

The Democratization Process in Mexico and Presidential Elections. Toward a Typology of Presidential Elections

Following McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, I will define democracy as a regime of protected consultation¹ and democratization, as:

Increases in the breadth and equality of relations between governmental agents and members of the government's subject population, in binding consultation of a government's subject population with respect to governmental personnel, resources, and policy, and in protection of that population (especially minorities within it) from arbitrary action by governmental agents. As shorthand, we can speak of increases or decreases in protected consultation, calling high levels of protected consultation democratic.²

The pathways to democracy are multiple,³ and different actors have been involved in that process (political parties, peasants, workers and student movements, elites, revolutionaries and armies of occupation, among others). Here, I will not develop a general theory of democracy and democratization. My purpose is more limited. First, I want to understand the historical process of democratization in Mexico; I will argue that the primary pressures for democratization were internal (that does not mean that there were no external forces in favor and against democracy, but they were not the determining factors), and I will concentrate my analysis on the role of the political parties that emerged in the processes of contention between the citizens and the authoritarian government.

At a minimum, my explanation should help to understand democratization in Mexico, as a process of contention and mobilization in which

political parties of opposition played key roles, *vis-à-vis* other explanations (particularly the elitist models of democratization).

I also hope that my research will give at least partial answers to more general questions about the process of democratization: How do these complex institutions called political parties develop strategies for democratization? What is the relationship between the mobilizations led by political parties in presidential elections and the democratization process? And under what conditions do parties of the democratic opposition become a viable alternative to an authoritarian regime? These are very broad and general questions that several political scientists have posed and, as we will see, they have proposed different theories to answer them. Since I will not develop a general theory, I will only try to understand the process of democratization in Mexico, as a case where internal factors were the primary pressure for democratization.

Although I will not analyze all possible types of transitions, I think that other researchers, who analyze processes of democratization where internal factors are the primary pressure for transition, could find similar processes of contestation and party-building to those that I analyze in Mexico.

An important assumption and strategy of inquiry in my research is that building a democratic polity requires the development of political parties that are able to fulfill a series of tasks necessary in a democracy: they aggregate the preferences of the electorate, they construct, through their political programs, the options that the electorate is going to vote for, they form leaders, they campaign and give the voters the necessary information to have a reasonable alternative to vote for, and they formulate policies that respond to different problems. That does not mean that all political parties enhance democracy. As we know, a political party can be used as a totalitarian machine to crush democracy. However, based on the assumption of the relevance of political parties I will develop four central arguments.

First, following several authors,⁴ I will argue that democratization in Mexico is the historical outcome of multiple struggles and contentious politics. In Mexico, the actors of the struggle have been workers, peasants, and student movements that confronted the authoritarian state and helped in the formation of political parties of the opposition. They pushed, cajoled, and even forced the governing elites into the democratic game of elections. Once the authoritarian regimes entered the electoral process, the possibilities of democracy increased with the construction

of political parties of the opposition that developed an alternative to the authoritarian regime.

Second, I will maintain that at the beginning, opposition parties were small groups of deeply committed, ideological individuals. These small groups can remain latent for a long time before becoming real alternatives to the authoritarian regime. There are resource-building and repertoire-building processes that are developed throughout the struggle for democracy. I want to show these processes by reconstructing the electoral history of Mexico between 1970 and 2012. In the following chapters, I will analyze how these parties changed and adapted their strategies to the different contexts (opportunity structures they had to face) over the years.

Third, I sustain that the level of institutionalization of the authoritarian regime is a key variable to explain the pace of the transition and the different tasks the parties have to fulfill. I will argue that the Mexican authoritarian regime was highly institutionalized around the PRI.

Finally, following a political process model, I argue that in the recent democratization processes of Mexico, the center-right party tends to win the founding elections not only, as Bermeo says, because "...the voting public has been affected by the experience of authoritarianism itself. Contrary to what might seem logical, authoritarianism may make important sectors of the voting public more, rather than less, moderate,"⁵ but because the center-right parties tend to have more resources than the center-left ones, i.e., it is not only a matter of values, but of mobilization of resources, particularly once the electoral process has started.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIZATION

In the following pages, I will try to define what political parties are, distinguishing their role in democratic and authoritarian regimes. I will sustain, following Sartori, that the parties are independent variables, and I will follow Shefter to distinguish between internally mobilized and externally mobilized parties. I will also use Shefter's typology to classify the Mexican political parties of the transition.

I will not develop here a typology of parties (e.g., distinguishing between, authoritarian parties such as the Nazis, clientelist parties such as the *Peronistas*, class parties such as social democrats, interest-oriented coalition parties such as the Greens, ethno-religious parties such as the

B.J.P., and so on). As we know from Roberto Michels, all political parties have a tendency to become oligarchies; consequently, for the democratization process it is more important to concentrate on the dynamics of the interaction of parties with other parties (if they exist) and their relations with the state and the different social groups in the country. Consequently, for our purpose—the analysis of the democratization processes in Mexico—it is more useful to distinguish between classes of party systems. Following Sartori, we find seven classes: (1) one party; (2) hegemonic party; (3) predominant party; (4) two-party; (5) limited pluralism; (6) extreme pluralism, and (7) atomized. Classes 1 and 7 make the formation of regimes of protected consultation impossible. I can think of at least two reasons why it is not possible to have a democratic regime in one-party systems. First, if there is only one political party, the collective consultation among polity members with respect to government personnel, policy, and resources loses most of its meaning (if only members of the same party can run for office, we have a dictatorship not a democracy). Second, in a one-party system, as we have seen in the historical cases of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, the protection of polity members and persons from arbitrary action by government agents practically does not exist. In a hypothetical atomized system, the possibilities of protected consultation are also minimal.⁶

Classes 2 and 3 also present important problems both in terms of the process of consultation and control by the governing elite of the subject population, and in terms of the effective protection of the population from the arbitrary action of the state. This will become very clear when we analyze the case of Mexico.

I will also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of what I consider the two most important approaches to the study of democratization: the structure-centered (Barrington Moore) and the elitist-centered (O'Donnell and Schmitter) theories of democratization. I sustain that these two approaches can be improved by analyzing the process of contention between the authoritarian regimes and workers and student movements and the formation and development of political parties as key organizations that mediate between the state and society. The causal explanation of democratization needs agents, but these agents are not simply elites (political, military, and economic elites), but elites that establish links with the population. This is why political parties were so important in Mexico and in other cases of democratization (e.g., Spain,

Chile, Argentina); they were adequate institutions to establish those links between the elites and the different social groups.

