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The Ontological Destruction of the Schematism

Two Readings of the 1st Critique

‘The following investigation is devoted to the task of interpreting Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as a laying of the ground for metaphysics and thus of placing the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology’ [G3 1/1]. This is the opening statement to Heidegger’s 1929 interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, one that clearly announces its utter devotion to the task of destroying this text. In 1927 Heidegger published *Being and Time*, and if he interprets the 1st Critique in its fundamental metaphysical significance, he nevertheless does so from the vantage point of the newly disclosed ‘ontological analytic of Dasein,’ the metaphysical ground of the 1st Critique forever ruined in the wake of this disclosure [1/1]. By 1929 Kant’s own laying of the ground for metaphysics had already been destroyed by that which it rendered possible. Hence ‘the violence’ that does not cease to dominate Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* [xvii/xx]: the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics is placed before us as merely a harbinger for his already accomplished fundamental ontology of Dasein.¹ This violent appropriation of Kant can only be understood in the last

instance as a historical confrontation—in the form of a destruction of the history of ontology—with what the ground-laying of 1781 failed to open up.² However, this should not detract from the importance of having to work out exactly what the stakes of the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics signified for the fundamental ontological movement of Heidegger's own thinking. 'Kant's "Copernican Revolution"' in the 1st Critique can receive its 'true [...] metaphysical sense' only from an engagement that is itself sensitive to the essential problematic of the entire enterprise therein [12/8]. With regard to Levinas's confrontation with Heidegger two interpretations of this problematic become apparent and reveal the stakes of the metaphysical ground-laying in question. In light of this confrontation it would appear that Heidegger's ontological destruction radicalises the metaphysical sense of Kant's revolutionary text to the point of obscuring what is truly at issue. How? In his concerted effort to prioritise the Transcendental Analytic Heidegger diminishes the potential of the Transcendental Dialectic to chart an interpretive direction in the Kantian ground-laying that takes us beyond the problem of Being, one that Kant himself had foreseen, but a direction which Heidegger's own interpretation conceals from us. In this way Heidegger reaches in his Kant lecture courses, and especially in the 1929 *Kantbook*, the schematism of the pure concepts of understanding.³ He therefore removes himself, and Kant along with him, from the supra-temporal excesses of traditional metaphysics which characterise 'the discipline of *Metaphysica Specialis*' [9/6] in order to open himself to an interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a historical outlet for the 'further clarification' of fundamental ontology presented in *Being and Time* [xvi/xix]. As Heidegger comments in the 'Preface to the Fourth Edition' of the *Kantbook*, it was 'the chapter on Schematism' that led him 'to interpret the *Critique of Pure Reason* from within the horizon of [...] *Being and Time*,' because it was this chapter of the 1st Critique which first uncovered the 'connection between the problem of Categories, that is, the problem of Being in traditional Metaphysics and the phenomenon of time,' a schematic connection of Being and time that until then had remained buried within the metaphysical tradition [xiv/xvii–xviii]. Through the schematism chapter of the 1st Critique, Kant lays the ground for the discipline of '*Metaphysica Generalis*

(Ontology)' and anticipates the temporal problematic of fundamental ontology in *Being and Time* [9/6]. In his 'projection of the inner possibility of metaphysics,' in his 'setting-free of the essential ground' of *Metaphysica Generalis* [2/2], Kant came across the problematic of Temporality as such, and he did so by leading this projection back beyond the timelessness of the ideas of pure reason toward the schematism of the pure concepts of understanding because he allowed himself to be drawn there 'by the coercion of the phenomena themselves' [SZ 23/45].⁴ To be sure, Kant ultimately fails to uncover the temporal problem of Being radically enough. However, in spite of this, once accomplished, the ground-laying does allow one to project the problem of Being, of the inner possibility of traditional metaphysics, more directly upon the phenomenon of time. Hence the historical connection which Heidegger explicitly recounts in *Being and Time* and which he ceaselessly suggests in 1929 between, on the one hand, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which in the Transcendental Analytic leads to the ground-laying of metaphysics 'in its originality' such as to free it from the timeless play of concepts alone—that is, from the purely rational ideas of *Metaphysica Specialis*—and, on the other hand, the task of a fundamental ontology of Dasein which interprets this ground-laying of *Metaphysica Generalis* 'in a retrieval' of the problematic of Temporality [G3 3/2]. The originality of the ground-laying of 1781 anticipates both the destruction of traditional metaphysics as well as the need to establish a temporal ontology of Being without having to resort to an ontic knowledge of supratemporal beings: Kant's ground-laying leads away from the timelessness of traditional metaphysics by allowing for the development of a fundamental ontology of Dasein's temporality.

The alternative approach—which belongs to Levinas in principle, even though he failed to outline it in fact—completely overturns Heidegger's ontological directive for reading the 1st Critique. The ground-laying of metaphysics certainly does consist in freeing up the categories in their connection to the phenomenon of time. But far from advancing his reading toward the dialectical expansion of these connections in the hands of the ideas, Heidegger would have unreservedly led Kant's metaphysics back to the schematism of the pure concepts alone, thereby imprisoning the problematic of Temporality within the problem

of Being. Thus, Heidegger's reading of the 1st Critique would perpetuate, even against the author's original intention to re-establish the metaphysical value of the ideas of pure reason, the primacy of fundamental ontology at the expense of ethics as first philosophy. In short, the adherence of Heidegger's Kant-interpretation to the categories of traditional ontology would betray, by recourse to the unquestioned primacy accorded to the schematism of the pure concepts of understanding, those concepts that 'break' with—or 'break up'—the ontological phenomenon of time. To overcome Heidegger's directive for the ground-laying of metaphysics would require that one overcome fundamental ontology, by revealing against its appropriation of Kant's theoretical philosophy, a possibility that had been passed over as early as 1927—of playing the ideas of God, man and world, those concepts foreign to all ontology, *against* the ontological concepts traditionally endowed with the title of categories and which connect to a phenomenon of time appropriate to *Metaphysica Generalis*. Within this topic, according to the development of a schematism of the ideas that will eventually lead it to the temporality of Being-for-the-Other, the 1st Critique of 1781 attempts to restore the ethical primacy of *Metaphysica Specialis* by expanding the phenomenon of time beyond the ontological primacy of the Transcendental Analytic. Kant's ground-laying therefore does not lead away from the timelessness of traditional metaphysics but leads back into it by compelling the Transcendental Dialectic to reveal the ethical expansion of time by the supra-temporal ideas of pure reason.

