

Welfare Politics: Building Welfare Institutions

The first generation of the welfare debates has focused on articulating the main drive which leads the development of the welfare state. They mainly exploit political or economic variables, such as industrialization (Wilensky and Lebaux 1958; Wilensky 1975), power resources mobilization of labor class (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985), or roles of states (Flora and Alber 1981; Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Orloff and Skocpol 1984). Political or economic factors mentioned above do influence welfare development. However, their explanatory capacity is limited to the quantitative expansion of the welfare state and cannot confront the historical variety or detailed historiography of the welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990, 13–17, 106–107). Due to this foible, the second generation, from the qualitative dimension, mainly explores the diversity of the welfare states and opens up a new field of cross-national comparison on the welfare regimes, that is, “welfare regime typology business” (Abrahamson 1999).

The welfare regime refers to “the combined, inter-dependent way in which welfare is produced and allocated between state, market, and family” (Esping-Andersen 1999, 34). That is to say, the welfare regime can be identified with its distinct welfare mixture of state, market, and family. Since Esping-Andersen’s ambitious works in 1990 and 1999, researchers have tried to identify the distinct welfare mix of one country or a specific region. Their comparative research outcomes have served not only as snapshots for the cross-national variance in welfare regimes of capitalist

societies but also as springboards for the historical variance in welfare mix of a specific country, from diachronic and synchronic perspectives.

It would be a waste of pages to summarize all the existing literatures or compare their perspectives on the welfare states. Hence, this chapter limits its range of discussion to the diversity of the welfare regimes from cultural perspectives. In the earlier chapter, I presented the puzzle of the variant welfare regime in Korea and Taiwan in terms of the relationship between the family and the state—why Korea has a highly familialistic welfare institutions, whereas Taiwan has welfare institutions that are stingy to families. It entails the core questions of the first and second generations of welfare debates regarding the diversity of welfare regimes and the determinant factor of such outcomes: how distinct the welfare institutions of the two countries are and why.

In searching for answers to this research question, this chapter first discusses how existing scholarship has approached and explained the welfare regimes and welfare politics. This chapter discusses the two core concepts, “de-commodification” and “de-familialization,” based on which a library of welfare regime studies has advanced and pinpoints the basic tenets of welfare regime typology debates. The first aim of this chapter is to show that the existing political economy approach fails in situating the family properly in the welfare development or the welfare regime. This failure stems from the cultural poverty of the approach; it fails to conceptualize family as a cultural entity.

The second purpose is to underscore the importance of institutions, to usher a more meaningful understanding of the origins and processes of diverse welfare politics in East Asia. Welfare politics is a series of processes, in and through which formal institutions and principles governing the redistribution of welfare goods or services are created and drawn. The discussion explores the classical problem on how institutions originate and change, from cultural and institutional perspectives, and the chapter will offer the framework for understanding and comparing the welfare institutional building and changing processes of S. Korea and Taiwan.

The central contention of the discussion is what influences welfare institution building. This research asserts the importance of institutional legacies, especially welfare institutions in earlier periods, in establishing the incentive structure and thereby structuring individuals’ choice of actions. As such, the authoritarian legacies and the specific configurations of earlier welfare institutions in S. Korea and Taiwan critically shaped individuals’ mode of interest articulation and their achievements in welfare politics.

The third purpose of the chapter is to explain the institutional changes from actor's roles in welfare politics by highlighting their motives. Institution-building processes have been explained mainly from economic interests of individuals. Although economic-structural and organizational characteristics of the given welfare institutional arrangements structure the individuals' choice of action, what motivates individuals' actions is not only economic incentive and material interests but also moral and normative motives given from cultural and social environments. Therefore, this chapter will offer the framework to synthesize the influences of not only efficiency but also historical legacy and social value and to analyze the mutual influences between individual actors and institutions, in order to understand the divergence of welfare politics and its outcomes.

DE-COMMODIFICATION AND DE-FAMILIALIZATION, REVISITED

The welfare regime refers to "the combined, inter-dependent way in which welfare is produced and allocated between state, market, and family" (Esping-Andersen 1999, 34). Based on the examination and comparison on social policies of 18 OECD countries, Esping-Andersen proposes the three distinct welfare regimes: liberal, conservative, and social-democratic welfare regimes. Since his welfare states typology, many research studies have concentrated their efforts on conducting cross-national or cross-regional comparative research studies and classifying them into one of his welfare regime types. The aim of this book is not to compare the welfare regimes of S. Korea and Taiwan. Instead, it heads our attention to his core concepts, de-commodification, and de-familialization.

