

## The Concept of Anxiety and Kant

*Alison Assiter*

In this chapter, I will outline the beginnings of Kierkegaard's or Haufniensis' solution to a problem faced by Kant—the problem of how it is possible freely to do wrong. Kant has difficulty, as many have suggested,<sup>1</sup> explaining the possibility of freely doing wrong, for he frequently argues that freedom and the moral law reciprocally imply one another.<sup>2</sup> He also has difficulty providing an account of the origin of freedom.<sup>3</sup> For Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, freedom consists in a different kind of causation from that which is operative in the rest of the natural world. Kant offers a very strong conception of freedom. It is an “absolute spontaneity” that “begins of itself.”<sup>4</sup> Freedom, at least on some readings of Kant on the subject, is a characteristic of the noumenal self which is outside time. I will suggest that Kierkegaard, or Haufniensis, in *The Concept of Anxiety*, offers an approach to freedom that does not lead to Kant's problem but that maintains Kant's strong and libertarian conception of freedom.

*The Concept of Anxiety* (CA) displays the influence of Schelling, particularly his *Freiheitsschrift*. In this text, Haufniensis refers to Schelling a number of times. Kierkegaard, or Haufniensis, I believe, takes from Schelling a conception of the natural world that differs profoundly from that of Kant. Schelling does not separate nature from freedom.

---

A. Assiter (✉)  
University of the West of England, Bristol, UK

Summarising a complex theory, his view is that humans form part of a living and active nature.<sup>5</sup> Causation, in the natural world, is understood by him in a teleological fashion, which is similar to that offered by Kant in his third *Critique*<sup>6</sup>; however, for Schelling, organic “things” like trees or flowers really are comprised of powers. Indeed, the whole world is made up of powers that manifest themselves in objects. Instead of viewing teleological causation, as Kant does, as a result of a reflective judgment<sup>7</sup> on the part of beings like us, organic things really are causes and effects of themselves. Insofar as all beings in nature are active, therefore, there is a form of freedom in the whole of nature. The bacterium, for example, makes a rudimentary “choice” about where to get nourishment. Correlatively, causal laws are understood as manifestations of the powers or the dispositions of objects. It is not completely determined, in advance, in the fashion assumed by some common accounts of causal laws, how these powers manifest themselves. As Kant himself suggests, in the *Critique of Judgment*, a seed gives rise to the tree, but it is not determined precisely in advance exactly how the tree will appear.

Schelling’s view might appear to some to be weird or fanciful insofar as it seems to challenge many presupposed assumptions about the natural world. It is a view that is distinct, on the one hand, from “scientistic” naturalism—a perspective that challenges any reference to “transcendental grounds, orders, causes, purposes, *Ding an Sich*, or the like”<sup>8</sup> and also, on the other hand, from theories that assert a dualism of fact and value. While I will not be arguing against these theories and in favour of a Schellingian form of naturalism in this chapter, I will merely note at the outset that Schelling’s form of naturalism may in fact fit some contemporary scientific theories better than the form that rejects purposes or powers as “occult” and “weird.”<sup>9</sup> The view of nature assumed in this chapter is similar to that accepted by a number of contemporary biologists,<sup>10</sup> and it is interesting that they, in their turn, draw more from Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* than they do from his earlier work. Schelling’s conception of value, moreover, circumvents the problem of it being either wholly outside the natural world and therefore having no relation to we finite beings, or as somehow reducible to our interests and desires and therefore having limited normative force.

I will argue, in this chapter, that Haufniensis, in *CA*, gives an account of the origin of freedom, drawing on Schelling’s *Freiheitsschrift*, through the story of Adam and Eve. Kierkegaard asks: “Is the concept of hereditary sin identical with the concept of the first sin, Adam’s sin, the fall of man?”<sup>11</sup>

On Kant's reading of the story, the existence of Adam does not explain anything. If Adam is inside the history of finite limited beings, then his sin is just like the sin of everyone else. If, on the other hand, he is placed wholly outside history, then he has no relation to everyone else's sin precisely because he is placed outside this world. Adam's sin does not explain the sin of others if his sin is seen either as a first cause in a series of mechanical causes or as a certain kind of rational explanation for sin. If the story, in other words, is read through a metaphysic that radically separates the free being from the natural world, which is itself conceived in terms of deterministic causation, then the story cannot explain the origin of sin. Indeed, read in this way, the story illustrates the extreme and intuitively odd view, which is common in debates on free will, that in order really to be free, in the libertarian sense, one has to break the laws of nature.<sup>12</sup> Instead, Kierkegaard writes, "by the first sin, sinfulness *came into Adam*."<sup>13</sup> The position is the same, indeed, for every other human being. The concepts with which Kantian speculative reason deals belong in logic whilst the notion of sin lies in ethics. Innocence is a natural state of the natural being that may continue in existence. Innocence is ignorance.