The conflict of these two interpretations situates the *Critique of Pure Reason* in two opposing directions: Either, reading it on the basis of the Transcendental Analytic, one can retrieve the temporal status of the traditional ontological concepts of metaphysics (the categories), and it then becomes possible to move on to fundamental ontology by carrying out the ground-laying of *Metaphysica Generalis* according to the temporality of Dasein. Or else, reading it on the basis of the Transcendental Dialectic, one reveals the conceptual primacy of the ideas of pure reason, which becomes all the more clear insofar as they expand the phenomenon of time in its connection to the categories of the understanding; it then becomes necessary to move on to ethics as first philosophy, in order to work out the ground-laying of *Metaphysica*

Specialis according to the temporality of Being-for-the-Other. This conflict, which for the purposes of this study becomes unavoidable, gives rise to a host of difficult questions. According to Heidegger's *Kantbook*, and thus in strict accordance with the newly disclosed ontological analytic of *Being and Time*, in what did the ground-laying of metaphysics consist exactly? Does Kant's motive for the ground-laying really concern the temporality of Dasein as newly disclosed by the project of fundamental ontology? Heidegger retrieves the temporal status of the categories; Levinas, in allowing us to begin stigmatising this approach, permits us to reveal the ethical expansion of the temporal by the ideas of God, man and world. Supposing that this distinction is supported by Kant's text, would it not offer a definitive range of material sufficient for us to present the conflict between the two readings in a more elaborate way? In other words, if it is a matter of situating the 1st Critique ontologically on the temporal ground of the schematism in the Transcendental Analytic, then is there not already, in support of the Levinasian reading of the 1st Critique we are proposing, an ethical expansion of this ground in the Transcendental Dialectic? An examination of these questions will not be easy, yet must be conducted if we are ever to reveal the conflicting motivations—both ontological and ethical—for the ground-laying of metaphysics in the 1st Critique.

Destroying the Doctrine of the Schematism

If 'the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism' effectively 'closed off the problematic of Temporality to Kant in 1781, Heidegger immediately recognises the ultimate reason for this in 1927: 'Kant could never achieve an insight into the problematic of Temporality [...] [because] his analysis of it remained oriented towards the traditional way in which time had been ordinarily understood; in the long run this kept him from working out the phenomenon of a 'transcendental determination of time' in its own structure and function' [SZ 23-4/45mod]. Such blockages by the tradition necessitate that one not take the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics as completely genuine, but instead bring to light those 'primordial 'sources'' that remain concealed beneath it,

and from out of which it is ‘in part quite genuinely drawn’ [21/43]. The doctrine of the schematism is not to be taken traditionally as something self-evident, but rather, is that which Kant himself is unable to render problematic and which therefore requires a certain task of ‘destruction’ [23/44]⁵; namely, the task of retrieving the original possibilities of the Kantian ground-laying, those “primordial sources” which elude Kant, but at the same time, enable him to return to the tradition of ontology in a positive manner and make it productive for working out the problematic of Temporality.⁶ Like Kant, who in a characteristic destruction of his own, led the categories—which are perhaps in themselves employed only timelessly—back to the phenomenon of their transcendental determination of time, one must lead the schematism itself and as a whole back toward its sources in the structure and function of Dasein’s ‘temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*]’ [17/38]. Indeed, ‘those very phenomena which will be exhibited under the heading of ‘Temporality’ in our analysis, are precisely those *most covert* judgements of the ‘common reason’ for which Kant says it is the ‘business of philosophers’ to provide an analytic’ [23/45]. The destruction of the doctrine of the schematism already implies the identification of that obscure doctrine with the failure to exhibit the phenomena of Temporality, and in return: ‘Only when we have established the problematic of Temporality [*Problematik der Temporalität*], can we succeed in casting light on the obscurity of his [i.e., Kant’s] doctrine of the schematism. But this will also show us *why* this area is one which had to remain closed off to him in its real dimensions and its central ontological function’ [23/45mod].

That the problematic of Temporality should have remained closed off to Kant is due to the fact that the phenomenon of a transcendental determination of time is governed principally by his own deductive use of the categories, those concepts of traditional ontology which for Heidegger are primarily responsible for the concealment of the dimensions of temporality. The retrieval of the problematic of Temporality therefore requires the task of destruction to reveal the extent to which ‘the chapter on the schematism and the Kantian doctrine of time’ operates with the concepts that the ontological tradition had laid out for it, so as to then be able to reveal the newly established temporality of Dasein that this chapter invariably conceals from us by its employment

of these concepts [24/45]. It then becomes incumbent upon the task of destruction to ‘stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its *limits*; these in turn are given factually in the way the question is formulated at the time, and in the way the possible field of investigation is bounded off’ [22/44]. The destruction of the doctrine of the schematism in terms of its retrieval of the problematic of Temporality has force only if it is a matter of bringing to light what, given the factual limitations imposed upon the Kantian doctrine of time, precisely conceals itself from view; a concealment that arises from out of its unquestioning appropriation of the traditional categories and concepts of ontology.

As these early passages of *Being and Time* confirm, Heidegger can retrieve the temporal problematic inherent in the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics only by carrying out this task of destruction. For only: ‘The destruction of the history of ontology [can] [...] raise the question whether and to what extent the interpretation of Being and the phenomenon of time have been brought together in the course of the history of ontology, and whether the problematic of Temporality required for this has ever been worked out in principle or ever could have been’ [23/44-5mod]. One must carry out a destruction of the doctrine of the schematism because one must lead Kant’s metaphysical enterprise in the 1st Critique back to the interpretive task of destroying its own historical limitations, which have hitherto prevented him, and us, from working out the principle ontological requirements of the problematic of Temporality. Only then can what remains essential to Kant’s own investigation of this temporal problematic come to light. Even the later *Kantbook* does not deviate from the importance of this initial intention, offering itself ‘as a “historical” introduction of sorts to clarify the problematic treated in the first half of *Being and Time*’ [G3 xvi/xix], one that Heidegger insists must be taken in the strictest sense as a “confrontation” [*Auseinandersetzung*]’ with the 1st Critique which aims ultimately at its destruction [249/175mod].⁷ We therefore conclude with Heidegger: the fundamental significance of the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics in the 1st Critique has to do with the elevation of time as determined transcendently by the categories, to the level of a complete ontological destruction of the phenomenon that

was initially worked out in the doctrine of the schematism, that is, to the absolutely decisive role the problematic of Temporality plays with respect to the phenomenon of a transcendental determination of time. The initial projection and the final completion of the ground-laying of metaphysics come into an immediate historical connection: Kant's metaphysical—and indeed, ontological—enterprise is identified as such by leading everything that the schematism claims to be worked out as a phenomenon of transcendental time-determination back to the fundamental ontology of Dasein's temporality. This conclusion gives rise to two arguments, which Heidegger delivers in 1929.

