

Military Corporatism Under the Restoration

External factors (such as financial constraints, or the cabinets' inconsistent military policies) were not the only explanation for the Spanish army's professional weaknesses. The army also suffered from its branches' corporate factionalism. The latter fostered a parochial spirit which, far from promoting cooperation, strengthened distrust and hindered efforts to achieve military modernization. This chapter surveys such corporatism, which took root during military education and affected even the professional elite of the officer corps: the staff officers.

THE SYSTEM OF SEPARATE CORPS ACADEMIES

Spanish Military Education from 1800 to 1893

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Spanish army trained most prospective infantry and cavalry officers in the regiments, while those of the artillery and engineer corps went to specialist schools.¹ During the war against Napoleon (1808–1814), the Spanish authorities set up several improvised military schools. Three of them (for infantry and cavalry officer candidates) survived after the war and, in addition to the restored artillery and engineer schools, carried on training officers until 1823. A new, single military academy—the *Colegio General Militar* (General Military College)—was opened in 1825. It was criticized because of its adoption of unified teaching for all arms despite their different requirements and a decree dated 5 November 1850 set up a

system of separate academies for the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer and staff corps. Meanwhile, the system of regimental officer cadets was abolished and restored several times until its final abolition after the Third Carlist War (1872–1876).

War Minister General Martínez Campos set up the *Academia General Militar* (General Military Academy) in 1882. The officer candidates took basic officer training for two years and, after passing the second year, went to either the infantry or cavalry academies (where they were commissioned after one year) or followed a preparatory course for the artillery, engineer or staff corps academies. Those who passed the course were commissioned as second lieutenants before joining their specialist school. The General Military Academy aspired to diminish the tense relationship among the branches of the Spanish officer corps. Each branch's academy doubtless impressed an indoctrination of general military values and attitudes in its graduates. But this was not enough to overcome the inward-looking corporatism of the arms of the service, eager to advance their own interests. A general academy, it was hoped, would make easier to develop an *esprit d'armée* that would prevail over the *esprit de corps* and its petty corporate interests. The General Military Academy was not as successful as intended. The syllabus did not reconcile sufficiently each branch's educational requirements. Different syllabi were introduced and the academy eventually became rather a preparatory school for the corps academies. War Minister General José López Domínguez closed the academy in order to cut military expenses in 1893. But the lobbying of the learned corps, eager to preserve their touchy *esprit de corps* and reassume responsibility for all of the whole training process, must also be taken into account. López Domínguez, himself an artilleryman, was doubtless receptive to their arguments.²

The Reform of 1893

The decree (dated 8 February 1893) that ordered the closing of the General Military Academy also laid down the new structure of military education.³ Officers of the combat arms would be once again trained in separate corps academies, sited in Toledo (infantry), Valladolid (cavalry), Segovia (artillery) and Guadalajara (engineers). There would also be a staff college in Madrid. The introduction to the decree pointed out that the system of separate academies allowed the numbers of annual

admissions to be settled accurately according to the needs of each corps. The reform also intended to address one particularly unhealthy practice. Many sons of families with some private means (including lots of officers' sons) who aspired to the military academies would join the army as volunteer privates and took advantage of the benefits (higher age limit, exemption from secondary education diploma, subsistence grants, free preparatory studies) for applicants coming from the enlisted ranks. Since the taxpayers' money paid for the studies of those officer candidates who came from the enlisted ranks, volunteering had become a simple (and much abused) way of receiving a free commission. This had corrupted a procedure designed to assist deserving enlisted men. After 1893, the benefits were supposed to be limited to conscripts alone, but in practice the subterfuge carried on as usual.⁴

Applicants should have completed full secondary education and had to prove their proficiency in specific subjects through a system of competitive examinations, with those with the best marks receiving admission. Nonetheless, provided that they got the minimum marks, orphans and brothers of military men who had died on campaign would be admitted as supernumerary students.⁵ The duration of the course of studies was either three (in the case of the infantry and cavalry) or five years (in the case of the artillery and engineers). Presence in the academy was only required in the final two years; the subjects in previous years could be studied privately and passed through examination alone. Students in the cavalry, artillery and engineer academies would live outside the academy; those in the infantry academy could be either boarders or external candidates. After passing the third year, the students would be commissioned as second lieutenants. They were promoted to first lieutenants after graduation at the academy (learned corps) or two years of service (infantry and cavalry).⁶ The graduates of the learned corps' academies also received a professional certification that was equivalent to a university degree in engineering (industrial engineering for artillery officers and civil engineering for engineer officers).⁷ In fact, the engineer corps had recently made a case for accreditation of its commissions as an academic degree entitling its officers to work outside the army as civilian engineers.⁸ Since looking for a supplementary job out of the army was not uncommon in the officer corps, such accreditation was very useful indeed.

The Reform of 1893 Under Criticism

López Domínguez's reform was fated to be contentious.⁹ The alleged advantage of allowing prospective officers to choose their commissioning branch from the outset was not consistent with their freedom to sit entry examinations in several academies in the same year. If many applicants really wished to become officers in just one specific arm, they should have had no reason to apply for admission in other corps at the same time. In short, the 1893 reform did no more than suppress the intermediate step of the General Military Academy and could therefore still produce officers who were dissatisfied with their arm of service. On the other hand, if this kind of dissatisfaction was as great a problem as the advocates of separate academies avowed, the fact is that the affected officers adapted themselves to their situation remarkably well—or at least did not make a public complaint. One plausible explanation lies in the motivation of applicants for the military career. As has been shown in Chap. 1, the economic security of a job on the state payroll was a major incentive (if not the only one in some cases) to take a career in the army. The effects of such a mindset on the Spanish army's professionalism were deplorable, and the military academies were themselves partly responsible because of their failure to select the right officer material. A decree dated 4 October 1905 forbade applicants to take the entrance examination in more than one academy in the same year, but Antonio Cordon states that in 1911 he took the exams in the infantry, artillery, and engineer academies, all of which admitted him.¹⁰

What were the faults of Spanish military education at this time? For a start, the military academies allowed the recruitment of applicants who could be as young as 14 years old (instances can be found by glancing through the *Anuario Militar of España*—the army yearbook). The keenness to enter a military academy as soon as possible was a consequence of the closed list, since the younger an officer started his career, the greater his chances of reaching the highest ranks before his retirement.¹¹ Actually, when the courses of study were shortened because of the 1890s overseas wars, a ministerial order dated 4 July 1896 had to remind the academies of taking into account that, when setting the requirements for new admissions, officer candidates younger than 17 could not be commissioned.¹² Miguel Campins, a graduate of the Academy of Infantry who would later play a prominent role in the restored General Military

Academy, deplored the commissioning of overly young officer candidates, who could be as young as 16 years old and reported at the barracks in immature conditions.¹³ Campins also concluded that, due to the excessive youth of their students, the academies of this period were more like secondary schools. The officer candidates were only under the semblance of true military discipline. Hence, for instance, whenever a very important person visited the Academy of Infantry, the student corps felt entitled to ask for a general leave, an interruption of teaching or the release of classmates under arrest. According to Campins, the academies' regulations and the pressure of the students' families made it impossible to counter this behaviour.¹⁴

An additional cause helped to maintain such behaviour for years: the absence of a boarding regime in most academies. This happened although the 1897 regulations stated that all the officer candidates had to live in a boarding regime until they were promoted to second lieutenants; if they had to carry on their studies in the academy, they would live in extramural lodgings. But the regulations accepted that circumstances could make it permissible for students to live outside the academy, thus providing an opening for non-compliance, and in 1917 the rule would be modified to allow students to live out of the academy if living with their parents, brothers or sisters.¹⁵ The Fifth Military Region's report on the 1907 inspection review stated that those officer candidates living outside the academy walls did not get used to the essential disciplinary habits, thereby paving the way to the poor morality and indebtedness of many officers. The report recommended the implementation of compulsory boarding in all the military academies, since it was reckoned essential for inculcating military customs and ethos deeply and sparing the officer candidates' parents from fears and expenses.¹⁶

The admission procedures of the military academies were also subjected to criticism in the contemporary military literature. There was no real inquiry about the family and moral background of the applicants, meaning that the selection depended finally on the exam results alone.¹⁷ The problem was exacerbated by the limited scope of the examinations, which could not assess the applicant's specific fitness to be an officer, since they only tested his mathematical knowledge.¹⁸ Moreover, after an educational reform in 1894 lengthened the full secondary education (*bachillerato*) by one year, the military authorities decided to demand only the subjects of its first four years.¹⁹ These academic limitations made

admission easier for young teenagers whose later performance in the academy proved their physical or intellectual handicaps (and even their limited basic education: for instance, a memorandum of 1907 noted that spelling mistakes were frequent in the students' work).²⁰

The syllabi of the academies were another common target for contemporary critics. According to them, Spanish military education was dominated by theoretical studies, which was, to say the least, of dubious value for junior officers. On the other hand, professional matters such as the essential field service and junior command duties were relegated to a secondary status behind scientific and mathematical subjects.²¹ The Academy of Infantry, when it had to shorten the training of officers to one year due to the colonial wars of 1895–1898, reportedly still maintained the teaching of the higher scientific subjects, while paying scant attention to the officer candidates' physical fitness.²² The emphasis on science was also seen as being detrimental to the indoctrination of military morale and ethos. Colonel Modesto Navarro complained in 1901 about the young officers coming out of the academies: they were well-versed in scientific theory, sometimes to the point of pedantry, but they lacked real military spirit and interest in the everyday details of the profession.²³ A decade later, Ricardo Burguete, a tactical theorist who stressed the importance of moral factors on the battlefield, lambasted an education allegedly oriented to produce cool, rational-minded officers: the heavy mathematical content crushed 'the ardent youthful fantasy, poetical and overwhelming, which makes up the most powerful lever of the warrior'.²⁴ Within this context, the reader may guess which armies Captain Eduardo Herrera de la Rosa was thinking of when he wrote in his report on the Russo-Japanese War that the officer training in the Japanese army lacked the kind of contents which sapped the energy of

the unfortunate group of people who, in some countries, come up to nourish the officer corps, to the point of turning them into engineers, doctors in science, architects, astronomers, geodesists, and so on; [these are] very respectable professional qualifications, but they are useless for developing leadership skills, getting used to command duties, deploying large masses of troops, being a good sapper or pontonnier or handling a gun, a rifle or a horse correctly.²⁵

