

## A Theoretical Overview of Democracy

### 2.1 DEMOCRACY: ITS USES, UNDERSTANDING, AND MEANINGS

Since Ancient Greece where the word was first coined, the term ‘democracy’ has been used to designate one of the various forms of government. It also describes and explains one of the ways in which legitimate political power can be exercised in a society. In particular, it designates that form of government in which people exercise their political power<sup>1</sup> using their free will by a method of election, or selection based on the consensus of the majority.

In the history of political theory, discussion of the characteristics, the merits, and the defects of democracy are found in the theory and typology of governmental forms. Consequently, no accurate account of democracy can avoid stating the relationship between it and other forms of government. This is because only in this way can its specific and unique characteristics be analysed, described, and appreciated.

Similarly, the concept of democracy belonged to a system of concepts constituting the theory of governmental forms so that it can only be understood in relation to those concepts of the system which it helped to define, and is itself defined.<sup>2</sup> It should be recalled that the early 1990s witnessed both the emergence of the ostensible ‘good-governance’ agenda and the return of multi-party democracy to the continent of Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.<sup>3</sup>

Despite this simultaneity, however, conventional explanations of democratization assign relatively little causal importance to the new

development paradigm. The good-government agenda may have placed democracy at the heart of development discourse. These explanations may affirm, but the real momentum for democratization is nevertheless seen as internal to Africa; external factors are regarded as only inspirational and supportive.<sup>4</sup>

Hence, the introduction to a collection of case studies of democratization claimed in no uncertain terms that the global political environment served merely to make 'things marginally less difficult for those in Africa seeking to democratise their political systems, and marginally more difficult for those who sought to prevent them from doing so'.<sup>5</sup>

According to Bobbio (1998), a division of approaches to the concept of democracy can be made by placing it in the larger conceptual network of the theory of governmental forms, and noting the various uses to which this has been put at different times and by different authors and scholars.<sup>6</sup> These three usages exist with respect to the conception of the term 'democracy': the descriptive (or systematic), the evaluative, and the historical usage.

To explain this further, in its descriptive or systematic use, it is a theory of governmental form consisting of the classification and typology of historically existing forms of government carried out, based on shared and distinct characteristics. This is similar to the operation in botany which classifies plants, and in zoology which classifies animals.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly, in the evaluative use of the term, it is a theory of governmental form that consists of a series of value judgements in which different constitutions are not simply compared to each other. They are ranked and judged as good or bad. One is considered as exceptional, while the other is described as appalling.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, it is possible to speak of a historical use of the theory of governmental forms when it serves not only to recommend one over another, but also to describe the different stages of historical development as a series of necessary transitions from one form to another.

It is worthy of mention that for a system of governance to be classified as democratic, it must satisfy the underlying principles of the various concepts on which the term 'democracy' is based and practised. This is evidenced in many Western societies, where the present form of democratic practice was initially exported to various parts of Africa following their independence. The words 'based' and 'practised' as used in this context refer to the minimum standards of freedom and participation accepted or conferred by a democratic state on her citizens. It is

relevant when making reference to various forms of freedom and rights conferred on citizens of democratic societies in the West, from where the system was exported to Africa. These are used as our standard for comparison throughout the discussion. Those countries that are referred to in the discussion include the UK, the USA, France, Italy, Sweden, and Germany.

It is important to mention also that while most of the earlier scholarships have discussed the implications of transnational law and globalization on dispute resolution at the international and interregional levels, none has actually theorized their implications on the stability of democratic governance in a country of Nigeria's heterogeneity, size, and plurality.

To buttress this further, Wheatley (2005)<sup>9</sup> argued that the international community has recognized the rights of peoples belonging to minorities to cultural security, and the collective rights of peoples to self-determination. However, it has failed to define the relevant beneficiaries of the rights or to detail the circumstances in which measures to protect and promote cultural security should be introduced, or territorial self-government regimes established.

