this related field of meanings.[12] His paintings of martyrdom provide the counter-trope. The martyr is, after all, the one who does not convert, but dies for her or his faith. So, too, would I include his painting of the *Denial of St Peter* in this cluster of theoretical explorations. This marvellous painting deploys a baroque theatricality in order to investigate the question of the performativity of the sincere.

According to Biblical accounts, Peter is challenged by the Roman authorities about his relationship with the troublesome Galilean, Christ. In Caravaggio's interpretation, Peter uses his hands to point at his own chest, in an expressive gesture asserting the infamy of the imputation of friendship. Peter's gesture is a 'moi?', deflecting the interrogation as absurd. 'Who, me?' Peter is effectively denying the charge of affiliation by deflecting it. The gesture does not only foreswear the truth of that covert being, the Christian, who has taken up residence within the household of the self; Peter's expressive hands, while diverting our attention, also ironically point accusingly at Peter himself.

Under the murderous circumstances of the Reformation, it seems there were conditions which would allow the believer to dissemble. The Nicodemites were one of several communities of believers during the Reformation who argued that God would not hold accountable those believers who, under threat, performed rites without substance.[13] The condition of the heart was all. This is in some ways the inverse of Eve Sedgwick's *Epistemology of the Closet*, which explores the proliferation of surface meanings in fugitive performances of selfhood, yet is its complement, in that it gestures towards an inevitable disjunction between internal landscapes and external representations. The horror, for authority, is that there is no way of knowing or proving the disposition of the inner self, regardless of external constraints or interventions.

The apparatus for conjuring up a performance of sincerity is learned through the disciplines of the larger cultural context, which had torture as one of its instruments of persuasion well into the modern era (and beyond). James C. Welling's study of the uses of torture as an instrument of the law cites an Italian treatise from 1612: 'The mode of administering torture by the use of the rope was invented by the Civil Law, and this torment of the rope, sometimes called the Queen of torment, was justly invented, for the sake of the public welfare, to the end that crimes

might not remain unpunished. It is called a species of evidence substituted to supply the lack of witnesses.' Nonetheless torture is described here as 'always a subsidiary remedy, to be invoked only when truth cannot be discovered in any other way',[14] not for ethical reasons but because 'some people have such an incapacity for the endurance of pain that they are more willing to lie than to suffer torments. Others again are so obstinate that they are more willing to suffer any torments whatsoever than to confess the truth'. The persuasive arts of sincerity take their authority largely from this set of contradictions. One archive of the ideological trauma of the era resides in the records of the torture and execution of countless pious men and women. The Caravaggio corpus gives us evidence within visual history.

Perez Zagorin has discussed the trope of the Nicodemite, that figure historically associated with religious inauthenticity. In the early modern era, the Nicodemite is one who is driven to disguise her or his beliefs because of the perils of the Reformation and its preoccupation with heresy.[15] Calvin's *Response a un certain Holandais* (1562)[16] addresses a theologian who had written in favour of tolerance and against capital punishment. Calvin's earlier letter to Luther, in 1545, articulates his disquiet (revulsion really seems closer to the mark) at the apparent syncretism of many Protestant converts who 'continue to defile themselves with the sacrilegious worship of the Papists'.[17]

Istvan Bejczy's essay 'Tolerantia: a Medieval Concept' sketches the journey of the third term often associated with sincerity or hypocrisy: tolerance. In Antiquity, especially in Stoic thought, it refers to the obligation on the self, of a kind of endurance. This idea is picked up by the early Christians, and a trace of the archaic sense still exists in one meaning of the term, in this phrase: 'How much can you tolerate' or 'bear'? Only from the twelfth century does it become a political concept used to identify circumstances in which so-called 'evils' can be left unpunished, or be 'tolerated' (this arising from Canon Law). Bejczy points out that certain religious practices are inscribed within a discourse of toleration in these terms: Jewish and Islamic practice should be 'tolerated' as lesser evils; and (rather asymmetrically) so too should prostitution. It is worth noting that tolerance is not advocated because of any inherent good recognized in the object, but rather 'despite its evil'.

Bejczy indicates that it is only from the sixteenth century that the process of pluralizing religious truths begins. Toleration at this stage is no longer in the first instance about the capacities of the self, but rather it

advocates political latitude towards contesting world views and faiths. At this point, perhaps, the cluster of concepts, 'hypocrisy,' 'sincerity,' and 'toleration', are co-productive, mutually disruptive. Inevitably, conversion destabilizes conceptions of the link between nation and religion. This is evident from the start in the universalist rhetoric of Pauline teaching. (The Peace of Augsburg is surely in part a compensatory mechanism that seeks to settle faith through geography, given the changing character of 'nation'.)[18] After his own conversion, Paul advocates a faith that is available to Jew, Greek and barbarian alike.