In addition, teaching methods were based on rote learning of huge quantities of information from textbooks, with no room for personal

work.²⁶ Rote learning in the military academies has been regarded as prone to producing a tendency to conformity and uncritical acceptance of orders and established procedures.²⁷ Perhaps this is the origin of the passive obedience which, according to a contemporary military essayist, prevailed among the Spanish officers during the Melilla campaign of 1909.²⁸ Most professional officers on both sides during the Civil War had passed through the military academies after the reform of 1893. Writing after the conflict, General Alfredo Kindelán concluded that the Spanish officer had ‘an extraordinary fear of responsibility, a desire of being given detailed, precise orders which save him from the duty of thinking things over and having his own criteria’. According to Kindelán, as a result of this mental inertia prevailing in the Spanish officer corps, whose members were reluctant to conceive of their own solutions for operational problems, the rebel or Nationalist commanders displayed a deplorable lack of initiative during the war.²⁹

Two of the few memoirs recalling with some detail the life in a Spanish military academy at that time were written by the artillerymen Carlos Martínez de Campos and Antonio Cordon. Each of them reflects the bookish nature of their training. Carlos Martínez de Campos, who entered the Academy of Artillery in 1903, recalled those years as endless lessons in the classroom, six hours every day. This burden was lightened by the afternoon gathering with his classmates, in which playing cards often replaced textbooks. Apart from the morning run to be present at the roll call, physical training was reduced to a weekly fencing session, horsemanship during the fourth year and a march to the firing range on some Saturdays. Martínez de Campos did not hesitate to define such a life as absurd for a career soldier.³⁰

Cordon also reckoned that the education in the academy was unsatisfactory: ‘Training the students as engineers was actually much more valued... than the specific military training.’ The principal, more demanding subjects were the scientific ones, while the military matters—artillery firing, tactics, and so on—were considered secondary subjects. Such order of priorities meant that ‘the artilleryman, after finishing his academy years, had limited military knowledge and not very deep and complete academic knowledge’.³¹ Cordon, like Martínez de Campos, was lodged in extramural accommodation (the boarding regime was not implemented until mid-1914 in the Segovia academy), but he had the opportunity to live for a while in the Academy of Infantry as a visiting student in 1913–1914. He concluded that, in contrast with Segovia, life

at the Toledo academy was more military, harder, and nearer to that of the soldier in the barracks.³²

What the academies seemed to produce was no more than another class of bureaucrats, with no regard for their real proficiency for military command. And too many officers were satisfied with this state of affairs, which provided a salary for life with little effort (especially if promotion was based on seniority alone).³³ They looked like ‘military officials’ rather than military officers and undemanding peacetime soldiering did not motivate them to hone professional proficiency during their later careers. For instance, the shortage of manoeuvres prevented the officers from putting into practice and improving their training. Thus, after leaving the academy, many officers limited themselves to reading the tactical regulations before an exercise in order to remember the procedures for carrying out the movements.³⁴ Nonetheless, it must also be said in fairness that some of the deficiencies of the Spanish military academies, such as the prevalence of theory over practical teaching or the emphasis on the sheer cramming of information, were not unique among contemporary armies.³⁵ And they mirrored those of the contemporary Spanish educational system as a whole, which has little or no regard for the benefits of physical fitness and vigorous sports, also neglected in Spanish society in general.³⁶

Attempted Reforms

The idea of a general academy did not die in 1893. On 21 July 1904, War Minister Linares—aware that basic officer training should be as standardized as possible for all the corps—decreed the reopening of the General Military College in Toledo.³⁷ But this decision was never implemented because of the rapid turnover of cabinets at that time. The cabinet of which Linares was a member left office in December 1904 and, after two short-lived cabinets, War Minister Weyler, through a decree dated 17 August 1905, suspended the implementation of those reforms whose funding depended on a budget plan which had failed to get parliamentary approval.³⁸ One of those reforms was the General Military College. Nevertheless, this setback did not dissuade Captain Herrera de la Rosa from advocating common training for officers, since it was the best way to instil a common spirit in all the army branches.³⁹ Nonetheless, a critic of the general academy model pointed out in 1905 that the benefits of a common indoctrination and training would be very

small if they were not accompanied by a reform of the promotion system, since the current one allowed the branches of the service different paces of promotion.⁴⁰ This fact certainly would continue to cause bitterness among members of the same class.

It does not seem casual that two years after the campaign of Melilla, which exposed some of the deficiencies of the Spanish army, War Minister Luque brought in a reform of the military academies' student selection procedure.⁴¹ Such reform inspired a desire of introducing a more practical orientation in the training of officer candidates and making sure, in particular, that they were fit enough for military life.⁴² Henceforward the entrance examination would be the same for all the academies, although each one could determine the relative importance of each exam subject for the applicants' overall score.⁴³ The new procedure introduced physical tests and balanced the academic requirements by reducing the weight of maths and introducing exams in geography and history (previously a school accreditation could substitute for them and the question paper in Spanish grammar).⁴⁴ The minimum entrance age was set at 15, but applicants were no longer required to pass all the entrance examination's question papers at the same time. Applicants who were at least 13 years old could take a few of the question papers of a summon; if they passed, their marks were recorded by the concerned academy and the applicants could take different papers in successive summons until passing all the papers of the entrance examination. Applicants could no longer take the exams after turning 21 (civilians), 24 (enlisted men who had served with the colours less than two years) or 27 (enlisted men who had served more time).⁴⁵ Although a step forward, this reform made only a limited effort to raise the entrance age, while the option of passing the exams in the course of several years seems designed to assist sons of military men, besides making it less likely that officer candidates had a homogeneous academic knowledge when they eventually entered the academies (they could have virtually forgotten the subjects of the earliest exams).⁴⁶

Later regulations developed the spirit of the reform in the academies by matching the importance of theory and practice in the officer candidates' marks.⁴⁷ This reformist spirit eventually reached their syllabi, which were revised in 1913, and the teaching methods. The new syllabi were based on the following assumptions: each academy could decide the weight of a subject in the grading of students; practical learning would take precedence over theory (exams would be divided into theoretical

and practical parts, with a view to remove exams and grade only the students' hands-on performance); military subjects would be as important as scientific and technical ones, and if he failed them, an officer candidate could not proceed to the following year's training; officer candidates would continually prove adequate fitness; and their behaviour would be assessed as well, and such assessment only could be done successfully if boarding was compulsory.⁴⁸ Teaching, in its turn, had to adapt to the new approach: it had to be a practical process and limit itself to the tasks an officer would face just after leaving the academy; textbooks would only be used for consultation after the lessons; the latter had to be active and participative, and students would take notes that would form the basis of their learning, supplemented by textbooks; the contents of the syllabi would be simplified, with less mathematics and more history and geography, and would include military moral education to develop soldierly habits and virtues, which only could be guaranteed through boarding; and students had to get an effective physical training.⁴⁹

The reality did not match the expectations. There were no entrance exams in either geography or history, an omission justified by an alleged lack of 'adequate' textbooks to be recommended for the applicants' preparatory studies, and there were few requirements in Spanish grammar.⁵⁰ The reformist effort of the early 1910s was derailed by a decree of 30 January 1918 and the abridged courses of the early 1920s.⁵¹ The decree argued that dual grading was no longer necessary because the students' marks in the theoretical and practical parts of the exams usually coincided.⁵² The effect was retrogressive. By 1918 teachers and students still had not got rid of the intellectual inertia binding them to the old methods and, once the need for a specific marking of the students' practical proficiency was removed, teaching tended naturally to focus on the theoretical contents again. Moreover, the Spanish military academies' facilities had not been improved enough for an effective practical training. The Academy of Infantry's *Junta Facultativa* (Academic Board) blew the whistle on this retrogression in 1924 and, in the three years to 1927, advocated a return to the dual exams and the enlargement of training facilities in the academies.⁵³

With regard to the abridged courses, convened from 1921 to 1923, they were meant for meeting the increased demand of subalterns resulting from the escalation of military operations in Morocco after 1919. They were opposed by the military academies, which demanded at least

a rise of the entrance educational requirements in order to focus teaching on the most essential subjects. The reality was quite the opposite, since the official policy facilitated the entrance of sons of military men who had died or were missing in war service. Afterwards the government planned to close temporarily the military academies to new admissions, but it eventually had to convene standard-length courses in 1924 and 1925 for the many applicants who had passed partially the entrance examinations in the previous years.⁵⁴ In the end, the most durable effect of the reforms may have been some revival of the regenerating spirit in the military academies, which was most evident in the Academy of Infantry.⁵⁵

Over 30 years after López Domínguez's reform, Spanish military education still fell short of amending its defects, despite some reformist attempts like those described above. Captain Vicente Rojo, a teacher at the Academy of Infantry during the 1920s (and a future chief of the loyalist or Republican General Staff in the Civil War), wrote a memorandum about the flaws of its syllabus dated May 1926, which basically reflected the views of the academy's academic board.⁵⁶ He described the syllabus as 'bombast, pedantry, external garb more or less modernist, but without a soul giving it life'. Rojo judged the syllabus' subjects disorganized and poorly balanced, keeping the students in the dark about which contents were really important. In addition, theoretical teaching and practical training were uncoordinated and sometimes at odds. So the faculty actually taught the officer candidates 'to hate books by demonstrating that the latter were good for nothing'. And the academy's graduates eventually joined the 'mass of illiterate officers'.⁵⁷ Perhaps the state of affairs was not so bleak in the other academies, but the reader must remind that the infantry branch was the largest one of the service by far, so training in its academy had an effect on the best part of the officer corps.

