The Two Modern Dictatorships in Romania and Chile 1970s–1989

The regimes of Nicolae Ceauşescu in Romania (1965–1989) and Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973–1989) are viewed by political science analyses as dissimilar cases, as totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, respectively. In this book, I compare their opposing strategies for the artistic sphere and show that they are not only comparable, but also had similarities in the approaches that they took to the artistic world. I consider these two regimes as the extremes of modern dictatorship in the second half of the twentieth century, as a result of their opposed ideological stances (communism versus anticommunism, or the doctrine of national security); their distinct projects for the artistic sphere, either centered around the state or dominated by the market; and their control of the reins of power. Comparing such extreme cases helps us to present the dictatorial approach to the arts and artists as seen in these two regions—Eastern Europe and South America—in the context of the Cold War.

In this chapter, I present the main features of these two modern dictatorships with regard to the control of power by the two dictators; their economic models; and the repressive system they enforced, which paradoxically led to the formation of <u>atomized</u> societies where the citizens were enclosed in private spaces.

2.1   The Ceaușescu Regime (1965–1989)

The Ceaușescu regime attempted to impose an exclusive version of reality to which everybody had to acquiesce, including artists. This official account drew on the previous socialist realist model, but it gradually assumed the characteristics superimposed by Ceaușescu himself.

The analyses of the Ceaușescu regime can be broken down into two broad categories. There are those studies which analyze it as a specific type of communism (national-communism) together with the other Eastern European communist regimes (Fejtö, Soulet). Other analyses highlight the importance of the leader himself, and of his original blend of communism, nationalism, and his own personal ideas. These studies emphasize either the Marxist-Leninist (Fischer, Gilberg) or the Stalinist (Tismăneanu) elements identifiable in the Ceaușescu regime's approach. In spite of these elements, the specificity of the regime is delineated using a variety of formulae. For Juan Linz, the Ceaușescu regime would be a case of sultanism—a specific type, as underlined by Trond Gilberg's term "Ceaușescuism." For Vladimir Tismăneanu, it represents a form of dynastic socialism, and for Fischer, a totalitarian dictatorship. This second approach is more rewarding as it underlines the importance of the leader, both in terms of the extreme centralization of power and as the source of a specific approach to the artistic sphere.

Moreover, most studies of the Ceaușescu regime observe two separate periods within it. The first, broadly between 1965 and 1971, saw an apparent liberalization in relation to the previous regime under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. It also saw an opening up toward the West, especially economically. During this first period, Ceaușescu applied a different strategy from that of his predecessor. Seeking to gain the popularity that he lacked, Ceaușescu tried to lure artists and intellectuals, attempting to gain their support by holding a series of meetings in 1965 and 1968. The year 1968 was of paramount importance as it was the year of his "defiance" of Moscow, of the affirmation of his autonomous policy, and the point at which a significant number of intellectuals and artists joined the ranks of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR). The second period (1971–1989) would be characterized by a strengthening of internal political control under the influential Asian model, as well as by the resumption of economic ties with the Soviet Union. This is significant because while in the first stage Ceaușescu presented himself as a more liberal leader, thereafter he resumed an even firmer control of

society, including artists and intellectuals. From 1974 onward, Ceauşescu was the sole power-holder: his authority inside the party and the state was absolute.

Nicolae Ceauşescu assumed power on the death of Romania's first communist leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, in March 1965. He rose to power despite other contenders for the position, such as State Council president Chivu Stoica and the three first deputy premiers: Gheorghe Apostol, who was apparently Dej's favorite; Emil Bodnăraş; and Alexandru Drăghici, who was the minister for Internal Affairs and chief of the Secret Police. Ceauşescu assumed total control of power both by politically annihilating his rivals and by making constant amendments to the institutional and legal instruments that would ensure the supreme title of president for himself. Ceauşescu was nominated as First Secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Romanian Workers' Party in March 1965, and unanimously elected General Secretary of the CC of the PCR by the participants in the Ninth Congress of July 1965.[1] Little by little, he removed all of his competitors and replaced them with trusted personnel. Ceauşescu's policy of eliminating his rivals had already been used by Dej, but, unlike Dej, Ceauşescu used institutional reorganization, and later the rotation of cadres, rather than public trials and imprisonment. Thus, Drăghici was eliminated at the PCR Ninth Congress of 1965, and Chivu Stoica in 1968.

The principle of collective leadership was gradually infringed upon. Using institutional amendments, at the Ninth Party Congress in 1965 the "old politburo was … replaced by two new bodies: a permanent standing presidium and an executive committee."[2] In December 1967, mandated by the National Conference of the PCR, the Great National Assembly elected Ceauşescu as president of the State Council and as General Secretary of the PCR, and no longer of the CC of the PCR. The Tenth Party Congress of 1969 abandoned the principle altogether; as Linz and Stepan observed, "the instrument that was most potentially useful for collective leadership was the fact that the Politburo and the Central Committee had the prerogatives of appointing and removing the General Secretary. Ceauşescu was able to shift these prerogatives to the much larger Party Congress, over which he had greater personal control."[3] Finally, on March 28, 1974, the Grand National Assembly elected Nicolae Ceauşescu as president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, thus making him the first Romanian president. The 1974 ceremony, "mimicking coronation," completed "the fusion of all key parts and state

Fig. 2.1 Nicolae Ceauşescu, general secretary of the PCR, president of the RSR with Elena Ceauşescu participated in the festivities for the 400 years of the anniversary of Scorniceşti and visited economic and cultural units of the commune. During their visit to the museum of history of the commune of Scorniceşti (22 September 1979). *Source* Fototeca online a comunismului românnesc (Online photoarchive of Romanian communism), Photo L162/1979. Reference 162/1979

roles," and Ceauşescu's use of the presidential scepter at his inauguration "was perhaps the first palpable sign of an unfolding dynastic scenario (Fig. 2.1)."[4]

Ceauşescu's strategy of legitimacy encompassed dual dimensions: within Romania, he replaced Dej's imaginary with his own (although he drew extensively on the original), and then imposed a new line on foreign policy, presenting himself as autonomous from Moscow. This external dimension was used to gain internal legitimacy. Ceauşescu substituted the myth of Dej with his own, and also established the "myth of the political reformer," giving the illusion of liberalization for a short period (1965–1971).[5] By accusing Dej of Stalinist atrocities, and by rehabilitating Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and other communist leaders executed

or imprisoned under Dej, Ceauşescu presented himself as "the restorer of legality."[6]

The year 1971 is considered to be the turning point in Ceauşescu's regime. After his journeys to China and North Korea, he increasingly transformed his regime into one similar to those of Mao and Kim Il Sung.

One point on which all the analyses of Romanian communism concur is that in the initial stages of his regime Ceauşescu presented himself as autonomous in relation to Moscow, in the lineage of Gheorghiu-Dej. This self-created staging was soon transformed into the myth of Romanian "national communism." The Romanian communists' opposition to the USSR began with Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and was not, as it was viewed at the time, a real break with Moscow.[7] In fact, Tismăneanu's main postulation is that Stalinism was never questioned by Romanian communists, be it Ceauşescu or Gheorghiu-Dej, and was not abandoned until the end.[8] Ceauşescu constructed an image of autonomy in foreign policy for himself, most importantly through his "balcony scene" of August 21, 1968, when he opposed the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.[9] His opposition to Moscow did not mean that he supported the opening up of the system, only that he was against the Soviet claim to control the Eastern Bloc.[10] Later, in the mid-1980s, Ceauşescu criticized Gorbachev for his reforms and "proclaimed Romania's priority to the USSR in terms of 'developing socialist democracy'."[11]

2.1.1   Extreme Personalization of Power

During the period 1974–1989 Ceauşescu's regime was characterized by an extreme personalization of power, which has been analyzed in terms of sultanism (Linz and Stepan), "Ceauşescuism" (Gilberg), or dynastic socialism (Tismăneanu). This personalization of power included the promotion of his close family to the highest ranks of power; the constant reshuffling of high officials, displaying features of clientelism based on the leader's unique will; and the slow but sure establishment of Ceauşescu as the sole source of state policy.

