

## Perestroika and American Political Science

Does democracy, or the lack of it, affect research methods? Philosophers of science Paul Feyerabend, and, less flamboyantly, Thomas Kuhn were among those who implied such a link. In the superpower that advertises itself as the world's greatest democracy (despite the Iraq invasion, the Patriot Act, Abu Ghraib and a panoply of voter suppression schemes), one might imagine that the American Political Science Association (APSA), which represents some 14,000 scholars and teachers of the art of politics, preached the gospel that the best system of government, despite all its faults and shortcomings, is democracy.<sup>1</sup> Actually, as with any group fancying itself an elite, many APSA members harbored grave doubts as to how far this unruly form of government ought to go not only in the great wide world but also especially inside their own club. The Association never considered the apparently subversive notion of conducting internal elections through a secret ballot. That is, not until the early 2000s when a rebellious bunch of political scientists explicitly connected the ascendance of a stultifying formal and quantitative view of political life to the absence of internal democracy inside the APSA.

What governed the APSA was a cozy arrangement whereby a committee chosen by the President nominates his (until the millennium, 80 times 'his' and four times 'her') successor who then picks the Governing Council who in turn pick the next President who picks the next Council, and so on and on. APSA officers were answerable to figures they themselves appointed: a splendidly regal arrangement. What did this hierarchic coziness mean for the vitality of teaching, research and democracy?

A hoary academic jest has a surly scholar grouching about a successful event: 'That's all very well in practice but how does it work in theory?'

The objection (to which I am not entirely unsympathetic) is only a slight exaggeration of the otherworldly plight afflicting American political science. For decades, it has been the icy elegance and artificial neatness of models, not their relation or relevance to real-world activities, which garnered the greatest kudos in the profession. Other kinds of scholars had gotten the unmistakable message that they need not apply. This disturbing doctrinal trend would not have come to public light except for a remarkable revolt against what disgruntled scholars complained has been the suffocating grip of mathematical models and of formal theory (rational choice, public choice, game theory) in political science, imported from economics.

Rational choice theory derives from an especially and, Perestroikans argue, excessively abstract version of neoclassical economics, which many political scientists could not help but notice win a lot of para-Nobel Prizes, though usually for no intelligible or sustainable reason and with no discernible benefit to humanity.<sup>2</sup> The theory deploys an arid set of assumptions about human behavior which reduce our complicated lives and societies to nothing but prioritized 'rational' choices that we supposedly make in order to maximize our materialistic 'utility' in any given situation. The theory is in deep trouble right off the bat given that utility is a notoriously circular concept.<sup>3</sup> In this chalkboard powder universe people are depicted in the behavioral terms of narcissistic, autistic, self-seeking 'homo economicus,' a conceptualization wherein any trace of culture, history, personality, accident, whimsy, self-reflection or other human impurity that might smudge the model is erased or ignored.<sup>4</sup> A heuristic concept that just might arguably be useful for some limited purposes was deemed applicable to all. In political science, the equation of 'empirical' with 'quantitative' also had become a common and, indeed, compulsory discipline-wide error, critics complained.

Although dissidents exclude statistical techniques *per se* from their critique of the careening hubris of formal theory, Professor Greg Kasza charged that it was a cohort of 'radical quantifiers' who 'popularized the study of politics outside of its historical and cultural setting, who made methodology into the core of graduate education while degrading political philosophy and foreign language study and who spawned the trend toward method-driven rather than problem-driven research.' Kasza charged that graduate students were forced to 'earn their passports to the clouds in

qualifying exams that grill them on multiple regression, most-different-systems analysis, and the small-*n* problem' when many have yet to master the history, economics, social structure and politics of even one '*n*.'<sup>5</sup> If you can't count it, in other words, it doesn't count.

Few Perestroikans deny that rational choice, and the statistical apparatus that often accompanies it, has some merit if employed with the ample ballast of humility, especially in studies of what rational choice proponents call 'collective action,' where groups ranging from suburban middle managers to hard bitten rural guerillas are imagined to weigh their choices according to identical incentive structures. The trouble is that formal models cannot help but dangle the tantalizing appearance of encompassing explanations for almost anything you name, although the resulting explanations, critics retort, are usually trivial, reinvent (or rephrase the invention of) the wheel, or fail to display any passing acquaintance with recognizable reality.<sup>6</sup>

Citizens in the UK and USA may well wonder why economic growth consistently generates a distribution upward of wealth—before and after the 2007–2008 financial crime of a crash when \$40 trillion equity went poof—or why the best and brightest market economists taught the Russians in the high-spirited early days after the Soviet Union's dissolution how to send their economy, so far as the average Russian was concerned, straight to hell.<sup>7</sup> Might some formal analyst explain why the average tax-paying citizen rationally chose not only to bail out the bankers and brokers who sliced and diced up the financial structure a decade ago but also to be punished and plundered through imposition of austerity programs that remorselessly generate the conditions for more austerity?<sup>8</sup> Few mainstream economists or rational choice connoisseurs pay serious attention to such impertinent questions.<sup>9</sup>

'Beyond generic group death and disability insurance, discounts on other unreadable scholastic publications, cheap tickets to APSA meetings, and periodically-issued surveys of what many academics pretend is 'cutting edge research,' the APSA does very little,' Professor Tim Luke assessed. 'It no longer aspires to guide the nation's public life, it bars members from making political pronouncements in any collective manner, and it produces a fairly apolitical and largely unscientific run of self-referential literature by, for, and of college professors.'<sup>10</sup> Steinmo cites a survey that found more than half the APSA members had no use for the flagship journal, which virtually had become the preserve of narrow-minded quantitative and formal theorists.<sup>11</sup>

Like the ‘post-autistic economics’ movement arising in France in 2000 against the formalistic excesses of economics, the American Perestroikans advocated a ‘plurality of approaches adapted to the complexity of the object studied.’ American economics proved fiercely resistant and indeed oblivious to challenge and so the movement ignited instead within political science, which zealously imitated any and all fads in economics.<sup>12</sup> The clarion call of the US revolt came in mid-October 2000 in a circulated email by ‘Mr. Perestroika’—perhaps a junior faculty member or group of them—who lashed out against ‘poor game-theorists who cannot for the life of me compete with a third grade economics student’ yet are able to crush the ‘diversity of methodologies and areas of the world that APSA “purports” to represent.’<sup>13</sup>

Let us recall that Perestroika, according to its—ahem—original sponsors, promoted the ‘vital creativity’ of society’s members, development of democracy, ‘initiative and independence’ and ‘the widening of criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of social life.’ Hence, Mr. Perestroika stated that the goals of the new movement were to ‘provide a forum where people can discuss and debate methodology, politics, theory, and the world in such a manner that APSA and APSR and our discipline become more open and more diverse in gender, racial, ethnic, and methodological terms—in teaching, publishing and hiring practices.’

