

Variation in Public Opinion on International Trade: A First Look at Cultural Distance

In the preceding chapter, we described trade as mutually beneficial exchange between two parties who may be located at opposite ends of the same street or on opposing sides of our world. We also posited that trade, if viewed as a voluntary activity that affords welfare enhancements to the involved parties, should be considered a good thing regardless of the partner considered. Extending from that brief discussion, we can say that, in the simplest of terms, trade is the buying and selling of goods and services. It is, effectively, a synonym for the word “exchange.” It seems quite reasonable to assert that the typical individual, if asked about their personal exchange (i.e., their purchases) of goods and services with their local grocer, their automechanic, a clothing shop, etc., would express a positive opinion. Similarly, if we asked these same individuals about the sale of their labor to their employer, they would consider it a good thing. After all, nearly all individuals rely on others for the production of the food they eat, the maintenance and/or repair of their automobile, the manufacture of the clothes they wear, and so on. Likewise, it is very common for individuals to rely on others (e.g., employers or, perhaps, customers if the individual is self-employed) to provide them with income via the purchase of their labor services. We seem to understand, either by intuition or more formally, that these transactions make us better off. In a few words, trade is a means by which we are able to enhance the quality of our lives.

It should be noted that not only is much of what we eat not produced locally, in many instances the items are, in fact, imported. Likewise, the

parts that our mechanics install on our cars and trucks, whether the vehicles are domestic brands or imports, are often produced in other countries. Even more so, the clothing that is sold in developed economies is almost exclusively manufactured in other countries, and quite commonly in developing economies. And selling our labor to a domestically-owned firm/employer or to a firm that is owned or controlled by, say, a foreign multinational corporation makes little difference in terms of our bank accounts and our respective purchasing power.¹ Thus, it seems reasonable that the positive opinions that many individuals would likely express for the trade/exchange that they undertake on a regular basis would apply equally when domestic transactions are considered or when international transactions are considered. When examining responses to public opinion polling data, we see this appears to be the case for a large majority of individuals; however, what is odd is that a sizeable share of the public expresses negative views when asked for their opinions on international trade.

As we note in the introductory chapter, the Pew Research Center's 2014 US-Germany Trade Survey solicited responses on the topic of international trade, asking respondents for both their general views on trade and their opinions on trade with specific partner countries. In that chapter, we reported that survey respondents typically expressed positive views of trade when they were asked about trade generally (i.e., when specific partners were not mentioned). We also noted that the frequency of positive responses varied considerably across trading partners and that a pattern was observed where the frequency of *positive* responses was higher when the specific trading partner was *less* culturally distant from the respondent's country of residence and that the frequency of *negative* responses was higher when the specific trading partner was *more* culturally distant. Finally, we also found that larger differences between the countries in which survey respondents live and their trading partners, in terms of average income (i.e., GDP per capita) and a broader measure of economic and social development (i.e., the UN HDI), correspond with a lower frequency of positive responses when respondents are asked about international trade.

These observations appear contrary to the notion that all forms of trade are simply the voluntary, welfare-enhancing action of buying and selling goods and services. They also seem to be at odds with the fact that much of what we buy and sell, and would likely consider as welfare-enhancing either via increased utility or through lower prices and

an expanded budget constraint (and, thus, greater capacity to enhance utility through additional consumption or present-day savings that allow for greater future consumption), involves goods and services that are sourced to/from other countries. Further, the variation in survey respondents' opinions of trade when asked about specific trading partners and that the patterns of variation in responses appear to correspond with cultural distance and/or relative economic well-being suggests an inconsistency between individuals' actions and their opinions of international trade.

In this chapter, as a prelude to the more expansive analysis presented in later chapters, we explore the 2014 US-Germany Trade Survey data in greater detail. Specifically, we employ regression analysis in an attempt to identify the determinants of individuals' opinions of international trade while paying particular attention to the potential influence that cross-societal cultural differences (i.e., cultural distance) may have on public opinion. Effectively, we seek to learn whether cultural distance is a significant determinant of public opinion on this topic and, if so, the extent to which public opinion is shaped by cultural distance. To this end, we also provide a descriptive analysis in addition to our econometric estimation of a series of probability models. The corresponding results are then employed to generate estimated probabilities, at different levels of cultural distance, of individuals' views that trade is bad or good or that trade is a very bad thing, somewhat bad, somewhat good, or a very good thing. Estimated probabilities, and comparison of the values at different levels of cultural distance, allow us to quantify the influence of cultural distance on public opinion toward international trade. Finally, by comparing predicted probabilities across varying levels of cultural distance and, separately, in response to changes in variables that represent individual-specific characteristics and that have statistically significant coefficients, we are able to understand the relative magnitude of each on public opinion toward international trade.

As a preview of our results, we can state unequivocally that the majority of survey respondents do express positive opinions of international trade whether asked about international trade generally or about trade with specific partner countries. That being said, our regression analysis indicates that the relationship between cultural distance and the probability that an individual expresses a positive opinion on international trade is negative and statistically significant from zero. This result is found whether we employ a dichotomous dependent variable and use the

binomial logit technique to estimate the model or if we instead substitute a categorical dependent variable series and employ the ordered logit technique. For example, results obtained when the binomial logit technique is utilized and the measure of cultural distance is allowed to vary from its lowest value to its highest value, while holding all other variables equal to their mean values, indicate a 5.28% decrease in the estimated probability that the respondent views trade as a good thing (i.e., as either a very good thing or as somewhat good). Similarly, when considering our categorical dependent variable series and employing the ordered logit estimation technique, a like increase in the cultural distance variable is estimated to reduce the probability that an individual views trade as a very good thing by 1.83% and to reduce the probability that the individual considers trade to be a somewhat good thing by 7.04%. Again, in response to the stated change in the cultural distance measure, the corresponding increases in the predicted likelihoods that international trade is viewed as somewhat bad or as a very bad thing are 2.81% and 6.07%, respectively.