First, focused on the welfare state and market nexus, his first work in 1990 estimates how the welfare state plays against market, on the basis of the "de-commodification." De-commodification refers to "the degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990, 37)". And in his later work in 1999, adding the dimension of the welfare state and family nexus, Esping-Andersen again estimates how the welfare state plays against families, on the basis of "de-familialization." Among the three axes of welfare mix, Esping-Andersen's interest lies in the welfare state's role in the welfare regime.

His typology and concepts got critics as much as attention. The first attack, related to the de-commodification, was that his analysis was

centered on the relationship between the state and the (labor) market (Abrahamson 1999, 409–411; Ditch et al. 1998). They criticize that his typology fails in integrating the civil society, especially roles of family or networks in the informal dimension and does not pay attention to the gender issue. Such critics were most aggressively raised by the feminist camp. They insist that the political economy approach to the welfare regime, including Esping-Andersen's works as an exemplar, does not take the gendered nature of welfare states or social policies into account; this approach does not acknowledge that the de-commodification of the welfare state has the importance only to the wage earners in the labor market, that is, the male breadwinners.

The Western states have developed the welfare institutions of “male breadwinner model,” benefitting mainly males who belong to the formal labor market. They assume that the male head of the household would be paid a family wage, sufficient to support his children and wife and mother who performed domestic labor without payment (Fraser 2000, 1). The fact that the gendered division of labor between “male=bread-winner” and “female=dependent/caregiver” inside families and the labor market is inscribed in social policies, showing that the family-related eligibility targeted for family dependents outside the labor market is socially structured. It implies that even though social policies intend to de-commodify, that is, to relieve the commodity status of labor, their effect can be realized only partially; the de-commodification of social policies can be effective only to male laborers, leaving females commodified or pre-commodified.

Moreover, they argue that the social policies themselves can reinforce the inequality between men and women in the labor market as well as within a family. From this perspective, the welfare state itself produces social stratification as well as gender stratification (Esping-Andersen 1999; Sainsbury 2001). Nevertheless, Esping-Andersen applied the de-commodification under conceptualizing women based on an undifferentiated status of citizens, and thereby neglected the female's complex role as “needs-bearing clients and rights-bearing consumers of service, and political citizens” (Fraser 2000).

The feminist critics on the de-commodification have two implications. First, how much de-commodifying potentials social policies do have is one thing, and how much such policies can de-commodify the welfare regime is another. Secondly, the degree to which one welfare regime is de-commodified cannot be simply reduced to the de-commodifying

potential of the social policies (Esping-Andersen 1999, 47): No matter how high the commodifying potential of a social policy is, as the historical institutionalism argues, the same potential does not always generate the same results because “effects of such policies will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941).

Such critics explain why Esping-Andersen (1999) adds the “de-familialization” of the welfare states to catch the relationship between the state and families in his later work. In his terminology, “de-familialization” is the effect or potential of “policies that lessen individuals’ reliance on the family” and that maximize individuals’ command of economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities (Esping-Andersen 1999, 45; Lister 2000).

According to Esping-Andersen (1999, 45), “familialism” has two following significances: familialism is used to denote (1) “pro-family” politics in a Christian conservative effort to restore traditional family values, and (2) in Scandinavia, the women-friendly welfare state, that is, an active policy committed to lessening the caring burdens of the family. Using the first definition, he concludes that “a familialistic welfare regime is one that assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household” based on the principle that families take the primary responsibility in offering welfare services to their members in need, and that the state should not intervene in the family’s welfare function because it could hamper the self-help tradition or ideology. He conceptualizes the “de-familialization” of the welfare state by its role in lessening individual’s reliance on families for welfare needs by absorbing the caring burdens of the family. Therefore, the welfare state reacts therefore against the family with its “de-familialization” as it reacts against the market with its “de-commodification.” Between the two terminologies, his description of the familialistic characters of the East Asian welfare regime is closer to the first meaning. Especially, the familialistic characters of social policies in the regions offer the solid ground, based on which he categorizes East Asia to the conservative welfare regime.

