

Chapter 2

Terrorism, Sociology and a Resilience Approach

2.1 Introduction

The French terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, in Brussels in March 2016 and in Ansbach (Germany) in July 2016 turned our attention to the power of terrorism to destroy the pre-existing social order and institutional stability in Europe and in a big city such as Paris, and to a new and different situation that arose in Brussels and in its Molenbeek neighborhood.

Media coverage focused on the seditious terrorism acts and the multidimensional impact that these criminal phenomena had on society and the European Union. These terrorism acts demonstrated to the general audience that the European Union and its member states were vulnerable to terrorism threats, making evident the fragility of risk assessment practices and their lack of efficiency and resilience: these facts have been the starting point for a new and needed reflection on the future of counterterrorism strategies and the related security policies both at the central level of the European Union and at the single member state level.

The awareness of being under attack came late in the hours after the first attacks in Paris in January 2015: in general, the European people, especially those from Western Europe, were not able to recognize the implications of Islamic terrorism because of the fragmentation of the European sense of belonging. It is normal to consider the single, subject State when under the pressure of terrorism, and this is what happened after the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005.

Furthermore, the Paris attacks posit a change of *modus operandi* and a different strategy developed by the perpetrators: “The 13 November Paris attacks introduced IS’s [the Islamic State’s] tactics of using small arms in combination with person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIED) in suicide vests, designed to cause mass casualties. The way these attacks were prepared and carried out – plotted by returnees, very likely receiving direction from IS leadership, and including the use of local recruits to carry out the attacks – lead us to the assessment that similar attacks could again be staged in the EU in the near future” (Europol 2016).

This state of “multiple identities” is present whenever an attack is perpetrated and makes the struggle against terrorism vulnerable and inefficient, although it is important to remember the symbolic counternarratives (Lucini 2015a) after the first attacks in Paris in 2015 and the signs of resilience shown by the population affected by the terrorist acts.

According to this perspective, the symbolic and the social representations of threats and vulnerabilities have been underestimated for a long time. The project described in this book analyses and illustrates the relations between the concepts of security, resilience, migration and terrorism, focusing on the importance of understanding the features of these relations as well as the definition of the single concepts considered.

Furthermore, the implications of European and Italian migration policies (Lucini 2015b) and terrorism counterstrategies assume great relevance considering the social side of the facts: the prejudice and stigma that can lead to inadequate and ruinous security policies, underestimating the signs of local vulnerabilities and social disadvantages.

This is why it seems worthwhile to propose and support a sociological approach to terrorism threats, to identifying their causes and to managing responses to them: if we want to create resilient and adequate terrorism counterstrategies, we cannot forget the social dimensions of this phenomenon: the collective causes that lead to subversive behaviours and rebellion against the current social order, and the social nature of terrorism acts, such as a socialization process (Lucini 2016a) both at a primary level (most terrorists have relatives) and at a secondary level (most terrorists have friends).

2.2 Security and Resilience

All through humankind’s history and evolution, security and its related features have been one of the most important needs. In the beginning, humans concentrated on what we nowadays call food security and environmental security, but after millions of years, security has become a concept and a necessity widespread over different domains—whether they be physical, psychological or virtual.

We now ask for engineering security, financial security and virtual security. This fragmentation and these multiple definitions make the concept of security similar to the concept of resilience.

The concept of security can be identified according to the four levels of meaning of the term “security” by Glæßner (2002), as cited in Maguire et al. (2014):

- (a) Certainty, reliability and the absence of danger
- (b) Security conferred by status and the conservation of social political conditions
- (c) Institutional arrangements to avert internal and external threats
- (d) Integrity of legal interests up to the point of a basic right to security

This classification of the security concept, and other hints such as those presented by the European project “The Evolving Concept of Security”,¹ identifies the concept of security as enhancing European policy security according to the following five dimensions (Hague Centre for Strategic Studies 2015)²:

- Its core values
- The political actors involved
- The types of security challenges (risks, threats and hazards) affecting these core values
- The levels at which security is protected
- The ethical and human rights issues which present themselves in this process

The dimensions together form a concept of security at a specific moment in time.

