

The Making of the CCMS, 1969

NIXON ON THE STAGE

The Americans' choice of NATO as a vehicle for an environmental initiative involved both environmental needs and their aims regarding the evolution of the alliance. In 1969–1970 the Americans repeatedly stressed to their allies that NATO had already established a legacy in scientific cooperation between its members, and could thus prove effective in the demanding new field of the environment. Regarding political aims, the new US administration wanted to expand cooperation and consultation within the alliance.¹ It believed that an Atlantic community was already in existence, and that NATO's military–political ties were solid and likely to exist in the long term.² According to Kissinger's memoirs, Nixon wanted to boost American leadership in NATO in view of the oncoming détente. Kissinger says that following Moynihan's endorsement, he urged Nixon to underline the principle that 'the security of the alliance should be broadly construed to involve not only its physical safety against external attack but the ability of our countries to cope with the problems *within* our societies ... As modern industrial nations we all shared the problems of protecting the environment or improving transportation, and surely the resources and imagination of the Western nations could be brought to bear on the quality of life'.³ Last but not least, the White House believed that the European allies needed some American help to focus on the new issues. A National Intelligence Estimate of December 1969 offers a good insight into the motives

of the new administration to seek to broaden NATO's competence. By the late 1960s, the Estimate noted, Western Europe was more prosperous and democratic than ever before. This also entailed 'a sensation of drift and dissatisfaction', which would probably not result in a rise of the extremes, but carried the danger of a loss of focus. In this climate, transatlantic relations would become more complicated and multifaceted.⁴ The CCMS was part of an effort to expand the relationship to new fields.

As was usual in Nixon's handling of transatlantic relations, these were good ideas, but were implemented unilaterally and caused some trouble. Moreover, the CCMS endeavour was undertaken by White House people who displayed their tendency—soon to become notorious—of ignoring the professionals of the State Department. As Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs at the State Department (and future Ambassador to Bonn) Martin J. Hillenbrand noted, the diplomatic service was not consulted about the initiative, for which it was less than enthusiastic: 'NATO had fulfilled and was fulfilling its essential purpose of providing security for Western Europe and ultimately for the United States. Anything beyond that would amount to pure gravy'.⁵ Thus, the American initiative caused significant nervousness among the allies.

On 24 February 1969, Nixon started his first presidential visit to Europe with a call to NATO headquarters, and attended a NAC meeting. He strongly declared his attachment to the alliance and its main purpose, defence, but went further than that: He suggested the significant broadening of allied cooperation. He noted that the alliance presented a chance to 'share ideas ... to broaden the horizon of our thinking'. No nation could work in isolation, he said, and 'we are riders on the Earth together — fellow citizens of a world community'. NATO had been born out of fear of the Soviet Union, but now had to rethink its role. The emergent problems of the environment, 'the by-products of our advanced technology', such as water and air pollution and the living conditions in the cities, should also become the focus of this cooperation. The answers, the president noted, were not going to be easy, as 'they deal with the vast sweep of history'. NATO needed to evolve and adjust to the new era to 'replace the unity of a common fear with a community of a shared purpose', and become 'more than it ever has been before: a bulwark of peace, the architect of new means of partnership, and an invigorated forum for new ideas and new techniques to enrich the lives of our peoples'.⁶ Interestingly, Nixon made no mention of this subject in his memoirs, writing about his visit to NATO, but Kissinger did in his.⁷

During his 24 February visit, Nixon did not put forward firm proposals. On their part, the allies focused on security issues. Before the visit, the European members had tried to coordinate in order to explain to the president their views on the defence problems.⁸ During the visit, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Lyman Lemnitzer stressed that 'if the Russians had done anything against NATO immediately after their invasion of Czechoslovakia, NATO would not have been in any state to resist them'.⁹ At the NAC session, but also during a private meeting between Nixon, Brosio and the permanent representatives immediately afterwards, the discussion focused on the levels of US forces, the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and the US–Soviet strategic arms talks, as well as on the need not to allow public opinion to relax on the road to détente. It was only at the end of the private meeting that Nixon carefully reverted to the subject of non-military cooperation, inviting his allies to express their views in the forthcoming ministerial NAC meeting in Washington, which would also celebrate the alliance's twentieth anniversary.¹⁰ The allies welcomed the assurances of the new US administration about the importance it attached to NATO, but did not fully appreciate the strength of Nixon's feelings regarding the 'new' issues that he put forward. For example, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, who had played a crucial role in the restructuring of the alliance only two years before, told the British that the Nixon visit had brought 'nothing unexpected'.¹¹

However, Nixon meant his words. During the National Security Council review of NATO, in March, the American search for new areas of allied consultation included the problems of industrialized societies.¹² In the same month, instructing the US delegation to NATO to sound out the views of the allied delegations, the State Department made clear that Nixon's concepts involved the role of NATO as a 'catalyst' for Western environmental cooperation. This involved profoundly political/social questions, relevant both to the ongoing Cold War, and to the recent internal problems of Western societies. NATO should contribute in the search for a new legitimization:

The premise of NATO engagement in this sphere could be described as a contribution to the strengthening of Western society as a bulwark against a hostile ideology, and as an example for other societies ... To [the] extent NATO was visibly engaged in addressing problems common to technologically advanced societies, it might promote support for the alliance from youth and other sectors now vocally opposed.¹³

During the Permanent Representatives' lunch on 25 March, the US member, Harlan Cleveland, raised this issue, stressing that the focus of the proposed cooperation would involve the social impacts as well as technical issues: 'In other words, focus is more on failures of and need for attention to social and governmental institutions, which are somehow not coping with the social fallout of scientific and technological "progress"'. Cleveland also mentioned the need to respond to student unrest. As could be expected, some of his colleagues were in favor of the concept (Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands) and some had doubts (Denmark or Italy), with Brosio siding with the latter and stressing that there was little time to prepare the subject prior to the next ministerial meeting. Most notable was the reserved attitude of the British Permanent Representative Sir Bernard Burrows, representing a country of pivotal importance within the NATO system and the closest ally of the USA. Burrows noted that these issues were being addressed through other international organizations, while on the social level, NATO should not be seen to side 'with establishments against students'.¹⁴

It was this NAC meeting, rather than Nixon's February speech, that alerted the allies to the fact that the USA was proposing a radical expansion of allied cooperation. Soon, most of the NATO members appeared rather uncertain about this prospect: A NATO role on such issues could divert it from its primary responsibilities in the field of security. At this stage, it was the British who projected their reservations more strongly. The FCO preferred to avoid any NATO activity which might duplicate the work of other international organizations, and noted that the OECD was better placed than NATO to deal with environmental issues.¹⁵ In late March, the British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart instructed the NATO delegation to resist the opening of such a new chapter: The alliance was not the appropriate forum, and was overextended with its studies of East-West negotiations. Britain did not want the environment to be mentioned in the draft communiqué for the Washington ministerial NAC, except perhaps in relation to East-West relations on environmental issues, on which the British regarded the ECE as the most competent international body.¹⁶

Confusion prevailed during a discussion of the permanent representatives on 1 April. The members appeared divided: Canada, Belgium and Turkey were positive about a discussion of these issues, while Norway, the Netherlands and Britain wanted the draft communiqué of the forthcoming Washington NAC meeting to refer to the environment only

in the context of the forthcoming East–West negotiations. Germany, Luxembourg and Denmark advised caution, and France questioned NATO’s competence in this field.¹⁷ Thus, the British managed to tone down the wording of the draft communiqué: It noted that the allies were aware that they faced serious environmental problems, which, however, were also being addressed by other competent international organizations. Thus, the ministers would instruct the NAC to ‘examine how to improve ... the exchange of views and experience’ of the members. As the British wanted, the communiqué made no reference to Article Two of the 1949 Treaty.¹⁸ The FCO was satisfied: Up to then, in NATO parlance, an ‘examination of how to improve the exchange of views’ was as harmless a wording as it could get.