His two versions of familialism imply that Esping-Andersen’s welfare mix is intrinsically tied to the implicit presupposition on the zero-sum relationship between a state and a family or between a state and a market. The aim of his work is to identify the welfare regime typology by discerning the different combination of welfare mix among

“state-market-family” by weighing the relative combination ratio that each provider makes in welfare responsibilities. And the explicit purpose of the welfare state is to lessen individuals’ reliance on market or family. In other words, the main task of the welfare state is to crowd out the market as well as families of welfare mix.

To exemplify the familialistic welfare regime that assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household, he evinces a highly familialistic nature of the conservative welfare state with examples of legal prescription that parents (or children) should be responsible for their children (or parents) in case of need. In this regime, social assistance is granted only to individuals whose parents or adult children fail to support them. In sum, “the more familialistic the welfare state, the less generous are family benefits” (Esping-Andersen 1999, 83). Inversely, he defines the “de-familialization” as the effect or potential of the “policies that maximize individuals command of economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities” (Esping-Andersen 1999, 45); the more the welfare state (absorbs caring responsibilities), the less familialism (Esping-Andersen 1999, 67). In his model, it is presumed that the state and families are vying for individuals’ welfare.

The first problem in his dealing way of familialism is witnessed in measuring the de-familialization through the welfare state. It is estimated by the government’s role in welfare production and distribution (Esping-Andersen 1999, 52), with operational indices such as (1) overall servicing commitment (nonhealth family service expenditure as a percentage of GDP), (2) overall commitment to subsidizing child families (the combined value of family allowances and tax deductions), (3) the diffusion of public child care (daycare for children less than 3 years), (4) the supply of care to the aged (percentage of aged 65+ receiving home-help services (Esping-Andersen 1999, 61). His indices are focused on measuring the spending of the welfare state and its population coverage.

However, we cannot assume that all spending equally counts (Esping-Andersen 1990, 19). The point is not the spending per se, but its quality and contents. Even though the states spend the large share for the benefits to families with an aim for de-familialization, their outcomes could vary according to the way in which such spending is distributed as planned; it could set individuals free from family relationship in securing their welfare or inadvertently maximize individuals’ reliance on family. Therefore, the de-familialization of the welfare regime should be measured not by the spending of a welfare state but by the contents of its programs.

This is why this book conceptually and analytically differentiates the de-familialization of the welfare regime and the de-familialization effect of the welfare state. The former can be confirmed by the quantitative proportion, which family or state occupies in supplying care service. Meanwhile, the latter refers to welfare state's capacity or potential of de-familialization, which can be estimated from institutional designs of social policies such as how they stipulate the individual or familial entitlement. Especially, to estimate the latter, this book pays attention to the conditions of eligibility: whether the welfare state's entitlement is based on the individualized and universal entitlement or the status within the family as caregiver or care-receiver.

EAST ASIAN WELFARE REGIME AND FAMILIALISM

Esping-Andersen's assumption on the zero-sum relationship between state and family is also reflected in his way of conceptualizing the two meanings of familialistic social policies. The first meaning of familialistic welfare is manifested in the liberal welfare regime, which maximizes the role of families and minimizes the role of states so that it is constrained to subsidiary intervention. The second meaning of familialistic welfare is manifested in the social democratic welfare regime in which the state absorbs the family's burden in care services, therefore minimizes the role of family. The two familialistic models are treated as if they were different models based on contrasting principles, existing in separate continents. However, in the real world of welfare capitalism, the two lines of family policies, based on the two principles of family responsibilities and state's intervention, coexist not as a deviant case but as a welfare regime, especially in the emerging welfare states in the East Asia.

In his welfare regime typology, the East Asian welfare state, though limited to the observation on Japanese cases, belongs to the conservative type that develops social policies of a fairly high degree of de-commodification with the blend of strong corporatist traits, status segmentation, and familialism (Esping-Andersen 1999, 81). Also, the Confucianism, prevalent in East Asia including Japan, playing the role of functional equivalence as the Catholic in the Western Europe, has contributed to the establishment of the conservative characters of their welfare regimes.