Kierkegaard's account, I believe, can be reconstructed to run as follows: in the biblical story, Eve and Adam, as natural beings, in a world of similarly constituted natural beings, existed. Adam and Eve, in other words, were part of a living and active natural world that pre-existed the domain of the free and thinking being. Adam was neither free nor not free. He had no awareness of the possibility of choice. Eve—in some way a derived person—came into being later. She, via the serpent, seduced Adam. At that point, Adam became aware, through sensuality, of good and evil. By the first sin, sinfulness, or the capacity to reflect on our passions and desires and to enact some and not others—in other words human freedom—came into Adam. Adam may have existed alongside other natural objects with their powers and capacities. These natural objects possessed powers and capacities that were akin to our human conceptual apparatus, but they were also different. The natural objects existing alongside Adam were not, in other words, purely inert mechanical things. Strictly, human freedom emerged first in Eve rather than Adam: "the woman was the first to be seduced and, that therefore she in turn, seduced the man."<sup>14</sup>

Adam, as well as each subsequent individual, is responsible for his own sin. The explanation, according to Haufniensis, of Adam's sin, must also explain the sin of every other person. Adam, or Eve, as the first individuals, both represent themselves and "the race." "With sinfulness, sexuality was

posited. In that same moment the history of the race begins.”<sup>15</sup> Adam and Eve, prior to the act of eating the fruit, are in a dream-like state of anxiety. “Innocence is ignorance. In innocence, man is not qualified as spirit, but is psychically qualified in immediate unity with his natural condition.”<sup>16</sup> Freedom “enters into” Eve via a “qualitative leap.”<sup>17</sup> In other words, Eve existed alongside all other natural beings, and she emerged, as they did, from their grounds.

There are two points Kierkegaard is making, then, in response to Kant. First, the free will cannot be wholly outside time because it would be unable to operate if it were so placed. But second, although Kierkegaard accepts Kant’s point that the notion of freedom of the will cannot be explained in either logical or mechanical causal terms, he would not accept the conclusion that this means it cannot be explained at all. For Kant, either Adam is wholly outside history or he is wholly inside history. These alternative options encapsulate the division outlined earlier between speculative dualism and reductive naturalism. But there is a third alternative: namely that Adam is partly inside and partly outside history—the history of beings like us. He is outside it as an innocent and natural being and inside it as a being that has become rational and free.

Kant’s difficulty explaining the notion of freedom to do wrong stems from his radical separation of the free will from the finite natural phenomenal being. It stems, furthermore, in Kierkegaard’s view, from Kant’s restriction of nature to that which can be accessed by human phenomenal experience. Nature, for Kierkegaard, then, by contrast, must be understood in two ways: first as human nature—natural intersubjective embodied experience. But there is also a second sense of the notion—the living dynamic nature that includes plants, bacteria, and other animals and that, according to this reading, included Adam and Eve prior to the emergence in them of freedom.

Haufniensis argues, further, that sin or evil results from the self taking itself as its own ground. When we do this, we are likely to be following our own desires or our own rationalisations for our behaviour and we lose the normative force of an independent ground. Kant was forced to look for the ground of evil either in our own nature, in which case, on his assumptions, we are not really free, or in some external and wholly evil source. For Kant, when the individual acts from the moral law, a law that she herself, at least according to many readings of Kant, prescribes, she is approximating as closely as she possibly can to a holy will or a perfectly rational being. But, according to Schelling and Kierkegaard, it is not possible for the self ever to

be a perfectly rational being or a holy will; thought cannot ground itself. This point applies whether one accepts a “constructivist” or a “realist” account of Kantian morality. In a recent book, Robert Stern has persuasively argued that the “constructivist” view, which grounds ethical norms in the self-legislating subject, while it is indeed plausible as far as the agent’s autonomy is concerned, it fails to offer a reason for the obligatory nature of moral commands. Kant, according to Stern, accepts a “hybrid” view. He is a constructivist about the obligatory—it is we ourselves who “give the content of morality its obligatory form.”<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, he is a “realist” about the right—his notion of the “holy will,” which is a will that is perfectly good, functions as a “moral fact” on the basis of which agents like us make choices. This account, while it offers an important corrective to many constructivist readings, still leaves open the question, for Kant, of the ground of wrongdoing.