### THE PERESTROIKAN CHALLENGE

The anonymous email catalyzed a lively intellectual insurgency. Within a month a movement of combat-ready professors crystallized, fronted by a bevy of prominent scholars whom APSA authorities, try as some might, could not afford to ignore or deride. By January 2001 more than 200 tenured faculty members signed a toned-down version of the original reform petition, crafted by Rogers Smith, charging that formal modelers, unless strongly checked, were slowly but surely stamping out other valuable forms of research. Signatories included 24 named chairs, luminaries ranging from Yale’s Ian Shapiro and political ethnographer James Scott to University of Chicago South Asian experts Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph to Penn’s political semiotician Ann Norton, and Columbia University’s Jan Elster.

Political science had ‘been taken over by methodological parochialists who believe that the only worthwhile scholarship in political science speaks the language of mathematics,’ lamented University of Chicago scholar John Mearsheimer. Only numbers and equations matter inasmuch as

mathematics conveys a glittery but illusory impression of pin-it-down precision. Numbers presumably cannot lie. Just ask vote tabulators in 2000 Florida, former Enron employees or any inebriated tax accountant off the record. The dubious, indeed daft, belief that quantitative data are not an interpretation of the phenomena to which it is assigned has become sedulously institutionalized, a sad fact that forecloses many valuable insights (such as this very old one). A regrettable consequence is that economists and political scientists have less and less to say of any interest about anything that we recognize as the actual world we have to maneuver in.

Young scholars, like it or not, must bend at least outwardly to prevailing winds in order to survive in their disciplines.<sup>14</sup> In America rational choice modelers quickly became notorious for forming powerful coterie bent on expanding their disciplinary control. This inveterate imperializing had not gone unnoticed in Britain either. 'The governing principle in most sensible political science departments is that rational choice theorists should be on tap but not on top,' the chair of a top UK politics department, who preferred anonymity, told me. 'They should exist, be permitted to flourish, but never be permitted dominance. Once dominant, they are incapable of appointing other than their own; the more vulgar they are the more this is true.'<sup>15</sup> Dissidents found that rational choice/mathematical modelers cannot bring themselves to concede that their phantasmagoric terms are just as much metaphors as any literary image deployed by supposedly 'soft' social scientists.<sup>16</sup> Professor Giandomenico Majone believes the fault for this doctrinaire behavior lies not with formal models in themselves but with the excesses of undereducated disciples: 'You should know more than the tool you use,' he observed. That state of affairs, unfortunately, is not the norm.

A side benefit of hyperspecialization—what Thorstein Veblen labeled 'trained incompetence'—for acolytes (or those lacking a sense of intellectual adventure) is that when they encounter flak from more broadly (multi-disciplinary) educated people, they retreat along a trail of numerical platitudes into the APSA fortress where number crunchers rule the roost. Other social science fields, except of course economics, are off-limits. The result is that blithe positivists tend to penalize, whenever they can, anyone who knows more than they do as a result of wandering off the reservation into realms they do not deem frigidly scientific. For all the positivists' protestations of superiority in skills over qualitative scholars, it is child's play for area specialists to puncture big-N study balloons, to unravel the strained assumptions, motley mistakes and vapid generalizations on which such work is usually built.<sup>17</sup>

Formal modelers too often take a framework derived from a Western context and apply it indiscriminately.<sup>18</sup> A typical example I witnessed at the height of the initial Perestroika controversy was a paper by two academics who imposed a one-size-fits-all rational choice framework upon Northern Ireland where, among other howlers, they argued that the Irish Republic could pressure Ian Paisley to endorse the fitful peace process, which was akin to asserting the Pope could make Osama bin Laden do his bidding. A tenured rising star Ivy League professor studying guerilla wars (including Vietnam) with the finest of quantitative precision tools turned out not to even have heard of Daniel Ellsberg ('How do you spell that?'), let alone his contributions on the subject.<sup>19</sup> A graduate student on the perestroika listserv recalled a faculty modeler incorporating India into his data set without any grasp of its history or cultures. 'Isn't Delhi the national language of India?' the undaunted scholar asked. Everything looks like easy prey if you never tried to capture it or just need to look as if you did. Practitioners plummet headlong into the blinkered touristic assumption that American values and practices are universal, even after posting ritualized disclaimers. They get away with it by assuming that putative neutral theories and procedures automatically make anything they do impeccably scientific.

The Perestroika movement, which subsided in the late 2000s, had two main prongs. One was opposition to the non-competitive process by which political scientists in the world's second largest democracy organized themselves. The second was resistance to the hegemony of formal and quantitative work in the journals and forums of the Association. Opposition took several forms. The severest criticisms regarding narrowness in quantitative approaches homed in on the American Political Science Review, flagship journal of the Association. 'Homogenous, narrow journals,' Susanne Rudolph stated, 'reduce the space in which political scientists can ask questions, pursue questions, find and retain jobs, and get promoted.'<sup>20</sup> Journals of several regional associations also came under scrutiny. These prized official organs were selected by many departments as shortcut certifications for faculty recruitment, promotion and tenure, which are useful as 'easy markers' for harried search committees and provost offices who wish to relieve themselves of the burden of reading and evaluating the work of prospective candidates.<sup>21</sup>

In riposte to Perestroikan upstarts, Ada Finifter, then APSR journal editor, opined that nothing more than sheer professional ambition was at stake in the insolent uproar. This dismissiveness ideally suited

the rational choice *weltanschauung*, where self-interested gain is all that comes into play. All else is at best mere marginalia. She remained puzzled then as to why prominent dissenters were so upset inasmuch as they were twice as deft as anyone else at inserting their work into the main journals. Finifter's reaction, widespread among positivists, nicely exemplified the trusty defense mechanism of projection, the first resort among dominant groups facing challenge. Finifter was oblivious to the slippery ambiguity of claiming that all's well in the discipline so long as scholars deliver 'high-quality work using methods appropriate to the research problem'—as if the definition of those 'appropriate' methods was not the crux of the matter.