What of the case of the Moor? The contradictory logic of tolerance is well known. As recent world history has demonstrated once again, anybody who advocates tolerance earns that right by becoming its border guard: 'Beyond here, you may not pass.' The figure of toleration becomes, ultimately, a threshold of its limits. A case in point can be found in the late sixteenth century in John Foxe's *Book of Martyrs* (also known as *Actes and Monuments*). His history of Protestant suffering serves as an early plea for tolerance. This spirit is evident in a tract he wrote while exiled in Europe, urging Queen Mary to cease religious prosecution, arguing that 'to compel with clubs is the mark of tyranny'.[19] Nonetheless the limits of his own tolerance are evident when he expresses his disquiet that such persecution is being undertaken by 'our fellow countrymen'; he indicates that it would be easier to understand if it were conducted by Turks or Scythians. Foxe is making an appeal to an inclusive faith by redefining its absolute limits. The Moor is outside the walls.

By the early seventeenth century, Hypocrisy and Insincerity begin to displace, disrupt or entail one another, and these terms are used pretty well interchangeably, as, for instance, we see in Thomas Cooper's *The estates of the hypocrite and syncere Christian Containing, certaine lively differences betweene synceritie and hypocrisie, very necessarie, for the try-all of our estates in Grace* (London: 1613). Here, clearly, sincerity and hypocrisy function as antonyms. While sincerity does have 'insincerity' as its opposite, no such pairing is available for any of the forms of 'hypocrisy' (such as 'hypocrite' or 'hypocritical'); 'sincere' in its various forms takes up those semantic values.

The discourse on Hypocrisy has a particular kind of theological usefulness. In the early modern era, its awful power is precisely that it institutes processes of internal regulation and self-censorship, accusing the wayward thinker. In other words, anyone who engages in enquiries or behaviours that are not already sanctioned and authorized stands accused

of hypocrisy because their conduct is no longer consonant with their thought. Snares of surveillance are set in order to detect just such a split between seeming and being. 'Doubt' is recast as 'deceit' and conscience must give way to conformity. Where compliance is all that is sought, conviction ceases to be a real value.

If Foucault's panopticon is the non-discursive formation that, in the eighteenth century, gives rise to internal surveillance, then it may well be that the rhetoric against Hypocrisy undertakes some of this work at a discursive level in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It seeks to curb any tendency to inhabit a position between orthodoxy and critical probing such as might be associated with scepticism. The injunction against hypocrisy works by compelling a correspondence between inner conviction and outer demonstration.

All the World's a Theatre

These theologically dangerous times gave rise to the first English treatises on acting, which were coterminous with new theological meditations on the authentic believer. Thomas Heywood's *Apology for Actors* (1612) was published just 1 year before Thomas Cooper's *The estates of the hypocrite and syncere Christian Containing, certaine lively differences betweene synceritie and hypocrisie, very necessarie, for the tryall of our estates in Grace* (London 1613). Heywood's burden is to professionalize the actor, and to distinguish her from the hypocrite, a figure at the centre of Cooper's treatise. 'The hypocrite' and 'the actor' are derived etymologically from the same root. Included with the dedications at the front of Heywood's *Apology* are several occasional verses from his friends. One Richard Perkins points to the hypocrisy of the Puritanical anti-theatricality of the day, boasting of his pleasure in the playhouse by avowing 'I am no open Saint, and secret varlet'. Heywood is, effectively, distinguishing stagecraft from dissembling. A co-evolution of theological and theatrical discourses locates truth as inaccessible through art.

William Prynne's diatribe against the immorality of the stage and the decadence and immorality of performers, *Histriomastix: The Player's Scourge, or Actor's Tragedy* (1632), was yet to be published. That text was produced in a kind of fervour. By contrast, William Dowsing, the Puritan commissioned in 1643 by the Earl of Manchester to smash the icons and stained glass and to tear down the altars and screens of the churches in East Anglia and Suffolk, was yet to realize a new calling, as

iconoclastic bureaucrat. His journal documents the order and routine with which he governed his purge. Donald Smeeton's review of the recently published diaries suggests that 'he appears to be a sincere and godly man who understood his work as state iconoclast' (2002: 820). It is chilling to register the apparent diligence with which Dowsing sought to undertake the destructive charge he had been given, to rid the churches of works of art that might seduce the believer. No doubt he considered himself to be a faithful servant.

