

Migration Times and Ethnic Identity: Mexican Migration to the US Over Three Generations

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Abstract This chapter uses census material and interviews with three generations of Mexican migrants to the US to explore the changing meaning of migration for family strategies of survival and how it affects transnational identities in both the US and Mexico. Using the concepts of family time and industrial time (labor markets and urbanization), and adding that of migration time (the dominant US migration policy), it looks at migrant family economies and the different ways family members adapted to historical changes in industrial time and migration time. The paper begins with the Bracero Program (1941–1962) and continues with the surge in undocumented migration from the 1970s and the peak in the 1990s, ending in the present when non-visa net migration to the US is close to zero. The drastic change in migration policy with the border blockade of the new millennium has paradoxically locked temporary undocumented migrants into the United States. This has helped create a new demographic in the US in which Hispanic children, mainly of Mexican origin, are the largest single ethnic component in the school-age population in many cities and states. It also weakens transnational ties with Mexico at the same time as the rise in involuntary deportations increases the insecurity of a substantial portion of the Mexican-born population in the US.

Introduction

In 2010, the 50 million Latinos, of whom some two thirds are of Mexican Origin, was the largest single minority group in the United States. Moreover, by midcentury, population projections show that non-Hispanic whites will cease to be the majority of the US population. Yet, as Sáenz (2013) points out, despite its size and long history of migration to the US, the Mexican origin population remains largely ignored in politics and in the media, and continues to be seen as perpetual foreigners in the US. This paradox has a partial explanation in a common border and

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the substantial differences in wages between US and Mexico. In 2010, the GDP of the US was still fourteen times larger than that of Mexico despite Mexico's economic growth; the prospects of substantially higher wages continued to motivate Mexicans, especially from the impoverished countryside, to migrate temporarily as well as permanently to the US with or without documents.

Though economics is part of the story of Mexico-US migration, it inevitably underestimates the importance of return migration in the imaginaries and practices of Mexican migrants and the consequences of both dimensions of return for the identities of Mexican migrants in the US. I focus in this paper on return migration, both voluntary and involuntary, as a means of capturing the changing social dynamics of Mexican migration to the US as return becomes less of a natural process of reincorporation into place of origin and the distinction between forced and voluntary return becomes blurred. In each generation, the economic rationale for migration is evident, but its significance for migrants and their families alters over time with changes in Mexican and US labor markets.

I look at changes in the three social timings that, I argue, shape Mexican migration. These are family time and industrial time as used by Hareven (1982, 2000); and socially expected durations, as used by Merton (1984), which I label migration time. I use these timings to understand the social changes in return and non-return migration between Mexico and the US from 1941 with the initiation of the Bracero program (1942–64) until the present. I use these perspectives to understand the inter-generational aspect of Mexican migration to the United States. I begin with the Bracero generation, those who worked in the US between 1942 and 1964, using a sample of ex-Braceros who were interviewed in Mexico in a joint project of UT-Austin and CIESAS del Occidente in Guadalajara.¹ We looked at the migrations of their children, and finally those of their grandchildren. The sample is a relatively small one of some 20 cases, though that generates substantial numbers in the following generations: one ex-bracero has, for instance, 143 descendants, the great majority of whom also migrated to the US. Much of what I will say is relatively well-known because of the extensive work in Mexico and the US on Mexico-US migration (Durand et al. 2001; Escobar 2008; Massey et al. 2002).

Our sample of Braceros comes from four different localities. One is the city of Guadalajara, the home of a considerable number of ex-braceros. The others are different types of rural localities. One is a thriving commercial agricultural municipality, another is an Indian village, and the third is a tiny hamlet of some 25 houses in the highlands. All three rural localities are within commuting distance of the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, indeed buses arrive early in the morning from 'maquiladora' plants in the south of Guadalajara to transport mainly women from the Indian village to work. Each of these localities represents different types of economic opportunities and challenges to residents, which, as we will see, have

¹The interview data were collected by researchers from CIESAS del Occidente (Elizabeth Perez and, Daniela Jiménez), the Colegio de Michoacan (Marcelo Zamora) and the University of Texas at Austin (Josh Greene). Names and/or locations when relevant have been anonymized in this chapter to protect study participants' confidentiality.

affected the family strategies of the bracero families and the incidence of return migration amongst them.