Thus the officer corps was already a not so united institution for the military academies' new intakes. It should come as no surprise that these prospective officers later developed corporate factionalism and mistrust which damaged seriously the professionalization of the army as a whole. It is also remarkable how much of the regulations on military education became dead letter (for instance, the implementation of boarding). This neglect has been imputed to the disruption in entrance procedures and syllabi caused by the abridged courses of the late 1890s and, at least as a partial explanation, the case does not seem to be off the mark.⁵⁸ In any

case, training in the academies displayed a much-criticized remoteness from the professional realities of the junior officer's service. These major flaws did not go unnoticed and the period 1911–1913 saw an attempt to remedy some of them, but the reform had miscarried by the early 1920s.

Why was the 1893 model so resilient for more than three decades? The separate education better suited the exclusive corporate spirit of the learned corps than did a general academy, and the learned corps undoubtedly lobbied to thwart any proposed reform in depth. But direct access to the corps academies also meant more opportunities for entry into the officer corps, unlike the bottleneck of a general academy. This was advantageous for families keen to direct their male offspring into a military career, and since the head of many of these families was (or had been) an army officer as well, there also was a 'peer pressure' factor which worked to deter any far-reaching reform. Moreover, the 1893 organization also suited the vested interests of the officers whose careers (and additional incomes) were closely bound to teaching in military academies.⁵⁹ Captain Eduardo Gallego wrote of officers who sought to get and remain in teaching assignments at any cost because these were a handy way to increase their earnings.⁶⁰ For these officers, the more academies and academic contents the better. One additional problem was that they included the reformist officers most likely to convey the deficiencies of the existing system, but whose professional and financial gain depended on it.⁶¹ As a result, there was limited stimulus for any reform from within. It should come as no surprise to anyone that the two major reforms of military education before the Civil War (which will be tackled in Chap. 6) took place under circumstances out of the ordinary.

THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATISM

The Learned Corps' Struggle for Responsibilities

The officers of the artillery and the engineer corps displayed the highest degree of inner cohesion (though most of the evidence used in this chapter concerns the artillery, since they were the largest and most influential of the learned corps). This cohesion stemmed from their being trained entirely in their corps' own academies and the adherence to a career pattern based on the closed list (seniority promotion). A foreign observer, the French journalist Arthur Houghton, provided a portrait of the artillery corps in the 1870s which is also valid for the following decades.

Houghton pointed out that the artillery officers made up a select network (*une espèce de franc-maçonnerie aristocratique et sévère*), which turned them somewhat into a separate branch from the rest of the officer corps. Zealous to hold their ground, they supported each other like an aristocratic oligarchy and their manner was distinguished, bordering on haughtiness, with the other corps. Such an attitude was allegedly based on higher professional standards, which—according to Houghton—bore well in comparison with all the European armies.⁶²

By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, many artillery officers stood for the abolition of merit promotion (at least within their corps). According to Cordón, during the late 1910s and early 1920s, the junior officers of the corps still thought the closed list a small price to pay for securing fairness within the military and this did not affect the artillerymen's conduct in peacetime or in wartime.⁶³ In order to satisfy such a desire, the corps' board (*junta*) decided in 1891 to collect in an album the signatures of those artillery officers who agreed to renounce to war merit promotions. All the officers signed in the album and from that year on all the new graduates of the Academy of Artillery did it as well. The heading of the album was as follows:

The artillerymen who sign this album want to conserve in the corps – and transmit through example to those who will serve in it later – the traditional spirit of honour, union, and fellowship that they received from their forerunners, through which it [the corps] achieved the glory and prestige it enjoys, both for the good of the fatherland and the honour of its members.

And by considering that the closed list is the indispensable condition for the attainment of such high goals, they resolve to maintain it among themselves, offering on their honour to renounce (through the ways allowed by the law) to any promotion within the corps or any general officer vacancy assigned to it which is not conceded due to seniority.⁶⁴

The artillery and the engineer corps looked after their cohesion through their own semi-official *juntas*. The artillery corps organized its *Junta Central de Artillería* (Artillery Central Board) in 1888. This body also assumed the function of watching over the artillery corps' prestige and traditions, and the morals of its officers. Due to this system, comradeship was strengthened and inner resentment disappeared within the corps, which developed a gentlemanly (*hidalgo*) spirit, fond of tradition and

hierarchies, and pleased to record the honours and awards of its members. Perhaps, according to Jorge Vigón, an officer and historian of the corps, the artillery became too snobbish, thereby stirring desires for imitation in the rest of the military as well.⁶⁵ The Artillery Central Board also meddled in issues which were clearly outside its original field of responsibility. For instance, in 1903 it vetoed the publication in the corps journal (*Memorial de Artillería*) of an article which questioned the artillery's alleged monopoly on the use of machine guns. Even Vigón puts into doubt the competence of the board to judge the matter.⁶⁶

This last example illustrates the mistrustful attitude of the learned corps with regard to issues of technological innovation. Artillerymen and engineers were jealous to preserve their privileged status (due to their academic education) in military technological and scientific matters, while they competed with each other for responsibilities in these issues.⁶⁷ Actually General López Domínguez, when he was war minister in the period 1892–1895, strengthened the corporate spirit of self-sufficiency by emphasizing the scientific and industrial responsibilities of the learned corps (artillery, engineer, and staff corps) and even the cavalry (on horse breeding and remount issues).⁶⁸ Thus a reformist work of the early 1920s complained about ‘the internal struggles between corps, trying to take away responsibilities from each other, not because of a noble desire for a better performance, but due to a spurious interest in holding vacancies [that is, in getting assignments for officers of one’s own corps]’.⁶⁹

Indeed, the learned corps often seemed more interested in scientific knowledge than in warfare, an attitude deplored by a number of contemporary military essayists. Captain Gallego, himself an engineer officer and a moderate critic, remarked in 1910 on the extraordinary contrast between the interest given in the Spanish army to the technical and educational institutions (firing schools, laboratories, technical commissions, and so on) and the neglect of the troops’ combat training.⁷⁰ Two decades later, Brigadier General Emilio Mola, an infantryman, was still criticizing harshly the excessive interest in scientific issues, which reflected and fostered the corporate rivalries:

I can offer even more proofs of petty corporatism. The fight between the corps to increase each one its importance and extend its influence over the army as a whole has reached anarchical proportions. There are laboratories and special establishments without discernment. A lot of chemistry, a lot of mechanics, and a lot of ballistics! And, above all, too many sages!⁷¹

Moreover, such rivalries often meant the unnecessary squandering of public funds. Gallego pointed out in 1905 that three brand new laboratories (run by the military engineers, the artillery corps and the state civil engineers) had been set up in the period 1898–1899 for a similar task of testing materials. He argued that it would have been more economical and rational to create a single laboratory whose equipment and funding might well have been shared by its three institutional users.⁷²

The Corporate Rivalry's Effects on Military Effectiveness

How far the idea of ‘the more technical responsibilities, the more prestige’ could lead is displayed by a manifesto written by the artillery officers of the Mahón garrison (in the Balearic Islands) in November 1914. They complained that the artillery corps had been deprived of any institutional role in the development of military ballooning; it had no overall responsibility for military motor transport nor involvement in its industrial dimension; and it was excluded from railway issues. They also complained that what they saw as the artillery corps’ exclusive scientific authority over the matters of ballistic science had diminished because the infantry and cavalry sections at the Firing School compiled their own firing tables for rifle and carbine. These officers also deplored the fact that the infantry had been granted, thanks to the machine gun, responsibilities for crew-served weapons (which had been a traditional monopoly of the artillerymen). According to them, all this proved that the artillery corps had not received its fair share of responsibilities as the number of new military devices grew.⁷³ Thus these artillery officers felt aggrieved because the infantry corps was fully responsible for the ballistic studies of its own weaponry. And they lamented the fact that technological innovation did not always mean an extension of their authority over ordnance and its use. Faced with such obstacles, the general arms—and especially the infantry—had to fight hard to overcome the institutional opposition of the more technical-minded corps and develop their own tactical doctrines.

An instance of the way the overlapping of corporate responsibilities could hamper the infantry’s own experimental labour was the *Escuela Central de Tiro* (ECT)—Central Firing School. It was formed in 1904 from the Artillery Firing School and divided into four sections (field, fortress, and siege artillery; coastal artillery; infantry; cavalry). The creation of the school had been opposed by the artillery, which wanted to monopolize the ‘legal responsibility’ for everything related to weaponry

and firing matters. The existence of the cavalry section was odd anyway, for the cavalry weapons' firing was similar to the infantry firing. Actually an inspection report of 1907 wondered if it would be a better arrangement to consolidate the infantry and cavalry sections into a 'portable arms school'.⁷⁴ Perhaps it was reckoned that the cavalry section provided active assignments for a number of officers.