Although this chapter serves to provide a deeper exploration of the potential relationship between individuals' opinions of international trade and cross-societal cultural differences that is first discussed in Chap. 1, we also very much view the work presented here as an exploratory analysis that is intended to serve as a bridge to the analyses presented in later chapters. Admittedly, the empirical specification is ad hoc and, in this chapter, we forego a detailed discussion of the related literature. Further, we provide only a modest explanation of the cultural distance measure. More elaborate discussions of the literature and of the measurement of cultural distance are provided in later chapters.

2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE

We begin with a cursory overview of the response frequencies for the sample of survey respondents that live in Germany (see Panel A in Table 2.1) and for those who live in the US (Panel B). Panel C of the table provides the response frequencies for the combined Germany-US sample. When looking to individuals' general opinions of trade (presented in column (a) of each panel), we see that 90.7% of the German survey respondents indicated an opinion of trade being a very good

Table 2.1 Observed survey response frequencies

Panel A: Germany sample (N = 4765)						
Mean cultural distance values and partner-specific response frequencies						
General Q _c	Brazil	China	EU	Japan	Russia	US
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
Cultural distance	2.2937	1.9673	.	1.023	2.3104	2.3526
Good (i.e., very good or somewhat good)	90.66%	65.27%	.	81.53%	67.37%	75.97%
Bad (i.e., very bad or somewhat bad)	6.92	31.27	.	14.38	28.12	20.46
Difference: "Good" % less "Bad" %	83.74	34	.	67.15	39.25	55.51
Very good	35.68	16.37	.	23.19	15.53	18.57
Somewhat good	54.98	49.11	.	58.34	51.84	57.4
Somewhat bad	5.56	25.18	.	12.07	24.13	16.89
Very bad	1.36	6.09	.	2.31	3.99	3.57
Don't know/Refused	2.41	9.65	.	4.09	4.51	3.57
Panel B: United States sample (N = 5010)						
Mean cultural distance values and partner-specific response frequencies						
General Q _c	Brazil	China	EU	Japan	Russia	Germany
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
Cultural distance	1.1625	3.3344	.	3.3089	3.4355	2.3526
Good (i.e., very good or somewhat good)	72.06%	50.80%	73.25%	75.45%	48.61%	80.14%
Bad (i.e., very bad or somewhat bad)	22.15	44.31	17.67	19.86	44.51	12.77
Difference: "Good" % less "Bad" %	49.91	6.49	55.58	55.59	4.1	67.37
Very good	27.05	14.57	23.65	29.34	11.48	30.24
Somewhat good	45.01	36.23	49.6	46.11	37.13	49.9
Somewhat bad	13.37	25.95	11.88	12.67	25.55	8.38
Very bad	8.78	18.36	5.79	7.19	18.96	4.39
Don't know/Refused	5.79	4.89	9.08	4.69	6.89	7.09

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

	Partner-specific response frequencies					
	General Q	Brazil	China	EU	Japan	Russia US/Germany
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f) (g)
Good (i.e., Very good or Somewhat good)	81.12%	68.24%	57.86%	.	78.41%	57.75% .
Bad (i.e., Very bad or Somewhat bad)	14.74	20.41	37.96	.	17.19	36.52 .
Difference: "Good" % less "Bad" %	66.38	47.83	19.9	.	61.22	21.23 .
Very good	31.25	17.24	15.35	.	26.34	13.45 .
Somewhat good	49.87	51	42.51	.	52.07	44.3 .
Somewhat bad	9.57	16.16	25.58	.	12.38	24.86 .
Very bad	5.17	4.25	12.38	.	4.81	11.66 .
Don't know/Refused	4.14	11.36	4.19	.	4.4	5.73 .

Question (column (a)): What do you think about growing trade between [GERMANY: Germany/US: the US] and other countries—do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?

Questions (columns (b)–(g)): Now thinking about [GERMANY: German/US: US] trade with particular countries. Do you think increased trade with [INSERT COUNTRY NAME] would be a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country? What about with [INSERT COUNTRY NAME]?

thing (35.7%) or as a somewhat good thing (55%). While less enthusiastic in their collective response, 72.1% of the cohort of US survey respondents indicated they believe trade to be a very good thing (27.1%) or a somewhat good thing (45%). Thus, we see strong support for trade, generally speaking, among the residents of both countries.

To better depict the differences in survey response frequencies across specific trading partners, the radar graphs in Fig. 2.1 present the categorical shares for the survey respondents who reside in Germany and in the US. The depicted trading partners are those in which survey respondents in both Germany and the US were asked to provide their opinions of trade. There are several common features for both cohorts. For example, somewhat good is the most frequent response, garnering between 49% and 59% of responses in Germany and 36–50% of US responses. To the contrary, very bad is typically the least frequently observed response. Illustrative of the variation in responses that is observed when individuals are asked about trade with specific trading partners, for the survey respondents in Germany and to a greater extent for US survey respondents, the response frequencies for China and Russia differ somewhat from those for Brazil, Japan and Germany or the US. This is quite pronounced in the lower graph, where responses of very bad and somewhat bad are much more common when US residents are asked about trade with China and Russia relative to when the respondents are asked about trade with Brazil, Japan, and Germany. Correspondingly, the response frequencies for somewhat good and very good are lower when respondents are asked about trade with China and Russia. A similar, albeit less pronounced, pattern is seen in the top graph for the survey cohort from Germany.

To represent the variation in responses when survey participants were asked about specific trading partners, we have included the difference between the share of respondents who indicated that trade with each country is a good thing (i.e., a very good thing or somewhat good) and those who indicated that trade with the noted country is a bad thing (i.e., a very bad thing or somewhat bad). Since more respondents in both Germany and in the US indicate that trade is a good thing as compared to the number who respond that trade is bad, the values for the difference between trade being good or bad are always positive. Looking first to Panel A in Table 2.1, we see that survey respondents in Germany are much less (more) likely to say that trade with Russia or China is good (bad) as compared to trade with Brazil, Japan or the US. Similarly, in




Fig. 2.1 Relative response frequencies: **a** Germany **b** United States

Panel B we see that respondents in the US are much less (more) likely to say that trade with Russia or China is good (bad) as compared to trade with Brazil, the EU, Germany, or Japan.