The political parties are not the only institutions that function as brokers between the state and society. In the recent democratization process, there have been other important actors: trade unions, student associations, professional associations, interest groups, churches, and civil and nongovernmental organizations. However, parties are particularly important because of several characteristics, which make them a particularly effective connector⁷ and, as I said, they are capable of fulfilling a series of tasks in a democratic regime that other organizations cannot fulfill. *Vis-à-vis* the structuralist and the elitist models, I will propose a third approach—a political process model to help us understand the democratization processes in Mexico. As a part of the model, following McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, I will distinguish three types of mechanisms of contentious politics: cognitive, relational, and environmental.

WHAT ARE POLITICAL PARTIES AND WHY ARE THEY IMPORTANT FOR DEMOCRACY?

Following Joseph Lapalombara and Jeffrey Anderson, “a party is any political group, in possession of an official label and of a formal organization that links center with locality, that presents itself at elections, and is capable of placing through these elections (free or non-free) candidates for public office.”⁸ One of the central advantages of this definition is that it allows us to analyze political parties in different regimes, authoritarian or democratic, or even more relevant for our case, in regimes in transition.

Two key elements of the definition that I would like to emphasize is the character of political parties as the main connector between the electorate and the government, and the importance of this electoral connection.

I do not think that, as Joseph Schumpeter or E.E. Schattschneider maintain, political parties are only instruments of power in the hands of politicians eager to be elected.⁹ That is a central aspect of political parties, but not the only one. Lapalombara and Anderson distinguish six central functions fulfilled by political parties: (1) Leadership recruitment; (2) Formation of governments; (3) Political identity; (4) The vote; (5) Mobilization; and (6) Integration. As Lapalombara and Anderson

argue, not all political parties are able to fulfill all of these functions, and even the more institutionalized political parties in the oldest Western democracies have problems to satisfy all these tasks, and they generally have to adapt their work to a changing context. However, they have become the key institutions in the democratic governments to fulfill these tasks.

As McKenzie says “The organization and behavior of political parties tend to adapt to structural and configurative dimensions of the systems in which they operate.”¹⁰ I would go even further by arguing that the political parties not only adapt themselves to the political system in which they work, but they are also able to transform that environment; in this sense, they are not only a dependent variable, but an independent one.

This independent power of the political parties is particularly important during the periods of transition in which an old regime is breaking down, but the new one has not yet been established. In these conjunctures, the role of the political parties is enhanced by the situation: the system is in flux. Consequently, each of the functions of the parties is also in flux. Of the six functions captured by Lapalombara, leadership recruitment, mobilization, and eventually the formation of a government become particularly relevant. Integration and political identity are more long-term processes, essential to explain the fate of democratic regimes.

As Giovanni Sartori sustained in his critique to Lipset’s “Political Man”, parties and party struggles are not only “a democratic translation of the class struggle.” Parties are not only representatives of different class interests, they are coalitions that do not only project social cleavages, but they can deviate and domesticate them or, instead, intensify and exasperate these social divisions.¹¹ Parties are an independent variable.

Following this reasoning, political parties actually are able to create cognitive divisions among the population. They create an *identity*, and this is particularly important in the democratization process. Parties are ideological families that mobilize resources. Martin Shefter has classified these “ideological mobilizers” as internally and externally mobilized parties.

Under authoritarian regimes, parties do not necessarily disappear, but their role is different. In some authoritarian regimes the role of the political parties is to limit the freedom of the population, as the cases of the former Communist and Fascist regimes have shown. On the contrary,

in a democracy, parties have been one of the central institutions to empower the powerless.

Externally mobilized parties are established by leaders who do *not* occupy positions of power in the prevailing regime and who seek to bludgeon their way into the political system by mobilizing and organizing a mass constituency. Many European Socialist parties and Third World nationalist parties fall into this category [...] Internally mobilized parties are founded by politicians who do occupy leadership positions in the prevailing regime and who undertake to mobilize and organize a popular following behind themselves¹²

In the Mexican transitions, we find both types of parties. The PRI is a classic example of an internally mobilized party, generated inside the government to keep the power.

As Shefter sustains, “The fewer resources any group of outsiders commands, the more it will have to rely on the weight of numbers to achieve its political demands.”¹³ The evolution of the left in Mexico partially exemplifies that process.

“A second condition influencing the strength of externally mobilized parties is the amount of resistance the party must overcome to win a measure of power. The more determined the incumbent leaders are to exclude outsiders, the fewer the allies inside the regime that the outsiders enjoy; and the more powerful the regime an externally mobilized party confronts, the stronger and more broadly based the party of outsiders must be if it is to succeed in forcing its way into the political system.”¹⁴

As we will see, the case of the *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD), the Mexican left-wing opposition party, is complicated because it was the result of a dual process: a division inside the PRI and of a long process of unification of different left-wing organizations. In Chap. 3, we analyze the different transformations, divisions, and later unification of the left-wing organizations that had to deal with the problem of a corporatist authoritarian regime that developed a strong capacity for co-opting the trade unions.

In the case of the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), although it was an externally mobilized party, for several years it was mainly a cadre party, a party of notables more than a mass-based party. It was to be environmental changes, in particular, the economic crisis of 1982, and the response of the state to this crisis, that would have a strong impact

on the transformation of the PAN from a cadre to a “catch-all party” in the late 1980s. This would imply a lot of tensions in the right-wing opposition, some of which are still present in the party today.

Again, following Shefter, “Another precondition for incumbent leaders pursuing a strategy of party building and political mobilization is that no single public or private institution so completely overshadows all others in civil society, that politicians are able to maintain themselves in power simply by allying themselves with it.”¹⁵ In Mexico, the overwhelming power of the “party of the revolution,” the PRI, and its corporative control over the most important social actors for several decades, made the development of political parties of the opposition or independent organizations very difficult.

THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS AND CAUSAL MECHANISMS

The democratization process always implies a redistribution of power and consequently, it is a contentious process. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly have distinguished three types of mechanisms in contentious politics: **cognitive, environmental, and relational mechanisms**.¹⁶ All these mechanisms are present in Mexico’s democratization.

