

Some Background

Abstract Provides background on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif's religious history within Judaism and Islam, and of the early development of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism.

Keywords Al-Aqsa Mosque · Second Temple · Zionism · Orthodox Jews · Palestinian nationalism · *Salafi* Arabism

A TALE OF TWO RELIGIONS

While no doubt most people are familiar with the appearance of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, either from personal experience or because of the pervasiveness of its image, it nonetheless behooves us to begin discussion by describing the actual structure. Its physical shape is actually quite straightforward, the dominant feature being the rectangular platform that comprises its foundation. It is located upon the northern extension of a series of hills in eastern Jerusalem, bordered on the east by the relatively steep Kidron Valley and on the west by an imperceptibly shallow valley known as the Tyropoeon, which divides the ground level of the platform from the rest of the Old City. The perimeter basically consists of walls made up of massive stones, with its eastern and southern boundaries corresponding to a section of the Old City's borders. Visually and architecturally, the structure is certainly impressive, its most dominant structure, without question, being the Dome

of the Rock, which rests on the upper platform of the Haram al-Sharif (Fig. 2.1). Dating back to the seventh century, it houses the bedrock, or *sakhrab*, from whence Muhammad allegedly ascended to heaven on his night journey. The lower platform of the Haram al-Sharif, which extends outward from all sides of the upper platform, contains the al-Aqsa Mosque—in English, literally “the farthest mosque”—a reference to the Qur’anic story of Muhammad’s night journey to heaven, which began with a journey from the nearest mosque (in Mecca) to the farthest mosque (in Jerusalem) (*sura* 17:1).

Both Jews and Muslims perceive the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif as existing on what renowned historian of religion Mircea Eliade characterizes as a kind of “sacred mountain,” the reason why (in the Jewish tradition) it remained uncovered by the great flood.¹ It stands at the navel of the world, the *omphalos*,² and is a “supremely creational place, because the source of all reality and consequently of energy and life is to be found there.”³ As such, it is also the place where this world was birthed—just as “the embryo proceeds from the navel onwards, so God began to create the world from its navel onward.”⁴ It is the point at



Fig. 2.1 Aerial view of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif

which heaven and earth meet, a “shadow of heavenly manifestation”⁵ reflective of the divine presence—the place where one might attain a level of intimacy with God unachievable elsewhere.⁶ Numerous religious traditions are associated with the site, though given that Judaism antedates Islam by over a millennium, we might first consider those pertaining to the former, some of which correspond to events held to have taken place well before the construction of the Temple. Notable in this respect is the site’s association with Mount Mariah, where Abraham is believed to have demonstrated his willingness to sacrifice his son Isaac.⁷ Of greater importance, of course, are those traditions that speak of the site’s later consecration by King David, the construction of the First Temple by his son Solomon,⁸ and its destruction by the Chaldeans, or Neo-Babylonians in 586 B.C.E. While some have questioned whether in fact a First Temple actually existed—the archaeological evidence is inconclusive on this count⁹—the existence of a Second Temple, during the time of King Herod (of New Testament fame), is beyond dispute¹⁰ (Fig. 2.2); it met a similar fate as the First Temple, though this time at the hands of the Romans, in 70 C.E. At the heart of both Temples was the Holy of Holies, the inner sanctuary, where—according to biblical



Fig. 2.2 Recreation of Herod’s Temple—Israeli Museum

tradition—the Ark of the Covenant containing the tablets of the original Ten Commandments was located. This was ultimately the basis of its perceived holiness, inasmuch as it was believed that the Ark contained the Divine Presence, or *Shekhinah*. Correspondingly, only the High Priest—a member of the Levitical¹¹ priesthood—was permitted to enter the Holy of Holies.¹² This last point, it should be noted, remains highly relevant, as even until now, it has greatly influenced how religious Jews approach the Temple Mount: Inasmuch as there is no way to know what was the exact layout of the Temple, and given that only a Levitical priest was permitted to enter the Holy of Holies, most religious Jews avoid exploring at least certain portions of the surface of the Temple Mount to avoid possibly straying into the prohibited precinct.¹³ This might explain in part why, by the Ottoman period, Jewish pilgrimage to and worship at the site came to focus on the Western or “Wailing” Wall (in Hebrew, the *Kotel Maaravi*), the exposed section of huge limestone blocks on the western flank, traditionally held to be the remnants of the retaining wall of the Second Temple destroyed by the Romans, and where it is believed that God’s *Shekhinah* currently resides.¹⁴