Both Prynne and Dowsing are, it seems, persuaded of the rightness of their calling. As John Locke would opine some 150 years later, in his *Letter Concerning Toleration*, 'everyone is orthodox to himself' (Locke 2007). A sincere believer may be in error, but that has no bearing on the credibility or veracity of the sincerity itself. (This circuit of thought, passing obliquely from Frith through Locke, seems unlikely as a precursor to Rousseau's confessional strategies, but the skeins of a Romantic self-authoring modernity clearly have been spun from a complex weave. Rousseau's *Confessions* suggests that the character and depravity of his sinfulness are countered by the candour with which he reveals himself. It is the quality of the penitent sensibility that matters. For it is not so much sinfulness that is weighed against the soul, but rather a failure of sensibility.) Locke's assertion that 'everyone is orthodox to himself' is in the opening paragraphs of his much-touted *Letter Concerning Toleration*, written originally in Latin to his friend Phillip van Limborch, a Remonstrant theologian from Amsterdam. Van Limborch apparently published the letter without Locke's permission. The Remonstrants had suffered considerably for their split from Calvinist orthodoxies,[20] and Locke was obviously a strategic ally.[21] Yet Locke would not have taken this revelation of his role lightly, and evidence suggests that he was always cautious of his reputation in light of the volatility of his thinking. Several of his letters were written in code or had their authorship concealed, and he didn't acknowledge his authorship of his *Two Treatises Concerning Government* until he was on his deathbed: 'This life-long user of false names, double envelopes and invisible ink was determined to leave no incriminating traces on paper' (847).

The *Letter* was published in 1689, a year before his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, and he was surely working through the two sets of ideas at the same time. He uses the terms 'sincerely' and 'sincerity' nine times in the *Letter*. His purpose is to argue for a separation of church and state (a position precisely counter to that resolved upon at

the Peace of Augsburg, discussed above) and there are two 'orders of sincerity' defined here, one of which can be attributed to those who claim 'sincerely' to persecute and torment their fellows in the interests of saving them from error; the other being the 'sincerity' of the believer in relation to his God. The term 'orthodox' is deployed both strategically and seemingly loosely (though we must imagine that is an effect of the writing rather than a laxity in Locke), as if the self is a knowable and non-contradictory agency. The phrase 'everyone is orthodox to himself' strikes a post-Freudian reader as extraordinary; however, we need look no further than to Locke himself to apprehend that human beings are anything but knowable or transparent to themselves.

Locke's celebrated chapter on Identity in the *Essay* engages in innumerable thought-experiments about the self-identical self. He asks whether his cat, Electra, at 4 pm is the same creature he sees at 4.15, or if Socrates awake is the same being as Socrates sleeping; whether the man who remembers what he knew as a youth is continuous with that youth who remembers what he had known as a child, but that he does not know as a man. These are complex and strategic considerations about the continuity of consciousness, an idea at the centre of his thinking. His resolution had been that 'Where-ever a Man finds, what he calls *himself,* there I think another may say is the same *Person*'.

In light of this scepticism, it takes some thinking to apprehend what he might mean by that subtle formulation 'everyone is orthodox to himself'. Clearly, for Locke, that 'himself' is a complex idea. I suggest that he is indicating that torture cannot persuade someone to change their convictions; it can at most persuade someone to conceal their beliefs.[22] Locke will not allow 'that men ought to be compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doctrines, and conform to this or that exterior worship'.[23] By 1710, after the Restoration, there seems to have been something of a sea change when Charles Gildon writes his *The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton, the Late Eminent Tragedian, Wherein the Action and Utterance of the Stage, Bar, and Pulpit are Distinctly Consider'd*. That parallelism of 'the Stage, Bar, and Pulpit', at the level of grammar at least, ranks the theatre, the law and the church together, implying that the techniques of rhetoric and performance are in some way evenly distributed across these 'professions'. These examples suggest the heralding of a new era of secularism in the eighteenth century. It had, after all, been a century since the last person had been burned alive for heresy in England. But that narrative is not quite so linear. It was within recent

memory that a 20-year-old student, Thomas Aikenhead, had been exe-
cuted for blasphemy in Scotland (1697). The terms of his indictment are:

> That […] the prisoner had repeatedly maintained, in conversation, that
> theology was a rhapsody of ill-invented nonsense, patched up partly of
> the moral doctrines of philosophers, and partly of poetical fictions and
> extravagant chimeras: That he ridiculed the holy scriptures, calling the
> Old Testament Ezra's fables, in profane allusion to Esop's Fables. That he
> railed on Christ, saying, he had learned magick in Egypt, which enabled
> him to perform those pranks which were called miracles: That he called
> the New Testament the history of the imposter Christ; That he said Moses
> was the better artist and the better politician; and he preferred Muhammad
> to Christ: That the Holy Scriptures were stuffed with such madness, non-
> sense, and contradictions, that he admired the stupidity of the world in
> being so long deluded by them: That he rejected the mystery of the Trinity
> as unworthy of refutation; and scoffed at the incarnation of Christ.[24]

In that same year, 1697, John Locke had been embroiled in a substan-
tial theological/philosophical dispute with Bishop Stillingfleet over
the Trinity and Locke's exploration of Person and Number in his *Essay
Concerning Human Understanding*.[25] Gildon himself draws attention
to the novelty of his enterprise in writing about these secular and sacred
spheres together, though it is not possible to know quite what is in his
mind when he asserts in his Dedicatory Epistle, to Sir Richard Steele:

> I flatter my self, that, as I am (as far as I know) the first who in English has
> attempted this subject, in the Extent of the Discourse Before you, so I am
> apt to believe that I have pretty well Exhausted the Matter.[26]

The dignity of the actor is changing, and it marks a social and aesthetic
shift that in some inextricably complex way is embedded within theologi-
cal transformation.

By the mid eighteenth century the English actor David Garrick has
become a byword for authenticity in stagecraft. It is difficult to appre-
hend the significance of the aesthetic revolution he precipitated with-
out some sense of the contemporary record. The playgoer Richard
Cumberland recollects the impact:

> When after long and eager expectation I first beheld little Garrick, then
> young and light and alive in every muscle and in every feature, come
> bounding on the stage […] it seemed as if a whole century had been stept

over in the transition of a single scene; old things were done away, and a new order at once brought forward, bright and luminous, and clearly destined to dispel the barbarisms and bigotry of a tasteless age, too long attached to the prejudices of custom, and superstitiously devoted to the illusions of imposing declamation. (McIntyre 125)

Garrick's performances were noted for what has been anachronistically characterized as a psychological realism, identified by the stutters and starts in his articulation, and his animated and complex language of gesture, which seemed to strike the audience as arising from sensibility. This did not win him universal admiration.

He was at times vilified by fellow practitioners from the old dispensation, in particular James Quin, who characterized Garrick as the new religion: 'Whitefield was followed for a time; but they will all come to church again' (McIntyre 62). It is striking for a consideration of Hypocrisy that a new acting style should be characterized so expressly within a religious rhetoric. Garrick defended himself in a tract in which he feigned attacking himself. This was a favourite rhetorical strategy of his, and many of the published assaults against Garrick were put out by himself. That in itself is worth consideration as a strategy of the dissembling performer. Garrick, in a very modern way, understood that there is no such thing as bad publicity. He responded to Quin, using the same religious metaphorics deployed by his antagonist, but he shifted the terms from nonconformist extremism to religious renewal:

Pope *Quin*, who damns all churches but his own,

Complains that heresy corrupts the town:

That Whitefield Garrick has misled the age,

And taints the sound religion of the stage;

Schism, he cries, has turn'd the nation's brain;

But eyes will open, and to church again!

Thou great infallible, forbear to roar,

Thy bulls and errors are rever'd no more;

When doctrine meet with gen'ral approbation,

It is not heresy, but reformation. (Garrick)

(Here, implicitly, is that conjoining of the Stage and the Pulpit, invoked in Gildon's biography of Betterton, cited above. The conflation has shifted register here, and is the substance of a rather blunt jest, in the inflated style of the mock-heroic.)

At the same time, we do know that while Garrick was being touted for his emotional realism he was not above deploying some singularly deliberate contrivances. He commissioned Perkins the wig maker to construct a hairpiece with an attached inflatable device that he wore in the role of Hamlet, which could make his hair stand on end when he encountered his father's ghost.[27]

The continentals were profoundly engaged in this project of understanding the self in relation to itself. Rousseau went to see Garrick perform in 1766, at Drury Lane, and according to popular report almost fell out of his seat, so keenly did he lean forward to see the actor.