What makes this project very worthwhile is the possibility to better understand both the European *securityscape* (Appadurai 1997) and the concept of “vernacular security” proposed by Bubandt (2005) as cited in Maguire et al. (2014): “an appropriate term for the analysis of different scales of creating imagined communities through a comparison of different but constantly interpenetrating political forms of management of threat and (un) certainty”.

The concepts of both security and resilience are multidimensional, fragmented, multifaceted and context-sensitive, and their practical application is difficult. They are also related to people’s perceptions, their sense and meaning making, their social interpretation and collective representations. However, all of these features have been underestimated, even in the European and Italian laws and policies on counterterrorism.

Both concepts are considered aims that can be achieved, making real specific measures of control. They also should be considered for their potential in prevention and preparedness phases.

Securitization seems to be the current and more relevant paradigm to interpret the terrorism threat, but many other perspectives have been minimized, including the social nature of the terrorism phenomena itself.

Security and resilience are also distinct concepts if we look at their theoretical paradigms: security aims at defence and protection, whereas the goal of resilience in the context of critical events is to proactively respond to and efficiently manage the harmful situation. Resilience is conceived to be an attitude that is expected as part of the collective soul of the population potentially at risk or affected by the crimes.

For most professionals working in the security sector, security and resilience are two distinct and different approaches to current threats to the society in which they live. Instead, these two concepts represent an interrelated paradigm to understand the waves of terrorism in European countries and the West.

Specifically, if we consider resilience as the ability or competence of a social system or person to adapt to the misfortunes of life, finding new ways to live and to survive, and security as a set of operative practices to achieve this aim, we can find

¹<http://evocs-project.eu/>.

²<http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables>.

a connection between these two concepts that underlies the consideration of risk and its definition, allowing us to better perceive and understand it.

Previous research using a qualitative approach has demonstrated that the meaning of risk can be based on the level of vulnerability and the level of resilience (including the operative skills and practices) a specific social system prone to a threat can attune (Lucini 2014). Specifically, risk is:

$$R = ([P \times I] \times [V \times R]).$$

where P is probability and I is intensity – two features of the stressors itself – and V is vulnerability and R is resilience, which are typical features of victims, systems, organizations and social structures (Lucini 2014). Again: “Understanding resilience as a component of risk itself allows us to improve the possibility of risk awareness, focusing attention on the cultural and social meaning of risk as a shared practice among communities that are potentially at risk” (Lucini 2014).

Including the element of resilience within the formula of risk means the possibility to analyse the risk itself sociologically, in line with the qualitative approach of the theorization itself. This draws attention to the stressing elements that, in this specific case, are not natural hazards or elements produced by a human activity but an explosive combination of human attitude towards violence and the material objects used to damage people, infrastructures or other salient places.

The concepts of risk and resilience are interwoven, as are those of security and resilience: “if risk was the policy and political hallmark of the first decade of the twenty-first century in relation to terrorism, as the second decade has unfolded, that same policy and political agenda is being increasingly informed by the concept of resilience” (Walklate and Mythen 2015).

According to this preliminary analysis, both security and resilience can be conceived as:

1. A concept
2. A paradigm or a model for theoretical interpretation of social, political, economic and legal facts or acts
3. An operative tool to be implemented within security strategies, policies or disaster management practices
4. An attitude of the population and of experts within security agencies to be measured and observed, aimed at enforcing the key principles of planned strategies
5. An aim to be achieved through the use of multiple tools and strategies
6. A method or “a way of *doing* security” (West 2013)

In accordance with the use and the practical implications of the relations between security and resilience, different types of relationships between them can be outlined:

- The prevalence of the paradigm of terrorism resilience is oriented more towards proactive attitudes and strategies that can be implemented within a counterterrorism context, becoming a methodological tool for risk assessment, threat measurement and crisis management.

- The prevalence of the paradigm of security, which focuses on the defensive and protective approaches, puts into effect the main roles and aims of defence and protection and remembers the limits of a society kept under surveillance (referring to the society of control theorized by Deleuze 1997; Foucault 2007).