First, Heidegger argues that the constitutive 'problem of the essence of a priori synthetic judgements' formulated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* orients Kant's metaphysical enterprise in no other direction than toward 'the question concerning the possibility of ontological knowledge,' and thus in no way contradicts the Copernican injunction to establish the genuine limits of pure reason [14/9]. In fact, Part 1 of Heidegger's interpretation does not hesitate to recognise that the 1st Critique, insofar as it admits of being a theory of knowledge 'adjusts itself to the ontological,' that is, to the determination of 'the essence of "transcendental truth, which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible"' [17/11].⁸ This revolutionary moment is carried out and acknowledged as such when one realises that for Kant 'the unveiling of [...] ontological knowledge' turns on 'an elucidation' of the a priori synthesis which, as common to all synthetic a priori judgements, first makes this unveiling possible [14/9]. In short, Kant's laying of the ground for metaphysics consists in a 'bringing-forth of the determination of the Being of the being [as] a preliminary self-relating to the being. This pure "relation-to..." (synthesis) forms first and foremost the that-upon-which [*das Worauf*] and the horizon within which the being in itself becomes experienceable [...]. It is now a question of elucidating the possibility of this a priori synthesis' [15/10mod]. This a priori sense of the Copernican revolution augments the ontological direction of the 1st Critique all the more insofar as Kant himself explicitly includes it: 'Kant calls an investigation concerning the essence of this synthesis a transcendental investigation. "I entitle all knowledge transcendental that is occupied in general not so much with objects as with

the kind of knowledge we have of objects, insofar as this is possible a priori.” Hence, transcendental knowledge does not investigate the being itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary understanding of Being, i.e., at one and the same time: the constitution of the Being of the being. It concerns the stepping-over (transcendence) of pure reason to the being, so that it can first and foremost be adequate to its possible object’ [15-16/10].⁹

For Heidegger at least, the Kantian problem of a transcendental elucidation of all synthetic a priori judgements belonging to the discipline of metaphysics does not deviate from the question concerning the possibility of ontological knowledge, but rather constitutes its accomplishment and truth: ‘To make the possibility of ontology into a problem means: to inquire as to the possibility, i.e., as to the essence of this transcendence which characterizes the understanding of Being, to philosophize transcendently. This is why Kant uses the designation “Transcendental Philosophy” for *Metaphysica Generalis* (*Ontologia*) in order to make the problematic of traditional ontology discernable’ [16/10-11]. An interpretation of the 1st Critique must take as its starting point Kant’s reduction of the understanding of Being to the problem of transcendence, i.e., to the question concerning the inner possibility or grounding of ontological truth, which in the first instance characterises the synthesis inherent in all ‘a priori synthetic knowledge’ [17/11]. Only then can we understand how ‘with this revolution Kant forces the problem of ontology to centre stage,’ and on that basis, begin to inscribe the *Critique of Pure Reason* into the ontological problematic passed down to us by the tradition [17/11]. Indeed, when one considers, as Heidegger does, that the whole of the 1st Critique was undertaken for the sake of developing this problem of a priori synthesis,¹⁰ then by implication, any interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a laying of the ground for *Metaphysica Generalis* ‘must pursue the a priori synthesis exclusively in itself, pursue it to the seed [*Keim*] which provides its ground and which allows that synthesis to develop into what it is (allows it to be possible in essence). [...] Thus, the task then arises of showing how this development of the possibility of ontology from its seeds is to be carried out’ [17-18/12].

With this task, we embark upon the second of Heidegger's arguments. It begins with a clear statement of destruction that opens the second part of the book: 'In order to project the inner possibility of ontological knowledge, we must first have opened up a view into the dimension of going back [*Dimension des Rückgangs*] to the ground which supports the possibility of what we are seeking in its essential constitution' [19/13]. What is most certain for Heidegger, what the *Kantbook* names the ground of a priori synthesis, and which alone renders possible Kant's projection of the inner possibility of metaphysics in the 1st Critique, has to do with this: the inner possibility of ontological knowledge, such as it becomes reduced to the constitutive problem of grounding all synthetic a priori judgements, is supported by an essential constitution, one whose primacy must be secured in advance and which guides Kant's own ontological insights from the ground up. Any interpretation that refuses to go back to the ground of Kant's metaphysical projection in the 1st Critique, cannot hope to secure what is most proper or essential to this constitution since any such interpretation excludes itself from 'an explicit, systematic uprooting and marking of the field' upon which an adequate interpretation of the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics becomes possible [19/13]. Consequently, if Kant's projection of the ground in his ground-laying of metaphysics is ignored, if the knowledge of the origin of pure reason which the 1st Critique requires remains undetermined, then the 'original directive force of the projecting,' that is, the essential constitution of the a priori synthesis which plays such a pivotal role in the ground-laying of metaphysics as Kant projects it, will remain concealed [19/13].

Two requirements then become necessary to the success of returning to the ground in question: The first of these is a preliminary 'characterization of the field of origin' of this a priori synthesis, one which concentrates 'on the clarification of the essence of the finitude of human knowledge' [21/15]. It demands that one ensure the return to 'the essential structure of knowledge itself' by means of a thorough appraisal of intuition [21/15]: 'In order to understand the *Critique of Pure Reason* this point must be hammered in, so to speak: Knowing is primarily intuiting. From this it at once becomes clear that [...] thinking is merely in the service of intuition' [21-2/15], and that 'both intuition and thinking

must have a certain inherent relationship that allows their unification,' a unification or synthesis that moreover opens itself up as the ground of 'Representation in general (*repraesentatio*)' [22/16]. It is the grounding of the two sources of knowledge that, above all else, characterises the development of the a priori synthesis that Heidegger is seeking to return to, a 'characterization of the finitude of human knowledge' which at the same time provides 'a clearer indication of the direction which the [process of] going back to the source of the inner possibility of ontology has to take' [35/24].¹¹ Now, this "springing-forth" [*Entspringen*] of our knowledge' into two basic sources cannot itself be a 'mere juxtaposition' of elements, since it is not 'a subsequent result of the collision of these elements,' but is, in terms of the synthesis that unites them, what allows these 'elements in their belonging-together and their oneness [to] spring forth' [36/25mod]. Such oneness of the basic sources of pure knowledge combines what each of them represents of the Being of the being; as the unknown root of sensibility (which represents the Being of the being in accordance with pure intuition) and understanding (which represents the Being of the being represented in pure intuition by representing it in pure concepts) this pure 'veritative synthesis' precedes them in their capacity for ontological knowledge [29/20], perhaps in the sense that here, according to Heidegger, 'something essential arises for the general character of the Kantian laying of the ground for metaphysics' [37/26]. It remains the case that in order to take on the projective function of the ground-laying, the pure veritative synthesis must be irreducible to either of 'the pure elements of pure knowledge' which spring forth from it [39/27], and thus 'goes into and points consciously toward the unknown [...] ground for Philosophy' [37/26].

The second requirement is concerned with the manner of unveiling this unknown ground of the pure veritative synthesis, as well as an indication of the method for confronting what becomes unveiled there.¹² Both are geared toward rescuing pure synthesis from an 'ambiguous indeterminacy' [29/20] by requiring us to return to 'the inner possibility of the essential unity of a pure veritative synthesis,' one that 'pushes us even further back to the clarification of the original ground for the inner possibility of this synthesis' [39/27]. The clarification of

this original ground of the pure veritative synthesis, or quite simply, of ‘ontological synthesis,’ becomes the principal recourse for every elaboration Heidegger ever makes regarding Kant’s distinctive contribution to the ground-laying of metaphysics in the 1st Critique by being the first and last thing to undergo the fundamental ontological retrieval, in this case by becoming unveiled as ‘pure synthesis’ in the deepest sense that Kant gives to this term [39/27]. Hence, the ontological destruction of the Kantian notion of pure synthesis, merely proposed in *Being and Time* as a destruction of the doctrine of the schematism, is now attempted by the investigation of 1929; as early as §8, it announces that the ‘provisional characterization of the essential structure [*Wesensbaues*] of finite knowledge has already revealed a wealth of structures [*Strukturen*] which belong inherently to synthesis’ [40/28]. And yet, the *Kantbook* will hold back from fulfilling the destructive promise of *Being and Time* until near the end of the third part. Part Two, which ‘runs through [the] five stages’ of the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics, does not enter into the ultimate confrontation—namely with the Kantian ground-laying in its originality—but sets about unveiling the ground upon which the ultimate possibility of destruction must play itself out [39/27mod]. Heidegger himself will confirm as much in the opening paragraph to Part Three when he states that ‘what the ground itself is, as already established in the ground-laying, must be clearly delimited’ [126/89].¹³ In fact one will have to wait until §33, explicitly dedicated to ‘the working-out of the inner temporal character of the three modes of synthesis’ [178/124], for Heidegger’s complete unveiling of this synthesis, and thus for its retrieval as the ‘original time’ of Dasein’s temporality [177/124].