Democracy, both as an organizational system and as a way of life, is constantly evolving. It is not static. It has developed and changed over the years in both form and purpose. Modern democracy has undergone various changes and developments from the traditional Greek experience in Athens. It has passed from the ideas and institutions of Medieval Europe (i.e. the concept of divine natural and customary laws as a restraint on the exercise of power, while the community is the source of all political authority),<sup>10</sup> to the practice of the European kings in the Middle Ages (i.e. the consultations with different 'estates' or interest groups, and the approval of their policies).<sup>11</sup> The system is visible from the impacts of the Enlightenment period, and of the American and French Evangelical Inspirations (i.e. religious thoughts are the source of the fundamental principles upon which the democratic order was built).<sup>12</sup>

Conversely, due to these metamorphoses, it would be difficult for the modern practitioner to consider the 'Athenian style of democracy' as a democratic system. Similarly, the Athenian citizen would surely contend that 'modern democracy' is not, after all, 'democratic' as claimed. Moreover, the word 'democracy' has become trite through consistent

and persistent loose usage. It has, hence, become both a domestic and commonplace term.

It can be rightly said that since Herodotus first coined the word *demokratia* some 2400 years back, the term ‘democracy’ has acquired wide-ranging meanings referring, as it has, to a very different historical setting as well as to very different ideas.<sup>13</sup> Thus, both its denotative and connotative uses have changed with the passing of time. Therefore, in the current era, not all scholars and writers agree on the meaning, form, and substance of the term.

Indeed, human rights are part of the essential sub-structural aspect of democracy in any modern society. The conception of democracy one has in mind here is the ‘integrative democracy model’ which appeals to an ideal equal membership in a political community. According to Lijphart (1977),<sup>14</sup> integrative democracy is possible in multi-ethnic societies, and in states such as Nigeria where ethnicity is not an inescapable aspect of politics. It is possible in these societies, as well as in others with similar characteristics, as well as where joint institutions can be structured to encourage moderation and cooperation amongst the different ethnic groups.

Horowitz (1990)<sup>15</sup> identified four common characteristics of the integrative democracy model. These are a presidential system, a semi-majoritarian electoral system, ethnically blind public policies, and a non-communal federal structure. However, it has to be stated that no state has yet to simultaneously employ all aspects of the integrative democratic system proposed by Horowitz. One reason for this could be a lack of empirical examples of the system at work. In addition, there is a questionable assumption that politicians, policymakers, and voters would respond to incentives for moderation.

## 2.2 TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

In the current human rights discourse, democracy and human rights appear as Siamese twins. They seem not only to presuppose each other, but they are genuinely intertwined<sup>16</sup> and quite inseparable. Maluwa (1997) argued that the two concepts should not be supposed to be merely synonymous. To a certain extent, it should be recognized that

there might be tensions between majority decision-making and certain specific human rights.

However, depending on the definition of the two concepts one chooses, it is possible to view human rights as a limitation upon democracy, or as an inherent contemporary of democracy, even though an appeal to human rights can be regarded as a limitation on democracy, especially in contexts in which arguments about human rights are underpinned by an appeal to the principle of the rule of law. Such an equation is often easily made amongst exponents of liberal democracy.

Arguments for the transnational protection of human rights are based on the concept that every nation has an obligation to respect the human rights of its citizens. The international community<sup>17</sup> has a right as well to protest if these obligations are not met. Transnational human rights law consists of the body of international rules, procedures, and institutions developed to implement this concept and to promote respect for all human rights everywhere.

However, since transnational law is generally only applicable to states and does not normally create rights directly enforceable by individuals in national courts, international human rights laws can, in practice, be made effective only if each nation makes these rules part of its own domestic legal system through entrenchment in the national constitution.<sup>18</sup> For instance, in the UK the Human Rights Act of 1998, which further gave effect to the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights, did not come into effect until the 2 October 2000 when it was passed by Parliament.