“Cognitive mechanisms operate through alterations of individual and collective perception; words like recognize, understand, reinterpret and classify characterize such mechanisms.”¹⁷ **In terms of cognitive mechanisms**, the party building process involves also a great transformation of the **cognitive maps** of the population. However, the argument that authoritarian regimes are based on the authoritarian political cultures of the populations is circular and has limited explanatory power. Contrary to that argument, I sustain that the parties are key actors that mobilize not only material resources, but also ideological ones. **They help in the construction of new democratic identities**, which sustain the transformation of the authoritarian regime into a democratic one. But following Rustow, I would say that in their origins, there could be democracies with very few democratic actors.¹⁸ Actually, the authoritarian elites are generally forced or cajoled into establishing a new democratic game either by internal or external forces or by a combination of both. Of course, if there were no transformation of the authoritarian actors into democrats, the stability of such a democracy would suffer, particularly if they are powerful actors such as the military, the entrepreneurs, or the leaders of the dominant party, but that is another issue that any democratic polity has to face.

Environmental mechanisms “are externally generated shifts in some connection between the structure or process of concern and surrounding structures and processes which shift the surroundings within which people interact. Such mechanisms can operate directly: for example, resource depletion or enhancement affects people capacity to engage in contentious politics.”¹⁹ Or they can operate through institutions; for example, when changing demographic patterns are channeled into pre-existing institutional processes they often render these processes less favorable to participants. In Mexico, the economic crisis of 1982 was a key environmental change in terms of the resources available to the authoritarian regime and, consequently, its capacity to maintain the union of the coalition that supported it decreased. During the 1980s, the PAN benefited from the alienation of some of the northern entrepreneurs who were affected by the nationalization of banks in 1982. The resources of these entrepreneurs would be central to the electoral success of the PAN in key cities such as Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua.

Finally, I will emphasize **the relational process of coalition building** of the political parties and how the party leadership develops links to different social groups. I will try to show how the political parties in Mexico have influenced the formation of different coalitions, which challenged the authoritarian regime at particular junctures. How these particular events are “solved,” affects the opportunity structure in which the opposition works until the next conjuncture. In the Mexican case, the presidential elections have been those junctures. Here, we will analyze them only from 1970 to 2012, but we could have analyzed previous presidential elections as a part of the process.²⁰

In the following section, I will analyze two main approaches to the process of democratization: the “structuralist” and the “elitist” schools. I will highlight their strengths and weaknesses, and I will propose a third approach: a political process model to help us to understand the democratization processes in Mexico.

THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

MOORE AND HIS FOLLOWERS: THE ‘STRUCTURALISTS’

In his classical work, “The social origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,” Barrington Moore Jr. developed what we can call a “structuralist” thesis of democratization. Moore argued that capitalist democracies in England, France, and the USA were the results “of violent

changes that took place in English, French and American societies on the way to becoming modern industrial democracies and that historians connect with the Puritan Revolution [...] the French Revolution, and the American Civil War.”²¹ The key element in the formation of the new regimes was the coalitions established through a long historical process in those societies. Thus,

[...] A key feature in such revolutions is the development of a group in society with an independent economic base, which attacks obstacles to a democratic version of capitalism that they have inherited from the past. Though a great deal of the impetus has come from trading and manufacturing classes in the cities that is very far from the whole story. The allies this bourgeois impetus has found, the enemies it has encountered, vary sharply from case to case. The landed upper classes, our main concern at the start, were either an important part of this capitalist and democratic tide, as in England, or if they opposed it, they were swept aside in the convulsions of the revolution or civil war. The same thing may be said about the peasants. And it was negligible either because capitalist advance destroyed peasant society or because this advance began in a new country, such as the United States, without a real peasantry.²²

In the case of England, “the landed interest to some extent engaged in a popularity contest with the bourgeoisie for mass support. After 1840, the landowning class found in the support of factory laws a convenient way of answering manufacturers’ attacks on the Corn Laws.”²³ The series of electoral reforms that would transform the competitive oligarchy of England into an inclusive polyarchy (using Dahl’s term)²⁴ were the result of these processes of social classes’ alliances and competition.

In France, it would be necessary for a social revolution led by the new bourgeoisie and supported by the peasantry to destroy the power of the landed aristocracy and the Monarchy. The French Revolution would establish a new Liberal democracy after a series of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements.

In the USA, the main battle was between two types of production, the industrial bourgeoisie of the North and the landed oligarchy of the South. If instead of a division between the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy, there was an alliance between the upper classes, and the State had a high degree of autonomy, such as in Germany or Japan, the result would be a fascist regime.

Moore's thesis has been subject to important criticism,²⁵ particularly for its Marxist overtone. However, there has been a revival of Moore's thesis exemplified by Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens's book.²⁶ For them,

The cross-national statistical analysis, which establishes a positive, though not perfect correlation between capitalist development and democracy, must stand as an accepted result [...] Any theory of democracy must come to terms with it. At the same time, such a correlation, no matter how often replicated, does not carry its own explanation. It does not identify the causal sequences accounting for the persistent relation, not to mention the reasons why many cases are at odds with it. Nor can it account for how the same end can be reached by different historical routes. The repeated statistical findings have a peculiar "black box" character that can be overcome only by theoretically well-grounded empirical analysis.²⁷

Rueschemeyer et al. have tried to fill the black box, arguing that "Democratization represents first and foremost an increase in political equality [...] the central proposition is that: it is power relations that most importantly determine whether democracy can emerge, stabilize, and then maintain itself even in the face of adverse conditions."²⁸

For Rueschemeyer et al., there are three power configurations that determine the emergence and stability of a democracy:

- (a) The balance of power among different classes and class coalitions;
- (b) The structure, strength, and autonomy of the state apparatus and its interrelations with civil society;
- (c) The impact of transnational power relations on both the balance of class power and on state-society relations.²⁹

Following Moore, Rueschemeyer et al. argue that

[...] large landlords engaged in "labor repressive" agriculture would be the most implacable opponents of democracy. However, contrary to Moore's theory, as well as that of Leninists and Liberal social scientists, they also expect the bourgeoisie to oppose suffrage extension to the working classes; as such a move posed a potential threat to their interests. On the contrary, the urban working class is expected to be the most frequent proponent of the full extension of democratic rights because this promised to include the class in the polity where it could further pursue its interests and because the working class, unlike other lower classes, had the capacity to organize itself. It is the capacity to organize and express its interests that differentiated the working class from the small peasantry [...] The middle classes

would favor their own inclusion, but would be ambivalent about further extensions of political rights perhaps swinging to one side or another on the basis of possible alliances.³⁰

In sum, their central hypothesis is that “capitalist development is associated with democracy because it transforms the class structure, strengthening the working and middle classes and weakening the landed upper class. It was not the capitalist market nor capitalists, as the new dominant force, but rather the contradictions of capitalism that advanced the cause of democracy.”³¹

