

## The Role of the State in Development

Conventionally, the concept of development has been equated with economic growth. As a result, mainstream literature—both academic and in the media—has viewed development as a fundamentally economic, perhaps even technocratic process. This book argues that development must be understood in much broader terms, as a historical change process (Kothari 2005: 5; see also Wylde 2012). It is the nature of this change that facilitates the marshalling of different resources to enact new ways to promote growth and welfare. After all, to paraphrase a popular analogy, growth on its own is simply about a bigger pie; development is about changing the very contents, make-up, and distribution of that pie—as well as growing its size. How is this intensely complex task to be undertaken, managed, and coordinated? (Neo)liberalism broadly states that this will happen spontaneously, a concept popularised by Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ of the market (Smith 1880/1776: 28). This book will argue that development does not happen *solely* of its own accord, and certainly not with the speed and continuity that is required if a real and sustained improvement in human welfare is to be achieved in the course of a generation. As Adrian Leftwich (2000: 7) noted: ‘...what is required is a central coordinating intelligence or coordinating capacity which can steer, push, cajole, persuade, entice, coordinate and at times instruct the wide range of economic agents and their groupings to go this way instead of that, to do this and not that, and which itself can act here or when private agents either cannot or will not’.

The only agent capable of achieving these goals on a national scale is the state. This is not to say that there is any a priori relationship between state intervention in the market and an attendant improvement in development. Clearly, this is not the case, especially when development is understood as more than simply economic growth. There are many instances of state involvement in the development process that have been disastrous for those countries: facilitating corruption, incompetence, cronyism, nepotism, patrimonialism, clientelism, and kleptocracy. Also, historically, there have been the kinds of states that Chalmers Johnson (1982) termed ‘plan-ideological’. Soviet-type, China, or Cuba are the real-world examples of these states, which used the state to take virtual complete ownership and domination of the market; not simply to guide or manage their economies but to control every aspect of it (and usually their societies as well).

There are clearly a number of different modalities of states, capable of manifesting in non-capitalist as well as capitalist forms, with the latter type further splitting into myriad types of capital accumulation strategies. As well as different forms of state present theoretically and in the historical record, there are a number of different ways of examining the state. Bob Jessop identifies six (Jessop 2016: 7), other contributions more (see, e.g., Hay et al. 2006). However, one chooses to categorise a taxonomy of state theory, different viewpoints reveal different facets of the state and state power. Each point has its specific blind spot, which prevents us from seeing what we cannot see from that perspective. So, ‘combining *commensurable* perspectives allows a more complex analysis, which may put apparently contradictory statements about the state into a more comprehensive analytical schema that reveals how the truth value of observations and statements depends on the contexts in which they are made’ (Jessop 2016: 7) [*italics in original*].

It is the purpose of this chapter to first outline a theory of the state, and then to sharpen this broad analysis into a theory of the capitalist state in the context of catch-up or latecomer development. Completion of this task also requires a theory of power. Such an exercise will facilitate an understanding of why states follow certain development trajectories rather than others through a framework that has been termed a Developmental Regime—first coined by T.J. Pempel (1999), and subsequently developed in the context of Latin America (Wylde 2012, 2014, 2016). The domestic aspects of the Developmental Regime approach will be dealt with here, with aspects of international political economy

and globalisation incorporated in the subsequent chapter. This collectively will provide the theoretical bedrock necessary for a comprehensive analysis of two emblematic cases of state-driven catch-up development strategies: Argentina and Malaysia.

## STATE AND REGIME IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY

The state is clearly the site of a paradox. On the one hand, it is merely one particular institutional complex among many others within any given social formation; yet on the other hand, it is peculiarly charged with overall responsibility for maintaining the cohesion of the social formation of which it is part. The state thus becomes much more than its associated ensemble of institutions, as whilst its form—or ‘strategically selective limits’ (Jessop 1990: 353)—is/are constituted through state structures and operating procedures, the outcome of state power also depends on the changing balance of forces engaged in political action both within and beyond the state. The state is everywhere; even where it is not. This suggests a focus on the institutional context of states is necessary, but not sufficient, for analysis of the state. Agent-centred institutionalism becomes an important intellectual tradition for understanding how social forces make history in specific institutional contexts. The focus is on ‘complex actors rather than on individuals; on actor’s interests, identities, action orientations, and resources in specific actor constellations rather than in generic, context-free terms; and on different forms of interaction’ (Jessop 2016: 9). This is clearly important. Examination of the ensemble of ‘socially embedded, socially regularised, and strategically selective institutions and organisations’ (Jessop 2016: 49)—or *Staatsgewalt*—forms a necessary element of any analysis of the state.

As suggested, this institutional analysis is necessary, but not sufficient, for an understanding of the state. Completion requires an analysis of other substantive aspects of the state: its social bases, state projects, and national-popular objectives. This framework can generate an understanding of all states, albeit fleeting and necessarily temporally specific due to their constantly evolving nature. Bob Jessop has called this *Staatsidee* (Jessop 2016: 49): the policies generated by the particular institutional ensemble of the state, and enacted on the members of a given society, and done in the name of the common interest of general will.

With the core object of interest in this study being the capitalist state, it therefore follows that there is no single logic to capital, unless it is the

autopoietic logic of continually reproducing the circuit of capital (Jessop 1990: 354)—regardless of the specific institutionalised forms in which this occurs. The specific type of state that this book is interested in is the one that has the authority, power, and capability to strike a relationship with the market that is not one of domination, but one that is able to ‘govern the market’ (Wade 1990). The literature has described this kind of formation as a Developmental State, a concept that will be discussed in detail and will form the guiding thread of this book. The literature associated with this area is often concerned over the necessary authority, power, and capability to enact appropriate market governance, which distils into the concepts of *autonomy* and *capacity*. Capacity can be defined as the ability of a state to implement goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socio-economic circumstances. It follows that in order to have capacity a state must also possess autonomy, defined as when it is able to ‘formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society’ (Evans et al. 1985: 9). The government may have to enact unpopular or even harsh policies in the name of development. To effectively guide economic development a state must enjoy the power to direct society and lead it through traumatic changes. Bureaucrats must be able to draft policies that promote national development, not the advancement of private lobbyists.