It is important to clearly understand that this differentiation does not mean a proactive versus a latent or defensive approach: they are the two sides of the same coin. For instance, it is impossible to think about a security operation without focusing on the resilience of the people involved.

Resilience and security are two indissoluble elements within the context of security strategies and crisis management because of their point of convergence, represented by the practices and interpretations of risk assessment, which can vary according to the dominant political and social agendas. These two concepts are also associated because of their contextual sensitive nature. In fact, we can identify the same multidimensional approach for both based on the following dimensions: physical, territorial and environmental, political, economic, social and cultural.³

Further, it can be argued that the terrorism threat is characterized by the partial vision affects security itself: “[...] it becomes clear that the ‘security’ sought by the State is partial rather than absolute, conditional rather than granted. Security for some often comes at the expense of the security of ‘other’” (Walklate and Mythen 2015). This statement reveals the profound nexus between the security agenda on counterterrorism and the missing one, called the safety agenda, and the qualitative sociological approach consisting of resilience practices, risk perception and its interpretation.

This last approach would be analysed according to the perspective of public health, public resilience and the operative strategies managed by terrorists, such as mobbing, bossing, bullying and straining.

2.3 Defining Terrorism from a Sociological Perspective

To better understand the previously explained different design, we must turn our attention on the definition of terrorism and the normative context of “Islamic” counterterrorism strategies both in Europe and in Italy.

The word “terrorism” appears for the first time during the French Revolution, and it is generally referred to as any act aimed at constructing fear or a sense of insecurity, or promoting struggle, and applying violent coercion, violent extremism and subversion.

Throughout the centuries many different forms of terrorism and organizations of terrorists who were committed to insurgency against the current social, political or economic order.

³For a theoretical discussion on security dimensions and their classification, please see <http://evocs-project.eu/>.

The definition of “terrorism” is not unanimous; it is determined by the different social, cultural and political backgrounds of the country affected by the threat (Schimid 1983, 2004; Orr 2015).

What seems more important to note is that, within this project, defining the Islamic State is difficult considering previous historical and cultural paradigms. This also limits some visions proposed by the experts interviewed during this study, taking into account the influence of their insights on their practical and professional activities.

For instance, Schmid (2004) proposes 10 key characteristic elements of terrorism:

1. The demonstrative use of violence against human beings
2. The (conditional) threat of (more) violence
3. The deliberate production of terror/fear in a target group
4. The targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents
5. The purpose of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda
6. Its use as a method, tactic or strategy to cause conflict
7. The importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences
8. The illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence
9. The predominantly political character of the act
10. Its use as a tool of psychological warfare to mobilize or immobilize sectors of the public

These peculiar elements have to be conceived according to the clarification proposed by Schmid (2004): “some of these elements might not be present in all acts of violence we call ‘terrorist’”.

Furthermore, Schmid (2004) stated that terrorism is a “contested concept”, and its definition varies depending on the context of studies. Instead, what seems to be challenging is that “terrorism is not a single casually coherent phenomenon. No social science can speak responsibly as though it were” (Tilly 2004).

An analysis of the definition of “terrorism” also cannot take into account the significance of violent extremism that encounters the same hardships because of a lack of “objective” boundaries and which characterizes an action or attitude or value as extreme:

Since extremism is a relational concept,⁴ to answer the question: “what is extreme?”, one needs a benchmark, something that is (more) “ordinary”, “centrist”, “mainstream” or “normal” when compared with the (extreme) political fringe. Humans have a tendency to think that others should also think like they do and therefore tend to assume that their own position is shared by the majority of other “reasonable” individuals. (Schmid 2004)

This feature makes the conceptualization of violent extremism and its distinction from terrorism more complex, even if, according to Backes (2010, as cited in Schmid 2014), it is possible to define extremists by observing their rejections:

1. Pluralism (they prefer decisions be made solely by a dominant individual or group)
2. Orientation towards a common good of all people, whereby different interests and worldviews are taken into consideration
3. Legal rules to which even the rulers have to adhere
4. Self-determination (by the majority of people instead of outside determination)

⁴50 (number of the notes in the original text) Vermeulen and Bovenkerk (2012), 48.