The ECT itself was an oddity as well because no other country had combined infantry and artillery firing schools: their respective modes of firing were too different and the infantry schools were rather tactical training centres. On the other hand, the ECT did not work as a testing centre either, because this role was performed—even for small weapons—by the Artillery Section of the War Ministry. To add insult to injury, the infantry and cavalry sections' own firing ranges were under the authority of the engineer corps. According to Cebreiros, worse than the organizational flaws was the almost worthless training. The courses had an 'informative' character only. Generals and regimental commanders were exempted from any course at all. Other corps' officers attended the artillery courses but artillery officers did not attend the infantry courses. Moreover, according to Cebreiros again, the teaching staff did not keep its expertise up to date and easily lost track of new doctrines.⁷⁵

Given this situation, it is unsurprising that, as late as 1918, a military essayist, Captain Epifanio Gascueña, complained about the lack of tactical agreement between the fighting arms. The 1913 infantry tactical regulations did not offer a comprehensive picture of combined arms combat, which had become the most usual case, while the 1910 artillery tactical regulations did not define in a clear way the mission of direct support to the infantry.⁷⁶ As Gascueña put it:

Neither of the two regulations considers these more or less lasting groupings of artillery and infantry with a common mission, those frequent cases in which artillery elements are charged with directly supporting an infantry attack with subordination in mission, though not in command, or those exceptional ones in which temporary groupings are formed by making up a tactical unit with subordination of the artillery to the appointed commander for such an unit.⁷⁷

The need for tactical cooperation would not remain a matter of theoretical analysis because the Spanish army was to wage in the 1910s a low-intensity war in the Moroccan Protectorate, where all-arm columns

played an important role. During the first phase (1911–1916) the artillery seems to have performed poorly. Vigón blames the dispersal of artillery units in penny packets attached to the columns for this.⁷⁸ But it can also be asked if a less corporate attitude to tactical training would have provided a better insight into combined arms operations.

Moreover, the scientific haughtiness of the learned corps may well have been responsible for fostering a fashion for bookish scholarship among the infantry officers, who tried to make up for their lower academic education. This trend seems to have been of no benefit for their professional performance. After the 1909 campaign in Melilla, the General Staff itself complained about the predominance given in the assessment of infantry officers to manifestations of written brainwork—which fostered the production of superfluous works on military theory—over the proficiency displayed in regimental service.⁷⁹

Later scholarship offers somewhat contradictory views about this issue. According to the French scholar Andrée Bachoud, the military authorities fostered an increase in Spanish professional literature after 1909 (at least until the mid-1910s), though the quality of this literature was sometimes poor, since authors seemed more concerned to add up pages than to make a new point.⁸⁰ In any case, there were certainly officers who tried to improve their professional lot at any price as prolific authors of works of supposed military value.⁸¹ On the contrary, Andrés Mas Chao has pointed out that non-fighting assignments and scientific training lost prestige among the officers most engaged in the Moroccan war.⁸² And Julio Busquets even states that the attitude of anti-intellectual pragmatism displayed by the officers fighting in Morocco was due to their limited military education.⁸³

Busquets' assessment is rather questionable. As has been shown above, the criticism of military education recorded in the contemporary professional literature alleged precisely that the academic content was excessive. Perhaps the excess of theory in their academy years was the origin of many officers' dislike of formal professional education for the rest of their careers. In any case, many officers of the fighting arms in Morocco paid small attention to the more cerebral side of military operations in this period. Such a dislike of intellectual effort in warfare could lead them to scorn methodical staff and logistical work, less glamorous than an infantry assault with fixed bayonets, and to boast of relying on *cojones* (testicles, meaning guts) alone.⁸⁴

The corporate rivalries were thus influential in disturbing the Spanish military environment and stood in the way of developments in military doctrine. Corporate rivalries were not unique to the Spanish army and were found in armies all over the world. Nevertheless, some armies overcame the worst effects of them on military doctrine thanks to a type of organization developed in parallel with the mass armies of the late nineteenth century and whose authority stood above all the branches of the military: the general staff.⁸⁵ Unfortunately, the development of the general staff in Spain was linked to another case of corporate struggle. This is better understood through a survey of the odd position of the staff corps within the Spanish officer corps.

THE ODD CORPS OUT: THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE STAFF CORPS

The Problem of the Reform of the Staff Corps

The war against Napoleon showed the Spanish army's need for highly proficient officers helping the senior commanders in the conduct of operations. The staff corps (*Cuerpo de Estado Mayor*) was born in 1810, after a proposal of General Joaquín Blake. However, as its officers were suspect of liberal leanings, the corps was disbanded during King Fernando VII's periods of absolute power (1814–1820 and 1823–1833) and was not finally restored until 1838. From 1842 to 1893, the staff corps (which recruited prospective officers straight from civil life in the period 1850–1882) reached its highest level of institutional autonomy and specialization. It initially sought prestige through its mapmaking functions, but their officers became more focused on operational matters after 1875.⁸⁶

Although the general arms and the learned corps distrusted each other, they nonetheless had common misgivings about the staff corps. This mistrust was based on the latter's somewhat hybrid nature. The general arms reckoned that its elitist attitudes (based on higher educational standards) too closely resembled those of the traditional learned corps, whereas the artillery and the engineer corps saw the staff corps officers as rivals and parvenus of sorts (because their careers were not ruled by a closed list system). Indeed, the artillery officers even kept a tacit commitment not to join the staff corps.⁸⁷ The staff corps certainly did not keep the solidarity with the other learned branches of the service

in the defence of the closed list. The bonds linking them on this issue were broken in January 1894, after a staff corps officer, Captain Juan Picasso, accepted a war merit promotion won during the small conflict of Melilla in late 1893. This meant the actual acceptance of the open list by the staff corps.⁸⁸

Such behaviour was born from the staff corps officers' realization, from 1875 on, that the prestige won through their performance on campaign could be more influential than scientific achievement. Thenceforward, they sought to reach general officer rank with first-hand knowledge of the realities of combat and life in the fighting forces, which would support their claims to hold high operational command assignments or high political-military office. Actually some staff corps officers (such as the future General Weyler) had stood out by following this career model, which was in line with General Martínez Campos' policy of fostering the moral unity within the military through participation in the fighting.⁸⁹

Nevertheless, such a policy could be overstretched by self-interested officers. A harsh critic of the Spanish military at the end of the nineteenth century reported that, in the Cuban campaigns of 1895–1898, many army corps and divisional chiefs of staff, instead of performing their essential staff duties, took command of operational columns with the backing of the general officers commanding the major units. Therefore, the staff work was never organized properly in the headquarters. Even if the needs of colonial warfare were different from those of a European regular campaign, a good general staff organization was still required to maintain 200,000 troops in a theatre of operations of over 100,000 square kilometres.⁹⁰

The way staff duties should be performed, either through a separate branch of the military (the staff corps) or through the temporary assignment of officers with special training (the concept of a 'general staff service'), was an issue much discussed during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. By the 1880s a small group of reformist officers drew conclusions about the military events of the 1860–1880 period (especially the Prussian–German victory in the 1870–1871 war against France). One of these conclusions was that an efficient general staff was indispensable for the command of modern mass armies. The success of the Prussian model had convinced the reformists of the need to reform the mobilization system and its territorial organization in order to make effective use of the reserve manpower in wartime. Such a reform meant

changing the current organization of the staff corps, focused on its traditional mapmaking role.⁹¹

General Martínez Campos, the leading military personality of the early decades of the Restoration, was a moderate reformist, who thought that the mapmaking missions of the staff corps (though they had to be entrusted to a scientifically trained branch of it) played only a supporting role and were not essential for the staff work.⁹² However, he did not undertake any actual reform of the organization of the staff corps. By contrast, General Cassola, war minister in 1887–1888, was a more resolute character. He reckoned that proficiency in cartography was not the monopoly of any corps and therefore should not determine the role of staff officers. Moreover, he thought that general staff assignments were nobody's monopoly. So, after being appointed war minister, Cassola included among his reformist plans the abolition of the staff corps: from then on, he asserted, staff duties would be performed by especially trained officers of all the other corps, after the Prussian model. These officers would remain in their commissioning corps' lists and alternate tours of regimental service and staff duty. On the other hand, although the traditional, overspecialized mapmaking tasks were discarded, the staff officer's status would be enhanced by turning it into a more influential advisory and executive assignment near the commander.⁹³

Although Cassola's reformist proposals were finally defeated by the pressure of the vested interests within the military, the debate about the staff corps and the general staff service remained alive. General López Domínguez tried to solve the issue through a compromise in 1893. He retained the staff corps, whose new members thenceforth would be graduates of the staff college who decided to leave their commissioning branches; the other graduates would remain in their corps as *diplomados de Estado Mayor* (staff graduates).⁹⁴ However, this arrangement did not solve the fundamental problem, as will be shown below.