Still, a conciliatory APSA selected as its next President a Perestroika-backed candidate, Harvard's Theda Skocpol. Even this emollient move was greeted with suspicions that crafty APSA honchos reckoned that Skocpol, although renowned as no pushover, could likely be co-opted into the 'East coast Brahmin' network and so opt to preserve undemocratic mechanisms. Everyone assiduously had read their Machiavelli, in which case it is a bit more difficult to be a wily Machiavellian. Most dissidents were pleased that, as Mr. Perestroika put it, there was a prospect of a 'dismantling of the Orwellian system that we have in the APSA.'

Yet it still spoke volumes that junior scholars feared to reveal Perestroikan sympathies in a profession that purported to prize vigorous and open exchange. When lifelong students of the way power works express surprise, and in some cases indignation, that some Perestroikans must conceal identities for fear of reprisals, one gets a whiff of apparatchik or inexcusably naive mentalities at work—even among a few Perestroika adherents. 'One does not need to be a rocket scientist—or a political scientist—to see that transparency does not always serve insurgency well,' replied Anne Norton to those Perestroikans who righteously demanded Mr. Perestroika disclose his/their identity. Imagine what would become of Mr. Perestroika's career if a Department superior like Daniel Diermeier (more below) or David Laitan, who disparaged Mr. Perestroika as a Luddite intent on sabotaging science altogether, got hold of him.<sup>22</sup>

'If P "came out of the closet" and turned out to be a graduate student at Michigan State, a junior faculty member at Los Angeles Community College, a recent Ph.D. with no job and no book contract, a recent Ph.D. from Chicago with a visiting post at a small college, or some senior scholar somewhere, how many of us would give their collective

opinions equal weight with those of Anne Norton, Rogers Smith, or Joanna, Dvora, and Sandy? Sure we all would,' snarkily but accurately estimated Michael Bosia. 'But talk to graduate students and recent Ph.D.s (and many scholars) about why they don't post on Perestroika, and you might learn that we don't weigh all voices equally. The group P, then, equalizes the discussion. Perestroika or P is a disembodied voice with no more power than the ability to remind and recall.'

During the early 2000s the network underwent two 'constitutional crises': one over whether to become a formalized institution with officers (rejected) and the other whether to become a forum for general political criticism (mostly rejected). The e-mail network did become semi-institutionalized and gave rise to a coherent collaboration by colleagues who in many cases had never seen each other. In 2003, a committee of major scholars formed to oversee listserv traffic. Listservs are never free from foibles and often get diverted for spells to the hobbyhorse concerns of a few garrulous members. The perestroika listserv seemed in danger of occupation by arch-conservatives who, in an era spanning Presidents Reagan, Bush I and II and an interim Southern Democrat who scuttled the welfare system and played enabler for Wall Street predation, asserted that they too are discriminated against within the Academy. Russell Jacoby, elsewhere, mooted the instructive notion of a trade of left/liberal influence in humanities and some social science programs for the loot available to business schools and other professional schools firmly in conservative safekeeping—not mention the Pentagon and Wall Street.<sup>23</sup>

Theda Skocpol was followed as President in 2003 by avowed Perestroikan Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. Rudolph, Skocpol and predecessor Robert Putnam appointed Perestroikans to APSA decision bodies. An initiative set in motion by in-house critics of the APSR to launch a journal as an alternative to the methodological parochialism of the APSR, accelerated during the Perestroika movement. Jennifer Hochschild ran the first 2 years of the new *Perspective on Politics*. A new APSR editor issued a welcome statement recognizing the accumulating grievances about absence of diversity in the journal. The issues of the APSR under Lee Siegelman's watch showed improvement though, by some accounts, it tailed off quickly.<sup>24</sup> From the September 2002 to the February 2004 APSR issues, a Perestroikan found twice as many purely qualitative articles (10–14%) appeared as in the previous decade. A self-nominated committee on reform of Association governance would formulate proposals for competitive elections, which, however, did not get very far.

Not all can be sweetness and light in methodological fights, which burrow right down to the roots of practitioners' beings. A 'Mr. Pravda' interjected, like Finifter, that Perestroikans patently were motivated by sheer careerism, even though open association with Perestroika scarcely was calculated to garner merit points with most hiring committees. As Chris Hedges notes of the upper ranks of journalism, the political science profession too has been packed over the years (as tuitions escalated) with people who spent their lives since kindergarten single-mindedly promoting their career interests *uber alles* and so cannot comprehend or must denigrate anyone who does otherwise.<sup>25</sup> In office Skocpol, ironically, chided Perestroika for itself being unrepresentative within the APSA—spectacularly missing the whole point of the movement—while APSA nominating committee member Joan Scott testily claimed that reforms were in the pipeline anyway so what was all the fuss about? Hence, on becoming APSA President in 2003, Susanne Rudolph received numerous letters warning her about cooptation, expressing fears that the Perestroikan agenda would be thwarted by a blend of inertia, divide-and-conquer tactics, and outright obstruction. The Perestroikans knew their politics and their colleagues all too well. A prominent Perestroikan even warned of Thermidore. Dissidents at the time fretted that the new journal launched to broaden the Association's appeal was fated to become a steerage class organ, though that clearly hasn't been the case, except in the eyes of hardcore 'qaunts'.<sup>26</sup> Nonetheless, studies of the key regional journals—AJPS, JOP, PRQ—showed they 'continue to represent a narrow section of the scholarship and a small section of the membership in our profession.'