This is not to say that the Temple itself became irrelevant to how religious Jews, or even Jews in general, understand their faith and identity. Yet whereas historically its significance had been defined by its status as “the primary ritual center for the Jews in the land of Israel,”¹⁵ its importance soon came to be understood in a more figurative sense, one reflective of the lived reality of Jews as members of a Diaspora population. The Temple, or more precisely, the idea of one day rebuilding it, became symbolic of the possibility of future redemption and the establishment of a more just society, a vision—it should be noted given the later rise of Zionism (concerning which, more below)—that could be understood in both a secular and a religious context. As expressed by the Jewish scholar Hava Lazarus Yafeh,

the hopes for rebuilding the Temple and Jerusalem and the restoration of the Davidic dynasty has become associated with the more general eschatological hopes for a golden messianic age, the redemption of Israel and all mankind, and the eternal prophetic search for justice, righteousness, piety, charity, and peace.¹⁶

In trying to understand the Temple Mount’s later importance as a *secular* symbol—in line with late-nineteenth-/twentieth-century Zionism—the

circumstances underlying the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine shortly after the Second Temple's destruction merit consideration. Resentful of Roman rule, a movement for Jewish independence emerged in 132 under Simon Bar Kosiba, better known as Bar Kokhba. It was brutally suppressed by the Romans roughly 3 years later, after which the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and its environs was completely eliminated.¹⁷ In an effort to remove any association between the province of Judea and the Jewish people, the Romans renamed the territory "Palestina," after the Philistines who had inhabited the land prior to them, and rebuilt Jerusalem as a pagan city, renaming it Aelia Capitolina.¹⁸ Though constituting a scattered people (the Diaspora) for the next 2000 years, within the context of Zionist/Israeli nationalist discourse, the Jews were nonetheless understood as having continued to comprise a unique "continuous nation," one moreover that had remained "faithful to their covenant and promised land."¹⁹ Numerous Jewish customs would come to reflect this sense of connection to what many Jews came to refer to as *Eretz Israel*, the "Land of Israel": the mentioning of the returning to and rebuilding of Jerusalem in the blessings at the end of meals; the leaving of a corner of one's home unfinished; the smashing of glass during the wedding ceremony; and the inclusion of soil from the Holy Land at burial. The destruction of the Temple was an important aspect of this process of remembrance, hence the fasting by religious Jews on Tisha B'Av, the anniversary of its ruin.²⁰ It is not entirely surprising then that for the more secularly minded Jew of the late nineteenth/twentieth century, the Temple Mount came to hold a symbolic value of great import, reflective of their people's historical connection to *Eretz Israel*. Indeed, for many Jews, it constituted undeniable proof of it.

For Muslims, the site occupied by the Haram al-Sharif—comprising the Dome of the Rock, al-Aqsa Mosque, and the surrounding precincts—constitutes the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina. As briefly referenced above, according to Islamic religious tradition, Muhammad rode his winged horse, Buraq, to Jerusalem, from whence he ascended from the *sakhrab* stone to heaven with the archangel Gabriel. On this journey, Muhammad supposedly saw all of the prophets, including Abraham, and received from God the five obligatory prayers such as dictate the religious lives of Muslims.²¹ The early Muslim community, in fact, regularly prayed toward Jerusalem's Haram until it became evident to Muhammad that he was not going to convert the extant Jewish population in Arabia, at which point the direction of prayer was changed to Mecca.²²

Jerusalem came under Muslim rule very shortly after Muhammad's death, in 637, in what was essentially a bloodless conquest under the caliph 'Umar ibn Al-Khattab.²³ Almost immediately, Jerusalem's new rulers took great interest in the Temple Mount. The French pilgrim Arculf, who visited the city around 670, for instance, reported that a small wooden mosque had already been long established on the site by then.²⁴ It was the Umayyad caliph 'Abd Al-Malik, however, who, in 692, commissioned the construction of the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque. While there is considerable historical debate concerning at what point the tradition relating the site to Muhammad's night journey actually became established,²⁵ what does seem clear is that almost from the start, Muslims had a strong appreciation of its overall religious importance, in large part on the basis of Jewish traditions associated with it,²⁶ for instance, those related to the binding of Isaac by Abraham.²⁷ More importantly, the construction of the Dome of the Rock signified Islam's appropriation of the site (and by extension, of Jerusalem), a way of signaling the arrival of a new faith, one entirely different from and superior to Judaism and Christianity. Such intention is evident not only in its location, but also in the building's very structure, which took the form, not of a traditional mosque, but of a Byzantine reliquary, such that it ended up greatly resembling the Church of the Holy Sepulcher which it overlooks; likewise, the Qur'anic inscription gracing its walls, which mimics the Nicene Creed²⁸: "Say God is one, God the eternal, he has not begotten, nor is he begotten, and there is no one comparable to him" (*sura* 112:1–4).²⁹ It was not long before the Haram al-Sharif became an important pilgrimage site for Muslims.³⁰ Worth mentioning given later developments is that, from a Muslim perspective, the Haram al-Sharif is inclusive of the Western Wall, believed to be where Muhammad hitched his supernatural steed Buraq during his aforementioned night journey, hence why Muslims often refer to it as al-Buraq.³¹