The reading of *CA* I am offering retains the advantages of Stern’s account of Kant. The ultimate ground of choosing to act well is, for Kierkegaard, independent of the self, in that it is nature, but a nature that is itself grounded in God. But the self is also relatively independent of her ground and thus she retains a degree of autonomy and responsibility for her actions. She is autonomous insofar as she acts from her own power, but the source of her moral norms comes from a nature that is external to her, and that is, in turn, grounded in God. In a sense therefore, her actions are “self caused” insofar as they stem partially at least from her own power. Freedom, then, for *Haufniensis*, involves the possibility of committing evil acts. This *Haufniensis* refers to as “anxiety about evil.”<sup>19</sup> The only way that this anxiety can be replaced by the alternative—a concern with the good—is through faith. “The only thing that is truly able to disarm the sophistry of sin is faith.”<sup>20</sup> In other words, sin involves failing to recognise the grounding of the self in something external to it, while acting well involves a recognition of this grounding. Only, for *Haufniensis*, though, if one goes a step further than simple evil, into the demonic, is freedom somehow curtailed.<sup>21</sup> *Haufniensis* describes the demonic as “anxiety about the good” and as “unfreedom.”<sup>22</sup> This is a state where the individual has been taken over and consumed by evil. Again we can see a critique of Kant here. We might, therefore, read Kierkegaard as suggesting that, while many thinkers, and Kant in particular, believed that it was important to account for the freedom to act well, in fact, it is equally, if not more important, to account for the freedom to do wrong. On Kierkegaard’s account, then, each organic object consists in a concatenation of powers or capacities. Each

“thing” is part of the creative process that is the whole of nature. Eve’s act both sets her apart from the rest of nature and maintains her continuity with this nature.

Once freedom has “emerged” in them, humans have a degree of responsibility for their natures that other organic things do not have. When Eve acts wrongly, her act stems from a power that is internal to her. Her acts stem from her capacities or her powers, which, in turn, inform her choices. There is an element of “self-causation”<sup>23</sup> in the whole of nature, but Eve has this to a greater degree than other natural objects. Zupancic<sup>24</sup> makes the point that Kant needs an infinitely existing body to be able to explain moral conversion and she refers to de Sade. Kierkegaard suggestively implies, though, that the two notions—an imaginary infinitely existing body and a perfectly rational will—stem from the same problematic assumptions: that the will and the body are radically separate. De Sade’s seeking of endless pleasure parallels the Kantian rational will, insofar as such a will, in parallel fashion, imagines an infinite rationality.

Freedom, for Haufniensis,<sup>25</sup> “came into” Eve through sexuality. It is appropriate, indeed, for freedom to emerge, initially, into a body that can birth. For birth, or procreation, is the means by which species reproduce themselves and the means by which one species emerges from another. It is also the metaphor Schelling uses for the “*Ungrund*”—the “yearning of the one to give birth to itself.”<sup>26</sup> Haufniensis writes, in *CA*, “woman is more sensuous than man.”<sup>27</sup> “That woman is more sensuous than man appears at once in her physical structure...aesthetically her ideal aspect is beauty.... Then I shall introduce her ethically in her ideal aspect which is procreation.”<sup>28</sup> Eve is “more sensuous” and, therefore, more anxious than Adam partly, and importantly, because she has the capacity, or potency, to give birth. Indeed, perhaps it is because of the latter that she is the former. A greater degree of anxiety, for Haufnienis, signifies strength rather than weakness. “Although anxiety belongs to her [Eve] more than man, anxiety is by no means a sign of imperfection.”<sup>29</sup> Insofar as she has the capacity to give birth, she illustrates in bodily form, as well as in “spirit,” the self in process; the self both as organic process and as free being, a potentiality capable of becoming a number of possible selves—of taking up and believing a number of possible ideas and of acting in a multiplicity of ways. Eve is effectively re-born as a free self, capable of good and bad actions. Moreover, as Anti-Climacus put it in *The Sickness unto Death*, in “willing to be itself, the self is transparently grounded in the power that established it.”<sup>30</sup> The “power that established it” can be read, at least in part, in the