Scholars have defined human rights as those rights held by all individuals due merely to being humans, which are devoid of status or position. Furthermore, they are neither privileges granted by the state nor contingent, but they are entitlements enforceable against the state.<sup>19</sup> Speaking broadly, they are any basic right or freedom to which all humans are entitled, and with the exercise of which no government may interfere. These include, among others, the rights to life and liberty, freedom of thought and expression, as well as equality before the law. Universal human rights are recognition of the need for the protection of all individuals against the all-pervasive powers of the modern state, recognizing that this need is valid all over the world, both in developed and less developed countries.<sup>20</sup>

The way in which humans see ourselves from one epoch to another changes greatly, particularly with respect to our sense of rights and

entitlements. Traditional democracies—such as liberal democracy and its social democratic variant—have held sway on this for a long while. This is so much so that liberal democracy in particular has come to be treated as universally valid and perhaps eternal. Yet, the emergence of the concept of neo-liberalism is indicative of the need to revise classical notions of liberal democracy.

For instance, while liberal democracy upholds the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, it does not address the question of social equity. This is referred to the fair, just, and equitable management of all institutions serving the public directly or by contract: the fair, just, and equitable distribution of public services, implementation of public policy, and the commitment to promote fairness, justice, and equity in the formation of public policy.

Accordingly, it is unable to deal with some of the major issues that have come to haunt contemporary society. These include issues such as an increase in poverty globally, and intolerable social injustice within and amongst nations, even in developed and industrialized nations. Indeed, it is handicapped because the theory of *laissez-faire* on which it is founded, obliged it to accept such phenomena as poverty and social inequality amongst citizens and nations as a natural outcome of the right of the individual to choose.<sup>21</sup>

Philosophically, it is precisely this phenomenon that is being challenged in a world in which the fates of individuals and nations are determined by pre-existing economic and power structures, which are rigidly maintained by the privileged. This has reached a point where the powerful nations believe that they have the moral right to use force nationally and internationally in the name of ‘law and order’, or in defence of liberal democracy, or ‘Western values’, as evidenced in the various crisis zones across the world.

According to Franck,<sup>22</sup> the entitlement to democracy in international law has gone through both normative and customary evolutions. It has evolved both as a system of rules and as the practice of states and organizations. This evolution occurred in three phases.

First was the normative entitlement to self-determination, then came the normative entitlement to free expression as a human right, and now we see the emergence of a normative entitlement to a participatory electoral process. The democratic entitlement, despite its newness, already enjoys a high degree of legitimacy derived from various texts and from

the practice of global and regional organizations, supplemented by that of a significant number of non-governmental organizations.

These texts and practices have attained a surprising degree of specificity, given the newness of the entitlement, and especially from its requirement of free and open elections. It is easy to deconstruct this now commonly used a set of textual formulations and the accompanying practice. These terms (e.g. elections, free, fair) inevitably convey different meanings in various political cultures.

However, remarkably, they evoke an amply demonstrable degree of convergent expectations. They interweave socio-cultural and political boundaries. The entitlement is now enduring, such that it is understood to be celebrated almost everywhere. This is not only because it portends a new global political culture supported by common rules and communitarian implementing institutions, but also because it opens the stagnant political economies of states to economic, social, and cultural, as well as political development.

As the heads of the European Community of states and governments pointed out in the group's conclusions of June 1991, 'Suppression of individual freedoms impede(s) an individual from participating in, and contributing to the process of development'.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, four broad justifications for democratization as a concern of transnational law are identified. These do not simply repeat pro-democratic arguments found in political history.

1. There is a perceived connection between competitive multi-party elections and the range of other internationally protected human rights, for reasons of Cold War politics, which relate primarily to the impossibility of agreement that free-and-fair elections were a human right on a par with core norms such as the right not to endure torture. These two categories have been consistently described in discrete terms: democracy and human rights. Nonetheless, international organizations increasingly assert that a commitment to the principles of choice, transparency, and pluralism that mark political democracy is essential to securing an institutionalized protection of other human rights.<sup>24</sup>
2. Democratization was indeed regarded as a means of preventing internal armed conflicts, which in the 1990s were unrivalled as the leading form of deadly strife. Democratization is said to address the exclusionary politics lying at the heart of civil conflicts.<sup>25</sup>

According to Kofi Annan,<sup>26</sup> ‘In the absence of genuinely democratic institutions, contending interests are likely to seek to settle their differences through conflict, rather than through accommodation’. Recent events in various parts of the world, particularly in Arab countries, come to mind as typical examples of this reasoning.