In order to make sense of these concepts of capacity and autonomy in an era characterised by the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm and its concomitant global institutions this book will argue that the Developmental State literature must be reinvigorated and made fit for purpose in the 21st century. This will involve exploration of the concept of a Developmental Regime: out of which a reformulated regime tripod image is developed; the legs of which are socio-economic alliances and relations, institutions, and public policy profiles. It is the action and interaction, the production and reproduction, of these three areas that facilitate distinct political economies of development and shape the contours of the specific geography of a given state’s capacity and autonomy. Although there are complex overlapping tendencies that will be fully explored in later sections, institutions can be understood to represent state capacity, socio-economic relations state autonomy, and public policy profiles the (non-)developmental agenda that emerges from these complex social interactions.

### *Developmentalism and the Developmental State*

In *State-Directed Development*, Atul Kohli (2004: 2) distinguishes between three ideal types of state involvement in the industrialisation (and therefore development) process: neo-patrimonial states, fragmented multiclass states, and cohesive-capitalist states. Neo-patrimonial states are the least effective at state intervention, a classic example for which is Nigeria as well as many other sub-Saharan African states. Fragmented multiclass states are a middling category with various degrees of effectiveness in facilitating latecomer industrialisation; better than neo-patrimonial states, but certainly less effective than cohesive-capitalist states. This last category can be most closely associated with the Developmental State paradigm, which can therefore be seen as the most effective model for effective state intervention in the development process.

The search for understanding the nature of state power and developmental intervention from within the Developmental State paradigm has traditionally sought to ascertain what the specific suite of policies, political organisation, and institutional make-up of the state is necessary in order to facilitate effective catch-up development. Such a scholarly endeavour has been broadly split between two separate schools: the ‘political school’ and the ‘economic school’. The economic school has tended to focus on what policies are necessary for late development: the state is required to accrue economies of scale and scope, coordinate investments within and across sectors, and to harness positive and eliminate negative externalities. The political school, on the other hand, has been concerned with the state itself and whether it has the potential in general, and the independence in particular, to adopt the necessary developmental policies (Fine 2013: 8). This school has suggested that the state must be free of capture by particular interests, and so be able to promote and implement appropriate (developmental) policies. Much scholarly effort has been spent discussing this autonomy, as it has been presented in the literature as the key to effective state intervention. Lack of autonomy leads to state capture by particular interests, such as family members in neo-patrimonial states, whose interests are not a priori appropriate for effective national developmental goals.

The two schools have traditionally understood the Developmental State concept in terms of a state-market dichotomy; the economics school seeing the state overruling the market and improving upon it,

whilst the political school visualising the state as standing aloof from the market and the economic interests found within it. This approach can be significantly critiqued and found to be problematic. From the economics school perspective, this view assumes that market actors would like to extend market forces at all opportunities, whereas states would ideally like to infringe upon the market. In other words, states and markets are viewed as two different if not incompatible sources of resource allocation (Palan and Abbott 1999: 32). The problem with this view is that states and markets do not comprise two sets of actors and dynamics that are profoundly different. For example, Trans-National Corporation (TNC) activity—a quintessential market agent—has been shown to actively seek and promote state bureaucratisation (Galbraith 2007/1967), whilst mainstream global governance such as the Bretton Woods Institutions—by definition constituted and run by states—actively promote markets. From the political school perspective, this suggests a theoretically very narrow perception of the state, one that views society as constituted in narrow market terms as well as potentially underplaying the role of class relations through seeing different class interests more in terms of social groups (Chang 2013: 90). Alternatively expressed in the words of Ben Fine, ‘[the state-market dichotomy] conceals the simple fact that economic development is a complex amalgam of processes and outcomes derived from capital accumulation, where state and market—and their interaction—are themselves attached to the economic and political relations and interests which act upon them’ (Fine 2013: 25).

In order to overcome this restrictive analysis, the lexicon of state-market complexes should be ejected and replaced with a more nuanced understanding of agency and structure that distils into the regime tripod concept. Public policy profiles capture the essence of this redundant dichotomy best perhaps and can be seen as emerging from the complex interactions of socio-economic alliances and relations, institutions and institutionalisation, and the overarching impact of globalisation on all three legs of the tripod. This all crystallises into a Developmental Regime concept that helps understanding of developmentalism in the 21st century, and simultaneously overcoming a number of shortfalls in the Developmental State literature.

The concept of the Developmental State emerged from an analysis of late development tactics of specific states in East Asia. When attempting to explain why these states adopted this specific political economy many of these analyses concentrate on specific geopolitical factors such as the

US confrontation with Communist China (Doner et al. 2005: 329), or to specific sociopolitical factors within the Developmental States themselves, such as the colonial legacies present at the beginning of the industrialising process in South Korea (Kohli 1994: 1270–1271). Certainly a strong and persuasive body of literature exists that suggests this East Asian development experience was unique as a result of specific colonial legacies and a specific geopolitical context in the second half of the twentieth century (Stubbs 2005; Doner et al. 2005; Cumings 1987: 44–83; Koo 1987). Alternative analyses steer away from *sui generis* arguments and instead ground understandings of developmental success in specific institutional formats, such as Johnson and his analysis of MITI in Japan. From these alternatives, two core principles can be identified: the role of industrial policy, and business–state relationships.

