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## Recognition Theory and Kantian Cosmopolitanism

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Kantian moral theory is construed as the paradigm of deontology, where such an approach to ethics is opposed to consequentialism and perfectionism. However, in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*, Kant understands historical progress in terms of the realisation of our rational capacities, to the extent that such emphasis on capability actualisation amounts to a form of moral perfectionism: wars and incessant periods of armed conflict lead rulers to grasp the value of peace, because war and armed conflict prevent human beings from achieving self-realisation. For Kant, in order to enable self-realisation, states must work together to establish a federal union of republican governments.

The aim of this chapter is to (i) articulate and defend a perfectionist dimension of Kantian ethics; and (ii) propose that an insightful way of articulating Kantian Cosmopolitanism can be provided by paying significant

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attention to recognition theory. Following Honneth's model of diagnostic social philosophy, I argue that armed conflict is best understood in terms of a particularly complex form of social pathology, where the peaceful resolution of such conflict requires a complex form of diagnosis and therapy. Under such an account, leadership involves taking the lead in diagnosing armed conflict as arising from an especially traumatic asymmetrical recognition order, and in proposing genuinely practical therapeutic solutions to resolving conflict by advocating specific progressive transformations to the current asymmetrical recognition order.<sup>1</sup>

## I

In her "A Habitat for Humanity," Barbara Herman relays an anecdote from her Kantian intellectual autobiography. As she writes, "I first read the *Idea* as a graduate student, at a time when I was in the grip of an austere reading of Kant's moral theory drawn mostly from the *Groundwork*. The dissonance between Kant's views about history in the *Idea* and what I understood to be his core moral views was at once disorienting and exhilarating."<sup>2</sup> What I find especially interesting here is that I find myself sharing the same formal phenomenology of disorientation and exhilaration when looking at the *Idea* and the central tenets of Kantian moral theory as presented in the *Groundwork*. For Herman, what underpins her sense of disorientation and exhilaration here is how she thinks, "Kant oriented historical thought around a global moral purpose that challenged the austere versions of the moral philosophy."<sup>3</sup> To understand what exactly Herman means, a brief return to the basics of Kantian ethics and a brief explication of the principal feature of the *Idea* is required.

According to Kantian ethics, the moral worth of actions consists in having a good will and correctly enacting the moral law: as rational autonomous agents, we are naturally sensitive to the deontic prescriptive demands of practical reason, "the legislation that comes from our own rational will."<sup>4</sup> Crucially, such sensitivity is *natural* for us, since human reason is self-legislating: the normative demands of the moral law are not imposed on us by any external authority, whether that

external authority is a divine commander or the world itself in some way, rather moral norms derive their authority from the demands of practical reason *itself*. Correspondingly, we understand human agency—specifically the normative dimension of *moral action*—in terms of formulating the moral law and then performing it successfully (or not).

Kant, famously, offers three ways of formulating the moral law, where the formulations provide a picture of the categorical demandingness of moral normativity and the concomitant picture of what human agency looks like. The first formulation of the law, the Formula of Universal Law tells us that we may not adopt a maxim that we cannot will to be a universal law, a morally valid law for all rational beings.<sup>5</sup> The second principal formulation,<sup>6</sup> dubbed by Kant as the Formula of Humanity as End in Itself, tells us that we must treat fellow human beings as ends in themselves and never as a means to an end.<sup>7</sup> The third form of the moral law, namely the Formula of Autonomy and its variant, the Formula of the Realm of Ends,<sup>8</sup> demands of human agents that we obey the laws that we are sensitive to through the use of our practical reason, and “whose universal observance would result in a ‘realm of ends’.”<sup>9</sup>

Given that Kant explicates agency here in terms of a genus of cognitive procedures wherein each autonomous being determines whether or not their beliefs/attitudes adequately pass the test of universalisability, and acts in the way the moral law demands autonomous beings to do so, I think it would not be unreasonable to claim that the overall view of human agency painted by the *Groundwork* is one of agency as “autarky.”<sup>10</sup> All that is required of rational subjects is that they judge and act on the moral law without having to recourse to other rational subjects to make sense of the sources and authority of moral norms—intersubjectivity and sociality are deemed unnecessary for this cognitive endeavour here. This is not to say that other agents do not figure in our normative deliberation; rather, what Kant seems to be articulating is the notion that an individual rational agent need only reflect on the moral law within themselves in order to understand what is and what is not morally acceptable.