If one recognises the guiding thread of pure synthesis throughout each of its stages of development, then the immediate historical connection between the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the ontological analytic of Dasein becomes clear. But what of the method for unveiling this ground? Heidegger posits as ‘a general indication of the fundamental character of the procedure for this laying of the ground for metaphysics’ the ‘type of investigation [which] can be understood as “analytic” in the broadest sense. It concerns finite pure reason with a view to how, on the grounds of its essence, it makes something like ontological

synthesis possible' [41/29mod]. In short, Kant's Transcendental Analytic in the 1st Critique is, in contradistinction to "Psychology" and "Logic" [41/28], a 'revealing of the essence of human Dasein' [41/29]. A semantic reading of the term 'analytic' immediately follows: Analytic means 'a *freeing* which loosens the seeds [*Keime*] of ontology. It unveils those conditions from which an ontology as a whole is allowed to sprout [*aufkeimen*] according to its inner possibility' [41-2/29].¹⁴ We should especially not lose sight here of the root meaning of this 'freeing' as the 'making fluid [*Flüssigmachen*]' or 'bringing into flux [*Fluß-bringen*]' of the 'Origin,' since it coincides with a certain wholly irremovable determination that defines the entire procedure of the Transcendental Analytic [41/29]: the very same inner temporal character of ontological synthesis which lies at the origin of the two sources of pure knowledge and which 'at the same time determines [its] construction' [42/29mod]. The inner temporal character of this construction 'thus becomes a letting-be-seen [*Sehenlassen*] of the genesis of the essence of finite pure reason from its proper ground. In such an analytic, therefore, lies the projecting anticipation of the entire inner essence of finite pure reason. Only in the thorough development of this essence does the essential structure of ontology become visible' [42/29]. Now that is a remarkable equation: the analytic unveiling of the pure synthesis supporting the essential unity of pure knowledge contains within itself an inner temporal character. Temporality not only 'brings metaphysics to the ground and soil [*Grund und Boden*] in which it is rooted as a "haunting" of human nature,' i.e., as the essence of human Dasein, but also more importantly, characterises its fundamental mode of procedure as an anticipatory projection of that ground [42/29].

We can therefore give an initial response to the first of our earlier questions: the ground-laying of metaphysics in the 1st Critique consists in leading the pure concepts of understanding and the pure intuition of sensibility back to the hidden ground of their pure veritative synthesis as defined in the doctrine of the schematism, and thus in radically deepening the ontological sense of this synthesis itself. The inner temporal construction of ontological synthesis implies that the Kantian doctrine of the schematism lets out far more to be seen, at least more to be seen than an unveiling that limits itself to a traditional ontological

understanding of the schematism alone. In other words, because the schematism occupies the central place of what Kant understands universally by the term ‘pure synthesis,’ there is more to be seen than what has traditionally been seen in the ground-laying of metaphysics; namely, exactly as much as the schematism allows to be seen in a fundamental ontological unveiling.

The Kantian Ground-Laying of Metaphysics—Five Stages

But what does the schematism allow to be seen with respect to the inner temporal construction of ontological synthesis? This remains to be answered, but a quick response to this consequence of the first question will allow us to conceive exactly how far the Kantian notion of ‘pure synthesis,’ and therefore also the laying of the ground for metaphysics, proceeds according to the five stages that Heidegger outlines in 1929.¹⁵ In the opening paragraph to his analysis of these stages, Heidegger reiterates what he considers to be the primary aspect of the ground-laying; namely the ‘problem of the possibility of Ontology’ according to the ‘problem of the transcendental, i.e., of the synthesis’ which essentially grounds—or ‘constitutes’—the transcendence of the preliminary understanding of Being’ [42-3/30]. In fact, in 1929, it is a matter of understanding how ‘finite human Dasein’ [42/30] or ‘the finite being that we call “human being” [must] be according to its innermost essence so that in general it can be open to a being that it itself is not and that therefore must be able to show itself from itself’ [43/30mod]. In order to attain the ontological orientation that is demanded by Kant’s transcendental philosophy, it is obligatory to review those key stages of the 1st Critique individually and to ‘follow the inner movement of the Kantian ground-laying’ on that basis [43/30]. Here it is first necessary ‘to assess the appropriateness, the validity, and the limits of the external architectonic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* based on the most original understanding of the inner course of the ground-laying’ [43/30]; and it is necessary to note above all that the Kantian ground-laying leads beyond the limits of its own

enterprise in order to reach the temporality of Dasein. Moreover, in an earlier lecture course conducted in 1927, and which we offer in support of what he is now saying here in 1929, Heidegger states the following: 'In Kant, the [...] decisive thing remains obscure, namely that in asserting existence [...] some being is always intended, but the [...] understanding in the assertion of being looks toward *something else* which, however, is already understood precisely in commerce with beings and in access to them. Expressed in Temporal language, the enpresenting of something has, as such, a reference to beings; but this means that as ecstasis it lets that for which it is open be encountered in the light of its own—the enpresenting's—horizon' [G24 451/317].¹⁶ It is therefore necessary to understand that to begin with, Kant's external architectonic of the ground-laying works in favour of an unveiling of the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of Dasein concealed within it.

The ontological analytic of Dasein is opposed to the schematism alone according to which the time of pure intuition is determined transcendently by the categories of pure thought. It is therefore a matter of submitting the highest synthetic principles of reason to a fundamental ontological destruction. It is a matter of discovering that the synthesis governing this pure transcendental determination of time allows for a deeper clarification, and therefore that this pure synthesis is unveiled according to a temporal figure of unity that far exceeds the schema-image of a category, that is, that far exceeds the pure sensible limits imposed by Kant himself upon the traditional concepts of ontology. The unfolding of the Kantian limitation is accomplished in five stages; each of these stages progressively unveil the pure synthesis of the schematism in such a way as to retrieve its fundamental ontological significance, and with the result that the Kantian schema-image is revealed by Heidegger to be the product of an ecstatic-horizonal construction.