### *Industrial Policy*

Ha-Joon Chang (see, e.g., 1993, 1995, 1999) has contributed more than most to the role of industrial policy and economic policies more widely within the Developmental State concept. His work has facilitated the argument that ‘a fundamental characteristic of the Developmental State is having a strategic industrial policy organised around government directives that are broad-based in scope and leave the operational detail to the individual firms’ (Madjd-Sadjadi and Karagiannis 2007: 244). Chang points out that both national and transnational bourgeoisie in developing countries tend not to invest in new industries because they do not know whether other, complementary investments will come along; hence, there needs to be a centralised coordination of investment plans (Chang 1999: 192). State intervention can therefore reduce transaction costs, for example through ‘indicative planning’ (Chang 1993: 53). Furthermore, infant industry arguments can be deployed. First, to raise an industry from the ground requires sums of capital beyond the reach of the private financial sector. The state, therefore, has a role to play, since through its actions it can raise the capital through borrowing, taxation, and the direction of export earnings (Rapley 2008: 141). There is also a role to play in the accumulation of human capital. State investment in education, for example, allows for its population to develop the skills necessary to compete in a global marketplace. Second, to acquire, adapt, and alter production technologies imported from the developed world, firms must be given a learning period during which the state protects them from foreign competition. To make it possible for firms to

move into a market in which barriers to entry and brand loyalty favour established producers, the state may need to reserve its domestic market for local producers for a set period of time (Gerschenkron 1962; Rapley 2008: 143).

Whilst the infant industry argument was deployed by the structuralists during the 1970s and therefore associated with Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI), the Developmental State concept used it with important differences. First, rather than building an industrial base to satisfy local demand (the very *raison d'être* of ISI), it focused on building export industries in order to foster new comparative advantages based upon dynamic rather than static efficiency. Second, rather than provide local industry with indiscriminate protection, governments choose winners, strategically selecting a few companies in key industries which they will help raise to maturity, leaving the others to die (Amsden 1989; Rapley 2008: 143). A final point concerns the nature of industrial and agricultural development. Neoclassical theory has criticised traditional ISI for its urban bias (Rapley 2008), for transferring resources from the rural sector to the urban industry when their best comparative advantages lay in that rural economy. However, the early Developmental States of East Asia did not necessarily follow these practices, as they nurtured both agriculture and industry, with protection for agricultural markets also offered (Jenkins 1991). For example, the principle adopted by South Korea was to initially focus on the primary sector and use these surpluses to fund manufacturing industry.

### *Embedded Autonomy*

Scholars draw attention to the strength, capacity, and autonomy required for successful Developmental States (Rapley 2008: 155; Evans et al. 1985: 9). As introduced earlier, capacity can be defined as the ability of a state to implement goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances. In the Developmental State literature, this capacity should arise less from crude power and more from a marriage between a technocratic state and a well organised indigenous capitalist class. It follows that in order to have capacity a state must also possess autonomy, defined as when it is able to 'formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society' (Evans et al. 1985: 9). The government may have to enact unpopular or even harsh policies in the name of development.



To effectively guide economic development a state must enjoy the power to direct society and lead it through traumatic changes. Bureaucrats must be able to draft policies that promote national development, not the advancement of private lobbyists. This idea is key. The failure of industrial policy to promote successful catch-up development in different parts of the world (large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa, for example) can be understood in terms of an inappropriate mix of capacity and autonomy.

Research on capacity has centred on the nature of the business–state relationship in a Developmental State and the presence of a domestic capitalist class who articulate their interests and concerns via interest groups and chambers of commerce, so the state does not reduce itself to crony capitalism (Wu 2008) and (neo)patrimonial politics (Rapley 2008). Furthermore, capitalists make up for their shortcomings, which in a developing country centre on the fact that they do not yet contribute large amounts to the national economy, by linking their businesses to entry points in the state. This produces a two-way information flow as not only can the capitalists express their concerns to policymakers, but policymakers can communicate more effectively with chief players in the economy (Rapley 2008). With Japan, for example, this manifested itself at one end in the form of a competent state bureaucracy, with a pilot agency with overall strategic responsibility for industrialisation: the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Furthermore, MITI had organisational and institutional links at the other end with major private sector firms and capitalists.

Somewhat paradoxically, the linkages between state and society (or bureaucracy and domestic bourgeoisie more specifically) must be complemented with state autonomy. Early Developmental State theory views the state to be necessarily separate from society in order to insulate it from competing interests (a classic authoritarian state), and those who may bear the costs of economic development incurred due to the lack of perfect mobility of factors of production. Johnson (1987) has argued that whilst there is no necessary connection between the Developmental State and authoritarianism there is an ‘elective affinity’ between the two, echoing the work of O’Donnell (1973) and his analysis of the connection between bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America and their emphasis on heavy industrialisation. However, this link between authoritarianism and the Developmental State has been questioned by a number of scholars, with a whole literature on democracy and the Developmental State emerging (see, e.g., Robinson and White 2002).

With regard to this link Bruce Cumings (1999: 69) argues that ‘theoretically speaking... there is no reason why this [the link between the developmental state and authoritarianism] has to be’. The traditional reason has of course been because of autonomy, but Bruce Cumings reminds us that—at least on the level of theory as this is what we are currently concerned with—there are other ways of achieving autonomy that are different from an authoritarian government.

Peter Evans (1995) coined the term *embedded autonomy* to better characterise state autonomy within a Developmental State beyond simple separation of the state from society through authoritarianism. Drawing together the work on capacity and state bureaucracies with the concept of state autonomy his argument suggests that a Weberian-style bureaucracy in the sense of selective, meritocratic entrance requirements and independent long-term career rewards gives them autonomy. However, here he departs from Weber and suggests that far from being insulated from society, ‘they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies’ (Evans 1995: 12). These ties are predominantly with captains of industry—or domestic bourgeoisie—and it is this embedded autonomy that best facilitates the state’s role in industrial transformation.