A difficulty, however, starts to emerge when we consider this conception of agency in relation to the conception of agency developed in both

the *Idea* and in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*: while the *Groundwork* focuses on an understanding of morality solely focused on respect for the moral law and the self-legislation of a rational will, the understanding of morality as it appears in the *Idea* is one that is focused on a perfectionist dimension.<sup>11</sup> For, Kant places significant emphasis on the development of the rational capacities of the human species as central to our self-realisation. As he writes:

[Human beings] shall not partake in any happiness or perfection other than that which they attain free of instinct and by means of their own reason.<sup>12</sup>

Human beings have an inclination to *associate* with one another because in such a condition they feel themselves to be more human, that is to say, more in a position to develop their natural predispositions.<sup>13</sup>

Such a commitment to perfectionism also appears in the *Anthropology*:

... [the human being] has a character, which he himself creates, insofar as he is capable of perfecting himself in accordance to ends that he himself adopts. By means of this the human being, as an animal endowed with the *capacity of reason* (*animale rationabile*), can make out of himself a *rational animal* (*animal rationale*) – whereby he first *preserves* himself and his species; second, *trains*, *instructs*, and *educates* his species for domestic society; third, *governs* it as a systematic whole (arranged according to principles of reason) appropriate for society.<sup>14</sup>

By advocating a perfectionist criterion for the human good, Kant thinks our rational species-nature is not only constituted but also gradually improved. There seems to be compelling reason to suppose the picture of agency in both the *Idea* and the *Anthropology* appears to be dissonant with the autarky and deontology of the *Groundwork* stance. For, as Herman writes, “[a]mong the things that the *Idea* implies is that moral justificatory principles cannot stand alone—they do not describe and cannot guarantee an ethical life.”<sup>15</sup> In other words, what we find absent in the *Groundwork* but present in the *Idea* is an apparent *post-Kantian*/proto-Hegelian commitment

to regarding agency and normativity as being constituted intersubjectively in social and historical contexts.<sup>16</sup>

The reason why intersubjectivity is favoured here over autarky is that autarky and procedural reflection on the *form* of moral norms fail to be *completely* illustrative of our moral phenomenology, our ethical *Erlebnis*. For, a central feature of human agency and a central feature of our normative practices is how we find ourselves *answerable to one another*, to the extent that “rational capacities are realised through response to developmentally salient experiences.”<sup>17</sup> This reveals the extent to which we find ourselves embedded in the *social* space of reasons, wherein each rational agent plays the game of giving *and* asking for reasons.

Understood in this way, the perfectionist emphasis on development and the inherent sociality of self-actualisation is significant for two reasons: firstly, “[i]t is to say something about the conditions in which persons can come to recognise themselves and others as subject to moral authority ... If autarky is not a possible moral state, if the moral agency and sensibility of each (and so the best) person is partly constituted by background social institutions, we are not just adding something to the traditional *Groundwork* picture of the moral agent, we are changing it.”<sup>18</sup> We are changing it, insofar as, to quote Karl Ameriks, we view Kant as holding “that morality calls us not merely to respect the moral law but also to be active rational agents.”<sup>19</sup> Such a moral subject is active to the extent that they are not passive “in the use of [their] reason,”<sup>20</sup> where the sense of passivity here is one that is formally similar to that of the logical egoist, namely someone who considers themselves “to be cognitively self-sufficient.”<sup>21</sup> As Kant writes in the *Anthropology*:<sup>22</sup>

The *logical egoist* considers it unnecessary to test his judgement also by the understanding of others; as if he had no need at all for this touchstone (*criterium veritatis externum*). But it is so certain that we cannot dispense with this means of assuring ourselves of the truth of our judgement that this may be the most important reason why learned people cry out so urgently for *freedom of the press*. For if this freedom is denied, we are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our own judgements, and we are exposed to error.<sup>23</sup>

As *active* rational agents, we do not view ourselves as normatively self-sufficient. However, this does not mean that we thereby relinquish our status as *independent thinkers*. Rather, this means that we continuously check our individual commitments and judgements against the commitments and judgements of our fellow moral agents.<sup>24</sup> Crucially, though, the practice of assenting to and acknowledging normative constraints and normative entitlements does *not* involve a crude constructivism or crude anti-realism. What this particular form of social engagement involves is that “the precise content of those implicit norms is determined through a ‘process of *negotiation*’ involving ourselves *and* those who attribute norms to us.”<sup>25</sup> By virtue of being a process of *negotiation* as opposed to a non-negotiated process, what is deemed appropriate or inappropriate is never *fixed* but always subject to “further assessment, challenge, defence, and correction.”<sup>26</sup>