Schmidt (2014) also offers an overview of the 20 indicators to monitor extremism and to define it. This clarification plays an essential role because of the impacts of indicators on the social and collective images of Muslims in Milan, as I argue in the following chapters.

What seems to be fundamental in this sociological context is the different compositions of these Islamic terrorist organizations, which are made up of many different political, religious and ideological components. Specifically, it is possible to identify diverse drivers that work as leading principles in recognizing and classifying individual terrorist groups:

1. Geographic localization: strong connection with the local culture and with internationalization practices
2. Leading values and principles act as motivations, be they political ideologies, religious faiths or economic purposes
3. Internal resources
4. Internal organizations and their histories
5. Members' features and the roles played by them: leader, supporter, cooperative member
6. Tactics, strategies and modus operandi

These principles are similar to those identified by Walklate and Mythen (2015) in their analysis on “new terrorism”: “[...] if we look at the literature in the round, we can identify six connected areas of transformation that have been used to underscore the historical uniqueness of new terrorism. These relate to organization structure, magnitude, targets, geography, weaponry and technology.”

The drivers identified for understanding terrorism groups are fundamental for leading an analysis of the social terrain of terrorism development and the connection that Islamic terrorism could have with the local area of interest, making it evident that it is not always possible to talk about “new terrorism” (Walklate and Mythen 2015), but rather that social seeds are embedded that can act to reinforce or sustain the rise of Islamic State (IS) terrorism in Europe or Western countries in a combined way.

At this point a crucial question emerges: What is Islamic terrorism?

Looking at the historical and cultural attempts to define terrorism, we can certainly argue that Islamic terrorism is developing worldwide and also in Europe, where member states have not been prone to this kind of terrorism. Therefore, most of their counterterrorism strategies are focused on internal and national sociopolitical threats and riots. Islamic terrorism can initially be defined, perhaps, as an “imported terrorism”, even if we consider that we are in a sort of second stage of the development of the IS, when a big role is also played by foreign fighters (ICCT 2016) and converters acting as a *trait d'union* between Europe and the Middle East.

A first interesting effort to define Islamic strategy from a sociological point of view is that of Guenter and Kaden (2016). These authors, analysing the rise of the IS, interpret its dynamics according to the definition of the IS as a sociopolitical movement and the concept of charismatic authority explained by Max Weber: “The case of the Islamic State is somewhat special, since the order that is envisaged by its

adherents is not, in fact, to be created by a charismatic leader, but already exists as a traditional order within which a designated leader exerts authority via his extraordinary, charismatic qualities” (Guenter and Kaden 2016).

Specifically, these authors applied the most important concepts theorized by Weber, such as rational, traditional and charismatic domination: “while in reality these typical modes of domination always occur in a specific mix, it is still possible to sort the various sources of legitimacy that the Islamic State taps into according to their predominant mode of domination. This reveals a surprisingly multi-faceted spectrum of sources of legitimacy” (Guenter and Kaden 2016).

The legitimacy discourse of the IS was, in fact, one of the most relevant geopolitical matters which arose in June 2014, when the IS made its first appearance on the international stage. The identification of the Islamic state as a legitimate state would open the possibility to act in terms of a diplomatic approach, but what seemed clear to the general audience and most international politicians was the indisputable difference between a democratic state and the so-called Islamic State.

This is the first difficulty: to engage the enemy in this way – because formally we don’t have a declaration of war – also denies the possibility to clearly identify the enemies and to give them a name and a material border.

Other attempts were made to define terrorism groups, acts and their strategies in general (not directly related to the IS) in a sociological framework after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, where most attention was focused on a social analysis of so-called religious terrorism.