Timings and Migration

Based on three generations of work histories of families in Manchester, New Hampshire, in the first half of the 20th century, Hareven (1982, 2000) argued that in face of changing economic circumstances, families acted as collective work units, allocating responsibilities in terms of the needs of the family economy and the stage in life and family cycle. Their strategies enabled families to cope with fundamental changes in the economy, such as the shift from agricultural to industrial work, and the challenges of recession and unemployment. Hareven makes clear that the balance of power was with the imperatives of industrial time, to which families adapted their strategies, and which fundamentally changed family economies. The shift was from the collective family work units of the transition from agricultural to industrial work that coordinated the paid labor and other forms of assistance of parents, children and often extended kin, to family consumption units in which members of the nuclear family follow individual labor trajectories and have individual consumption preferences. Migration was a family strategy in Manchester, NH, including internal migration from countryside to work in the city and the immigration of families from Europe. We will see, however, that changes in industrial time happen in different ways and at different timings in the US and Mexico. Our migrants have faced not just one historical set of changes in industrial time, but two. This inevitably gives a different character to the changes in family economies and strategies to our Mexican migrants as compared to Hareven's Manchester, NH, families.

Hareven's was one of the most influential of the many studies in the 1970s and 1980s by historians, anthropologists and sociologists that emphasized the importance of the family and household, their internal timings and coordination in how people coped with the major transitions of urbanization and industrialization. Its value rests on reminding us that time and sequence are vital explanatory factors in understanding social trends. Context changes so that, for example, the ways by which the poor cope in one generation or one location are likely to show important differences with the ways they cope at other times and places, even if there may be some overall similarities. Equally important are memories and family memories, including expectations of migration. Circumstances may change, but children and grandchildren remember how their parents and grandparents lived. In our Jalisco sample, memories, negative and positive, shape how even a third generation copes with the present.

The third type of timing, Socially Expected Durations, is a product of the social environment (Merton 1984). They get their force from the pressure of social and institutional norms and affect migrants' adaptation as well as their ethnic identity in their own eyes and that of others (Roberts 1995). Migration is one of the most

consequential of expected durations. When a migrant sees migration as only temporary, it is likely to affect commitments in the place of destination, such as renting rather than purchasing a home or not seeking citizenship. Likewise viewing migration as permanent will likely lead to commitments such as raising a family and gradually cutting ties with the place of origin, such as ceasing to send remittances. Groups of migrants culturally institutionalize expectations of duration, as shown by the differences between twentieth century immigrants to the US by country of origin. These differed substantially in their propensity to naturalize and to return home after immigration (Roberts 1995).

Migration systems between countries or, for that matter, between urban and rural locations shape expectations of migration duration. A temporary migration system is one in which migrants have insecure subsistence conditions at home that they supplement by migration and work in places where the amount of time that they can work is restricted by the seasonal nature of the work and/or by government regulations. Temporary migration continues because families can subsist at home through farming or craft activities, when supplemented by the cash income of the migrant member. Temporary migrants can survive on relatively low wages in their destinations and make savings because the home village effectively subsidizes them by providing for the subsistence of their family members while they are absent. This type of migration system applies to internal migration as well as to international migration: it was documented in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, in Peru in the 1970s and applied as much to migration to work in mines or urban centers as to work in commercial agriculture (Epstein 1960; Mitchell 1959, 1969; Long and Roberts 1984).

In contrast, a permanent system of migration emerges when at home subsistence possibilities decline, whereas work opportunities increase and broaden in the place of destination. At home, population pressure on land, inequitable land distributions or competition from commercial agriculture or imported manufactures undermine even the possibility of subsistence agriculture or crafts for families left behind. At the place of destination, work opportunities become year round, as urban economies demand labor and government lifts restrictions, formally or informally, on migrant families settling in the place of destination. Immigration laws and policies can strengthen or weaken both permanent and temporary migration systems, but are unlikely to resolve the cultural ambiguities involved in making cultural commitments.

The long history of Mexican migration to the US shows a gradual transition from a predominantly temporary migration system to one that is more permanent (Masferrer and Roberts 2012). The difference between temporary and permanent migration is conceptual and not empirical. There are no easy ways of determining empirically whether people return to destinations in Mexico other than their places of origin. Even intentions are unreliable since migrants, as did the 19th century Irish, often claim that they will return, but, in practice, die in their place of destination. The continuing attachment of migrants to family and community relationships in Mexico and to Mexican cultural practices characterizes this transition in the case of Mexican migration. It gives rise to a transnationalism defined as groupings of immigrants who participate on a routine basis in a field of relationships, practices, and norms that include both places of origin and places of destination

(Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Rouse 1992). Transnationalism can ease adaptation to a new culture, but it is also sustained by the blocking of opportunities in both country of origin and country of destination—migrants see few permanent prospects in either their country of origin or of destination.