Secondly, Kant’s perfectionist emphasis on the social development of human rational capacities plays a central role in his critique of war and his arguments for peace. Arguably, his most powerful condemnation of war and armed conflict is made in the following passage from the *Idea*:

As long as states use all their resources to realise their vain and violent goals of expansion and thereby continue to hinder the slow efforts to cultivate their citizens’ mind and even to withhold all support from them in this regard, then nothing of the sort can be expected, because such moral cultivation requires a long internal process in every commonwealth in order to educate its citizens.<sup>27</sup>

Though Kant appears to restrict war and armed conflict to military campaigns of territorial expansion,<sup>28</sup> his principal objection here to these kinds of practices is one made on perfectionist grounds: the use of capital by the state for the purpose of military engagement over a sustained period of time prevents citizens from achieving self-realisation, since such a use of capital is not being directed to the development of the rational capacities of the citizenry. In other words, there is a significant and damaging opportunity cost in the diversion of capital and resources from the effort to gradually improve the *Bildung* of the community. Of course, by this, Kant is not suggesting that the *only* terrible

and condemnable feature of war and armed conflict is that the state is misusing its resources. Nor is Kant suggesting that the *only* concern of the state should be spending *all* its capital on developing a rational group of citizens. Rather, the specific focus of his critique here is on the ways in which war acts as a barrier to the rational development of the human *species in general*: a paradoxical feature of human nature, for Kant, is that we possess “unsociable sociability,”<sup>29</sup> namely a social disposition towards forming communal relations with others, which is also offset against an anti-social disposition towards wanting to dominate and control others.<sup>30</sup> Our principal means of overcoming our unsociable attitudes in favour of realising our inherent sociability is through the development of our rational capacities, because as we refine our critical thinking and become *progressively* enlightened, we gradually learn to rid ourselves of “prejudices and superstition.”<sup>31</sup> However, warfare “... tends to stifle the developmental process within states,” because funds necessary for educative endeavours are diverted to the military, and civil rights are often violated for the sake of national security.<sup>32</sup> Since the developmental process is stifled, our capacity for critical thinking is not refined, meaning that we fail to become more enlightened and therefore remain asleep in our dogmatic slumbers. Not only that, as our unsociable disposition grows stronger, we want to dominate and control others thereby creating a sort of social alienation. The extent to which we are social is then also the extent to which the unsociable disposition alienates us from ourselves as well. By consequence, our failure to be roused from such dogmatic slumbers prevents us from achieving self-realisation and attaining human perfection.

If we are to develop our rational capacities and thereby progress on the road to self-realisation, then it is clear, on the Kantian picture, that the *only* environment conducive to such anthropological development is an environment of peace. Crucially, though, Kant’s understanding of peace is one that does not merely involve the obvious commitment to a cessation of hostilities (whether such hostilities are military or diplomatic ones). Kantian peace is also committed to a particular geopolitical order that provides the conditions for pacific internal and international relations. As he writes:

... through wars, through the excessive and ceaseless preparations for war, through the resulting distress that every state, even in times of peace, must ultimately feel internally, nature drives humankind to make initially imperfect attempts, but finally, after the ravages of war, after the downfalls, and after even the complete internal exhaustion of its powers, [nature] impels humankind to take the step that reason could have told it to take without all these lamentable experiences: to abandon the lawless state of savagery and enter into a federation of peoples.<sup>33</sup>

The formation of a cosmopolitan federal union of republican states with coercive powers to enforce its laws, what Kant calls the “*cosmopolitan condition*,”<sup>34</sup> is deemed to provide the required conditions for peace insofar as such a political and legal order exemplifies our concerted wish to overcome unsociability and realise our sociability. Much like Hegel’s account of the development of *Geistigkeit* as an arduous pathway of despair that eventually culminates in rational satisfaction,<sup>35</sup> Kantian cosmopolitanism views the process of rational development of the human species in terms of necessarily requiring to *pass* through periods of significant strife and challenges: we do not envision bringing about a federal union simply because we naturally prefer such a socio-political legal ordering *from the outset*. Rather, our unsociable sociability forces us to engage in all sorts of unpleasant and morally reprehensible practices, whose consequences are so harrowing that they *rationaly* compel us to overcome those normative *Weltanschauungen* that are symptomatic of the unsociable aspects of our nature,<sup>36</sup> so that we can fully development our sociality. This is what I take Kant to be saying in the following passages from the *Idea* and the *Anthropology*:

It is only in a refuge such as a civic union that these same inclinations subsequently produce the best effect, just as trees in a forest, precisely by seeking to take air and light from all others around them, compel each other to look for air and light above themselves and thus grow up straight and beautiful, while those that live apart from others and sprout their branches freely grow stunted, crooked, and bent.<sup>37</sup>

So it presents the human species not as evil, but as a species of rational beings that strives among obstacles to rise out of evil in constant progress



toward the good. In this its volition is generally good, but achievement is difficult because one cannot expect to reach the goal by the free arrangement of *individuals*, but only by a progressive organisation of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united.<sup>38</sup>

Having explored the perfectionist dimension to Kantian ethics, and having sketched the central claims of Kantian Cosmopolitanism, in what follows, I shall propose that Kantian Cosmopolitanism can be articulated in terms of recognition theory. Following Honneth's model of diagnostic social philosophy, I argue that armed conflict is best understood in terms of a particularly complex form of social pathology, where the peaceful resolution of such conflict requires a complex form of diagnosis and therapy. Under such an account, leadership involves taking the lead in diagnosing armed conflict as arising from an especially traumatic asymmetrical recognition order, and in proposing genuinely practical therapeutic solutions to resolving conflict by advocating specific *progressive transformations* to the current asymmetrical recognition order.

## II

One of the key developments in practical philosophy over recent decades has been the rise of diagnostic social philosophy.<sup>39</sup> In the words of its leading contemporary exponent, Axel Honneth, such a tradition "... is primarily concerned with determining and discussing processes of social development that can be viewed as misdevelopments, disorders or 'social pathologies' ... Its primary task is the diagnosis of processes of social development that must be understood as preventing the members of society from living a 'good life'."<sup>40</sup> Under such a framework, the methodology of diagnostic social philosophy roughly follows the approach of curing some kind of ailment or disease: just as a physician will first diagnose the condition and then administer some cure, the diagnostic social theorist must first diagnose the relevant social

problem and then work out a cogent means of curing the malady.<sup>41</sup> As Christopher Zurn writes:

First, each theorist points to some malady or ailment that troubles their own society, and identify some particular causes of that disorder which are specifically social. That is, the disorder is said to be rooted in the particular ordering or structuring or practices of the society. Further, the disorder identified is said to be a social problem or pathology because it impedes the ability of individuals to live fulfilling, or fully realised, or ethically praiseworthy, or happy lives. Thus the inability of individuals to live the “good life” according to the standards of the theory is said to be caused by particular features of the present social ordering.<sup>42</sup>

For Honneth, the touchstone concept for articulating the formal complexities of social pathologies is *recognition*, the practice of acknowledging and being acknowledged by others: under recognition theory, one understands the form of social conflict and pathology in terms of uncovering the moral grammar of the society in question. By uncovering the moral grammar of society, one is able to *reveal the moral and social commitments* governing how members of that society interact with one another. Social conflict, then, is understood to arise from how certain collective groups within a given society experience either *misrecognition* or *nonrecognition*: in cases of misrecognition, the recognition order of a society acknowledges the subjectivity of a group or minority, but, incorrectly, does not afford that particular subjectivity the *same* level of respect and value as that of the majority. In cases of nonrecognition, the recognition order of a society incorrectly fails to acknowledge the subjectivity of a group or minority, incorrectly affording that group or minority *no* positive normative status at all. Both misrecognition and nonrecognition are severely detrimental to human development, since they are not genuine forms of *intersubjective recognition*: “[t]hrough intersubjective recognition, [one] is engaged in the process of self-realisation with respect to [one’s] practical relation-to-self,”<sup>43</sup> to the extent that the self-realisation of any individual can only be achieved in a progressive social environment. To quote Fred Neuhaus on this subject, “[t]he idea here is that each type of identity has a distinct value for

individuals and that possessing them all is essential to realising the full range of possible modes of selfhood. To miss out on any of these forms of social membership, then, is to be deprived of one of the basic ways of being a self and hence to suffer an impoverishment of one's life."<sup>44</sup>