A TALE OF TWO NATIONALISMS

For the purposes of our discussion, some background is also necessary concerning Zionism and Arab nationalism. Regarding the former, perhaps the simplest and most rudimentary definition is that it encompasses the idea that the Jewish people constitute a nation in a *secular* sense. Correspondingly, those who initially embraced the movement were largely secular, not least the individual generally considered most

responsible for getting Zionism off the ground, Theodor Herzl.³² Born in Budapest in 1860, Herzl was educated in the spirit of the *Haskalah*, or Jewish Enlightenment, and, much like many of his background, believed early on that the only real solution to European anti-Semitism was assimilation and conversion, even at one point contemplating appealing to the Pope to help bring about both *en masse*.³³ What ultimately changed his mind was the Dreyfus Affair in France,³⁴ a political scandal at the turn of the century, which saw a captain in the French military, Alfred Dreyfus, falsely accused and convicted of treason. The scandal deeply divided France over the question of his guilt, and for those convinced of it, an overriding consideration was the fact of his Jewish descent—in their eyes, that alone made his loyalty to France highly suspect. Theodor Herzl was assigned to cover the trial as a journalist for the prestigious and very liberal Vienna paper, *Neue Freie Presse*. The anti-Semitism demonstrated in Dreyfus' conviction and French societal reaction—with mobs shouting in the streets, “death to the Jews!”³⁵—persuaded him that anti-Semitism was ultimately an immutable aspect of European society. Despite their supposed emancipation in most parts of western Europe—by that time, they had been granted equality in a legal sense in most western European countries—the Jews could never hope to fully assimilate into European society, hence the necessity of a Jewish national state.³⁶

For Herzl, this was a political solution to a political problem and had nothing to do with religion. In his seminal work, *Der Judenstaat* (*The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question*), published in 1896, Herzl made it clear that what he envisioned was the creation of a Jewish state on some portion of the globe³⁷ based on the western liberal model.³⁸ In addressing the possibility of a theocratic state, he maintained that while faith was what united the Jews, it was knowledge that had given them freedom. “We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore... We shall keep our priests within the confines of their temples in the same way as we shall keep our professional army within the confines of their barracks.”³⁹ Jews such as Herzl essentially rejected their religious culture. At the same time, they also rejected the idea of assimilation into European society given the persistent hostility toward Jews. For secular Jews, the only solution was to establish an independent Jewish national existence, ideally in Palestine⁴⁰—as Herzl put it, a “house which [was] to shelter the Jewish nation.”⁴¹ This should by no means, however, be construed as

meaning that Herzl and the early Zionists rejected the “biblical” history of the Jewish people—certainly their focus on Palestine as the inevitable site of a Jewish state is clear evidence of this—yet within the context of Zionism, the Hebrew Bible was to be employed, not as a religious or legal document, but as a historical one, a chronology of the evolution of the Jewish nation, one moreover wherein the Jews were reconfigured as the “progenitors of the Enlightenment.” It was in this way that Judaism was to be harnessed to “the project of building a *modern* [emphasis mine] Jewish nation-state.”⁴² As was affirmed in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, proclaimed on May 14, 1948, the new state was to be “based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the Prophets of Israel.”⁴³

Initially, religious Jews—and in particular, the Orthodox⁴⁴—were almost entirely opposed to Zionism; the leading rabbis in East Europe regarded it as an “unmitigated disaster” and a “poisonous weed.”⁴⁵ A return to Zion was certainly to be hoped for, but this would come about by God’s hand, not via what was essentially a nationalistic, secular movement. The Diaspora reflected God’s punishment of the Jews; in like manner, their redemption would come about as part of God’s plan (according to Orthodox belief, when the end of the world was nigh).⁴⁶ As stated by the nineteenth century spiritual leader of German Jewish Orthodoxy, Samson Raphael Hirsch, to actively “accelerate the redemption was a sin and strictly prohibited.”⁴⁷ (It might be noted that, as of the beginning of the British Mandate, this outlook in fact represented the vast majority of Palestine’s indigenous Jewish population, most of who were Orthodox.⁴⁸) Perhaps the most sophisticated argument against Zionism came from the Orthodox ideologue, Isaac Breuer, who maintained that the Jews as a religious nation were different from all other nations—religion was its *only* content, and to the extent that Zionism diminished religion as a defining aspect of Jewish identity, it would leave the Jewish nation an empty shell.