Sultanism is defined as "unrestrained personal rulership," a type of rule that is "unconstrained by ideology, rational-legal norms, or any balance of power," and Ceauşescu's regime would be characterized as "totalitarianist-sultanist."[12] Conversely, for Tismăneanu, it was a form of

"dynastic socialism," emphasizing the growing personal arbitrariness of the regime. While Linz and Stepan acknowledge the strong dynastic tendencies evident in the promotion of family members, and consider this manifestation to be a departure from strict totalitarianism, Tismăneanu stresses that Stalinism or neo-Stalinism cannot be ignored in the portrayal of the regime.[13]

Trond Gilberg analyzes the regime in terms of "Ceauşescuism," a set of unique traits that includes a form of national, personal, and nepotistic communism.[14] For Mary Ellen Fischer, there were four fundamental elements that defined Ceauşescu's rule: the personalization of power "including nepotism and the leadership cult," nationalism, "rapid industrialization of the economy at the expense of improved living standards," and "centralized political and economic control."[15] Fischer stresses the totalitarian turn operated by Ceauşescu through the centralization of power, his cult, the use of police terror, and the invasion of citizens' private lives.[16]

Dynastic socialism, sultanism, or Ceauşescuism all designate how the leader promoted his family or persons related to this inner circle on the basis of preferential criteria and not on the basis of performance, which Gilberg labeled "government by clan."[17] First and foremost, Elena Ceauşescu became the second most powerful person in Romania. A member of the CC since 1972, Elena rose to the positions of member of the Executive Committee and chair of the National Council for Science and Technology in 1974, only to become a member of the permanent presidium, chair of the CC for Cadres, and second in command of the regime as first deputy prime minister in the 1980s.[18] In fact, Elena's ascent to power led Tismăneanu to talk of a "bicephalous dictatorship."[19] In the Romanian collective mind, Elena Ceauşescu was considered to be the true holder of power, especially in the late 1980s. She was influential in the cultural, educational, and scientific fields. Monica Lovinescu stressed how "the monopoly of culture was placed in her hands; 'she approves (and particularly denies) editorial plans, forbids reediting, and wants revenge on the Academy'."[20]

Nicu Ceauşescu, third in line and the couple's youngest son, became prominent in the party and state hierarchies.[21] Leader of the Union of Communist Students' Associations in 1972, he followed in his father's footsteps by becoming the first secretary of the Communist Youth Union in 1983. A candidate member of the CC in 1979 at the Twelfth Congress and secretary of the Grand National Assembly, he was

confirmed as a full member of the CC in 1982, and became a candidate member of the executive committee at the Thirteenth Congress in 1984.[22] According to Tismăneanu, Nicu was also designated Nicolae's "heir-to-be," a final proof of the "degeneration of Romanian communism in[to] a dynastic form." In addition to his wife and son, Ceauşescu also promoted his brothers and his wife's family to the highest ranks.[23] Nicu intervened, as his mother did, in the cultural sphere: in May 1976, the *Flacăra Cenacle* (Flame Artists' Circle), one of the most important tools of the regime, came under the supervision of the CC of the Union of Communist Youth, and in December 1976 Nicu became secretary of this CC. Finally, in May 1978, he became a member of the Council of Romanian Radio-Television directed by Dumitru Popescu, one of the regime's ideologues.[24]

Ceauşescu's sultanistic leadership was increasingly visible in his policies, as he became the initiator of all policy at a national level.[25] This extreme personalization meant that no institutional autonomy could survive, and in the final period of his regime the dictator's speeches were simply collected and adopted as national programs of government.[26]

2.1.2   *People's Dictatorships: Mandatory Ritualized Participation*

The Ceauşescu regime, characterized by Gilberg as a "mobilization regime," entailed a series of "inclusion policies," as observed by Daniel Barbu and Mary Ellen Fischer following Jowitt, which ended up creating a society made up of atomized individuals (Gilberg), or a "weak state and a fragmented society" (Verdery). Thus, in spite of the policies of mobilization and inclusion, and the "voluntary participation" which was a characteristic of Mary Fulbrook's "participatory dictatorship," people tended to conform only in a ritual, formalized manner. After completing the assigned tasks of mandatory participation, people "escaped" in alternative private spaces where they exchanged information and shared entertaining activities.

Mandatory participation took many forms. Beyond being members of the PCR and other organizations, which were gender-based, age-based, or professional, from 1977 onward all Romanian citizens had to do patriotic work. Moreover, in a society in which being unemployed was forbidden, all employees were required to participate in the public demonstrations and increasingly numerous celebrations as the cult of the dictatorial couple intensified. In this sense, as Daniel Barbu observed, the

questions of both mobilization and inclusion are important if we want to understand the approach of the Romanian communist regime, especially after 1965. Gilberg's discussion of communist regimes in terms of "mobilization regimes" observes how "the politicization of Romanian life from top to bottom in the sense of mobilization of the masses for work is palpable, frantic, and at times hysterical in appearance. The cynicism and detachment of the masses are equally evident."[27]

The Ceauşescu regime enacted a "set of policies of inclusion" to such a great extent that in 1989, the PCR included 16% of Romanian citizens, "a third of the active population and a quarter of all adults. If we also count family members, three-quarters of Romanian society was linked institutionally, directly or indirectly, to the communist regime."[28] For Daniel Barbu, the Romanian communist regime's approach evolved "from repression, to mobilization and inclusion,"[29] and for Fischer (1989), it developed from a type of mobilized participation regime to an inclusive type, only to return to the first. Fischer evokes the "participatory reforms" introduced by Ceauşescu, drawing on Schulz's concept of "participation crisis" and on the two-stage process described by Kenneth Jowitt "when manipulation rather than domination becomes the defining relationship between regime and society."[30] These reforms were implemented in the period 1965–1971, when Ceauşescu returned to operating a mobilization regime. There were three major reforms, the first being "increased consultation with interested groups at all levels," and in this case, Ceauşescu's "work visits" are the most evocative example; these were gradually transformed into ritualized, staged interactions with the working people. The other two reforms were "a more important role for the Grand National Assembly" after 1965, and the introduction of "multi-candidate elections for the Grand National Assembly and other legislative bodies," implemented for the first time during the 1975 elections.

Daniel Barbu, however, questions the existence of a "public space" in communist Romania, because the "party did not want so much to represent society but to become society itself," and to that end it enrolled a significant part of society in its ranks, and created an array of structures called upon to make decisions in all fields.[31] Barbu considers that Romanian communism failed to rally support for its social project because Romanians generally do not participate in any societal project. Thus, there was mass participation and mobilization and the insertion of citizens at different levels, but this was only a ritual, formalized

participation. It is interesting to mention here the notion of "negoti-
ated participation" discussed by Daniel Barbu, departing from the clas-
sification of three types of participation in Soviet systems.[32] Katherine
Verdery also agrees that the two elements defining communist systems
are negotiation and the logic of allocative bureaucracies. The three
types of participation commonly encountered in Soviet systems, as dis-
cussed by Barbu, are: committed participation, petitioner participation,
and negotiated participation. The first is the ritual participation in the
regime's public manifestations, such as elections; the second character-
izes the citizens' relationship with the public officials and institutions;
while the third represents the constant bargaining with local authori-
ties. This negotiated participation "exerted an informal influence on the
modality in which the policies dictated at the center where applied at the
micro-level."[33] Barbu's observation matches Fulbrook's theorization of
the "participatory dictatorship," which included, through this "oxymo-
ronic expression," both the ways in which people were constrained and
the modalities in which they also "actively and often voluntarily carried
the ever changing social and political system of the GDR."[34]

These characteristics of the communist regime under Ceauşescu can
be identified in the relationship that the regime established with artists.
The regime imposed mandatory inclusion in state organizations, such
as the creative unions, in order to gain the right to produce art. Artists
were mobilized to participate in the state's structured cultural activities;
this is a constant of the official approach, which included, for example,
"voluntary participation" as professors in the popular art schools and
universities, but is perhaps best seen in the organization of the mass fes-
tival *Cântarea României* (Song to Romania). Negotiated participation is
also identifiable in the artistic world, as shown by the relationships that
writers attempted to establish with political power (Verdery, Dragomir).