Above all, it is important to consider the pioneering studies developed by Turk (1982, 2004), Black (2004), Deflem and Costanza and Kilbun (2005) aimed at a first analysis of terrorism acts and strategies, considering the role of sociological and methodological components.⁵

The sociology of terrorism has been conceptualized according to three main theoretical paradigms: structural functionalism, the conflict theory and the symbolic interactionism. The classical schools of sociology are not missing within this theoretical discourse, which also includes the proposal developed by Cinoğlu and Özeren (2010) and focuses on sociological macro-level approaches, in particular:

1. Functionalist perspective and consideration of the concept of anomia by Durkheim (1933, 1938) and the manifest and latent function by Merton (1957) applied to acts of terrorism. Moreover, the functionalist perspective permits a focus on the fact that “every system and things in the society have at least one vital or necessary purpose and function” (Cinoğlu and Özeren 2010). This position leads to the resilience approach to terrorism and the prevention activities that can be promoted to diminish the level of anomia, thus allowing more social cohesion and inclusion (Durkheim 1938).
2. Conflict perspective.
3. Symbolic interactionism and its related concepts, such as the role of perceptions and their interpretations, as well as the importance of the learning process and its

⁵For a deeper understanding of this topic, see Costanza and Kilbun (2005).

dynamics and the resocialization process and its organizations (Cinoğlu and Özeren 2010), above all within the terrorist recruitment process.

Two other sociological perspectives that influence and highlight the theoretical framework of this project are represented by work by Turk (in Matson 2008) and Vertigans (2011). Both of these are highly valued and reliable pieces of writing because they focus on the sociological approach to terrorism issues, approaching the elements of sociology and their dynamics and organization, which are pervasive throughout the more general terrorism studies approach.

Specifically Turk (in Matson 2008) considers terrorism as a social construction of the society in which it takes place, producing and reproducing criminal and deviant identities along with the rise in terrorism. However, he also includes broadened definitions of terrorism, such as political violence and acts of communication.

On the contrary, Vertigans (2011) focuses his analysis using a more holistic approach to terrorism:

[...] a sociological framework for terrorism that is designed to draw together historical and modern social processes for a range of individuals, groups and societies. This approach aims to illuminate shifting individual and collective identification and interwoven attitude to violence that can help explain the careers of terrorists from beginning to end.

This approach clearly tends to highlight the social processes and dynamics of terrorist recruitment, the habitus of terrorist groups and their group dynamics, actions, tactics and targets. Moreover, this contribution opens new opportunities for those interested in a sociological insight on terrorism facts and above all on terrorism by the IS.

The following sociological theories seem to be missing but can also offer other fruitful insights into the understanding and interpretation of terrorism by the IS and its related social dynamics:

- The dramaturgical approach by Goffman (1969) and his contributions to the conceptualization of strategic and symbolic interactions, but more important for the concept of total institutions and its application to the recruitment and engaging phases of Islamic terrorism in the online world. The focus must be on the depersonalization process that affects newcomers and future converts.
- Furthermore, Goffman's (1963) theories about stigmatization dynamics help us to define the perceptions that affect the Muslim community in Milan.
- The social constructionist approach (Berger and Luckmann 1966) that also leads to the concept of social perceptions and collective interpretations both in the real and digital world. This is also the case of this research project, focusing on the double identities of the social actors involved in the analysis (above all the migrants living in Milan and their ethnic communities).
- The symbolic interactionism approach (for a review, see Izzo 1991) is considered for the attention it draws to social acts, symbolic interactions, and its interpretation of – and the impact of that interpretation on – the relations among people.
- The theory of social systems proposed by Luhmann (1995) and the two key concepts of system and environment, which can be translated in the conceptualization

and interpretation of the technological and cultural framework of Islamic terrorism and its recruitment practices and online training.

- Habermas (1987) and his connection between social structure and personality development, as well as the role of communicative action that seems to be the preferred channel of recruitment of Islamic terrorist groups and the radicalization processes (Vertigans 2008), and that needs to be analysed in the online domain.
- The phenomenological approach by Schutz (1967) and his concept of social milieu.

These sociological theories, even if part of another historical period, can be successfully applied to the new terrorism threat, and their elements connected to pre-existing illegal activities or previous social structures, in order to emphasize a different interpretation of the phenomena itself, contributing to innovative and creative counterterrorism strategies.