Despite this, the US National Security Council continued to examine the new initiative.¹⁹ However, the Americans gave no further indications that they were about to table specific proposals. For example, no mention of a NATO environmental project was made during the conversations between the British Foreign Secretary Stewart, and the new US Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in late February and on 9 April, prior to the NAC session.²⁰ This accounts for the further surprise of the allies during the Washington NAC.

It was during this NAC session, a very formal event which aimed to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of NATO, that Nixon created a *fait accompli*. On 10 April, the president took the floor to make his point. He referred to NATO’s roles in defence and political cooperation, but also brought forward his ideas on new subjects. He noted that the alliance should ‘devise better means of *harmonizing* our policies’—a verb which, arguably, sounded very threatening to members of an intergovernmental organization such as NATO. Nixon placed emphasis on the development of non-military cooperation in the alliance, and suggested the setting up of another NATO planning body [additional to the existing Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG)], the holding of regular meetings at deputy foreign minister level, and the creation of a committee to deal with the challenges of modern society. According to Nixon, the latter committee would be responsible to the deputy foreign ministers’ meetings; it would constitute a ‘third dimension’ of NATO activities, dealing with the issue of the ‘quality of life’, in addition to the alliance’s traditional competence in security and political consultation. Significantly, the new committee would not even be confined to the alliance members. ‘Quite the opposite’, Nixon noted, ‘our purpose would

be to share both ideas and benefits, recognizing that these problems have no national or regional boundaries'.²¹

Nixon had delivered his coup magnificently. Nobody could rebuff the US President on issues which he had raised personally and publicly. Everybody was practically committed to do something about it, and it mattered little what the communiqué said. It is notable that during the NAC's private discussion between Nixon and the ministers of the member-states, the US President focused exclusively on defence, reassured his allies, and expanded on the issue of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). Only British Foreign Secretary Stewart mentioned social and environmental problems, making the point that it was not a good idea to place too much on NATO's plate, and 'to discuss too many topics without being able to understand precisely any one of them'.²² Thus, the ministerial NAC agreed that the Council in Permanent Session would study the issue. But in NATO this procedure, seemingly simple, could hide great tensions.

At this stage, it is important to turn to the tensions and the dilemmas that the US proposals sparked within the alliance.²³ In his memoirs, Kissinger provided an explanation for the objections raised by the allies: 'It was clear that Europe was ambivalent about major American initiatives; it welcomed American commitments as long as they did not constrain its own freedom of action'.²⁴ This interpretation, however, was at best partially accurate. The CCMS was described by a leading American diplomat as 'the *pièce de résistance*'.²⁵ The allies preferred to avoid a row with the Americans: They tended to express their reservations to the British and to Brosio, and to expect them to make the running. However, the allies were concerned about a series of issues regarding the potential impact of the new American proposals upon the functioning of NATO.

Article 2 of the 1949 Washington Treaty authorized the alliance to deal with non-military issues. However, by its very nature, NATO's primary objectives were security and political consultation; would this 'third dimension' be compatible with the alliance's role? The Europeans, always fearful of abandonment by their major transatlantically, seemed particularly anxious that such a new sphere of NATO activity might weaken US commitment to European defence. Moreover, at a time when the alliance was studying its agenda for the détente discussions with the Soviets, it seemed strange to open such a radically new (and, in the eyes of many allies, unnecessary) chapter. The suggestion to create new NATO

machinery on many levels (deputy foreign ministers' conferences, a new planning body, and a committee on modern society) was bound to irritate the alliance members who had already gone through a large-scale renovation of NATO with the Harmel Report, and had seen the alliance headquarters being moved from Paris to Brussels.

But there was much more than that. Nixon's environmentalist proposal raised specific practical questions *about the functioning of NATO*, which always tended to create problems of an existential nature in the alliance. It had always been understood that NATO was a specialized organization, and should not duplicate the work of other international and mostly Western organizations, especially the economic ones, such as the OECD. More ominously, Nixon's idea to place the CCMS under the deputy foreign ministers' meetings (not the NAC) was bound to be seen as particularly threatening for the allies, who always saw the NAC as a guarantee of the intergovernmental nature of NATO, and consequently of their veto powers. It is difficult to exaggerate the fears that the mention of a different body, or Nixon's plea to 'harmonize' policies raised for the allies. In all previous cases when new machinery had been created, fresh assurances had to be given that the process would not violate the principle of unanimity, or (in NATO parlance) that it would remain under the control of the NAC. This had happened, for example, in 1957 when the Committees of the Political and the Economic Advisers had been set up, and in 1961 during the creation of the APAG.²⁶ Now, the Americans appeared ready to disregard this convention of NATO, which the other allies regarded as indispensable for their own position. By-passing the experienced State Department officials, the White House officials had broken a major NATO 'rule', and had intensified the nervousness of the allies.

Apart from these issues, the American proposal to set up a 'senior level group', or a group of 'broad gauge' personalities also caused discomfort in many member-states: In previous instances it had become repeatedly clear that only the USA had experts of adequate calibre to participate in such a 'senior level' team, and therefore would easily dominate it.²⁷ Tellingly, Assistant Undersecretary of the FCO John Edward Killick, a future permanent representative to NATO (1975),²⁸ commented that the only balance to the American category of 'broad gauge' personalities was the Chief Scientific Adviser of the British Government, Sir Solly Zuckerman, who was already overburdened. As a result, Killick stressed, the idea of the 'senior level' experts would not do: 'This sort

of animal is peculiar to the United States'.²⁹ In other words, the 'senior level' of that group was perceived by the member-states as another indication of American hegemonism.

Thus, the Nixon proposal surprised the allies and raised multiple dilemmas on many levels, involving conventional wisdom on the functioning of NATO, and the nature of intra-allied relations during the Cold War. Many allies feared that the Americans were out to change the intergovernmental nature of NATO and turn it into a tool for the imposition of their ideas. A minute by J.P. Waterfield, the head of the FCO's Western Organizations Department (WOD) speaks for itself:

Any idea that experts should meet under the aegis of the NATO Council with a view to collective action by member countries smacks of empire building, would be impractical, and is not generally viewed with favour by the permanent representatives.³⁰

There were other objections as well. The sudden and pressing emergence of the environmental agenda in various international meetings had placed huge burdens on the foreign ministries of the allies. The US Embassy in London pointed to an 'almost instinctively' negative disposition towards the US proposal:

This is not simply question bureaucratic negativism or traditionalism stemming from concept that NATO is essentially diplomatic institution to deal with foreign policy and defense questions, but feeling among Fo[reign] n Off[ice]s that whenever something like this comes up politicians in due course lose interest in their initiatives and FonOffs left to cope with something they not equipped for by either inclination or experience.³¹

Last but not least, the Nixon environmental proposal affected the internal affairs of the allies, including the very functioning of their foreign ministries and their governmental services. Scientific and environmental questions were not exclusively 'international'. The 'new frontier' subjects involved many government departments, as well as industry and the scientific community. By the late 1960s, there already was a growing tendency for environmental and scientific international cooperation in various international organizations. All European states had to reorganize their government machinery in order to deal with these challenges. Especially, the environment called for an unusual degree of coordination

between ministries of the internal ‘front’, while international environmental cooperation required very difficult arrangements between these ministries and the diplomatic services. This often led to upheaval or important power struggles *within* the administrations of the NATO members. Last but not least, this was the period when the Western Europeans tried to reclaim a role in high technology, but also to avoid dependence on the USA, and thus preferred to engage in European rather than transatlantic projects in which the danger of US domination was always present.³² Nixon had astonished his allies on more than one level.

THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC ONSLAUGHT: ENVIRONMENT AND POWER

In April 1969 Nixon thrust onto the table a series of proposed long-range changes in the NATO structure. His ideas on deputy foreign ministers’ meetings were accepted in principle, but Secretary General Brosio, and the NATO International Staff resisted the proposal for a new planning body, preferring instead an expanded APAG, and sparking US discomfort with their conservative approach.³³ The CCMS was the most far-reaching and radical of the US President’s proposals. The British FCO understood that it was impossible to rebuff Nixon, but expected that the ‘exchange’ envisaged in the communiqué should start with NATO examining the activities of other international organizations; no new NATO machinery needed to be created.³⁴ But the allies had underestimated the resolve of the White House. On 19 April, US Secretary of State Rogers instructed the US delegation to reopen the issue of the proposed CCMS. The USA was asking for the creation of a new NATO committee; at a first stage, a high-level exploratory group should be formed, which would report to the deputy foreign ministers’ conference in autumn. The latter group would decide the setting up of the CCMS.³⁵

On 23 April Cleveland tabled these US proposals at the NAC. He cautioned his colleagues that the USA envisaged an in-depth discussion on comparative domestic policies, which was radically different from traditional NATO consultation. Taking the FCO line, Burrows insisted that NATO should first examine what other international organizations were doing on the subject, and described the procedure proposed by the USA as ‘grandiose’. However, reporting the conversation to London, Burrows suggested that after Cleveland’s presentation, the British line of a simple

examination of the work of other organizations would not be adequate, and that Britain should go along with the majority's decision on the issue.³⁶

At the end of April, a new informal meeting of Brosio and the permanent representatives was held. The Secretary General, who had told Burrows that he was apprehensive over the 'fairly sharp difference of opinion' on environmental issues between the USA and the other members, was in favour of NATO examining technical rather than social problems, as the latter depended on conditions which varied radically in each member of the alliance. Moreover, there was the question of procedure: Should a high-level committee be summoned to examine the issue (as the Americans wanted) or was it a subject for the NAC? Brosio wanted to conduct informal deliberations with the allies, bring the issue to the NAC, and only then proceed to a high-level meeting. The Assistant Secretary General on Scientific Affairs, the Norwegian Professor Gunnar Randers, had prepared a paper embodying these suggestions. Brosio wanted a cautious, gradual approach, which would satisfy the Americans, also reassuring the allies by maintaining control in the hands of the NAC.³⁷

Meanwhile, the Americans were stepping up their diplomatic effort. The US Embassy in London stressed that the effort at the NATO headquarters would not be enough: US pressure in the allied capitals was also necessary.³⁸ By early May, Nixon was informed about the allied reservations; the Germans and the Dutch seemed favourable to the idea of an ad hoc committee to report to the deputy foreign ministers' meeting, but this meant that the others had not come out in favor of it.³⁹ On 5 May Cleveland informed his NAC colleagues and Brosio that the US embassies in NATO capitals had received 'very long instructions' to raise all three of Nixon's proposals—namely, environmental cooperation, the planning machinery and the deputy foreign ministers' meetings.⁴⁰

The American insistence created a new situation. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the reluctant allies to block the American suggestions. New information coming from Washington convinced the British that a compromise was needed. Counsellor Clive Rose of the British Embassy in Washington (who would later serve as head of the British delegation to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and as permanent representative to NATO after 1979)⁴¹ noted that US diplomats disagreed with the idea of a NATO involvement in environmental questions. However, these proposals had come from the very top

of the American administration and would be 'processed energetically'. Moreover, 'the extent to which NATO is willing to take this subject seriously is likely to be regarded in the White House as something of a test of the Organisation's ability to adapt itself to modern needs'.⁴² The writing was on the wall. Still, the FCO was against the American idea of a new committee of 'broad gauge' personalities. In these conditions, and rather unusually for its record in NATO, Britain opted to maintain a low profile:

We wish to play this, from the UK point of view, in as long and in as low a key as we can decently get away with. We rather hope that we shall not get into a position in NATO in which third dimension activities are formally accepted as an integral part of NATO's activities equivalent to the military and political dimensions.⁴³

Britain was the only possible spokesman for the reluctant allies, and its decision to give way to the Americans was crucial. From now on, the reluctant allies would try to amend, rather than block the US initiatives. On 9 May, as the formal NAC discussion of the Nixon proposal was getting closer, Stewart sent detailed instructions to his NATO delegation. He asked Burrows to ensure that any proposals were kept 'within manageable proportions ... There is a distinct danger of empire building in this exercise'. Thus, the NAC should keep the process under its control; a high-level group might work outside the authority of the Council or become a 'second Council'. Britain did not want the alliance to evolve into a community; Britain was working for a European, not an Atlantic community, and in any event 'we should prefer to discourage unnecessary metaphysical speculation on this point'.⁴⁴

But the unstoppable Americans stepped up their pressure. On the same day, Cleveland circulated a US proposal. The Americans wanted the NAC to examine the problem, and then to convene a high-level exploratory group in the summer. This would report to a meeting of senior foreign policy officials in September, which would set up the new committee.⁴⁵ The Americans continued to press for a speed unusual in NATO, and for 'senior level' groups which always were seen by the allies as masking American imposition. As the British remarked, the US proposals were going 'beyond the spirit of what was agreed by NATO Ministers in Washington', and 'threaten the authority of the Council'.⁴⁶

The dilemmas surfaced in mid-May, when the NAC got down to study the follow-up to the Washington communiqué. No one accepted

the US proposals on matters of procedure: The other allies were not prepared to start a process which might by-pass the NAC. Brosio suggested deliberations with the allies. He would then present a report to a 'reinforced' NAC, including 'national personalities well qualified and responsible in the fields concerned'. The reinforced NAC idea was evidently aiming to circumvent the initial thought of bringing in the deputy foreign ministers' meeting or high-level groups, thus reassuring the member-states. All permanent representatives accepted that the Secretary General study the problem and report, but also called for caution. The Belgian André de Staercke, a very old and experienced member of the Council, took the lead in asking for further clarifications, since the scheme involved 'the transition of the Alliance to an Atlantic community'. Burrows noted that environmental issues were important, but doubted that they could be dealt with through NATO. Instead, he was in favour of a NATO role in issues involving defense technology, and cautioned against the danger of duplicating the work of other international organizations. The French were uncertain as to the exact definition of 'environment', and—echoing their 1966 withdrawal from the military command—preferred to make no mention of an Atlantic community. The Germans stressed that the alliance could only work as a forum for the exchange of views and for the coordination of the members' activities. Cleveland rather impatiently reminded his colleagues that this was not what Nixon had suggested. The USA had called for a completely new approach, 'not only [for] a new dimension of the work of the Alliance, but a new dimension of international co-operation in the field ... because of its nature, the problem could not be handled through previously used channels of the Alliance'. Cleveland stressed that he was aware of 'the problems of jurisdiction posed at the national level and in relation to the Council itself', and agreed to recommend Brosio's procedural suggestions to his government. Thus Cleveland tried to meet some of the more pressing concerns of the allies, especially regarding the NAC's role. The NAC finally gave Brosio a mandate to report to a subsequent meeting.⁴⁷