The Training of Staff Officers After 1893

López Domínguez's reform also affected the training of staff officers. A staff college was created at Madrid in 1842, where graduates of the General Military College got additional training. From 1850 to 1882, it admitted officers commissioned in other branches and civilians able to pay for their studies. After 1882, the college only admitted General Military Academy graduates.⁹⁵ The staff college was renamed as *Escuela Superior*

de Guerra (ESG) in 1893. Requirements for sitting the entrance competitive examination were the rank of first or second lieutenant and at least three years' seniority after commissioning as second lieutenant (including one year of regimental service); if the student wanted to join the staff corps after graduation, he must not be older than 29 years when entering the ESG. Since commissioning officer candidates when they were (or were about to be) 18 years old was not unusual, a Spanish officer could be an ESG student at 21.⁹⁶ In the German army, by contrast, most officers were commissioned at 21 and had to fulfil four years of regimental service before applying for admission to the *Kriegsakademie*. The theoretical studies in the ESG lasted three years but the syllabus' military contents seem small in comparison with the academic ones:

First year

- i. Elements of astronomy, topography, fortification, military bridging, castramentation
- ii. Artillery and engineer ordinances, regimental internal service, foreign tactical regulations
- iii. Algebra, spherical trigonometry and analytical geometry, general geometry and general history (optional subjects)

Second year

- i. Descriptive and strategic military geography, telegraphic and telephonic signals, railways, ballooning, cryptography
- ii. Outline of military and naval organization (in Spain and major powers), military art, staff duties and regulations, survey of floating material
- iii. Descriptive geometry, calculus and rational mechanics, chemistry, gunpowder and explosives, ordnance manufacture (optional subjects)
- iv. Foreign language (English, German or Arabic)

Third year

- i. Survey of Spanish naval artillery and foreign artillery
- ii. Political economy, military administration, political and administrative law, international law, survey of medical and quartermaster equipment

- iii. Astronomy and geodesy or elements of zoology and botany, mineralogy and geology
- iv. Foreign language (English, German or Arabic)

The syllabus' academic orientation repelled many artillery and engineer officers (actually no new student came from these corps in 1896), who thought their scientific 'exclusivity' under threat. This did not benefit the prestige of the ESG.⁹⁷

The German army's *Kriegsakademie*, by contrast, had the following syllabus (though this is the syllabus adopted in 1907, its contents seem not to show significant changes with regard to previous years):

First year

Tactics, military history, fortification, ordnance, medical service, general history, military and international law; (optional subjects) pre-1648 history, mathematics, physics, foreign languages

Second year

Tactics, military history, fortification, topography, communications, naval warfare, general history; (optional subjects) pre-1648 history, mathematics, foreign languages, chemistry, physical geography

Third year

Tactics, military history, staff duties, siege warfare, general history; (optional subjects) pre-1648 history, mathematics, foreign languages, topography, geodesy⁹⁸

Comparing the German syllabus with the Spanish one, it can be seen that the former had a clear-cut core of military subjects centred around tactics and history, whereas all its scientific subjects remained optional. On the contrary, tactical and historical matters look underdeveloped in the Spanish staff college's syllabus.

The teaching of the ESG was judged unsatisfactory in the early years of the twentieth century and the college was reorganized in 1904 by War Minister General Linares. He realized the need to increase the number of officers qualified for operational staff duties and stood for giving priority in promotion to general officer rank to those who had passed the staff college.⁹⁹ The new syllabus was as follows:

First year

- i. Military and strategic geography, basic notions of geology
- ii. Political economy and military administration, hygiene, international law, medical field service
- iii. Topography, notions of electricity
- iv. Conversation and writing in French
- v. Horsemanship, fencing, photography, practical sessions of topography and visits to medical and quartermaster corps centres

Second year

- i. Military history
- ii. Mathematical algorithm, astronomy, geodesy, meteorology, military industry, technical and practical studies in military communications (optional)
- iii. Art of war, grand tactics, military law
- iv. Foreign language (English, German, Arabic, Portuguese), fencing
- v. Landscape sketching, horsemanship, practical sessions in subjects of (ii) and (iii)

Third year

- i. Military history
- ii. Use of artillery and fortification in warfare
- iii. Staff duties, wargaming, communications as a means of war
- iv. Foreign language (English, German, Arabic, Portuguese), fencing
- v. Panoramic military sketching, horsemanship, practical sessions in subjects of (iii), staff ride and geographical surveys¹⁰⁰

The non-military scientific content was substantially reduced (although one cannot help but wonder how far the staff officer's proficiency depended on his skill with the sword). As a whole, this new syllabus bore more resemblance to those of other foreign staff colleges. For instance, in the French army, whose studies for the staff diploma lasted two years, the contents included the following subjects: military history, applied strategy and tactics, staff duties, fortification, ballooning, international law, geology and geography, military law and administration, mobilization, German, Russian (optional), railways, hygiene, medical service, naval warfare, and horsemanship.¹⁰¹

The teaching methods of the ESG were reportedly changed as well. Official textbooks were removed; instead the college's teaching staff was supposed to encourage the development of analytical skills and judgement through the writing of essays, group projects, and group debates in the classroom, which allowed the display of the students' personal views. In short, any teaching only based on rote learning had to be banished.¹⁰² Nevertheless, it is not clear how successful this change of methods was. A graduate of the ESG argued in 1921 that the college was still inflexible and unwilling to accept critical views (at least in some subjects). And in the same year, a Spanish officer studying at the French army's staff college commented, via Colonel Juan García Benítez (the military attaché), on the too erudite learning system of the ESG, in contrast with the French institution, where teaching was based on case studies taken from recent campaigns.¹⁰³

Attack and Defence of the Staff Corps

The reforms after 1893 did not stop the antagonism towards the staff corps. One of its most heated critics, Cebreiros, even lambasted the quality of its officers. According to Cebreiros, the root of the problem lay in the system of entrance into the staff corps. After the reform of 1904, applicants for the ESG had to be captains or first lieutenants with two years' regimental service. An officer who got the staff diploma remained in his commissioning branch after leaving the ESG. In order to join the staff corps, an ESG graduate had to apply for admission whenever there were vacancies in its list and before being promoted to the rank of major in his commissioning branch (the career in the staff corps started at the rank of captain).¹⁰⁴ But only the youngest officers (that is, those who could presume a career advance) applied for admission to the staff corps. However, they often graduated with the lowest marks of their class, due to their relative immaturity. Thus the worst qualified students got into the staff corps whereas the best ones—most of them older men with many years of service as captains—preferred to stay in their commissioning branches rather than joining a new officer list and starting again behind younger captains belonging to a previous ESG class and who had been able to apply for a vacancy before. In order to attract the brightest graduates, the staff corps pursued a policy of fast promotions which was only feasible through the creation of as many assignments for staff corps officers as possible.¹⁰⁵

Cebreiros also pointed out that another result of the coexistence of the staff corps and the *diplomados* was the rivalry between the two groups of staff officers. The staff corps officers wanted to cut the number of *diplomados* to prevent them from occupying staff assignments—if not, the policy of fast careers within the staff corps would be under threat. The fact that assignments near the high command were deemed almost a passport into it also spurred this attitude (which was not unjustified: in 1895, 11 out of the Spanish army's 39 lieutenant generals came from the staff corps, whereas 13 came from the infantry). What made this competition an even more lamentable case of corporate selfishness was the feeble state of the Spanish army. Since the budgets did not allow an effective preparation for war, the term 'staff work' (outside the forces in Morocco at least) and its alleged 'technical' complexity—which the staff corps used as a justification of its own existence—actually concealed more and more red tape. Indeed this institutional self-interest even fostered more bureaucracy.¹⁰⁶ As Cebreiros concluded, '[m]ainly due to the fault of the staff corps, the Spanish army is a lie wrapped in notepaper'.¹⁰⁷ Nonetheless, the reader must bear in mind that Cebreiros was an infantry officer and therefore his criticism suffered from corporate bias as well. So, how justified was the antagonism towards the staff corps?

The military archives keep primary evidence which shows that the staff corps was not very pleased that *diplomados* received the same training as its prospective officers. There is no evidence to find out the extent of such a mood, but the fact that two staff corps officers of very different rank and writing a decade apart proposed similar solutions to cope with the *diplomados* suggests that the mood was shared by large sections of the corps. The first piece of evidence comes from the report on the inspection of the ESG carried out by General Pío Suárez Inclán (who had been promoted from the list of the staff corps) in 1907.¹⁰⁸ It is not clear if the points made in the report are actually General Suárez's own ideas, but it seems plausible that his views were influential in the conclusions of the report. It was certainly a good opportunity to defend his former corps' interests. The report pointed out that it was not a good idea to allocate equal value to all the subjects of the syllabus, because this meant that a student who excelled in general academic matters could get a better place in the graduation list than another who obtained high marks in the essential professional subjects. So the report proposed allocating to each subject a quotient which indicated its relative importance for the overall score of the student. So far, so good.

But after that the report remarked that the ESG students had different motivations in their training as staff officers. The proposed change would not affect the students merely aiming for the diploma, but it would affect those aspiring to join the staff corps since their place in the graduation list settled the precedence for admission and their place in the corps' list. Therefore, the report questioned the policy of teaching the same syllabus to both groups, since it could be deficient for prospective staff corps officers and too demanding for those just looking for an extension of their professional expertise. The solution to this problem put forward in the report was to divide the syllabus into two parts. The first one would be a common course including the essential military matters; the second part would be a more demanding course reserved for those called to perform staff duties permanently (that is, the staff corps officers). Thus more officers would come to the ESG to improve their military education without any need to turn themselves into 'perfect' staff officers after five years of theoretical studies and practice. The implied consequence of this proposal was to render *diplomados* unfit for staff assignments, since only the officers of the staff corps would be fully qualified to hold such posts. Therefore, the corps would be able to justify its enlargement (and new promotions) whenever there were staff vacancies. There is no evidence in the files consulted by the present author about the later fate of the proposal, though it obviously found no favourable reception because there was no significant change in the ESG syllabus.

The second piece of evidence dates from early 1918, so it is contemporary with the political-military crisis caused by the *juntas de defensa* from 1917 on (see Chap. 5). The *Junta Superior de Defensa* (Higher Defence Board) of the staff corps consulted its officers in December 1917 about the need for preserving a corporate organization to perform staff duties. The answer of an officer stationed in Valladolid, Captain Nicolás Benavides, argued for the absolute need for keeping the staff corps instead of replacing it with a general staff service.¹⁰⁹ His first argument was that the common training, the constant performance of staff duties and the cohesion caused by belonging to a single branch provided unity in working procedures and methods. On the contrary, the different corporate background of the *diplomados*—though they carried out similar tasks—would damage the unity of the whole if the general staff service was implemented.

Another of Benavides' arguments was that the staff corps, due to its own corporate organization, limited unhealthy ambition among its

members, because all of them had the same legal rights. On the contrary, according to Benavides, the *diplomado* of the general staff service would be placed on a different level in relation to his commissioning branch's fellow officers because of his separate staff duties and the special training for the staff diploma, whereas he would be keen to please his superiors, who could back his career up. Therefore the general staff service would offer more fertile ground for unlimited personal ambition. Finally, Benavides reckoned it very difficult to achieve a good performance in staff duties if these were alternated with regimental service.