2.1.3   The Economic Model

Romania under Ceauşescu continued to be an illustration of the model
of "intervention, control, and monopoly of the state on economy
and society."[35] Romania had a centralized economy in which specific
economic targets were set according to a predefined five-year plan.
Ceauşescu continued the gigantic projects of heavy industrialization, the
implementation of which seriously indebted Romania. In this context,
the oil crisis of the 1970s and Romania's inability to pay its foreign debts

led to the adoption of restrictive measures of economic autarky. These measures affected the living standards of Romanians, leading them to live in the absence of all basic provisions, including food, and making them even more apathetic and concentrated on the bare task of survival.

Ceauşescu's economic policies prolonged the Stalinist model of "the rapid growth of heavy industry financed largely by internal resources, which thus require[d] postponement of adequate supplies of consumer goods and services."[36] In this sense, Ceauşescu's "gigantomania" consisted of imagining disproportionate plans of constructing "huge factories, grandiose construction projects, and ongoing tasks so large that they defy technical capabilities and economic resources, let alone the manpower of the nation. Examples include the petrochemical combine at Piteşti, the Iron Gates project on the Danube River, the Danube-Black Sea Canal."[37] One direct consequence of Ceauşescu's grandiose industrialization projects was the growth of Romania's foreign debt, from $1.2 billion in 1971 to $9.5 billion in 1980.[38] In this context, the energy crisis of the 1970s proved decisive in the Romanian leader's plans. Additionally, the Iranian revolution worsened the landscape through the refusal of the new authorities to accept "payment for oil in inferior Romanian goods."[39]

Ceauşescu reacted by imagining an austerity policy designed to repay the debt, thus redirecting all agricultural and industrial production toward exports. In spite of its proclaimed independence, Romania continued to rely on Moscow for economic purposes, especially in the 1980s in the process of repaying the foreign debt.[40] As Fischer recalled, however, although the oil crisis was the catalyst for the new policy of autarky imposed by Ceauşescu at the beginning of the 1980s, it was not the only cause. Ceauşescu's decision to invest in "petroleum and petrochemical products and to minimize cooperation inside Comecon increased the country's dependency on hard currency imports of technology and raw materials, and the cost of these imports together reached unprecedented levels about 1980."[41] As a result,

the General Secretary proclaimed an austerity program, reduced energy consumption by administrative fiat, increased production quotas, speeded up his investment program, allocated increasingly scarce resources to production rather than consumption, and forced greater exports of saleable commodities such as foodstuffs, thus further lowering the standard of living. The leadership became obsessed with autarky; it drastically reduced

imports of all kinds, including technology, instead forcing the development of homemade technology.[42]

What followed was "a drastic fall in living standards."[43] The effects on daily life in the cities were disastrous. Daily deprivations were recorded in private journals kept by both intellectuals and ordinary people, even though people had already suffered for keeping journals, as the case of the engineer Gheorghe Ursu shows. The architect Gheorghe Leahu started his diary in 1985 and presented it as a manifest for eternity in which he recorded the everyday humiliations because he could not express his dissent in any other way. Leahu evokes his "adventures" in obtaining food and gasoline, his seven-day workweeks, the everyday feeling of injustice, and the double standards between the leadership and the Romanian population.

In 1981, food shortages were chronic as basic goods were rationed using food cards.[44] From 1981 to 1982, food rationing was rationalized through the so-called Program of Scientific Nutrition, which was intended to limit the consumption of products that were exported. The program established a monthly quota for bread, sugar, oil, eggs, and meat. Some of these products were quasi-permanently absent, particularly meat, and "the Official Bulletin tout[ed] the value and price of chicken claws, necks and heads apparently as a meat substitute."[45]

In this context, the practice of queuing for all basic provisions proliferated. People would stay for hours, day and night, waiting in line for the arrival of much-needed products. Staying in line (*a sta la coadă*) was so common that it marked popular consciousness and continues to do so even today. Paul Cernat writes one of the most evocative descriptions of the practice of queuing for food and fuel:

> In the 1980s, staying in line for basic products was a daily experience, familiar, an expression of underdevelopment and resignation with state-controlled misery … The dominant, overwhelming impression was that of open-air concentration camp … [it was] a school of everyday humiliation, of patience, submission, of the dole and gregarious exhaustion.[46]

As Cernat and Neculau underline, this daily devastation served to demobilize individuals and direct their energies solely toward survival, an element of discipline and of "colonization of free time."[47] People also queued for books, especially for those books that contained "lizards"

or (imagined) political allusions.[48] As queuing was one of the main daily preoccupations, it also became the place to socialize and came to be supervised by the *Securitate* (secret police) officers, who infiltrated queues and used this space to test the feelings of the population and to spread rumors.[49]

As well as staying in line for long hours, the secondary or informal economic networks dominated the background, leading to inequality in a proclaimed egalitarian society. Economic restrictions were not universal, as some categories of people could bypass them successfully, and new hierarchies were built within the system. Through bribes given to shop managers, and the use of family or friends, informal networks for obtaining rationed and often absent resources became paramount. Some of the direct beneficiaries, who often exploited their position for personal gain by reselling such inaccessible products, were the nomenklatura, officials at different levels, *Miliţia* (police) officers, butchers (in a country were all meat was exported), store managers, vendors, people working in the food industry and in restaurants, and air stewards. The broad range of deprivations was also alleviated by packages sent by relatives or friends who had emigrated, which included such inaccessible goods as chocolate or coffee.

This panorama was completed by chronic power and heating cuts, as from 1973 to 1979 restrictions were imposed on lighting, heating, and fuel.[50] Cities were left in a perfect "socialist pitch darkness" as a result of the daily blackouts. Theaters also modified their programs because of these restrictions, and plays began at 5 or 5:30 p.m.[51] On the rare occasions when there was electricity, television programs were nonetheless reduced and exclusively ideologically oriented. Restrictions were also imposed on traffic by the limit on acquiring gasoline for private cars, which from 1979 onward was accompanied by a program of alternating driving for private owners.[52]

As a result of these restrictions, a feeling of absurdity dominated most Romanians: "In a state which produces cars but bans driving, builds housing developments but withholds heat and running water, announces the biggest grain crop in history but implements a bread-rationing policy," in this "bizarre process of demodernization [that] the party press is constantly appealing … shops are advised to transport merchandise on tricycles; the use of refrigerators and washing machines is officially

discouraged and coal irons, hand mixers and oil lamps are considered better than modern energy-consuming electric devices."[53]

The effect of all of these measures was the generalization of anguish and constant fear, which dominated individuals who were mainly preoccupied with their physical survival. As a Romanian teacher recalls, in a survey carried out by Adrian Neculau: "From a psychological point of view, I felt a permanent tension, a state of anxiety … from morning to dawn I was in a state of continuous stress. I didn't know what tomorrow would bring besides interminable lines and countless hours spent in front of a store. … I was like a machine placed in the service of survival."[54]

2.1.4   *Repression, Fear, and Suspicion: The Securitate*

The Securitate, or Romanian secret police, played an important role in maintaining Ceauşescu's rule. Through the systematic use of terror and persecution, and by threatening people with the non-choice of prison versus internal or external exile, it maintained a general sentiment of "national pessimism," to use Vladimir Tismăneanu's expression.

At the beginning of his regime, Ceauşescu seemed to relinquish the power of the infamous Securitate as part of his previously described intention of myth-substitution. This is also shown by the fact that "he dismissed Alexandru Drăghici, the minister of Internal Affairs, a name associated with the Stalinist excesses, and dismissed many of his acolytes who had the same mentality,"[55] a measure which, for Tismăneanu, signaled a strengthening of the party's control over the Securitate.[56] Afterward, Ceauşescu stabilized his control of both the Party and the Securitate, which allowed him to remain in power for almost 35 years.

The Securitate "devoted itself to state terrorism" through the use of "violence, the silencing of information and the control of the population."[57] The construction of a society of terrorized individuals was achieved both by the citizens' quasi-permanent fear of the Securitate and by constant worry about survival. The fear instilled by the secret police was total, as its great strength "was that it managed to convince the population—that is, every individual—it was supervised and that no action and no gesture could escape authorities."[58] The degree of "mass supervision" was extreme in Romania, with "the expanded use of informers" and a "constant fear of surveillance and betrayal to the security

police" leading to "the legacy of suspicion and the tendency to focus on personal needs or the needs of the immediate family."[59] Romanians lived with an omnipresent "fear of denouncement, the suspicion that the person next to you might be an informer."[60] Barbers and taxi drivers were commonly avoided because they served as "natural confidants."