This NAC discussion was for the Americans only a partial set-back. On the procedural level, it was clear that the process would be firmly under the NAC. Yet, the US government wanted to revert to the idea of an exploratory study group to meet in September, prior to the 'reinforced Council'.⁴⁸ As Kissinger informed Nixon in early June, the reception of the US proposal by the allies was 'generally positive though

cautious', clearly an understatement. Kissinger tried to interpret the 'slowness and skepticism' of the allies, by attributing it to their discomfort at proposals which involved new structures in NATO, outside the traditional domains of the foreign ministries. He also suggested the dispatch of personal messages by Nixon to the heads of allied governments.⁴⁹ During the next days, the US pressure to the allies was substantial. Significantly, the Americans (including the Permanent Representative-designate Robert Ellsworth) asked to see the FCO officials in London several times in the second half of May, gave them an aide-memoire, and a meeting of the American Ambassador Walter Annenberg with Stewart took place in early June.⁵⁰ In late May, speaking to British officials, the Italians indicated that they 'viewed the American proposals with horror but were at a loss to know how to tone them down'. Brosio also appeared anxious. Waterfield of the FCO described the dead-end that his colleagues were facing:

Our best tactics would seem to be to play along with the Americans, without too obvious negativeness, but in as slow time as possible, in the hope that their ideas will be reduced to reasonable proportions in due course. There remains, nevertheless, the undoubted risk that such tactics will lead us, willy nilly, into being landed with empire building in NATO ... and to more grandiose schemes than we can contemplate with equanimity.⁵¹

The ball was now in Brosio's court. The member-states presented their views, while a US memorandum arguing for a high-level meeting was submitted on 23 May. In late May, in his initial paper on the matter, the secretary general took particular care to assure the allies that the NAC would retain full control of the process. He noted that there were two sets of problems that could be examined: those arising directly from technological development (such as air and sea pollution, the increase of carbon dioxide, noise, traffic, etc.), and societal ones (psychological problems, lack of incentive, race relations, educational problems, etc.). Regarding the first set of issues, he stressed that it was not NATO's role to engage in research, but to make use of research conducted nationally or internationally. At any rate, any subsequent action following an examination of a problem by NATO would remain a national competence, a stipulation meant to reassure the allies. The second set of problems, of a societal nature, involved *domestic* issues, not falling under the competence of foreign ministries. Accordingly, NATO could provide for

the opportunity to exchange views, and act as a facilitator. In any case, Brosio anxiously noted, NATO would 'act as a stimulant for action by individual countries'. This meant that the new committee would make recommendations to the member-states, but would not dictate policy; the intergovernmental element of the procedure would thus be upheld. Brosio proposed to prepare a full report, and then call a 'reinforced' NAC with the participation of national officials. Additionally, an explorative committee could be formed to examine the issue. He also brought forward the idea of using the scheme of 'pilot' countries, which would undertake the primary responsibility for each project. Such an approach would underline the national competence and would remove the prospect of creating many NATO subcommittees which always irritated the member-states, and often proved costly.⁵² Then, the Secretary General started his informal deliberations with the allies, visiting London in late June and Washington in early July.

The idea of a new NATO role in environmental issues received a further boost late in June, when NATO's APAG planners (reporting on the mid-April meeting), referred to the possibility of seeking 'new solutions and improvements in the structure of modern society'. The APAG went out of its way to stress that '[t]he West's capability to cope successfully with its internal problems and to organize its society effectively was an important factor', and also relevant to East-West antagonism. The report made a reference to the restlessness of younger generations of the West, which was not only a problem but also an opportunity to develop new processes.⁵³

During Brosio's visit to Washington in early July, the Americans conceded that the projected CCMS would function under the NAC, would not engage in original research and would try to avoid duplication.⁵⁴ These conclusions aimed to lessen allied objections to the original US scheme. On their part, the British were trying to decide what to do. In early June, the holding of Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American talks on the UN environmental agenda tended to underline the width and the urgency of these problems.⁵⁵ On 10 June, the Cabinet Office's Official Committee on Science and Technology examined the problem, taking into account the FCO's positive attitude to Brosio's suggestions, especially the idea of the pilot studies, which had the advantage of focusing discussions on specific projects. The FCO noted that it was impossible to rebuff Nixon, since this would increase disillusionment in the USA about NATO. Britain should ensure that the projects were practical and did not duplicate the work of other international organizations. The FCO also

noted that if the USA insisted on the creation of a new committee, this should be composed of members of the permanent delegations, not high-level experts. This was the usual NATO formula to water down the special gravity of a collective body: If it were based in NATO and staffed by the permanent delegations, it tended to become integrated in the alliance structure.⁵⁶ The Cabinet Office also asked the various government departments to comment on whether international action on the environment was needed, and on whether such action should be undertaken through NATO. Almost all the departments replied affirmatively to the first question, but thought that other organizations were better equipped to deal with environmental issues.⁵⁷ On 16 June the Official Committee on Science and Technology noted that the NATO proposals had to be narrowed down; no separate structure was needed in the alliance, and the focus should be placed on social questions in order to avoid overlaps with the work of other competent international organizations.⁵⁸ This was a preference expressed earlier in the month by Sir Alan Cottrell, the British government's Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser, and Britain's representative to the NATO Science Committee.⁵⁹ In view of these reservations, the FCO sent the very unusual—indeed unique, for a NATO process—instruction to Burrows *not* to take the lead in the relevant discussions.⁶⁰

Brosio's final report was submitted to the NAC early in July. He noted that environmental problems were international by nature, involved the common values of Western societies, and could not be dealt with separately by individual countries. However, Brosio continued, most members had called for 'realism and caution': A NATO role in these matters should not weaken its primary responsibilities in security and political consultation. Moreover, most members wanted to avoid duplication with the work of other international organizations. Brosio stressed that NATO's role would be that of a stimulant and a catalyst — once again, this was an effort to ease the members' anxiety about imposing a supranational process on the alliance. Brosio noted that differences of views between the members had already emerged: Some wanted NATO to serve merely as a forum for the exchange of views, some expected the alliance to play a more executive role and some wanted it to be able to recommend non-binding measures. Some wanted to focus on social issues, while others to avoid them altogether. Some preferred the creation of new machinery and some the utilization of existing structures. Thus, in order to avoid the creation of costly and cumbersome new subcommittees, Brosio put forward the idea of pilot studies. Brosio recommended

the creation of the CCMS, chaired by himself or the assistant secretary general for Scientific Affairs. A Preparatory Committee could also be set up, as the Americans had insisted. However, Brosio stressed, all these bodies would remain responsible to the NAC in all stages of their work.⁶¹