Having suffered so greatly for two thousand years, would it not be madness now to aim at transforming the Jews into a nation like all others, to politicize them, to establish a state which was neutral towards religion?

For Breuer and most Orthodox Jews, Zionism deprived the Jewish nation of its most genuine cultural content, replacing it with modern nationalist ideology—it was the worst kind of assimilation.⁴⁹

There were exceptions, however, with regard to the Orthodox community, the most notable of which was the Mizrahi, a group founded by a Lithuanian Orthodox rabbi, Isaac Jacob Raines, shortly after Herzl published *Der Judenstaat*. Though initially constituting a minority group within the Zionist movement, they were arguably a portent of things to come post-1967 in terms of the growing role Judaism would play in shaping the content of Israeli national identity. There is little question that the Mizrahi supported Zionism, which they justified on the basis of a religious injunction in the Torah stating “unequivocally that it was the duty of every faithful believer to settle in the Holy Land (*Mitzvat Yishuv Eretz Israel*),”⁵⁰ even if, historically, the injunction had never been understood as corresponding to state building in the sense of what was now being proposed. What the Mizrahi found problematic with Zionism was its secular emphasis—as they put it, “the Jewish nation without religion is a body without a soul.” Correspondingly, they saw their role as that of a watchdog, charged with assuring that the movement did not stray too far from its Judaic roots.⁵¹ In practice, this meant doing everything possible to gain control over “Zionist institutions and create a religious majority among the Jews of Palestine.”⁵² The Mizrahi encountered little resistance from secularly minded Zionists, who desperately needed whatever support they could garner from among their own. Given the reality that, as of the turn of the century, the vast majority of Europe’s Jews were religious and not inclined to support the new movement, it behooved Zionists not to do anything that might alienate the more religiously minded; hence why at the Second Zionist Congress it was resolved that “Zionism will not undertake anything contrary to the commandments of the Jewish religion,”⁵³ likewise why, as noted above, even Herzl himself had made allowance in *Der Judenstaat* for high priests as a key element of the Jewish state he envisioned, individuals to be held in high esteem, even if “confined to their temples.”⁵⁴

What perhaps seems especially evident with hindsight is that, however much its proponents sought to present Zionism as a *secular* nationalist movement, the potentiality that Judaism should become the key determinant of Jewish/Israeli national identity was intrinsically present from the start, even if initially lying dormant. Considered against this backdrop and given that the Temple Mount’s significance had, for centuries, been understood primarily in a religious context, one can well understand why later attempts at appropriating it as the definitive symbol of a secular Jewish/Israeli identity were almost guaranteed to enhance the

likelihood of that potentiality being realized. Nonetheless, for the time being at least, both Jerusalem and the Temple Mount were well out of reach, related to which, one ought not to underestimate the secular character of early Zionism—observant Jews would remain openly hostile to Zionism for some time to come, while those drawn to the movement tended to strongly abjure religion. In any case, most early Zionists who made it to Palestine focused their efforts largely outside of Jerusalem, either on agricultural settlements—most notably the *kibbutzim*, which were communally run and had a strong ideological element that substituted a Jewish work ethic for religious practice—or in the building of an entirely new “Jewish” city, Tel Aviv.

Many prominent early Zionists, in fact, were quite ambivalent about Jerusalem, the Temple Mount in particular. Given the “messianic implications of their efforts,” they were keenly aware of the danger it posed to the secular underpinnings of Zionism. Herzl himself, in fact, had maintained that making Jerusalem the capital of any future Jewish state would be a mistake⁵⁵ (expressing instead a preference for Haifa), arguing that the Holy Basin—the Old City and the adjacent valley of churches, mosques and cemeteries—would best function as “an international center of religion and science.” Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president, and during the British Mandate arguably Zionism’s leading figure, sought to have Jerusalem’s Old City (inclusive of the Temple Mount) excluded from the Jewish state proposed in Britain’s first partition plan.⁵⁶ Finally, Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, initially espoused the partition of Jerusalem in order to “preclude Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount,” maintaining that if the holy places were to come under Israeli sovereignty, “Zionism would not be able to design its capital according to its progressive worldview.”⁵⁷