Another problem that Perestroikans did not solve is how to ensure 'diversity of methods' in departmental hiring processes, which are usually steered by hegemonic formalists. Cyberspace discussions suggested an informal process to rank departments on degree of diversity, relying on the information process itself as a form of critique and consciousness raising. That discussion became mired in questions of, you guessed it, methodology, which shades and infiltrates everything in this fray. Getting it exactly backwards, Sidney Tarrow, ordinarily one of the fairer minded eminences in the field, therefore wrote in a retrospective on Perestroikans that they 'strove mightily to sharpen boundaries between themselves and mainstream political scientists, but in the end failed,' although the movement plainly arose in response to the frustrating positivist barriers they increasingly encountered.<sup>27</sup> Finding a Perestroikan

who derides quantitative methods as a part of any repertoire is difficult; not so, finding formal theorists and quantitative practitioners who regard anyone lacking their overrated skill sets as a species of charlatan. Perestroikans never opposed formal methods or mathematical models, as the late Susanne Rudolph stressed, but rather opposed their consecration as sacred and sufficient devices of investigation, thereby squeezing out cultural, historical and psychological approaches. Rudolph stated that the objective is ‘high-quality work using methods appropriate to the research problem,’ and aligned with fellow dissident Margaret Keck in advising that ‘the problem dictates the method,’ not the other way around.

Like much else in American politics, the Perestroika movement was convolutedly many-stranded, which was both its initial strength and an eventual cause of dissolution. The objectives of demographic groups within the Association happened to overlap with those of Perestroika. Skocpol was supported by the women’s caucus while Rudolph was supported by the women’s caucus, the black caucus, the lesbian and gay caucus and the Hispanic caucus. Indeed, after Perestroika, four of the next six APSA Presidents were women, and seven of the last 15 up to 2016. Nearly all those Presidents were sympathetic or else made their peace with Perestroikans as an APSA faction whose influence wasn’t going away even if the titular organization would.

When the September 11 attacks occurred an acrimonious political debate erupted which was shunted rapidly to other Web sites. Perestroikans had to be wary of provoking splits in their volatile melange of methodological approaches and political colorings. By contrast, Chris Howell protested that overreliance on quantitative methods were only a symptom and that the ‘real goal is a critical and engaged political science that does not readily conform to what the powers that be want of it.’ Stuart Schram proposed a Perestroikan-inspired political science ‘open to allowing ongoing political struggle to serve as the context for deciding which methods will be used in what ways to address which problems’ and so ‘enable people on the bottom working in dialogue with social researchers to challenge power.’<sup>28</sup> That didn’t go over big. Brian Caterino lamented the loss of an opportunity to bring political science more squarely into political life.<sup>29</sup> Both had their supporters. Certainly, a key ‘purpose of education is precisely to promote reflection on preferences,’ Mark Graber contended. Tim Luke noted, however, that ‘formally inclined rational choicers look down on others as story tellers and journalists.’

No epithet—except maybe plagiarist—is more damning. A political science department in North Carolina a few decades ago discarded a young academic as a mere journalist—just months before he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for a political biography. One doubts that those who did it harbored the slightest regret afterward. This ingrained conceit is concisely expressed in a 2011 post discussing Perestroika—treated by then as almost ancient—on the PolSciRumors Web site: ‘The Perestroika people were just bothered by the fact that there were people who knew more than they did ... the best advice is actually ‘Tool up!’<sup>30</sup> Likewise, Laitin’s seemingly conciliatory suggestion that political scientists train in a skewed tripartite mode—narrative, statistics, formal modeling—was just a disingenuous way of disregarding anyone not entranced by the latter pair of methods.<sup>31</sup> That certain highly treasured ‘tools’ can be dubious ones for examining given problems, or operate to distort or prevent understanding of any subject matter, are possibilities that do not compute for scholars of this stern mindset.

Mr. Perestroika summarized the insurgency’s aim as retaining ‘the amorphous character of this movement and list group. However, we will form working groups in Democracy, publishing, future initiatives to broaden intellectual base. In the same vein, perestroika as it stands needs to make a real effort to draw in people of color and other oft-marginalized communities if it is to make any valid claims to representativeness.’ There was always danger of rifts among a delicately constructed coalition who are up against a set of opponents who are cohesive to a fault. While Fiorina disarmingly avers that he suspected ‘the only thing that all RC [rational choice] people would agree upon is that their explanations presume that individuals behave purposively,’ the other thing that the vast majority of rational choice modelers do agree on is that non-practitioners really aren’t doing anything scientific, according to their shriveled definition of science.<sup>32</sup> They are of course entitled and welcome to explore this single groove of desiccated inquiry for all it is worth (which is matter of perpetual dispute), but not entitled to impose it as a standard on everyone else.

## HOW TO LOOK LIKE A SCIENCE

Examples proliferate of this stale and obstructive rendition of science at mischievous work. The acrid exchanges especially between Laitin and Shapiro are a must read on this score, but let’s hone in for the sake of illustration on Daniel Diermeier’s stab at a refutation of Green and

Shapiro's wrecking ball of a book *Pathologies of Rational Choice*.<sup>33</sup> This he attempts by invoking what he calls 'the philosophy of science,' which phrase is itself a dead giveaway, employed as it is in a manner indicating that 'the philosophy of science' is a single-minded enterprise which ultimately yields correct method, and there can only be one. Stephen Toulmin in the 1970s wisely warned we seminar members that the word 'the' preceding any concept was a red alert signal as to dogmatic dangers within, and even way back then Diermeier's unduly restrictive idea of 'the philosophy of science' (which stalls out with saint Carl Hempel) was a nineteenth-century relic barely worth the trouble of ridiculing anymore.<sup>34</sup>

Diermeier strives to execute a table-turning exercise—the favorite tactic of rational choice defenders who unsurprisingly behave as though they have a listserv too. Cursorily citing Thomas Kuhn's work, Diermeier nevertheless lauds Newtonian science, whose overdue overturn Kuhn charts, as an ideal that needs to be emulated in political science. (This presumably is the Newton who in his turn as historian a biographer discerns that 'everything human is alien to him—at least insofar as he expressed himself on Mankind').<sup>35</sup> A little knowledge of philosophy of science is a dangerous thing, as Green and Shapiro remark.<sup>36</sup> Diermeier gripes that Green and Shapiro "do not point to paradigmatic cases of good theorizing," as if one is required to do so first in order to criticize rational choice, which is a conveniently conservative restriction. For people in Diermeier's camp, it's inconceivable that social sciences proceeded as other than an ardent collective quest ultimately for a unitary science in the sense of 'what is fated to be agreed by all who investigate,' as Charles Sanders Pierce long ago yearningly phrased it.<sup>37</sup> Diermeier therefore must reckon that it is Green and Shapiro's criteria, and not innocent rational choice methods, that 'would hinder scientific progress in political science' despite the obvious embarrassing fact that Green and Shapiro pointedly applied criteria that rational choice proponents themselves champion! Green and Shapiro accomplished this task so well that many rational choicers mistook the pair for paid-up, purse-lipped positivists. Hoisted high by their own petard, rational choice theorists could only lamely point fingers the other way.