At the NAC meeting of 15 July, despite Brosio's line of compromise, some discomfort was still evident. Burrows reported to the FCO that a 'surprisingly large number' of members were reluctant to accept a commitment to create new machinery. The Germans insisted that there should be no duplication with the social policies of the Six, which were under discussion. Norway doubted that NATO had a competence on environmental issues. Canada's Ross Campbell agreed to the setting up of a Preparatory Committee but not yet of the permanent CCMS. This was an indication of the uncertainty that the US proposal caused even to allies who had been noted for their 'forward' thinking on non-military cooperation. Burrows insisted that any NATO role should involve coordination and political orientation, not research, and should focus on social rather than on technical problems. To this, however, other representatives (mostly the Scandinavians) objected, arguing that a NATO role on social issues might have 'undesirable domestic political implications', especially for the younger generations who were hostile to NATO. All members stressed that the envisaged Preparatory Committee should be responsible to the NAC. Finally, following a US proposal, the NAC took 'favourable note' of the proposal to set up a Preparatory Committee under Randers, Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, which would study the proposed CCMS, its organization, terms of reference and methodology. Reporting to London, Burrows gloomily referred to American hegemonism, which was always below the surface: 'The Americans contemplate making a good deal more out of the preparatory committee than may initially have seemed likely'.⁶²

Burrows's estimation proved correct. On 18 July, during an informal meeting of Randers and representatives of the USA, Britain, France and Germany, J.N. Elam of the FCO's Western Organizations Department noted Washington's intention to draft the CCMS's term of reference, and commented that the Americans were 'quite unaware of the extent to which other governments were dragging their feet'.⁶³ However, the British still hoped to water down the US proposals: 'Our aim has therefore been to adopt a constructive attitude and to guide NATO towards procedures which are realistic and practicable'.⁶⁴

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CCMS

Following the July decisions, the Americans stepped up their diplomatic effort both in the NATO headquarters and the national capitals. As was usual in NATO, the problems tended to emerge not regarding the general principle involved (in this case, the formation of a CCMS), but on its practical implementation—namely, the mandate and work of the preparatory committee. This became evident when, in late July, Randers circulated an invitation to members to appoint representatives to the preparatory committee. He envisaged a two-day meeting in early September. The US delegation welcomed the invitation, but asked that the meeting last four or five days.⁶⁵ The Americans feared that in a shorter meeting the reluctant allies would refer all questions to their governments and obstruct the process. Moreover, the USA aimed to ensure that in the preparatory committee the member-states would be represented by high-level delegates rather than members of their Brussels delegations. In the American view, a high-level representation would ‘liberate’ the process from the tight embrace of the NATO headquarters and its perceived traditionalism. In mid-August the White House appointed Moynihan as US coordinator of the CCMS process. It was expected that the appointment of such a distinguished person would impress the allies and encourage them to bring senior people to the preparatory committee.⁶⁶ A special advisor, Robert Aliber, Professor of International Economics at the University of Chicago, was sent to the US delegation in NATO to tour the European capitals. At the same time, the US State Department wanted to ensure that many member-states would offer to serve as pilot countries in as many projects as possible. The American initiatives were careful and incisive, designed to break the perceived impasse and boost the process.

Together with this diplomatic offensive, the Americans also appeared more eager to ease the anxieties of their allies: The State Department agreed with Brosio on the projected terms of reference of the CCMS which would act merely as a ‘catalyst’. The Americans stressed that the new committee would not deflect NATO energies from the other two dimensions of security and political cooperation, and agreed that publicity would not be overambitious. Finally, Washington supported the pilot countries’ scheme for the CCMS’s methodology. At the same time, the Americans strongly insisted on the need to move swiftly and efficiently, and pointed to the existence of a dynamic relationship between

the technical and the societal elements, arguing that 'the problems of modern society are in large measure those that stem from technological development unaccompanied by corresponding societal advances and reforms'.⁶⁷ However, in mid-August, the US delegation to NATO reported to Washington the initially cautious replies of Britain, Belgium and Italy to the Randers invitation, the ambivalent Canadian attitude and the lack of the replies by the rest. The US Permanent Representative Ellsworth feared that if things were allowed to unfold at such a pace, the Preparatory Committee would not be successful. To avert such an outcome, the USA should provide strong leadership.⁶⁸ This initiated a frenzy of renewed American diplomatic activity in the allied national capitals.

From the very start, the Americans praised the West Germans for their comprehensive preparation for the CCMS: By mid-August, seventeen German ministries were already involved in the administrative arrangements to cope with the new environmental process.⁶⁹ The British position was seen, somehow optimistically, as constructive: Initially, the British were reluctant to appoint a senior representative to the Preparatory Committee, but following US pressure, they sent Cottrell. It is telling that the State Department kept instructing its London embassy to continue approaching the British, whose attitude was regarded as pivotal.⁷⁰ The Dutch and the Danes were encouraged to upgrade their representation on the Preparatory Committee, and to undertake pilot projects.⁷¹ Canada finally accepted the process, and the Americans strongly suggested that Ottawa undertake a pilot study for water pollution control. In late August Canada's appointment to the Committee of Professor Robert Uffen, the government's science adviser, reassured the Americans.⁷² Despite their own doubts, the British advised the reluctant Norwegians that it was 'tactically wrong' to appear to oppose an initiative by Nixon himself. Nixon wanted to boost NATO's image in the USA, and the Europeans should not embarrass him.⁷³

By late August, Randers had accepted the US idea for a four-day meeting of the Preparatory Committee.⁷⁴ Still, the Americans were anxious about the allies' lack of enthusiasm, which could mean that the preparatory work would become 'bogged down in aimless discussion'. Rogers asked the US embassies to the NATO countries to approach the governments again.⁷⁵ Thus, a new round of US diplomatic activity followed in early September. The Germans, mentioning bureaucratic resistance in their ministries about the projected NATO role, cautioned the Americans not to push too hard, as this would prove

counterproductive.⁷⁶ The Dutch continued to express doubts.⁷⁷ The Canadians now appeared more receptive and even complained about the lack of US early notification on this project.⁷⁸ Indeed, in mid-September (following the meeting of the Preparatory Committee) Canadian MPs visiting Washington expressed their suspicion that the CCMS was going to be a 'cosmetic operation' to hold NATO together in the face of its 'vanishing' security role.⁷⁹ There were other complications as well. Oslo and Copenhagen were, precisely at that moment, active in the CoE against the Greek dictatorship, and did not want to be seen to cooperate with Athens (or with Lisbon) on such a wide-ranging program.⁸⁰ For their part, the Greeks had indicated their interest to pilot a study on social security, which further embarrassed the Scandinavians.