2.4 An Overview of the European and Italian Norms on Counterterrorism

The attention of the European Union on counterterrorism measures was clear after the 9/11 attacks and the demanding need expressed by the national states and public agencies. For this reason, the European Union adopted a set of counterterrorism measures,⁶ contemplating different sectors (such as politics, infrastructure, economic agencies, industrial partnerships) which could be stricken by a terrorist attack.

The legislative European tools for the fight against terrorism and its strategies changed: they were enhanced after the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, and were adopted in 2005 based on four pillars⁷: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Further: “The EU counter-terrorism strategy [sic] aims to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice”.⁸

These main pillars must be conceived together with strategic counterterrorism measures⁹ specifically focusing on the tools to combat terrorism; the radicalization and recruitment processes; protecting critical infrastructure; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats; weapons of mass destruction; and prevention, preparedness and crisis management.

⁶<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-catalogue-of-EU-counter-terrorism-measures.pdf>.

⁷<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/>.

⁸<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/>.

⁹<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-catalogue-of-EU-counter-terrorism-measures.pdf>.

Legislative tools also focus on collaboration and cooperation between European member states and their external partners: “cooperation with external partners – cooperation should be further developed through international organisations, such as the United Nations, and with non-EU countries, particularly the United States”.¹⁰

The relevant issue when analysing the European normative panorama on counterterrorism strategies is the lack of traces of resilience within the counterterrorism strategies. This means that this is considered a usual personal and social ability to cope with disasters and crises, undermining the potential of resilience within risk assessment and terrorism crisis management.

The normative approach seems to lack a relevant topic around which to construct an effective counterterrorism strategy: the cultural meaning and the social roots of diverse terrorism threats.

This is also observable through the various types of terrorism threats present within the member countries of the European Union, making Europe a geographic and social area prone to terrorist attacks which, according to a Europol report (Europol 2016), can be distinguished between religiously inspired terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism and right-wing terrorism.¹¹

The difficulty for the European Union is that its normative order and its counterterrorism strategies lie in the neglected role played by the cultural understanding of each member state of the indigenous terrorist or subversive groups, as well as of social disadvantages and local economic power that can lead to the development of religious (Islamic) terrorism.

This is notable when considering the main topics of the European legislative norms from 2005 and the attention on CBRN risks,¹² terrorist financing,¹³ protecting critical infrastructures¹⁴ and the “control of the acquisition and possession of weapons”.¹⁵

The focus is clearly on the material means and the operative tools that can be used during a terrorist attack, but a central point is also represented by the policy strategies and the information shared by and communication between terrorist profiles.¹⁶

In this normative framework, the social dimensions of terrorism threats have been (perhaps intentionally) set apart. In fact, by considering the social factors and causes which lead to terrorism and potential terrorist attacks, attention could be drawn to specific ethnic groups or the relations among different ethnical groups,

¹⁰ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aj10041>.

¹¹ The case study presented in this book of the current Islamic terrorism situation in Milan shows a potential connection between the different types of terrorism and potential reciprocal influences.

¹² http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:2501_6&qid=1412582464618.

¹³ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011778%202008%20REV%201>.

¹⁴ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015893%202010%20REV%201>.

¹⁵ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31991L0477&from=EN>.

¹⁶ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160404STO21310/fight-against-terrorism-meps-to-debate-counter-terrorism-strategies>.

with psychological and social implications for the management of social order, which is under threat by potential social disorders and interethnic conflicts.

After the attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, the European political and security agendas were updated, but the primary topic that should have been addressed was the coordination of and collaboration by European intelligence services.

This was just more a political vision of the matter than a real operative proposal to cope with the terrorism threat, also considering that many authors are discussing the role and the competence of the European Union in facing terrorism threats and responding in the event of an attack (Coolsaet 2010; Kaunert and Leonard 2013). Further, with regard to this trend, Fägersten (2016) stated that “as long as it is only small states with limited capacity (or the European Commission that has even less), which are calling for more centralised cooperation, the prospects for success are slim”. If resilience could be applied to measure the efficacy of this legislative plan, the response would not be successful because success is based on an interpretative framework of neoliberal strategies (Maguire 2014) that is missing in evaluations of the current changes in European and Western societies.