Diderot was by all accounts astonished at Garrick's performances, but he remained sceptical of the space between affect and effect. In his *Paradox of the Actor*, he complains:

> Garrick will put his head between two folding-doors, and in the course of five or six seconds his expression will change successively from wild delight to temperate pleasure, from this to tranquility to surprise, from surprise to blank astonishment, from that to sorrow, from sorrow, to the air of one overwhelmed, from that to fright, from fright to horror. […] Can his soul have experienced all these feelings, and played this kind of scale in concert with his face? I don't believe it; nor do you.[28]

What Diderot is inaugurating is a scepticism about the presumed unity of outside and inside. The professional actor is now celebrated for a capacity to 'resemble', a term I would distinguish from the earlier accusations against dissembling. Again, theatrical techniques are providing exemplifications of broader shifts in ideological, theological and political imperatives.

Reform/Perform

The mobilizing of an appropriate performance of self and the imperative to secularize have become increasingly critical facts in our age, with the profound transformation of geographies and identities. 'Globalization', we now understand, is substantially more than the economic *desideratum*

once dreamed of. It is deeply, profoundly embodied; its consequences for our mortal species are unforeseeable; and the modes of toleration and sincerity will be under considerable pressure as our lives become more dispersed. Gauri Viswanathan's fascinating study *Outside the Fold* provides considerable depth for a modern understanding of secularism and performance. She links 'the legal emancipation of religious minorities in England' to the 'acculturation of colonial subjects to British rule'.[29] What this foregrounds is that the field of meaning around the emergence of a secular modern state in the United Kingdom was necessarily dialectical, playing across the geopolitics of empire, now in Britain, now in India.

Viswanathan's deft analysis turns to the 'Macaulay Minute', a piece of legislation introduced by Thomas Babington Macaulay, the then Governor-General of British India. The Act, from 1835, advocated that henceforth Indians in British India be educated in English, not in Sanskrit or Arabic. His objective was that an English education would in future foster Indians who were 'Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect'.[30] Significantly, Viswanathan demonstrates how this legislative event is articulated with Macaulay's writings on the significance for British culture of the failure to embrace Jews:

> If there be any proposition universally true in politics, it is this, that foreign attachments are the fruit of domestic misrule. It has always been the trick of bigots […] to govern as if a section of the state were the whole and to censure the other sections of the state for their want of patriotic spirit. If the Jews have not felt towards England like children, it is because she has treated them like a stepmother […] The English Jews are, as far as we can see, precisely what our government has made them. (1998: 8)

In several ways, then, the obligation on Jews in England is much like that of Indians in British India. A form of conversion is a necessary precondition for assimilation; however, it is a 'conversion' that must necessarily be manifest. The conviction evident in Macaulay's line of reasoning is that a modification of bodily demeanours and language use will somehow precipitate a change of the inner being of the subject. This spiritual 'change of state' would allow access to the rights of citizenship within the modernized community of Englishness. In such terms, then, 'toleration' is the return for a persuasive performance of conversion. A staging

of the new self, however, is required of the convert, and thus the problem of 'sincerity' constitutes a crisis of representation.

One of the most insightful and influential thinkers on the question of 'sincerity' is Lionel Trilling. His *Sincerity and Authenticity* opens with a compelling observation: 'Now and then it is possible to observe the moral life in process of revising itself.'

That phrasing, 'the moral life in process of revising itself', resonates with our urgent moment, in light of the transformation since 2001 of the global landscape (geographical, aesthetic, ideological, military, economic, erotic, psychological, metaphysical). It seems productive to imagine that we are facing a 'now' in Trilling's elegant schema of a 'now and then'. While, in some ways, the Trilling citation is a discursive prop, I cite his work for more deliberate reasons, because his writing charts, in the early modern era, an emerging language of the 'sincere' and a yearning for what he calls 'a congruence between avowal and actual feeling' (2). Trilling takes us back to the Renaissance, and the aesthetic riddle confronting the Reformation: how to perform true feelings. And yet, more than this, Trilling's enquiry is inflected with particular resonances for our understanding of Macaulay and the nineteenth century: Trilling's important graduate work explored the writings of the nineteenth-century writer and intellectual Matthew Arnold, and through it Trilling examined the counterveiling claims of the individual and society in the definition of a self. Here Trilling's thinking is clearly inflected by his own circumstance as the first Jewish member of the Department of English at Columbia University. Trilling was keenly aware of the pressure to inhabit a performance of self that would allow for assimilation. He was explicitly reluctant to align himself with a particular mode of victimage that he seemed to identify with a strain of Jewish advocacy. In 1929, he raised the rhetorical question, 'Is a Jew a Jew without a pogrom in the middle distance?' (qtd in Alexander 1988: 44). Yet the secular instincts in Trilling had also to reckon with the opinions of Dr Thomas Arnold, the father of Matthew Arnold. Arnold Snr had held vehement opinions on national identity and ethnicity. In Trilling's own formulation, Thomas Arnold believed that Jews 'should be barred from the universities and from citizenship. He held that citizenship required an almost mystic homogeneity which was supplied in the ancient world by race […] and in the modern world by religion' (1955: 60).