There were some signs of discomfort from the OECD for NATO's new environmental interests, and there is evidence to suggest that the British Permanent Representative Sir John Chadwick tried to intensify this OECD discomfort further.⁸¹ Killick, meeting Moynihan in Washington, minuted that the presidential adviser was himself unclear about what NATO could do in this field.⁸² However, by early October, it was clear that the American diplomatic onslaught had produced results, and the road for the creation of the CCMS had been cleared. As the FCO noted to the Department of Education and Science (DES), 'we cannot now oppose the Committee's creation. Moreover, I do not think that there is any chance that other nations will do so. We must therefore resign ourselves to the fact that it will indeed be set up'.⁸³

Following its meetings in early September, the Preparatory Committee presented its report in early October 1969, suggesting the creation of a permanent CCMS, functioning under Article Two of the Treaty. Committee Chairman Randers, presented the proposed terms of reference of the new committee. The CCMS would not conduct research on its own, and would not have executive competence. Rather, it would make recommendations to the NAC on exchange of information and the need for governmental action (including recommendations for the implementation of the findings of other international organizations), but these would not be binding for governments. It would report annually to the ministerial session of the NAC. Therefore, it was going to be a process strictly under the control of the NAC, a fully intergovernmental body. This arrangement aimed to reassure the allies. On the other hand, the CCMS would not be staffed by the permanent delegations, and each country would appoint its representatives, which meant that the Americans were

free to send their senior specialists. Each project would have its pilot country, which would propose the subject to the CCMS, and the latter to the NAC, the body ultimately responsible to approve the undertaking of the study. A very peculiar characteristic of the CCMS was the provision that its recommendations could also be used 'outside the Alliance'. This was fully in line with the nature of environmental and societal problems, but extremely unusual for a process of the Atlantic alliance. The report also contained a list of subjects which could be studied. These included air, soil and water pollution; noise problems; transportation; urban life and town planning; poverty; crime; food and nutrition standards.⁸⁴

The NAC discussed the report on 15 October. Most members stressed the need to avoid overambitious publicity which the USA had wanted from the start, and to focus only on results. They also wanted to avoid overlaps with the work of other organizations, and were assured by Brosio that he was already working on this issue. The French wanted broader guidelines for the CCMS, rather than a specific description of its processes. The British stressed once more that NATO should not engage in research, but should act as a 'catalyst and a stimulus'. The Dutch cautioned that the CCMS should deal with a limited number of issues. Canada was not yet ready to approve the report, and finally did so on 29 October. On 5 November a 'reinforced' NAC formally decided to create the CCMS.⁸⁵ But even then, appearances were important and perspectives differed. The Americans sent Undersecretary of State Elliot L. Richardson, who reported to Washington about 'the striking change in attitude of our allies'.⁸⁶ The Germans were represented by State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, Belgium by Foreign Minister Harmel, Canada by Undersecretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux, and other states by high-level officials of their foreign ministries. The British sent George Thomson, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

CCMS: THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION, DECEMBER 1969

Throughout this period of procedural and psychological difficulties, the American exponents of the 'third dimension' kept stressing that they were not speaking of a technical process, but of a scheme touching upon the social and political development of the West. On 21 October the US coordinator, Moynihan, addressed the North Atlantic Assembly (consisting of NATO parliamentarians), which endorsed the project. His main theme was the need to prevent technology from running wild

in Western societies. Moynihan stressed that the North Atlantic Treaty spoke of 'security' in terms which made sense in 1949, and mostly in the Western European area. He insisted that it was time for the West to go beyond this concept. Freedom was not a static, but an evolving concept: It had started with individual liberties, had moved on to the democratic regimes, and was now embracing the notion of the 'quality of life'. The latter, however, existed only within 'the context of time constraints that make it ... also extraordinarily fragile'. The very technology that boosted the quality of life, Moynihan noted, also threatened to destroy it. Western societies should understand that an ecological crisis was upon them; they had focused on preventing the 'instant' nuclear disaster, but there also existed other threats, less spectacular but accumulating—for example, the increase of carbon dioxide emissions which by the year 2000 were expected to raise the temperature of the planet and the level of the seas; and population pressures. Even an ingredient in American soft drinks, aiming to prevent overweight, had been found to cause cancer. All these environmental challenges, appearing on different levels and with differing intensity, constituted a threatening whole. Technology, continued Moynihan, was 'the true Apollonian passion of our [the American] people', but the challenges were interconnected. Moynihan went out of his way to emphasize that he was putting forward a modernizing concept: 'Modern governments fail because they are not modern', and issues should not be approached with the mentality of pre-technological societies: 'Technology is always ahead on creating problems, and government is always behind in resolving them'. NATO had succeeded in furthering Western cooperation on technological matters, and was the proper forum to tackle this new challenge.⁸⁷

Contrary to the triumphant Americans, the British continued to struggle with their own internal soul searching. The decision to establish the CCMS proved the catalyst for the transfer of coordinating competence within the FCO to the Science and Technology Department (STD).⁸⁸ An FCO minute to No. 10, dealing with the question of allowing Cottrell to be interviewed on the CCMS by *The Guardian*, noted:

We ... have, by judiciously taking the initiative in NATO, succeeded in modifying it [the American proposal] in a more practical direction ... We have succeeded in pleasing both the Americans, who are grateful for our active support, and the skeptics in the Alliance, who recognize that we have brought the President's proposal down to earth.⁸⁹

This picture was only partially accurate. Whitehall's response remained timid and inadequate. The British appointed Cottrell to lead their delegation during the first plenary session of the CCMS, but only after strong pressure by the Americans who wanted the allies to send senior people.⁹⁰ Moreover, the British Social Science Research Council (SSRC) was not ready to make a detailed study of the proposed British pilot project on 'individual and group motivation',⁹¹ and thus Cottrell, who had warned against this danger, had to make a rather ill-prepared presentation during the plenary session. The instructions of the FCO to the NATO delegation for the first plenary session are also an indication of bad preparation, inflated expectations and inaccurate assessments. The FCO wanted its representatives to steer the discussion towards wider themes, rather than specific projects. 'But if the Americans field a high-powered team and table proposals for specific studies, it will be difficult to avoid *yet again* [emphasis added] being pressured into over-hasty action'. In that case, the British should 'temper the enthusiasm' and accept 'one, or at most two' proposals.⁹² In fact, eight pilot studies were finally approved at the plenary session. It is also telling of the British ill-preparation that it was only on 8 December, the day the CCMS plenary started, that the FCO asked the NATO delegation to propose a pilot study on the environmental agenda of future East-West negotiations.⁹³ It is indeed rare to witness such bad preparation by the British for a major international gathering.

At any rate, the road was open for the first CCMS plenary meeting on 8–10 December 1969. The first session was chaired by Brosio, and despite his objections on grounds of security, was attended by representatives of the press, a highly unusual occurrence for a NATO process. This was imposed by the Americans who insisted that the session be televised.⁹⁴ The Secretary General and the heads of national delegations made a series of declarations regarding the aims and nature of this ground-breaking initiative. Brosio pointed to the innovative elements of the CCMS's function: the pilot country scheme; the unclassified nature of the pilot studies ('in the same way as a study carried out by a university or research unit'); and their availability to all countries and organizations, not only the alliance members. The latter aspect, pointing to the global nature of the undertaking, was also stressed by the delegates of several members. Uniquely, the Canadian Ambassador Campbell, while welcoming the creation of the CCMS, made the unnecessary remark that 'Canada hoped the rule of consensus and unanimity—which was the

hallmark of the Alliance—would prevail’, revealing his country’s continuing fears about US imposition. Canada and Denmark cautioned against raising public expectations too much, as the committee needed time to produce results.⁹⁵

However, it was the US delegate, Moynihan, who had recently been promoted to cabinet rank, who made the most forceful comments, asserting that the creation of the CCMS ‘might well mark the beginning of an era of genuine change in the manner in which modern technological societies sought to maintain their viability’. Indeed, he noted, the CCMS represented a new historical stage of political and social development. It was possible for personal or political liberty to suffer setbacks and then revive, but a disaster in the environment could prove irreversible. The USA hoped that the CCMS would become a ‘market for ideas and techniques’, but also a facilitator of codes of practice. Immediately after Moynihan, Germany’s Ralf Dahrendorf made an impressive showing. The crux of his intervention was that the setting up of the CCMS showed ‘the fact that member countries’ security depended as much on the vitality of their societies as on the strength of their armies’. Dahrendorf and West Germany proved a strategic ally of the American advocacy of the new field of cooperation.⁹⁶