Benavides also pointed out several alleged dangers for the survival of the staff corps. One of them was the corps' weak state, which was partly a reflection of the deterioration of the army as a whole, but it was also due to its own neglect and lack of collective effort. Another major danger he saw (and this point shows the degree of ill-will between the two groups of staff officers) were the *diplomados*. Their numbers (and foreseeable increase) and deeds caused and fostered hostility towards the corps in political circles and the press; even the archbishop of Tarragona, who also held a seat in the Senate, had allegedly displayed antagonism! Benavides expressed fears that the political debate could bring about a cut in the number of admissions to the staff corps, which would lead to a consequent increase of *diplomados*. Some political groups and sections of the press—mostly of leftist leanings—also were especially hostile because the corps (according to Benavides) strengthened the unity of the army (the major support of government) and therefore held back their ambitions. Benavides recommended the case for the staff corps to be presented to leading politicians, who could defend its cause in the parliament.

He also recommended the establishment of a secret record of data on the main foes of the corps, especially the *diplomados* (a proposal with somewhat sinister tinges). Benavides concluded with a proposal to turn the ESG into an institution which would graduate staff corps officers only. Those officers who did not want to join the corps would make up a sort of *adjutantur* (adjutant's service) after two years of studies plus one more of practice.¹¹⁰ These officers would perform ancillary staff duties and become a reserve of staff officers in wartime; they would serve usually within their branches, though they could be called up to work in manoeuvres under the orders of staff corps officers.

The essential coincidence of Captain Benavides' last point about the staff college with General Suárez's views is significant. The ultimate aim

of both them was to turn the *diplomados* into second-class staff officers, who would therefore be denied the responsibilities and benefits of being fully qualified staff officers. Thus the staff corps would recover at least the monopoly of the most important staff duties. This monopoly had been broken by the 1893 reform, which gave the same professional qualification to prospective staff corps officers and those who aspired to the diploma alone. Therefore, the staff corps had to remove this equality if it wanted to maintain its *raison d'être*. The fact that a general officer in 1907 and a captain a decade later shared rather similar solutions to this problem makes it plausible to think that corporate self-interest was highly developed in the staff corps and hence that criticism of the staff corps as a whole on this ground was not unfounded. Furthermore, Benavides' paper bear witness to the deep rivalries within the military; his suggestion to spy on the *diplomados* illustrates clearly how far the deterioration of the inter-corps relationship could reach.

The Staff Corps and the Development of the General Staff

What made the rivalry of the staff corps with the rest of the military even more serious were its consequences for the development of the General Staff. According to García Benítez, the staff corps worked against the 'military bureau' set up by War Minister Echagüe; it could not tolerate ideas alien to the corps on issues related to the reorganization of the army. Any crisis within the military caused by a reorganization project meant a crisis for the existence of the staff corps, so the latter was urged to take control of the reform by its *esprit de corps* and instinct of survival. The result was the preservation of the corps without any real improvement of the army.¹¹¹ Echagüe's military bureau was kept idle by his successor, General Luque, while the General Staff's rebirth was prepared under the guidance of staff corps officers. According to García Benítez, their aim was to turn the General Staff into 'an organization which saved the hegemony so endangered by that inconvenient military bureau, which had to be destroyed in a hurry, and this [the bureau's disbandment] was carried out to the relief of many people'.¹¹²

García Benítez, despite his criticism of the attitude of the staff corps, stated that he did not underrate the individual value of its members, whose educational standards were higher than those of the other branches. But this superiority also made more dangerous their corporate selfishness. And since they were facing up to another group with similar

professional qualifications (the *diplomados*), the struggle was waged on grounds which damaged the reforms badly needed by the army. The other corporate rivalries seriously affected the effectiveness of the army as well,

[b]ut these struggles among ‘guilds’ do not have the [same] importance... as that one waged by the guiding ‘guild’ against all the guided ‘guilds’; and its result is that an army whose general staff functions are still in embryo has got the following organizations to carry them out: the staff corps, a staff college, and a legion of *diplomados*; three sources of unsurpassed material and a very deficient service, the most deficient one of our weak military body.¹¹³

Certainly, an in-depth reform of the army was not a very realistic goal when the officer corps quarrelled about who was most qualified to direct such a work. That the root of such division lay in corporate factionalism is proven by the fact that there was no criticism (excepting Cebreiros) of the professional proficiency of the staff corps officers as individuals: what displeased the rest of the military were their behaviour and privileges as a group. Nonetheless, a general staff service would not necessarily have been a panacea: the French army had adopted it after 1871, but, according to the historian Douglas Porch, this did not prevent its staff officers from turning into an inward-looking body of careerists, entrenched in routine and the defence of their privileges.¹¹⁴

CONCLUSION

Rivalry between the branches of the service is not unusual in armies. Nonetheless, corporate factionalism and self-interest in the Spanish army were highly developed and turned into serious obstacles to military effectiveness in the early decades of the twentieth century. Much of this corporatism was reflected in military education. The reform introduced by López Domínguez in 1893 had imposed the learned corps’ approach to the training of officers, which even seems to have been imitated by the general arms’ academies, whose syllabi became more bookish. Moreover, the current organization and working of the academies reveal deficiencies and subterfuges that, despite damaging the quality of officer training, were tolerated because they served vested interests of the officer corps (for instance, the endemic excess of admitted applicants). The reforms

of the period 1911–1913 offered a chance of moving towards a new model of military education, but they were ruined by the modification of grading criteria in 1918 and the abridged courses of 1921–1923. The fact that these reforms have been missed by historians, excepting José Fernando García Moreno, may be a sign of their utter failure.

The learned branches, especially the artillery, were eager to enlarge their turf by monopolizing technical responsibilities, including the weaponry of the other corps. Thus the infantry found difficult to test new weapons and their effects on tactics because of the artillery's insistence in controlling all the matters related to firearms. The problem of corporate factionalism perhaps reached its apex in the case of the staff officers. Military reformists had advocated the Prussian–German model of staff officer who alternated tours of staff duties and regimental service in his commissioning branch. The old staff corps lost the monopoly of staff duties after the reorganization of the staff college in 1893, but it managed to survive and thereafter sought to restore its former status through subterfuges. This reinforced the antagonism of the other branches, which perceived the corps as a body of conceited careerists. The consequence of all this was that the Spanish army's professional elite was divided and its role in the modernization was influenced negatively by the needs of corporate self-interest. The contribution of staff work to Spanish military successes in later conflicts perhaps must be seen more as a proof of the staff officers' individual competence than as an evidence of institutional effectiveness.

NOTES

1. For a sample of literature on the Spanish military education until the 1890s, see Julio Ferrer Sequera, *La Academia General Militar. Apuntes para su historia*, 2 vols. (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1985), I. 33–188; José Ignacio Muro Morales, *El Pensamiento Militar sobre el Territorio en la España Contemporánea*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, 1993), I. Chaps. 1–6, 10–14; Miguel Alonso Baquer, 'En la hora de las Academias Militares', in Miguel Alonso Baquer and Luis A. Collado Espiga (eds), *Historia de la infantería española*, 5 vols. (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, 1993–2001), III. 47–79; José Izquierdo, José Ramón Ortiz de Zárate, and Ángel Aparicio, *La Academia General Militar. Crisol de la oficialidad española* (Saragossa: Institución 'Fernando el Católico', 2011), pp. 17–41.

2. Ministerio de la Guerra, *Colección Legislativa del Ejército 1893* (Madrid: n.p., 1893) (hereafter *CLE plus the year of publication*), Item No. 33, Introduction; Daniel R. Headrick, *Ejército y política en España (1866–1898)* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1981), p. 240.
3. *CLE 1893*, Item No. 33, Introduction, Articles 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 17.
4. *CLE 1893*, Introduction; Julio Busquets, *El militar de carrera en España*, revised edition (Barcelona: Ariel, 1984), p. 80; José Fernando García Moreno, 'Servicio militar universal y personal en España. Procedencia social y formación del soldado, clases profesionales y oficial de carrera en el Ejército de Tierra español de 1913 a 1936', 5 vols. (doctoral dissertation, Universidad de Zaragoza, 1985), II. 588–9, 598, 651–9, 863–4.
5. *CLE 1893*, Item No. 33, Articles 7, 8.
6. Busquets, *El militar*, p. 81.
7. Enrique Ruíz-Fornells and Alfredo Melgar Mata, *Organización militar de España y algunas potencias extranjeras*, 9th edition (Toledo: Rafael Gómez Menor, 1901), p. 119 footnote 2; Busquets, *El militar*, p. 118.
8. Archivo General Militar de Segovia, Fondo del Ministerio de la Guerra, 2^a Sección, División 3^a, Legajo 183 (hereafter AGMS No. Sección/No. División/No. Legajo), Inspección General de Ingenieros, Secretaría to Ministro de la Guerra, 24 May 1892.
9. For a heated and thorough criticism of the Spanish military academies in the early years of the twentieth century, see El Capitán Equis [pseud. of Nazario Cebreiros], *El problema militar en España. Apuntes para un estudio sincero y al alcance de todos*, 2 vols. (Burgos: Saiz y Comp^a, 1916–1917), II. 41–78.
10. *CLE 1905*, Item No. 200, Article 6; Antonio Cordon, *Trayectoria (Recuerdos de un artillero)* (París: Librairie du Globe, 1971), p. 23.
11. García Moreno, 'Servicio militar', II. 750.
12. *CLE 1896*, Item No. 163.
13. Miguel Campins Aura, 'La Academia General Militar de Zaragoza y sus normas pedagógicas', non-commercial edition (n.p.: [Centro de Ayudas a la Enseñanza de la Armada, 1983]), p. 28. Campins himself was commissioned at 18 after an abridged course of study which lasted just one year. On Campins and his career, see Manuel Tournon Yebra, 'El General Miguel Campins y su época (1880–1936)', 2 vols. (doctoral dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1992).
14. Campins, 'La Academia General Militar', pp. 28, 42, 47.
15. *Reglamento orgánico para las Academias militares de Infantería, Caballería, Artillería, Ingenieros y Administración Militar* (n.p.: n.p., 1924 [originally issued in 1897]), Article 86. Actually the cavalry, engineer, and quartermaster academies did not implement a boarding