Schellingian sense of a grounding of the self in an original event of creation of the whole and in a process of “ejecting love,” a process that “yearns” to give birth to itself. Haufniensis uses language reminiscent of Schelling, when he writes that when sin comes into the world, sin “acquired significance for the whole creation.... The meaning of this I can indicate by calling attention to the Scriptural expression ἀποκαρδοκία της κτίσεως (the eager longing of creation) (Romans 8:9).<sup>31</sup>

The self is also grounded in the “dark ground,” or a further potential, that leads to anxiety. The “dark ground” is the potentiality in the ground of God for evil. Subjective anxiety, then, is anxiety in the face of the recognition of the potential that lies at the heart of the human being. The deity is born out of the opposing forces that constitute its ground. In a footnote, in *CA*, when discussing the creation, Haufniensis refers to these metaphors of Schelling. He writes: “By these expressions he signifies, if I may say so, the creative birth pangs of the deity.”<sup>32</sup>

The reading I am offering of the Eve story is consonant with a Schellingian inspired influence on Kierkegaard. It is consistent with a picture according to which: “matter itself becomes, in some manner difficult to conceive, capable of participation in the form of the understanding.”<sup>33</sup> For Schelling, as Iain Hamilton Grant puts it, “subjectivity arises in nature.”<sup>34</sup> Kierkegaard, though, adds a phenomenological account of the emergence of the specific form of control that agents like us have, over the powers of which we are comprised, which constitutes one element of libertarian freedom. On this account, there is no radical separation between freedom and nature. Rather the self, like other organic things, is comprised of powers or capacities. Some of these are purely bodily powers, like the power of chewing. But others are expressed in the form of conscious choices to act in certain ways, and these choices and these acts, in turn, shape our natures.

In innocence, for Kierkegaard in *CA*, “man” is not qualified as spirit. Man is neither a beast nor an angel. “If he were a beast or an angel, he could not be in anxiety.”<sup>35</sup> He is neither animal nor is he rational. Kierkegaard—or rather the pseudonymous author Haufniensis—outlines how the state of innocence in the Garden of Eden is precisely that. There is no knowledge of good and evil. Eve cannot understand the prohibition. There is peace and repose. But what else is there? Nothing. Nothing has the effect of producing anxiety. Anxiety is “freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.”<sup>36</sup> Man is a synthesis of the “psychical and the physical.” Anxiety “passes into Adam as the possibility of possibility.”

When Kant writes, as he does in his work *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*,<sup>37</sup> about the origins of freedom, he prioritises reason. Freedom comes about, according to him, from someone in the Garden, seeing two fruits and choosing between fruits. But this version of the story presupposes the very thing it is setting out to explain—freedom—which is, no doubt, why Kant ultimately came to regard the origin of sin as inexplicable. For Kierkegaard, instead, the moment “spirit” enters into Adam, it must posit also—since the human is the synthesis of the psychic and the bodily—its antithesis in the sensual, and the most extreme form of the sensuous is the sexual. Adam was beguiled by Eve who was “more sensuous” and therefore more anxious than him. Without sin there is no sexuality; the moment Adam becomes man, he does so by becoming animal as well. It might be argued, however, in an objection to this account, that on Haufniensis’ account as well, the capacity to choose must already have existed in Adam. After all, Eve and Adam knew about the prohibition. But the reading I am offering suggests that Eve was not, prior to the eating of the fruit, a fully free being. The prohibition on her, at that time, functioned rather as a limit on the extent of her world, a little like a fence in a zoo round a lion.