Repression under the Ceauşescu regime had a different configuration than in the first period of the communist regime. If the regime of Gheorghiu-Dej was characterized by physical brutality, after 1964, the Securitate opted for persuasion over outright punishment.[61] In the later period, the Ceauşescu regime relied on 15,000 officers and 1,370,000 active informers. The latter comprised three types: "classical informers, collaborators, and residents—hosts of the houses where the officers and the informers met."[62] Despite the regime's preference for the persuasion and supervision of citizens, new forms of torture were still practiced. As in the Soviet Union, forced confinement in psychiatric establishments was used for dissidents and opponents of the regime.[63]

This "everyday fear is [also] a form of terror," and it is the direct consequence of the constant search for basic products, and of the fear of hunger and cold, that in the end created the obsession with "the safety of tomorrow."[64] This permanent search "had as a predominant indirect effect social desegregation" and passivity, because "a person preoccupied only by survival, active so as to ensure his existence, has reduced available means of involvement in social life, of critical appreciation of the manner in which he is governed."[65]

Romanians were not allowed to leave the country without obtaining a passport provided by the officials. Passports were rarely granted, although, as in the case of Goma and his supporters, they were used as a means of silencing opponents. Engaging in any type of exchange with foreigners was forbidden and was regulated, as "a number of laws were passed (many of them initially introduced as presidential decrees) restricting contact with foreigners."[66] From 1971 onward, any Romanian who spoke to a foreigner had to report it to the Securitate within 24 h.[67] Later on, decree number 408 of January 1986 "heavily restricted any contact between Romanian citizens and foreigners."[68] Cristina Petrescu believes that this decree, specifying that Romanian citizens had to report any contact with foreigners within 24 h and were forbidden to provide lodging to foreigners, was directed primarily against intellectuals who attended receptions at Western embassies.[69]

2.1.5   *An Atomized Society: Private Spaces of Encounter*

The effect of this system of constant fear and suspicion was the configuration of a "closed society" (Tismăneanu, Barbu), formed of atomized individuals (Gilberg) who used a double language (Liiceanu, Neculau). Tismăneanu states that "Romania was a closed society" and "Romanians had to choose between internal exile—silent survival in their homeland—and emigration."[70] For Daniel Barbu, Romania was "in Popperian terms a closed society," "a social body not only fragmented but also decomposed, without consistency of face" because "before being a political regime, communism was a power over life."[71] For Trond Gilberg, "the 'desocialization' of Romania was a major success for the Ceauşescu regime because it reduced the chances for any organized opposition to develop while the clan was still in charge," and "throughout the quarter-century of Ceauşescuism, the masses in Romania gradually became depoliticized." This meant that the average man and woman ceased to take an interest in public affairs, withdrew from activities in this realm, and focused almost exclusively upon private matters. There was a collective shrinking of horizons and thoughts and concerns became private.[72]

Consequently, people escaped in a private, secret, defended space of freedom. A substitute private space was formed in which an alternative culture emerged, consisting of reading and exchanging books in *samizdat*, watching videos, forming new community ties dominated by secrecy, and developing an "oral culture" (Pleşu), which is evoked by Aurora Liiceanu:

> The group meetings, the prolonged visits into the night, even staying overnight, going to cafés or public gardens had become marvelous occasions to talk about everything. And if someone had the luck to see a movie we all dreamed about, he had to recount it. Oral production, conversation with all it has, the exercise of verbalization surpassed by far written production. Rightly, Andrei Pleşu considered that "the euphoria of orality explains, in his opinion, the absence of drawer literature and of samizdat. Everything was consumed in the discrete 'agora' of dialogue, of the unwritten word, of volatility." Writing was associated with the public space: we wrote our articles—planned themes without élan, they were the space of censorship; orality meant liberty, creativity, unconventional, spontaneity and, above all, emotion.[73]

In this atmosphere, the phenomenon of diglossia appeared: the articulation of two different languages, a private and a public. This can be extended to talk about two lives, the private life also being artistically molded. Aurora Liiceanu acknowledges the "dissociation between normal, natural and fictive, imposed," "the order of things that passed in the public space, a fiction fostered by the hierarchs had a parallel existence with that in which people lived their daily existences."[74]

The only place where people could find inner strength was in their personal relationships.[75] This led to a "superficial existence, a double game" in which "everything was prescribed, directed, censored: the word, the gesture, the attitude, public behavior. This atmosphere of lack of faith and continuous pressure had its effects. It encouraged a behavior tainted by duplicity, obedient, servile."[76]

In fact, Romanian society was "not really a society, but rather an agglomeration of individuals who happen[ed] to live on the same territory, subject to the same regime, forced to seek a living in the economic setting in existence" and this suited the regime well, as "it is much easier to *control* such a society."[77]

2.2   The Pinochet Regime (1973–1989)

The Pinochet regime was established through force and, although it was presented as a temporary intervention by the military, it lasted 17 years under the control of the dictator Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet held all the reins of power and was the main integrator of several right-wing groups that had supported the coup of September 11, 1973.

There are essentially two main types of analysis of the Pinochet regime. The first approach examines it as a military intermezzo, which was used to depoliticize society; this approach sees it as a necessary intervention of the last "impartial actor," the army. The second approach considers it a larger project to reform society, which merely used the military regime to impose this project on the country.[78] Tomas Moulian, Carlos Huneeus, Eugenio Tironi, Manuel A. Garretón, Enrique Cañas Kirby, and Rodrigo Contreras Osorio, although constructing very different analyses of the Pinochet regime, all agree on this point. We follow their conclusions by emphasizing the composite ideological stance of the Pinochet regime, and the different tendencies that constituted its approach.

Consistent with this second approach, the Pinochet regime developed across two broad periods or phases, which were complementary and interrelated. The regime encompassed two dimensions: one was reactive and used repression, and the other was foundational, and intended to establish a new economic, political, and cultural model.[79] The regime also had two stages: the first, from 1973 to 1980, was reactive and revolutionary, a "revolutionary dictatorship" encompassing a terrorist phase, and the second, from 1980 to 1990, was constitutional.[80] The general characteristics discernable throughout the Pinochet regime were: violence and coercion leading to the establishment of a police state, significant economic reforms, and the figure of Pinochet acting as the "integrator" of the previous two elements.[81]

In the first phase, marked by repression, violence was unleashed against all those associated with the previous *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity, UP) government led by Salvador Allende (1970–1973), and a police state was created. Additionally, the intent to restore "constitutional order"[82] was proclaimed by the new military regime.[83] In the second phase, a project was set in place to transform society based on sweeping economic reform. A project of political institutionalization was deployed, alongside the process of personalization of power by Augusto Pinochet.

The arts also suffered the effects of the repression that dominated the first phase of the regime. Artists were physically eliminated: they were killed, tortured, disappeared, or exiled. They also suffered psychologically by, for example, being dismissed from their jobs; works of art were also destroyed.[84] This first period of purging and erasure was followed by a period in which an official project was set in place. This plan encompassed the different tendencies discernable within the various groups that structured the regime.