- regime until the reform of 1927: García Moreno, 'Servicio militar', II, 677–8.
16. Archivo General Militar de Madrid, Colección Adicional de Documentos, Legajo 8, carpeta 5 (hereafter AGMM-CAD No. Legajo/No. carpeta), Revista de Inspección al Ejército: Capitanía General, 5^a Región Militar, 1907.
 17. Capitán Subrio Escápula, 'Reformas militares', *Revista Científico-Militar* (hereafter RCM), 26 (1901), pp. 134–6.
 18. Comandante Beta [pseud. of José García Benítez], *Apuntes para historiar tres años de reformas militares (1915–17)* (Madrid: Imp. de Bernardo Rodríguez, 1917), p. 128.
 19. CLE 1894, Item No. 293; Cordon, *Trayectoria*, p. 23; Busquets, *El militar*, p. 80.
 20. AGMS 2/3/123, Revista de inspección, Reformas que se proponen en las Academias y Colegios Militares, 17 June 1907.
 21. Critón [pseud. of Ricardo Burguete Lana], *Hágase Ejército. Infantería, Caballería, Artillería. Estudios tácticos al alcance de todos* (Barcelona: Luis Tasso, 1899), pp. 41–4; Efele [pseud. of Francisco Larrea y Liso]: *El desastre nacional y los vicios de nuestras instituciones militares* (Madrid: Publicaciones de los Estudios Militares, 1901), pp. 291–5; Eduardo Gallego Ramos, *Proyecto de reorganización y mejora del ejército de tierra* (Guadalajara: n.p., 1905), p. 17.
 22. Efele, *El desastre nacional*, pp. 243–4. The contents of this syllabus are listed in Touron, 'El General Miguel Campins', I, 78–81.
 23. Modesto Navarro, 'Lo moral en lo militar', *Revista de Infantería*, 1, 2 (1901), pp. 65–6.
 24. Ricardo Burguete, *La guerra y el hombre. Psicología de las tropas* (Madrid: Sáenz de Jubera Hermanos, 1911), p. 70. A graduate of the General Military Academy, Burguete (1871–1937) was commissioned in the infantry and fought in Cuba (where won the San Fernando Laureate Cross, the Spanish army's highest award for gallantry), the Philippines (1896–1898), and Morocco (1909–1913), where he later became high commissioner (1922–1924); in the last stage of Alfonso XIII's reign, Burguete displayed an ambiguous conduct which turned a court martial against Republican leaders he chaired in 1931 into an anti-monarchist propaganda success; he went into retirement after the proclamation of the Second Republic and shifted towards leftist and pacifist stances during his last years. Burguete's intellectual thought is analyzed in detail in Geoffrey Jensen, *Cultura militar española. Modernistas, tradicionalistas y liberales* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2014), Chaps. 2–4; this work is a revised Spanish edition of Geoffrey Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*:

- Cultural Despair, Military Nationalism, and the Ideological Origins of Franco's Spain* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2002).
25. AGMS 2/8/152, Capitán [Eduardo] Herrera de la Rosa, Impresiones recogidas de la campaña ruso-japonesa con el ejército del general barón Nogui, p. 19, 30 November 1905.
 26. Equis, *El problema militar*, II. 58.
 27. Corelli Barnett, 'The Education of Military Elites', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 2, 3 (1967), p. 25.
 28. Juan Avilés, 'Enseñanzas de la guerra del Rif', *RCM*, 35 (1910), pp. 371–2.
 29. Alfredo Kindelán y Duany *Mis cuadernos de guerra* (Madrid: Plus Ultra, c. 1947), pp. 207–8. Kindelán (1879–1962) was commissioned in the engineer corps (1899); a pioneer of the Spanish military aviation, he became chief officer of the army air service (1926); a staunch monarchist, Kindelán left the service in 1931, but he returned to command the Nationalist air force throughout the Civil War; he asked unsuccessfully for the return of the monarchy in the 1940s and finished his career half-ostracized.
 30. Carlos Martínez de Campos y Serrano, *Ayer*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1946–1970), I. 28–9. Martínez de Campos (1887–1975), commissioned in the artillery (1908) and a graduate of the staff college (1918), held assignments in the General Staff and as military attaché in Japan and Italy; during the Civil War, he was artillery commander of the Nationalist Navarrese Brigades and Army of the North; after the conflict, he was chief of general staff (1939–1941).
 31. Cordón, *Trayectoria*, pp. 29–30. Commissioned in the mid-1910s, Cordón (1895–1969) left the service under Azaña's volunteer retirement decree (1931) and became a Communist; he rejoined the army on the Republican side in the Civil War, held senior staff assignments on the Andalusian and Aragonese fronts and became Ministry of Defence undersecretary (1938) and chief of staff of the Eastern Region Army Group, and was raised to general officer rank in February 1939.
 32. Cordón, *Trayectoria*, pp. 25, 37. But even in Toledo a number of students were allowed external lodging.
 33. Beta, *Apuntes*, pp. 130, 135; Campins, 'La Academia General Militar', p. 109.
 34. Efele, *El desastre nacional*, pp. 300–6; Gallego, *Proyecto de reorganización*, p. 18.
 35. See, for instance, the conclusions of the 1902 and 1923 reviews of British military education: Alan Shepperd, *Sandhurst. The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and its Predecessors* (Feltham: Country Life Books,

- 1980), pp. 102–4, 133–4. And rote learning was a long-established (and deplored) feature of the West Point military academy in the United States: Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars. The American Army, 1898–1941* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 147; Jensen, *Cultura militar*, pp. 167–8.
36. Critón, *Hágase Ejército*, p. 46; León Fernández Fernández, *De la enseñanza militar* (Madrid: n.p., 1907), pp. 32–3; Manuel Espadas Burgos, ‘La Institución Libre de Enseñanza y la formación del militar español durante la Restauración’, in Congreso de Historia Militar (1º. 1982. Zaragoza), *Temas de Historia Militar*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Servicio de Publicaciones del Estado Mayor del Ejército, 1983), I. 498–9.
 37. *Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra* (hereafter *DOMG*), 25 July 1904; Miguel Alonso Baquer, *El ejército en la sociedad española* (Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1971), pp. 237–8.
 38. *DOMG*, 19 August 1905.
 39. AGMS 2/8/152, Capitán [Eduardo] Herrera de la Rosa, Impresiones recogidas de la campaña ruso-japonesa con el ejército del general barón Nogui, p. 19, 30 November 1905; another instance of support for a single academy is Miguel A. Moreno y Álvarez, ‘Instrucción y reclutamiento de la oficialidad’, *RCM*, 36 (1911), pp. 260–1.
 40. Capitán Subrio Escápula, ‘El Colegio General Militar’, *RCM*, 30 (1905), p. 43.
 41. *CLE 1911*, Item No. 240.
 42. *CLE 1911*, Item No. 240, Introduction.
 43. *CLE 1911*, Item No. 240, Articles 1, 28.
 44. *CLE 1911*, Item No. 240, Introduction, Articles 2, 25.
 45. *CLE 1911*, Item No. 240, Articles 6, 30, 31.
 46. García Moreno, ‘Servicio militar’, II. 668.
 47. See, for instance, *CLE 1912*, Item No. 97.
 48. García Moreno, ‘Servicio militar’, II. 708–10.
 49. García Moreno, ‘Servicio militar’, II. 714–18.
 50. García Moreno, ‘Servicio militar’, II. 696–8.
 51. García Moreno, ‘Servicio militar’, II. 693.
 52. *CLE 1918*, Item No. 37.
 53. García Moreno, ‘Servicio militar’, II. 720–7.
 54. García Moreno, ‘Servicio militar’, II. 727–31, 733–5, 741–7.
 55. García Moreno, ‘Servicio militar’, II. 751–2.
 56. The memorandum is titled ‘Crítica de algunos aspectos interesantes del plan de estudios y del régimen escolar de la Academia de Infantería’ and reproduced in Alberto Guerrero Martín, ‘Análisis y trascendencia de la Colección Bibliográfica Militar (1928–1936)’ (doctoral dissertation, UNED [Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia], 2015),