It is this embedded autonomy that facilitates the kind of strategic industrial policy witnessed in the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), rather than that seen during the Latin American ISI period. Contributions by Koo and Johnson in Deyo (1987) highlight a key distinction between the political basis for strong, autonomous developmentalist states and the institutional basis for state intervention and effective industrial policy implementation. Analysis suggests that not only did this political basis exist in certain East Asian countries in the form of a specific sociopolitical context that facilitated strategy formulation conducive to rapid industrialisation and economic development, but that this basis, although separate from the institutions and structures through which policies are implemented, represented a fundamental aspect of development capacity (Öniş 1991: 114). Therefore, the strategic power of the East Asian Developmental State depended on the formation of political coalitions with domestic industry; whilst successful state intervention relied on organisational and institutional links between politically insulated state agencies and major private sector firms.

Underlying these Developmental State imperatives were the two central features of unusual degrees of both bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation. This facilitated the formulation of independent national goals by the state and its bureaucracy, as well as translating these broad national goals into effective policy action. Therefore, the coexistence of these two features was essential. For example, in the absence of bureaucratic autonomy public-private cooperation could easily degenerate into situations in which state goals are directly reducible to private interests. Argentina and Brazil during their bureaucratic-authoritarian periods could be examples of such a political economy, where close government-business cooperation materialised in the context of a weak state, in the sense that it lacked autonomy from powerful groups in society. The logic of the Developmental State therefore rests precisely on the combination of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation; the central insight of which is that the degree of government-business cooperation and consensus on national goals is not purely the product of a given cultural environment but has been largely engineered by the state elites themselves through the creation of a special set of institutions (Öniş 1991: 115).

This thought was further developed as Evans and his concept of embedded autonomy was critiqued for having an inadequate or incomplete understanding of state-society relationships; it was not a sufficient explanation of successful development experience as *both* strong states and strong economic groups in society are needed to create 'governed interdependence' (Weiss 1998: 38). Pempel's (1999: 157) analysis captures this well when he critiques the Developmental State literature for privileging the political and economic role played by state bureaucrats. This is because they are treated as totally depoliticised, socially disembodied, and in rational pursuit of a self-evident national interest (ibid.: 144). In the words of Chalmers Johnson (1982: 356) 'politicians merely reign, whereas the bureaucrats actually rule'. This led Bruce Cumings (1999: 61) to suggest that the state then emerges as a 'web without a spider'. This critique makes the observation that 'if not from the politicians from whom do bureaucrats get their sense of direction?' (ibid.: 145). Bureaucracies may well be rational, but in whose interests are they rational? One answer could be the national interest, derived from the possible interests of the politicians or at least of those in power. This opens the door to the possibility of multiple capitalisms and many varied versions of economic development; or many different capitalisms or

forms of development, each promoting the interests of different specific socio-economic groups (Pempel 1999: 145). As a result, different ‘Developmental Regimes’ (see Pempel 1999; Wylde 2012, 2014) are possible, based on different constellations of socio-economic interests rooted in state–society relationships that go beyond the narrow confines of embedded autonomy, authoritarianism, and the Developmental State concept.

It is this critique that the concept of the democratic Developmental State is grounded in. In the early Developmental State literature, democracy was perceived to be a luxury that was feasible only in countries that had achieved developmental success. Democratic politics were considered to be a barrier to sustained development since unbridled political competition could generate pressures that led to deviation from the appropriate path necessary for sustained economic development (Robinson and White 2002: 1). Whilst developmental democracy is not an assured outcome of a simultaneous process of economic and political liberalisation, it should not be totally discarded. The political and institutional basis for a number of states that have demonstrated broad-based sustainable development combined with a legitimate and inclusive democracy lies in the form of the democratic Developmental State (Robinson and White 2002: 1; White 2002). An effective Developmental State requires a particular mix of politics and institutions that can create, maintain, and deepen democratic structures and shape developmental outcomes in both productive and equitable ways. This mix can move beyond state–society relations characterised by embedded autonomy, achieving the same developmental results—i.e. sustained economic growth and industrialisation—yet grounded in a social contract characterised by democratic institutions. This opens the (theoretical) door to the possibility of different constellations of state–society relationships beyond embedded autonomy that can lead to effective development.

The Developmental State’s preoccupation with the insulation of state bureaucrats as key to economic development can therefore be (re) interpreted as theoretically constricting. Evans’ emphasis on the role and character of the state’s bureaucracy at the expense of other explanatory factors reduces the basis of legitimacy for state-led developmental intervention to bureaucratic links with industrial capital (Woo-Cumings 1999: 31; Pempel 1999: 144). The possibility of legitimacy based on other forms of state–society relationship, or indeed multiples and combinations of different relationships, is not considered. As Pempel (1999: 147)

suggests, ‘bureaucratic autonomy and mandarin competence in the absence of numerous other conditions are thin reeds on which to rest a strategy of economic development’. In a critique of the Developmental State literature in terms of its analysis of bureaucracies, Woo-Cumings (1999: 31) contends that ‘trimming some bureaucratic fat off the Developmental State does not mean the end of the Developmental State; rather, it is a requirement for survival’.

### *Towards a 21st Century Developmental State?*

The ontological theorisation of state–society relationships in classic Developmental State thought, as outlined in the previous section, can be brought into question. Developmental State theory, and indeed the Developmental Regime (at least in its original form as understood by Pempel), conceptualises society as a set of social groups with different economic functions. Therefore, the actions of states (including those of a developmental persuasion) can be explained through the ‘organisational features’ of a given state. Organisational features can be defined as a set of organisations through which collectives of officials may be able to formulate and implement distinctive strategies of policies (Evans et al. 1985: 20–21). In terms of a Developmental State, this led to focus on bureaucratic strength and coherence; what matters is the relation between the state and other groups of collective individuals. In terms of Pempel’s Developmental Regime, this led to a focus on socio-economic alliances as one of the legs of the tripod. This was achieved by interpreting the state as an independent agent that develops and institutionalises relationships with different groups—for the Developmental State with business sectors and for the Developmental Regime a wider constellation of different social groups dependent upon the specific case under consideration. States pursue a distinct ‘national interest’, independent of discrete social and political interests. Economic competition can be understood as an extension of the national interest, and traditional Developmental State/Regime theory accommodates this in a traditional states-and-markets, neo-Weberian fashion.