The Structural Changes in Migration from Mexico to the US

From censuses and surveys, we can obtain a general outline of the structural changes in Mexico-US migration (Masferrer and Roberts 2012). A major change has been from a predominantly circular or temporary pattern of migration in the 1970s in which most migrants (some 75%) returned within five years of leaving Mexico, to one in which most migrants (some 75%) in the new millennium did not return within five years.

The Mexico-US migration system changed from temporary to permanent as Mexican peasant agriculture grew increasingly unable to sustain the rural population both from population growth and the undermining of smallholder agriculture by large-scale commercial agriculture and imports, such as those fostered by NAFTA. In the US, the prospering urban economies of the 1950s onwards created an increasing demand for low-end service and construction labor, and a relatively open border, until the late 1990s, and amnesties such as that of 1986, permitted the entry not only of a male labor force, but of women and families.

In the 1940s to 1960s, Mexican labor migration to the US was heavily concentrated in the traditional sending states (mainly those of the central-west of Mexico, such as Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Zacatecas etc.) and came mainly from small towns and villages of 2500 people or less. This concentration has continued to this day, but diminishes as a proportion of total Mexico-US migration with each census (Binational Study of Migration 1998; Masferrer and Roberts 2012). New sending areas in the South, Center and North of the country have emerged and now account for the majority of migrants captured by the census. Equally, small places are less important than they once were in migration, and larger numbers of migrants are leaving from Mexico's cities. Another change over time is in the destination of migrants. In the 1940s to 1960s, most Mexican migrants went to work in agriculture in California, Texas, or other US border states. Recent censuses in the US have captured the enormous dispersion of contemporary Mexican migration to the US, with new receiving areas emerging, such as Georgia, the states of the North-East and North-West, as well as the Middle West. The occupations have also changed with a minority of migrants now working in agriculture in the US and the majority working in services.

Demographic change in Mexico fueled migration (Table 1). After the disturbances of the revolutionary years, Mexico entered a period of relative stability and of rapid population growth. Declining rates of population increase followed from 1980 onwards until 2000–2010 saw an increase of 1.4%. The 1940s onwards were

Table 1 Population growth in Mexico

Year	Population	Population growth	% Rural (<2500)
1910	15,160,369		73.1 (11,082,230)
1921	14,334,780		
1930	16,552,722	1.6	
1940	19,653,552	1.7	64.9
1950	25,791,017	2.7	
1960	34,923,129	3.0	
1970	48,225,238	3.2	
1980	66,846,833	3.3	33.8
1990	81,249,645	2.0	
2000	97,483,412	1.8	
2010	112,236,538	1.4	23.1 (25,926,640)

Source Mexican Censuses

also years of rapid urbanization in Mexico, particularly from 1960 to 1990. Mexico changed from a country that was 64.9% rural in 1940 to one that was 49.3% rural in 1960, 33.8% in 1980 and 23.1% in 2010. At the time of the Mexican Revolution, Mexico was 73.1% rural; but the number of people living in rural places was half that living in rural places in 2010, and even by the narrower definition of people working in agriculture, there were more peasants in Mexico in 2010, than in 1910. Population increase in Mexico together with the diversification of employment opportunities in the US gave Mexican migration to the US a unique character when compared to the other international migrations that populated the US. Mexican migration to the US was not only one of the oldest and largest but was also one that never stopped. Compared to the drastic decreases over time in the proportion of the foreign-born among other important immigrant groups, such as those from Poland and Italy, the Mexican foreign-born did not show a consistent decline (Table 2).

The constant flow and spread of Mexican immigration has had the effect, I argue, of creating the appearance that Mexican migrants are always recent and temporary. Whereas Italians and Poles, over the generations, diluted their ethnic characteristics in terms of language, residential concentration and intermarriage with other ethnic groups, this was less marked amongst Mexicans. In 1980, 75% of people of Italian ancestry and 82% of those of Polish ancestry born after 1950 married outside their ethnic group compared with some 30% of US-born Hispanics (Alba 1991). In a 2000 restudy of Mexican origin residents in Los Angeles and San Antonio who were originally interviewed in 1965, Telles and Ortiz (2008) conclude that on various measures of education, income and intermarriage assimilation to US averages has been very slow, and that Mexican Americans are clearly less accepted than European immigrant groups of a century previous.

These changes in the demography and geography of migration provide the frame for the generational life history analysis that follows. The major points that we should bear in mind are first that at the same time as migration to the US increases, opportunities are opening up in Mexican cities, stimulating rural-urban migration.