However, as Honneth writes, "[i]f one interprets social struggle from the perspective of moral experiences in the manner mentioned, there is no theoretical pre-commitment in favour of either non-violent or violent resistance. Instead, at the level of description, it is left entirely open whether social groups employ material, symbolic, or passive force to publicly articulate and demand restitution for the disrespect and violation that they experience as being typical."<sup>45</sup> Though recognition theory is *neutral* with regard to explicating social conflict as *necessarily armed* social conflict or non-armed social conflict, I think there are compelling reasons to think that the conceptual and methodological resources of recognition theory can be used *along with* those of a plurality of social sciences, namely anthropology, social psychology, economics, politics, and culture theory, to provide an explanation for why a social conflict is an armed conflict.<sup>46</sup> An especially illuminating feature of recognition theory is the way in which it articulates the complexities of the phenomenology of disrespect and the rational motivation to express resistance to such disrespect in a collective way—to use a Hegelian *tournure de phrase*, the manner in which the "I" becomes the "We." As Honneth writes:

Feelings of having been disrespected ... form the core of moral experiences that are part of the structure of social interaction because human subjects encounter one another with expectations for recognition, expectations on which their psychological integrity turns. Feelings of having been unjustly treated can lead to collective actions to the extent to which they come to be experienced by an entire circle of subjects as typical for their social situation ... [T]he models of conflict that start from the collective feelings of having been unjustly treated are those that trace the emergence and course of social struggles back to moral experiences of social groups who face having legal or social recognition withheld from them ... [In this case] we are dealing with the analysis of a struggle over the intersubjective conditions for personal integrity.<sup>47</sup>

What the analysis of a struggle over the intersubjective conditions for personal integrity provides is an additional social perspective on why armed conflict occurs: one can diagnose armed conflict as arising from an especially traumatic asymmetrical recognition order, where the phenomenology of disrespect is so intense and unbearable that those affected by the debilitating effects of such trauma feel that the only way of expressing outrage and a desire for restitution is through armed activity. Crucially, however, this framework for making sense of the aetiology of armed conflict is *not* meant to replace or reject those models that account for the materialist issues at the heart of the conflict. Rather, the aim of the recognition model is to provide a hitherto neglected but significant dimension to an incredibly complex *explanans*. Moreover, just as a physician's diagnosis of a pathological condition is refined by considering a wide variety of causes and explanations, a social theorist's diagnosis of a social pathological condition is refined by engaging in critical interdisciplinary enquiry. By consequence, when a diagnosis is refined more and more, there is less chance of misdiagnosing the condition with potentially fatal therapeutic results.

For the recognition theorist, since they offer a social diagnosis of a social malady in terms of uncovering the moral grammar underlying an asymmetrical recognition order, the kind of therapeutic programme suggested is one rooted in developing the conditions required to bring about genuine intersubjective recognition. Given this, I think there is compelling reason to regard the efforts to bring about genuine intersubjective recognition as a way of articulating the Kantian cosmopolitan condition: the formation of a cosmopolitan federal union of republican states with coercive powers to enforce its laws is deemed to provide the required conditions for peace insofar as such a political and legal order exemplifies our concerted wish to overcome unsociability and realise our sociability. The practice of *overcoming unsociability and realising our sociability* seems to effectively be the same as the process of *transitioning from asymmetrical recognition orders to genuinely intersubjective and symmetrical recognition orders*, since *true* sociality does not merely consist in interacting with others *simpliciter*, but rather in interacting with others in such a way that enables self-realisation. Moreover, what is crucial about *this* particular conception of sociality, one that is grounded

in the concept of intersubjective recognition, is how the *logic* of intersubjective recognition *naturally aims at* cosmopolitanism: the “I” first finds itself in the “We” of the family; then in the “We” of a community; then in the “We” of a state-citizensry; then in the “We” of continental federal citizensry; and then finally in the “We” of a global federation.<sup>48</sup>

In response, a potential critic of my account may well object to the putative virtues of articulating the Kantian cosmopolitan condition and realising the goals of perfectionism under the framework of intersubjective recognition: from the perspective of Foucault’s and Judith Butler’s variety of post-structuralist social theory,<sup>49</sup> not only does the concept of intersubjective recognition fail to explain how power operates in the normatively integrated social spheres—the ways in which “power relations centrally structure intersubjective recognition”<sup>50</sup>—the concept also fails to show adequate sensitivity to how forms of recognition themselves produce and endorse unequal power between people.<sup>51</sup> Given this, there appears to be significant reason to think that recognition theory fails to be a properly *critical* social theory.