Although I agree with the hypothesis about the importance of social coalitions to explain the emergence and sustainability of a democracy, I think it is necessary to analyze the role of the political parties as the brokers in the formation of these social coalitions. Otherwise we cannot understand cases like Mexico, where the leaders of the urban working class have long supported an authoritarian party like the PRI. According to Rueschemeyer et al., “Political parties emerged in a crucial role as mediators in both the installation and consolidation of democracy. Strong parties were necessary to mobilize pressures from subordinate classes for democratization, but if their programs were too radical, they stiffened resistance among the dominant classes against democracy. Once democracy was installed, the party system became crucial for protecting the interests of the dominant classes and thus keeping them from pursuing authoritarian alternatives.”³²

A key argument that I share with Rueschemeyer et al. is that democracy in Latin America has not followed a linear progression from oligarchic to restricted to mildly restricted regimes to democracy, but there have been reversals and skipping stages.³³ This could also be applied to other cases like Spain, where there were fast advances to democracy like the establishment of the Second Republic in 1931, but then a strong reaction that led to a civil war between 1936 and 1939 and the ensuing authoritarian regime of 1939–1975.

The authors of *Capitalist Development and Democracy* brought up a topic that Dankwart Rustow first developed; he argued that the only prerequisite for the emergence of a democratic polity was “national unity.”³⁴ “The greater difficulties in consolidating state power in Latin America compared to Europe explain at least part of the comparative scarcity of stable institutionalized elite contestation and gradual inclusion of non-elite sectors.”³⁵ However, in Mexico the highly institutionalized

authoritarian regime made it particularly difficult to institutionalize a process of real elite contestation.

In a recent volume inspired by Barrington Moore's *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy*, Theda Skocpol says that "Moore could have more effectively sustained his thesis about the contributions of the US Civil War to the emergence of modern American democracy if he had more carefully considered the organizational patterns and competitive electoral dynamics of US political parties in the late nineteenth century."³⁶ Following this idea, I argue that the process of political change in Mexico cannot be explained if we do not analyze these institutional aspects (the construction of political parties, particularly the political parties of the opposition, and their transformation into a democratic alternative to the authoritarian regimes) in the process of transition from authoritarianism. But before introducing the role of the political parties as a key link between the social structure and the elites in the transition, it is necessary to analyze the other main approach to democratization: the elitist school.

SCHUMPETER AND HIS FRIENDS: THE ELITISTS

Joseph Schumpeter developed the argument that democracy was mainly a competition among elites for the popular vote. Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe Schmitter later developed this idea of democracy as a mechanism in their model of procedural democracy. Thus, they talk of a "procedural minimum," which contemporary actors would agree upon as necessary elements of political democracy. Secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability, all seem to be elements of consensus in the contemporary world.³⁷ Until the 1970s there were very few countries that could fulfill such conditions.

However, in the late 1970s, Portugal, Greece, and Spain went through processes of transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes. In the middle of that transformation, a group of scholars decided to initiate a research program to understand these processes of change. That was the origin of the Woodrow Wilson Center group on democratization. As Adam Przeworski says, during the debates of the group there was a silence that he made evident, the abandonment of the structuralist thesis of Barrington Moore. According to Przeworski, none of the scholars in the meeting mentioned the most well-established theory of democratization: B. Moore's book. Why? His answer is that,

in addition to being scholars, the members of the WWC were activists interested in “stop the killing,” i.e., transform the authoritarian regimes into democratic ones.³⁸ Moore says that the construction of democracies involved long social processes in which there was little agency, very little possibilities of individual action. The social and state structures of each country determined the road that they would follow. That explained the silence on Moore and the structuralists. The revival of authoritarian regimes in the most developed countries of Latin America: Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile during the previous two decades, had discredited other structuralist theories, such as the modernization theory.

The revival of democracy in parts of the periphery like Greece, Portugal, and Spain, and eventually, the democratization processes of the Southern Cone countries in the 1980s refuted also the dependency theory of the 1970s. Consequently, on the right and the left, the structuralist theories became discredited.

Following Rustow’s seminal article, the WWC group of scholars developed a model of stages to explain the processes of transition from authoritarian rule. According to them, there were three consecutive stages: Liberalization, Transition, and Consolidation of Democracy. The model was not teleological because they considered the possibility of failure and the maintenance or strengthening of authoritarian regimes. But, as Bermeo has argued, the model was voluntarist and it overemphasized the indeterminacy of the process. The elitist model also built a myth of moderation, which Bermeo and my own analysis challenge.

O’ Donnell et al. say that “One premise of this way of conceptualizing the transition is that it is both possible and desirable that political democracy be attained without mobilized violence and dramatic discontinuity.”³⁹ As I will show in the book, in Mexico the process was not a velvet revolution, there was violence involved in the process and without the menace of more violence, we could not understand the willingness of the elites to accept the democratic process; democracy, according to D. Rustow, is basically the result of a compromise, a way of solving a struggle between different groups.

SOME CRITIQUES OF THE ELITIST MODEL

In his now classical review article, Bermeo calls for bringing parties back in. “[P]olitical party leaders are the key players in the transition gamble. They set the stakes; they work out the compromises, they act as the

forces for moderation that a successful transition process requires.”⁴⁰ O’Donnell and Schmitter see “parties, whether revived or emergent [...] to be not only, or not so much, agents of mobilization as instruments of social and political control.” I intend to show that the parties of the opposition were agents of mobilization in Mexico and that without such mobilization we could not understand the process of transition, its pace, and outcome. I would also like to emphasize the construction of identities encouraged by the political parties.

Bermeo addressed a series of important questions: “One thing we do know or should know by now is that center-right parties can play an especially important role in the transition process.” It is clear, she says, that center-right parties win a disproportionate share of the first elections in re-democratizing states; it happened in Italy, Greece, Spain, post-Nazi Germany, Austria, and even Hungary. In Asia, it was the center-right Liberal Party that won the founding election in Japan, and in South America virtually none of the enduring experiments in returning to democracy began with a national electoral victory for the left; the answer given by Rouquie is that “the military appear not to accept withdrawal unless the civil government that replaces them is similar to their own [...] or unless the elections produce a victory for their own candidate.”⁴¹

According to Bermeo, this answer leaves open the question of why a majority of citizens will vote for a center-right party in the first place. As I mentioned before, Bermeo sustains, as a possible explanation, that the experience of authoritarianism could affect the electorate, making it more moderate.

I propose an alternative hypothesis, that the center-right parties tend to have more resources than the center-left ones, i.e., it is not only a matter of values, but of mobilization of resources, particularly when the electoral process has started.