Ironically, stressing the first meaning of "familialism" also appears in some studies which challenge the typology focused on Western state welfare and try to construct East Asia as a distinct welfare regime (Ku

1997; Aspalter 2002; Kwon 2004): “Confucian welfare state” (Jones 1993; Hong 1999), “East Asian welfare model” (Goodman et al. 1998), “Patriarchal welfare state” (Pateman 2006 [1988]), “Developmental welfare state” (Kwon 2004), and so on. All these terms are invented to illuminate unique and distinct features of the East Asian welfare regime, which cannot be compared to the Western cases. In their debates, the region’s unique characteristics such as stress on economization rather than redistribution, “anti-welfarism,” and “the roles of family” are also affirmed as the elements of a unique model that differentiates from the Western typology (Goodman et al. 1998; Chan 2003). This model can be interpreted as another expression for “household economy” that presupposes the traditional, Confucian, and extended families taking the role of offering welfare services to individuals by encompassing them in the kinship networks. They insist that such roles of families persist despite the advent of modern welfare state or hamper the establishment and development of the welfare state. This shows that the familialism in the East Asian welfare model debates also denotes the first meaning that assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household and assumes the underdevelopment of welfare states.

However, regarding the importance of family, the East Asian welfare regime shows a unique nature which does not fit to the typology derived from the Western experiences (Walker and Wong 2005). In the context of East Asia, both the meanings of familialism can be witnessed simultaneously. Familialism in the East Asian welfare regime debates can be interpreted in two ways based upon the usages of the terms. The first interpretation proposes that in the informal sector, families offer welfare goods and services to their family members in need (Chang 1997; Holliday 2000; Lew et al. 2011; Boucher 2014). The second interpretation claims that welfare institutions in the formal sector, be it state or market, have been constituted based on a family model (O’Connor 1993; Lister 2000; Fraser 2000). The first interpretation is consonant with the first meaning of the familialistic regime of Esping-Andersen, epitomizing apparently welfare laggards or the residual welfare state that stresses the obligation of family in taking care of their members.

However, in the second interpretation, the familialistic welfare regime develops the social policies based on the family model, which assumes the gendered division of domestic care services as well as the intergenerational reciprocity between caregiver generation and care-receiver generation. In this model, family is the locus of reproducing, caring,

and educating children as well as caring the old. The social policies are centered to helping families perform the function continuously without failure. Therefore, abundant privileges are given to the caregiver generation regardless of caregiver's gender or status in labor market. In the care-receiver's side, in order to access the state's welfare services, it costs less to rely on one's dependent status in family such as the relationship with wage-earner of household and intergenerational relationship than to claim the individual eligibility. Likewise, abundant benefits are given to households with more dependents in priority in the form of free of contribution or tax deduction. Meanwhile single or married couples without any responsibility in caring children and the old aged is disadvantaged. In this model, it is hard to draw a line analytically between the state and family. The fact is that family and state are so interlocked that it is impossible to separate how much proportion of the state or family contributes to individuals' welfare services. In this regime, the state-family relationship is not a zero-sum; rather, the more familialistic the welfare state, the more generous the family benefits.

This book aims to extend the debates on the de-familialized welfare state, encompassing not only gender relationship but also intergenerational relationship between caregiver and care-receiver. In the post-industrial capitalist societies, the risks are not only entailed in the gender-segregated labor market but also the instability of labor market itself. Not only female as a caregiver but also a dependent as a care-receiver (children and parents), who are perpetually or temporarily excluded from the labor market as well as family, are at risks now. As female's independence necessitates "de-familializing" their caregiving obligation, dependents also need to 'de-familialize' their welfare services free from fragile and capricious institutions of family: De-familialization is not the prerogatives of female.

CULTURE MATTERS?

Another problem is that Esping-Andersen assumes that the different welfare regimes could be the function of the welfare state's intervention through social policies of de-commodification and de-familialization. But not always. The degree to which the welfare regime is de-familialized can be the outcome of state's intervention or nonintervention. Or, it could be the influence of other factors than welfare states. Nevertheless, in his logic, the independent variable is simply assumed to be the state's roles.

In line with this, some critics have tried to find the origin of diverse welfare regimes from a cultural perspective, and even to construct East Asia as a distinct welfare regime (Ku 1997; Holliday 2000; Aspalter 2002; Kwon 2004). Firstly, Goodman and Peng (1996, 195), based on analysis of social policies in Japan, S. Korea, and Taiwan, fleshed out the characteristics of East Asian welfare as the “conservative social welfare state.” They argue that the three societies draw on the common “language of Confucianism,” which stresses “respect for seniors, filial piety, paternal benevolence, the group before the individual, conflict avoidance, loyalty, dutifulness, lack of complacency, striving for learning, entrepreneurship and meritocracy.” This language has been powerfully utilized in debates on the social welfare system stressing economization rather than redistribution, anti-welfarism, and the roles of family.