Though the post-structuralist critique of Honneth seems compelling—even the most sympathetic defender of recognition theory would recognise the lack of a satisfactory theory of power—I would not regard this limitation to be a “call for rejection, but for further work in broadening and diversifying the basic social theory”:<sup>52</sup> there seems to be nothing in the conceptual resources of either theories of power or the current iteration of recognition theory to suggest that they cannot be compatible with one another, not in the least because *both* approaches to social and political philosophy are exemplars of *anti-ideal* political philosophy.<sup>53</sup> For, that Honneth puts significant emphasis on sociology and historiography gives one *prima facie* reason to hope that the power relations theorist and the recognition theorist can pool their respective resources to understand social struggles, thereby having important consequences for the concept of leadership:

The motor and the medium of the historical process of realising institutionalised principles of freedom is not the law, at least not in the first instance, but social struggles over the appropriate understanding of these principles and the resulting changes of behaviour. Therefore, the fact that

contemporary theories of justice are guided almost exclusively by the legal paradigm is a theoretical folly. We must instead take account of sociology and historiography, as these disciplines are inherently more sensitive to changes in everyday moral behaviour.<sup>54</sup>

Under such an account, leadership involves taking the lead in diagnosing armed conflict as arising from an especially traumatic asymmetrical recognition order, and in proposing genuinely practical therapeutic solutions to resolving conflict by advocating specific *progressive transformations* to the current asymmetrical recognition order. Just like the Machiavellian Prince must be completely embedded in his socio-political environment and be attuned to a multiplicity of internal and external political relations, leaders, according to recognition theory, must be completely attuned to the moral grammar of societies and take clear initiatives to enact meaningful *progressive policies* to realise genuine inter-subjective recognition.<sup>55</sup> While, of course, very few ever approximate such standards, this idea of leadership, as Kant would say, is “an idea to be diligently pursued as the vocation of the human race.”<sup>56</sup>

## Notes

1. As armed conflict is understood in terms of a complex social pathology, requiring complex diagnosis and therapy, leadership might not always involve taking the lead. Sometimes, it may be enough to simply be open to possible diagnoses and therapies proposed by others (subordinates or externals). In other words: positive change (and, of course, problems) can come from many directions and good leaders should be able to recognise this early and adapt their plans accordingly.
2. Herman (2009, 151).
3. Ibid., 152.
4. Schneewind (2002, 85).
5. Cf. “The categorical imperative is thus only a single one, and specifically this: *Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law*” (Kant 2002, 421).

6. I have written ‘second principal formulation’ here, as Kant introduces a second formulation, which is a *variant* of the Formula of Universal Law, namely the Formula of the Law of Nature.
7. Cf. Kant (2002, 429).
8. Cf. Kant (2002, 431–433).
9. Wood (2009, 121).
10. Herman (2009, 159).
11. Perfectionism has its roots in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he famously writes: “The function of man [is] a certain kind of life, and this [is] an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man [is] the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence, human good turns out to be activity of the soul in conformity with excellence” (Aristotle 2005, 1098a12–16).  
To quote Terry Irwin here: “(1) Human nature consists in rational agency, that is, in exercising the capacity to guide behaviour by practical reason. (2) The human good consists in the full actualisation of this capacity in fulfilling our other capacities. (3) The virtues are the different ways of actualising this capacity” (Irwin 2009, 882).
12. Kant (2009, 19).
13. Ibid., 20–21.
14. Kant (2006, 321–22).
15. Herman (2009, 152).
16. One should note here that the task of the *Groundwork* is *not* one that aims to provide the socio-historical material conditions of moral agency. Rather, all the *Groundwork* focuses on is understanding the formal and rational conditions of moral agency under various formulae for universalisability. Under this formal account, it does not follow that there are no socio-historical conditions for such agency. Still, the *Idea* goes a step further by claiming that such agency is constituted intersubjectively.
17. Herman (2009, 160).
18. Ibid., 161.
19. Ameriks (2009, 66).
20. Deligiorgi (2002, 150).
21. Ibid., 150.
22. See also his *Lectures on Logic*: §740.