Finally, looking to the final row in each panel of Table 2.1 and comparing the values in column (a) to those presented in columns (b) through (g), it is interesting to see that when survey respondents are

asked for their views on trade with specific countries they are often more likely to volunteer the response of “Don’t know” or to refuse to answer the question. This is the case for all values presented in Panel A and in Panel B with the exceptions of when US residents are asked their views on trade with China and Japan.

2.2 OUR EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND DATA SOURCES

To examine the potential relationship between cross-societal cultural differences and individuals’ opinions of international trade, we estimate a series of ad hoc regression models. The dependent variable series employed in the models are constructed based on responses provided when participants in the Pew survey were asked the following questions:

What do you think about growing trade between [GERMANY: Germany/US: the US] and other countries - do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?

This question asks for respondents’ general views on international trade. A second, related question was asked immediately after the above question:

Now thinking about [GERMANY: German/US: US] trade with particular countries. Do you think increased trade with [INSERT COUNTRY NAME] would be a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or a very bad thing for our country? What about with [INSERT COUNTRY NAME]?

This second question asks for the respondents’ views on international trade between their countries of residence and specific trading partners. The countries for which the respondents were asked their opinions have been noted earlier and are also listed, along with response frequencies, in Table 2.1.

From the survey responses, we have constructed four dependent variable series. The first pair of dependent variables is drawn from the general (i.e., first) question presented above. The second pair of dependent variables is drawn from the partner-specific (i.e., second) question. Beginning

with the dependent variable series that represents survey respondents' general views on trade, the first dependent variable takes a value of one if the respondent indicates that they believe increased trade is either a very good thing or is somewhat good and is equal to zero if the respondent indicates they feel trade with the country is either somewhat bad or a very bad thing. The second dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes the value of one if an individual's response is that trade is a very bad thing, a value of two if they consider trade to be somewhat bad, is equal to three if trade is considered to be somewhat good, and is set equal to four if they indicate that they believe trade with the partner to be a very good thing. The dependent variable series that identifies survey respondents' views when asked about trade with specific partners are constructed in the same fashion; however, the values may vary across each trading partner.² The general form version of our binomial logit regression model is provided as Eq. (2.1).

$$\ln\left(\frac{p_i}{1-p_i}\right) = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 CD_{jk} + \beta_X X_i + \varepsilon_{ijk} \quad (2.1)$$

In Eq. (2.1), p_i is the probability that the survey response of individual i is that trade is good (i.e., again, either a very good thing or somewhat good). The explanatory variable that is of primary interest, presented here as CD_{jk} , is a measure of the cultural distance between the survey respondent's country of residence (i.e., country j) and a given trading partner (i.e., country k). A set of survey respondent-specific explanatory variables, X_i , is included in the empirical model as is an assumed stochastic error term, ε_{ijk} .

2.2.1 *Our Variable of Primary Interest: Cultural Distance*

As a working definition, culture can be said to represent a society's shared habits, traditions, and collective learned beliefs (White 2015). To represent culture, and more importantly, to allow for a measure of cultural differences across societies, in this analysis we employ the Inglehart measure of cultural distance (Inglehart et al. 2004).³ The measure is based on data collected as part of the World Values Surveys (WVS). As the WVS data are drawn from representative national samples, we posit that the data represent the attitudes, values, behaviors, and norms of the societies in which the survey has been administered; thus, differences

across societies, as reflected by responses to the survey questionnaires, are indicative of cross-societal cultural differences.

The survey questions used to produce the cultural dimensions that are then used to generate the composite measures of Inglehart cultural distance elicit respondents' views on issues related to economics, politics, and technological advances as well as views on topics such as gender roles, religion, sexual orientation, environmental issues, and family values (Inglehart et al. 2004). Two broad dimensions of culture—Survival vs. Self-expression values (SSE) and Traditional vs. Secular-rational authority (TSR)—are generated from the application of factor analysis to a subset of WVS questions. It is the data for these broad dimensions that are used to produce the composite cultural distance series.

A simple, yet illustrative, example of the Traditional vs. Secular-rational authority dimension holds that a survey respondent who firmly believes in the importance of a God, who holds views that are consistent with a nationalist perspective, and who indicates that they respect authority, would likely be categorized as being more traditional. If the other members of the society in which this individual lives commonly share these views and values, then the society would be identified as having a more traditional focus. A society comprised of individuals who hold views that are diametrically opposed to those described above would be categorized as being more secular-rational.

Thinking of the dimension that represents Survival vs. Self-expression values, individuals in societies that are characterized as being more survival-oriented often emphasize hard work, self-denial, and the achievement of economic and physical security. It is common for members of these societies to see foreigners and outsiders as threats. Not surprisingly, the typical individual in such a society holds negative opinions of ethnic diversity and cultural change. These views include a general intolerance toward outgroups (e.g., homosexuals and minorities) and a strong adherence to traditional gender roles. Quite often, members of survival-oriented societies believe that post-secondary education, jobs, and political activity are better suited for men than for women. These individuals also often have an authoritarian political outlook. More specifically, members of such societies are often proponents of increased government or state ownership of businesses and they are relatively more open to structures of government besides democracy. Generally speaking, individuals in societies that emphasize self-expression values are found to commonly hold opposing views on these, and related, issues.

As noted earlier, the rationale is that when economic security and physical security exist, cultural diversity begins to be appreciated and sought out. This corresponds with greater tolerance for deviation from traditional gender roles and sexual norms and to greater support for equal rights.

Given that WVS respondents are classified according to the two cultural dimensions discussed above, country-specific SSE and TSR values are generated. Using the SSE and TSR values, we then generate the Inglehart measure of cultural distance by applying the Pythagorean Theorem. Specifically, $CD_{jk} = \sqrt{(SSE_j - SSE_k)^2 + (TSR_j - TSR_k)^2}$ (White 2010). We employ country-specific SSE and TSR values, as available, for the most recent wave of the World Values Survey.⁴

2.2.2 *Construction of Individual-Specific Control Variables*

To control for individual-specific characteristics that may have some bearing on opinions of international trade, we utilize our survey data to construct a number of explanatory variables. The set of explanatory variables includes measures that represent each survey respondent's age, educational attainment, employment status, gender, relative household income, political views, and living environment.