The meeting discussed the proposals of members for pilot studies. The USA suggested three themes: disaster relief, road safety and (together with Turkey) an impressively prepared proposal on air pollution. The Belgians and the Portuguese suggested open sea pollution; Canada, inland water pollution; and Britain, individual and group motivation (including the feeling of alienation in the working classes and the use of applied sciences in industry). Germany proposed the transmission of scientific knowledge to political decision making. All proposals were approved by the CCMS for transmittal to the NAC. The Greeks refrained from tabling a social security proposal, evidently to avoid strong reactions by the Scandinavians. All members stressed that the CCMS studies could also contribute to East–West cooperation, although the first priority of the CCMS would be to address the environmental problems rather than serve the needs of détente. Finally, the CCMS decided that it would meet twice annually, while a special meeting on procedure would be held in mid-February 1970. It also determined that it was the NAC’s competence to decide on inviting observers to attend meetings, for example from the OECD or the Atlantic Assembly.⁹⁷ The full control of the NAC over the CCMS process was confirmed with the

submission to the Council of a report by Randers, referring to its first meeting and conveying the proposed projects.⁹⁸

But the sanitized NATO documents—approved by fifteen member-states—do not always give the full flavour of a NATO process. A different but equally interesting picture of the first CCMS plenary is offered by the British documents, which radiate awe at the American triumph. An exasperated Cottrell wrote to Zuckerman deploring Britain's badly prepared performance in the meeting. In particular, Cottrell noted that his own presentation on the pilot study on individual and group motivation was unsubstantial, and that the Germans had questioned the practicality of the British proposal: 'In the circumstances I can hardly blame them for entertaining such thoughts'. Britain had not tabled any papers, had not sent experts, had not offered to co-pilot an additional project, and only Paris had fared worse than London. On the contrary, Germany's Dahrendorf had dominated the scene, together with the Americans. Cottrell strongly advised that Britain reconsider its attitude, and offer to co-pilot the German study on knowledge and decision making. In a note of self-sarcasm, the FCO officials were interested in a cutting from the *Daily Telegraph* announcing the British pilot study with the title 'Britain ready to sponsor hippy inquiry'.⁹⁹

A similar picture emerges from the British delegation's report to the FCO. The CCMS plenary session had ended in 'an atmosphere of self-congratulatory euphoria'. Cottrell had made a brave effort, but he had no paper and his briefing was not good: 'I think that it must have been obvious to all that we had not done our homework on this particular subject and were by no means ready'. The report conveyed a sense of unusual American triumph and equally unusual British failure:

It was, in fact, a rather messy meeting because, under pressure from the Americans, a topsy-turvy format was followed ... The Americans dominated the scene by sheer weight of numbers. At one stage, I counted three at the table supported by 25 behind (at the same stage the United Kingdom was represented by Dr. Cottrell and I at the table with no-one behind save the American overspill).¹⁰⁰

Even this disappointing picture was not enough to change attitudes in London. On 22 December, Waterfield noted that Britain had been successful in watering down the initial ambitious US proposal, and had protected NATO from rushing into 'overambitious and premature or dramatic schemes'. However, Waterfield continued, the CCMS would

clearly move on, ‘and it is becoming increasingly clear that, despite their initial skepticism, other NATO members are now taking this whole question more seriously’.¹⁰¹ But it was Moynihan’s report to Nixon that gave a more accurate picture. Moynihan was elated at the liveliness of the sessions, and remarked that in the end, ‘those who came empty handed seemed almost to regret their judgment that it would not work and was not worth wasting time on it’.¹⁰² In other words, the CCMS was now a reality, but it still had a long road to travel.

NOTES

1. Luke A. Nichter, *Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 6–13.
2. Washington DC, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), RG 59, Hughes to Rogers, 17 February 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1589; Cleveland (NATO) to State Department, 24 January 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 2355.
3. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), pp. 386–387.
4. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1969–1976, XLI (Western Europe, NATO, 1969–1972), National Intelligence Estimate, 4 December 1969, doc. 27. See also Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 175–185, on the Nixon administration’s ‘ambivalence’ towards the EC. However, this ambivalence had not yet fully developed in 1969.
5. Martin J. Hillenbrand, *Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of a Diplomat* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), p. 275; see also pp. 268–269.
6. Brussels, NATO Archives, International Staff (hereafter NATO/), CR(69)9, 3 March 1969. See also London, The National Archives (hereafter TNA/), FCO 41/442, Burrows to FCO, no. 101, 24 February 1969.
7. Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 370; Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 80.
8. TNA/FCO/41/442, minute (Waterfield), 18 February, Stewart to NATO delegation, 18 February, and Burrows to FCO, 20 February 1969.
9. TNA/FCO 41/442. Burrows to FCO, no. 105, 24 February 1969.

10. TNA/FCO 41/442, Burrows to FCO, 24 February (no. 103) and 26 February 1969.
11. TNA/FCO 41/442, Barclay (NATO) to FCO, 24 February 1969.
12. *FR US*, 1969–1976, XLI, Pedersen to Richardson, 26 March 1969, doc. 10.
13. NARA, RG 59, Rogers to all NATO capitals, 19 March 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1589.
14. NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 25 March 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1589; TNA/FCO 41/409, Burrows to FCO, 25 March 1969.
15. TNA/FCO 41/410, minute (Caff), 30 March, and minute (Waterfield) 31 March 1969.
16. TNA/FCO 41/410, Stewart to NATO delegation, 31 March 1969.
17. TNA/FCO 41/410, Burrows to FCO, 1 April 1969.
18. TNA/FCO 41/410, Stewart to NATO delegation, 2 April 1969; TNA/FCO 41/412, minute (Waterfield), 14 April 1969.
19. See *FR US*, 1969–1976, XLI, Hillenbrand to Rogers, 7 April 1969, doc. 11; Nichter, *Nixon and Europe*, p. 13.
20. TNA/FCO 55/228, Record (Stewart, Rogers), 25 February 1969; FCO 41/411, Record (Stewart, Rogers), 9 April 1969.
21. Nixon speech, 10 April 1969, facsimile reprint *Science and the Alliance: NATO's Third Dimension* (Brussels: NATO Archives, 2014), pp. 133–135. See also Stephen Macekura, 'The Limits of the Global Community: The Nixon Administration and Global Environmental Politics', *Cold War History* 11/4 (2011), pp. 492–493.
22. TNA/FCO 41/411, 'Record of a meeting between President Nixon and NATO Ministers on April 11'.
23. On allied objections, see also Nichter, *Nixon and Europe*, pp. 13–14; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 'Nixon's Coup: Establishing the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 1969–70', *International History Review*, 38/1 (2016), pp. 88–108; Linda Risso, 'NATO and the Environment: The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society', *Contemporary European History*, 25/3 (2016), pp. 505–535.
24. Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 386–387.
25. Hillenbrand, *Fragments of Our Time*, p. 275.
26. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Analysis and Reporting, 1951–1969* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 71–72 and 108–109.
27. See for example, Hatzivassiliou, *NATO and Western Perceptions*, p. 27, pp. 86–87.
28. *The Diplomatic Service List, 1977* (London: HMSO, 1977), p. 298.