What the twentieth century would demonstrate is that the imperative to assimilate does too readily slide from a question of representation to

an act of annihilation. In 1948 Trilling counterbalances his previous pre-varications by asserting:

> [B]efore what we now know the mind stops; the great psychological fact of our time which we all observe with baffled wonder and shame is that there is no possible way of responding to Belsen and Buchenwald. The activity of mind fails before the incommunicability of man's suffering. (1950:)

In that same year, 1948, Sartre, in *Black Orpheus*, would identify the significance of race within the discourses of conversion. 'A Jew, white among white men, can deny that he is a Jew, can declare himself a man among men. The Negro cannot deny that he is a Negro nor claim for himself this abstract uncoloured humanity' (2003: 17).[31]

In the nineteenth century, wherever the missionary project proceeded, it threatened African modes of belief and the very habitus of indigenous life. Mudimbe argues that:

> The fact of 'African conversion' – rather than being a positive outcome of a dialogue – unthinkable per se – stood as the sole position that the African could take in order to survive as a human being. (Gnosis 154)

Jean and John Comaroff, in Volume I of their *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness*, consider the meaning of conversion within the mission experience in South Africa:

> The Pauline model of conversion has become deeply enshrined in modern Western thought. Having been absorbed silently into the bourgeois ideal of spiritual individualism, it permeates both theological and popular conceptions of religious change [… T]he concept of conversion itself retains its commonsense European connotation. And so the problem remains: how well does it grasp the highly variable, usually gradual, often implicit, and demonstrably 'syncretic' manner in which the social identities, cultural styles, and ritual practices of African peoples were transformed by the colonial encounter? (250)

The 'Pauline model of conversion', with an absolute surrender to a force that both obliterates and renews the self, does not provide a compelling model for the African colonial encounter, in which there is an incremental transaction through which the habits of a cultural life are displaced.[32]

Conversion is a key contradiction.[33] While, as Mudimbe suggests, it is necessary for survival, it also marks the African as a dissembler. Like the *converso* Jew, the convert in Africa cannot be trusted.[34] Dissembling becomes a conceptual characteristic, a trait which ironically can be rendered only more palpable in those who convert. Personhood is contingent upon conversion, yet conversion undermines any persuasive performance of personhood.

Etienne Balibar's essay 'Is There a Neo-Racism?' suggests that, under the conditions of late capitalism and globalization, we have generated a *neo-racism*. The racism which prevails in the era of multiculturalism is, Balibar suggests, a 'racism which does not have the pseudo-biological concept of race as its main driving force' (Balibar 1991: 23).

By the nineteenth century, the universalism that had been espoused by Paul was reframed in new terms by Macaulay, who was advocating a universalism premised on the special conditions of empire. Macaulay advocated a performance that provided the spectator with a pleasing-enough 'seeming'. What Macaulay is suggesting is a universalism 'under-the-sign-of' Englishness. Viswanathan summarizes the impact of Macaulay's creed in the following terms:

> [B]y 1850 there occurred a parallel process in English social and political life that aimed to turn Jews into non-Jewish Jews, Catholics into non-Catholic Catholics, Dissenters into non-Dissenters, Non-Conformists into non-Non-Conformists, and so forth. (qtd in Viswanathan 5)

What we should understand from this sketch is that there has been a profound revolution in the matrix of performance and conviction. The 'universalism' propounded by Paul had been premised on belief; by the nineteenth century, Macaulay's conception was based on an imperial conception of habitus that undertakes the work of secularization. An embodiment of modernity will alter the internal landscape of faith. That shift to an increasingly manifest and visible 'staging' of the self suggests a cultural shift. What is becoming necessary, in order to partake in the community of internationalist modernity, is a practised hypocrisy—that is, an achieved level of Acting.

Diderot would perhaps have understood it.