2.2.1   Centralization of Power

When the military junta was established in Chile, on September 11, 1973, they planned to share power and to have a rotating presidency among the four commanders-in-chief.[85] This principle was invalidated by the growing power acquired by General Pinochet. Pinochet's consolidation of power never formally invalidated the collegial character of power sharing, with the Junta safeguarding the legislative role while he

became the holder of executive power, in line with the statute of the Junta.[86] From his position as president of the Junta in September 1973, in June 1974 Pinochet became, through the statute of the Junta, head of state, or "Supreme Chief of the Nation." At this stage "his authority still depend[ed] on the Junta," until, in December 1974, he was designated President of the Republic, "autonomous of the Junta [and] with an authority superior to this."[87] This "succession of juridical-institutional definitions" was sanctioned by the 1980 Constitution.[88]

Pinochet constantly asserted his supreme power in opposition to other members of the regime such as General Leigh, who had contested Pinochet's call for the 1978 consultation and criticized his ever-increasing political power. The affirmation of the personal leadership of General Pinochet was paralleled by a similar supremacy of the Army within the regime over the other branches of the military—the navy, national police force (*carabineros*), and air force.[89] The military were present at all levels of political power, acting not only as ministers but also as subsecretaries, governors, and quartermasters in the regions; furthermore, the number of army officials was constantly increased.[90]

The consolidation of the presidency meant that Pinochet constantly created institutions in order to help him coordinate affairs of state, and to do this in spite of the formal institutions. The first Constitutional Act, which created the State Council, was adopted on January 1, 1976. This council, comprising two ex-presidents, ex-commanders-in-chief of the armed forces, and ex-ministers, was projected as a consultative body to the Junta. Its role was nonetheless merely decorative, as Pinochet concentrated the supervision of decision-making. Carlos Huneeus retraces the range of consultative bodies established by Pinochet, finally leading to the General Secretary of the Presidency, a body which still exists today and acts as a ministry. When he was elected president in December 1974, Pinochet created the Presidential Staff (*Estado Mayor Presidencial*) as a consultative body exclusively for the presidency, although the Consultative Committee of the Governing Junta survived from November 1973.[91] After the 1980 Constitution, another reshuffle was approved as Pinochet created the Presidential Consultative Committee. This new structure was maintained until 1983, when the General Secretary of the Presidency was created; this new institution "depended directly [on] the chief of state" and "obtained a preeminent position [over] the other ministries."[92] This series of institutional reshufflings at

Fig. 2.2 Kena Lorenzini, Pinochet, posición firme, Aniversario de la Constitución Edificio Diego Portales Santiago/Pinochet firm stand, Anniversary of the Constitution Diego Portales building in Santiago (1986). *Source* Courtesy of the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos

the level of consultative committees of the presidency is important, as it gives an account of the control exerted by Pinochet.

After the promulgation of the 1980 Constitution, Pinochet expanded the legislative domains that were exclusively assigned to the presidency. "The President can legislate on all … matters that were not under the title of 'matters under the exclusive domination of the law,' which meant that the law became the exception while the decrees of the President the rule … a sort of presidential cæsarism invigorated (Fig. 2.2)."[93]

2.2.2   *Eclectic Legitimacy*

The two periods or phases that structured the regime—the establishment of a repressive regime, and the delineation of a new political model different from both liberal democracy and "Marxism"—were based on a

series of discourses or elements leading to an "eclectic strategy of legitimacy" in the absence of an elaborated ideology, as Linz theorized.[94] This policy was dynamic, evolving with the regime.

The regime's strategy of legitimacy encompassed several directions. In the first phase, when the military junta was established, a discourse was enshrined based on the diagnosis of the failure of the *Unidad Popular* government, and in this context, the Armed Forces appeared as the saviors of the nation. The National Security Doctrine, together with the different nationalist conceptions, supported this discourse. In the second stage, the discourse departed from the condemnation of Chile's entire model of development since the end of the political society of the nineteenth century, with an emphasis on the figure of Diego Portales and a discourse on the "decadence of the nation." Stemming from this conclusion, the intent to institutionalize a new political project developed; the economic project and the new political model of "authoritarian, protected democracy" enshrined by the Constitution of 1980 are to be thought of together, supporting one another.

In the beginning, they appealed to historical legitimacy to justify the military intervention, alongside the National Security Doctrine, which legitimized this intrusion as part of the fight against Marxism. This initial legitimacy can be discerned better using two of the regime's four legitimating discourses, as described by Enrique Cañas Kirby: a restoring, a regenerating, a geopolitical, and a revolutionary discourse.[95] The restoring discourse made reference to the role assumed by the Armed Forces to "reinstate the constitutional order" after the political and social chaos caused by the previous UP government. The regenerating discourse already laid the basis for societal reform, no longer as a result of the destruction brought about by the UP, but by referring to a deeper historical crisis with the "discourse on decadence," a constant since the disappearance of the Portalian republic in the nineteenth century.[96]

The regime's process of political institutionalization was more clearly put in place from 1976 onward.[97] In fact, since the declaration of the permanence of the military junta's power in March 1974, an often-contradictory project of institutionalization developed in accordance with the different factions of the regime: the *blandos* (softliners) and the *duros* (hardliners).[98] The legal-constitutional legitimacy evolved because "the military did not maintain their initial decision [to] promulgat[e] a new Constitution, and in 1975 they opted for a different path: establishing separate Constitutional Acts" in 1976, which "tried to institutionalize"

the dimension of geopolitical legitimacy based on the National Security Doctrine by "constitutionally sanctioning the Military Junta."[99] Furthermore, the Chacarillas speech of 1977 was paramount, as "for the first time it was recognized there [would] not be a return to the previous democracy but a different regime would be established," a new democracy which was "authoritarian, protected, integrative, technified and participative."[100] The manifest tendency in the Chacarillas speech was that of neoliberalism (Cañas) and of *gremialismo* (Moulian) who were the *blandos* of the regime. The subsequent landmark in this process was the project of a new constitution or the *Anteproyecto constitucional* (1978), which provoked much debate within the regime, and which ultimately recaptured Pinochet's principles and was approved by the 1980 plebiscite.[101]

The political project imagined by the Pinochet regime began with an important economic reform put in place by the neoliberal group of technocrats known as the Chicago Boys, which completely restructured society and eventually led to a new type of political interaction. The military government's intention of political institutionalization stemmed from the neoliberal vision that "pretended to realize a society regulated by the market" according to Cañas' last type of discourse: the revolutionary discourse.[102] Thus, the economic legitimacy (Huneeus) was connected to the new formulation of society based on the imposition of the market ideology. For Garretón, this foundational dimension, which defines the political project of the Pinochet regime, must be regarded as broader than the economic project launched by the technocrats, and encompassing the "intention of [the] global reorganization of society … and the creation of a new political order."[103] This political model, which envisaged "a sort of authoritarian regime with restricted participation," was expressed in the 1980 Constitution, itself based on the double diagnostic of the failure of the previous Chilean model of the twentieth century and the projection of reform based on economic freedom.[104]

At the base of the plural strategy of legitimacy, the ideological resources of the Pinochet regime's legitimacy were shaped by the diverse nationalist tendencies, the National Security doctrine, and the market ideology imposed by the neoliberal group in control of the economic reforms.

The strategy of legitimacy concerns both the regime itself and Pinochet's leadership within it. Pinochet consolidated his leadership by appealing to different sources alongside the legitimacy granted by his

dual role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and President of the Republic. To this end, he made an appeal to "political-electoral" capital with the popular consultations of 1978 and 1980, which granted him the legitimacy he lacked, and he imposed the political institutionalization of the regime in his own defined terms with the 1980 Constitution.[105]

Pinochet's political ability and his extreme personalization of power can be seen in the way the General acted as the coordinator, or mediator, of the right-wing political groups supporting the regime: the *duros*, who were nationalists and supported the establishment of a new democracy, and the *blandos*, who supported the institutionalization and the economic reforms.[106] Pinochet's role as a bridge, or as the reunifying element between the different tendencies of the regime, is paramount to this analysis as it allows me for the acknowledgment of the plurality of groups present within the Pinochet regime and their different conceptualizations of cultural affairs.