3. Democratization has been asserted as a key to ensuring and fostering peace among states. The widely reported findings that democratic states do not go to war with one another—though not uncontroversial in its particulars—has led many to link the international community’s security interests to the promotion of democratic governance within states.<sup>27</sup>
4. Various international norms unrelated to democratization have come to rely upon implementation through democratic processes. Three examples of these phenomena can be found in the international efforts to protect the environment, to fight official corruption, and to promote the rights of indigenous peoples.

In each of these cases, instruments establishing the regimes provide for the maximum degree of popular participation in formulating strategies for implementing a state’s international obligations. The instruments require the sort of transparent decision-making processes and the free flow of information that are typical of democratic systems.<sup>28</sup>

### 2.3 DEMOCRACY: DEFINITIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Undeniably, different definitions exist for the term ‘democracy’ based on the understanding of the concept by the scholar providing such a definition, particular occurrences at the time of formulating the definition, and the choice of elements which the scholar hopes to incorporate into it. Therefore, there is no ‘universal definition’ for the concept.

Orwell (1946) pointed out that:

Not only is there no agreed definition but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. The defenders of any kind of regime claim that it is a democracy and fear they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning.<sup>29</sup>

Similarly, Kant asserted that: ‘Democracy is despotism because it sets up an executive power in which all citizens make decisions about, and



if need be, against one (who therefore does not agree). Consequently, “all”, who are not quite “all” decide, so that the “general” will contract both itself and freedom’.

Kaldor (2008) identified two types of democratic practices. Namely, formal democracy, which was defined as: ‘The framework of rules and institutions that provide the necessary conditions in which members of a community can shape their own lives to the extent that it does not conflict with others’. The institutions referred to in this definition include citizenship, rule of law, separation of powers, an independent judiciary capable of upholding a constitution, elected power holders, free-and-fair elections, freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, and civil control over security forces.<sup>30</sup>

Substantive democracy, on the other hand, was defined as ‘A process which has to be continually reproduced for maximising the opportunities for all individuals to shape their own lives and to participate in, and influence debates about a public decision that affects them’.<sup>31</sup>

At this point, it is important before proceeding further to review a few of the various definitions, meanings, and understandings that different schools of thought and different scholars have attributed to or provided for the term ‘democracy’. For this purpose, the following would be considered.

According to Diamond (1999),<sup>32</sup> democracy is: ‘A civilian, constitutional multi-party regime, with competitive elections’. Makinda and Okumin (2008) posited that democracy is ‘a way of government firmly rooted in the belief that people in any society should be free to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems’.<sup>33</sup>

The African Union (AU) Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in Africa (Article 3) identifies the following principles for a system to be accepted as democratic: regular, transparent, free-and-fair elections; representative government; respect for human rights; separation of powers; popular participation; and constitutional transfer of political power.

In Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), it was stated that: ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government’. Similarly, the Chambers dictionary gives the definition: ‘A form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people collectively, and is administered by them or by the officers appointed by them’.<sup>34</sup>

According to Dyzenhaus (1998),<sup>35</sup> a concept of a liberal-democratic system has three constitutive principles. These are the principle of participation, which guarantees each individual a role that allows him or her to participate or make a difference to the character of political decision; the principle of equal stake, where every individual is treated as equal under any collective decisions to count as a full member of the political community; and the principle of independence, which allows each member of the political community to see moral and ethical decisions as their responsibility, rather than the responsibility of the collective unit.

A survey of the different literature revealed that the definitions or descriptions of democracy revolved around the following: consent, popular participation, separation of powers, and accountability.

These various definitions and descriptions agree with Locke's explanation that men came together originally with a view to realizing the purpose of social existence by entering into two main pacts. These are the *pactum unionis*, by which they all agreed with one another to form themselves into a community; and the *pactum subjectionis*, by which they decided to elect one of themselves as head to act as an overseer in charge of the various activities within the community.<sup>36</sup>

## 2.4 THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

Irrespective of the meaning and connotation given to democratic governance, the following principles still apply broadly<sup>37</sup>:

De Tocqueville (1835) argued that, 'equality', not 'liberty', lies at the heart of democracy. He maintained that 'political liberty' occasionally gave sublime pleasure to a few. Equality clearly gives each man in the crowd a host of satisfaction. The chains of equality are felt the whole time and are within the reach of all, the noblest spirits appreciate them, and the commonest minds exult in them.