Some emphasize the importance of Confucianism as cultural resources shared in East Asian societies and suggest the “Confucian welfare state” model (Jones 1993; Hong 1999). Based on the analysis of social welfare systems in S. Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, Jones (1993, 214) points out that these Confucian welfare states are characterized by the “conservative corporatism without (Western-style) worker participation, subsidiary without the Church, solidarity without equality, and laissez-faire without libertarianism.” This model can be interpreted as the “household economy” welfare state that presupposes the traditional, Confucian extended families. All these studies demand the necessity to consider family institutions or family culture in debates on the welfare state in the historical and cultural context of the East Asian familialism.

However, it is not easy to introduce families into welfare state debates. First of all, we have to settle down on how to define family. Especially, in the East Asian context, family has various layers of meanings. First, families are “collective actors” grounded on unique perception and behavior logic. Second, they are “institutions” that lead production, distribution, and consumption based on unique *modus operandi*. Finally, they also function as the “adaptation mechanism” that assists the social process of governance, control, resistance, and negotiation in which various individuals and state participate (Chang 1997). The multilayered meanings of families in the East Asian context imply that families should be treated as cultural entities rather than objective or material entities.

If we conceptualize family as a cultural entity, the debate becomes even more complicated. The difficulty condenses into the problem of addressing how culture, abstract and obscure, influence the specific and

concrete welfare institutions. It inevitably requires the explanation on the complicated mechanism that mediates the relationship between culture and institution. Nevertheless, most of the existing studies only suggest a simple correlation or affinity between the existence of certain values and specific welfare institutions. They usually compare the national values and relate their differences to characteristics and patterns of social policies in modern democratic capitalism societies (Rimlinger 1971, 62, 91; Coughlin 1980).

However, the similar values can be crystalized into the two polarized policy outcomes as it is witnessed in the two drastically different familialistic policies of Europe and Scandinavia. It implies that the institutional difference cannot be simply reduced to culture. Therefore, they cannot explain the casual mechanism through which values or cultural orientations are crystalized into specific welfare institutions. Moreover, they conceptualize values or cultures as something analytically vague, obscure, and quite static. Due to these shortcomings, they fail to grasp the historical dynamics in welfare institutions and their changes, and eventually become trapped in cultural determinism (Brooks and Manza 2006).

One should note that culture in a society is neither homogenous nor continuous. The existence of various cultures in a society indicates an incoherent and fragmented nature of culture (Swidler 2001, 6; Chan 2009, 275). Therefore, for a specific culture to be dominant in a society, it has to involve a political process in a form of cultural struggles between one group that conveys a specific value and culture and the other group that supports the alternative value and culture (Wang and Choi 2012). Moreover, the process through which such values and cultures are crystalized into specific policies or institutions, that is, the “institutionalization of culture” is a problem that belongs to a totally different dimension. This requires the conflicts and negotiation among various actors and between actors and state, i.e., politics.

CULTURES BEHIND THE INSTITUTIONAL CREATION AND CHANGES

Based on the theoretical concerns discussed in the previous section, it can be concluded that we need a re-conceptualization of culture in order to explain the institutional changes that are brought about by the multi-layered variables surrounding families. We need a concept of culture that acknowledges the possibility of changes and the variety of institutions. In

particular, a new concept should recognize the autonomy of actors in the institutionalization process of culture, which produces cultural diversity. Here, noteworthy are the two different conceptions of culture.

Swidler (2001) and Chan (2009) point out that there are two different paradigms in defining cultures in cultural sociology. The first meaning of culture, following the Weberian and Parsonian tradition, refers to a subjective and coherent meaning system shared by all members in a society such as belief, norms, values, or ideology (Alexander 1990; Alexander and Smith 1993). This kind of culture, that is, a *de facto* social structure, means social forces that lead individuals to act and think in a particular way (Swedberg 1994, 255). This classical conception of culture cannot explain why people who share the same cultural values and face the same structural constraints differ in their actions.