1. In his Introduction to the Transcendental Logic, Kant famously states that intuition would remain utterly blind if there were no concepts of thought to unify it, and that these same conceptual unities of thought would remain completely empty if there was no intuition to fulfil them. Heidegger uses this statement as a reason to posit that the 'finitude of knowledge directly demonstrates a peculiar inner dependency of thinking upon intuition, or conversely: a need for the

determination of the latter by the former' [G3 58/41]. This peculiar attraction 'of the elements toward one another indicates that their unity [...] must have applied to them "earlier" and must have laid the ground for them' [58/41]. Hence, the pure form of intuition—namely time—would not have any validity unless it had already been unified conceptually by the categories of pure thinking; the function of pure intuition is a requirement on its part to 'be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and bound together in order to produce knowledge' [61-2/43]. Conversely, pure thinking must be 'viewed with regard to its own essence, i.e., its pure relatedness to intuition' [57/40], which characterises the unveiling of 'the origin of the categories' in their capacity to take up time and bind it together ontologically [56/40]. In this way, Kant sets about unveiling 'the essence and the idea of the category in general' [56/40].

The unity that is presupposed by each of these elements, and which is earlier in a metaphysical sense, is none other than the unity that Kant himself announces 'by naming it "synthesis"' [60/42]. They can presuppose it only if 'the essential unity of ontological knowledge [...] revolves around the pure Veritative Synthesis' [60/42]. The fundamental task of the 1st Critique is to ask about 'the original union of pure, universal intuition (time) and pure thinking (the notions)' [60/42], such that the 'problem of the pure veritative or ontological synthesis must hence be brought to the question' of how 'the original (veritative) "synthesis"' can appear in its capacity to unify such things as time and the categories [60-1/43]: that is, to the question of unveiling the inner possibility of ontological truth which lays the ground for the discipline of *Metaphysica Generalis*.

2. This ontological synthesis is itself unveiled in the veritative mode of what Heidegger provisionally calls a 'reciprocal preparing-themselves-for-each-other' of the elements of pure knowledge, 'the pure manifold of time' and 'pure thinking' [62/44], for 'it must share the basic character of the two elements, i.e., it must be a representing' [62-3/44]. Now, "Synthesis in general," as Kant himself tells us, "is the mere result of the *power of imagination*, a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are seldom conscious even once" [63/44].¹⁷ This means that the 1st Critique delivers two parts that whilst being irreducible to one another,

are seen to belong to a ‘joining-into-one’ which is exhibited for Kant in ‘the sticking-together [*Syn-haften*] of intuition and the understanding’ [64/45]. From here it becomes ‘evident that there are three parts belonging to the full essence of pure knowledge’ [63/45], and that ‘the pure synthesis of the power of imagination holds the central position’ [64/45].

But how does this pure synthesis of imagination appear at the outset? Upon what ground must the destruction of the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics deploy itself? Provisionally we can say that the pure synthesis of imagination appears in two ways simultaneously: On the one hand, it appears as ‘the pure Synopsis’ ‘in intuition’ [60/43] which “demands” that the pure manifold of time be ‘gathered from dispersion’ by already being made ‘to fit [*fugt*] with thinking itself, i.e., fit with it as a conceptual determining’ [62/44]. On the other hand, it appears as ‘the pure reflecting (predicative) synthesis’ of pure thinking [61/43], which requires that the demand for gathering the pure manifold of time in pure synopsis be guided in advance by being ‘brought to the concept which itself gives it unity. Thus pure synthesis [of imagination] acts purely synoptically in pure intuition and at the same time purely reflectively in pure thinking’ [62/45mod]. We shall elaborate further on these important points in a moment, but already from his outline of the two ways of its appearance it is clear that Heidegger assesses the pure synthesis of imagination ‘as one having a truly superior character’ due to its power ‘to unite such things which in themselves already demonstrate synthetic structure’ [61/43].¹⁸ The power of imagination therefore appears in its ontological superiority as the pure synthesis of intuition and understanding, anticipating the doctrine of the schematism, and it does so, above all, ‘in such a way that it shows how it is able to unify time and notion’ [69/49].

It is therefore necessary to understand that in the 1st Critique, the two parts of ontological knowledge give way to ‘the exhibition’ of the power of the imagination to unify the categories and time, an exhibition that the imagination itself carries out in ‘what Kant calls the “Transcendental Deduction of the Categories”’ [69/49]. Thus, for Heidegger, the ‘basic intention of the “Deduction”’ is to provide an imaginative exhibition of the category of pure thinking in its unity with

the time of pure intuition [69/49]. Pure synthesis of imagination comes into play in order to exhibit the pure synthesis of the category of pure thinking in the pure manifold of time as a pure synopsis in intuition, but only because this synoptic demand to gather the pure manifold of time is itself guided in advance by the categorial synthesis of pure thinking: 'The pure manifold of time [...] belongs to the essential structure of pure thinking [...]. Correspondingly [...] pure intuition is offered in its own right, namely, in the direction of pure thinking' [62/44]. This means that the pure manifold of time is exhibited synthetically in accordance with the categorial structure of pure thinking, and even more significantly still, that the power of pure synthesis itself is not limited to the category of pure thinking alone but is exhibited in the pure manifold of time, which it serves synoptically.

3. Thus the 'pure synthesis' of 'pure intuition and pure thinking' [69/49] exhibits itself in the Transcendental Deduction as the 'essential service [*Dienst*]' that the category of the latter provides the time of the former [71/50]; for it pertains to an 'original self-forming of the essential unity of ontological knowledge' [69/49] that Heidegger now defines as an 'intuiting which takes things in stride [...] in a faculty of letting-stand-against of...', and 'which first of all forms a pure correspondence' with these things [72/51]. Thus, when it exhibits the 'drawing-together into unity' of the pure manifold of time, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories defines 'a setting-forth of unity' or 'connectedness which in advance rules all possible gathering together' [74/52]. It is this 'universal' connection, 'according to which a certain manifold (thus, in uniform fashion) can be posited,' that is attributable to the understanding as 'the faculty of letting-stand-against' out of which we allow the pure intuitive correspondence with things to stand against us [74/52]: 'And what is it that we, from out of ourselves, allow to stand-against? It cannot be a being. But if not a being, then just a nothing [*ein Nichts*]. Only if the letting-stand-against of...is a holding oneself in the nothing can the representing allow a not-nothing [*ein nich-Nichts*], i.e., something like a being if such a thing shows itself empirically, to be encountered instead of and within the nothing' [72/51]. In other words, the letting-stand-against is nothing other than a setting-forth of 'the conditions for the possibility of a preliminary Being-oriented toward the Object, i.e., [...] of the necessary

ontological turning-toward the object in general' [73/51]. Hence, the setting-forth of the unity of the pure manifold of time is equivalent to the setting-forth of the synthesis which forms the horizon of transcendence (the nothing) in which the preliminary encounter with—or turning toward—a being (a not-nothing) is rendered possible. It is this setting-forth itself which 'attains the more original concept of understanding [...] as the *faculty of rules*' [75/52], and which, in its advance ruling over all gathering-together of the pure manifold of time, 'is empowered to regulate in advance all that "intuition" brings forth' [75/53].