Progress, according to Diermeier and his comrades, entails generating a mathematized and positivist brand of inquiry that refashions by fiat all realms of phenomena in its own image.<sup>38</sup> This familiar quest is a deeply romantic one, a determined hunt for coveted certainty even if one must force a predesignated template on a recalcitrant world.<sup>39</sup> Yet

the studiously ignored lessons of Kuhn's work for most readers are that this quest is both undesirable (because it restricts forms of inquiry) and impossible (because no single model ever accounts for all relevant explanatory factors). Kuhn did make a highly hedged case for 'methodological conservatism' as one way forward, but only as one such way and as a matter of preference, not principle.<sup>40</sup> Imre Lakatos went much further, thereby gaining favor with positivists, opining jaw-droppingly that 'dogmatism in normal science does not prevent growth.'<sup>41</sup> Popper, Feyerabend and other scruffy philosophers of science milling around outside of 'the philosophy of science' respectfully but emphatically disagreed.<sup>42</sup>

Diermeier deflects attention from Green and Shapiro's charge of 'post hoc theory development'—meaning rational choice theorists work only from past cases—by excusing the practice as providing legitimate grist for 'puzzle-solving,' as if that is the sole aim of scientific inquiry.<sup>43</sup> Kuhn famously distinguished between solving a puzzle (or 'mopping up') within the terms of a dominant paradigm and the crisis situation arising from accumulated anomalies throwing a paradigm into radical doubt, the latter of which Diermeier can't conceive might befall his favorite explanatory apparatus. His purpose rather is to work out 'puzzles' according to an abstruse instruction manual laced with positivist homilies. Science thereby becomes a staunchly conservative enterprise wherein, as Green and Shapiro noted, the preservation of the model supersedes all other concerns. A recipe for dogmatism is disguised as a plea for rigor.

Diermeier, otherwise quite the stickler, avers that 'puzzle-solving—the explanation of a known but unexplained fact by means of a theory—should not cause any methodological concern.'<sup>44</sup> The problem with this stance is his solution, which is the application of a single model, or a severely skewed 'family' of models, to explain phenomena according to inadequately examined assumptions. The theory, and the practices by which it is tested, are held sacrosanct. There is no appeal. There is no alternative—in science as in Maggie Thatcher's Britain. Sophisticates like Diermeier know that what is really tested anyway is not assumptions but a conjuncture between sets of statements (which are deemed uncontaminated by assumptions) and sets of initial conditions (also supposedly uncontaminated) so that it's fine to proceed with rational choice excursions even if several conditions underpinning and predicted by them admittedly do not apply because otherwise one would 'hinder science,' by which he means the stately ascension of rational choice theory to status of dominant paradigm. Political science should aspire to become

nothing less than a subset of a theory of Newtonian particle mechanics. What is striking is the cool calm extremism underlying the scientific patina of this argument.

Any entity, Diermeier acknowledges, 'is T-theoretic if its measurement presupposes the validity of Theory T.'<sup>45</sup> Why, yes. Angels are T-theoretic. So are phlogistons. Luminiferous ether too, which Lord Kelvin thought of as a sure bet.<sup>46</sup> Prosperity might be said to be T-theoretic during expansionary phases of property bubbles. 'At this stage one may be tempted to argue that the presence of T-theoretic terms would be a fatal blow to any theory,' he admits, but this 'would be a serious misconception' because all theories contain T-theoretic terms.<sup>47</sup> This revelation, which is anything but, is conjured to gain *carte blanche* to simplify and promote a favored paradigm. In 1911, by contrast, Hans Vaihinger too argued that conscious fictions can be useful to scientific inquiry but was roundly spurned by Diermeier's predecessors, the logical positivists, for it.<sup>48</sup> Karl Popper tolerated the role of fictions as hypothesis generators in the 'context of discovery' phase so long as hypotheses were subjected to the testing ground of the 'context of verification,' insofar as these contexts are distinct.<sup>49</sup> Popper's rebel pupil Paul Feyerabend, who would seem anathema to Diermeier, heartily agreed that obsolete theories and even fantasy can generate useful hypotheses except that playing with such fictions only made sense to him in the realm of a proliferation of theories by which to test what theory as well as what hypothesis worked.<sup>50</sup>

One might well confuse some of these preceding stances with stark relativism.<sup>51</sup> 'The confusion stems from the belief that theories in some sense determine their domain,' asserts Diermeier, who thereby proves to be confused about this confusion inasmuch as Kuhn indicated that theories do exactly that, though the *extent* of it, not *whether* it happens, has been a matter of vigorous debate.<sup>52</sup> Diermeier takes refuge in Sneed's ordered pairs of a core C which expresses the mathematical core of a theory, and a set of intended applications which 'are common procedures in the empirical sciences.'<sup>53</sup> The future of research consists of 'strengthening C or extending I,' as if dumping or demoting Sneed is not an option for reasonable investigators. 'By a reasonable position, I mean one that does not declare typical scientific behavior, *such as that exemplified by Newtonian physics*, to be unscientific or bad science' (italics mine).<sup>54</sup> The catechism stays intact. Normal science reigns undisturbed.<sup>55</sup>

The question whether Newtonian physics really is applicable outside its proper domain goes resolutely unasked. Defenders plead the case for rational choice as if it were an endangered marginal species rather than the ubiquitous doctrine that hordes of practitioners implacably are set on spreading. Diermeier ends by insinuating the standards Green and Shapiro use to evaluate rational choice theory are ‘deeply questionable’ and inconsistent with, according to his bowdlerized rendition of ‘the philosophy of science,’ ‘established practices in the most successful empirical science,’ by which he means nineteenth-century physics and chemistry. The kind of stringent coherence that rational choicers seek ‘cannot be the major test of validity for a cultural description,’ Geertz argued in his actual thick description essay.<sup>56</sup> ‘Cultural systems must have a minimal degree of coherence, else we would not call them systems; and, by observation, they normally have a great deal more. But there is nothing so coherent as a paranoid’s delusion or a swindler’s story.’