Instead, other scholars insist that culture is not so much a set of shared meanings that propels human actions in a coherent and homogeneous way, than a grab-bag of odds and ends or more exactly “repertoire” or “tool-kits” from which individual actors construct their “strategies of action” or “repertoire of strategies” to solve various kinds of problems (Smelser 1992; Swidler 2001, 7; Chan 2009, 273). Their re-conceptualization of culture as “tool-kits” implies that people select among parts of culture (tradition, norms, rituals, symbols, and so on), picking up and putting aside cultural resources for practical uses. This concept of culture can overcome the problem that the existing cultural analysis have faced in explaining changes of culture and integrating actors and institutions into their analytical frame. Plus, the emphasis on actor’s voluntary and autonomous choice of actions can contribute to explaining the cultural diversity and changes.

The tool-kit concept of culture does not necessarily entail denying the importance of the first meaning of culture. Regardless, actors have to play in a broad field of cultures which existing institutions have framed. It is the cultural context that provides tool-kits which they are to utilize and mobilize. In this sense, actors are embedded in the first meaning of culture. Nevertheless, actors do not necessarily accept given institutional constraints (Swidler 2001). Actors, especially those who cannot maximize their interest under institutional constraints, start to enter into a resistance against those institutions. In order to legitimize their resistance and claims morally, they reinvent and utilize an alternative culture. In turn, those who favor those institutions also enter into the counter-movement and mobilize the existing culture under the name of tradition or customs. As a result, a new

culture or custom is created, or an existing culture is reinvented and reinforced. Thus, culture is not predestined automatically from tradition in the past, but consistently constructed and reconstructed (Geertz 1973).

Then, how can we explain institutional changes with the two concepts of culture? If we apply the institutional economics to the two concepts of culture, it becomes easier to understand. It helps us to analytically grasp how and which level of culture operates in the serial process of institutional changes. Williamson (2000), criticizing that the existing debates and analysis done by the new institutional economics have dealt with institutions without exact conceptualization and differentiation, suggests four levels of institutional analysis: social embeddedness, institutional environment, (organizational) governance, and individual alignment. Figure 2.1 summarizes and visualizes four levels of the institutions analysis.

The top level is the “social embeddedness” level (L1). This is where the norms, customs, mores, traditions, and religion are located. Level 1 is considered as given, and institutions at this level change very slowly (Geertz 1973). Many of these informal institutions have mainly spontaneous origins, which means that individual actors’ deliberative choice of a calculative kind is minimally implicated. The Level 1 institutions are “adopted and thereafter display a great deal of inertia—some because they




Fig. 2.1 Four levels of institutional analysis in the new institutional economics.
Source Williamson 2000, 597

are functional (as with conventions); others take on a symbolic value with a coterie of true believers; many are pervasively linked with complementary institutions (formal and informal), etc.” (Williamson 2000, 597).

Among these complementary institutions, formal ones constitute the second level. The second level is referred to as the “institutional environment,” (L2) which includes formal institutions such as the executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of government as well as the property rights and of contract laws. The institutions of L2 function as the “first order economizing,” that is, “getting the formal rules of the game right.” They are partly “the products of evolutionary processes, but design opportunities are also posed (Williamson 2000, 598)”. Such formal rules shape the incentive structure of organizations and actors in the third level of “organizational governance” (L3), which affects the resource allocation among actors in the next level of “individual alignment” (L4). Level 4 is the terrain in which individual actors interpret the incentive structure posed by the institutional environments (L3), choose their action to maximize their interests based on the calculation of the incentive structure, and align their interests with others’ in the process. This level 4 is a realm of microscopic and calculative rationality of the individuals, but due to the institutional constraints from the upper levels, this rationality is fundamentally bounded (Williamson 1988). This alignment process includes interaction between institution and individual actors as well as strategic interaction among actors who have various interests and motives, not only material but also moral, normative and social.

If connecting the institutional view and the cultural view, the first meaning of culture belongs to the level of social embeddedness (L1): this level provides the cultural context, that is, a tool-kit which are full of various values, norms, tradition, and customs for actors in the lower levels. L2, L3, and L4 can be shaped differently, depending on the parts of tools that are appropriated, mobilized, and linked to experience by actors. Strategic mobilization and appropriation of cultural resources, that is, the second meaning of culture operates broadly in the L2, L3, and L4.