What is needed to solve this problem is an explanatory framework that instantiates the limits placed by capitalist relations of production on the variation in the scope of state action (Radice 2008: 1161–1162). The liberal political hegemony that dominates the intellectual understanding and conceptualisation of the state as a congruence of ideas, interests,

and institutions obscures this task as it marginalises the role of class and social relations (*ibid.*: 1168). The classic example of such a conceptualisation is Evan's embedded autonomy: where the key aspects of a (developmental) state are reduced to state bureaucratic links with domestic capital (Evans 1995). Class according to this theory are not classes in any relational sense, rather a series of 'social groups' with different economic functions (Chang 2013: 90). Evans et al. (1985) achieved this by putting the state as an independent agent at the centre of analysis, autonomous from classes and class relations. This downplayed the dependence of the state upon capital (or other class) relations (Chang 2013: 91). Instead, understanding of difference in terms of developmental outcomes of state intervention was grounded in different organisational features of a state. This led to a focus on bureaucratic strength—and hence embedded autonomy—and therefore what matters is not the relation between the state and class relations, but the relations between the state and other groups of collective individuals (Chang 2013: 92). Although Pempel's Developmental Regime offers a wider set of theoretical constellations of social groups and their relationship with the state that can achieve successful developmental outcomes beyond embedded autonomy, these relationships remain the same at an ontological level.

Such a view of the state has been critiqued by neo-Marxists (see, e.g., Jessop 2016) as for this theory of the state to work politics must be viewed as analytically separate from economics—or the state as autonomous from classes. 'Class' in Developmental State theories are therefore not actually classes in any relational sense, but closer to 'social groups' with different economic functions. Such a view misrepresents or downplays the dependence of the state upon capital (or other class) relations (Chang 2013: 90–91). The logical climax of this argument is a concept of the state that stands above class relations without any regard of its relationship to the (re)production of class relations. As Poulantzas (1973) has argued, policies are shaped primarily by the constellation of interests *and* the struggle between them. Without this understanding, states are seen as pursuing a 'national interest' independent of social and political interests. As highlighted earlier, this results in such a 'national interest' being defined in abstraction from societal interests—or the state becomes a web with no spider (Cumings 1999).

To untie this particular Gordian knot requires not a simplistic Alexandrian solution; rather, what is needed is an analytical framework that can generate leverage towards a reinvigorated understanding of the

concepts of capacity and autonomy. An understanding that is sensitive to the relational role of class as well as other aspects of social contracts, that understands at a much deeper level the role of power in these processes, and that understands the role of multilevel governance and the interaction of different levels of analysis in an era characterised by globalisation. In other words, what is needed is an appropriate theory of the state, a more nuanced theory of power, and a theory of global governance. This is in order to get leverage on the overarching problem of how a ‘national interest’ of developmentalism and industrialisation emerges, or more specifically in the empirical context of this book, what constitutes different kinds of Developmental Regime in the developing world. The rest of this chapter will complete the first two of these tasks through suggesting an understanding of the state as a social relation(ship), and through an exploration of the concept of (relative) autonomy. The third will be achieved in the following chapter through integrating a sound understanding of the role of international political economy in an era characterised by (neoliberal) globalisation.

#### *The State as a Social Relation(ship)*

An understanding of class in relational terms facilitates an understanding of the state itself as a social relation (Poulantzas 1969, 1973). Whilst lengthy, Bob Jessop’s definition of the state from this perspective sums up this complex idea best:

...the exercise of state power as an institutionally and discursively mediated condensation (a reflection and a refraction) of a changing balance of forces, which seek to influence the forms, purposes, and content of the polity, politics, and policy in specific conjectures, marked by a variable mix of opportunities and constraints, themselves linked to the wider natural and social environment. (Jessop 2016: 53)

Somewhat more pithily, the state can be understood as ‘...a strategically selective terrain which can never be neutral among all social forces and political projects; but any bias is always tendential and can be undermined or reinforced by appropriate strategies’ (Jessop 1990: 354); or, a ‘condensation of a changing balance of class forces’ (Jessop 2002: 195).

This concept has a clear concern for the class character of the state, and is therefore associated with (neo-)Marxist analysis (see, e.g., Bonefeld 2012; Jessop 2016). It postulates that the state has inbuilt

biases that privilege some agents and interests over others, but how these biases are actualised depends on the changing balance of forces and their strategies and tactics. It therefore tries to capture the effects of state power as a contingent expression of a changing balance of forces that seek to advance their respective interests inside, through and against the state system (Jessop 2016: 54). This changing balance of forces is clearly mediated institutionally and discursively—hence the need to seriously and systematically consider the role of the institutions of the state. As Jessop notes (2016: 54) ‘[the changing balance of forces] is conditioned by the specific institutional structures and procedures of the state apparatus as embedded in the wider political system and environing societal relations’. The mixing of these two approaches—agent-centred institutionalism and (neo-)Marxism—is a core postulate of this book and will be expanded upon considerably throughout this chapter.

The state must be treated as a specific structural ensemble with its own effects on the reproduction of a society divided into classes. Furthermore, classes have no abstract, unifying consciousness but are constituted as political forces through the state itself (Jessop 2016). This expands understanding of state capacity beyond narrow and perhaps ephemeral links between business groups and the state—understood in abstraction from their relational terms. Actors act not only because of, and through their particular relationship with the state but also in a more immediate relational sense—due to the nature of structure and agency. Bob Jessop’s ‘Strategic-Relational Approach’ that underpins the concept of the state as a social relation reveals that structure consists in differential constraints and opportunities that vary by agent; and that agency in turn depends on strategic capacities that vary by the structure as well as according to the actors involved. This further reveals a dialectic between acting routinely or habitually, and ‘evaluating the current situation in terms of the changing “art of the possible” over different spatiotemporal horizons of action’ (Jessop 2016: 55). Structures are only strategically selective, rather than absolutely constraining. As a result, scope exists for actions to overwhelm structural constraints; subjects are unlikely to absolutely know their own strategic action(s); and ‘...calculating subjects that operate on the strategic terrain constituted by the state are in part constituted by the current strategic selectivity of the state system as well as by past state interventions’ (Jessop 2016: 56).