We begin our discussion by focusing on the series of demographic variables. To control for potential differences in opinions of international trade that correspond with respondents' ages, we construct dummy variables to represent four age categories: 18–34 years of age, 35–54 years, 55–70 years, and 71–95 years of age. In our estimation equations, we exclude the 18–34 years of age variable as the comparison category. To control for potential differences in opinions of trade across genders, we include a dummy variable that is equal to one if the survey respondent is female and is equal to zero if the respondent is male. Similarly, we identify college graduates in the survey cohorts by including a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual has completed at least a 4-year college degree and is equal to zero otherwise.⁵

Acknowledging that employment status may correspond with an individual's views on international trade, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual reports being employed

and is equal to zero if the respondent is either unemployed or reports being not in the labor force.⁶ We also include a dummy variable that identifies survey respondents who live in urban locations. This variable is included to capture any influence that cosmopolitanism may have on public opinion of international trade. To control for relative income effects, we also include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the respondent's household income is greater than their respective national average level. Finally, as political views may shape an individual's opinions of trade, we include two measures of political conservatism (leaving centrists and left-leaning individuals, together, as the comparison group). The first measure of conservatism is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the survey respondent self-identifies as being conservative or affiliated with a right-wing political party and is equal to zero otherwise.⁷ The second measure is also a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the individual reports being very conservative or self-identifies as being affiliated with a far-right political party.⁸

As noted, the choice of individual-specific explanatory variables is limited to include only those variables that are available from the survey—thus, the ad hoc nature of our estimation equations. Rewriting Eq. (2.1) to explicitly state our estimation equation, we have the following.

$$\ln \left(\frac{\text{Trade is Good}_i}{1 - \text{Trade is Good}_i} \right) = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Cultural Distance}_{jk} + \beta_2 \text{35–54 years}_i \\ + \beta_3 \text{55–70 years}_i + \beta_4 \text{71–95 years}_i \\ + \beta_5 \text{College Graduate}_i + \beta_6 \text{Employed}_i + \beta_7 \text{Female}_i \quad (2.2) \\ + \beta_8 \text{Above Average Income}_i + \beta_9 \text{Right Wing}_i \\ + \beta_{10} \text{Far Right Wing}_i + \beta_{11} \text{Urban Resident}_i + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

When estimating Eq. (2.2), we employ the binomial logit estimation technique to regress our dichotomous dependent variable series on a measure of cross-societal cultural distance and our individual-specific control variables. We also estimate a modified version of the equation where a categorical dependent variable series is substituted for the listed dependent variable series. As noted, the categorical dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent indicates they believe increased trade

to be a very bad thing, is equal to two if they consider it somewhat bad, equal to three if trade is viewed as somewhat good, and is equal to four if they believe trade to be a very good thing. Given the responses follow an ordering where trade is viewed in the least favorable terms to most favorable terms, the ordered logit technique is employed for this estimation.

2.2.3 *Descriptive Statistics*

Descriptive statistics for the individual survey cohorts and for a combined cohort of respondents in Germany and in the US are presented in Table 2.2. A correlation matrix is provided as Table 2.3. Beginning with the dependent variable series, we see that large majorities of the survey respondents express positive views of international trade: 84.6% for the combined sample, 92.9% of the survey respondents in Germany, and 76.5% of those located in the US. As noted earlier, however, when considering trade with specific countries, the expressed support for trade often declines considerably. Overall, only 76.3% of survey respondents in Germany and just 69% of respondents in the US express support for trade when asked about specific partners. Thus, support for international trade in Germany and in the US declines by quite large margins—by 16.6% and by 7.5%, respectively, when respondents are asked about specific trading partners.

Turning to our explanatory variable series, we see that the US is, on average, more culturally distant than is Germany from the groups of countries for which survey respondents are asked their opinions of international trade. We also see that the typical survey respondent in the US, relative to the typical survey respondent in Germany, tends to be slightly older, is much more likely to be a college graduate, is slightly more likely to live in a household with an income above their national average, is more commonly male, and is more frequently unemployed or out of the labor force. The typical survey respondent in the US, again relative to their counterpart in Germany, is also more likely to hold conservative or very conservative political views and is much more likely to live in a rural environment.

Given the makeshift nature of our estimation equations, the pairwise correlation coefficients presented in Table 2.3 carry importance both in that they provide general relationships between the dependent variable series and each of the explanatory variables and because they allow us

Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics

	<i>Expected</i>	<i>Coef. sign</i>	<i>Germany and</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>US sample</i>
			<i>US sample</i>	<i>sample</i>	
<i>Dependent variables...</i>					
General opinion of trade (binary: 0, 1)	.		0.8463 (0.3607)	0.9290 (0.2568)	0.7648 (0.4241)
General opinion of trade (categorical: 1–4)	.		3.1185 (0.7921)	3.2806 (0.6323)	2.9587 (0.8946)
Partner-specific opinion of trade (0, 1)	.		0.7258 (0.4461)	0.7628 (0.4254)	0.6897 (0.4627)
Partner-specific opinion of trade (1–4)	.		2.8534 (0.8347)	2.9138 (0.7306)	2.7946 (0.9212)
<i>Explanatory variables...</i>					
Cultural distance	–		2.3703 (0.8006)	1.9859 (0.5039)	2.7448 (0.8566)
Age (in years)	–		52.3240 (18.8773)	51.3716 (18.1305)	53.2517 (19.5348)
18–34 years of age	+		0.2131 (0.4095)	0.2173 (0.4124)	0.2091 (0.4067)
35–54 years of age	±		0.2977 (0.4573)	0.3163 (0.4651)	0.2795 (0.4488)
55–70 years of age	±		0.3164 (0.4651)	0.3015 (0.4590)	0.3310 (0.4706)
71–95 years of age	–		0.1728 (0.3781)	0.1649 (0.3711)	0.1804 (0.3846)
College graduate	+		0.2969 (0.4569)	0.2230 (0.4163)	0.3689 (0.4825)
Employed	+		0.5533 (0.4972)	0.5623 (0.4962)	0.5446 (0.4981)
Female	–		0.4845 (0.4998)	0.4856 (0.4998)	0.4834 (0.4998)
Above-average income	+		0.5037 (0.5000)	0.5004 (0.5001)	0.5069 (0.5000)
Political ideology/ affiliation: right wing	±		0.3142 (0.4642)	0.2907 (0.4541)	0.3372 (0.4728)
Political ideology/ affiliation: far right wing	–		0.0537 (0.2254)	0.0363 (0.1869)	0.0706 (0.2562)
Urban resident	+		0.4879 (0.4999)	0.6550 (0.4754)	0.3252 (0.4685)