Democrats usually like equality, but there are times when their desire or agitation for it turns to delirium. Sarton (1924, p. 39) wrote that:

To have inequality all that is required of us is to let things follow their natural course. However, if we are to seek equality, we can never afford to relax. Inequality can be attributed to acts of God; equality can only result from acts of men. Inequality is nature, equality is de-naturalisation ...

The democratic idea of equality stemmed from the Judeo-Christian and Islamic beliefs in the value of the individual—that all men are equal before God. It was on this belief that ‘the thinkers’ of the Reformation in the seventeenth century produced the phrase: ‘Mighty heave of the will’, which translated other-worldly ideals into aims for earthly communities.<sup>38</sup>

Modern democracy began when people fought to establish the conditions for equality and freedom which is based on natural self-government, natural rights, or the human rights and liberty of the individual. For instance, it was this belief that Locke (1689, p. 3) affirmed when he wrote that:

Though I have said that all men are equal, and I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality. Age or virtue may give men a just precedence. Excellence of parts or merit may place others above the common level. Birth may subject some, and alliance or benefit, others. To pay observance to those whom nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due, and yet all this consists with the equality. I therefore speak of, as the business in hand, being that equal right, which every man hath to his natural freedom, without being subject to the will or authority of another man ...

This is an assertion that all men are equal in their right to participate in government and to be protected from all invasive actions of government in the exercise of some form of individual freedom. This Lockean idea was further developed in the Declaration of American Independence on 4 July 1776.

We hold these truths to be self-evident. That all men are created equal. That they are endowed by their creator with certain undeniable rights. That amongst these is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, government is instituted amongst men, deriving their just power from the consent of the government ...

From the discussion above, it is possible to arrive at the following conclusions:

1. the notion of equality of all men, though impossible to prove or demonstrate, is self-evident, and is a postulate of natural law;

2. equality is not uniformity—a type of egalitarianism, which knows no superiority, that is a mere an anonymous average;
3. equality is neither standardization, nor is it unrestricted in behaviour;
4. equality is linked with freedom and self-government. That is, it is a political concept that implies the ‘natural’ right to equal participation in the government and to equal opportunity in public affairs.<sup>39</sup>

Therefore, as a political concept, equality implied the demand that the system of power be erected upon the similarities and not the differences between men, that is on their essential human qualities. It means that those qualities that are possessed by all human beings, and which can be discerned beneath ‘all the undeniable differences amongst men’.

Similarly, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognized the right of all citizens to ‘take part in the conduct of public affairs’. To vote and be voted for at genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage; and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.<sup>40</sup>

The UDHR recognized the rights of individuals to freedom of political opinions and expressions,<sup>41</sup> as well as to peaceful assembly and association.<sup>42</sup> Article 21(1) provided that everyone has the right to take part in the government of his or her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. It is noted that the words freedom and liberty are used interchangeably, in order to facilitate ease of expression and discussion.

Pennington (1651) remarked that: ‘Freedom is more worth than your estates, than your lives, and therefore deserved to be highly prized’. This is so because without the liberty of the individual, and of the group as a whole, broadly speaking man, cannot attain the goals he is capable of reaching. As a person, he cannot reach a higher stage of human development if he is not free from unnecessary regimentation imposed by authorities above him. Hence, preservation of freedom is often hard fought.<sup>43</sup>

To buttress this further, Rousseau (1750, p. 16) opined: ‘To renounce one’s freedom, is to renounce one’s status as human. The right of humanity and even its duties ... such renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man’.

Similarly, Stapleton (1949, p. 26) established that: ‘All democratic behaviour depends upon freedom. Our valuing of equality, for example, led straight to freedom as a condition of its understanding or fulfilment. Any meaning we ascribe to human existence, any apprehension that is not mechanical, presupposes freedom ...’.

