

Preface

This book brings together nine essays around a central thesis, namely, Kant's radical subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge, which is delineated in the introductory essay. All of the essays were written, for various occasions, after the publication of my *Kant's Deduction and Apperception: Explaining the Categories* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012), except for Chap. 9, which is based on a contribution to a volume on Kant's idealism, which I co-edited with Jacco Verburgt (*Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine*, Springer 2011), and Chap. 5, which has its origin in an article that first appeared in Dutch in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* in 2010. The essays address central issues in the Deduction—and in the case of Chap. 9, questions that are the corollary of the claims of the Deduction—that were not, or only tangentially, dealt with in that earlier book. Importantly, the present book deals with the core arguments in the so-called 'second step' of the B-Deduction as well as the essential account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction, neither of which I addressed in the earlier book. It also includes a short essay on a historical interpretation of Kant's Deduction by G.W.F. Hegel.

I would like to express my gratitude to Corey Dyck, Marcel Quarfood and Andrew Stephenson for taking part in the discussion of my previous book on the Deduction in the pages of *Studi kantiani*, and for providing detailed and thoughtful criticisms. I thank Claudio La Rocca for facilitating the discussion in *Studi kantiani*. My response to the critics, which forms the basis of Chap. 2, should ideally be read in tandem with their critiques, published in the 2014 issue of *Studi kantiani* (see Dyck 2014; Quarfood 2014; Stephenson 2014). An early version of Chap. 7 was originally written for an invited talk at the conference *Kant's Conception of Empirical Knowledge*, organised by Ido Geiger in collaboration with the Israel Institute of Advanced Studies, and held at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 8–11 December 2013. Unfortunately, I could not attend. I thank Ido for the initial opportunity to write the essay, which is presented here for the first time. I also thank Marcel Quarfood and Scott Stapleford for providing extensive feedback on earlier drafts of various chapters, Robert Hanna for his comments on an earlier version of Chap. 4, Jacco Verburt for his feedback on Chap. 8, and Wolfgang Ertl for his very useful comments on the penultimate draft of Chap. 9.

Christian Onof read the entire book in its penultimate form, and I am ever so grateful for his insightful and critical observations and suggestions for improvement. Parts of Chap. 7 would not have been if not for our collaborative research project on 'Kant and space' during 2011–2014, which was presented in outline at the UK Kant Society conference in St Andrews, 1–3 September 2011, and resulted in two co-authored articles: 'Kant, Kästner and the Distinction between Metaphysical and Geometric Space', which appeared in *Kantian Review* 19(2) (2014): 285–304, and 'Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal Intuition. On the Note to B160 in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*', which was published in the *Philosophical Review* 124(1) (2015): 1–58, as well as a translation of Kant's *Über Kästners Abhandlungen*, which appeared as 'On Kästner's Treatises' in *Kantian Review* 19(2) (2014): 305–313.

Some of the material in this book appeared in print in an earlier form elsewhere. I gratefully acknowledge permission of the respective publishers to reprint material here. Chapter 2 appeared, in a shorter version,

under the title ‘Kant’s Deduction *From* Apperception: A Reply to My Critics’, in *Studi kantiani* XXVII (2014): 95–118. An abridged version of Chap. 4 also appears in G. Motta and U. Thiel (eds.) *Immanuel Kant. Die Einheit des Bewusstseins* (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, forthcoming). Some arguments in Sect. 4.10 are based on arguments first presented in my article ‘Kant’s Idealism: The Current Debate’, in *Kant’s Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine*, ed. D. Schulting and J. Verburgt (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 1–25. Chapter 5 is based on material that appeared originally in ‘Kant, non-conceptuele inhoud en synthese’, *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 72(4)(2010): 679–715, and in ‘Probleme des „kantianischen“ Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion’, *Kant-Studien* 106(4)(2015): 561–580. Some of the ideas in Chap. 8 date back to a paper I wrote for the Hegel conference on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of *Faith and Knowledge* in Jena, Germany, in 2002, published as ‘Hegel on Kant’s Synthetic A Priori in “Glauben und Wissen”’, in *Hegel-Jahrbuch: Glauben und Wissen. Dritter Teil*, ed. A. Arndt et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005), pp. 176–182. Lastly, Chap. 9 is a substantially revised and expanded version of ‘Limitation and Idealism: Kant’s “Long” Argument from the Categories’, which appeared in *Kant’s Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine*, ed. D. Schulting and J. Verburgt (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 159–191.

Unfortunately, as most of the manuscript was already completed when Henry Allison’s magisterial new book on the Transcendental Deduction (Allison 2015) came out, I do not address it here. I intend to publish a separate essay on the newest literature on the Deduction, which will include a discussion of themes from Allison’s book (see Schulting MS). I was also not able to incorporate an account, in particular in Chap. 7, of Michael Friedman’s latest reflections on the issue of space and geometry in the B-Deduction (Friedman, forthcoming). Professor Friedman kindly provided me with a copy of his article, but the book was already in production. I hope to engage with it on another occasion.

This book is dedicated to Cristiana Battistuzzi, my companion in everything.

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Kant's Radical Subjectivism

Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction

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