Rational choice academics, such as Diermeier (now a Provost), are notable enough for seeking out administrative power—and why wouldn’t seekers of pat answers not pursue the power to enforce their preferences, which they portray as unassailable? One cannot ‘limit a problem by reason of a method of attack,’ Alfred North Whitehead long ago protested against similar methodological antics.<sup>57</sup> While Kelly opines that any fault with rational choice, formal theory or quantitative methods lies with theorists and not the theory, there clearly is an underlying elective and even emotional affinity between any theory and an adherent of it. Every social scientist can divide their grad students into those who crave certainty and precision at all costs, and those interested in exploring open-ended approaches, and it is clear which sort of students filed onto either side of the perestroika chasm.<sup>58</sup> When certainty seekers slip into positions of power, they cannot help but enforce their myopic vision upon everyone else. And that is why Perestroika arose.

In response to mounting critiques rational choice theorists claim they have evolved since such that there now is ‘thin’ theory and a richer ‘thick’ one, thereby feinting toward Clifford Geertz’s use of ‘thick description’ (via Gilbert Ryle) though in its execution more often approaching the colloquial Irish sense of ‘thick.’<sup>59</sup> Yet these excursions plainly are *ad hoc* maneuvers. However many layers are added, and caveats acknowledged, the result usually winds up exhibiting one of two tendencies, or both. First, that of incorporating sundry aspects into rational choice so that everything seems rational and

therefore ‘the boundaries become so murky that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to assess when rational choice theories succeed and when they fail.’<sup>60</sup> Second, and not by any means secondary, the vaunted ‘family of approaches,’ ‘analytic narratives’ and anything else are only integrated into the degree that they serves the original purpose of the enterprise, customized to sustain the model, and so affirm the critics’ charge about the handling of evidence all along. ‘It is in the interest,’ Susanne Rudolph glumly noted, ‘of a conversionary project—and much modernization theory, as well as its generational successors [such as rational choice] was a conversionary project—not to attend sympathetically to alternative worldviews.’<sup>61</sup> A third tendency that formal theory proponents do not care to reckon with is that people equipped with all the skills they cherish will recognize the intrinsic limitations and oversold nature of these ballyhooed methods, just as Green and Shapiro did.

That said, there should be room for humility all around. ‘I rarely encounter any political scientist,’ attests Rogers Smith, ‘who is 100% versatile in all the methods that are employed within political science’—though clearly a very large and influential swarm of rational choice proponents believe they attained exactly that exalted status and do not take kindly to anyone who tugs at their flimsy masks of reason. A discipline that is ‘methodologically dexterous is bound to advance more effectively,’ Skocpol wisely stated, ‘than one becoming overly specialized in narrow or fixed techniques.’

The rebels agreed that diversity of methods needs encouragement also looked into NSF and SSRC funding practices, which, in opponents’ hands, shore up a quantitative hegemony. Attention also was drawn to the permanent non-elected, bureaucracy of the APSA who had some interesting historical links to the national security establishment.<sup>62</sup> Yet the overarching challenge remains hiring and promotion criteria, which are controlled by individual departments, and a long struggle has ensued on hundreds of fronts. Dissidents, or many of them, still aimed to improve democracy outside as well as inside their profession. The increasingly otherworldly methods of ‘the social sciences make it difficult to communicate with and make our work relevant to the wider public,’ argued the late Lloyd Rudolph. ‘We have to know and live with differences within our profession as well as in the world.’

## CONCLUSION

What did the Perestroikans accomplish? Plenty. The movement undid the shiny masks of reason that so many opponents delightedly had donned, behind which was the unkillable conceit that a single unitary ‘neutral’ language or set of technical procedures can bypass human interests and foibles so as to establish scientific reality for once and for all. The qualitative studies branch of the APSA is a welcome institutionalized breakwater.<sup>63</sup> Green and Shapiro, among others, wielded both the complement of skills and the temerity to call the bluff and—*lese-majeste* on wheels—helped to beat back the latest attempt at disciplinary hegemony, at least for a while. If Lowi is right in his impish but serious observation that ‘the APSA follows Leviathan’ (state funding shapes research priorities), then it is possible that upon a receding of the neoliberal tide, if ever, nationally that rational choice fancies will subside with it.<sup>64</sup> All the foregoing conflicts have arisen before in political science (in the 1960s uproar over the ‘behavioral revolution’), and no scientific field, as will be seen in Chap. 7 “[The Mystique of Genetic Correctness](#)”, is proof against them, nor need they be. Conflicts, civilly conducted, can illuminate; consensus, if imposed, terminates routes to invaluable insights.

The Perestroikan movement ‘never sought to have a unified program or agenda or any formal organizational existence,’ as Rogers Smith later assessed.<sup>65</sup> ‘It has instead provided venues—public letters, conference panels and receptions, and especially a list serve—through which political scientists could air and debate their dissatisfactions with and their aspirations for the profession.’ That suffices. In my long lapsed Catholic youth, priests (with, as always, some exceptions) were pretty imperious characters, and why not? The Church could damn you by mumbling a few hermetic words. Yet from the 1960s onward, one could not help but notice that as Church deference faded (and scandals erupted), and they no longer commanded obedience, most priests transformed into genial genies.<sup>66</sup> They could not afford to behave otherwise. One would like rational choice theorists, who tend to take on the mien of a religious order when they acquire power, to remain genial colleagues too. There is something about being the bearer of the one true faith, or science, that brings out the unapologetic or unwitting authoritarian. This is ‘Newton’s sleep’ from which William Blake wanted to wake us. In the service of what such formalist scholars believe is scientific rigor they want to snuff out other fertile means of inquiry. Parsimony has a lot to answer for.