In a more recent article, Bermeo, after examining the cases of democratization in Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, South Korea, Peru, and the Philippines, sustains that “high levels of popular mobilization do not inevitably sidetrack the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule [...] Moderation is not a prerequisite for the construction of a democracy; [...] In many cases, democratization seems to have proceeded alongside weighty and even bloody popular challenges.”⁴²

Bermeo centers her explanation on why, in some cases such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Peru, there was extremism and this did not lead

to the destruction of democracy on the perceptions of “pivotal elites.” (Table 2.1).

I consider that in addition to looking at the “elite’s perceptions,” it is necessary to bring in the perceptions of challengers and even more important, their capabilities. Following Tilly, we should look at the level of WUNC⁴³ (worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment) of the opposition, i.e., “how worthy, unified, numerous and committed the opposition is.” As Tilly says, “each of these elements compensates one another to some degree; for example, a high value of worthiness (‘respectability’ in the language of 1829) can make up for small numbers. Yet a visible low value on any one of these elements (a public demonstration of unworthiness, division, dwindling numbers, and/or outright defection) discredits the whole movement.”⁴⁴

In our case, I also show the continuous process of mobilization of different sectors, workers, students, and political parties. The history of the democratization processes in Mexico is certainly not linear. At the empirical level, I maintain that a high level of contestation-mobilization preceded the Mexican transition. In order to study these long processes of contestation-mobilization, I propose to follow a political process model in the following section.

We have seen that both the structuralist and the elitist models of democratization have flaws. The structuralists overdetermine the process of democratization, while the elitists make it look like a simple agreement among elites without considering the weight of the past and the history of the actors. That is why I consider it necessary to use a political process model to analyze the democratization process in Mexico. Before

Table 2.1 Elite Forecasts of the effects of extremism and the resulting scenarios for transitions to democracy

<i>Scenario</i>	<i>If pivotal elites forecast</i>	<i>They</i>	<i>Because they see democracy as</i>	<i>As happened in</i>
I	Extremist victory	Will reject democracy	An intolerable threat	China, 1989
II	Extremist defeat	May accept democracy	A means of escape	Peru, 1977 Greece, 1975
III	Extremist defeat and their own victory	May accept democracy	A form of legitimization	Portugal, 1974 Spain, 1976

Source Nancy Bermeo, *Myths of Moderation*..., p. 317

developing the model, I will discuss briefly the current debate on democratization.

THE CURRENT DEBATE ON DEMOCRATIZATION

In "Contention & Democracy in Europe,"⁴⁵ Tilly has distinguished four styles of arguments in recent attempts to explain democratization and de-democratization: necessary and sufficient conditions (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens),⁴⁶ variables (Huntington),⁴⁷ sequences (Linz and Stepan,⁴⁸ Sorensen,⁴⁹ Diamond⁵⁰) and clusters (Geddes,⁵¹ Collier,⁵² Markoff,⁵³ Bratton, and van de Walle⁵⁴). The political process model of democratization that I will develop in the following section borrows from the necessary conditions and cluster type of arguments. I agree with Collier in that "Democracy is an outcome of the struggle between the dominant and subordinate classes and hence an outcome of the balance of class power."⁵⁵ However, in contrast with Collier, I consider that the democratic struggle involves the construction of coalitions and political parties, and it is not only a struggle of classes in the Marxist sense. Members of the same class could be a part of the authoritarian or the democratic coalitions. As we will see, when we analyze the workers' and students' movements in Mexico, in several moments, the history of contention and the struggle for democracy took place inside the working class.⁵⁶ The success of democracy in Mexico and in other countries such as Spain and Chile involved the construction of broad coalitions that included not only the working classes, but important sectors of the middle classes too.

Recently, Nancy Bermeo has contrasted two competing visions of how ordinary people behave in the drama of democracy's construction and consolidation:

In one vision, ordinary people seem heroic. Either as single actors challenging dictatorship through individual acts of resistance or as members of associations nurturing democracy in civil society, common citizens appear in some of our literature as democracy's salvation. In a second set of works, ordinary people seem much less noble. As members of groups, they can demand too much democracy and erode its capacity to perform and survive.⁵⁷

After analyzing 20 cases, including every democracy that collapsed in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution in interwar Europe, the breakdown of democracy in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina and three democracies that avoided breakdown despite serious economic and political challenges, Bermeo concludes that: “the culpability for democracy’s demise lay overwhelmingly with political elites [...] The histories recounted here are replete with examples of monarchies, militaries, and long-established political parties that toppled democracies by leaning too far to the Right. Ordinary people sometimes threw democracies off balance too, but only rarely with their votes.”⁵⁸


Bermeo’s book tells us compelling stories about why democracies fail, and I agree with her argument that political and, more important, military elites are key actors in those breakdowns. However, the questions of how democracies emerge and the role of “ordinary” people in that process have not been fully answered. This book, using Mexico as a case study, will try to partially explain that process. Of course from one case I do not pretend to develop a general theory of democratization, but I think I can illustrate the process of construction of democratic institutions through the several struggles led by workers, students, and political parties.

A POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL AND THE BUILDING OF A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

Both structuralist and elitist theories of democratization have a tendency to ignore the fact that building a democracy is a political process. For some of the structuralists, like the followers of the modernization theory, political culture, and dependency theory, democracy is a byproduct of the economic system or the cultural system of a specific society.

Schematically the causal mechanisms would look as shown in Fig. 2.1.

As Doug MacAdam argues on social movements, the difference between political process models and structuralist models, such as the modernization theory is that: For classical theorists, the relationship between insurgency and socioeconomic processes is direct, i.e., “with industrialization/urbanization generating a level of strain sufficient to trigger social protest... In contrast, the political process model is based on the idea that social processes, such as industrialization, promote insurgency only indirectly through a restructuring of existing power relations.”⁵⁹

(a) *Modernization theory***(b)** *Political Culture theories*

Broad socioeconomic processes → Literacy → New political culture → Democracy

For the elitists, democracy, as Tilly has argued, would be like a garden built by political elites that reach an agreement: the famous pacts to establish a procedural democracy.

(c) *Elitist theories*

Conflict → → → Elites → → → Pacts → → → Democracy

In contrast with the previous three models, here, following the literature on political process and social movements, I will use a political process model to explain the emergence of the opposition in an authoritarian regime and the democratization process. The caricature of our model would look like this:


(d) *Political process model*

Fig. 2.1 Four causal models

I consider democratization as a type of insurgency. It is puzzling that the dialogue between social movement theories and the literature on democratization has not been more vigorous. Most of the literature about transitions rarely mentions the literature on social movements and vice versa. I hope that this book helps to solve that lack of communication.