23. Kant (2006, 128–29).
24. Cf. the following passage from the *Lectures on Logic*: “An *external* mark or an *external* touchstone of truth is the comparison of our own judgements with those of others, because the subjective will not be present in all others in the same way, so that illusion can thereby be cleared up. The *incompatibility* of the judgements of other with our own is thus an external mark of error and is to be regarded as a cue to investigate our procedure in judgement, but not for that reason to reject it at once” (Kant 1992, §57, 563).
25. Houlgate (2007, 139).
26. Brandom (1994, 647).
27. Kant (2009, 26).
28. Here, Kant only condemns goals of expansion and, indirectly, any other political goals that hinder intellectual and moral cultivation. However, it is not immediately clear if this Kantian condemnation *also* extends to wars of defence (where states simply defend their efforts and means to enable their citizens’ flourishing), or what we now call humanitarian intervention (especially when we use armed force to secure another state’s efforts and means of flourishing).
29. Kant (2009, 26).
30. This is reminiscent of Freud’s *Thanatos* (death-drive) and its sublimation. Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization* brings this together with his own views on alienation (which, in turn, are much influenced by his interpretation of Hegelian recognition theory). A precise analysis, tracking down similarities between Kant’s unsociable sociability and Marcuse’s interpretation of Freud, is very interesting and worth pursuing.
31. Kleingeld (2009, 173).
32. *Ibid.*, 173.
33. Kant (2009, 24).
34. *Ibid.*, 28.
35. Cf. the following section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “[Philosophical critique] can be taken to be the path of natural consciousness which presses forward towards true knowledge, or it can be taken to be the path of the soul as it wanders through the series of the ways it takes shape, as if those shapes were stations laid out for it by its own nature so that it both might purify itself into spirit and, through a complete experience of itself, achieve a cognitive acquaintance of what



it is in itself. This path can accordingly be regarded as the path of *doubt*, or, more properly, as the path of despair ...” (Hegel 1977, §77–78)

36. By this, I mean ideologies of conquest and colonisation, to name a few.
37. Kant (2009, 22).
38. Kant (2006, 333).
39. The diagnostic social philosophical tradition has its historical roots in the work of de Tocqueville, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Nietzsche, Tönnies, Durkheim, Weber, Lukács, Spengler, Dewey, Plessner, Fromm, Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse, Bataille, Gehlen, Heller, Márcus, Arendt, Habermas, Foucault, and Taylor.
40. Honneth (2007, 4).
41. An important qualification should be made here: what counts as health is a matter of empirical fact and the relation between therapy and achieving physical health is a nomological relation. But what counts as a good life or a flourishing society (where it is possible for all citizens to live a good life) is not a matter of empirical fact. Furthermore, it is not clear that the relation between ethical actions and political programmes on the one hand and goals like a good life or a flourishing society on the other hand need be nomological. So, I would argue that whatever social pathologies are, they are categorically distinct from the sort of pathologies we find in medicine. My feeling is that social pathologies are best understood in terms of alienation (and this is why Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche—among others—play a special role in understanding social pathologies).
42. Zurn (2015, 93).
43. Ibid., 25.
44. Neuhauser (2008, 223).
45. Honneth (1995, 163).
46. Of course, this is not to claim that any social conflict is also an armed conflict.
47. Ibid., 165.
48. Consider this in parallel with the Stoics’ understanding of the development of collective identity: “Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles ... The first and closest circle is the one which a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind. This circle encloses the body and anything taken for the sake of the body ... The second one contains parents, siblings, wife, and children ... The third one has in it uncles and aunts ... The next residents, then that

- of fellow citizens ... The outermost and largest circle, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race" (Hierocles, *Stobaeus* 4.671, 7–673, 11, quoted in Long and Sedley 1987, 349).
49. See Butler (1997).
  50. Zurn (2015, 209).
  51. See Allen (2010) and McNay (2008).
  52. Zurn (2015, 205).
  53. Some concept of social alienation à la Marcuse can play a central role in explaining both asymmetrical recognition orders and how power operates.
  54. Honneth (2014, 329).
  55. Of course, Machiavelli's image of a perfect leader envisages her or him as a *heroic* leader. But, it seems recognition theory simply requires a leader that is sensitive to and can cope with certain social processes where disrespect and reactions to disrespect are involved. Such a leader need not be heroic or take clear initiatives as long as he or she can disentangle the asymmetrical recognition order. A leader who corresponds more to a *fatherly*, *motherly* or the *éminence grise* archetypes may have other ways to take influence and change things for good.
  56. Kant (2006, 331).

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