Institutionalist’s distinction of cultures can be applied to the topic of this book. Cultural or behavioral orientation of familism belongs to L1, whereas specific family norms belong to the L2 of the institutional environment. Familism refers to cultural, normative, or behavioral orientation which prioritizes family over other values, while family norms are related to preference or idealization of a certain type of families. It is undeniable that familism has been the deeply rooted cultural orientation in Korean and Taiwanese society. However, the idealized family norms varied over

time. When the initial welfare institutions, including the NHI, launched in the two societies, paternal family norm was in force: this norm was pervasively linked with complementary institutions in the L2, such as the patrilineal family-related law which authorized the superior status of father and son in a household, labor market and industrial policy which favored male labor force, or welfare institutions which protected only families of the male bread-winner model. Under such institutional arrangements (L2)' influence, the specific organizational governance, that is, the economic incentive and disincentive structures had been formulated and designed in L3. For example, the wages between males and females were manipulated disproportionately in order to push males into the labor market while letting females stay at home and carry out domestic services. The dependent systems under the NHI, which set the rules in distributing the medical services and demanding the different insurance fees among family members, also belong to L3. Individuals were to seek their interests within this institution, even if the institution goaded them to modify their interest and confirm to its rules of games. However, those who could not secure or maximize their interest under the given incentive structure, would enter into resistance to the institution of L3. In their trials for adoption and circumvention or resistance and changes, actors would draw on alternative cultural tools from L1 or L2 in order to circumvent cultural barriers that the institution in L3 has set.

RECOGNITION STRUGGLES IN THE WELFARE POLITICS

Changes in the institutions and the actors' motives have been explained mainly from the two dichotomized approaches: either a bottom-up approach focusing on individual actors' economically rational calculation or a top-down approach stressing the influence of abstract culture or norm. Their contrasting orientation can be summarized as "under-socialized" and "over-socialized" (Granovetter 1985). This book, rather than displacing economic perspectives with culture one or vice versa, aims to bring together the two perspectives to explain changes in institutions and the actors' motives. Linking the economic analysis and the cultural analysis can compensate the shortcomings of the two dichotomized perspectives on the institutional changes. In the process, it will argue that the interaction between the strategic and autonomous utilization of culture by actors and the play of abstract culture result in institutional changes. This approach will help articulate the multidimensionality of actors' motives behind institutional changes and the complex net of meanings of their actions in which economic, normative, or moral orientations are interwoven together.

In particular, this book tries to conceptualize cultural tools or repertoires that actors strategically utilized and mobilized from a broad sets of tool-kits as family identity and family recognition struggle. Honneth (1996, 160), based on the fact that social conflicts occur when not only mere economic interests but also the implicit rules of mutual recognition are violated, highlights the moral dimension of social conflicts with the concept of “recognition struggle.” It means that feelings of being disrespected and treated with injustice or feelings of hurt and violation are the motivational force that initiates perpetuates the social struggle.

Honneth identifies three patterns of recognition necessary for an individual’s development of identity: love, rights, and solidarity. The first mode of recognition termed “love” refers to our physical needs and emotions being met by others and takes the form of our primary relationships (close friends, family, and lovers). The second mode of recognition termed “rights” refers to the development of moral responsibility, developed through our moral relations with others. It is a mutual mode of recognition “in which the individual learns to see himself from the perspective of his/her partner in interaction as a bearer of equal rights” (Honneth 1996, 194). The denial of rights through social and legal exclusion or by social ostracism can threaten one’s sense of being a full-fledged and respected member of society, equally endowed with moral rights (Honneth 1996, 133). Therefore, this form of struggle relies on the general and universal feature that makes him or her a legally capable subject equal to other citizens (Honneth 1996, 113). Contrary to the second form based on equality, the last mode of recognition termed “solidarity” relies on certain personal traits or particular characteristics (their own accomplishments and forms of life) that distinguish a person or a specific group from others and show a person or a specific group to be especially valuable (Honneth 1996, 113, 126). It is essential for developing our self-esteem and for how we become “individualized,” for it is precisely our personal traits and abilities that define our personal difference (Honneth 1996, 122).

The struggle can be characterized as “social” to the extent that its goals can be generalized beyond the horizon of individuals’ intentions and to the point where they can become the basis for a collective movement. At this stage, the struggle can constitute “politics of recognition” (Honneth 1996, 162). Politics of recognition is also “politics of identity” in that an individual wants his/her specific identity to be recognized in his/her society (Taylor 1994). The contents of identity rely on the intersubjective relation with others. Thus, the

identity, the centerpiece of recognition, can be acquired in the process of “recognition struggle” (Honneth 1996, 126–127; Markell 2008). As Fraser (1997) puts, “politics of recognition” is “to correct cultural injustices embedded in social modes of expression, interpretation, and communication.” Here, cultural injustices include cultural dominance, nonrecognition, and disrespect. Therefore, recognition struggles progress in a way that identity and cultural products of degraded group, through the cultural or symbolic alteration, can be uplifted and reevaluated or the cultural diversity can be endowed with the positive meaning (Fraser 1997).