McAdam argues that “the political process model identifies three sets of factors that are believed to be crucial in the generation of social insurgency. The first is the level of organization within the aggrieved population; the second, the collective assessment of the prospects for successful insurgency within the same population; and the third, the political alignment of groups within the larger political environment.”⁶⁰

Following McAdam, I will use the structure of political opportunities and the organizational strength of the political parties of the opposition as the two central explanatory variables. Both sets of factors help to explain not only the “success” or “failure” of the democratization process, but also the length of the process.

STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

In their seminal critical review article to Robert Dahl’s *Who Governs?* Morton S. Baratz and Peter Bachrach, following Schattschneider, argue that “all forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.”⁶¹

The structure of political opportunities is “the particular set of power relationships that define the political environment at any point in time.”⁶² However, this structure is not immutable. As Tilly, MacAdam, and others say, there are several events that are disruptive to the political structure, such as wars, industrialization, depression, migration, political realignments, and sociodemographic changes. We can think of the democratization process as the transformation of the structure of political opportunities in a society. In order to achieve that transformation, I sustain that it is necessary to construct political parties capable of “converting” the grievances of the population under an authoritarian regime into a democratic alternative. Following Przeworski, it is not enough for a regime to lose its legitimacy to rule; in order to have a transition,

it is necessary to build an alternative. This leads us to our second set of factors: the “organizational strength of the opposition.”

ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSITION AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES

MacAdam divided the organizational strength of a social movement into “the members, the established structure of incentives to solidarity, the communications network, and the leaders.” I want to use these categories of the organizational strength to analyze the construction of the political opposition parties in Mexico.

As Katz and Gurin have argued, an aggrieved population will not start a social movement unless it has the resources that enable the group to use a particular opportunity structure, i.e., “To generate a social movement the aggrieved population must be able to ‘convert’ a favorable ‘structure of political opportunities’ into an organized campaign of social protest.”⁶³ Following McAdam, the existence of networks and organizations conditions this “conversion.” Four elements constitute the organizational strength of a group: the members, the established structure of incentives to solidarity, communication networks, and the leaders. These elements have been used for the analysis of social movements, but I think they are useful for the analysis of political parties.

“Bloc recruitment” is another type of party recruitment, the trade unions and the student movements in Mexico are characteristic of this type of building a social base. According to Oberschall, “mobilization does not occur through recruitment of large numbers of isolated and solitary individuals. It occurs as a result of recruiting blocs of people who are already highly organized and participant.”⁶⁴ In the empirical chapters, I will analyze the types of recruitment and the process of party building in Mexico.

STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVES TO SOLIDARITY

In his classical study “The logic of collective action,” Mancur Olson posed the “free-rider problem” for any organization interested in achieving a collective good. His answer to the problem was that either there were selective incentives or there were leaders who assumed the original cost of establishing the organization. Another explanation is the existence of a “structure of solidarity incentives,” “interpersonal rewards that

provide the motivating force for participation in insurgent groups.”⁶⁵ Without these structures of solidarity incentives, it would be very difficult to explain the participation of hundreds of people who literally sacrificed their personal lives for a cause.

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

The establishment of a communications network is one of the central tasks of any emerging political party, this is also known by the government and it is a reason why the first thing any dictatorship tries to do is to break the lines of communication between the members of the opposition. A key element in the history of the opposition in Mexico is the construction and destruction of networks of communication; party journals like *El Machete* in Mexico reflect this history. According to McAdam, “the inter-organizational links characteristic of established groups facilitates movement emergence by providing the means of communication by which the movement, as a new cultural item, can be disseminated throughout the aggrieved population.”⁶⁶

The authoritarian governments in Mexico, knowing the power of the mass media, tried to maintain a strict control of the media. One of the key demands of the opposition was the opening up of the press and the media in general. There were timid processes of liberalization of the press in the early 1970s in Mexico, but the authoritarian elites stopped that liberalization when they considered it had gone too far, the example during Echeverría’s presidency, the repression against Julio Scherer at *Excelsior*, is emblematic of the problem.

LEADERS OR POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS

In his appendix to the “Logic of Collective Action,” Olson accepts Richard Wagner, Oran Young, Norman Frohlich, and Joe Oppenheimer’s arguments about the importance of “political entrepreneurs” to explain collective action. “They all emphasize the role of the entrepreneur or leader who helps to organize efforts to provide the collective good and tend to call him/her a “political entrepreneur.”⁶⁷ For Olson “The successful entrepreneur in the large group case is above all an innovator with selective incentives.”⁶⁸ In established democracies, there are some selective incentives, but in the previous stage, the leaders really have very little selective incentives. I think that during

the “resistance” period, the leaders actually work mainly through the solidarity structure built around common experiences, there are common goals and identities built through a complex process of socialization in the *lucha* (struggle) that are certainly more important than the selective incentives. Most of the leaders of the opposition and their families had to carry the burden of the organizational work during the authoritarian periods; without these solidarity structures, it is very difficult to explain the construction of the democratic alternatives.

The opportunity structure and the four elements of the organizational strength: members, established structure of solidarity incentives, communication network and leaders, are the key variables that I will analyze, in order to explain under what conditions parties of the opposition become a viable alternative to the authoritarian regimes in Mexico.

In sum, the general argument of the book is the following: (1) That in Mexico, workers, student movements, and the political parties of the opposition played crucial parts as brokers in the democratic transitions. Without the history of mobilization of these actors, we could neither understand the acceptance of electoral processes by the governing elite, nor the transformation of elections without a choice into real electoral contests where parties lose elections. (2) That parties, workers, and student movements in Mexico (operating through a number of members, solidarity incentives, communication networks, and leaders) shaped both the organizational strength and the WUNC of the opposition to threaten an authoritarian regime. (3) That the opposition party’s brokerage attaching—or failing to attach—various segments of the population is key to understanding their strength and affects the possibilities of establishing democratic regimes. (4) That the superior resources of center-right parties in Mexico *vis-à-vis* Left-wing parties are a key variable to explain their pivotal role in the transitions and to understand the electoral results of the first competitive elections in Mexico. (5) The presidential elections have been, in the Mexican case, those crucial junctures where we can analyze the whole process. In order to study these elections, in the following pages I will develop a typology.