- pp. 341–57. Vicente Rojo (1894–1966) was commissioned in the infantry (1914), served in Morocco, taught at the Academy of Infantry in the 1920s, passed the staff college in the early 1930s and was a co-publisher of *Colección Bibliográfica Militar*, a successful series of professional literature, from 1928 to 1936; despite his conservative leanings, he was a loyalist in the Civil War; chief of staff in the defence of Madrid in late 1936; as chief of army general staff after May 1937, Rojo planned the main Republican offensives.
57. Rojo's analysis and quotations are taken from Guerrero Martín, 'Análisis y trascendencia', pp. 341–2.
 58. García Moreno, 'Servicio militar', II. 693.
 59. Equis, *El problema militar*, II, pp. 43–4, 62–3, 71–8.
 60. Gallego, *Proyecto de reorganización*, p. 18. As set in the 1897 regulations, the time limit for a tour of teaching duty were six years, or eight if the teacher wrote and got approved a textbook for his subject within the first three years after his appointment (as a comparison a German officer could not hold a teaching assignment for over five years): *Reglamento orgánico*, Article 6; Luis de la Gándara Marsella, *El oficial alemán de la escala activa y de reserva* (Madrid: n.p., 1916), p. 94. The decree of 4 October 1905 reiterated the 1897 rule, later modified by a decree dated 1 June 1911 which set the limit in seven years without further extension; even so, the head of artillery studies at the Segovia academy in 1931 managed to be one of its teachers since 1911, and Vicente Rojo also was a teacher at the Toledo academy from 1922 to 1932: *CLE 1905*, Item No. 200, Article 5; *CLE 1911*, Item No. 109, Article 23; Fernando Puell de la Villa, *Gutiérrez Mellado* Gutiérrez Mellado, Manuel. *Un militar del siglo XX (1912–1995)* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1997), p. 71; Guerrero Martín, 'Análisis y trascendencia', p. 167.
 61. Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*, p. 68.
 62. A[rthur] Houghton, *Les origines de la restauration des Bourbons en Espagne* (Paris: Plon, 1890), p. 13.
 63. Cordón, *Trayectoria*, p. 43.
 64. The text is taken from Jorge Vigón, *Historia de la Artillería española*, 3 vols. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1947), II. 134–5.
 65. Jorge Vigón, 'Breves notas para la historia de las Juntas de Defensa y de la Dictadura', unpublished manuscript [mimeographed copy filed in Archivo General Militar de Ávila, Fondos del Ejército Popular, armario 47, legajo 73, carpeta 8], p. 3; Vigón, *Artillería española*, II. 134.
 66. Vigón, *Artillería española*, III. 240.
 67. Equis, *El problema militar*, II. 114. Nonetheless, the artillery officers had debated in the nineteenth century if their corps had to take on a

- facultativo* (technical) role besides the military (tactical) one: Muro, *El Pensamiento Militar*, I. 421–9.
68. Miguel Alonso Baquer, *Aportación militar a la cartografía española en la Historia contemporánea. Siglo XIX* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1972), p. 170.
 69. A.F.B. y P. de A., *Nuestro ejército. Lo que es y lo que puede ser* (n.p.: S. Fernando, 1923), p. 55.
 70. Eduardo Gallego Ramos, *La campaña del Rif (1909). Orígenes, desarrollo y consecuencias* (Madrid: n.p., c. 1910), p. 306 footnote 1.
 71. Emilio Mola, *Obras completas* (Valladolid: Librería Santaren, 1940), p. 972. Mola (1887–1937) was promoted to brigadier general in 1927 after a successful career in the Moroccan campaigns; director of state security during the last stage of Alfonso XIII's reign; separated from the service by the first republican government, he returned in 1935 under a right-wing cabinet; he became the organizer of the 1936 military rebellion and commanded the Nationalist army in northern Spain until his death in an air crash in June 1937.
 72. Gallego, *Proyecto de reorganización*, p. 44.
 73. Equis, *El problema militar*, II. 118–19.
 74. AGMM-CAD 8/20, Revista de Inspección: Estado Mayor Central del Ejército, 1907.
 75. Equis, *El problema militar*, II. 89–100.
 76. Epifanio Gascuña, *El principio de la cooperación y enlace de las Armas y nuestros vigentes reglamentos tácticos* (Toledo: Publicaciones del Memorial de Infantería, 1918), pp. 14, 16. Born in 1882, Gascuña volunteered as private in 1900, became a sergeant in 1902, and entered the Academy of Infantry in 1905; after fighting in the Melilla campaign (1909), he passed the staff college; staff corps officer after 1916, he studied in the French staff college (1927–1929); a lieutenant colonel in 1936, the military uprising found him in the loyalist zone; he was unassigned most of the war and surrendered to the Nationalists in April 1939; he was court martialled and dismissed from the service in 1942 after a spell in prison.
 77. Gascuña, *El principio de la cooperación*, pp. 16–17.
 78. Vigón, *Artillería española*, III. 183.
 79. Estado Mayor Central del Ejército, *Enseñanzas de la campaña del Rif en 1909* (Madrid: [Depósito de la Guerra], 1911), pp. 76–7.
 80. André Bachoud, *Los españoles ante las campañas de Marruecos* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1988), pp. 105–6.
 81. Jensen, *Cultura militar*, pp. 164–7. A notable instance of this sort of officers (although part of their writings does have intellectual value in their own right) is Antonio García Pérez, an infantry officer and teacher

- in his arm's academy; for a biography, see Pedro Luis Pérez Frías, *La vida que fue. Antonio García Pérez—un intelectual militar olvidado* (n.p.: Estudios Especializados, 2015); for an analysis of his thinking, see Jensen, *Cultura militar*, Chap. 5.
82. Andrés Mas Chao, *La formación de la conciencia africanista en el ejército español (1909–26)* (Madrid: Servicio Geográfico del Ejército, 1988), pp. 58, 60–1.
 83. Busquets, *El militar*, p. 97.
 84. Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 154; Gabriel Cardona, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la guerra civil* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1983), p. 36. During the campaign which led the Melilla district forces, under the command of a cavalry general (Manuel Fernández Silvestre), to the disaster of Annual (July 1921), the staff officers played a very small role, if any, in the operational planning and their functions were often reduced to passing on orders: [Juan Picasso González] *Expediente Picasso. Documentos relacionados con la información instruida por el señor general de división D. Juan Picasso sobre las Responsabilidades de la actuación española en Marruecos durante julio de mil novecientos veintiuno*, facsimile edition (Mexico, D.F.: Frente de Afirmación Hispanista, A.C., 1976), p. 311.
 85. Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 99–101.
 86. For a history of the staff corps, see Eladio Baldovín Ruiz, *Historia del Cuerpo y Servicio de Estado Mayor* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, Secretaría General Técnica, 2001), Introduction, Chaps. 1–9. See also Alonso Baquer, *Aportación militar*, pp. 150, 159; Busquets, *El militar*, pp. 189–95; Muro, *El Pensamiento Militar*, I. Chap. 7. The direct recruitment of civilians was due to the shortage of officers applying for the staff college; 47 officers and 74 civilians entered the college in the period 1852–59: Baldovín, *Historia del Cuerpo*, pp. 83–4.
 87. Cordon, *Trayectoria*, p. 142.
 88. Alonso Baquer, *Aportación militar*, pp. 159–60. In 1921 Picasso (now a major general) headed the commission of inquiry on the Annual debacle, whose proceedings were later known as the *Expediente Picasso* ('Picasso Dossier'); he was an uncle of the painter Pablo Ruíz Picasso.
 89. Alonso Baquer, *Aportación militar*, pp. 171, 191. On Weyler's career, see Gabriel Cardona and Juan Carlos Losada: *Weyler, nuestro hombre en La Habana* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1997).
 90. Efele, *El desastre nacional*, pp. 22–3.
 91. Fernando Puell de la Villa, 'El general Cassola, reformista militar de la Restauración', *Revista de Historia Militar*, 45 (1978), pp. 180–1.

92. Alonso Baquer, *Aportación militar*, p. 170.
93. Alonso Baquer, *Aportación militar*, p. 170.
94. Alonso Baquer, *El ejército*, p. 196.
95. On the staff college before 1893, see Alonso Baquer, *Aportación militar*, pp. 148–9; Muro, *El Pensamiento Militar*, I. Chaps. 8–9.
96. CLE 1893, Item No. 33, Article 27. The students of the intake of 1898 were 20 years old on average: present author's estimate based on data taken from Ministerio de la Guerra, *Anuario Militar de España 1899* (Madrid: n.p., 1899).
97. Equis, *El problema militar*, I. 132–5.
98. Gándara, *El oficial alemán*, pp. 236–7.
99. Alonso Baquer, *El ejército*, pp. 237–8.
100. Equis, *El problema militar*, I. 142–3.
101. Equis, *El problema militar*, I. 109–10.
102. AGMM-CAD 9/1, Memoria del Jefe del Estado Mayor Central, 1907.
103. Enrique Maquieiría, 'Hombres e ideas de la guerra europea', *Memorial de Infantería*, 10, 1 (1921), p. 80; Juan García Benítez, 'Nuevos métodos de enseñanza en la Escuela Superior de Guerra francesa', *La Guerra y su preparación*, 6, 1 (1921), p. 133.
104. CLE 1893, Item No. 33, Article 32.
105. Equis, *El problema militar*, I. 137–8.
106. Equis, *El problema militar*, I. 125, 138–9, 159–62. The fear caused among the staff corps officers by the competition of the *diplomados* is voiced in Pío Suárez Inclán, *Organización del Cuerpo de Estado Mayor, 1810–1910* (Madrid: Talleres del Depósito de la Guerra, 1912), p. 192.
107. Equis, *El problema militar*, I. 160.
108. AGMM-CAD 9/1, Memoria del Jefe del Estado Mayor Central, 1907.
109. Archivo General Militar de Ávila, Fondos del Ejército Popular, armario 47, legajo 73, carpeta 7a, Captain Nicolás Benavides to Junta Superior de Defensa del Cuerpo de Estado Mayor, 2 January 1918.
110. The *adjutantur*, in the Prussian–German military system, was a service, separate from staff duties, which handled the administrative affairs in a major command headquarters, thus allowing the staff officers to focus on operational and logistical matters: *Dictionnaire militaire. Encyclopédie des sciences militaires*, 3 vols. (Paris and Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1898–1910), sv 'Adjutantur'.
111. Beta, *Apuntes*, pp. 64–5.
112. Beta, *Apuntes*, pp. 70–1.
113. Beta, *Apuntes*, p. 72.
114. Douglas Porch, *The March to the Marne. The French Army 1871–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 58.

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