## NOTES

1. On voter suppression see Greg Palast, 'The GOP's Stealth War Against Voters,' *Rolling Stone* 24 August 2016 and his *The Best Democracy Money can Buy* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2016, 2nd ed).
2. The Nobel Prize in economics, bestowed by Sweden's Central Bank, has nothing to do with the original Nobel Prizes. The economics profession made it up, the media sold it, and the public, hearing nothing to the contrary, bought it. See Avner Offer and Gabriel Soderburg, *The Nobel Effect: The Prize in Economics, Social Democracy and the Market Turn* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) and Philip Mirowski, *Never Let a Serious Crisis Go To Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown* (London: Verso: 2013).
3. Utility, Robinson pointed out, is determined by people wanting to buy the particular commodity while we reckon people will want a given commodity because of its, well, utility. Joan Robinson, *Economic Philosophy* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p. 46.
4. For critiques of the concept see Amartya Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,' *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 6, 4 (Summer 1977 as well as the early insightful appraisal of Adam Smith's 'egoism' by Hans Vaihinger in *The Philosophy of As-If* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1924).
5. Greg Casza, Perestroika listserv, 30 June 2004. A key critique that just preceded the onset of the Perestroika movement is Jan Elster, 'Rational Choice Theory: A Case of Excessive Ambition,' *American Political Science Review* 94 (2000).
6. See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, eds. *Pathologies of Rational Choice* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) and Steve Walt, 'Rigor or Rigor Mortis?' in Michael E. Brown, Owen Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. *Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and his Critics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). The firestorm over Walt's piece, first appearing in *International Security*, got this volume out within a year, which is head-spinningly swift for academia.
7. See Peter Gowan, 'Neoliberal Theory and Practice in Eastern Europe,' *New Left Review* 213 (January–February 1996) and Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine* (London: Penguin, 2008), pp. 246–262.
8. See Michael Hudson, *Killing The Host* (Dresden: Islet, 2015), Wolfgang Streeck, *Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism*, (London: Verso, 2014), Yanis Vaourfakis, *The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy* (New York: Zed Books, 2015) and Michael Lewis, *The Big Short* (London: Penguin, 2011).
9. Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, 'Economics' Fall from Grace', *PS: Political Science and Politics* October 2010. p. 747.

10. Tim Luke, 'Caught between Confused Critics and Careerist Co-Conspirators: Perestroika in (American) Political Science' in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed, *Perestroika!: The Raunchy Rebellion in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 469.
11. Sven Steinmo, 'The Emperor Had No Clothes', in Monroe, *Perestroika!* p. 296.
12. Still, there have been inroads and there are 'heretics.' Note the formation of the World Economics Association consisting of well over a thousand dissident economists in the USA and the world over.
13. The clarion call is reprinted in Monroe, *Perestroika!: The Raunchy Rebellion in Political Science*, pp. 9–11.
14. Peter Loewenberg's essays on psychological conflicts arising in graduate school and in university departments remain relevant. See his *Decoding the Past: The Psycho-historical Approach* (New York: Knopf, 1983).
15. Cited in Kurt Jacobsen, 'Unreal, Man' *The Guardian* 3 April 2001 and in Kurt Jacobsen, 'Perestroika dans la science politique Americain.' *L'Economie Politique* Winter 2004–2005. One gets a strong dose in Daniel Diermeyer, 'Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science,' in Jeffrey Friedman, ed, *The Rational Choice Controversy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), a volume marshalled in riposte to Donald Green and Ian Shapiro's *Pathologies of Rational Choice*.
16. Kurt Jacobsen and Donald MacLeod, "Fired Up For Battle: Economic Traditionalists and Their Critics." *The Guardian* 9 September 2003. 'What rarely is grasped is that these economic theories are themselves metaphors; *homo oeconomicus* is a particle, the commodity-space is a force field, utility is energy, disutility is work, force and marginal utility are vectors energy and utility are scalars ....' James Bernard Murphy, 'Rational Choice Theory as Social Physics,' in Friedman, *The Rational Choice Controversy*, p. 157.
17. Chalmers Johnson, 'Preconception Versus Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30, 2 (June 1997).
18. 'At its extreme, area scholars regard any methodology that does not recognize specificity and context as immoral; they condemn as the gas pump strategy of research scholarship that takes a purely utilitarian stance toward area knowledge, exploiting it as the 'raw material' of hypothesis testing.' Rudolph, 'Situated Knowledge', p. 11.
19. See Daniel Ellsberg's *Papers on The War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972) and his *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and The Pentagon Papers* (London: Penguin, 2003).
20. Susanne Rudolph, 'Perestroika and the Other' in Monroe, *Perestroika!* p. 14.
21. Sven Steinmo, 'The Emperor Had No Clothes: The Politics of Taking Back the APSR' in Monroe, *Perestroika!*, p. 295.

22. David Laitin, 'The Perestroikan Challenge to Social Science,' *Politics & Society* 31 (2000), p. 163. Reprinted in Monroe, *Perestroika!*
23. Russell Jacoby, 'The New PC: They Claim that Liberals are Victimizing Them' *The Nation* 18 March 2005.
24. Greg Kasza, 'Perestroika and The Journals,' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 43, 4 (October 2010). Kasza's article is a contribution to a symposium entitled 'Perestroika in Political Science: Past, Present and Future' in this issue edited by Tim Luke and Patrick McGovern. Also see David Pion-Berlin and Dan Cleary, 'Methodological Bias in The APSR,' in Monroe, *Perestroika!*
25. Chris Hedges interview 2013. [www.herealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=10449](http://www.herealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=10449).
26. See Jeffrey C. Isaac, 'Perestroika and the Journals?: A Brief Reply to My Friend Gregory Kasza,' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 4, 4 (October 2010).
27. Sidney Tarrow, 'Polarization and Convergence in Academic Controversies,' *Theory and Society* 37, 6 (December 2008), p. 517.
28. Stuart Schram, 'Return to Politics: Perestroika and Postparadigmatic Political Science,' *Political Theory* 1, 6 December 2003, p. 838.
29. See Brian Caterino, 'The Practical Import of Political Inquiry: Perestroika's Last Stand' *Logos: A Journal of Modern Society & Culture* 14, 1–2 (2015) and his contribution in Monroe, *Perestroika!*
30. [www.polscircumors.com/topic/perestroika-movementin-polsci/page/2](http://www.polscircumors.com/topic/perestroika-movementin-polsci/page/2).
31. Laitin, 'The Perestroikan Challenge to Social Sciences,' p. 165.
32. Morris Fiorina, 'Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise' in Friedman, *The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 87.
33. See David Laitin, 'The Perestroika Challenge' and Ian Shapiro, *The Flight from Reality in The Human Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) as well as Shapiro's essay in Monroe, *Perestroika!*
34. For a 1970s philosophy of science volume whose implications entirely elude or are disregarded by Diermeier and most RC enthusiasts see the rich combative essays in Richard Musgrave and Imre Lakatos, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
35. Frank Edward Manuel, Isaac Newton, *Historian* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 17–18.
36. Green and Shapiro, 'Revisiting Rational Choice,' in Shapiro, *The Flight from Reality in The Human Sciences*, p. 78.
37. A pertinent critique of Peirce's project is found in Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
38. Diermeier, 'Rational Choice', p. 61.