On the subject of Arab (and by extension, Palestinian) nationalism, I have argued elsewhere that during the period of its formulation—the late nineteenth/early twentieth century—one might speak of there having existed two models, or conceptions, of (Palestinian) Arab national identity.⁵⁸ Whereas the first model was essentially secular, predicated on a shared language, culture and historical legacy,⁵⁹ the second stressed the link between Arab national identity and Islam. To be sure, it has never been simply a matter of the secular model versus the one rooted in Islam in any absolute sense; rather, it has been more a question of emphasis, with the one or the other playing a bigger role in shaping conceptions of Arab national identity. Thus, whereas during the 1950s

and 1960s—the heyday of pan-Arabism—the secular model was clearly dominant, from 1967 onward, the latter model, emphasizing the relationship between Arab national identity and Islam, has proven increasingly influential.

Roughly outlined here, the secular model of Arab national identity has its roots in circumstances pertaining to the latter part of the nineteenth century, a period of growing European regional influence, not only politically and economically, but also culturally and ideologically. Related to this, many Christian Arabs in Syria (inclusive of Palestine)—who generally speaking, tended to interact with Europeans to a much greater extent than their Muslim compatriots—began attending Protestant and Jesuit missionary schools, where many became exposed to ideas related to nationalist ideology. Especially relevant is that many of these institutions used Arabic as their language of instruction,⁶⁰ and it was the combination of these two things that led many of their students to see themselves nationalistically as “Arab” on the basis of a shared language (Arabic), culture and history, an identity moreover that was conceived of as being equally inclusive of Muslims and non-Muslims. Within this context, Islam was characterized more as a civilizational achievement—one wherein, for instance, the medieval Abbasid caliphate was portrayed as an example of the Arabs’ collective past glory⁶¹—than as what determined one’s political and social status (as was essentially the case in the Ottoman Empire at the time). These early “Arab nationalists” would go on to actively promote this secular conception of Arab national identity via the publication of newspapers and periodicals⁶²; the formation of cultural and intellectual societies⁶³; and the founding of secular schools.⁶⁴

It should be briefly noted that a fair number of scholars have questioned the exact nature of the contribution of Christian Arabs to the development of a secular Arab nationalist ideology, inasmuch as many were more focused on narrowly defined regions—Syria or Lebanon—as opposed to the entire Arabic-speaking world.⁶⁵ Yasir Suleiman and Stephen Sheehi, however, convincingly argue that their emphasis on a shared cultural and historical heritage rooted in the Arabic language⁶⁶ laid the cultural foundations of a secular Arab nationalism, whether intentionally or not.⁶⁷ Equally relevant in this regard is that the discourse they utilized reflected what Ussama Makdisi has characterized as “a secular antithesis to a sectarian age”⁶⁸—put simply, they were attempting to define a communal identity inclusive of all the religious communities

existing in Syria and Lebanon, likewise to instill within them notions related to liberal democracy and representative government.⁶⁹

The second model of Arab nationalism, while not strictly religious, greatly emphasized the link between the Arabs and Islam, and might be traced back to the late-nineteenth century movement known as *salafiyyah*, a “return to the way of the ancestors”—hence why I refer to it as the *salafī* model of Arab nationalism. *Salafiyyah*, as developed by such thinkers as Muhammad ‘Abduh, Muhammad Rashid Rida and ‘Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi, might best be characterized as an Islamic modernist movement, in the sense that it sought within Islam the precedents for social, economic, and political principles by which to modernize the Islamic world in a manner reflective of contemporaneous (i.e., late-nineteenth century) developments in Europe. Islam was presented by such individuals as being in complete “harmony with the principles discovered by scientific reason, was indeed the religion demanded by reason.”⁷⁰ While the movement was, in its initial incarnation, primarily concerned with Islamic reform, it was also understood as having a political utility. Islam’s current corrupt state, it was argued, was the reason why the Muslim world was being dominated by Europe; a reformed Islam would provide a basis for Muslim unity, thus allowing it to more effectively resist European domination. Regarding how this sad state of affairs had come about, the problem, they maintained, was that the leadership of the Muslim world had fallen into the hands of non-Arabs—that is, the Turks, the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire. Reform, they maintained, could only come about through the Arabs, who by virtue of their language and their descent,⁷¹ knew best how to protect and defend Islam.⁷² They were the Muslim community *par excellence*. Conceived as such, it was Islam that defined who the Arabs were as a people.⁷³ In line with this conception of Arab identity, the “golden age” of Islam was reimagined to extend beyond the *rashidīn*⁷⁴—till then, something of a convention within Islam—to include every Arab ruler up to and including the final Abbasid caliph, who died in 1258.⁷⁵ It was only after this lengthy period of Arab rule that the Muslims had deviated from the true Islam, a consequence of the corrupt practices introduced by the non-Arabs (again, read Turks) who had ruled the Muslim world since then.⁷⁶