2.2.3   Repression and the Market: Demobilization and Exclusion

The Pinochet regime attempted to disjoint and demobilize society through the use of repression and market ideology in two phases. At the beginning, the Chilean regime had a "terrorist phase" (1973–1980), followed by the "constitutional stage" of the revolutionary dictatorship from 1980 onward.[107] The two components of the "disciplinary" official approach were the "uniform regulation of behaviors conforming to the rules of obedience [repression] and utility [market]."[108] The various stages of repression started with the indiscriminate and uncoordinated "massive repression" following the coup.[109] The neoliberal economic reforms enacted by the Pinochet regime affected all spheres of Chilean society. Although a moderated, gradualist approach was adopted in the beginning (1973–1975), attempting to "normalize the economy, reduce public spending and eliminate price controls and revert expropriations," the 1975 recession provided the pretext for a "shock treatment" by the economic team known as the Chicago Boys.[110]

Most analyses of the Pinochet regime recognize that one of the main traits of the regime was the control exerted by the dictator over the secret repressive organization. For Manuel A. Garretón, for example, Pinochet's personalization of power also encompassed the "growing concentration and centralization of the repressive apparatus under the direct command of Pinochet: [the DINA] tended to subordinate

the intelligence and security units of the branches of the armed forces, although not without friction."[111]

The establishment of the infamous *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* (Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA), which was placed under the direct control of Pinochet as "sultanistic power recourse," took repression to unbearable heights.[112] "The DINA was created by General Pinochet a few days after the coup d'etat in order to be the main instrument in the war against Marxism … an entity of support in the consolidation of power of Pinochet."[113] The legal establishment of DINA, initially a secret organization, did not take place until the summer of 1974. The extent of the control that it exerted is impossible to determine, as both the number of personnel and the budget delivered to it remain unknown.[114]

Following a series of international attacks[115] under the transnational Operation Condor and "combined pressure from [the] international community, the Catholic Church and a few sectors within the regime," DINA was dismantled on August 12, 1977, and replaced with the *Central Nacional de Información* (National Central of Information, CNI). The CNI inherited the former agency's personnel and, throughout the regime, continued its infamous practices: murders, disappearances, and torture.[116] The new institution, having learned something from DINA, tried to legalize its actions. This was reflected in the new constitution of 1980, which also "awarded the broadest of discretionary powers to Pinochet so that all kinds of repression could be employed without any judicial check or other control."[117]

Throughout the 17 years of dictatorship, "state terrorism persisted as a permanent context, eroding everyday life, [and] torture represented a privileged instrument to disseminate terror, a basic and routine element," "an essential resource to politically control the order and security of the state and to substantially modify its labor, political and economic relations."[118] Those who were declared enemies of the state suffered one of the three solutions: "*destierro, encierro, entierro*" (exile, imprisonment, or burial) Those who were undesirable to the Chilean state had their citizenship withdrawn after they were expelled from the country.[119] Political violence took several forms: political executions and imprisonments; the disappearances of detainees whose corpses were subsequently found; those who were completely erased as persons, and whose disappearance continues to haunt their relatives; and torture, deadly or otherwise.[120] The system of terror organized by the Pinochet regime also, as

part of Operation Condor, targeted those citizens who had managed to escape the country, a course of action that was also used by its Romanian counterpart. A form of state surveillance was also registered in Chile: for example, in *las micros* (Santiago's buses), no one would talk for fear of being overheard. In fact, in Chile, the DINA and then the CNI established a network of civilian informers.[121]

Perhaps the most traumatic form of violence proved to be the disappearances, as the feeling of "not knowing" instilled by the absence of proof was the most difficult thing to cope with.[122] Patricio Guzmán's documentary film *The Pinochet Case* (2001) recounts the hardships of the families, friends, and relatives of the disappeared in their fight to find the truth and to be able, finally, to mourn. Another documentary, *Fernando ha vuelto* (Fernando is Back, 1998) by Silvio Caiozzi, tells the story of the arduous identification of the bones retrieved by the family of Fernando Olivares Mori. Both films emphasize the impact of this trauma on a part of Chilean society, along with its complete ignorance of this suffering. These atrocities—torture leading to disappearance, along with imprisonment—were pursued in an impressive number of detention centers (1200 according to the Rettig Report) throughout the Chilean territory.

"Fear of the omnipresent repressive organs with the ensuing sentiments of vulnerability, impotence and helplessness" paralyzed individuals in Chile, but the description is also valid for Romania.[123]

> Fear brings persons to avoid all that seems dangerous, to reduce to a minimum what they do and say, and they are dominated by apathy, passivity and resignation. But fear does not originate solely in repression, it also had to do with economic and labor instability, that is, an event that would destroy again the precarious attained equilibrium.[124]

The nocturnal curfew, quasi-permanent during the Pinochet regime, meant that "the simple presence on the street was a crime,"[125] while several legal measures forbade the effectuation of public acts.[126]

2.2.4   The Televised World of the "Credit Card Citizen" and the Popular Mobilization

In the second phase, the Chicago Boys enacted more than an economic reform, aiming to redefine society according to the principles of the

market. There were six ideological referents of the neoliberal revolution, Milton Friedman's principles of "paneconomism": (1) "the classical liberal principle of the superiority of economy on the political"; (2) "the epistemological principle according to which human knowledge being always limited and fragmentary" can only progress through "'trials and errors' of millions of individuals" (the market); (3) "an anthropology founded on three hypotheses—the scarcity and thus concurrence as the principle of any social organization, the individualist hypothesis of the primacy of the individual on the group or on society, the *homo œconomicus* as an individual whose rational behavior is to increase its benefits"; (4) "the social integration through socialization by the market"; (5) "the subordination of politics to the market and the conception of politics as a market"; (6) "a state which limits its functions to domains that transcend concrete private activity—security, regulations, environment, certain services, external policy."[127]

The economic model was institutionalized by the 1980 Constitution, because it was at that time that its efficacy reached its "best moment."[128] Market ideology was accompanied by a disdain for politics, as an intense official propaganda campaign against politicians and parties was unleashed: "Chile was a dual state that promoted economic freedom through a regime that suppressed political liberty."[129] The model imposed was one of exclusion and social demobilization, of "a non-participative nature, autocratically centralized," and the stated purpose was to "put an end to society, which became an aggregate of individuals unstably linked together by markets."[130]

Within this panorama, "deprived of public spaces, society was condemned to the private" and was offered in exchange the "consumers' paradise" and televised culture.[131] This context of unrestrained consumerism promoted by the new neoliberal revolution led to what Tomas Moulian has called the "credit card citizen." The massification of credit, leading to constant debt, and the promotion of the idea that anyone could participate in the abundance—such as Pinochet's promise that everyone would have a television set—led to the appearance of the "weekend citizenry" and the "credit card citizenry," both of which were forms of depoliticization.[132] Consumption functioned as both a "desire-pleasure" mechanism and a "disciplining" mechanism in the "construction of oneself."[133] "*Chile Actual*," the result of the revolutionary dictatorship set in place by the Pinochet regime, assumed the form of a "gigantic

market where social integration is realized at the level of interchanges more than at the political level."[134]

José Brunner analyzed the formulation of a new society molded by television culture. With political intervention in the management of television channels, the Pinochet regime began to articulate a cultural model based on entertainment programs (contests, telenovelas, etc.), which represented 61% of broadcasts in 1981.[135] The proliferation of television sets, which were present in 95% of Chilean homes in 1983, transformed this medium into the privileged channel for the transmission of the official version of reality.[136] Television programs constantly extended their broadcasting hours and the time dedicated to advertising, another means of transmitting the principles of the new market ideology and of the consumer obsession described by Moulian.[137] While the other cultural industries experienced a downturn, television was reinforced as a reaction to "the privatizing tendencies predominating in everyday life and that rearticulate social life around the home."[138] This centrality of television particularly affected "popular sectors," and their reception of the official propaganda was more effective. Television allowed its viewers to have instant contact with the world and the nation through accessible entertainment, "a factory of images, free conversation," a "diurnal dream, source of symbols of our identity."[139]

The failure of the economic model was nonetheless visible in 1982, and the economic crisis lingered until 1985. It had a high social cost, provoking high unemployment rates of 15% in the period from 1975 to 1979 and more than 20% in the period from 1982 to 1985, penury across large swathes of the population, and a huge external debt of $17 billion in 1982.[140] It also led to "the atomization of the social fabric as a result of the modernizations inaugurated in 1979 through the Labor Plan, the education reforms etc.," and "a profoundly fractured society."[141]

Economic breakthrough, which was partial and not accessible to the entire population, ended with the economic crisis, which acted as a catalyst for "the awakening of the multitudes," realized in the significant popular mobilizations organized between 1983 and 1985.[142] The crisis led to an attempted opening of the regime in 1983, and the beginning of a series of political negotiations through "the recognition of parties."[143] Alongside the series of failed negotiations, the regime unleashed a new form of repression, the "probabilistic death," intended to provoke fear in the masses.[144]

Economic hardships were coupled, in the Chilean case, with the terror enacted by the repressive organs supervised by Pinochet himself. These actions met the popular mobilization which had been expressed since 1983, and which triggered new forms of repression. Popular mobilization accompanied the important human rights movement, which developed around and with the support of the Catholic Church.