The dissonant legislative panorama in Europe is also translated with a specific orientation within single European country members, such as Italy. In terms of anti-terrorism norms, Italy approved a law in April 2015 providing specific legislative actions to counterterrorism that completely fits with the social and political situation of the nation.

The law¹⁷ contemplates different aspects and punishments as counterterrorism strategies:

- The definition of foreign fighters and their punishments.
- The definition of “lone wolves” and their punishments.
- The norms for the prevention of online propaganda and a blacklist of relevant websites
- Preventive wiretapping and call monitoring
- Prevention in prisons and more power to control and monitor suspects
- Punishment for those who foster illegal immigration
- Agreement on the new international mission in Europe operated by the law enforcement agency and military sector
- The coordination of all prevention activities is managed by the anti-mafia national public prosecutor. According to this legislative framework, the task carried out through the overlap of these two roles indicates the possible connection between mafia business and Islamic terrorism.¹⁸

To clearly understand the normative background regarding the antiterrorism norms in Italy, Law n°206, approved in 2004,¹⁹ must be taken into account. This law provides specific understandings of the national plan for managing terrorism threats and

¹⁷<http://www.interno.gov.it/it/antiterrorismo-nuova-legge-ecco-norme-principali>.

¹⁸This topic is explained in Chapter 5 paragraph 5.5.

¹⁹<http://www.levittimedeldovereditalia.it/files/1-Legge--206-del-03.08.pdf>

attacks, and the operative organization of the crisis units. This law also establishes the peculiar role of prevention and monitoring activities by the National Intelligence Services and of policies to counter the financial support of terrorist groups and organizations.

The Italian legislative scenario cannot be completed without considering at least another three laws:

- Law n° 431, approved in 2001,²⁰ aimed at planning all activities against the financial support of terrorist organizations
- Law n° 438, approved in 2001,²¹ which focuses on introducing the crime of international terrorism
- Law n° 155, approved in 2005,²² explains the new norms and operative actions to counter international terrorism in line with the European Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism²³

This legislative panorama makes the ongoing nature of counterterrorism legislation evident. This is based not only on studies and analyses by experts and researchers but also on the emergency and the contingency of the moment, and the nature of the emergency itself. This clearly depicts the path of the Italian security discourse and its tangled form, as well as the impacts that the normative discourse has on counterterrorism strategies.

2.5 Conclusion

As has been explained before, what seems clear after this analysis, is the missing role of sociological theories and social matters within the main theoretical and normative discourse on terrorism threats.

Many sociological topics drive the analysis of the case study in Milan and its nine districts.

In concluding this chapter, some sociological matters need to be considered:

- The current European and Italian legislative contexts need to be informed and updated with a more general overview, taking into account the inner and pre-existing vulnerability of the society where diverse forms of terrorisms are present as a result of sociological seeds and the physical, social and institutional possibilities that the terrorism could be identified as a graft within a society that acts as a fertile social terrain through which it can spread.

²⁰ <http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/014311.htm>.

²¹ <http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/014381.htm>.

²² <http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/051551.htm>.

²³ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TEXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:l33168&from=IT>.

- The current normative framework is affected by the historical lens of the past decades, in which, for the most part, terrorism was a “national” affair and not an international matter.
- This overview makes clear the co-existence of two paradigms to approach terrorism: that of security and that of resilience, above all, for the response to terrorism attacks. We are now looking at a more comprehensive resilience approach to terrorism threats, developing the analysis according to the evolution of the disaster circle and its phases.
- It has been clarified that sociology will enlighten the previous social and political terrain able to support the rise of this particular form of terrorism.

Considering all these relevant issues in the next chapter, attention will focus on a better understanding of Muslim terrorism, IS terrorism, the rise of Muslim gangs, the new paradigm of public resilience and the strategies of mobbing, bossing, straining and bullying – all in order to depict the inner organization and structure of this relevant terrorism threat.

The Other Side of Resilience to Terrorism

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