39. See Floyd Matson, *The Broken Image* (New York: Anchor, 1966) and Stephen Toulmin, *Return to Reason* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
40. See Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Lakatos and Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, and his *The Essential Tension: Selected Essay in Scientific Tradition and Change* (University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 225–239. See also Steve Fuller's controversial biography, *Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Time* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
41. Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,' in Lakatos and Musgrave, *Criticism and The Growth of Knowledge*, p. 177.
42. On Lakatos' conservative affinity to conventional political science see Thomas C. Walker, 'The Perils of Paradigm Mentalities: Revisiting Kuhn, Lakatos and Popper,' *Perspectives on Politics* 8, 2 (June 2010). Like virtually all IR scholars Walker has taken the disciplinary hint that he should shun Feyerabend. The plea for pluralism goes only so far. See, then, Jacobsen and Gilman, 'Paul Feyerabend's Philosophy of Science,' in Kurt Jacobsen, *Dead Reckonings: Ideas, Interests and Politics in the 'information Age'* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997).
43. Diermeier, 'Rational Choice,' p. 61.
44. Diermeier, 'Rational Choice,' p. 62.
45. Diermeier, 'Rational Choice,' p. 64.
46. Matson, *The Broken Image*, p. 243.
47. Diermeier, 'Rational Choice,' p. 62.
48. Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of As-If*. Vaihinger has attracted a renewal of interest. See Mauricio Suarez, *Fiction in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealisation* (London: Routledge, 2009). '[T]he impact of Vaihinger's work then was not unlike the impact of Thomas Kuhn's work in our own time,' Pine reckons. 'In the 1960s and 1970s most philosophers of science reacted to Kuhn with strident criticism.' Arthur Pine, 'Fictionalism' *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* XVIII (1993). pp. 3, 4. That seems to be the cut-off period when Diermeier and a good many other positivist social scientists formed and finished their idea of 'the philosophy of science.'
49. Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1959, 1935). Kuhn wrote how 'extraordinarily problematic' he found the discovery/justification distinction such that, while 'circularity does not at all invalidate them ... it does make them parts of a theory and, by doing so, subjects them to the same scrutiny regularly applied to theories in other fields.' Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962), pp. 8–9. See Paul Hoyningen-Heune, 'Context of Discovery Versus Context of Justification and Thomas Kuhn' in Jutta Schikore and Friedrich Steinle, eds. *Revisiting*

- Discovery and Justification* (Springer, 2006). Also see Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science* (New York: Free Press, 1957) and Norwood Hansen, *Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 18.
50. Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method* (London: Verso, 1975).
  51. See Jacobsen and Gilman, 'Paul Feyerabend's Philosophy of Science'.
  52. '[S]omething like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself.' Hence, '[d]ebate over theory-choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or mathematical proof.' Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 113, 199. See William Brewer and Bruce Lambert, 'The Theory-Ladenness of Observation: Evidence from Cognitive Psychology' in *Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993) and the intermediary approach in Peter Galison, *Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 787–796.
  53. Diermeier, 'Rational Choice,' p. 66.
  54. Diermeier, 'Rational Choice,' p. 68.
  55. 'Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none.' Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, p. 52.
  56. Geertz, 'Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture' in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 26.
  57. 'There is clear evidence that certain operations of certain animal bodies depend upon the foresight of an end and the purpose to attain it. It is no solution to the problem to ignore this evidence because other operations have been explained in terms of physical and chemical laws. The existence of a problem is not even acknowledged. It is vehemently denied.' Whitehead, cited in Matson, *The Broken Image*, pp. 147–148.
  58. Stanley Kelly, 'Promises and Limitations of Rational Choice,' in Friedman, *The Rational Choice Controversy*, p. 87.
  59. Clifford Geertz, 'Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,' p. 32.
  60. Shapiro, *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences*, p. 78.
  61. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 'The Imperialism of Categories: Situating Knowledge in a Globalizing World' *Perspectives on Politics* 3, 1 (March 2005), p. 12.
  62. Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and Us: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
  63. See the issue on Qualitative methods in the *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association*, 5, 1 (Spring 2007).

64. Theodore Lowi, 'Every Poet His own Aristotle,' in Monroe, *Perestroika!*, p. 51.
65. Rogers Smith, 'Systmatizing the Ineffable: A Perestroikan's Methods for Finding a Good Research Topic,' *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association*, p. 6. For other reflections on the movement see Andrew Hindmoor, 'Review Article: 'Major Combat Operations have Ended'? Arguing about Rational Choice' *Perspectives on Political Science* 41, 1 January 2011, Simon Hug, 'Further Twenty Years of Pathologies?: Is Rational Choice Better Than It Used to Be?' *Swiss Political Science Review* 20, 3 (September 2014), and John Gunnell, 'Pluralism and The Fate of Perestroika: A Historical Reflection' *Perspectives on Politics* 13, 2 (June 2015).
66. Here I belatedly realize I also am echoing Mannheim. See Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, p. 11.



<http://www.springer.com/978-3-319-54351-2>

International Politics and Inner Worlds

Masks of Reason under Scrutiny

Jacobsen, K.

2017, VII, 231 p., Hardcover

ISBN: 978-3-319-54351-2