Among the first organizations was the National Committee of Help for Refugees, supported by Chilean churches, which helped 5000 people threatened by the new regime to leave the country. This was followed by the establishment of the Cooperation Committee for Peace in Chile, known as *Comité Pro Paz*, in October 1973, which provided assistance to those arrested and detained or those fired for political reasons.[145] Cardinal Silva Henríquez was forced to dismantle *Comité Pro paz* in December 1975, and in January 1976 that same cardinal created the most important human rights advocacy and defense organization: *Vicaría de la Solidaridad* (The Vicariate of Solidarity), "an official organization of the Catholic Church."[146] The role of the vicariate was vital as it documented the abuses and all of the cases reported to it. Additionally, in 1974, an Association of Relatives of the Disappeared Detainees was established, similar to the Argentinian organization *Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* formed in 1977. Other NGOs participated in the defense of human rights more politically, such as the Chilean Commission of Human Rights and the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the People, or international branches of human rights organizations such as WOLA and Amnesty International.[147]

Notes

1. The post of First Secretary was originally created in 1955 and was replaced in 1965 with that of General Secretary. The Congress approved the change of the name of the party back to Romanian Communist Party and the constitution adopted in August 1965 changed the name of the country from the People's Republic to the Socialist Republic of Romania. Thomas Kunze, *Nicolae Ceauşescu: O biografie* (Bucureşti: Ed. Vremea, 2002), 203–204 (Kunze 2002).

2. Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2003), 195 (Tismăneanu 2013).

3. Juan Linz and Stepan Alfred, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 348 (Linz and Stepan 1996).

4. Linz and Stepan, *Problems*, 349; Tismăneanu, *Stalinism*, 213.

5. Tismăneanu, *Stalinism*, 199.

6. Ibidem.

7. Tismăneanu, *Stalinism*, 187.

8. Ibid., 35.

9. Ibid., 202–203.

10. Ibid., *Stalinism*, 202.

11. Ibid., 31.

12. Linz and Stepan, *Problems*, 54, 347, 356.

13. Tismăneanu, *Stalinism*, 30.

14. Trond Gilberg, *Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceauşescu's Personal Dictatorship* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), 47, 57 (Gilberg 1990).

15. Mary Ellen Fischer, *Nicolae Ceauşescu: A Study in Political Leadership* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 257–259 (Fischer 1989).

16. Mary Ellen Fischer, "Romania: The Anguish of Postcommunist Politics," in *Establishing Democracies*, ed. IDEM, (Boulder & Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), 184 (Fischer 1996).

17. Gilberg, *Nationalism*, 92.

18. Tismăneanu, *Stalinism*, 258.

19. Ibidem.

20. Monica Lovinescu, *Jurnal 1981–1984* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2002), 228 (Lovinescu 2002).

21. Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu had three children: Valentin (b. 1948), Zoia (1950–2006), and Nicu (1951–1996).

22. Tismăneanu, *Stalinism*, 209–210.

23. Ibid., 223.

24. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *Cultul personalităţii lui Ceauşescu* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2003), 101 (Gabanyi 2003).

25. Linz and Stepan, *Problems*.

26. Linz and Stepan, *Problems*, 350–351.

27. Gilberg, *Nationalism,* 67.

28. Daniel Barbu, *Republica absentă* (Bucureşti: Nemira, 2004), 66 (Barbu 2004).

29. Ibid., 78.

30. Fischer, *Nicolae*, 228.

31. Daniel Barbu, "Prefaţă. Cenzura şi producerea spaţiului public," in *Cenzura comunistă şi formarea "Omului nou"* by Bogdan Ficeac (Bucureşti: Nemira, 1999), 9 (Barbu 1999).

32. Departing from a study realized by Wayne Di Francesco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and 'Covert Participation' in Policy Implementation," *American Political Science Review* 78: 3 (1984): 603–621, quoted by Barbu, *Republica*, 92.

33. Barbu, *Republica*, 92–93.

34. Mary Fulbrook, *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 12 (Fulbrook 2005).

35. Barbu, *Republica*, 75.

36. Fischer, *Nicolae*, 258.

37. Gilberg, *Nationalism,* 64

38. François Fejtö, *La fin des démocraties populaires: les chemins du post-communisme* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997), 209 (Fejtö 1997).

39. Gilberg, *Nationalism,* 65; Fischer, *Nicolae*, 249.

40. Fejtö, *La fin,* 210.

41. Fischer, *Nicolae*, 250.

42. Gilberg, *Nationalism,* 65–66.

43. Fischer, *Nicolae*, 259.

44. Decree no 313 (17 October 1981), *Buletinul Oficial*, no 79, 17 October 1981.

45. Vlad Georgescu, "Romania in the 1980s: The Legacy of Dynastic Socialism," *East European Politics and Societies* 2 (1987*)*: 69–93, 80 (Georgescu 1987).

46. Paul Cernat, "Cozi şi oameni de rând în anii '80," in *Viaţa cotidiană în communism*, ed. Adrian Neculau (Iaşi: Polirom, 2004), 191, 195, 198 (Cernat 2004).

47. Ibid., 196.

48. Cernat, "Cozi si oameni," 196.

49. Ibid.

50. "The use of energy was reduced by 20% in 1979, by 20% in 1982, by 50% in 1983 and again by 50% in 1985—each time measured in relation to the already reduced numbers." Decree no. 620 of November 17, 1973 (*Buletinul Oficial*, no 181 of November 18 1973); Decree no 283 of July 30 1979 (*Buletinul Oficial*, July 31, 197). Gabanyi, *Cultul,* 264–265.

51. Gheorghe Leahu, *Arhitect în "Epoca de aur"* (Bucureşti: Fundaţia Academia Civică, 2004), 16 (Leahu 2004).

52. Cars with registration numbers ending with an even number were allowed to circulate only two out of four Sundays and the same was true for the cars with a registration ending in an odd number. In 1985, these restrictions were strengthened by a ban on using private cars in the period from January 16 to March 25, 1985. Gabanyi, *Cultul*, 265. Fischer, *Nicolae,* 251.

53. Georgescu, "Romania," 80.
54. Adrian Neculau, ed., *Viaţa cotidiană în comunism* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2004), 99 (Neculau 2004).
55. J. F. Brown, "Prefaţă" in *Cultul personalităţii lui Ceauşescu*, by Anneli Ute Gabanyi (Iaşi: Polirom, 2003), 11 (Brown 2003).
56. Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Arheologia terorii* (Bucureşti: Ed. Allfa, 1998), 240 (Tismăneanu 1998).
57. Conforming to the definition of the Argentine political scientist Ernesto Garzon Valdes following the analysis of South American repressive practices. Marius Oprea, "L'Héritage de la Securitate: Terreur en Roumanie 1952–2002," in *Le jour se lève: l'héritage du totalitarisme en Europe 1953–2005*, ed. Stéphane Curtois (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 2006), 241–242 (Oprea 2006).
58. Christian Duplan and Vincent Giret, *Viaţa în roşu Vol III Varşovia, Praga, Budapesta, Bucureşti 1968–1989 Nesupuşii* (Bucureşti: Nemira, 2000), 511 (Duplan and Giret 2000).
59. Gilberg, *Nationalism*, 143, 272.
60. Neculau, *Viaţa cotidiană*, 104.
61. Ruxandra Cesereanu, *Gulagul în conştiinţa românească. Memorialistica şi literatura închisorilor şi lagărelor comuniste* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2005), 158 (Cesereanu 2005).
62. Ibid., 160.
63. For this particular topic see the writings of Ion Vianu and for a brief overview see his evocation of the case of Vasile Paraschiv in Ion Vianu, "Persecutia psihiatrica a opozantilor si disidentilor," *22, XV:847* (02.06.2006).
64. Radu Clit, "Frica de zi cu zi," in *Viaţa cotidiană în comunism,* ed. Adrian Neculau (Iaşi: Polirom, 2004), 69, 59–61 (Clit 2004).
65. Ibid., 67, 69.
66. Fischer, *Nicolae*, 238.
67. Gabanyi, *Cultul*, 263.
68. Petrescu, Cristina, "Seven Faces of Dissent: A Micro Perspective on the Study of the Political (Sub) Cultures under Communism," in *Cultură politică şi politici culturale în România modernă* (*Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Modern Romania*) ed. Alexandru Zub and Adrian Cioflâncă, (Iaşi: Editura Universităţii "Alexandru Ioan Cuza", 2005), 305–344, 337 (Petrescu 2005).
69. Ibidem.
70. Tismăneanu, *Stalinism,* 216, 217
71. Barbu, *Republica*, 72–73, 80
72. Gilberg, *Nationalism*, 270, 271.