Table 2 Foreign-born percentage of two generations, 1910–1970

Country of origin	Mexico		Poland		Italy	
Year of census	% foreign born ^a	Rate of growth FB ^b	% foreign born	Rate of growth FB	% foreign born	Rate of growth FB
1910	58	NA	56	8.9	64	10.2
1920	66	7.8	47	2.0	48	1.8
1930	52	2.8	38	1.1	39	1.1
1950	34	−1.7	31	−1.9	31	−1.1
1960	33	2.4	27	−1.4	28	−1.3
1970	32	2.8	23	−3.1	24	−2.2
1980 ^c	28.6	10.6	5.1	−2.7	6.8	−1.9
1990 ^c	38.4	7.0	4.2	−0.5	4.4	−2.6
2010	33.8	7.2				

Sources U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Part I, Series C 195-227, C 228-295. Bureau of the Census, 1980 and 1990 Census Special Tabulations

^aThrough 1970, this is the proportion of the group that is foreign born (first generation) of the total population that was either born in the country of origin or whose parents were born in that country. From 1980, the proportion is the proportion foreign-born of the total population that considers itself of that ancestry

^bThis is annual rate of growth of foreign-born since previous census year

^cThe 1980 and 1990 Censuses ceased to ask for birthplace of the respondent's parents and, for the first time, contained an ancestry question, asking for the nationality group with which the person identifies (Lieberson and Waters 1988: 6–9)

Rural residents face a strategic choice; move to the city or the US, or combine both strategies. Second, the economic opportunities facing Mexican migrants are changing both in Mexico and in the US: the decline of agricultural livelihoods in Mexico, and the increase of non-agricultural opportunities in the US. Third, rapid population growth and large family size enables and forces families to diversify their survival and social mobility strategies.

The Bracero Generation

A. Antecedents

In the early part of the twentieth century, a system of temporary labor had long supplied labor for agriculture in California, Texas and other Southwestern states, and for construction and industry in the Midwest. This system was predominantly circular and mainly consisted in young males aged between 20 and 44 (Gratton and Merchant 2013; Taylor 1970 [1930], 240–241). A portion of Mexican immigrants increasingly settled in the US in the 1920s, as women as well as men arrived so that just over a million second and third generation Mexican immigrants resided in the

US by 1930. There was little fresh net immigration to the US during the Depression years, and there was a substantial repatriation of Mexican immigrants, including those that were US citizens. Estimates indicate that there was an ‘excessive’ repatriation/deportation in these years that could be attributed to anti-Mexican sentiment by US communities and authorities (Taylor 1930, 34); but much repatriation was voluntary and was assisted by the Mexican government and supported by an anti-emigration sentiment in Mexico itself (Gratton and Merchant 2013). Until the 1970s, Mexican government policy was formally anti-emigration, fueled in part by fears of losing both skilled and unskilled labor needed for developing the economy; but, in practice, local authorities might encourage out-migration, particularly as a safety valve during the agrarian conflicts of the 1920s (Fitzgerald 2006).

Whatever the reality of repatriation, public attitudes on both sides of the Border reinforced the image of Mexicans, whether born in the US or not, as temporary foreign workers. Both the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the California Development Association depicted Mexicans in the 1920s as essentially a temporary labor force; while an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* of 1930 reporting the facts about Los Angeles ignored the presence of the sizeable Mexican-origin colony, seeing Los Angeles as populated by native Americans, mainly from the Mid-West (Romo 1983, 86–87). The ‘temporary’ nature of Mexican immigration is also brought out by US anthropologist, Robert Redfield, who carried out six months of field research into Mexican immigrant communities in Chicago between 1924 and 1925 (Arias and Durand 2008). Redfield brings out the reality of the competition that the Mexican arrivals brought to other ethnic groups in both housing and jobs. He also brings out the difficulties that Mexican families faced in terms of very low income, step inter-city migration, residential mobility and in educating their children. But he found no evidence of family break-down amongst this group of Mexicans that employers and other ethnic groups saw as essentially transitory; they put up with their conditions with little complaint, crime or desire to assimilate (Arias and Durand 2008, 75–76).

B. Family Time in Face of Alternative Industrial Times

It is against this background of temporary and undocumented migration to the US that our sample of ex-braceros began to migrate to the US. The Bracero program from 1942 to 1964 was agreed between the US and Mexican governments in response to US needs for agricultural labor during the Second World War. Our sample is men born in the 1920s to 40s, now in their 70s and 80s. All of them were born in small rural places, where semi-subsistence agriculture was the main source of livelihood. Though by the 1930s, the ejidal system had transferred some land from the haciendas to peasant farmers, agriculture was not an easy livelihood. Families rarely had access to much more than 5 has of land, and average family size by the 1940s was close to 7–8 persons. Also, access to land did not bring access to credit or agricultural inputs. Informants remember being still reliant on former hacienda owners for credit or work. Even the hamlet in our sample got little benefit from agrarian redistribution despite being close to reforming President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) home state of Michoacán.