A TYPOLOGY OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

In his classical paper “A Theory of Critical Elections,” V.O. Key Jr. defined a critical election as “a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties.”⁶⁹ Gerald Pomper, following Key and Angus Campbell

Table 2.2 Types of presidential elections, majority party’s electoral result

		<i>Victory</i>	<i>Defeat</i>
Electorate Cleavage	Continuity Change	“Maintaining” “Converting”	“Deviating” “Realigning”

Source G. Pomper, *op. cit.*, p. 538


et al. (1960), proposed a classification of presidential elections on the basis of the electorate’s situation and the results of the majority party (Table 2.2).

In *critical* elections, the majority party is defeated and there are significant changes in the electoral cleavages. On the contrary, *maintaining* elections are characterized by a new victory of the ruling party together with continuity in electoral cleavages and, therefore, in the party’s base of support. In *deviating* elections, even if the governing party is defeated, this is not due to a change in electoral cleavages. Finally, in *converting* presidential elections, the majority party wins, but there are significant changes in the situation of the electorate.

To classify Mexican elections, I performed two statistical computations: first, I related the electoral results of each presidential election by state to the results of the last election; second, I correlated the electoral result of the ruling party with the average votes it obtained in the last three presidential elections, a variable I called “traditional” presidential vote.

STUDY OF CONSECUTIVE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

I used the percentage of votes that the PRI obtained in the presidential election in each state of the Mexican Republic between 1964 and 2012 so as to create the database. Every election is a variable and the percentage obtained by the PRI in each state is an observation of that variable. Every election (variable) was correlated to the preceding variable. The correlation coefficients capture the degree of association in the geographical distribution of the votes for each pair of elections, and they indicate the degree of electoral continuity or change. Irrespective of whether the ruling party won or lost the election, a high correlation coefficient reveals continuity in the electorate base of the ruling party,



Graph 2.1 Correlations of consecutive presidential elections, 1964–2012. *Note* Graphed from 1970 onwards. *Source* Prepared by the author


whereas a low correlation coefficient indicates shifts in the electorate's preferences. Graph 2.1 summarizes the results obtained.

The spikes in the graph show moments when support for the PRI was strongly related to its support in the last presidential election. According to our data, it is clear that change started in the 1988 presidential election, accelerated in 1994, and more so in 2000. The increase in the correlation coefficient for 2006 shows the continuity of the electoral supports for the PRI at the state level during 2000–2006. Even when Roberto Madrazo, the PRI candidate, ranked third in the presidential contest, its constituency at the state level did not change dramatically. The sharp decrease in the correlation coefficient in 2012 suggests a new realignment that might account for the victory of the PRI in 2012.

CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VOTE FOR THE PRI
AND ITS “TRADITIONAL” VOTE

To corroborate the results, I performed a second statistical computation, by correlating the average vote for the PRI in three presidential elections (variable I, named “traditional” vote) with the outcomes by states in the following presidential election. The results are shown in Graph 2.2.

Here, the pattern is similar to that in Graph 2.1. The elections from 1970 to 1982 can be classified as a maintenance of the PRI hegemony. In 1988, a period of changes began in the electorate: Even if the official results gave the victory to the PRI, we can speak of a “conversion” election. This conversion deepened in 1994 and finally led to a critical election in 2000, that is to say a realignment, reflected in the triumph of the opposition. In the 2006 election, even if the PRI became the third political force, the geographical distribution of its support is similar to that in 2000, which explains a relatively high correlation coefficient (0.68). In terms of the typology suggested, the presidential elections between 1970 and 2012 can be grouped as given in Table 2.3.



Graph 2.2 Relation between the percentage of votes and the “traditional” vote for the PRI in presidential elections. *Note* Graphed from 1970 onwards. *Source* Prepared by the author

Table 2.3 Typology of presidential elections in Mexico Majority Party's electoral result

		<i>Victory</i>	<i>Defeat</i>
Electoral	Continuity	"Maintaining" 1970, 1976, 1982	"Deviating"
Cleavage	Change	"Converting" 1988, 1994, 2006	"Realigning" 2000, 2012

Source Prepared by the author

The 2006 election is a complicated case, to which I will return in Chap. 3, but here I will classify it as a converting election. By going beyond particular elections, it might be possible to distinguish periods or stages of political stability and instability. For this, I built a chart with correlation coefficients between elections from 1958 to 2012; this allows us to distinguish four stages or periods: (1) from hegemony to crisis (1970–1982); (2) from fracture of the hegemony to limited pluralism (1988–1994); (3) alternation and pluralism (2000–2006), and (4) a new realignment and possible reconstruction of hegemony (2012) (Table 2.4).

Between 1970 and 1982, there is a clear vote coalition for the PRI. Each election from this period is correlated to the consecutive one with coefficients ranging from 0.5 to 0.8. In 1988, the correlation level decreases to a range of 0.3–0.7, which is a sign of a converting election. This process, first of conversion and then of realignment, will be clear in the 1994 and 2000 elections. The figures indicate a substantive change in the sources of support for the PRI over the next period. The correlation index between the 1988 and the 1994 elections decreased to 0.34, and in the critical election of 2000 it is even lower, 0.27. The year 2006 represents a new stage, and the correlation index goes up again to 0.63. In the presidential election of 2012, there was a new realignment with a decrease in the correlation coefficient of 0.295. In the following pages, I will link the process of democratization and the presidential elections in Mexico.

Using as a template our previous theoretical analysis, in the following chapters we will examine the transformation of the Mexican political system from a hegemonic party system into a moderate pluralist one.

Table 2.4 Correlations of the vote for the PRI in presidential elections, 1958–2012

		<i>PRI64</i>	<i>PRI70</i>	<i>PRI76</i>	<i>PRI82</i>	<i>PRI88</i>	<i>PRI94</i>	<i>PRI00</i>	<i>PRI06</i>	<i>PRI12</i>
PRI58	Pearson's correlation	0.687 ^a	0.585 ^a	0.429 ^b	0.511 ^a	0.305	-0.067	0.178	0.090	-0.071
	Sig. (bilateral)	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.003	0.089	0.715	0.331	0.624	0.699
PRI64	Pearson's correlation		0.851 ^a	0.541 ^a	0.637 ^a	0.512 ^a	0.043	0.352 ^b	0.310	-0.140
	Sig. (bilateral)		0.000	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.815	0.048	0.084	0.445
PRI70	Pearson's correlation			0.735 ^a	0.818 ^a	0.610 ^a	0.210	0.294	0.371 ^b	0.024
	Sig. (bilateral)			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.248	0.103	0.037	0.897
PRI76	Pearson's correlation				0.740 ^a	0.540 ^a	0.306	0.349	0.410 ^b	0.348
	Sig. (bilateral)				0.000	0.001	0.088	0.050	0.020	0.051
PRI82	Pearson's correlation					0.700 ^a	0.366 ^b	0.377 ^b	0.550 ^a	0.043
	Sig. (bilateral)					0.000	0.039	0.033	0.001	0.817
PRI88	Pearson's correlation						0.343	0.519 ^a	0.604 ^a	-0.020
	Sig. (bilateral)						0.055	0.002	0.000	0.914
PRI94	Pearson's correlation							0.279	0.271	0.391 ^b
	Sig. (bilateral)							0.122	0.133	0.027
PRI00	Pearson's correlation								0.638 ^a	0.456 ^a
	Sig. (bilateral)								0.000	0.009
PRI06	Pearson's correlation									0.295
	Sig. (bilateral)									0.101