But given what Heidegger has already stated about the primary role of intuition, 'how then may the dominant position of the understanding, which is now becoming apparent, be brought into accord with its subservient position? Are its mastery and governing, as the letting-stand-against of the rules of unity, fundamentally a serving?' [75/53]. It is at this moment, in the asking of these questions, that the true significance of the Transcendental Deduction is brought to light, insofar as Kant demands an intuitive exhibition of the faculty of the understanding itself; 'the exhibiting of what, as underlying authority, continues to be legally valid (*quid juris*)' [85/60]. The *quid juris*, whose governance presides over the unfolding of the problem of ontological knowledge in its entirety, is a legal requirement for the Transcendental Deduction, i.e., for 'the proof [of] the possibility of the a priori knowledge of pure concepts to refer to objects. Since the authority for the use of these concepts, which do not come from experience, is never to be shown by means of a reference to their tactical use, the pure concepts "always [demand] the Deduction"' [86/60].¹⁹ This can only entail that the 'authority of the categories must be determined' through a corresponding 'elucidation of their essence. As pure representations of unities within a finite representing, they are essentially dependent upon pure synthesis, and hence upon pure intuition' [86/60-1]. It is the intuitive exhibition of this authority that above all compels the discipline of metaphysics to adhere to its laws, 'a "tribunal" of pure reason that is as equally legislating as it is metaphysical [86/60].'²⁰ In other words, the orientation of the ground-laying toward a deduction of the unities of pure understanding rests entirely on their exhibition in pure intuition by the pure synthesis of imagination.

As early as the Transcendental Deduction the decisive step of unveiling the horizon of transcendence is accomplished, but only on the basis of an ‘unveiling of the essence of the categories [...] which by means of the pure power of imagination refer essentially to time’ [86/61]. Once again, Kant’s metaphysical enterprise remains incomprehensible and unjustifiable if it is not read as an ‘elucidation of the essence of the categories’ in which ‘their “objective reality” is demonstrated’ [86/61]. This demonstration of ‘the objective reality of the categories’ [86/61] by means of ‘the pure synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination’ [87/61], however, does not simply correspond to the unveiling of the “fact-ness” [*Sachheit*]’ of the category [86/61]; it corresponds above all to the unveiling of ‘the “origin and the truth” of the categories,’²¹ that is, it responds to ‘the question of the possible manifestness of Being from beings in the essential unity of ontological knowledge’ such as Heidegger will formulate this again immediately after the completion of the third stage [87/61]:

[T]he Transcendental Deduction has indeed made precisely the totality of ontological knowledge in its unity into a problem. For all that, with the central meaning of finitude and the dominance of the logical (rational) way of posing the question in metaphysics, it is the understanding – or rather its relation to the unity-forming medium, to the pure power of imagination – which comes to the foreground. However, if all knowledge is primarily intuition and if finite intuition has the character of taking things in stride, then for a fully valid illumination of transcendence the reference of both the transcendental power of imagination and the pure understanding to pure intuition must be explicitly discussed. Such a task, however, leads the transcendental power of imagination and the self-forming of transcendence and its horizons to demonstrate their unifying function in their innermost occurrence. [88-9/62-3]

The transcendental power of imagination, via its reference to pure intuition, exhibits the unifying of the pure manifold before exhibiting (and in order to exhibit) the pure manifold; or rather, the letting-be-seen of the unifying of the pure manifold precedes that unifying function so as to let it be seen in its innermost occurrence. Pure intuition therefore does not come after the pure understanding but, by means of the unity-forming

medium of the pure power of imagination, actually precedes it in exhibiting its ontological possibility. It is here that the pure synthesis governing the exhibition of the pure concepts of the understanding in pure intuition receives its fundamental ontological significance: here, at the innermost occurrence of the transcendental power of imagination itself.

4. Whence the fourth stage of the Kantian ground-laying of metaphysics: 'the ground for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge' in its deepest sense [108/76]. In following the precise moment when in 'the section which adjoins the Transcendental Deduction and which bears the heading "On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding," Kant 'undertakes the freeing-up of the essential ground for ontological knowledge as finite, pure intuition' and thus the initial (and anticipatory) projection of the ground-laying of metaphysics in the 1st Critique of 1781, the manner of Heidegger's proceeding cannot but amaze, as much by the subtlety of his interpretation as by his extraordinary conclusion [89/63].²² Hence the fundamental ontological claim that 'the systematic working-out of ontological knowledge in the presentation of the system of synthetic principles must necessarily come across the character of the schematism a priori and must set forth the corresponding transcendental determinations of time' [105-6/75].²³ In other words, whatever be the intentions of unveiling the essential origin of the categories, those categories still require, in principle, at least the possibility of their being intuited within the innermost occurrence of the pure power of imagination which here comes under the title of the schematism. In short, we are dealing with that innermost occurrence of the transcendental power of imagination which intuitively exhibits or 'sets-forth' the categories of the pure understanding as rules for the transcendental determinations of time such that these determinations will reveal themselves as the laying of the ground for metaphysics.

An elaboration of this claim is now required, one that Heidegger does not hesitate to begin providing for us:

[A] pure making-sensible of the pure understanding and its concepts (notions) happens in a transcendental schematism. What this [schematism] itself is, will be clarified with the unveiling of the manner in which it occurs. The schema-forming making-sensible has as its purpose

to procure an image for the concept. What is meant in [this concept], therefore has an ordered relation to a discernibility. In such intuitability, what is conceptually intended becomes perceivable for the first time. The schema brings itself, i.e., brings the concept, into an image. The pure concepts of the understanding [...] require an essentially pure discernibility if in fact that which stands-against in the pure letting-stand-against is to be capable of being perceivable as a Being-in-opposition. The pure concepts must be grounded in pure schemata, which procure an image for them. [102/72]

Prior to the ground-laying of *Metaphysica Generalis* in the 1st Critique, there remained the predominantly logical-rational use of the categories in the hands of *Metaphysica Specialis*, empty and without discipline. Now the categories are themselves ordered to their essentially pure discernibility, are no longer conceptually intended to form an impossible encounter with the timeless objects of God, man and world, but instead become perceivable for the first time as ‘those rules in which objectivity in general as preliminary horizon for the possible encountering of all objects is formed [*bildet*]’ [103/73]. Indeed, what becomes perceivable here is nothing other than the Being-in-opposition of what ‘Kant himself even says [is]: “The pure image...of all objects of sense in general,” [which] however, [is] time.” [...] As “pure image,” time is the schema-image and not just the form of intuition which stands over and against the pure concepts of the understanding’ [103-4/73mod].²⁴