For the ex-braceros coming to adulthood in this period, the possibilities of making their own individual way were neither easy nor seen as desirable. A patriarchal family economy dominated. They worked for their father, and any earnings they gained by laboring on nearby estates, were passed on to the mother and father. As one informant remarked, there was just no money around to spend. Family timing of work was straightforward; all worked, men and women, but in different tasks around the house and farm. The major timing event was marriage, but given the shortage of land and the number of siblings, marriage did not mean economic independence from one's parents but the addition of another family member to the parental household. The couple would work for the family, at the most constructing their own shack on family land.

There were exceptions as when some couples migrated to work as laborers elsewhere in the region or in other parts of Mexico. Migration for ex-braceros was a major part of their and their families' strategies. Its timing was based both on the family's needs for cash to build up their agriculture through the purchase of animals or equipment and an individual's need to buy some land or build a house to establish their own family. Bracero contracts were of short duration, usually between 3 and 6 months, though a Bracero could seek another contract with another farmer or rancher. Relatively brief absences meant that the Bracero migrants remained closely tied to the place and family of origin. Braceros left their own wives and children with their parents and remitted or saved money to pay for the subsistence of those they left behind as well as to strengthen the family economy. On the whole, our sample of ex-braceros was positive about their migration experience, complaining about the strict routines to which they were subjected, but thankful for the employment. Hardly any of them remembered having any interest in remaining in the US, though several continued to migrate there without documents when the Bracero program ended.

But as these ex-braceros made their journeys via Empalme in the state of Sonora (a major recruitment station) to the US, so, too, their families were caught up in migration to the Mexican cities—in our cases, Guadalajara and, to a lesser extent, Mexico City. In one case, the ex-bracero was part of a family farming enterprise that had begun to sell some of their smallholding products in Guadalajara. When he returned from the US after one of his temporary stays, he would help his brothers and father with transporting and selling products. After his last bracero migration, he decided that he would move to Guadalajara in the 1960s and set up his marketing business there, using his savings to buy a plot in the fast expanding city. He never migrated to the US again, saying that there were work opportunities enough in Guadalajara and that he had not felt comfortable in the US.

Another ex-bracero, Antonio, was born in a small village in the southern state of Oaxaca, had ten siblings and a family ejidal plot of 2 ha. From adolescence he worked locally as a watchperson and mechanic, to help sustain the family economy, and migrated externally to work in construction, such as on a dam in Veracruz. He then decided to join the bracero program to earn enough to help save the family farm from being sold, making five separate trips to the US, after the first of which he married a local woman who he left in the care of his parents on his subsequent

migrations. After his final migration to the US and in face of difficulties finding work in Oaxaca and Veracruz, he moved with his wife and sons to Guadalajara, where one of his brothers was living, and where he got work in construction and as a mechanic. The ex-braceros that settled in Guadalajara had no shortage of work—in factories or in the many construction projects of the time—building the airport, building the expressway circling the city, and building the Kodak factory are all projects that the ex-braceros now in Guadalajara worked on.

The ex-braceros still living in the villages used their migrations to improve farming or start small enterprises. This was most marked in the village that is now a center of mango production. Before that this village had been an important center of small-scale production of vegetables for the Guadalajara market, and the ex-braceros came from families with political influence that gave them access to land and to migration permits. In the other villages, where economic opportunities were more restricted, ex-braceros were more ambivalent about return, and deportation played a part in their presence. Though our interviewees obtained legal permits (*micas*) to enter the US, they told us that other members of their families did not need them, particularly in states, like Texas, where employers were wary of the regulations attached to the *bracero* program. Many *braceros* stayed in the US after the program ended. In one case we interviewed, the ex-bracero had settled in the US, where most of his children and his wife were resident, but returned to the village annually, where two of his daughters lived, to oversee his land and his burial plot.

Our sample is biased in that we interviewed ex-braceros who had returned to Mexico; but it is likely that most did, as indicated by the thousands of ex-braceros officially registered as living in the state of Jalisco with the largest single concentration in the Guadalajara metropolitan area. They were registered because ex-braceros were entitled to compensation from the Mexican government for withholding taxes that had been deducted from their US salaries. In the political meetings that we attended where they pressed for compensation, speakers stresses their patriotism and the contributions that they had made to both the US and Mexican economies.