Through this use of neo-Marxist tools, the state becomes ‘the instance that maintains the cohesion of a social formation and which reproduces



the conditions of production of a social system by maintaining class domination' (Poulantzas 1969: 77). The modern state therefore possesses two fundamental roles: an 'accumulation imperative' and a 'legitimation imperative' (Poulantzas 1969: 76). The accumulation imperative is the repressive apparatus of the state—the government, army, police, tribunals, and administration—and deal with factors such as infrastructure, the rule of law to ensure growth (especially private property), and defence. The legitimation imperative is there to make the whole system legitimate to workers both institutionally—through the welfare state for example—and ideologically—through concepts such as developmentalism and/or redistribution. Following Gramsci (1971), the ideological apparatus of the state are institutions such as the Church, political parties, schools, mass media, and in certain instances the family.

The historical emergence of society and associated social entities cannot be separated from the evolution of the state. The state is no longer simply defined as a 'black box' where competing social interests form, rather it centralises and concentrates social power so that it can be exercised, executed, and directed. (Developmental) policy that emerges from this becomes the application of this social power, grounded in material conditions. Ideology is reduced to the facade (or 'hegemonic project' for Poulantzas) of coherence in policy, with its presence helping maintain consistency through the articulation of a worldview. The state is therefore a dynamic and constantly unfolding system. Its specific form at a given moment in time in a particular national setting represents a 'crystallisation of past strategies' which privileges certain strategies and actors over others. As such, 'the state is located within a complex dialectic of structures and strategies' (Hay 2006: 129). It thus becomes 'a strategic site traversed by class struggles and as a specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries, no institutional fixity and no pre-given formal or substantive unity' (Jessop 1990: 267). The era of the neoliberal state witnessed the separation of the state from the economy. This separation 'maps out new spaces for the state and the economy by transforming their very elements' (Poulantzas 1978: 18). The problem lies in understanding how the shape of these 'new spaces' and their interrelations are transformed through the historical development of capitalism.

Viewed in these terms the state is neither a neutral instrument nor a rational calculating subject (Jessop 1999: 11). For the purposes of this discussion, the critique of underplaying class through treating the state as equally accessible to all forces and useful for any purpose is overcome.

This plugs a key gap in mainstream understandings of the state—pluralism and elite theory—which view class as social groups. A further shortcoming that is overcome is that of seeing the state as possessing a pre-given unity and clear purpose, in the context of the Developmental State literature an *a priori* national interest in favour of developmentalism. Instead, the state is the crystallisation and ongoing metamorphosis of the continuing interaction between ‘the structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities of the state as an institutional ensemble and the changing balance of forces operating within, and at a distance from, the state and perhaps, also trying to transform it’ (Jessop 1999: 11).

A number of important observations emerge from this understanding of the state as a social relation. The first is the analysis of unequal access to the state for different agents. A strategic-relational approach combines nicely with (neo)pluralism given the shared concern with the changing balance of diverse forces, shared sensitivity to crosscutting and intersecting groups and social forces, and a shared focus on conflict, competition, and coalition building. However, the introduction of a consideration of the more relational aspects of class—as opposed to simply treating classes as social groups whose relationship with the state is the only ontologically relevant force—further improves our understanding of the strategic selectivity of the state itself. (Neo)Pluralist analysis gives equal weight, analytically, to the structurally inscribed, strategic, selective asymmetries involved in institutions, institutional orders, and societal configurations. Also, it is less attuned to the specificities of the capital relation—especially its inherent structural contradictions, strategic dilemmas, and social antagonisms; less attuned to the relative primacy of profit-orientated, market-mediated accumulation as a principle of societal organisation; and less attuned to the ways in which these shape the overall pattern of constraints and opportunities in contemporary societies (Jessop 2016: 70).

The second is a better understanding of the mechanisms and modes of state intervention. Combining strategic-relational concerns with (neo) pluralism introduces very important relational aspects to the concept of state capacity. It facilitates a framework for understanding the differentiation between what Michael Mann (1984: 185) called ‘despotic power’ and ‘infrastructural power’. Infrastructural power gives the state the capacity ‘to penetrate [Sic.] society and organise social relations throughout its territory on the basis of its political decisions’ (Jessop 2016: 70). This is opposed to despotic power, which ‘can be “measured” most vividly in the ability of... Red Queens to shout “off with his head” and have

their whim gratified without further ado' (Mann 1984: 189). What strategic-relational concerns provide is an understanding that these capacities are relational. For, even when they meet no resistance, states are not omniscient—because every mode of intervention has its strengths and weaknesses.

The third and final contribution for understanding the state concerns the unequal capacity of agents to shape, make, and implement decisions. The structural dominance that facilitates unequal access to the state must be combined with a widely accepted 'hegemonic project' if the structurally privileged class (fraction) is to become truly hegemonic. In the absence of this condition, state structures can undermine the pursuit of a project favourable to a class (fraction) other than the structurally privileged. In turn, this indicates that a long-term shift in hegemony requires not only a new hegemonic project but also the reorganisation of the state system towards underwriting a more durable shift in the balance of forces (Jessop 2016: 69).