Politics of recognition is closely related to the rise of multiculturalism. In the past, the nation state guaranteed the economic, political, and social rights for all citizens, that is, the citizenship. The goal of the traditional “citizenship-as-right” model was to enhance a common national identity among citizens. This model was premised on the assumption that “normal” citizen referred to the able-bodied, heterosexual white male. Those who deviated from this model of normalcy were subject to exclusion, marginalization, silencing, or assimilation (Kymlicka 2002, 327–328). However, as multicultural phenomena beyond the traditional boundary and concept of nation states increase, those who have been silenced, marginalized, or defined as “deviant” from the so-called normal citizen, such as race, culture, gender, ability or sexual subaltern groups, demand a more inclusive conception of citizenship which recognizes (rather than stigmatized) their identities and accommodates (rather than excludes) their differences: this movement can be labeled as politics of recognition, politics of difference, or identity politics (Taylor 1994, 25).

Most of existing literature on politics of recognition applies this conception to the social movements of those who are excluded from the boundary of citizenship and identity defined by the modern nation state and explores how they claim their own identity and rights, that is, “differentiated citizenship” based on their social and cultural differences. In doing this, they mainly focus on the second and third patterns of recognition to account for the political movements. Especially, the researches which apply the concept of recognition to redistribution struggles, stress the second type of recognition which demands the universal and equal citizenship in the civil society. This orientation alludes the separation between the private sphere where intimate and primary relations dominate and the public sphere of the state or civil society where individuals are treated as

undifferentiated citizenships. It also assumes the evolutionary relations between these two spheres; subjects, with the development of self-identities, go beyond the realm of intimacy and participate in the public sphere as full-fledged citizens. However, it is obvious that the recognition politics operate in both the public and private spheres (Taylor 1994, 37). Therefore, this book tries to reject the linear evolution of self-identities. Rather, it highlights the overlapped features of the three forms of identities in the politics of recognition. In addition, it argues that individuals can flexibly and selectively shift their identities to maximize their interests in the welfare politics.

Also, this book claims the break with the existing perspective, which underscores solely the moral and normative dimension of struggles. The moral dimension of recognition struggle does not mean that this type of struggle always stems from purely moral and normative motivation. The material interests are closely related to moral and normative ones (Kymlicka 2002, 328): “the negation or forfeit of specific rights and the objective inequalities in the distribution of material opportunities” can lead individuals to experience feelings of being disrespected and treated with injustice or disdain (Honneth 1996, 161). In particular, “when the social esteem for a person or group is so obviously correlated to the level of control over certain goods, only the acquisition of those goods can lead to the corresponding recognition” (Honneth 1996, 166). However, this book pays attention to the possibility that such experiences can lead the subject to go beyond the mere economic struggle and result in the moral transformation of the subject. This is because the strategic and practical use of cultural resources in the initial stage may culturalize or moralize the actor’s motive in the process of struggle and, therefore, alter the character of struggle in the later stage as well as the motive of actors (Honneth 1996, 168).

In this context, this book also rejects Swidler’s assumption that strategic utilization or mobilization of cultures is motivated by little less than practical or instrumental incentives. Contrary to her view, in the light of moral aspect of recognition struggle, practical motive does not solely construct the whole process of institutional changes. Ironically, instrumental and moral motives act together and reinforce each other in the process, which lead to institutional changes in the end. To test this hypothesis, this book interprets the multilayered meanings of actors’ motives and demonstrates the two motives’ operation in the historical changes of the NHI in S. Korea and Taiwan. More specifically, practical and economic motives will be evaluated within the economic incentive structure that the state’s welfare systems have posited on family. In

addition, moral motives will be explained by “normative claims that are structurally inherent” in relations of familial recognition from the perspective of social recognition (Honneth 1996, 2).

To this aim, it will compare the welfare politics in S. Korea and Taiwan, focused on institutional changes of their NHIs. In the process, it will scrutinize how the multiple identities of actors, for example, gender, ethnicity, family in private sphere and laborer and citizenship in public sphere, have coupled and de-coupled, and how their different combinations of identities have affected the outcomes of their welfare politics as well as their welfare developmental path.

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