The Second Generation

A. Industrial and Migration Timings

The second generation are those whose industrial time is that of the decline of Mexican small-scale agriculture, the continuing, but crisis ridden growth of Mexican cities and the rapid expansion of a US labor market for cheap labor in construction, industry and the services that marked the expansion of the US suburbs and the development of ‘green field’ sites for industries such as meat-packing or carpets, in locations with low population density.

The changes in industrial time affect migration timings. Costs are rising in Mexico as the cities consolidate and housing and transport costs increase; also agriculture is commercializing to meet the food demands of the cities. More cash is

needed to help families secure a livelihood in city and countryside. Trips to the United States become longer as the amount of money increase that migrants need to save or remit. And in the US, the expanding urban economies generate a year round demand for construction and service labor.

It is also the period when the flood of new migrants confronts a Mexican-American population whose growth for the previous 30 or so years had been slow and mainly by natural increase. Two different migration times thus, in a sense, confront each other. The earlier migration had left a relatively small settled population mainly concentrated in California, Texas and other Southwestern States. Social mobility had not been high in this population. Telles and Ortiz (2008) show that the average income in 2000 of 4th generational Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio was approximately the same as that of their parents in 1965. In 2000, the 4th generational Mexican Americans still remained mainly (54%) positive about the immigration of Mexicans, but less so than did their fathers and grandparents (56 and 63%) (ibid.).

Pablo Vila's (1992, 1993) analyses of ethnic identities on the U.S.-Mexico Border show how the second and subsequent generations of Mexican-Americans on the Border face new waves of Mexican immigrants. These new immigrants constantly recreate the image of the Mexican as the economically impoverished temporary labor migrant. In this situation, Mexican-Americans adopted a version of their ethnic identity that puts them out of phase with the new immigrants. This is the conclusion of Vila's analysis of focus group interviews that included Mexicans in Ciudad Juarez and Mexican-Americans in El Paso, Texas (Vila 2000). For Mexican Americans on the Border, the new migrants represent a Mexico that they did not know or want to know. They have a Mexican identity, but it does not, however, give them anything in common with Mexican immigrants or with the Mexicans living across the border in Ciudad Juarez, as this statement from a Mexican-American lawyer makes clear:

Today it's very divided... and the Mexican citizen can be very, uh, almost not Mexican like, from another world..." In another statement: "And my aunt, um, ...the one in immigration, she says crazy things like: I hate 'em, I hate 'em, I hate 'em! [laughter] ... and she's become so bitter, so embittered with, with uh, her job and what she sees that she'll say, I am not Mexican! [laughter] ... so talk about confusion." (Vila 2000: 117, 121).

Vila argues that these Mexican-Americans resolve this confusion by stressing that their Mexican identity is that of Mexicans of the past not of present day Mexicans. Thus another member of the group, a Mexican-American teacher, says:

We have different attitudes, different values... But they did exist in Mexico, when there was that pride and that respect as we knew it, because our grandparents came from there, and it was there! It was a different Mexico! (ibid.: 15121).

Potential tensions between immigrants and Mexican-Americans will be alleviated in this generation by immigrants going to new destinations—thus, in Texas, fast-growing Austin receives many more immigrants from Mexico than does San Antonio, whose growth in the 1980s was slow. Also, the stereotyping by police and immigration personnel of all the Mexican origin population as likely undocumented immigrants provided some basis for unity.

B. Family Time

Families are large in the second generation. And some but not all the children continue to migrate to the US, most often without documents. The constant in this generation remains the importance of family and family strategies. The father helps the children, especially the males, to migrate. And relatives help them find work in both the US and Mexico.

The second generation who grew up in Guadalajara is somewhat less likely to migrate to the US than those whose families remained in the villages. Of the 71 children of the 10 ex-braceros in Guadalajara, 27 migrated to the US, and of those 13 are now living there. The ex-bracero, Antonio, had only two sons. Both are working together in a small distribution company that they own. The eldest never migrated to the US. The youngest, Paco, migrated to Los Angeles with his wife and two children for two years because his wife's family was living there legally and encouraged them to come. It did not work out since Paco, who had worked in large-scale enterprises in Guadalajara, found himself working picking oranges and then in a factory making adornments for horses. He returned and joined his brother's business. Paco commented: "look, here you are poor, but with a more decent life, there (the US) you have to be hiding and regretting being Mexican." In contrast, all four surviving children of ex-bracero, Fernando, are resident in the US, migrating there with the help of Fernando's sister who is a resident in the US. All the children had finished secondary education in Guadalajara, two are legal residents in the US, one of them by marriage. There is, however, little family contact with the daughter that migrated.