Source Prepared by the author with data from IFE, www.ife.org.mx, and from Silvia Gómez Tagle (1997)

^aThe correlation is significant at the 0.01 level

^bThe correlation is significant at the 0.05 level

NOTES

1. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 78–79 (McAdam et al. 2001).
2. Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 14 (Tilly 2004).
3. I will use Richard Rose's typology of alternative paths to democracy (see p. 43), but there are others typologies like the one developed by Alfred Stepan, "Paths Towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Guillermo O' Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, P. and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 64–84.
4. The thesis that democracy is the outcome of struggle can be traced to Karl Marx. More recently, this thesis has been developed by Barrington Moore, Dankwart Rustow and Charles Tilly. This book is built on their work.
5. Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking regime change," *Comparative Politics* 22, no. 3 (1990): 371 (Bermeo 1990).
6. As we have known since Tocqueville, one of the shortest routes to a tyrannical and despotic regime is the destruction of the intermediate groups that mediate between the state and the citizens. An atomized society cannot guarantee protection from the arbitrary action of the state. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1945) and Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York: Anchor Books-Doubleday, c1955) (De Tocqueville 1945, 1955).
7. As Charles Tilly has argued during the formation of the democratic regimes in 19th century Europe limited but fairly resilient democratic institutions emerged in a number of countries before mass-based parties formed. However, the European experience is a clear example of the importance of political parties in order to develop robust democracies. Charles Tilly, *European Revolutions, 1492–1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); and "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere," in *Citizenship, Identity, and Social History*, ed. Charles Tilly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) (Tilly 1993, 1995).
8. Joseph Lapalombara and Jeffrey Anderson, "Political Parties," in *Encyclopedia of government and politics*, vol. I, ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Morice Kogan (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 394 (Lapalombara and Anderson 1992).

9. For an analysis of the political parties as institutions of public interest vs. private gain see: Ibid., p. 394.
10. Robert T. McKenzie, *British political parties, the distribution of power within the Conservative and Labour parties* (London: Heinmann, 1963), quoted in: Joseph Lapalombara and Jeffrey Anderson, *op. cit.*, 399 (McKenzie 1963).
11. Giovanni Sartori, "The sociology of parties: a critical review," in *The West European Party System*, ed. Peter Mair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 174 (Sartori 1990).
12. Martin Shefter, *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5 (Shefter 1994).
13. Ibid., p. 5
14. Ibid., p. 5
15. Ibid., p. 11.
16. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 25.
17. Ibid., p.26.
18. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (1970): 350–351 (Rustow 1970).
19. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *op. cit.*, 25.
20. Other authors have analyzed some of those critical junctures, for example: John Skirius, *José Vasconcelos y la cruzada de 1929* (México: Siglo XXI, 1978) or Elisa Servín, *Ruptura y oposición. El movimiento henriquista, 1945–1954* (México: Cal y Arena, 2001) (Skirius 1978; Servín 2001).
21. Barrington Moore Jr., *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), XXI (Moore Jr. 1966).
22. Ibid., 21.
23. Ibid., 35.
24. Robert Dahl, *Poliarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 7–8 (Dahl 1971).
25. Theda Skocpol, "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," *Politics and Society* 4, no. 1 (Fall 1973): 1–34 (Skocpol 1973).
26. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist development and democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).
27. Ibid., 4.
28. Ibid., 5.
29. Ibid., 5.
30. Ibid., 6.
31. Ibid., 7.

32. Ibid., 9.
33. Ibid., 158.
34. Dankwart Rustow, *op. cit.*, 350–352.
35. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, *op. cit.*, 163.
36. Theda Skocpol, ed., *Democracy, Revolution and History* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 11 (Skocpol 1998).
37. Guillermo O’ Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 8 (O’ Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
38. Adam Przeworski, “Studying democratization: twenty years later,” (New York: New York University, Mimeo, 1996) (Przeworski 1996).
39. O’ Donnell and Schmitter, *op. cit.*, 11.
40. Nancy Bermeo, “Rethinking regime change”, 369.
41. Ibid., 371.
42. Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions,” *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (April, 1997): 315 (Bermeo 1997).
43. Tilly uses the acronym WUNC to analyze social movements, but I think worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment are central aspects to study the institutional construction of any opposition political party, and key variables to explain their capacity to become viable alternatives to the authoritarian regimes.
44. Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 213 (Tilly 1998).
45. Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe 1650–2000*.
46. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*.
47. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) (Huntington 1991).
48. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) (Linz and Stepan 1996).
49. Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospect in a Changing World* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998) (Sorensen 1998).
50. Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) (Diamond 1999).
51. Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?,” *Annual Review Of Political Science* 2 (1999): 115–144 (1999).

52. Ruth Berins Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) (Collier 1999).
53. John Markoff, *Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Grove Press) (Markoff 1996).
54. Michael Bratton, and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).
55. Collier, *op. cit.*, 10.
56. See Chap. 3.
57. Nancy Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, c2003) (Bermeo 2003).
58. Nancy Bermeo, *op. cit.*, 221.
59. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 41 (McAdam 1982).
60. *Ibid.*, 40.
61. E. E. Schattschneider, *The semisovereign people* (Hinsdale, ILL: Dyden Press, 1960), 71 (Schattschneider 1960).
62. McAdam, *op. cit.*, 40.
63. *Ibid.*, 44.
64. Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 125 (Oberschall 1973).
65. MacAdam, *op. cit.*, 45.
66. McAdam, *op. cit.*, 47.
67. Mancur Olson. *The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 175 (Olson 1965).
68. *Ibid.*, 177.
69. V.O. Key, *op. cit.*, 16.

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