It should be clarified that, at least initially, the point was neither to undermine the Ottoman Empire nor denigrate the Turks; it was not even to glorify the Arabs as a people for its own sake. They were simply a means to an end, the revitalization of Islam, the fulfillment of which

would ultimately benefit all Muslims.⁷⁷ Correspondingly, those supportive of the *salafi* conception of Arab identity—individuals we might deem *salafi* Arabists—were not seeking Arab independence, but rather to revive Arab culture and achieve some autonomy within the framework of the Empire so as to better fulfill their mission of religious reform.⁷⁸ It was only when the Ottoman Empire began adopting policies perceived as being both anti-Islamic and degrading to the Arabs,⁷⁹ in the years immediately preceding the First World War, that they committed themselves to Arab independence. The Ottoman Empire's collapse at the end of the First World War only served to strengthen support for the *salafi* model of Arab nationalism, in large part a consequence of the political and ideological vacuum thus created.⁸⁰ Given the subject matter of this book, we might conclude our discussion of Arab nationalism by briefly considering the Palestinian variant of the *salafi* model, wherein Palestine's chief significance is understood as being that it contains Islam's third holiest site, the Haram al-Sharif, and being Palestinian entails a special responsibility to defend it.⁸¹

NOTES

1. Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, transl., Rosemary Sheed (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1958), 376 (Eliade 1958).
2. Philip Alexander, "Jerusalem as the *Omphalos* of the World: On the History of a Geographical Concept," in *Jerusalem: Its Sanctity and Centrality to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, ed., Lee I. Levine (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1999), 104–116 (Alexander 1999).
3. Eliade, 377.
4. Ibid.
5. Pullan et al., 32.
6. Hassner, 5.
7. Carol Delaney, *Abraham on Trial: The Social Legacy of Biblical Myth* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 120 (Delaney 2000).
8. Yair Zakovitch, "The First Stages of Jerusalem's Sanctification under David: a Literary and Ideological Analysis," in *Jerusalem: Its Sanctity and Centrality to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, ed., Lee I. Levine (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1999), 30–32 (Zakovitch 1999).
9. Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman, *The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology's New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of Its Sacred*

- Texts* (London: Touchstone, 2002), 128–129, 241 (Finkelstein and Silberman 2002).
10. Though more recently, some have contested its existence, mostly for polemical reasons. See Chap. 7.
 11. That is, a descendant of the tribe of Levi.
 12. See, for example, 1 Kings 8.
 13. See, for instance, Nadav Shragai and *Haaretz* Correspondence, “Leading Rabbis Rule Temple Mount Is Off-Limit to Jews,” *Haaretz*, 7.6.2005, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/leading-rabbis-rule-temple-mountain-is-off-limits-to-jews-1.147456>, accessed 7.5.2013.
 14. Francis E. Peters, *Jerusalem, The Holy City in the Eyes of Chroniclers, Visitors, Pilgrims, and Prophets from the Days of Abraham to the Beginnings of Modern Times* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 111–118, 527–528. See also CO 733/163/5, “The Western Wall, Relevant historical information indicating the historical affinity of the Jewish race and the Western Wall,” Joseph Klausner, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, enclosed in Reading- Passfield, 9.5.1929 (Peters 1985).
 15. Yaron Z. Eliav, *God’s Mountain: The Temple Mount in Time, Space, and Memory* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 11 (Eliav 2005).
 16. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, “Jerusalem and Mecca,” in *Jerusalem: Its Sanctity and Centrality to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, ed., Lee I. Irvine (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1999), 291–292 (Lazarus-Yafeh 1999).
 17. Emil Shürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.–A.D. 135)*, Volume I, revised and ed., Geza Vermes and Fergus Millar (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark Ltd, 1973 [1885–1924]), 553–555; and Yitzhak Reiter, *Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 67 (Shürer 1973; Reiter 2008).
 18. Rivka Gonen, *Contested Holiness: Jewish, Muslim, and Christian Perspectives on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem* (Jersey City: KTAV Publishing House, Inc., 2003), 15; and Reiter, *Jerusalem*, 67 (Gonen 2003).
 19. Anthony Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001a), 103 (A. Smith 2001).
 20. Reiter, *Jerusalem*, 68–69.
 21. A.L. Tibawi, “Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History,” *Islamic Quarterly*, 12:4 (October/December 1968), 186–187. See also Gonen, 85 (Tibawi 1968).
 22. Tibawi, 186; and Gonen, 84–85.
 23. Peters, 176–178; and Reiter, *Jerusalem*, 80–82.