Migration to the US and to Mexican cities is common among the children of ex-braceros that stayed in their villages of origin, and many reside in the US. But there are exceptions. All the 8 children of an ex-bracero entrepreneur in the indigenous village are now living in the village, though they had migrated to the US. In the commercial agricultural village, migration to the US is common, but so is return, with returnees using their savings to set up businesses. Migration from the villages is not simply to the US, but includes Guadalajara where second generation children now live. The small hamlet is the one that is most involved in migration to the US and Mexican cities. Three of the 47 second generation children still live in the village, but the rest are living in Mexico City, Guadalajara or a nearby town. Only one is living in the US, but four have migrated there, and in the next generation most will have migrated and many have stayed in the US.

The occupations of the second generation in the US are mainly urban ones, construction, mechanics, bartenders, cooks, and they are living in US cities, such as Oakland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, or Houston. In Mexico, there is some evidence of social mobility: some four of the women are government workers; the males are usually in construction, commerce or crafts, such as electricity or mechanics.

In this generation, compared with the first, families are less likely to operate as a family economy. Children are more likely to set up independently from their parents; but most live close to parents or siblings whether in Mexico or the US, and in some case live with them on the same lot. The ex-braceros are in frequent contact with their children, help them and are helped by them. However, it is also clear that

distance and size of the family is weakening some relationships. Several of the ex-braceros remark on having lost contact with some of their children, and of no longer receiving remittances from them.

The Third Generation

A. The New Migration Time

This is the generation faced by increasing restriction on undocumented entry to the US. In the new millennium, documents have come again to have significance in patterns of migration. Possessing legal documents facilitates permanent migration, but it also facilitates circular migration. Whereas in the 1970s, undocumented migrants were much more likely to migrate and be circular migrants than documented migrants, by 2007, documented migrants are the majority of circular migrants (Massey et al. 2014). Not having documents deters, as studies have shown, temporary migrants returning to Mexico because of the increasing difficulties of re-entry (Rural Migration News 2012). About a third of return migrants to Mexico are now likely to be involuntary, forcibly returned by deportation order. The increasing permanence of Mexican migration to the US has created Mexican origin communities of considerable size throughout the US that extend well beyond the traditional receiving areas.

Family reunifications policies in the US as well as the increasing numbers of women migrating, even without documents, have resulted in Mexican origin communities being predominantly of a nuclear family type. Over half the population growth of the US between 2000 and 2010 is due to the mainly Mexican origin Latino population; it is also a young population with almost 30% being under 15, and an average age of 27.3 compared with 42 for non-Latino whites (Sáenz 2013). The third generation, whether they are documented or undocumented migrants, now live in a US where this previously invisible population is now the majority of students in the schools of many of the major cities. The social services needed by this population make it an increasingly visible and contested population. In contrast, to the previous generation, however, the Mexican origin population is more unified politically than in the past. The massive migrations of the 1980s and 1990s, their settlement, and the intermarriages of migrants with Mexican Americans have created Mexican origin communities in which diverse migration statuses unify rather than divide. Families, and certainly extended families, often contain all three migration statuses—citizen, legal resident, undocumented. The increasing visibility of the Mexican origin, their stereotyping by others as ‘illegal’ and their political potential in deciding elections, as seen in 2008 and 2012, unifies previously divided communities.

The pattern set in the second generation of bracero families continues into the third. The grandchildren of the ex-braceros whose parents settled in the US will be citizens, and do not return except for the occasional visit. The grandchildren whose parents did not leave Mexico are unlikely to migrate to the US. Ex-braceros

children who migrated to the US temporarily are likely to have children that accompanied them and who continue to migrate. This pattern can be illustrated from the small hamlet. All the children of Cecilia, the second generation non-migrant daughter of the ex-bracero Juan Lopez, migrated. They began by going to Mexico City and then through family/village contacts to California. They did not stop there. Through working in a fast-food franchise in LA, they obtained work in Hawaii in a similar franchise. They served as bridgeheads for other migrants from the hamlet, so that most people in the village have worked at one time or another in Hawaii. Of the 82 great-grandchildren of Cecilia's father, 37 have migrated at least for some time to Hawaii. Another branch of the family has relocated to Nebraska and another to Chicago. In turn their children, the fourth generation, also migrate. Indeed of Cecilia's 32 grandchildren, 5 are US citizens. Two of these are now in the village being looked after by their grandmother, while their parents remain abroad.