Notes

1. The Spanish Inquisition, for instance, relied on such technologies of the body.
2. Thomas Heywood's *An Apology for Actors* (1641) serves to situate 'acting' as a profession, in order to distinguish it from dissembling.
3. Only after several centuries of philosophical interrogation of this premise would William James be able to assert, in his celebrated paper 'What Is an Emotion?' that the case is not that we weep because we are sad, but that we are sad because we weep. In other words, he makes possible a remarkable shift which asserts that in part it is Expression that gives rise to the Emotions:

[p. 189]: 'Surprise, curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, lust, greed, and the like, become then the names of the mental states with which the person is possessed. The bodily disturbances are said to be the "manifestation" of these several emotions, their "expression" or "natural language"; and these emotions themselves, being so strongly characterized both from within and without, may be called the *standard* emotions. Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that *the bodily changes follow directly the* PERCEPTION *of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the* [p. 190] *same changes as they occur* IS *the emotion.* Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually *feel* afraid or angry.' (From *Mind*, 9: 188–205, 1884)

4. This is discussed at some length in Stephen Greenblatt's *Will in the World*. Norton: 2005 (Greenblatt 2005).
5. '[T]he righteous must forgive the unrighteous. It is the way of the world.' *Ubu and the Truth Commission*, Jane Taylor, Cape Town, 1998 (Taylor 1998).

6. Though the problem about 'disenchantment' is certainly of interest to me, as one theorizes alongside Walter Benjamin, about enchantment and magical thinking.

7. See, for example, Roy Porter, ed. *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*. London: Routledge, 1997 (Porter 1997).

8. The patriarch Augustine had provided the justification necessary. His writings condone the use of torture as a technology to manage heresy. His letter no 35 to Eusebius (written before 400) indicates that, at this stage, he supports the principle of allowing heretics to return to the fold if they were persuaded by free will to do so. Over the succeeding years, he changes his opinion and becomes a defender of justifiable persecution. In a letter to the Donatist, Vincent, he argued on behalf of coercion. He distinguishes between the 'unjust persecution which the wicked inflict on the Church of Christ, and the just persecution which the Church of Christ inflicts on the wicked'. (This in a letter, dated 417, to Boniface. For the detail of this set of arguments, see the second chapter of Perez Zagorin 2003.) By contrast, Hobbes is forthright about the unreliability of coerced confession: 'They that approve a private opinion, call it opinion; but they that mislike it, heresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion' (139).

9. The interesting phrase in the first sentence is 'arbitrar oportere me integritatem nominis mei defendere'. It is documented in *Erasmi Epistolari* 2831/41–42. The letter is written to Erasmus when More writes the epitaph for his tomb, which he has engraved. The words committed here between the two men thus have a distinct sense of the substantial, and themselves mark a kind of 'perpetual' utterance. (Professor Gerald Wegemer of the Thomas More Institute provides the context of this letter to Erasmus, in 'Integrity and Conscience in the Life and Thought of Thomas More', published 21 August 2006. Accessed 9 August 2015.)

10. Cited as the epigraph to Perez Zagorin's *Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe.*

11. Something pernicious seems consolidated here. Badiou points to the ironies implicit in the heightened conflation of state and identitarianism in our current moment. He invokes the Pauline appeal to a universalism (57).

12. This is not surprising, given his significant role as an agent of the iconographies of the Counter-Reformation.

13. I will discuss the Nicodemites in more detail below.

14. James C. Welling, 'The Law of Torture: A Study in the Evolution of the Law', *American Anthropologist* 5.3 (July 1892) 193–216. Citation from Sebastian Guazzini, *Tractatus ad Defensam Inquisitorum, Carceratorum, Reorum et Condemnatorum super quocunque Criminae*, 1612, Italy (Welling 1892).

15. Perez Zagorin, *Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe*. Harvard University Press, 1990. Carlo Ginsburg's *Il Nicodemismo: Simulazione e dissimulazione religiosa nell'Europa del 1500* (Torino 1970) is an important precursor to this study, and it takes a pamphlet of Calvin as its point of origin. Calvin's essay is a harsh assault against Protestants who, living among Catholics, continue to engage in certain Catholic practices. Ginsburg's controversial argument is that while many 'Nicodemites' were seeking to avoid prosecution, there were others who for strategic reasons were concealing their faith, living a double existence in order to infiltrate religious centres in Germany and Switzerland. For Ginsburg, these were the Nicodemites who engaged Calvin's ire. Ginsburg's reading of the strategic purposes of the Nicodemites has been challenged. The substance of the dispute can be read in Carlos M. Eire's *War Against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 239. Eire points out that the archive has not preserved the documents which provoked Calvin to his particular response. The 'Nicodemite' was initially studied by the Italian historian Delio Cantimori, in his *Eretici italiani del Cinquecento* (1939) (Zagorin 1990; Eire 1989).