73. Aurora Liiceanu, "Cotidianul comunist" in *Viaţa cotidiană în comunism* (Daily life during communism) ed. Adrian Neculau (Iaşi: Polirom 2004), 77 (Liiceanu 2004).
74. Ibid., 72.
75. Neculau, *Viaţa cotidiană*, 105–106
76. Ibid., 107
77. Gilberg, *Nationalism*, 145.
78. There is of course a third manner in which to label the regime, that of the Left that suffered the majority of persecution: that the Pinochet regime was a fascist regime, a totalitarian dictatorship.
79. Manuel A. Garretón, *El proceso político chileno* (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana De Ciencias Sociales, 1983), 125 (Garretón 1983).
80. Eugenio Tironi, *Pinochet: La dictature néo-libérale* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987), 42, 46; Tomás Moulian, *Chile Actual: Anatomía de un mito* (Santiago de Chile: LOM-Arcis, 19th edition, 1998), 146 (Tironi 1987; Moulian 1998).
81. Carlos Huneeus, *El régimen de Pinochet* (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2000), 35, 37 (Huneeus 2000).
82. Eugenio Tironi observes that the first military communicate declared that the political objective was to "restore the broken institutionalism." Tironi, *Pinochet*, 42.
83. Enrique Cañas Kirby, *Proceso político chileno: 1973–1990* (Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello, 1997), 74–76 (Cañas Kirby 1997).
84. Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar, and Oscar Sepúlveda, *La Historia oculta del Régimen Militar. Memoria de una época 1973–1988* (Santiago: Mitos Bolsilllo, Grijalbo Mondadori, 2001) (Cavallo et al. 2001).
85. The four-man military junta was formed by the commanders-in-chief of the Army: General Augusto Ugarte Pinochet; Admiral José Toribio Merino, in charge of the Navy; the Air Force general Gustavo Leigh; and the general in command of the national police force (*los carabineros*), Cesár Mendoza. Eugenio Tironi, *El regimen autoritario: Para una sociología de Pinochet* (Santiago: Dolmen Ediciones, 1998), 71 (Tironi 1998).
86. Cavallo et al., *La Historia*, 42.
87. This title was granted in accordance with the Constitution of 1925. Huneeus, *El régimen,* 281; The Decree No. 806 (December 17, 1974) designated Pinochet as president of the Republic, the President of the Junta, chief of the executive and supreme chief of the nation. Cavallo et al., *La Historia*, 90; Huneeus, *El régimen*, 144.
88. Garretón, *El proceso,* 136.
89. Tironi, *Pinochet*, 63.

90. Huneeus, *El régimen*, 189, 192, 198.
91. Ibid., 145
92. Ibid., 147.
93. Cañas Kirby, *Proceso*, 96.
94. Ibid., 73.
95. Ibid., 73–74.
96. Ibid., 76.
97. Moulian, *Chile actual*, 225.
98. Huneeus, *El régimen*, 215.
99. Huneeus, *El régimen*, 232; Cañas Kirby, *Proceso*, 77–78.
100. Huneeus, *El régimen*, 234; Cañas Kirby, *Proceso,* 78.
101. Ibid., 91.
102. Ibid. 78–79
103. Garretón, *El proceso*, 139.
104. Ibid., 157–158.
105. Huneeus, *El régimen*, 133.
106. Moulian, *Chile actual,* 229.
107. Ibid., 146.
108. Tironi, *Pinochet*, 70.
109. Manuel Antonio Garretón, *The Chilean Political Process* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 119 (Garretón 1989).
110. Tironi, *El regimen*, 64; Huneeus, *El régimen*, 252.
111. Garretón, *The Chilean*, 119.
112. Such was the case with the *Estadio Nacional*, one of the main places of detention during the first months of the regime. The other "landmark" of the repression was *Villa Grimaldi*, one of the most important sites of imprisonment and torture in the capital of Santiago. Huneeus, *El régimen*, 160.
113. Huneeus, *El régimen,* 104.
114. The creation of DINA was approved by the Junta in a session of November 1973 (by the AHJG No 33 of November 1973, point 8) and the legal formalization was published by the Law Decree no 521 of June 18, 1974. Huneeus, *El régimen,* note 99, page 126, 105.
115. The international attacks were perpetrated against the exiled General Carlos Prats (Pinochet's predecessor during the Allende regime) in Buenos Aires (September 1974), the failed attack against Bernardo Leighton, ex-chief of the Christian Democrats in Rome (October 1975), and the assassination of Allende's ex-ambassador to Washington, Orlando Letelier (September 1976).
116. Garretón, *The Chilean*, 119.
117. Ibid., 120

118. Brian Loveman and Elisabeth Lira, *Políticas de reparación: Chile 1990–2004* (Santiago: LOM, 2005), 186, 204–205 (Loveman and Lira 2005).
119. Ibid., 206.
120. Ibidem.
121. Roger Burbach, *El affair Pinochet: Terrorismo de estado y justicia global* (Santiago: Mosquito Comunicaciones, 2006), 83 (Burbach 2006).
122. The report commissioned by the Rettig Commission, established by Patricio Aylwin in 1990, listed 3196 victims for the period 1973–1990. Of these, 1720 dead and 1185 disappeared. Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos Fundación Ideas, *Nunca más en Chile: Sintesis corregida y actualizada del Informe Retttig* (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, Colección Septiembre, 2nd edition 1999), 229. The report commissioned by the Valech Commission, established by Ricardo Lagos in 2003, listed 3195 victims of political violence for the same period, of which 2008 dead and 1183 disappeared. www.ddhh.gov.cl/estadisticas.html.
123. Tironi, *El regimen*, 77.
124. Ibidem.
125. Moulian, *Chile actual*, 302.
126. Moulian, *Chile actual*, 302; The Law of State Security and then the law-decrees (D.L. 1281 of 1975, Military edict 107 of 1977) and finally through the 24 transitory article of the 1980 constitution that granted the president the power to impose restrictions on the right of reunion, as well as on the freedom of publications. Anny Rivera, *Transformaciones culturales y movimiento artístico en el orden autoritario* (Santiago: CENECA, 1983), 55 (Rivera 1983).
127. Tironi, *Pinochet*, 47.
128. Cañas Kirby, *Proceso*, 83; Huneeus, *El régimen*, 252.
129. Huneeus, *El régimen*, 249.
130. Cañas Kirby, *Proceso*, 97; Tironi, *Pinochet la dictature*, 72.
131. Tironi, *Pinochet*, 71; Moulian, *Chile actual*, 85.
132. Moulian, *Chile actual*, 104.
133. Ibid., 107.
134. Ibid., 121.
135. José Joaquín Brunner, *La cultura autoritaria en Chile* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1981), 94 (Brunner 1981).
136. José Joaquín Brunner, "Campo artístico, escena de avanzada y autoritarismo en Chile," in *Arte en Chile desde 1973: Escena de avanzada y sociedad*, ed. Nelly Richard (Santiago de Chile: FLACSO, 1987), 17, 19 (Brunner 1987).

137. José Joaquín Brunner and Gonzalo Catalán, *Cinco estudios sobre cultura y sociedad* (Santiago: Ediciones Ainavillo, 1985), 59 (Brunner and Catalán 1985).
138. Ibidem.
139. José Joaquín Brunner, *Vida cotidiana, sociedad y cultura: Chile 1973–1982.* Documento de Trabajo Programa FLACSO-Santiago de Chile, Numero 151, (Julio 1982), 32–33 (Brunner 1982).
140. Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *Historia de Chile 1808–1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 315, 316 (Collier and Sater 1999).
141. Rivera, *Transformaciones*, 57, 59.
142. Moulian, *Chile actual*, 278–279.
143. Huneeus, *El régimen*, 554.
144. Moulian, *Chile actual*, 292.
145. Burbach, *El affair*, 94–95.
146. Ibid., 101.
147. Ibid.

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Art and Politics under Modern Dictatorships
A Comparison of Chile and Romania
Preda, C.
2017, X, 323 p. 19 illus., 3 illus. in color., Hardcover