Broadly, freedoms necessary in a democratic system include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:

Freedom of the person: this is security from arbitrary seizure, imprisonment, or punishment. Freedom from (unlawful) coercion, to stay alive and be healthy is the fundamental of all civil liberties, and the first pillar of self-government, because it is the right to life itself. It also includes bodily freedom, which forbids chattel slavery. Freedom of movement: people should be free to move from place to place, subject only to traffic rules which are the same for all. Livelihood freedom: this is where one should have choices between various means of making a living, or a voice in determining economic policy. Further freedoms are the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial.

According to a remark made by President G W Bush of the USA: ‘One of the protections of democracy is free and open criticisms. Democracy welcomes criticism from inside and outside. The true democracy has no fear of opposing views or unsolicited advice ...’.<sup>44</sup>

In addition, Lichtenberg (1987, p. 33) wrote: ‘A person cannot think freely if others cannot speak. For it is in hearing the thoughts of others and being able to communicate with them that we develop our thoughts’.<sup>45</sup> Freedom of speech can be broken down into the following:

1. freedom of thought with an equal opportunity to learn and seek the truth; choice in the matter of belief and faith;
2. freedom of expression in whatever acceptable means (as long as it does not contradict the laws of the land or infringe on the rights of others);
3. freedom from arbitrary investigation and detention.

Other freedoms are as follows:

1. freedom of worship: by this principle, neither the government nor any faith shall impose upon an individual the observance of religious rites. Each person shall be free to worship his or her god(s) according to his or her understanding;

2. freedom of assembly: that is, freedom of association in private and public meetings, and in private or public organizations, provided that such meetings are peaceful and convoke for some public aim. This importance rests upon the fact that private associations or meetings are the most necessary channel of thought and action for citizens. They serve as an unofficial, but often direct mode of representation for groups whose views might otherwise be unknown or unheeded. Without freedom of assembly and petition, freedom of speech would be incomplete<sup>46</sup>;
3. majority and minority rights: the terms 'majority' and 'minority' are relative. It is always majority or minority in relation to whom, in different situations. It is well known that in some countries, such as the former apartheid South Africa, the non-dominant constituted the majority of the population, while the dominant group constituted the minority.

The security council of the UN is another example. The minority essentially rules it. This is because the right to veto decisions, which is possessed by the Great Powers, makes impossible the true functioning of law. Hence, the demand for unanimity is really a demand that the smaller number shall have the power to block decisions<sup>47</sup> which they do not necessarily support, or which contradict their interests. It is probable that a minority in a current situation could become a majority in a future situation, and vice versa, depending on the circumstances and the question or issues.

According to Stapleton (1949), a majority is not permanent or fixed. Members of the majority counted with respect to one question may be a minority in another. The same individual thinks differently at different times, even on the same question. At one time, their opinion may coincide with that of a majority, while at another time with that of the minority. It is a fact that democracy necessarily involves the application and utilization of both the principle of majority rule and that of minority rights. However, while decisions of the majority are implemented, the minority have the right to be listened to and protected.

## NOTES

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2. Bobbio, N. (1998) *Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Powers*. London: Polity Press.
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 Neo-liberalism, which is an intellectual shadow of liberalism, is essentially about making trade between nations easier (Onimode 2004). It is about freer movement of goods, services, resources, and enterprises in a bid always to find cheaper resources that would maximize profits and efficiency (Petras and Veltmeyer 2004). It is argued that these can only be achieved through stability in democratic governance.  
 In order to actualize this, theorists of neo-liberalism argue that it requires the removal of various controls considered as barriers to free trade, such as tariffs, regulations, certain standards, laws, legislation and regulatory measures, and restrictions on capital flows and investment (Soros 1998). It is claimed to lead to global freedom, prosperity, and economic growth through 'deregulation, liberalization and privatization' (Martinez and Garcia 1997, p. 65).
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taken. For example, against what in their opinion is political repression in a target country. The term is commonly used to imply unanimous international support for a point of view on a disputed issue, for example to enhance the credibility of a majority vote in the United Nations General Assembly.

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43. Ibid. 1, p. 14.
44. Excerpts from the address of US Vice President, Mr. Quayle, at *The African Attorneys General Conference*, Abuja, Nigeria, September 9 1991.
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