Standard deviations in parentheses. See text for variable definitions. All explanatory variables are dummy variables with the exception of Cultural Distance. $N = 1874$ for General Opinion of Trade variables (Germany and United States combined sample), 930 for Germany sample, and 944 for the United States sample. $N = 9168$ for all other combined sample variables, $N = 4524$ for all other variables in the German sample, and $N = 4644$ for all other variables in the United States sample

Table 2.3 Correlation matrix, Germany and United States combined sample

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	
General opinion of trade (0, 1)	(a)	1.00											
General opinion of trade (1–4)	(b)	0.79	1.00										
Partner-specific opinion of trade (0, 1)	(c)	0.31	0.35	1.00									
Partner-specific opinion of trade (1–4)	(d)	0.34	0.44	0.84	1.00								
Cultural distance	(e)	0.11	−0.10	−0.14	−0.14	1.00							
Age	(f)	−0.01	−0.03	0.01	−0.01	0.03	1.00						
College graduate	(g)	0.11	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.09	1.00					
Employed	(h)	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.02	−0.01	−0.39	0.10	1.00				
Female	(i)	−0.05	−0.13	−0.12	−0.15	0.00	0.04	−0.02	−0.08	1.00			
Above-average household income	(j)	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.00	−0.07	0.21	0.21	−0.09	1.00		
Political ideology/affiliation: right wing	(k)	−0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.10	−0.04	−0.03	0.01	0.05	1.00	
Political ideology/affiliation: far right wing	(l)	−0.07	−0.07	−0.01	−0.01	0.04	0.03	−0.01	−0.03	−0.07	−0.02	−0.16	1.00
Urban resident	(m)	0.12	0.13	0.05	0.05	−0.16	−0.07	0.00	0.01	−0.07	−0.01	−0.07	−0.08

N = 9168

to check for pairwise collinearity among the explanatory variable series. The correlation coefficients presented in columns (a) through (d) correspond to the dependent variable series. Based solely on the coefficient signs (i.e., setting the magnitudes of the correlation coefficients to the side), we find negative correlation coefficients between each dependent variable series and our measure of cultural distance (i.e., trade being a good thing (i.e., either somewhat good or a very good thing)). We also find a negative relationship between the dependent variable series and the female dummy variable, suggesting that female respondents may hold less favorable/more negative views of international trade relative to male respondents. Additionally, negative relationships are found between the dependent variable series and the far-right political affiliation variable. To the contrary, we see positive relationships between the dependent variable series and the respondents' level of educational attainment. We also see that respondents who report being employed and those that indicate a level of household income that is higher than their respective national average more frequently express favorable/positive opinions of trade. Lastly, we also see a positive relationship between the dependent variable series and the variable that identifies respondents as living in an urban environment. A check of the pairwise correlation coefficients presented in columns (c) through (j) also indicates that collinearity is not an issue for our set of explanatory variables.

2.3 DOES CULTURAL DISTANCE CORRESPOND WITH VARIATION IN OPINIONS ON TRADE?

To determine whether cultural differences between the survey respondents' countries of residence (i.e., Germany or the US in this particular analysis) and their trading partners have any bearing on their opinions of international trade, we estimate Eq. (2.2) using the binomial logit technique while employing a dichotomous dependent variable series that indicates whether respondents view international trade as being good or bad. We also estimate a variant of Eq. (2.2) where the dummy dependent variable series is replaced by a categorical dependent variable series and the ordered logit estimation technique is employed. We examine the potential determinants of trade both when specific partner countries are considered and when survey respondents are asked for their general views of international trade. The results obtained from these two estimations are presented in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 Determinants of general and trading partner-specific opinions on international trade

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Partner-specific opinion of trade (0, 1)</i>	<i>Partner-specific opinion of trade (1–4)</i>	<i>General opinion of trade (0, 1)</i>	<i>General opinion of trade (1–4)</i>
<i>Estimation technique:</i>	<i>Logit</i>	<i>Ordered logit</i>	<i>Logit</i>	<i>Ordered logit</i>
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Cultural distance	–0.4527*** (0.0319)	–0.3204*** (0.0256)		
35–54 years of age	–0.0849 (0.0686)	–0.0699 (0.0572)	0.0756 (0.1892)	–0.0019 (0.1281)
55–70 years of age	–0.0890 (0.0692)	–0.1543*** (0.0571)	–0.0313 (0.1873)	–0.0807 (0.1292)
71–95 years of age	0.0567 (0.0859)	–0.1015 (0.0701)	0.0467 (0.2272)	–0.0894 (0.1573)
College graduate	0.5368*** (0.0578)	0.5961*** (0.0458)	0.6733*** (0.1685)	0.5895*** (0.1019)
Employed	–0.0856 (0.0569)	–0.0720 (0.0476)	0.021 (0.1527)	–0.0310 (0.1070)
Female	–0.5436*** (0.0487)	–0.6031*** (0.0406)	–0.2292* (0.1322)	–0.5462*** (0.0907)
Above-average income	0.1533*** (0.0506)	0.1144*** (0.0418)	0.3037** (0.1380)	0.2069** (0.0937)
Right wing	0.0461 (0.0533)	0.0529 (0.0437)	–0.0143 (0.1448)	0.1635* (0.0987)
Far right wing	–0.1711 (0.1056)	–0.0653 (0.0927)	–0.5896** (0.2535)	–0.4515** (0.2119)
Urban resident	0.0827* (0.0493)	0.0889** (0.0405)	0.6900*** (0.1364)	0.4407*** (0.0906)