24. Cyril Mango, "The Temple Mount AD 614–638," in *Bayt al-Maqdis: 'Abd al-Malik's Jerusalem, Part One*, eds., Julian Raby and Jeremy Johns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3 (Mango 1992).
25. Reiter, *Jerusalem*, 13–14.
26. Eliav, *God's Mountain*, 92.
27. Reiter, *Jerusalem*, 45.
28. The statement of Orthodox Christian belief adopted by the Council of Nicaea in 325, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: "We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, of one Being with the Father. Through him all things were made."
29. Jonathan Berkey, *The Formation of Islam, Religion and Society in the Near East, 600–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82 (Berkey 2003).
30. Tibawi, 188–190.
31. Gudrun Krämer, *A History of Palestine, From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel*, trans., Graham Harman and Gudrun Krämer (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008 [2002]), 35 (Krämer 2008).
32. The movement, in fact, predated Herzl's involvement, inclusive of some early settlements in Palestine, beginning in 1882. For the most part, though, these efforts were sporadic and not particularly well coordinated with one another. See Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism, From the French Revolution to the Establishment of the State of Israel* (New York: Schocken Books, 1972 [2003]), 40–83; and Krämer, 106–107 (Laqueur 2003).
33. Laqueur, 87–89.
34. Howard M. Sacher, *A History of Israel, From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 38–41 (Sacher 1996).
35. Mariú Suárez, *Beyond Homo Sapiens, Enlightened Faith, Volume III* (Bloomington, Indiana: Xlibris, 2011), 119. See also Laqueur, 86 (Suárez 2011).
36. Ibid.
37. Though by this time, there was already a sense that it should be in Palestine on the basis of the Jewish people's historical connection to that land.
38. Laqueur, 90–93. Though especially from the mid-nineteenth century onward, Jewish/Israeli identity was increasingly understood as having an ethnic/racial quality about it. M. Shahid Alam, *Israeli Exceptionalism, The Destabilizing Logic of Zionism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 54 (Alam 2009).

39. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1988 [1896]), 146 (Herzl 1988).
40. Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, A History with Documents*, 4th edition (New York, Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001), 33 (C. Smith 2001).
41. Herzl's opening address at the First Zionist Congress, Basel 8.29-31.1897, The Herzl Museum Website, <http://www.herzl.org/english/Article.aspx?Item=544>, accessed 6.23.2012.
42. Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht, *To Rule Jerusalem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19 (Friedland and Hecht 1996).
43. "Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel," 5.14.1948, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx>, accessed 8.11.2016.
44. The term "Orthodox" as applied to Jews is not one of self-designation, at least in its origin, rather it was applied by more progressive Jews—individuals influenced by the *Haskalah*, or "Jewish Enlightenment"—during the nineteenth century to those considered as adhering to more traditional beliefs and practices. Many nonetheless eventually came to embrace the term as an expression of their opposition to the secularizing trends represented by more progressive Jews. I use the term to include both more conventional Orthodox Jews and the Hasidim—the latter constituting a special spiritual movement within Jewish Orthodoxy—even given that, initially at least, many Orthodox Jews rejected many of their ideas and practices. Presently, many Orthodox Jews embrace at least some aspects of Hasidism to one extent or another. For an overview of the origins of Orthodoxy within the Jewish community, see Moshe Samet, "The Beginnings of Orthodoxy," *Modern Judaism*, 8:3 (October 1988), 249–269 (Samet 1988).
45. Laqueur, 407. Regarding the attitudes of Orthodox Jews towards Zionism in general, see *ibid*, 407–413.
46. Smith, *Palestine*, 33; also Friedland and Hecht, 16–18.
47. Laqueur, 407; also Amnon Ramon, "Delicate Balances at the Temple Mount, 1967–1999" in *Jerusalem: A City and Its Future*, eds., Marshall J. Breger and Ora Ahimeir (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 297 (Ramon 2002).
48. See, for instance, Naomi Shepherd, *Ploughing Sand, British Rule in Palestine 1917–1948* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 37, 39; also FO 371/3385, telegram from General Clayton, Cairo, 11.18.1918 (Shepherd 2000).
49. Laqueur, 408.
50. *Ibid*, 407.