16. The Dutchman was apparently Dirck Coornhert, a celebrated theologian who had become an enemy of Calvin, though it is apparently not clear that Calvin knew the identity of the writer.

17. From *Selected Works of John Calvin: Tracts and Letters,* Vol. 4. pp. 440–442. Letter to Luther, 21 January 1545. Original in Latin in the *Library of Geneva*, Vol. 196.

18. Certainly there will be a great deal at stake in the redefinitions of belonging, insider and outsider identities, allegiances and geographies in the aftermath of the recent phenomenon of translocations.

19. Foxe, *Ad Inclytos*, cited in Achinstein 90.

20. See my comments above.

21. John Marshall has outlined some of the details of this link between Locke and the Remonstrants in his *John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 (Marshall 2006).

22. Hobbes had formulated the same principle in his Leviathan in 1651: 'they that approve a private opinion call it opinion; but they that mislike it, heresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion'. Hobbes, Thomas, *Political Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*. London: 1750, 2010: p. 139 (Hobbes 2010).

23. Locke, John. *Letter Concerning Toleration*, Filiquarian Publishing, 2007, p. 6 (Locke 2007).

24. The proceedings against Aikenhead are recorded in *A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanours from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, with Notes and Other Illustrations: Vol. 13* (Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1816, p. 917).

25. In 1697 Stillingfleet had criticized Locke's *Essay* in his *Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, casting Locke as engaging in 'a new way of reasoning' that endangered Christian belief. Locke replied in his open letter, *A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester*, a letter which prompted a response which elicited a rejoinder.

26. Charles Gildon, *The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton the Late Eminent Tragedian wherein the Action and Utterance of the Stage, Bar, and Pulpit are Distinctly Consider'd*, London: 1710 (p. vi) (Gildon 1710).

27. This marvellous story is detailed in Joseph Roach's important study *The Player's Passion: The Science of Acting*, p. 85.

28. Diderot, *Paradox of Acting*. From the English translation by Walter Herries Pollock. London, Chatto and Windus, 1883, p. 38 (Diderot 1883).

29. That economic compression of the core interrogation of the book can be found on the back cover of the Princeton paperback edition.

30. See Thomas B. Macaulay, 'Minute on Indian Education, 2 February 1835', in *Macaulay: Poetry and Prose*, edited by G.M. Young (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1967, p. 729). The Act defined the ways in which the East India Company was to allocate funds, as required by the British Parliament, an entanglement that demonstrates the complex character of imperial relations of power (Macaulay 1967).

31. While I do recognize the force of these lines, I think they should be measured against recent research into the traumatic history of Jewish conversion in the early modern era. I have written elsewhere on the dilemma that confronted Caravaggio when he attempted to represent the Jewish Talmudic scholar as the author of the New Testament Book of Acts in his painting *The Conversion of St Paul*. It is quite evident that there are very precise codes within the visual indexing of Jewishness, which suggests that this is an ethnicity as well as a faith-based identity. The visual signs are themselves embedded within a larger discursive field of reference to the distinctive habits, practices and appearance of the Jew. Nonetheless, this is not to deny that there is something very particular about the nexus of conquest, race and ideology, which summons up Eiseman Maus's generic reference to the 'black men' in her recent introduction to *Titus Andronicus*.

32. The provocative question they raise is whether such a paradigm has relevance for the context of gradualist transformation such as took place on

the Southern African frontiers. It is, the Comaroffs suggest, through a protracted process of exchange, trade, linguistic invasion, education and cultural assimilation that the mission project 'held'. This seems a key insight. Nonetheless, what should not be overlooked is the power of the European model of 'conversion' as determining authenticity and sincerity within non-Conformist missions.

33. Every Protestant would by definition have some narrative of conversion, either personal or familial, either recent or historical. Within the context of the murderous religious wars, a semiotics of sincerity would surely have been indispensable. Thus, the core assertion of Protestant subjectivity is founded in some way on the necessary, persuasive performance of a self-authenticating being. This would suggest that what would have arisen in the early Renaissance was a representational idiom through which the reinvention of the self could be both performed and recognized.

34. It is thus no surprise to discover that, in the list of words which make up David Livingston's own handwritten vocabulary tables in the South African library, along with 'Far, Near, Great, Little, Above, Beneath' are included the synonyms 'Lies, Falsehoods'.

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