Indeed, Kant does not mean here only the categories, and then their form of pure intuition standing over and against them, as though the categories were somehow determinable within time, but rather their ontological relation, and therefore Kant affirms ‘the innermost structure of this relation’ [103/73] as a schema-image which ‘must necessarily regulate these [categories] internally in time’ [104/73mod]; more than that, Kant affirms that ‘the essential necessity of the relation between notion and time’ is supported by a transcendental declaration [103/73]: namely, that ‘the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding “determine” time. “The schemata are thus nothing but a priori *determinations of time* according to rules,” or put more succinctly, “transcendental determinations of time.”’ [104/74].²⁵ Thus, Kant does not simply understand the categories as requiring their pure intuitability

in an image of time qua the time of the categories, but that the pure intuitability of the categories in a schema-image is itself a rule for the transcendental determinations of time. Now, this pure intuitability of the categories as an a priori rule of transcendental time-determination is precisely what unveils the essence of the categories in their subservience to pure intuition.²⁶ Therefore Heidegger notes that these pure concepts of the understanding require a schema-image which purely intuitively serves them in their essential service to the transcendental determinations of time, and that consequently, such concepts are in need of a 'schematizing intuition' [105/74] that purely discerns them in time 'as rules which impart themselves to a possible look' [104/73]: 'Hence time is not only the necessary pure image of the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding, but also their sole, pure possibility of having a certain look. This unique possibility of having a certain look shows itself in itself to be nothing other than always just time and the temporal' [104/73-4].²⁷

We finally obtain here in 1929 the confirmation that the categories are not only conceptually intended in pure thought but receive their own pure intuitability in the schema-images of time and of temporality as such. It is the inner temporal character of the 'Transcendental Schematism' which ultimately reveals itself as 'the ground for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge,' since it 'forms [*bildet*] that which stands against in the pure letting-stand-against in such a way that what is represented in pure thinking is necessarily given intuitively in the pure image [*Bilde*] of time' [108/76]. Hence, the Transcendental Schematism imposes itself 'through the mediation of the pure synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination,' which grounds the essential relation between notion and time insofar as it is capable of showing how 'the pure concepts are essentially relative to pure intuition (time), and vice versa' [103/73]. It therefore results from the pure and simple return (one demanded by the Transcendental Deduction) to an unveiling of the categories of pure thinking in the pure image of time. For it is precisely through 'this schematism [that] the notion as schematized stands in view in advance, so that in this preliminary view of the pure image [...], a being [...] can show itself for experience' [108/76mod]. Consequently, the transcendence toward a being requires the pure

image of time ‘which in advance bestows upon the horizon of transcendence the character of the perceivable offer. But not only that. As the unique, pure, universal image, it gives a preliminary enclosedness to the horizon of transcendence. This single and pure ontological horizon is the condition for the possibility that the being given within it can have this or that particular, revealed, indeed ontic horizon’ [108/76].

5. The entire course of the Transcendental Analytic—from the deduction of the categories to the doctrine of the schematism—is therefore nothing more than a continuous and progressive unveiling of the transcendence of pure thinking through ‘its [...] “relationship” to “something wholly other.” This other is the being itself’ [115/81]. Now, ‘Kant calls this the relationship to the “wholly other” synthesis (the Veritative Synthesis)’ [115/81], a synthetic relationship of transcendence toward the being that, as Heidegger now goes on to argue, is itself conditioned by ‘a Being-in-there [*Darinnensein*], in a “medium” within which this “wholly other” [...] can be encountered,’ and which is formed by the Transcendental Schematism [115/82]; a medium which it turns out is none other than the ‘inner sense and its a priori form, time’ [116/82]. Therefore, the “highest fundamental principle of all synthetic judgments,” namely, that “the conditions for the *possibility of experience* in general are at the same time conditions for the *possibility of the objects of experience*,”²⁸ is marked by that ‘essential unity’ of pure a priori synthesis which Heidegger has been attempting to elucidate from the beginning, one that he will now present in the following way [118/84]:

[T]he essential unity of the full structure of transcendence [...] lies in the fact that the letting-stand-against which turns itself toward as such forms the horizon of objectivity in general. The going-out-to..., which was previously and at all times necessary in finite knowing, is hence a constant standing-out-from...(Ecstasis). But this essential standing-out-from..., precisely in the standing, forms and therein holds before itself – a horizon. In itself, transcendence is ecstatic-horizonal. The highest principle gives expression to this articulation of transcendence unified in itself. [119/84]

The forming of the ontological horizon of transcendence as the forming of the horizon of objectivity in general, is in itself, and according to its highest synthetic principle, ecstatic-horizonal.

Another confirmation of this point comes from what ‘Kant calls [...] the “transcendental object,” i.e., the Being-in-opposition [*das Dawider*] which is discernible in and through transcendence as its horizon,’ a ‘pure horizon’ of the “object in general” ‘which is known in ontological knowledge [...] such that it holds open this horizon in its character as [...] that which makes up in advance the rough sizing up of all possible objects as standing-against’ [122/86-7]. It is this ontological knowledge which, in its holding open of ‘the horizon of a standing-against,’ rightfully attains the title of ‘original [...] “transcendental truth,” the essence of which is elucidated by means of the Transcendental Schematism’ [123/87]. Thus, by means of its attainment of the transcendental truth of the object in general through the Transcendental Schematism:

Ontological knowledge “forms” transcendence, and this forming is nothing other than the holding-open of the horizon within which the Being of the being becomes discernable in a preliminary way. If truth indeed means: unconcealment of ..., then transcendence is original truth. Truth itself, however, must bifurcate into the unveiledness of Being and the openness [*Offenbarkeit*] of beings. If ontological knowledge unveils the horizon, then its truth lies precisely in [the act of] letting the being be encountered within the horizon. Kant says: ontological knowledge only has “empirical use,” i.e., it serves for the making-possible of finite knowledge in the sense of the experience of the being which shows itself. [123-4/87]

It has now become apparent that the Transcendental Schematism does indeed offer an initial, if somewhat obscure, exhibition of the inner temporal character of the pure synthesis that grounds the unity of the two sources of pure knowledge, and that a critique of pure reason, insofar as it is charged with the task of a laying of the ground for *Metaphysica Generalis*, discovers its fundamental principle, one that had until now been concealed, in the ecstatic-horizonal unveiling of the Being of beings. It is the temporality of Dasein alone that determines in advance the inner course of the Kantian ground-laying throughout its five stages of development.

And yet for Heidegger, these ecstatic-horizonal characters of the ground-laying ‘are not so much developed systematically through and

out of an analysis of time itself, but instead are fixed in it “according to the order of the categories,” which is to say, according ‘to the four moments of the division of the categories’ given in ‘the Table of Notions’ [105/74].²⁹ Consequently, a further advancement beyond the ‘universal essence of the schematism in general, and of the transcendental in particular’ [106/75], is required so as ‘to grasp the ground-laying which has now been achieved in a still more original way’ [126/89]. Therefore, the transcendental limits fixed in the analysis of time by the *Critique of Pure Reason* must be subjected to a further task of destruction, one that far exceeds the schematizing intuition of the categories of traditional ontological thought—but for one reason: the fundamental ontological requirement to retrieve the inner temporal character of the pure synthesis which, concealing itself within the categorial ordering of the transcendental schemas of time, renders possible the unveiling of the Being of beings by way of the ontological analytic of Dasein’s temporality.

We thus come upon the last consequence of the first of our earlier questions: Does the ground-laying of 1781—now identified with the task of retrieving the inner temporal character of the doctrine of the schematism, of an elucidation of pure synthesis itself in its original form—really concern the temporality of Dasein as newly disclosed by the project of fundamental ontology?