### *On (State) Power*

Understanding the state as a social relation draws attention to the configuration of the social bases of state power and the inherently unstable equilibrium of compromise that it is refracted through. In other words, to draw out all the implications of understanding the state as a social relation for the concepts of capacity and autonomy in the context of developmentalism requires a more complete understanding of power. For Gramsci (1971: 257–264), state power was shaped by the relation between the state and the institutions and forces in the broader political system and in society as a whole. Some Gramscian analytical categories are useful here: the 'power bloc', a durable alliance among dominant classes that define the 'art of the possible' (Jessop 2016: 73); the 'hegemonic bloc', a broader ensemble of national-popular forces mobilised behind a specific hegemonic project; and a 'historic bloc', a mutually supportive relation among the economic base, juridico-political organisations, and the moral and intellectual field (ibid.). These are the building blocks of durable state projects, or hegemonic visions. In the context of latecomer development: a coherent and cohesive national interest rigorously pursued and defined in terms of developmentalism.

Whilst the Marxist debates of the late 1970s imploded 'under the weight of a multitude of competing theoretical starting points and an over-emphasis on highly abstract theorising that blithely disregarded the

historical variability of political regimes and the different forms taken by capitalism' (Jessop 2001: 150), the concepts of the state as a social relation and 'relative autonomy' can be retrieved from the wreckage and help facilitate an understanding of the relational aspects of power and its exercise by the state. Having analysed the state as a social relation and its consequences for an understanding of capacity, the rest of this section will now analyse the concept of relative autonomy and the attendant understanding of power relations that result in order to generate more sophisticated understandings of autonomy that can complement the work on capacity. Combined with an analysis of multilevel governance (see next chapter), a more robust understanding and conceptualisation of the related concepts of capacity and autonomy can be generated—unlocking a framework for understanding 21st century developmentalism in the process. This is to ultimately generate a reinvigorated Developmental Regime concept capable of dealing with the issue of how and why states at early stages of development follow certain trajectories rather than others.

The state as a social relation(ship) should not be seen as a mere reflection of class interests—the 'economic committee of the bourgeoisie'; rather, the state should be seen as possessing 'relative autonomy' from different class interests as it advocates the interests of capitalism rather than capitalists. Such an understanding facilitates a firmer grip on the necessary ensemble of social relations of production and associated institutions that link society with the state that best facilitates late-comer industrialisation. This view allows for a holistic understanding of the state and its forms. Classic state theory (the debate between Elite theory and Pluralism) views the state as an adjudicator between conflicting interests and groups. Marx saw the state as controlling and suppressing the lower classes. The discipline of public policy looks to how the state achieves targeted goals. But really the state is all of these things (Palan and Abbott 1999: 45). Given these functions, the key question becomes how to maintain loyalty to the state by its members? The liberal tradition answered this in one particular way. Starting with Hobbes the solution was the sovereign (or 'might is right'), through to Locke with the guarantee of life, liberty, and property, and then to Rousseau with the concept of the social contract underpinned by the General Will. However, a social contract must pre-suppose the state because people must already have a strong consciousness of their membership of a social community (Palan and Abbott 1999: 46). In other words

(Löwith 1964: 242) ‘...the individual member of bourgeois society is educated behind his back to the generality of his personal interests. Bourgeois society... is forced against his will to become the true state of an absolute community’. This Hegelian conceptualisation was critiqued by Marx (2000 [1843]: 33) when he highlighted the fact that the state wasn’t a separate social body, but the encapsulation of the entire civil society. Furthermore, it was a material entity, a form of class organisation—rather than a Hegelian spiritual one.

Poulantzas extended this analysis through the observation that the gap between ‘citizenship’ and ‘individuality’ are not problems that can be surmounted, but profound reflections of changing material conditions. This led to the conclusion that the state must simultaneously be autonomous from and embedded within civil society: or, in other words, it must possess ‘relative autonomy’. It must be autonomous because the government needs to pursue the true interests of the people, and embedded because the government needs to be implanted in the social. The state enjoys a degree of independence from the economy because of its location in the autonomous sphere of politics, but this does not render the state independent of classes which influence the economy through the state. The state thus fulfils its adjudicatory role between contradictory interests, and development stalls where a state is no longer able to do this—it no longer has (or perhaps never had in the first place) relative autonomy.

Class domination of the state does not simply mean that its form—the institutionalisation of a suite of policies in the form of a public policy profile and the ideological justification underpinning that profile—is a simple reflection of the interests of the dominant class. Rather, the very existence of this domination is made possible by the relative autonomy of the state. That is, state power must be seen in relational terms, i.e. as founded on an unstable equilibrium of compromise among class forces rather than as a monopoly of one class (fraction) (Poulantzas 1973: 191–193). This power is conceptualised, following Gramsci, as hegemonic leadership, in which prominence is given to the organisation of an ideological and political unity among the classes and fractions of the power bloc, and to the securing of ‘active consent’ on the part of the dominated classes (Benton 1984: 149). An essential condition of hegemonic domination over the dominated classes is that they, in turn, have ideological apparatuses—for example, trade unions and political parties—which pursue their interests and thereby achieve concessions (ibid.).

The concept of relative autonomy helps overcome this reductionist and constricting approach by ‘bringing class back in’. The state fulfils an adjudicatory role between contradictory interests and is therefore simultaneously autonomous from and embedded in social relations. It is autonomous because the state needs to pursue the ‘true’ interests of the people as a whole, rather than any distinct class (fraction), and it is embedded as it is itself part of the social formation of society. Therefore, the historical emergence of society and associate social entities cannot be separated from the evolution of the state. For example, development often stalls where a state has no relative autonomy from society—with sub-Saharan Africa being a clear example of this as states have often been captured by discrete interests. The state centralises and concentrates social power so that it can be exercised, executed, and directed. Policy is therefore the application of social power, and the policies of the state must be understood in the context of this application.