(continued)

Table 2.4 (continued)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Partner-specific opinion of trade (0, 1)</i>		<i>Partner-specific opinion of trade (1–4)</i>		<i>General opinion of trade of trade (0, 1)</i>	<i>General opinion of trade (1–4)</i>
<i>Estimation technique:</i>	<i>Logit</i>		<i>Ordered logit</i>	<i>Logit</i>		<i>Ordered logit</i>
Constant	2.1797*** (0.1147)		(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
/cut1				–3.4351 (0.0991)	1.2346*** (0.2084)	–2.7735 (0.1727)
/cut2				–1.9067 (0.0927)		–1.5912 (0.1537)
/cut3				0.5292 (0.0905)		0.9611 (0.1499)
N	9168			9168	1874	1874
Count R ²	0.7270			0.5190	0.8460	0.5250
LR χ^2 statistic	457.20***			588.55***	66.86***	119.76***
Log-likelihood	–5156.74			–10,576.47	–770.60	–1987.92

Columns (a) and (b): Now thinking about [Germany/US: the US] and other countries—do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?
Columns (c) and (d): What do you think about growing trade between [GERMANY: Germany/US: the US] and other countries—do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?
Dependent Variables (columns (a) and (c)) is equal to one if response is “Very good” or “Somewhat good” and is equal to zero if response is “Somewhat bad” or “Very bad”
Dependent Variables (columns (b) and (d)) is equal to four if response is “Very good”, equal to three if the response is “Somewhat good”, equal to two if the response is “Somewhat bad”, and equal to one if the response is “Very bad”
Robust standard errors in parentheses. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively

Beginning with the results from the binomial logit estimation that are presented in column (a), we find the estimated coefficient of the measure of cultural distance is negative (-0.4527) and statistically significant from zero. Similarly, the results from the ordered logit estimation, presented in column (b), also include a negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient (-0.3204) for the measure of cultural distance. We can interpret the coefficients, in general terms, as follows: All else held constant, a greater cultural distance between a given survey respondent's country of residence (i.e., Germany or the US) and a given trading partner corresponds with a lower likelihood that the respondent will express a positive or more favorable opinion of international trade. Further, and perhaps of greater importance, as the measure of cultural distance varies across trading partners, we can say that the results are consistent with the notion that, independent of other determinants of public opinion on international trade, cross-societal cultural differences influence individuals' views on international trade.

The estimated coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are largely consistent with our expectations and our intuition regarding individuals' opinions on international trade. More specifically, survey respondents who are more educated (i.e., college graduates) or who live in households with incomes that are above their respective national average are significantly more likely to express positive opinions on international trade. Similarly, survey respondents who live in urban areas are also significantly more likely to view trade in a positive light. To the contrary, female respondents are significantly less likely to express a positive opinion on trade. We do not find much in terms of statistically significant relationships based on our age categorizations, the respondents' employment status, or their political views/leanings.

We also see that the ad hoc econometric specifications perform quite well in terms of the models' ability to correctly predict the observed values of the dependent variable series. Specifically, evaluating the explanatory variables at their mean values and applying the estimated coefficients that are reported in column (a), we see that the count R^2 value is equal to 0.727, meaning that the model correctly predicts the observed value of the dependent variable in 72.7% of cases. Similarly, the model for which results are presented in column (c), that correspond to the binomial estimation where survey respondents' general (i.e., non-partner-specific) views of international trade are employed as the dependent variable series, correctly predicts the observed value of the dependent variable series

in 84.6% of cases. Looking to columns (b) and (d), where the ordered logit estimation technique is employed, the models correctly predict the observed value of the dependent variable series in 51.9% and 52.5% of cases.

As a sort of robustness check, to see the extent to which the estimated coefficients of our control variables change in magnitude or in terms of statistical significance, we also estimate Eq. (2.2) with the measure of cultural distance excluded from the specification while using the dependent variable series that asks respondents for their general views of international trade. These results are presented in columns (c) and (d) of Table 2.4. For the most part, the coefficient signs and the pattern of statistical significance are consistent with the results presented in columns (a) and (b). We do see a loss of statistical significance for the estimated coefficient of the variable that identifies respondents who are 55–70 years of age, and we find that the estimated coefficients of the political ideology/affiliation variables are generally significant in columns (c) and (d) with the coefficients of the far-right ideology/affiliation being negative and significantly different from zero in both estimations. Generally, the results, across the four columns, are in line with expectations based on the pairwise correlation coefficients (Table 2.3). Otherwise, we can say that, again, we find college graduates, those who live in households with above-average incomes, and those who live in urban areas are more likely to express positive, or more favorable, views when asked generally about international trade. And, again, female respondents are more likely to express negative, or less favorable, views when asked generally about trade.

Since the estimated coefficients that are reported in Table 2.4 indicate the change in the log-odds ratios, to provide a more clear indication of the influence of cultural distance on public opinion of international trade, we estimate the predicted probabilities for the dependent variable series using the estimated coefficients presented in columns (a) and (b) of Table 2.4, several values of the cultural distance measure (i.e., the minimum, maximum, mean, and a one standard deviation range about the mean), and the corresponding mean values for all other explanatory variables. The resulting predicted probabilities are presented in Table 2.5.

Focusing first on the values presented in column (a), when the cultural distance measure is set equal to its mean value, the corresponding estimated probability that survey respondents will consider international trade to be a good thing is equal to 73.78%. This is very similar to the mean value for the variable (72.58%) that is reported in Table 2.2.