51. Ibid, 482.
52. See, for instance, Stephen Oren, "Continuity and Change in Israel's Religious Parties," *Middle East Journal*, 27:1 (Winter, 1973), 38 (Oren 1973).
53. Quoted in Friedland and Hecht, 59.
54. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, 146.
55. His visit to Jerusalem in 1898, left him unimpressed with the city, which he described as mostly comprising "foul-smelling alleys" filled with the "musty deposits of 2000 years of inhumanity, intolerance, and uncleanness." Quoted in James A. Haught, *2000 Years of Disbelief, Famous People With the Courage to Doubt* (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996), 196 (Haught 1996).
56. Friedland and Hecht, 49.
57. Tomer Persico, "The Love-Hate Relationship Between Zionism and the Temple Mount," 11.14.2014, <https://tomerpersicoenglish.wordpress.com/2014/11/14/the-love-hate-relationship-between-zionism-and-the-temple-mount/>, accessed 7.5.2016. See also Laqueur, xxii–xxiii.
58. Erik Freas, *Muslim-Christian Relations in Late Ottoman Palestine, Where Nationalism and Religion Intersect* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 173–187 (Freas 2016).
59. Zeine N. Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, with a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East* (New York: Caravan Books, 1973 [1958]), 52–53; also Albert Hourani, *Arab Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983 [1962]), 245, 276–279 (Zeine 1973; Hourani 1983).
60. William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000), 126–127.
61. Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven, American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008, 197, 207; Zeine, 53; and Hourani, 246–247 (Makdisi 2008).
62. Christians would dominate the Arabic-language press well into the twentieth century. Hourani, 97, 246; and C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism, Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 132 (Dawn 1973).
63. Such as the Syrian Society of Arts and Sciences, formed in Beirut in 1847, and the Syrian Scientific Association, formed in 1857.
64. In Jerusalem, for instance, the Al-Madrasa Al-Dasturiyya, or Constitutional School, established by the Orthodox Christian Khalil Sakakini in collaboration with non-Christian Arabs.
65. See, for instance, Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton: Princeton University

- Press, 2003), 27–30; and Youssef M. Choueiri, “Pensée 2: Theorizing Arab Nationalism,” *IJMES*, 41:1 (February 2009), 13 (Dawisha 2003; Choueiri 2009).
66. Quoted in Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, 5. See also Dawn, 132–133.
 67. Abdulrazzak Patel, *The Arab Nahdab, The Making of the Intellectual and Humanist Movement* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2013), 129 (Patel 2013).
 68. Ibid, 181.
 69. Hourani, 99.
 70. Ibid, 123. The “Arabs,” as the Muslim community *par excellence*, would lead the way. See, for instance, Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks, Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1997), 36–37. The term *salafyyah* has, unfortunately, more recently come to be overly associated with literalist and puritanical understandings of Islamic theology as a basis for organizing Muslim societies, largely based on the actions and beliefs of a small minority of *salafīs* (Kayalı 1997).
 71. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening, The Story of the Arab National Movement* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1946 [1938]), 98 (Antonius 1946).
 72. Zeine, 63; also Antonius, 97–98; and Dawn, 135.
 73. See, for instance, Kayalı, 36, 48; also Sylvia Haim, introduction to *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1962), 22. Regarding the appeal of this model of Arab nationalism among Palestine’s Muslims in particular, see Rashid Khalidi, “Society and Ideology in Late Ottoman Syria: Class, Education, Profession and Confession” in *Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective, Essays in Honour of Hourani*, ed., John Spangnolo (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996), 119–131 (Khalidi 1996).
 74. The “rightly guided”—essentially referring to the first four caliphs, who had also been companions of the Prophet.
 75. In this respect, the *salafī* model of Arab nationalism found a concurrence with the more secular model of Arab national identity discussed above. See Izzat Tannous, *The Palestinians, A Detailed Documented Eyewitness History of Palestine under British Mandate* (New York: I.G.T. Company, 1988), 16 (Tannous 1988).
 76. Kayalı, 36; also Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, 20–21.
 77. Zeine, 51; also Dawisha, 22–23.
 78. David Commins, “Religious Reformers and Arabists in Damascus, 1885–1914,” *IJMES*, 18 (1986). 411–412; and Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, *Muhibb Al-Din Al-Khatib, A Portrait of a Salafi-Arabist (1886–1969)*,

- Masters of Arts Thesis, Department of History, Simon Fraser University, December 1991, 6, 60 (Commins 1986; Rizvi 1991).
79. Kayali, 94–95.
 80. See, for instance, Philip P. Graves, ed., *Memoirs of Abdullah of Transjordan* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), 244; also Dawn, 57 (Graves 1950).
 81. Louis Fishman, “The 1911 Haram al-Sharif Incident: Palestinian Notables Versus the Ottoman Administration,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 34:3 (Spring 2005), 19 (Fishman 2005).

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