Relative autonomy represents an excellent tonic to the limited ontology associated with either Evans’ embedded autonomy or structural Marxism; it distinguishes between either overly deterministic or overly agent-driven understandings of power. But it isn’t in itself a theory of power: it is an explanandum, not an explanans (Jessop 2016: 93). In other words, in the context of empirical analysis it becomes descriptive rather than analytical. Instead, it must be recognised that relative autonomy arises from relationships between economic region, civil society, institutional structures, social bases of support and resistance, and effectiveness of policies. As a result, a theory of power needs to be articulated that encapsulates an understanding of how power comes to be realised and exercised in the context of the hegemony of different constellations of class (fractions). Or, how a general will is realised and, in the specific context of the research agenda of this book, how a national interest in favour of rapid development comes to be hegemonic within the state.

The elaboration of a state project clearly emerges from the historic record: both in terms of institutions and social relations. This state project—or specific accumulation strategy—can be seen as the product of the hegemony of one class fraction. Although, and crucially, a class fraction that is seen to represent at least some of the interests of different fractions of capital (finance capital, commercial capital, national capital, etc.). This state project must be relevant to the interests of the hegemonic fraction, but also to a critical mass of different fractions of capital. Furthermore, and once again following Gramsci (1971), this hegemony

is (re)produced through elements of civil society—which are themselves part of the state; and hegemony is only truly achieved through the consent of both subordinate classes and the non-hegemonic fractions of capital.

The overall implications of this are a hegemonic accumulation strategy that is linked to the changing balance of forces between capital and labour as modified from time to time by the influence of other class or non-class forces (Jessop 2016: 114). Therefore, hegemonic politics and policies acquire a particular content as a result of the exercise of power. In other words, hegemony of a particular accumulation strategy can be seen as the product of domination. For (neo-)Marxists, this is expressed through class domination, with class understood very much in a *relational* sense and therefore it is social relations that acquire ontological primacy. For (neo-)Weberians, this domination is expressed through political party, status, *and* class domination—although class here is understood more in terms of social groups and therefore relational aspects are not analysed. For Feminists, it is patriarchal domination that is of utmost importance. For (neo)pluralists, it is a vast array of resources, identities, and interests across an array of governance levels that form domination. What all these approaches can have in common is a rejection of state power being above society, and class power being anchored wholly in the economy or in civil society. Therefore, state power is in fact a mediated effect of the changing balance of all forces—class, party, status, gender, identities, and interests—in any given scenario. It therefore follows that state power itself is an explanandum (Jessop 1990: 117), and the explanans is the strategic-relational terrain that reflects and refracts mediated power grounded in a constantly changing balance of different forces: a state's relative autonomy.

### CONCLUSIONS: WHITHER THE STATE?

The levels of coordination and capital required to facilitate successful catch-up development in the form of rapid industrialisation require more than just markets. It requires markets to be harnessed in order to act in a long-term national interest, rather than short-term individual interests. The only viable contemporary institution that is capable of such coordination is the state. The pre-requisites of successful state-led interventions to facilitate catch-up industrialisation have been investigated through the vehicle of Developmental State theory. This chapter

has attempted to show that whilst this has represented a good start, in order for these theories to remain relevant in the 21st century further analysis is required.

This analysis involves two fundamental reformulations of traditional Developmental State theory: the first concerns better understanding of state–society relations, the second integration of national–international concerns in an era of accelerated (neoliberal) globalisation. This chapter has completed the first task, with the next chapter examining the second. In terms of the first task, the state and its associated capacity must be understood as a social relation(ship)—an entity that is the product of a changing balance of social forces. The constitution of those social forces is best conceptualised through the lens of relative autonomy. State power is not therefore a simple reflection of dominant class interests or the monopoly of one class, but rather a complex amalgam and unstable equilibrium of compromise among class, and other social forces. The state provides a context within which political actors are seen to be embedded, and with respect to which they must be situated analytically (Hay 2006: 10). The state therefore is the institutional landscape which political actors must negotiate. For Bob Jessop this landscape is ‘strategically selective’—i.e. it is more conducive to certain strategies, and therefore certain actors, than to others (Jessop 1990: 9–10). The state therefore becomes a ‘factor of cohesion’ (Hay 2006: 62); or, ‘...the state is understood in terms of its effects and is defined in terms of its role in maintaining the unity and cohesion of a social formation by concentrating and sanctioning class domination’ (Poulantzas 1978: 24–25; see also Jessop 1985: 61, 177). In being strategically selective, the state presents an uneven playing field whose complex contours favour certain strategies (and hence certain actors) over others. As a result, ‘...there can be no general or fully determined theory of the capitalist state, only theoretically informed accounts of capitalist states in their institutional, historical, and strategic specificity’ (Hay 2006: 76).

It must never be forgotten that this relative autonomy not only functions in the context of competing and conflicting domestic social interests, but also (real and perceived) external environmental interests: i.e. those of (neoliberal) globalisation and the forces of international capital. In other words, amidst this theorisation and conceptualisation of the state is globalisation. Integration of social relations and relative autonomy into a robust theory of the state requires an appreciation of the fact that ‘long-term, structurally consolidated, class or class-fraction alliances are no



longer located purely on the national level' (Jessop 2002: 190). However, this does not mean that foreign capitals directly participate as autonomous forces in power blocs: 'instead they are represented by certain fractions of the interior bourgeoisie within the power bloc and also have access, through various channels, to the state apparatus' (ibid.). Therefore, the state does not have its own independent power which can either be fused with that of capital or eliminated due to the growing counter power of capital. Instead, state power must be seen in terms of class power; that is, the actions of the state can only be understood as a product of the interaction of social relations of production constituted at a domestic level. Different class fractions that constitute the building blocks of those social relations of production are the product of complex interactions of domestic and international pressures must not be forgotten in the analysis, and through such an approach the role of contemporary neoliberal globalisation can be integrated into a framework for understanding the contemporary (capitalist) state. This task will be undertaken in the following chapter. This will allow the generation of a robust, 21st century theory of state-led developmentalism, paving the way for the empirical analysis of the second half of the book which will apply this framework to two contemporary emerging markets in the form of Argentina and Malaysia.

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