On a Kantian view, the burden of guilt becomes debilitating. Kant eventually explains “sin” as innate in all of us and as constantly tempting us away from the moral law. For Kierkegaard, though, as free and finite rational beings, we are continually both rational and sensuous; we are free to choose to do good, in terms of the love that comes from sensuality and ultimately from the ground of the whole of nature. Or we are free to choose the bad, and when we do this we are taking ourselves as the source of our norms. For Kierkegaard, then, freedom is conceived partly as the spontaneous capacity of the natural and rational being but also as the partial shaping of this being by a norm, or a power, that stems from external nature—a nature that is living and active and grounded in a God that itself comes into being.

Kierkegaard has open to him a form of explanation that is not available to Kant. It arises from his recognition that a human being is a paradox—a synthesis of two opposing notions. But this paradoxical nature of the human being does not suggest nonsense. Rather it suggests that explanations in ethics must take a different form from explanations in logic or in those domains of thinking that are governed by mechanical causation. If there is, as Grant’s reading of Schelling implies, a naturalistic explanation of ideas, “a physical explanation of idealism,”<sup>38</sup> there may be a natural



grounding of the mind and of mental phenomena. This natural grounding cannot be a purely mechanical one, for such a ground would not have the capacity to give rise to human mental abilities. Although the myth of Eve and Adam is just this—a myth—it is a myth that provides an explanation for something, the origin of freedom, that otherwise remains inexplicable. It fits with a deep form of metaphysical naturalism, which sees mental phenomena being grounded in a powers-based and active nature. Kant sees freedom as arising rationally out of thoughts' capacities and out of an awareness of "the prohibition." Freedom, according to Kierkegaard, though, is the "anxious possibility of being able" crucially formed through sensuality. It is ultimately grounded, to reiterate, in a Being like Schelling's Absolute—or the ungrounded ground of this Absolute—Schelling's *Ungrund*. As Schelling puts it in *The Ages of the World*, "necessity and freedom are in God."<sup>39</sup> The ground of the good lies in nature, but crucially nature is understood as being active and dynamic and as existing outside the limits of possible human experience.

For Kierkegaard, after the emergence of freedom in Eve, the future is wide open. It consists in a range of possibilities, an "abyss" that creates anxiety in the self. The future, for each self, therefore, is not determined, either by causal forces outside its own nature or, as it might be seen to be for Kant, by its own rationality. Kierkegaard's self is shaped by its own capacities or powers. Humans have, then, the kind of control over their volitions that is required for libertarian freedom. Overall, the attempt to provide a complete explanation for ethical notions, in the way that Kant sets out to do, is, Kierkegaard argues, bound to fail. Human beings have agency precisely insofar as they are not perfectly rational—determined by their reason—or determined by their desires. Kierkegaard's response to Kant, then, is as follows: Haufniensis does not face the difficulty that befalls Kant's theory, since he does not separate out, in the fashion of Kant, the rational self that follows a norm, from the sensible, natural self. For Haufniensis, selfishness and sinfulness, as well as the capacity for good, come into being with freedom. Prior to the act of eating the fruit, these characteristics of an actual person were non-existent. For Kierkegaard, sin and evil are contingently given as a result of freedom and are not, as Kant suggested, innate. Kierkegaard, then, can make sense of the Augustinian distinction between *peccatum originale*—the first sin—and actual sin—the sin as realised by an actual existing individual. It is difficult for Kant, however, to make sense of this distinction, since he argues that sin is innate.

The self of *CA* is a combination of two things—it is a synthesis of “body and soul,” “temporality and eternity,” “finitude and infinitude,”<sup>40</sup> and necessity and freedom. But it is one self that exemplifies each of these apparently conflicting notions. The self is partly grounded in God and partly independent of God. This position does not make sense if one assumes either the reductive naturalism outlined at the beginning of this chapter or a Kantian, or any other, dualism. But it does make sense on a view that sees the self as in process, as in a process of becoming something other than it might previously have been. The processual self is made up of finite and biological powers, like the power of eating, but also of capacities to follow norms stemming from outside itself. In their turn, though, these stem from a natural world that contains the self but that culminates in a God, conceived in the fashion I have outlined here.