Notes

1. For an alternative argument to this retrospective reading of the *Kantbook*, see Stephan Käufer’s essay ‘Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’ in Daniel O. Dahlstrom (ed.), *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 174–96. He is especially critical of the chronological distortion of such readings.
2. The various issues raised by the appropriative violence of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation, as well as the related charge levelled against the obscurity of his *Kantbook*, lie well beyond the reach of this work. For an astute examination, see Mark Weatherston, *Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination and Temporality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 1–5.

3. The two most significant Kant lecture courses to mention in this context would no doubt have to be G25 and the second part of G21. For a detailed discussion of the composition and central theses of Heidegger's lecture courses on Kant, see the essays written by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, 'Heidegger's Kant-Courses at Marburg' in Theodore Kisiel & John van Buren (eds.), *Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays on His Earliest Thought*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 293–9, and Christopher Macann, 'Heidegger's Kant Interpretation' in Christopher Macann (ed.), *Critical Heidegger*, (London: Routledge, 1996), 98–9.
4. Indeed, Heidegger considers Kant to be: 'The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality' [SZ 23/45]. The most precise echo of these claims is found, outside of *Being and Time* and the *Kantbook*, in the final section of G32 where Heidegger writes that 'in fact the problematic of "being and time" flares up for the first and *only* time in Kant' [G32 212/146-7]. See also G21 194/163: 'Kant is the only philosopher who even suspected that the understanding of being and its characteristics is connected with time.'
5. The reader is urged to consult Theodore Kisiel & John van Buren (eds.), *Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays on His Earliest Thought* for three exemplary essays written on Heidegger's projected task of 'destruction': Jeffrey Andrew Barash, 'Heidegger's Ontological "Destruction" of Western Intellectual Traditions', 111–21; Robert Bernasconi, 'Repetition and Tradition: Heidegger's Destructuring of the Distinction Between Essence and Existence in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*', 123–36; and Otto Pöggeler, 'Destruction and Moment', 137–56. A more detailed and judicious commentary has been provided by Benjamin D. Crowe in his admirable book *Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity*, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006); see especially the final chapter.
6. Two works that have adequately emphasised the fundamental importance of 'retrieval' for understanding Heidegger's project of destruction in the *Kantbook* are Charles M. Sherover's *Heidegger, Kant, and Time*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), 10–23 & 213–21, and Frank Schalow's *The Renewal of the Heidegger-Kant Dialogue: Action, Thought, and Responsibility*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 188–204.

7. The equivalence Heidegger establishes here between interpretation, confrontation and destruction, is rendered even more explicit in G31 292/198.
8. Heidegger here quotes Kant at A146/B185.
9. The Kant quotation is from A11/B25. See also Charles M. Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant, and Time*, 27–36.
10. ‘It is ontological knowledge, i.e., the a priori synthesis, “for the sole sake of which the whole critique is undertaken.” Just by establishing the guiding problem of this grounding of metaphysics, a more precise determination of this synthesis becomes all the more pressing’ [G3 15/10]. The quotation of Kant in this passage can be found at A14/B28.
11. See also Charles M. Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant, and Time*, 38–47.
12. ‘The *Critique of Pure Reason* [...] is “a treatise on method.” In this context, however, that [...] signifies [...] the working out of a complete determination of the “whole contour” and the “whole internal, articular structure” of ontology. In this laying of the ground for metaphysics as projection of the inner possibility of ontology, the “complete sketch of a system of metaphysics is drawn” [G3 16/11].
13. The five stages of the Kantian ground-laying come under ‘the following headings: (1) The Essential Elements of Pure Knowledge; (2) The Essential Unity of Pure Knowledge; (3) The Inner Possibility of the Essential Unity of Ontological Synthesis; (4) The ground for the Inner Possibility of Ontological synthesis; (5) The full Determination of the Essence of Ontological Knowledge’ [G3 38-41/27-8].
14. Heidegger’s most succinct account of the ‘*analytic* as understood by Kant’ appears in G31 177-82/125-8. He provides a far more detailed and lengthy discussion of Kant’s Transcendental Analytic in G25 199-255/136-73.
15. The clearest and most thorough exposition of these five stages of the Kantian ground-laying can be read in Charles M. Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant, and Time*, 48–130. For a briefer, but equally lucid, account of these same five stages, see William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 116–36, and especially John Sallis, *Echoes: After Heidegger* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 104–7. See also Christopher Macann, ‘Heidegger’s Kant Interpretation’ in *Critical Heidegger*, 106–7.

16. The significance that the ecstasis of enpresenting holds here with respect to the Kantian ground-laying will not be made apparent until our discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of the three time-forming modes of pure synthesis, and in particular the pure synthesis of apprehension which he carries out in the third part of the *Kantbook*. For this reason, we have allowed ourselves to cite this earlier text written prior to the *Kantbook* in preparation for what follows.
17. See also A77/B103. The italics are Heidegger's own.
18. For an insightful commentary on Heidegger's assessment of these different types of pure synthesis, specifically with respect to the problem of their unification in the pure veritative or ontological synthesis of imagination, one really should consult Chap. 4 of Martin Weatherston's *Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination and Temporality*, 85–100.
19. The quotation is from A85/B117.
20. Heidegger cites two sources here: A669/B697 & A703/B731. We shall return to this tribunal of pure reason in our interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic.
21. Kant quoted at A128.
22. On the role of the schematism in the ground-laying of ontological knowledge according to the *Kantbook*, see Charles M. Sherover's exposition in *Heidegger, Kant, and Time*, 102–20.
23. As a matter of interest, the four groups contained within the system of synthetic principles are called by Kant the 'Axioms of Intuition,' the 'Anticipations of Perception,' the 'Analogies of Experience,' and the 'Postulates of Empirical Thought as such.' Heidegger himself provides an extensive analysis of all these principles in G41 187-254/184-243.
24. See also A142/B182.
25. The Kant quotations are themselves taken from A145/B184 & A138/B177 respectively.
26. We now see how the "mastery and governing" of the understanding over intuition is "fundamentally a serving." The schema-image allows us to capture the power inherent in this service, insofar as it places an a priori demand on the category to carry out the transcendental determination of time. The same issue of determination also inhabits the centre of the 1961 lecture entitled 'Kant's Thesis about Being'. This should cause no surprise, since the latter work is directly informed by, and thus builds upon, the earlier discoveries of the *Kantbook*. Thus, in

elaborating upon The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection as ‘the situational context of the site in which being as positing belongs’ [G9 472/357], Heidegger writes that: ‘Even the mere enumerating of the concepts of reflection gives us hints for a more thorough understanding of Kant’s thesis about being as positing. Positing shows itself in the joining of form and matter. This is explained as the difference between determining and the determinable, i.e., with regard to the spontaneity of the act of understanding in its relation to the receptivity of sensuous perception’ [474/359].

27. The ‘look’ of time is here announced for the first time. The ‘pre-forming proposing’ of that look will be the subject of the next chapter.
28. Kant quoted by Heidegger at A158/B197.
29. See also A145/B184.

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