Family ties remain important in the 3rd generation, but the family is no longer a collective economy in the hamlet the way it once was. The hamlet has some agricultural land, but not much. NGOs and government programs are seeking to develop organic farming there, and migrant remittances are used to improve agriculture. One of the migrant third generation used his earnings in Michigan to buy a small local rancho/hacienda, with the aim of corn and mushroom farming, and also eco-tourism, but there is little possibility of creating many jobs or much prosperity in the village. Thus, the fourth generation migrates and returns but has no project for securing a future for themselves in the village. One group of cousins used their earnings abroad to set up a carnita restaurant in a nearby town. They bought the pig, butchered and roasted it, and then served it. It was a disaster. The costs exceeded the profits. So, again, they had to migrate. Their expenditures are highly personal, mainly on highly decorated large pick-ups, and visits to the bars in nearby towns. The family in the hamlet is a unit of consumption. Cecilia, like her sisters, provides meals for everyone.

The family serves as a place of last refuge for migrant children, as in the case of Cecilia caring for her US citizen grandchildren while their parents remain in the US. Another example is ex-bracero, Antonio and his wife, who live in Guadalajara, caring for the grandson of the daughter with whom the family, including her siblings resident in the US, had lost contact. When the daughter migrated, she did so alone and refused to help a son who followed her. He in turn left his infant son with his grandparents in Guadalajara; he has now returned from the US to live with his grandparents.

Conclusion

Mexican migration to the US began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as primarily a strategy by which the family economies of small places obtained the monetary resources to keep family farming going and to enable adult children to make the transition to a more independent status. In that respect, it was

little different to the temporary internal migrations of the period. It concentrated in those rural areas of the Center-West of Mexico that were already embedded in a market economy and on routes to the North that had been opened up by the railroads. Although migration would increasingly originate in towns and even cities, in regions other than the Center-West and lose its circular character, it never lost in the eyes of people in the US and Mexico its temporary, rural character. Mexicans might leave from cities, such as Mexico City or Guadalajara, but often the contacts that they used to obtain work and shelter in the USA came from the rural roots of their families (Roberts et al. 1999). Strong transnational cultures were created tying migrants in cities such as New York to villages in the south-central state of Puebla (Smith 2005). The US-Mexican border developed strong cross-border ties between families on both sides. Massey (1987) pointed to the way that this migration symbolically recaptured territory for Mexico in using the title, *Return to Aztlan*, the semi-mythical homeland of the Aztecs located in northern Mexico and South-western United States.

Even in the Bracero period, official permits for temporary migration were not the only way that circular migrants crossed the border. Whether frustrated by the bureaucratic and clientelistic barriers to obtaining a permit or encouraged by US farmers wanting 'flexible' labor, Mexican migrants saw crossing the border without permits whether by the river or over the wire as a natural way of crossing the border. Our bracero interviewees did emphasize the convenience of legality, but did not discourage their children from migrating without documents. With the ending of the bracero program, undocumented migration reached unprecedented levels in the 1980s and 1990s, which together with documented migration increased the foreign-born Mexican population some 17-fold from 1970 to 2010 when net increases ended (Pew Hispanic Center 2012). In this period, migration to the US was a way of life for many Mexicans, particularly in the small towns and villages of Mexico. In the US, communities of Mexican origin established themselves not only in the traditional receiving cities, such as Los Angeles, Chicago and the Texas cities, but in much of large city US. They appeared in towns of the Midwest and South, where labor intensive industries recruited heavily from Mexico, and as we have seen they appeared in Hawaii. Most of this migration was networked, resulting in clusters of kin and fellow-villagers. Among our informants, these networks and the exchanges that spanned the generations both facilitated migration and strengthened families. Most of the bracero generation that we interviewed still maintains ties with their children and grandchildren who settled in the US. It is also clear that with time families lost touch with some at least of their descendants. The economies of both Mexico and the US became less favorable to family economic strategies, rewarding more easily individual spatial and occupational mobility. This occurred even in traditional sending areas, from which our samples are taken. Less networked migration also increased as new sending areas, including Mexican cities, participated more in US migration. The transnational aspect of Mexican migration also began to wane as strict border enforcement made circular migration difficult, and gave little choice to undocumented migrants other than committing themselves to the US. For Mexican migrants, the US was a natural extension of the Mexican

labor market; NAFTA lost an opportunity by encouraging the flow of goods and capital, but not of labor. On the US side, there was considerable ambiguity: entrepreneurs welcomed the abundant supply of low-cost labor, as did families needing help with gardening, domestic service, and child and elderly care; but the image of the illegal, fears of job competition and racism created many vociferous opponents of Mexican immigration. Mexican settlement in the US thus took a different path from that of European immigration. Mexicans, the largest immigrant group in the US, were caught in a limbo where return home was increasingly improbable, but in which their permanent presence in the US is constantly questioned by others.

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