Table 2.5 Predicted probabilities

<i>Cultural distance level...</i>	<i>Predicted probability that dependent variable is equal to...</i>	<i>Predicted probabilities generated using coefficient values in Table 2.4, column...</i>	
		(a)	(b)
Minimum = 1.0230	1 = "Good"	0.8381	.
	0 = "Bad"	0.1619	.
	4 = "Very good"	.	0.2719
	3 = "Somewhat good"	.	0.5382
	2 = "Somewhat bad"	.	0.1415
	1 = "Very bad"	.	0.0484
Mean - 1/2 standard Deviation = 1.9616	1 = "Good"	0.7720	.
	0 = "Bad"	0.2280	.
	4 = "Very good"	.	0.2165
	3 = "Somewhat good"	.	0.5430
	2 = "Somewhat bad"	.	0.1762
	1 = "Very bad"	.	0.0643
Mean = 2.3703	1 = "Good"	0.7378	.
	0 = "Bad"	0.2622	.
	4 = "Very good"	.	0.1951
	3 = "Somewhat good"	.	0.5396
	2 = "Somewhat bad"	.	0.1926
	1 = "Very bad"	.	0.0726
Mean + 1/2 standard Deviation = 2.7649	1 = "Good"	0.7018	.
	0 = "Bad"	0.2982	.
	4 = "Very good"	.	0.1761
	3 = "Somewhat good"	.	0.5334
	2 = "Somewhat bad"	.	0.2090
	1 = "Very bad"	.	0.0816
Maximum = 3.4355	1 = "Good"	0.6347	.
	0 = "Bad"	0.3653	.
	4 = "Very good"	.	0.1470
	3 = "Somewhat good"	.	0.5162
	2 = "Somewhat bad"	.	0.2376
	1 = "Very bad"	.	0.0992

Allowing for a one standard deviation change in the cultural distance measure about its mean value, with all other explanatory variable held constant at their respective mean values, produces estimated probabilities that range in value from 77.2% to 70.18%. Thus, we can say that the resulting change in the estimated probability that trade will be considered good, given a one standard deviation increase in the cultural distance measure, is a decrease of 7.02%.

Further, allowing the measure of cultural distance to take its minimum value and its maximum value, while again holding all other explanatory variables at their mean values, the corresponding respective estimates of the probability that the survey respondent views international trade as a good thing are 83.81% and 63.47%. This indicates that the change in the predicted probability, due to variation in the levels of cultural distance between the typical respondents' country of residence and given trading partners, is equal to a decline of 20.34%. In both instances, the change in the predicted probabilities that survey respondents view trade as a good thing given either a one standard deviation change in the cultural distance value or considering the spread of cultural distance values across the cohort of specific partner countries are of considerable magnitude.

Turning our attention to the estimated probabilities presented in column (b) of Table 2.5, we find similar results when considering the likelihood that respondents view trade as a very good thing, as somewhat good, somewhat bad, or as a very bad thing. When our measure of cultural distance is held at its mean value, as are all other explanatory variables, we see the predicted probability that a respondent will consider trade to be a very good thing is 19.51%. A much higher predicted probability (53.96%) is estimated for the view trade is somewhat good. Lower likelihoods are predicted for the opinion that trade is somewhat bad (19.26%) or that trade is a very bad thing (7.26%).

Again, we consider changes in the predicted probabilities that stem from variation in the level of the cultural distance variable. As before, we first allow for a one standard deviation change in the cultural distance variable about its mean value and then we allow the variable to range from its minimum value to its maximum value while holding all other explanatory variables constant at their mean values. Given a one standard deviation increase in the level of cultural distance, we find a 4.04% reduction in the likelihood that the typical survey respondent views international trade as a very good thing. We also see that the estimated likelihood that trade is viewed as being somewhat good declines by 0.96%. Corresponding with the decreased probabilities that trade will be viewed as a very good thing or as somewhat good, we see increases in the likelihoods that trade is viewed as somewhat bad (a rise of 3.28%) or as a very bad thing (an increase of 1.73%). Allowing the cultural distance measure to range in value from its minimum to its maximum produces more pronounced changes in the predicted probabilities. The likelihood that a respondent views trade as being a very good thing declines by 12.49%, and the

Table 2.6 Changes in predicted probabilities

<i>Based on results presented in:</i>	<i>Column (a) of Table 2.4</i>		<i>Column (b) of Table 2.4</i>		
<i>Probability of Dep. variable:</i>	<i>...equal to 1</i>	<i>...equal to 1</i>	<i>...equal to 2</i>	<i>...equal to 3</i>	<i>...equal to 4</i>
<i>Trade is:</i>	<i>...good</i>	<i>...very bad</i>	<i>...somewhat bad</i>	<i>...somewhat good</i>	<i>...very good</i>
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Cultural distance	-0.2035	0.0508	0.0961	-0.0220	-0.1249
35–54 years of age
55–70 years of age	.	0.0106	0.0198	-0.0066	-0.0238
71–95 years of age
College graduate	0.0983	-0.0365	-0.0728	0.0087	0.1005
Employed
Female	-0.1054	0.0414	0.0764	-0.0235	-0.0943
Above-average income	0.0297	-0.0077	-0.0146	0.0043	0.0180
Right wing
Far right wing
Urban resident	0.0160	-0.0060	-0.0113	0.0033	0.0140

Values presented are estimated changes in predicted probabilities. The estimates are generated using the results presented in the corresponding columns of Table 2.4. Each value is based on a change in the listed explanatory variable from its minimum value to its maximum value (i.e., from 0 to 1 for all variables except the measure of cultural distance) while the mean values of the remaining explanatory variables are held constant. “.” denotes the corresponding coefficient estimate is not statistically significant from zero

predicted probability that trade is viewed as somewhat good decreases by 2.2%. These changes correspond with increases in the predicted probabilities that trade is somewhat bad (9.61%) or is a very bad thing (5.08%).

Finally, to gain some perspective on the relative influence of cultural distance on individuals’ views of international trade, we estimate the changes in our predicted probabilities for all explanatory variables in columns (a) and (b) of Table 2.4 for which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant from zero. These predicted probabilities are presented in Table 2.6. For reference, the first row of the table repeats the changes in the probabilities that are estimated to occur given a change in

the cultural distance measure that are presented in Table 2.5. Looking at the remaining values that are presented in column (a), we see that the estimated change in the predicted probability that a survey respondent will view trade as being either a very good thing or as somewhat good is 9.83% higher if the individual is a college graduate. The predicted probability is also estimated to be 10.54% lower if the respondent happens to be female, 2.97% higher if the respondent lives in a household with above-average income, and 1.6% higher if the respondent lives in an urban environment.