29. TNA/FCO 41/414, minute (Killick) 9 April 1969.
30. TNA/FCO 41/412, minute (Waterfield), 14 April 1969.
31. NARA, RG 59, Annenberg (London) to State Department, 25 April 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1590.
32. Hubert Zimmermann, 'Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965–1973', in Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), *Between Empire and Alliance: American and Europe during the Cold War* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 127–155.
33. NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 22 May and 11 June 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 2354.
34. TNA/FCO 41/414, Record of meeting with Randers, 14 April 1969; FCO 41/414, Waterfield to Pemberton-Pigott (NATO), 18 April 1969.
35. NARA, RG 59, Rogers to NATO delegation, 19 April 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1590.
36. NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 24 April 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1590. See also TNA/FCO 41/414, Pemberton-Pigott to Waterfield, 24 April 1969.
37. TNA/FCO 41/414, Burrows to Waterfield, 2 May 1969; Randers' non-papers in the same file: 'Suggestions by Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific Affairs', and 'First Tentative Suggestions on Article 14 of the Washington Communiqué'.
38. NARA, RG 59, Annenberg (London) to State Department, 25 April 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1590.
39. NARA, RG 59, Richardson, memorandum for the President, 6 May 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, NATO 3, Box 3158.
40. TNA/FCO 41/412, Burrows to FCO, 5 May 1969.
41. *The Diplomatic Service List, 1980* (London: HMSO, 1980), p. 318.
42. TNA/FCO 41/414, Rose (Washington) to Waterfield, 2 May 1969.
43. TNA/FCO 41/414, Waterfield to Pemberton-Pigott, 1 May 1969.
44. TNA/FCO 41/414, Stewart to NATO delegation, 9 May 1959.
45. TNA/FCO 41/414, Burrows to FCO, 9 May 1969. See also FCO 55/197, Stewart to NATO delegation, 12 May 1969, reporting that the Americans had delivered a similar paper to London.
46. TNA/FCO 41/414, minute (Waterfield), 13 May 1969.
47. NATO/CR(69)22, 12 June 1969. See also TNA/FCO 41/414, Burrows to FCO, 14 May 1969.
48. NARA, RG 59, memorandum for the President, 19 May, and memorandum for Henry Kissinger, 21 May 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1590.

49. *FRUS*, 1969–1976, E-1 (Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972), Kissinger to Nixon, 2 June 1969, doc. 287.
50. TNA/FCO 41/414, minutes (Waterfield), 19 and 27 May; US aide-memoire, 4 June; and Stewart to NATO delegation, 4 June 1969.
51. TNA/FCO 41/414, minute (Waterfield), 30 May 1969.
52. NATO/PO/69/265, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, ‘Environmental Problems’, 29 May 1969.
53. NATO/CM(69)30, APAG, 26 June 1969. See also the US report on the APAG meeting in NARA, RG 59, Rogers to NATO delegation, 26 April 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1590.
54. TNA/CAB 168/278, Rose (Washington) to FCO, 3 July 1969.
55. TNA/FCO 41/414, Record of UK/US and UK/Canadian talks, 4–6 June 1969.
56. TNA/FCO 41/414, ST(O)(A)(69)9, 10 June, and FCO papers; CAB 168/278, Note on a meeting, Cabinet Office, 6 June 1969.
57. TNA/FCO 41/414, Johns (Cabinet Office), circular, 17 June; Wilkinson to Elam (FCO), 19 June; Stephens (Home Office) to Elam, 24 June; and Appleyard (DES) to Elam, 23 June 1969. See also FCO 55/197, Price (Ministry of Transport) to Elam; and Pooley (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) to Elam, 15 August 1969.
58. TNA/FCO 41/414, ST(O)(A)69th meeting, 17 June 1969.
59. TNA/FCO 55/197, Record of a meeting, 6 June 1969.
60. TNA/CAB 168/278, FCO to NATO delegation, 11 July 1969.
61. NATO/PO/69/338, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, ‘Environmental Problems’, 8 July 1969.
62. NATO/CR(69)33, 1 August 1969. See also TNA/FCO 55/197, Burrows to FCO, 16 July 1969.
63. TNA/FCO 55/197, minute (Elam), 18 July 1969.
64. TNA/CAB 168/278, Barrington to Youde (no. 10), note ‘NATO and Environmental Problems’, 5 August 1969.
65. NARA, RG 59, Ellsworth (NATO) to State Department, 23 July 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
66. NARA, RG 59, Elliot (State Department), memorandum to Kissinger (White House), 11 Aug. 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
67. NARA, RG 59, Richardson to NATO delegation, 8 August 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
68. NARA, RG 59, Ellsworth to State Department, 14 August 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
69. NARA, RG 59, Aliber (Bonn) to State Department, 21 August, and Rogers to all NATO capitals, 26 August 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.

70. NARA, RG 59, Cleveland (London) to State Department, 25 August, Rogers to London, 27 August, and Rogers to all NATO capitals, 30 August 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591. See also TNA/FCO 55/197, Rose (Washington) to Waterfield, 28 August 1969.
71. NARA, RG 59, Dudley (Copenhagen) to State Department, 26 August, and Middendorf (The Hague) to State Department, 27 August 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
72. NARA, RG 59, Schmidt (Ottawa) to State Department, 28 August, Rogers to all NATO capitals, 30 August 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
73. TNA/FCO 55/197, minute (Killick), 18 August 1969.
74. TNA/FCO 55/197, FCO to NATO delegation, 29 August 1969; CAB 168/278, Stewart to NATO delegation, 5 September 1969.
75. NARA, RG 59, Ellsworth to State Department, 21 August, Johnson to all NATO capitals, 22 August, and Rogers to all NATO capitals, 26 August 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
76. NARA, RG 59, Weiss (Bonn) to State Department, 4 September 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
77. NARA, RG 59, Middendorf (The Hague) to State Department, 4 September 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
78. NARA, RG 59, Schmidt (Ottawa) to State Department, 5 September 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
79. NARA, RG 59, Rogers to NATO delegation, 16 September 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
80. NARA, RG 59, Crowe (Oslo) to State Department, 25 October 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.
81. TNA/CAB 168/278, Roper (OECD) to FCO, 26 September; CAB 168/279, Chadwick to FCO, 13 October 1969.
82. TNA/CAB 168/278, minute (Killick) 22 September 1969.
83. TNA/CAB 168/279, Braithwaite to Appleyard, 3 October 1969.
84. NATO/CM(69)43, Preparatory Committee on Challenges of Modern Society, 6 October 1969.
85. NATO/CR(69)46, 28 October; CR(69)48, 14 November; CR(69)49, 24 November 1969; and CR(69)55, 9 January 1970. See also TNA/CAB/168/279, Burrows to FCO, 16 October and 6 November 1969.
86. *FRUS*, 1969–1976, XLI, Richardson (London) to State Department, 6 November 1969, doc. 23.
87. NARA, RG 59, Rogers to Moynihan, 31 October, and text of Moynihan's speech to the North Atlantic Assembly, 21 October 1969, Central Files 1967–1969, Def 4 NATO, Box 1591.

88. TNA/FCO 55/198, Elam to Piercy, 11 November; CAB 168/279, Audland to Cottrell, 19 November 1969.
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The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society, 1969-1975

Transatlantic Relations, the Cold War and the
Environment

Hatzivassiliou, E.

2017, XIII, 287 p. 1 illus., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-53846-4