Much of the discussion in this chapter uses metaphor. The story of Adam and Eve is just that—a story. But it is important to note that scientists, as well as artists and storytellers, use metaphor. As Mary Hesse put it: “The world does not come naturally parcelled up into sets of identical instances for our inspection and description.”<sup>41</sup> On the assumptions outlined in this chapter, the idea that we have some responsibility for the nature that we now have may not be as ludicrous as some have taken it to be.<sup>42</sup> The chapter offers a challenge to the view put by Nagel, that, “when looked at from far enough outside, agents are helpless and not responsible.”<sup>43</sup> Using Haufniensis’ story of Adam and Eve, this chapter has outlined an approach to freedom and evil that does not give rise to Kant’s difficulty—that of explaining the freedom to do wrong.

## NOTES

1. See, for three examples as well as for references to others, Alison Assiter, *Kierkegaard, Kant and Metaphors of Birth* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015); Michelle Kosch, *Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling and Kierkegaard* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006); and also Paul Guyer, *Kant* (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 225–226. For an ingenious attempt to solve Kant’s problem from a Kantian perspective, see Seiriol Morgan, “The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity’s Radical Evil in Kant’s Religion,” *Philosophical Review* 114, no. 1 (January 2005).
2. See Alison Assiter, “Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil,” *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 72 (July 2013): 275–296 for some discussion of attempts to solve this problem for Kant.
3. See Assiter, 2015, Chap. 3.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Edited and translated by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 26; Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900), 5:29.
5. Friedrich W.J. Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), translation of the *Freiheitsschrift*, in the *Sämmtliche Werke* (Beck & Oldenbourg: Munich, 1959).
6. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987). Hereafter cited as CJ.
7. Kant, CJ.
8. Yervan H. Krikorian (ed.) Epilogue, *The Nature of Naturalism in Naturalism and the Human Spirit* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944) quoted in Fiona Ellis, *God, Value and Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 9.
9. See Ellis, 2014 for references to theories that view powers as dubious kinds of entity.
10. See, for example, Lynn Margulis, “Biologists Can’t Define Life,” in *From Gaia to Selfish Genes: Selected Writings in the Life Sciences*, ed. C. Barlow (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1991).
11. Ibid. 25.
12. See, for example, Peter van Inwagen, “An Argument for Incompatibilism,” in *Free Will*, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
13. Ibid. 33 (my italics).
14. Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*, edited and translated by Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 7. Hereafter cited as CA.
15. CA, 52.
16. CA, 41.
17. Haufniensis distinguishes his own understanding of this “leap” from Hegelian logical understanding. “Hegel’s misfortune is exactly that he wants to maintain the new quality and yet he does not want to do it, since he wants to do it in logic...” (CA, 30, footnote). Hegel’s conception of the leap is contrasted there with that of Schelling.
18. Robert Stern, *Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
19. CA, 131.
20. CA, 117.
21. See CA, 118–136.
22. CA, 123.
23. This is conceived in a weaker sense than the Kantian “absolute spontaneity.”

24. Alenka Zupancic, *Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan* (London: Verso, 2000), 80–82.
25. I am using the pseudonymous author of CA. However, I believe that there are continuities in the various pseudonymous texts of Kierkegaard as well as between these and the works written in Kierkegaard's own name.
26. Schelling, 2006, 59, VII, 395.
27. CA, 64.
28. CA, 65.
29. CA, 47, footnote.
30. Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness unto Death*. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 14.
31. CA, 57–58.
32. CA, 59.
33. Grant, 2006, 37.
34. Grant, 2006, 162.
35. CA, 155.
36. CA, 42.
37. Immanuel Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," in *Anthropology, History, Education*, Vol. 10, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. and trans Robert B. Loudan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 160–175.
38. See F.W.J. Schelling, *Ages of the World*, trans. Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942); and Grant, Iain Hamilton, *On an Artificial Earth: Philosophies of Nature after Schelling* (London: Continuum, 2006).
39. F.W.J. Schelling, *Ages of the World*, 5.
40. See CA, 155.
41. M. Hesse, "Tropical Talk; the Myth of the Literal," *The Aristotelian Society* 61 (1987): 297–310, 311.
42. See, for one example of such a view, Galen Strawson, *The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility*, in Watson, *Free Will*.
43. Thomas Nagel, *Freedom*, in Watson, *Free Will*, 231.



<http://www.springer.com/978-3-319-57086-0>

Evil, Fallenness, and Finitude  
Benson, B.E.; Putt, B.K. (Eds.)  
2017, VI, 224 p., Hardcover  
ISBN: 978-3-319-57086-0