Columns (b) through (e) present the changes in predicted probabilities that a respondent will view international trade as a very good thing, as somewhat good, somewhat bad, or as a very bad thing. Here, we see that individuals who range in age from 55 to 70 years of age, relative to 18–34 year olds, are somewhat less likely to view trade as being a very good thing (–2.38%) or as somewhat good (–0.66%) and are more likely to consider trade to be somewhat bad (1.98%) or a very bad thing (1.06%). Again, we see that education attainment, as represented by having attained a college degree, corresponds with a large increase in the predicted probabilities that the survey respondent considers trade to be a very good thing (10.05%), and smaller changes in the predicted probability that trade is viewed as somewhat good (0.87%), somewhat bad (–7.28%), or as very bad (–3.65%). The estimated probability that survey respondents view trade as being a very bad thing or as somewhat bad are 4.14% and 7.64% higher, respectively, if the respondent is female. Similarly, the estimated likelihoods that trade is viewed as being somewhat good or a very good thing are 2.35% and 9.43% lower, respectively, if the respondent is female. While living in a household that has an income above the respective national average or that is located in an urban environment are found to have statistically significant effects, the influence on the values of the predicted probabilities are relatively small.

2.4 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The primary purpose of this chapter is to extend from the material presented in Chap. 1 and, by doing so, present a deeper exploration of the potential relationship between individuals' opinions of international trade and cross-societal cultural differences. Thus, the work presented here serves as a bridge to the material that is presented in later chapters. As has been noted, we view the material presented here as an exploratory analysis. That being said, we also view the work presented here as initial

evidence that cultural distance is negatively associated with individuals' opinions on international trade.

Employing a measure of cultural distance that is constructed based on responses to the World Values Survey, we have sought to determine whether cross-societal cultural differences between the countries of residence for the two cohorts of survey respondents (i.e., those who reside in Germany and those who live in the US) are significant determinants of individual opinions on international trade. Using our measure of cultural distance in conjunction with data from the Pew Research Center's 2014 US-Germany Trade Survey, we have utilized regression analysis—namely logistic regression techniques—to identify the determinants of individuals' opinions on international trade while paying particular attention to whether cultural distance influences public opinion. Based on the results obtained when estimating our specifications, we have generated estimated probabilities, at varying levels of cultural distance, of whether individuals view international trade as good or bad and as a very bad thing, somewhat bad, somewhat good, or a very good thing. We have compared the relative changes in predicted probabilities that are attributable to isolated changes in the measure of cultural distance and of other explanatory variables for which estimated coefficients were found to be statistically significant from zero.

Our findings indicate that the majority of survey respondents express positive opinions on international trade whether asked about trade in general terms or asked about trade with specific partner countries. Even so, when estimating our probability models we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between cultural distance and the probability that an individual expresses a positive opinion on international trade. This result is found whether we employ a dichotomous dependent variable series and utilize the binomial logit estimation technique and when we instead use a categorical dependent variable series and employ the ordered logit technique.

We find that allowing the measure of cultural distance to vary from its lowest value to its highest value, while holding all other variables equal to their mean values, results in a 20.35% decrease in the predicted probability that the respondent views international trade as either a very good thing or as somewhat good. Similarly, the same assumed increase in cultural distance is estimated to reduce the probability that an individual views trade as a very good thing by 12.49% and to reduce the probability that the individual considers trade to be a somewhat good thing by

2.20%. The corresponding increases in the likelihoods that international trade is viewed as somewhat bad or as a very bad thing are 9.61% and 5.08%, respectively.

These findings lend credibility to the notion that the variation in survey responses, with respect to individuals' opinions on international trade, that is observed across specific trading partners may be partially due to cross-societal cultural differences. Even so, the analysis presented here, being sourced from data that represent the countries of residence (i.e., Germany and the US) and only a handful of trading partners, is not sufficient to reach such a strong conclusion. The results and findings do, however, correspond with the notion that cultural distance is a significant determinant of individuals' opinions on international trade and, accordingly, we consider the analysis presented in this chapter to be a basis for the more detailed and complete analysis on public opinion on international trade that is presented in Chap. 7. Since international trade is a facet of international economic integration (i.e., economic globalization), public opinion on other forms of economic globalization—namely immigration and FDI inflows—may be similarly affected by cross-societal cultural differences. Accordingly, these possibilities are explored in greater detail in Chaps. 6 and 8, respectively.

NOTES

1. In actuality, being employed by a foreign firm is, in many instances, beneficial relative to working for a domestic employer. A report issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2008) examines wages paid by domestic and foreign firms in Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, Portugal, and the UK. The authors find that foreign takeovers of domestic firms correspond with increases in average wages that range from negligible (in Germany) to 19% (in Indonesia) and that workers who move from a domestic-owned firm to a foreign-owned firm realize, on average, wage increases that range from 6% (in the UK) to 21% (in Brazil).
2. Individuals who responded that they did not know or who refused to answer the question were coded as missing values and, thus, are not included in the analysis.
3. Unless otherwise noted, descriptive information in this section is from Inglehart and Baker (2000).
4. The first wave of the WVS was conducted between 1981 and 1984. Wave 2 was completed from 1990 to 1994. From 1995 to 1998, the third wave

was completed. Wave 4 was conducted during the 1999–2004 period, and wave 5 spans the years from 2005 through 2009.

5. Unfortunately, the categories in the survey data do not allow for more descriptive categorization of respondents' levels of educational attainment.
6. Survey respondents in the Germany cohort are simply identified as “working” or “not working”; thus, although there is a greater variety of responses available to members of the US cohort, we are limited in defining the labor force status of the observations in our data.
7. The dummy variable “right-wing” is equal to one for German survey respondents who report a political party affiliation of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Christian Democratic Union or Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), or Freie Wähler (Free Voters), is equal to one for US respondents who report having a “conservative” political ideology, and is equal to zero otherwise.
8. The dummy variable “far right” is equal to one for German survey respondents who report a political party affiliation with either the National Democratic Party (NDP/DVU) or Alternative for Germany (AfD), is equal to one for US respondents who report having a “very conservative” political ideology, and is equal to zero otherwise.

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